JAMES M. IMBONG, ET AL., v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ET AL.,

Facts: Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates to sticker campaigns, from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy -the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, RA10354, RH Law was enacted by Congress in 2012. Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in 14 petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention. Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn, the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products, and to religious freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude, among others.

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions. It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.

While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech. In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from the people the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." It ignores the management perogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment. The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC., in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote.

Issue: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional.

Ruling: One subject-one title....Petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Sec. 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent- to act as a population control measure. To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are separate.

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modern, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country. The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law. Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation. As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women." Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.

Right to life.... It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men. In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

The use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization, to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of the family's wellbeing. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion." As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.

When life begins....Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter. In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization. In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins. In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm. On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." From the deliberations, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins. Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence. From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization. For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation. According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous." Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected." This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object -it is a living human being complete with DNA and chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.

The right to health....A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides: The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz: The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers. Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems. Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and selfreliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society. Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides: The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions. It bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo -under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician -be maintained. The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself. At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.

Freedom of religion and the right to free speech.... History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all -the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution. The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality. The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa.

The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 ofthe 1987 Constitution, viz: The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable. Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country. Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution. In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition ofa religion. On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith. The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.

Legislative acts and the free exercise clause.....In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church...are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts." The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom. While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief. Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A. No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs. Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs inexchange for blind conformity.

Academic freedom....The Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity. At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State. It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation building. Furthermore, as Sec. 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Sec. 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.

Due process.... A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.

Equal protection....The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles and definition of terms of the law. "According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." The concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective." The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him." The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "under include" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification.

Involuntary servitude....The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Sec17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with Phil Health being a privilege and not a right. The point of the OSG is well-taken. It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether. Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bona service. Other than non-accreditation with Phil Health, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest. Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.

Constitutionality of the RH law....In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State. In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other. As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago, are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing. Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or lifethreatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5] Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless ofhis or her religious beliefs;

6] Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8] Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court as extended by its Order, is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

G.R. No. 171182 August 23, 2012

UP vs. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, STERN BUILDERS, INC., and SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ

Facts: In 1990, UP, through its then President Jose V. Abueva, entered into a General Construction with Stern Builders for the construction of the extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building in UPLB. In the course of the implementation of the contract, Stern Builders submitted three progress billings corresponding to the work accomplished, but UP paid only two of the billings. The third billing worth P 273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by COA. Despite the lifting of the disallowance, the UP failed to pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders to sue UP and its co-respondent officials to collect the unpaid billing and to recover various damages. It was docketed in the RTC of Quezon City.

After trial, RTC rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs. RTC issued the writ of execution and the sheriff of the RTC served the writ of execution and notice of demand upon the UP, through its counsel. UP assailed the denial of due course to its appeal through a petition for certiorari in the CA. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari upon finding that the UPs notice of appeal had been filed late. UP sought a reconsideration, but the CA denied the UPs motion for reconsideration. UP was exhausting the available remedies to overturn the denial of due course to the appeal and the issuance of the writ of execution. Sheriff served notices of garnishment on the UPs depository banks, namely: Land Bank and DBP. In 2004, RTC, through respondent Judge Dizon, authorized the release of the garnished funds. UP was served with the order directing DBP to release the garnished funds but it was not released. Stern Builders moved to cite DBP in direct contempt of court for its non-compliance with the order of release. UP brought a petition for certiorari in the CA to challenge the jurisdiction of the RTC in issuing the order. UP argued that government funds and properties could not be seized by virtue of writs of execution or garnishment, citing Section 84 of PD 1445 to the effect that "revenue funds shall not be paid out of any public treasury or depository except in pursuance of an appropriation law or other specific statutory authority;" and that the order of garnishment clashed with the ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan to the effect that the funds belonging to the UP were public funds.

