The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 17 | Issue 9 | Number 3 | Article ID 5281 | May 01, 2019

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Abdication, Succession and Japan’s Imperial Future: AnEmperor’s Dilemma

John Breen

A Turkish translation of this article is available(https://apjjf.org/data/Tr_Diplo_-_HAZIRAN_2019.pdf) as Breen, John. “Japonya’nın EmperyalistG e l e c e ğ i : B i r I m p a r a t o r u nIkilemi.” Turque Diplomatique 24 (June2019), pp. 25-28.

Abstract

On 30 April 2019, 86-year old Emperor Akihitomade history. He became the first emperor in200 years to abdicate, yielding the throne to hisson. The trigger for this historic moment wasan extraordinary event that took place threeyears earlier. In August 2016, the emperorappeared on NHK and all TV channels toaddress the nation. His purpose? To intimatehis desire to abdicate. The address, ofquestionable constitutionality, set in motion adebate about the nature of emperorship in 21st

Century Japan, and led directly to the Aprilabdication. This article sets out to explore someof the questions raised by the emperor’saddress, and its historic outcome: What areemperors for? What is their p lace incontemporary Japan? What, indeed, are theirfuture prospects?

Key Words Emperor Akihito, EmperorNaruhito, abdication, Nippon Kaigi, KoboriKeiichirō, Murata Haruki, Abe Shinzō, SunGoddess, Ise Shrines, senso, sokui, daijōsai

Introduction

On 30 April 2019, 86-year-old Emperor Akihito

明仁made history. He became the first modernemperor to abdicate. Indeed, his was the firstabdication since that of Emperor Kōkaku 光格over two centuries before in 1817. By thesame token, the succession of Akihito’s 59-year-old son, Crown Prince Naruhito 徳仁on 1 Maywas an historic moment. For he was the first inmodern times to succeed to the throne whilehis father was alive and well. The trigger for allthese firsts was an extraordinary event thattook place nearly three years before. On 8August 2016, Emperor Akihito appeared onNHK and all other TV channels to address thenation. He gave an understated but rivetingperformance. Speaking of his advanced yearsand the growing burden of his duties, heintimated his desire to abdicate. Abdicationrumors had been circulating for some weeks,but his address dispelled all doubt. An addressof this sort was quite without precedent. TheConstitution requires that succession to thethrone accord with the Imperial Household Lawof 1946, but that law does not recognizeabdication. The emperor was thus challengingthe law. The challenge, however circumspect,was a political act, and political acts are notpermitted him under the Constitution. It is littlewonder that he caused a stir; it is no less thanremarkable that he got his way.1

The emperor’s TV address, watched by some12% of the population, triggered a nationaldebate that led to Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’sgovernment enacting a special abdication bill,which became law in June 2017.2 It was this billthat enabled Akihito to abdicate, yielding thethrone to his son. Emperor Akihito raisedfundamental questions about the role of theemperor in 21st Century Japanese society. What

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are emperors for? What is their place incontemporary Japan, and what are their futureprospects? This article sets out to exploreprecisely these questions. The place to start isthat August 2016 address.

1. The Emperor’s Words: O-kotoba

The emperor began by framing his reign as apersonal search for meaning. He had dutifullycarried out the “acts of the emperor in mattersof state” as stipulated in Article 7 of theConstitution. These include convocation of theD i e t , d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e H o u s e o fRepresentatives, attestation of ministerialappointments, awarding of honors, and so on.However, he had “spent [his] days searchingfor and contemplating on” the meaning ofArticle 1’s designation of him as “symbol of theState and of the unity of the people.” TheConstitution, after all, fails to elucidate whataction is required of, or indeed permitted to, a“symbol of the State.” The emperor’s search ledhim to conclude that he must serve as “anactive and inherent part of society, respondingto the expectations of the people.”

