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Forrest C. Pogue

The Ardennes Campaign:The Impact of Intelligence

Last night 1 happened to pick up a copy of my TheSupreme Command, which was published in 1954, andI noticed that I began the section on intelligence (orthe lack of it) in the Ardennes by saying certaininformation which had been available earlier ceasedto come in during the Ardennes period and had anegative effect on operations. That was a carefulformula that I had worked out to handle certaininformation which 1 thought I knew and to handlecertain other information which I knew I didn't knowabout but suspected so that it protected me in theperiod when people began to reveal things about Ultra.I had guessed wrong on the source of Ultra information.But it was that information that we did not have inthe Ardennes.

1 attended in 1978 conferences in Bad Godesbergand Stuttgart at which some of the great experts atBletchley Park and some of their enemy counterpartsgathered to discuss the things that were known andthe things that were not known and their impactpositively or negatively on the campaigns which fol-lowed. Since Ultra was not available in mass as it hadbeen on certain occasions earlier, this talk, instead ofbeing about how Ultra information aided the cam-paign, might well be called a study of how unduereliance on intercept material caused the people toforget how to use adequately current, conventionalmethods of intelligence.

Why did they have no Ultra? The Germans, to anextent that had not been true in earlier campaigns inNorthwest Europe, entertained the most rigid silenceprior to the last week before the attack. A good bit ofthe early planning, going back into September 1944,actually took place before von Rundstedt knew thebroad outlines of the plan. Even after he knew thoseoutlines and disapproved a part of them and urged asmaller solution, most of the high-ranking leaders ofthe counteroffensive, or the breakthrough if you wantto call it that, were left in considerable ignorance oftheir objectives, of the number of troops, of thesupport, until in some cases a week before the attack.An amazing amount of silence on the wireless traffic

This is an edited transcript of Dr. Pogue's remarks to the NSACommunications Analysis Association, 16 December 1980.

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was imposed. The result was that in the days beforethe counterattack no one came to the commandinggeneral of the First U. S. Army, whose Army was tobe attacked, and said, "The Germans have this manypeople. They are going to attack on the morning of 16December in this area." And without that, he wentahead with the plans for his own attack which was totake place on 19 December 1944.

Now unlike the later (31 December) Colmar attackin which some Ultra information was available and forwhich we were better prepared, this attack caught theAmerican and the British commanders by surprise.Later on they said that they had taken a calculatedrisk and it did not matter. Later on several people,including the First Army Chief of Intelligence, ColonelB. A. Dickson, said that they expected the attack bythe 17th at the outside. But this G-2 had to backdown in the face of the question which I was promptedby the commander of the First Army (General Court-ney H. Hodges) to put to him: "If you believed theattack would come not later than the 17th, where wereyou when the attack came?" The answer was Paris.The commander did not believe that his G-2 was veryserious, if almost one day before the attack he tookoff. He took off so completely that it took them somehours to find him in order to direct him to return.

First Army might have been caught short even ifUltra had been available because the G-2 of thatArmy, for some reason, very early developed anantipathy to intelligence sources outside his own head-quarters. He fought the idea of having OSS peopleattached to his headquarters. And when he was givenan officer who was to bring him Ultra information, hepromptly made him a regular member of this G2Staff and said, in much the same way that Pattonsaid to Bradley when Bradley was sent to his head-quarters as an observer, "I don't want any spiesaround here." So the young G-2 was put into theregular organization and often he was doing otherthings besides reporting his Ultra material. He haswritten quite freely about his frustrations since therecent revelations began to appear.

There was another problem in the case of the FirstArmy and Bradley's 12th Army Group. Bradley's chief

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of intelligence in North Africa, and in the early daysin Normandy, was Colonel Dickson. He had hoped togo to the 12th Army Group when Bradley assumedthat command, but Bradley left him instead with anew commander of First Army and picked a general,Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, as his G-2 in 12thArmy Group. The two intelligence officers became, notmortal enemies, but competitive-each one insistingthat his information was better than that of the other.Each one in retrospect claimed that he had been rightand the other had been wrong about what was goingto happen in the Ardennes. As a matter of fact, inthe course of a number of months in 1946 through1948, interviewing Eisenhower's G-2 (the British gen-eral, Major General Kenneth Strong), General Sibert,Colonel Dickson, and a number of others, I concludedthat these chiefs of intelligence at various levelscooperated very little. When I tell you that Montgom-ery's G-2 intended to describe Eisenhower's chief ofintelligence as the "Chinless Horror" and felt that hewas the least informed of any intelligence chief, youget some notion of the disarray at that level at thattime.