On May 16, 2005, DBP filed a motion to consign the check representing the judgment award and to dismiss the motion to cite its officials in contempt of court. UP presented a motion to withhold the release of the payment of the judgment award. RTC resolved all the pending matters,noting that the DBP had already delivered to the sheriff Managers Check No. 811941 for P 16,370,191.74 representing the garnished funds payable to the order of Stern Builders. However, the RTC directed in the same order that Stern Builders should not encash the check or withdraw its amount pending the final resolution of the UPs petition for certiorari. CA promulgated its assailed decision dismissing the UPs petition for certiorari. Petitioners next argue that the UP funds may not be seized for execution or garnishment to satisfy the judgment award. Citing Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC, University of the Philippines Board of Regents vs. Hon. Ligot-Telan, petitioners contend that UP deposits at Land Bank and the Development Bank of the Philippines, being government funds, may not be released absent an appropriations bill from Congress.

Issue: Whether the funds of UP were the proper subject of garnishment in order to satisfy the judgment award.

Ruling: UPs funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment. Despite its establishment as a body corporate, UP remains to be a "chartered institution" performing a legitimate government function. It is an institution of higher learning, not a corporation established for profit and declaring any dividends. Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the States constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a government instrumentality, UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and income from the yearly appropriations. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UPs mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the RTCs writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability. A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

Also, in Republic v. Villasor, where the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment was nullified, the Court said: The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

UP correctly submits here that the garnishment of its funds to satisfy the judgment awards of actual and moral damages (including attorneys fees) was not validly made if there was no special appropriation by Congress to cover the liability. The CA and the RTC thereby unjustifiably ignored the legal restriction imposed on the trust funds of the Government and its agencies and instrumentalities to be used exclusively to fulfill the purposes for which the trusts were created or for which the funds were received except upon express authorization by Congress or by the head of a government agency in control of the funds, and subject to pertinent budgetary laws, rules and regulations. Indeed, an appropriation by Congress was required before the judgment that rendered the UP liable for moral and actual damages (including attorneys fees) would be satisfied considering that such monetary liabilities were not covered by the "appropriations earmarked for the said project." The Constitution strictly mandated that "(n)o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."

COA must adjudicate private respondents claim before execution should proceed. The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already validated the claim against UP. The settlement of the monetary claim was still subject to the primary jurisdiction of the COA despite the final decision of the RTC having already validated the claim. As such, Stern Builders had no alternative except to first seek the approval of the COA of their monetary claim. On its part, the RTC should have exercised utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in dealing with the motions for execution against the UP and the garnishment of the UPs funds. The RTC had no authority to direct the immediate withdrawal of any portion of the garnished funds from the depository banks of the UP. By eschewing utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in dealing with the execution and garnishment, and by authorizing the withdrawal of the garnished funds of the UP, the RTC acted beyond its jurisdiction, and all its orders and issuances thereon were void and of no legal effect.

Moreover, it is settled jurisprudence that upon determination of State liability, the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in P.D. No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. All money claims against the Government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit which must act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in effect, sue the State thereby. However, notwithstanding the rule that government properties are not subject to levy and execution unless otherwise provided for by the statute or municipal ordinance the Court has, in various instances, distinguished between government funds and properties for public use and those not held for public use. Thus, in Viuda de Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo the Court ruled that "where property of a municipal or other public corporation is sought to be subjected to execution to satisfy judgments recovered against such corporation, the question as to whether such property is leviable or not is to be determined by the usage and purposes for which it is held. Hence the SC annuls the order for the garnishment of the funds of UP and for the release of the garnished amount to Stern Builders. The Court Order Stern Builders Corporation to redeposit the amount of P 16,370,191.74 within 10 days from receipt of this decision. Costs of suit to be paid by the private respondents.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUDGE VICENTE A. HIDALGO,

Presiding Judge of the RTC of Manila, Branch 37,

534 SCRA 619 (2007)

FACTS:

Tarcila Laperal Mendoza filed an action for the annulment or declaration of nullity of the title and deed of sale, reconveyance and/or recovery of ownership and possession aproperty against the Republic of thePhilippinesin the RTC of Manila. It is also known as the Arlegui Residence which housed two Philippine presidents and which now holds the Office of the Press Secretary and the News Information Bureau.