Emperor Akihito delivering his address tothe nation on NHK, 8 August 20163

What matters, he said, is to “stand by the

people, listen to their voices, and be close tothem in their thoughts.” Many of those whotuned in to his eleven-minute broadcast musthave cast their minds back to the visits hemade with the empress throughout Japan,especially in times of national crisis. Never wasthe emperor closer to the people than in 2011after the Great East Japan earthquake.Historically a distant figure, he made apowerful TV appearance after the disasterstruck, articulating his concerns, offeringsolace and hope.4 He and the empress visitedsurvivors in Saitama, Chiba, Ibaraki, Miyagi,Iwate, Fukushima, and Tochigi prefectures,and, of course, in Tokyo, too.5 In his August2016 broadcast, the emperor left no doubt thatsuch active devotion to the Japanese peoplewas his calling. It was demanded of him, hebelieved, as “symbol of the State.”

It was at this point in the broadcast that theemperor broached his dilemma. What to dowhen an emperor has become too old to servethe people? He acknowledged, only to dismiss,the constitutional answer: the appointment of aregent. A regency was, in his view, no solution.For when an emperor ceases to serve thepeople, he no longer functions as symbol. Hisrole is done, and he must step down. EmperorAkihito intimated that stepping down was,indeed, his intention. He was especiallyconcerned lest he become a burden to thepeople. He was thinking ahead here to his owndeath, and to the “heavy mourning” that wouldendure for months were he to die in situ asemperor. If he gave up the throne, he wouldinconvenience no one; his son Naruhito wouldsucceed him, and continue the vital work ofpublic service uninterrupted. Such was his“earnest wish.” Emperor Akihito concludedwith a plea to the people of Japan: “I sincerelyhope for your understanding.”6 Nowhere in hisaddress did the emperor deploy the word“abdication,” but this was the radical solutionhe offered.7

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2. Abdication

Emperor Akihito’s address was more than anappeal for understanding: it was a personalchallenge to the law, and a call for criticalreflection on the role of the emperor in the 21st

Century. It was undeniably political. During histhirty-year reign, the emperor made severalstatements freighted with political meaning. In2001, he declared “a certain kinship withKorea” on learning that the mother of EmperorKanmu 桓武– the 8th Century founder of the cityof Kyoto – was descended from Koreanimmigrants.8 In 2004, he said it was desirablenot to compel Japanese school pupils to singthe national anthem.9 In 2009, he reflected thatthe monarchy under the 1946 Constitution wascloser to Japan’s “traditional model” than it hadbeen under the 1889 Constitution. The 1946Constitution, he implied, was more appropriatefor the 21st Century.10 Likewise, in 2013, hepraised the postwar Constitution for laying thefoundations of peace and democracy.11 Theseissues - relations with Korea, the anthem andthe Constitution – were all, to differing degrees,political. The emperor’s statements werepolitical interventions, but he had never beforequestioned the law. Nor, of course, had heplayed any role in fashioning the law.

What did the Japanese people make of it all?The Yomiuri newspaper, Japan’s best-sellingdaily, conducted an opinion poll threedays after the national TV broadcast and foundthat it had won the approval of 93% of thepopulation. This figure was reflected in othermedia surveys. The Asahi reported that 84%supported abdication, while 5% opposed it. TheMainichi survey yielded a somewhat lower 67%approval rating, but it rose to 84% in a secondsurvey. Of those polled by the Kyōdō newsagency, 86% approved changing the law toallow abdication.1 2 In any case, it wasabundantly clear that the emperor’s wish toabdicate accorded with the “will of the people,”albeit after the fact. This degree of popularsupport was little cause for surprise, given the

consistently high ratings the emperor andempress had enjoyed in recent years, especiallysince the disaster of 2011.13

What is interesting is the reaction of ultra-conservative groups, the self-appointedguardians of Japan’s imperial legacy. The mostvociferous among them today is Nippon Kaigi日本会議 (Japan Conference; hereafter NK).This is a powerful group, whose board featuresmany Shinto religious leaders. The chief priestsof the Ise Shrines, the Yasukuni Shrine, and theMeiji Shrine are among them. But NK mattersbecause Prime Minister Shinzō Abe and themajority of his cabinet are members.14 How didNK respond to the emperor’s address? NK wasswift to deny press reports that it was“vigorously opposed” to abdication, butstatements by key NK members suggestedotherwise. The most articulate among themwas Kobori Keiichirō 小堀桂一郎, emeritusprofessor of Tokyo University and incumbentNK Vice-Chairman.