One of the big problems came because these peoplehad been so accustomed for some months to havingthe intelligence story handed to them by a represent-ative of the Ultra staff that they did not do thecareful analysis of conventional gathering of intelli-gence. When I started to write in 1946-47 the historyof the Ardennes, I was given a full-time assistant toread the intelligence reports that came out betweenthe first day of September 1944 and the day of attack,16 December. I indicated to him that I wanted him totake the G-2 report from every unit from specialbattalions up to the supreme commander-take themdaily if they were issued daily-take them weekly ifthey were issued weekly, collate the material and showme what they knew at each week or each ten-dayperiod up to the attack. It is astonishing how muchprisoner interrogation, air reconnaissance, patrolling,reports from spies, and reports from individuals nearthe Ardennes told us, and how good a picture theyafforded of what was occurring. But nothing wascoming from Ultra. Nothing was coming throughinterceptions. So there was a tendency to feel thatthere was no great buildup. There was a tendency toexplain what was occurring on other grounds.

For example, there was evidence from Septemberon of units -German units-moving into the Ardennesarea, but that was explained by the argument thatthese were replacing units being moved out. And so wedecided that the Germans were doing exactly the samethings that we were doing. This was a quiet area. So

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you brought new units in to give them a chance tosettle down, to get accustomed to a front beforeputting them into battle. The Germans played thatgame exceeding well. Part of the people were not goingout as we found out later. Part of them were stayingthere.

Then we found out the Germans were issuing verystrict orders on saving gasoline. We interpreted thatto mean that they were about to run out of gasoline.The point was that it was a part of a strict conser-vation program to make sure there was enough gasolinefor the attack. But again we were standing thesethings on their head because the theory was that if anattack was imminent Ultra would have told us.

There was evidence in October that a new PanzerArmy had been created. But again that didn't seemto upset anybody, because again the theory was thatthe Germans knew we were going to mount an attacksomewhere around the middle of December in the areasouth of Cologne and that therefore they were settingup a reserve to meet that attack. Again and againthat was our reaction, that the Germans didn't haveenough to attack us but they were trying to make alast defensive action before the winter ended.

Later on, the First Army G-2 insisted that hisreport on 10 December indicated that there indeedwas going to be an attack on our front. But when youread all of the possibilities, and all of the capabilities,you find that the area he continually identified wasone at the point where Ninth U. S. Army and theBritish Army joined. It was farther north on Monty'Sfront than it was down, almost to the point at whichthe Third U. S. and the First U. S. Army joined. Iremember he came down once after he saw my chapter,bringing a great number of graphs and charts underhis arm. And he said, "You see, here is where Iidentified all of the air targets which shows that therewas a buildup of German supplies and so we wereattacking it." But I said that he failed to note thatthe charts also showed that there were nearly as manyfirst priority targets up here in the northern sector,and the attack didn't come there at all. But that'srather true of all things that go wrong-the tendencyto find out that what you said was right and to leaveout all the points at which you said exactly whatshould not have been said.

One of the appalling things is again and again thetendency to equate German reacting to Americanreaction-the tendency to say that we would notattack under these conditions, therefore they wouldnot attack under these conditions. Later on we saidwe should have known their psychology. This was thelast time that Hitler had the chance to choose, and

he chose to take advantage of a period when heassumed that the effete British and Americans wouldbe tending to Christmas festivities rather than payingany attention to the war.