The case was initially dismissed by the presiding Judge of the Manila RTC (Branch 35) on the ground of state immunity. The case was re-raffled to the Manila RTC (Branch 37), with respondent Vicente A. Hidalgo as presiding Judge.

In an Order, Judge Hidalgo declared the Republic in default for failure of Solicitor Gabriel Francisco Ramirez, the handling solicitor, to file the required Answer within the period prayed for in his motion for extension.

It is contended that the respondent Judge violated the Constitution and the fundamental rule that government funds are exempt from execution or garnishment when he caused the issuance of the writ of execution against the Republic.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial courts issuance of the writ of execution against government funds to satisfy its money judgment is proper

RULING:

It is basic that government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments. Republic v. Palacio teaches that a judgment against the State generally operates merely to liquidate and establish the plaintiffs claim in the absence of express provision; otherwise, they cannot be enforced by processes of law.

Albeit title to the Arlegui property remains in the name of the petitioner Republic, it is actually the Office of the President which has beneficial possession of and use over it since the 1975 takeover. Accordingly, and in accord with the elementary sense of justice, it behooves that office to make the appropriate budgetary arrangements towards paying private respondent what is due her under the premises. This, to us, is the right thing to do. The imperatives of fair dealing demand no less. And the Court would be remiss in the discharge of its duties as dispenser of justice if it does not exhort the Office of the President to comply with what, in law and equity, is its obligation.

It is settled that when the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the state has a liability.

The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan

G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012

Nature of the Case:

This is an original petition for the issuance of an Environmental Protection Order in the nature of a continuing mandamus under A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, promulgated on April 29, 2010.

FACTS:

Claiming that tourist arrivals to Boracay would reach 1 million in the future, respondent Province of Aklan planned to expand the port facilities at Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay. Thus, on May 7, 2009, the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aklan Province issued a resolution, authorizing Governor Carlito Marquez to file an application with respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) to reclaim the 2.64 hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan. In the same year, the Province deliberated on the possible expansion from its original proposed reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40) hectares in order to maximize the utilization of its resources.

After PRAs approval, on April 27, 2010, respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Environmental Management Bureau-Region VI (DENR-EMB RVI) issued to the Province Environmental Compliance Certificate-R6-1003-096-7100 (the questioned ECC) for Phase 1 of the Reclamation Project to the extent of 2.64 hectares to be done along the Caticlan side beside the existing jetty port. On May 17, 2010, the Province finally entered into a MOA with PRA which stated that the land use development of the reclamation project shall be for commercial, recreational and institutional and other applicable uses. It was at this point that the Province deemed it necessary to conduct a series of public consultation meetings.

On the other hand, the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay and petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. (BFI), an organization composed of some160 businessmen and residents in Boracay, expressed their strong opposition to the reclamation project on environmental, socio-economic and legal grounds. Despite the opposition, the Province merely noted their objections and issued a notice to the contractor on December 1, 2010 to commence with the construction of the project. Thus, on June 1, 2011, BFI filed with the Supreme Court the instant Petition for Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the Writ of Continuing Mandamus. Thereafter, the Court issued a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and ordered the respondents to file their respective comments to the petition.

Petitioner submits that a full Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) study is required to assess the reclamation projects likelihood of rendering critical and lasting effect on Boracay considering the proximity in distance, geographical location, current and wind direction, and many other environmental considerations in the area. Petitioners arguments on this issue hinges upon its claim that the reclamation project is misclassified as a single project when in fact it is co-located. A co-located project is a group of single projects, under one or more proponents/locators, which are located in a contiguous area and managed by one administrator, who is also the ECC applicant.

The Province responded by claiming that its compliance with the requirements of DENR-EMBRVI and PRA that led to the approval of the reclamation project by the said government agencies, as well as the recent enactments of the Barangay Council of Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay favorably endorsing the said project, had categorically addressed all the issues raised by the Petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether there is a need for review of the proper classification and environmental impact of the reclamation project in order to uphold the mandate of Section 16, Article II of the Constitution

RULING:

The mandate found in Article II, Declaration of Principles and State Policies, of the 1987 Constitution, states:

SECTION 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

x x x x

SECTION 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.

