BrandishingtheAmericanSwordintheGulf(basedonanarticleoriginallypublishedinTheNationalIntereston30March2014:http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/brandishing‐the‐american‐sword‐the‐gulf‐10152?page=1)TheIslamicRepublicofIranfirstbegantoexploreuraniumenrichmentin1985.Theprogramlimpedalongforcloseto15years,beforeIranianscientistssuccessfullyintroduceduraniumhexafluorideintoP‐1centrifugessometimein1999.IranbeganenrichmentatNatanzin2007.Andnow,Iranhassome20,000P‐1’sundervacuum,withcloseto10,000actuallyenrichinguraniumto3.5%.AspartoftherecentlyconcludedJointPlanofAction(JPOA),theP5+1andtheIslamicRepublicagreedthat“acomprehensivesolutionwouldinvolveamutuallydefinedenrichmentprogramwithpracticallimitsandtransparencymeasurestoensurethepeacefulnatureoftheprogram.”Thetwosidesarenowhagglingoverthenumberofcentrifuges,aspartofaconcertedAmericanefforttodecreaseIran’scapacitytoenrichuranium,soastolengthenthetimeinwhichIrancouldre‐enrichitscurrentstockpileoflowenricheduraniumtoweaponsgradeinaso‐called”breakout”scenario.(Iranwouldthenhavetofashionthatweaponsgradeuraniumintoausableweapon.)TheGulfStates–likeIsrael–haveexpresseddeepreservationsaboutIranretainingitsenrichmentprogram,butappeartohaveacquiescedtoaformulawherebythetimeinwhichIrancan“breakout”ismorethanayear.TheGCCappearstohaveacceptedthattheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgencycandetectthediversionofanyIranianfissilematerialwithinthattimeperiod,andthattheUnitedStateswouldthenusemilitaryforcetodestroytheprogram.Thus,regardlessofwhetherthecurrentnegotiationsaresuccessfulornot,Iranwillcontinuetoretainelementsofitscurrentenrichmentinfrastructure.TheissueforAmericanpolicymakers,therefore,isn’twhetherIranwillbeabletoenrich,butratherhowU.S.policywillbeaffectedonceIran’senrichmentprogramislegitimized.AmericanpolicymakersfearthatIran’snuclearprogramwillpromptotherstatesintheregiontopursuedual‐usetechnologythatcouldbeusedtodevelopnuclearweapon.Thosefearsaremisplaced.TurkeyandJordanhavebothoptedforuniquefinancingmodelsfortheirnuclearpowerstations,whichallbutrulesoutthepossibilityofclandestinenuclearweaponsdevelopment.TheUnitedArabEmirateshasforeswornenrichmentandreprocessing.Egypthashintedthatitmayre‐launchitsnuclearprogram,butthereisabsolutelynoevidencethatithastakenstepstorectifytheissuesthathavepreventeditsprocurementofreactorsinthepast.SaudiArabiahasindicatedthatitmightacquireanuclearweapon,butitsnuclearpowerplansremainonthedrawingboard,andthereareseriousquestionsaboutwhetherornottheKingdomhasthecapacitytoindigenouslydesign,develop,andthendeploynuclearweapons.

Barringanyradicalshiftfromthecurrentstatusquo,theUnitedStateswillcontinuetohavetoprovideitsregionalallieswithnuclearassurances.Yet,thedynamicsintheregionpresentauniquechallengetosecurityplannersthatmaybetemptedtoreplicateAmericanpracticeinSouthKorea.IntheKoreancontext,theObamaAdministrationhaspairedthecontinueddeploymentofgroundtroops,witha“playbook”ofscriptedmilitaryresponsesdesignedtodemonstrateAmericanresolvetousewhatevermeansnecessarytodefendSeoul.TheplanhingesonpublicizingU.S.militarydeploymentstotheregion,includingtheroundtheworldflyingofB‐2bombersoutfittedwithdummybombsthatweredroppedonaSouthKoreantestrange.WhiletheUnitedStatesdoesstationairandnavalassetsintheMiddleEast–mostnotablyinBahrain–itisforcedtokeepthepresenceofitsmilitaryassetsunderwraps,orotherwiseriskinflaminganti‐Americansentiment.IntheMiddleEast,theUnitedStatesdoesnot,andwillnothavetheluxuryofresortingtohigh‐profilemilitaryexercisesandsimulatednuclearstrikemissionstoreassuretheArabstates.Adifferentapproachisneeded.Inthepast,