After I had written these particular pages [for TheSupreme Command], I submitted them to the variousG-2s involved and I got some almost unbelievablesnorts of rage. Some of them came in particular fromGeneral Bradley's G-2, General Sibert. One day theChief of Military History said to me, "That general'srather upset with you. I wonder if he could come andtalk to you?" And I said "I'm not accustomed tohaving generals come to see me. I go to see them." SoI went to his headquarters in Washington. His firstquestion was, "How high is your clearance for accessto secret material?" And I said I was "BIGOTed" atthe time of the Neptune phase of Overlord. I'd hadcryptographic clearance, Top Secret, and all of that.General Sibert responded that this was not highenough and he'd be courtmartialed if he told me. I'vebeen told in later years he was the main source forAnthony Cave Brown's books. But he didn't tell Browneverything, so you get some things skewed in Brown asyou see when you get to Ultra revelations. And he said[that] if he could tell me, then I wouldn't hold himresponsible for the intelligence failure. There was someinformation that they were no longer getting that theyused to have. Well, that was that. It is very difficultto write history on the basis of "if you could just knowwhat I know then you would know."

About two days after speaking to this general, hiswartime deputy, then Deputy CIA, called me and said,"He's right. He can't tell you, and he's right that hedidn't have certain information." That settled that,but a week later [General Walter] Bedell Smith, thenhead of CIA, called me and said, in effect, "I'm gettingsome flak from General Strong, Eisenhower's G-2, andhe wants me to tell you that he informed me exactlywhat was going to happen, and I paid no attention tohim." I don't think General Smith really intended forme to accept that fully, but he was being broadminded.General Smith then said, "But you know what he'stalking about though?" I said, "Well it's somethingblack." And he said, "Yes, how did you find out?"And I said, "You told me two or three years ago." Iknow now he hadn't in so many words. He told me agreat deal probably that he shouldn't have, but Ididn't know the effective part of the source of Ultra.And I had written for a long time in the belief thatthis was spy-oriented, spy-directed information, rather

A special clearance status for officers with access to plans forthe invasion of Europe. -Ed.

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than the type which Ultra was depending on inparticular. But that didn't get the generals off thehook for what I had written. So I told General Smiththat this did not let these generals off the hook. Theyhad the information in their hands, and they did notgive it to the commanders involved. And he said, "No,they were trying to outguess the Germans rather thandepend upon German capability."

It so happened that I had recently read the manu-script of General Bradley's book in which he says justthat-e--nobody gave him the kind of information thatwould cause him to take unusual preparations to meeta German attack. And I finally settled with his G-2 onthe basis that I would say nothing worse about it thanGeneral Bradley had said. I doubt seriously if heenjoyed reading that part of Bradley's book.

Now the funny thing-not funny for the peopleinvolved-is that the last G-2 report written beforethe attack came from General Bradley's headquarters.And it began with a very flashy beginning: "The enemyhas had it." You got the impression that within a fewweeks the enemy would roll over and play dead. Iasked why that was written? It was very interestingreading, very exciting, showing how the German Armyhad deteriorated to the point that it could no longeract. General Sibert told me that no one was readinghis G-2 Reports, so they decided to put a little "umph"into them. And they got a well-known editorial writernamed Major Ralph Ingersoll, who had written abeautiful book called The Battle Is the Payoff. Andthey asked if he couldn't make the reports a littlemore exciting. And so he made it exciting: "Theenemy has had it." Even at that, he probably cameoff about as well as Monty's G-2, who almost had itbut muffed it. Monty's G-2, looking over the wholesituation, made a proper statement-if Hitler werestill running the war, we could expect a surprise actionbefore Christmas. But he went on: "We know thatvon Rundstedt is now running the war and he is acautious man." Now he guessed the psychology abso-lutely correctly. It was a positive piece of analysis.Hitler, if he were running the war, would launch thattype of thing. In fact, Hitler was running the war.Von Rundstedt, when given the benefit of Hitler'sideas, did not favor it. But Hitler was in charge.