The protection of the environment in accordance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate is the aim, among others, of Presidential Decree No. 1586, Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other Environmental Management Related Measures and For Other Purposes, which declared in its first Section that it is the policy of the State to attain and maintain a rational and orderly balance between socio-economic growth and environmental protection. Thus, respondent Provinces cooperation with respondent DENR-EMB RVI in the Court-mandated review of the proper classification and environmental impact of the reclamation project is of utmost importance.

Lack of prior consultation and approval

Under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.

The claim of respondent DENR-EMB RVI is that no permits and/or clearances from National Government Agencies (NGAs) and LGUs are required pursuant to the DENR Memorandum Circular No. 2007-08. However, we still find that the LGC requirements of consultation and approval apply in this case. This is because a Memorandum Circular cannot prevail over the Local Government Code, which is a statute and which enjoys greater weight under our hierarchy of laws.

The lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the subsequent endorsement of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan on February 13, 2012, and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay on February 28, 2012, which were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging and insistence of respondent Province. As we have established above, the respective resolutions issued by the LGUs concerned did not render this petition moot and academic.

Need for review of the proper classification and environmental impact of the project

As may be gleaned from the breakdown of the 2.64 hectares as described by respondent Province, a significant portion of the reclaimed area would be devoted to the construction of a commercial building, and the area to be utilized for the expansion of the jetty port consists of a mere 3,000 square meters (sq. m). To be true to its definition, the EIA report submitted by respondent Province should at the very least predict the impact that the construction of the new buildings on the reclaimed land would have on the surrounding environment. These new constructions and their environmental effects were not covered by the old studies that respondent Province previously submitted for the construction of the original jetty port in 1999, and which it re-submitted in its application for ECC in this alleged expansion, instead of conducting updated and more comprehensive studies.

Any impact on the Boracay side cannot be totally ignored, as Caticlan and Boracay are separated only by a narrow strait. This becomes more imperative because of the significant contributions of Boracays white-sand beach to the countrys tourism trade, which requires respondent Province to proceed with utmost caution in implementing projects within its vicinity.

The Court chooses to remand these matters to respondent DENR-EMB RVI for it to make a proper study, and if it should find necessary, to require respondent Province to address these environmental issues raised by petitioner and submit the correct EIA report as required by the projects specifications.

SEMA VS COMELEC

FACTS: The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.

On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,[5] enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:

Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated from the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and independent province, which is hereby created, to be known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

Later, three new municipalities[6] were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.

The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.

in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.

On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).[9]

In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution[10] and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.[11] Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanaos first legislative district despite the COMELECs earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative district.

respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City. Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a) as a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions, through their organic acts, legislative powers over other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160.

ISSUE: whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional

Ruling: Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void.

The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,[25] subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, only x x x an Act of Congress can create provinces, cities or municipalities.[26]

Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies.

There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.

Under the present Constitution, as well as in past[28] Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.

section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,[29] we held that the power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.

This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.

The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended.

Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official.[31] It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office.

To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assemblys legislative powers [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x.

4. LOCKHEED DETECTIVE AND WATCHMAN AGENCY, INC.vs.UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

Petitioner Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. (Lockheed) entered into a contract for security services with respondent University of the Philippines (UP).

In 1998, several security guards assigned to UP filed separate complaints against Lockheed and UP for payment of underpaid wages, 25% overtime pay, premium pay for rest days and special holidays, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, night shift differentials, 13th month pay, refund of cash bond, refund of deductions for the Mutual Benefits Aids System (MBAS), unpaid wages from December 16-31, 1998, and attorneys fees.

Labor Arbiter held respondents Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. and UP as job contractor and principal to be solidarily liable.

Both Lockheed and UP appealed the Labor Arbiters decision. The NLRC modified the Labor Arbiters decision but still held respondent University of the Philippines to be solidarily liable with Lockheed in the payment of the rest of the claims covering the period of their service contract.