theUnitedStateshassoughttoreassureitsallieswithmassivearmssales,designedtoensurethattheArabstatesretainatechnologicalmilitaryadvantagevis‐à‐visthemorenumerousIranianmilitary.TheUnitedStateshasalsoemphasizedthattheGCCpurchasemissiledefensesystems,whicharedesignedtobeinteroperablewithU.S.missiledefensesystemsbasedintheregion.ThemissiledefensearchitectureisintendedtodefendagainstIranianballisticmissiles,whilealsoreassuringtheGulfAlliesoftheviabilityoftheU.S.commitmenttocometotheirdefense.Thisstrategyhassomenotabledrawbacks.ThepairingofprecisionstrikecruisemissileswithcapablemissiledefensesincentivizesIrantobuildmoreballisticmissiles,soastonegatetheGCCstates’technologicalmilitaryedge.This,inturn,createstheneedformissiledefensesandgreaterprecisionstrike.Thus,thetwosidescouldfindthemselveslockedinaconventionalarmsracethatonlyhelpsfurtherdestabilizetheregion.Absentacrediblenuclearguarantee,theUnitedStatesmaybefacedwithanescalatingconventionalarmsbuild‐up,fueledbyconcernsthatIran’ssmallenrichmentprogramcouldstillbeusedasthebasisforanuclearweaponsprogram.Thesituationnecessitatesthecraftingofapolicyusingamixtureofconventionalweaponsandthenuclearforcesinthetriad‐intercontinentalBallisticMissiles(ICBMs),submarineLaunchedBallisticMissiles(SLBMs)andheavybombers–tosimultaneouslyreassureGCCalliesanddeterIran.Inthepast,theUnitedStatesoptedtoreassurewaryalliesofitscommitmenttousenuclearweaponswithportvisitsmadebySSBNS.ThepoliticalsituationintheMiddleEast,however,wouldappeartoprecludesuchanoption.TheUnitedStateswouldhavetodedicatesignificantforcestoprotectitsSSBNs,orotherwiseriskterroriststryingtotargetthesubinasimilarmannertothatoftheUSSCole.

Moreover,formanyleadersintheGulf,SSBNvisitscouldbedeemedtoorisky,lestsuchovertdisplayofAmericanmilitaryhardwaresparkmassiveanti‐Americandemonstrations,orempowergroupsthatabidebyareligiousideologysimilartothatofAlQaeda.Absenttheseoptions,thetwosidescouldopttoincreaseconsultationsaboutnuclearwarplanning,inmuchthesamewaytheUnitedStatesandJapancooperatedonthedraftingofthe2010StrategicPostureReview.TheUnitedStatescouldalsoteachcoursesindeterrenceattherecentlyestablishedGulfAcademyforStrategicandSecurityStudiesintheUAE.Morebroadly,thecruxoftheU.S.‐GCCrelationshipwillcontinuetohingeonthePresident’sabilitytoconvincehis/herGCCcounterpartoftheviabilityoftheAmericansecurityguarantee.TheUnitedStatesfacedasimilarquandaryduringtheColdWar.EuropeanalliesopenlyworriedaboutWashington’scommitmenttousenuclearweaponsagainsttheSovietUnion,lestsuchactionledtoaRussianstrikeontheU.S.homeland.Toassuagethesefears,theU.S,beginninginthe1950s,optedtodeploynuclearweaponsinNATOcountriesandeventuallyresultedintheinclusionoftheAlliesinNATOnuclearwarplanning.TheUnitedStateswillnotdeploynuclearweaponsintheMiddleEast.Theassurance,therefore,willhavetobebasedonconventionalweapons,backedbyanironcladpresidentialguaranteeoftheUnitedStates’willingnesstousewhatevermeansnecessarytoprotectitsGulfallies.ThiswillrequiretheU.S.PresidenttocontinuetoprioritizeitsrelationshipwiththeGCC’sleadership.TheUnitedStates,therefore,hasaperverseincentivetoretaintheregionalstatusquo,eventhoughthecurrentsituationfailstoadheretothepromotionofdemocracyworldwide.And,morebroadly,itcastsdoubtonthenotionthattheUnitedStateswillabandontheMiddleEast,asitseekstodedicatemoreresourcestoAsia.RegardlessoftheoutcomeofthecurrenttalkswithIran,theU.S.willretainastrongincentivetoengagewithitsAraballiesondeterrenceandnuclearrelatedissues.ThetimefordebateaboutafutureIranianenrichmentprogramhasnowpassed.TheUnitedStatesmustnowbegintocraftastrategytoreassureveryskepticalallies.Itwontbeeasy.