I will say this in favor of the G-2 of the BritishArmy or British Headquarters. His next G-2 reportbegan "How wrong I was." That came because he wasa history don at Oxford before he got into the G-2business and returned there after the war and retiredvery recently as Warden of Rhodes House. One trouble,beyond the fact that everyone tended to approachwhat the Germans might do on the basis of what we

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might do under the same circumstance, was the factthat we thought that the war was about over; thereforewe weren't worried about what the Germans could doto us. There was this fact that I've just mentioned:we assumed that von Rundstedt was running the war,when he was not. Von Rundstedt had believed forsome time that the war was lost. He was not about tokill off a number of his troops just to have a lastgamble before the end of the year. His view had beenfor some time to make the best peace possible. Hewas willing to have a small solution in the general areaof Aachen to throw off the timetable, in the hope thatthe Allies, who were also getting weary of the war,might be willing to negotiate a better peace than theone that they would impose in case the war continueduntil Germany's collapse.

Now let us approach the point I was asked tomention today. What was the overall effect of the lackof Ultra? What happened on this badly stretched frontof the VIII Corps, which ran from 70 to 90 miles,seemed astonishing to some Americans. It was assumedthat the enemy would not come through that country.The road net was wrong. It runs north-south, insteadof east-west. It was forested, it was mountainous, andthe roads were narrow and winding. They were notright for tanks.

Of course the Germans had come through there in1870. They'd come through there in 1940, but thatwas in better weather. Marshall had gone along thatfront in October and said it looked to him as if wewere getting thin. And he was told the Germans werenot coming through there. Later, people said they hadhoped the Germans would attack there. But Marshall'scomment was, "I don't believe they had in mindwanting what happened." As a matter of fact, that'swhat Bedell Smith replied to Bradley when the lattersaid that they were glad the Germans had come outwhere they could be destroyed. And Smith said thathe did not think they expected exactly what happened.

So you had the enemy pouring through. It disruptedour timetable for ending the war from four to sixweeks. We suffered something like 70,000 casualties,which was one of the largest for that period of fighting.This was not as important to us as it would have beento the Germans in that we were beginning to sendover the last of our well-trained division, were able todivert from the Pacific units that were prepared to gothere, and were able to find roughly 100,000 men inthe rear echelons. Men that were quite able to fight.It was a serious inconvenience in that we didn't havethe information that we wanted, rather than a greatcatastrophe. Those people who like to deal in mighthave beens indicate, of course, that this delay meant

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that we were still trying to cross the Roer in the springwhen the Russians were approaching the Oder, andthat we were still trying to push across the Elbe whenthe Russians had been within thirty or forty miles ofBerlin and just sitting there.

This can be overdone, but at the same time whenyou are talking about the value of intelligence - ifyou get it or if you use that which you have, imperfectas it may be, in the best way possible - helps explainpart of the story of the Ardennes. Above all, I thinkthe lesson was then and may still be now, that if anew type of intelligence becomes available, you shouldnot forget your skills with the old, conventional typeand you should not disregard that conventional type.I think everyone who dealt with this matter concludedin retrospect that you must not violate one of the rulesof intelligence analysis: you must not try to guess whatthe enemy may think, but you must think of what heis capable of doing at a particular time, and at aparticular place.

Dr. Pogue, a noted military historian, isDirector of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Institutefor Historical Research, Museum of AmericanHistory, Smithsonian Institution. He holds anAD from Murray (Ky.) State University, an MAfrom the University of Kentucky, and a PhDfrom Clark University. Dr. Pogue has served onthe faculty of Western Kentucky State Collegeand Murray State University and has been ..professional lecturer in the field of internationalrelations and diplomatic history at GeorgeWashington University. He began his career asa military historian in 1948, serving as assistanthistorian with the Second Army (Memphis) andlater as combat historian with the First Army inthe European Theater of Operations. Since thewar, he has served as a member of the HistorialSection, U.S. Forces European Theater. anoperations research analyst with the OperationsResearch Office at John Hopkins University,Director of the George C. Marshall ResearchCenter and later of the Marshall ResearchLibrary. Dr. Pogue, author of a three-volumebiography of General Marshall, has a number ofother published works to his credit. including11Je Supreme Comm8od- the Army's officialaccount of General Eisenhower's decisions andoperations in Northwest Europe, 1944-45. Dr.Pogue is the recipient of several honorarydegrees and other awards for professionalachievement.

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