The complaining security guards and UP filed their respective motions for reconsideration, however, the NLRC denied said motions.

UP moved to reconsider the NLRC resolution. The NLRC upheld its resolution but with modification that the satisfaction of the judgment award in favor of Lockheed will be only against the funds of UP which are not identified as public funds. Lockheed then filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution.

A Notice of Garnishment was issued to Philippine National Bank (PNB) UP Diliman Branch for the satisfaction of the award of P12,142,522.69 (inclusive of execution fee). PNB informed UP that it has received an order of release.

UP filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Garnishment. UP contended that the funds being subjected to garnishment at PNB are government/public funds. As certified by the University Accountant, the subject funds are covered by Savings Account No. 275-529999-8, under the name of UP System Trust Receipts, earmarked for Student Guaranty Deposit, Scholarship Fund, Student Fund, Publications, Research Grants, and Miscellaneous Trust Account. UP argued that as public funds, the subject PNB account cannot be disbursed except pursuant to an appropriation required by law. The Labor Arbiter, however, dismissed the urgent motion for lack of merit.

The amount of P12,062,398.71 was withdrawn by the sheriff from UPs PNB account.

UP filed a petition for certiorari before the CA but the latter dismissed it. On reconsideration, however, the CA issued the assailed Amended Decision. It held that without departing from its findings that the funds covered in the savings account sought to be garnished do not fall within the classification of public funds, it reconsiders the dismissal of the petition in light of the ruling in the case of National Electrification Administration v. Morales which mandates that all money claims against the government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit (COA).

The CA cited Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals which held that UP ranks with MIAA, a government instrumentality exercising corporate powers but not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. While said corporations are government instrumentalities, they are loosely called government corporate entities but not government-owned and controlled corporations in the strict sense.

Hence this petition.

Issue:

WHETHER RESPONDENT UP IS A GOVERNMENT ENTITY WITH A SEPARATE AND DISTINCT PERSONALITY FROM THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND HAS ITS OWN CHARTER GRANTING IT THE RIGHT TO SUE AND BE SUED.

Ruling:

We agree with UP that there was no point for Lockheed in discussing the doctrine of state immunity from suit as this was never an issue in this case. Clearly, UP consented to be sued when it participated in the proceedings below. What UP questions is the hasty garnishment of its funds in its PNB account.

This Court finds that the CA correctly applied the NEA case. Like NEA, UP is a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government and has the capacity to sue and be sued. Thus, also like NEA, it cannot evade execution, and its funds may be subject to garnishment or levy. However, before execution may be had, a claim for payment of the judgment award must first be filed with the COA. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327,22 as amended by Section 26 of P.D. No. 1445,23 it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle "all debts and claims of any sort" due from or owing the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to money claims arising from the implementation of Republic Act No. 6758,24 their allowance or disallowance is for COA to decide, subject only to the remedy of appeal by petition for certiorari to this Court.

We cannot subscribe to Lockheeds argument that NEA is not similarly situated with UP because the COAs jurisdiction over the latter is only on post-audit basis. A reading of the pertinent Commonwealth Act provision clearly shows that it does not make any distinction as to which of the government subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries whose debts should be filed before the COA.

As to the fait accompli argument of Lockheed, contrary to its claim that there is nothing that can be done since the funds of UP had already been garnished, since the garnishment was erroneously carried out and did not go through the proper procedure (the filing of a claim with the COA), UP is entitled to reimbursement of the garnished funds plus interest of 6% per annum, to be computed from the time of judicial demand to be reckoned from the time UP filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which occurred right after the withdrawal of the garnished funds from PNB.

7. China National Machinery v. Santamaria

Facts:

On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) (CNMEG), represented by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the North Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail), represented by its president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for the conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila to San Fernando, La Union (the Northrail Project).

On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance of the Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30 MOU), wherein China agreed to extend Preferential Buyers Credit to the Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project.3 The Chinese government designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while the Philippine government named the DOF as the borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount not exceeding USD 400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate of 3% per annum.

On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Wang Chungui (Amb. Wang), wrote a letter to DOF Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) informing him of CNMEGs designation as the Prime Contractor for the Northrail Project.

On 30 December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the construction of Section I, Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos on a turnkey basis (the Contract Agreement).7 The contract price for the Northrail Project was pegged at USD 421,050,000.

On 26 February 2004, the Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into a counterpart financial agreement Buyer Credit Loan Agreement No. BLA 04055 (the Loan Agreement). In the Loan Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to extend Preferential Buyers Credit in the amount of USD 400,000,000 in favor of the Philippine government in order to finance the construction of Phase I of the Northrail Project.

On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction with Urgent Motion for Summary Hearing to Determine the Existence of Facts and Circumstances Justifying the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and/or TRO against CNMEG, the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the Department of Budget and Management, the National Economic Development Authority and Northrail. The case was filed before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Makati City, Branch 145 (RTC Br. 145). In the Complaint, respondents alleged that the Contract Agreement and the Loan Agreement were void for being contrary to (a) the Constitution; (b) Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A. No. 9184), otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act; (c) Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code; and (d) Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code.

On 15 May 2007, RTC Br. 145 issued an Omnibus Order denying CNMEGs Motion to Dismiss and setting the case for summary hearing to determine whether the injunctive reliefs prayed for should be issued. CNMEG then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court in an Order dated 10 March 2008. Thus, CNMEG filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 4 April 2008.

The appellate court dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. Subsequently, CNMEG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 5 December 2008.

Petitioners Argument: Petitioner claims that the EXIM Bank extended financial assistance to Northrail because the bank was mandated by the Chinese government, and not because of any motivation to do business in the Philippines, it is clear from the foregoing provisions that the Northrail Project was a purely commercial transaction.

Respondents Argument: respondents alleged that the Contract Agreement and the Loan Agreement were void for being contrary to (a) the Constitution; (b) Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A. No. 9184), otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act; (c) Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code; and (d) Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code.

Issues:

1. Whether or not petitioner CNMEG is an agent of the sovereign Peoples Republic of China.

2.Whether or not the Northrail contracts are products of an executive agreement between two sovereign states.

Ruling:

The instant Petition is DENIED. Petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) is not entitled to immunity from suit, and the Contract Agreement is not an executive agreement. CNMEGs prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is DENIED for being moot and academic.

The Court explained the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Holy See v. Rosario, to wit:

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).

Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. As held in United States of America v. Ruiz

Admittedly, the Loan Agreement was entered into between EXIM Bank and the Philippine government, while the Contract Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG. Although the Contract Agreement is silent on the classification of the legal nature of the transaction, the foregoing provisions of the Loan Agreement, which is an inextricable part of the entire undertaking, nonetheless reveal the intention of the parties to the Northrail Project to classify the whole venture as commercial or proprietary in character.

Thus, piecing together the content and tenor of the Contract Agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding dated 14 September 2002, Amb. Wangs letter dated 1 October 2003, and the Loan Agreement would reveal the desire of CNMEG to construct the Luzon Railways in pursuit of a purely commercial activity performed in the ordinary course of its business.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

10. ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, October 22, 2007

Facts: On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8. Petitioner was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Silverio and Anita Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth. His sex was registered as "male."He alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a mans body, he underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he had in fact undergone the procedure.From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. The granting of the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. The Republic of the Philippines, thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.ISSUES :

1. May the Court render judgment to change name or sex on the ground of equity

2. Whether or not petitioners claim that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.HELD:

1. No. The Court cannot render judgment to change name or sex on the ground of equity It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To grant the changes sought by Silverio will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if Silverios petition were to be granted.

But the SC emphasized: If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

Change of Name, primarily Administrative in nature:

Section 1 of RA 9048 provides in essencethat no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clericalor typographical errors, which can be changed by concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. The jurisdiction therefore is primarily lodged with these officers. The intent and effect of thelaw is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless anadministrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. In sum, the remedyand the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.Hence, the venue to which petitioner filed is improper.

2. The petition lacks merit.

A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex ReassignmentThe State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for