PM Abe Shinzō addressing Nippon Kaigi’s20th anniversary gathering, 27 November

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Kobori was “confused” by the emperor’spressing the government to take extra-constitutional measures to satisfy his personalwishes. He wondered at the government’sapparent compliance, and was dismayed at theprecedent set , namely of an emperorsuccessfully challenging the Constitution. ForKobori and his colleagues, however, the realissue lay elsewhere, in the nature ofemperorship. Is it really necessary, askedKobori, for the emperor to engage in thoseactions that he finds so meaningful? Kobori’sanswer was no. “Symbol of the state,” heargued, does not require social engagementfrom the emperor. That the emperor’s agerendered him no longer able to serve thepeople was, therefore, no reason for him toabdicate. Kobori blamed the American makersof the “anti-kokutai Constitution” for creatingconfusion about the emperor’s role.16

Other NK members were less measured.Murata Haruki 村田春樹 authored anextraordinary opinion piece in the journalSeiron 正論in October 2017. His critique ofEmperor Akihito makes for fascinating reading.Murata saw the emperor’s wish to abdicate assymptomatic of his failure to appreciate theunique nature of Japanese emperorship. Theemperor cannot refer to himself as anindividual, as he did in the broadcast, since heis semi-divine; he has no need for popularapproval, since he is neither politician norperformer, but descendant of the Sun Goddess;and he has no business appearing on TV toaddress the people; it is his ancestors – the SunGoddess and the first emperor Jinmu above all– whom he should be addressing.17 Muratafound, moreover, that Emperor Akihito hadbreached the Constitution on three counts: 1)he had failed to consult the will of the peoplebefore taking action; 2) he was responsible for

the fact that an abdication bill – not theImperial Household Law – would determinesuccession for the first time ever; and 3) as aconsequence, he had effectively exercisedlegislative power. All of this, asserted Murata,was “blatantly in breach of the Constitution.”18

Nippon Kaigi is, in fact, divided over theabdication issue, but it is clear that whatmatters to Kobori, Murata and their fellows isnot the person of the reigning emperor, nor theConstitution, but the unbroken imperial linethat began, so they believe, with the SunGoddess. Emperor Akihito’s words and actionsconst i tuted a threat to their v iew ofemperorship. Clearly, if an emperor can changethe rules of succession on a whim, the mythbecomes untenable. What then would they andtheir allies have had the emperor do? On thespecific issue of succession, they wanted him tohand the burdensome tasks over to a regent,and stay put. As a general principle, emperorsshould abstain from the sort of public service inwhich Emperor Akihito found meaning. Theyshould instead remain within the walls of thepalace, perform their acts “in matters of state,”and otherwise devote themselves to prayer.

Emperor Akihito was clearly not averse topraying. Indeed, he stressed the importance ofprayer twice in his TV address. “The first andforemost duty of the Emperor,” he insisted, “isto pray for peace and happiness of all thepeople.” He reflected further that it was alwaysincumbent on him to “think of the people andpray for the people, with deep respect and lovefor the people.”19 But for him, prayer alone wasnever sufficient. The NK position, by contrast,is that “symbol of the State” means preciselythe emperor’s performance of prayer at theshrine-complex within the Tokyo palace. Thecomplex in question, built in 1888, is known asthe kyūchū sanden宮中三殿, and as the namesuggests, it comprises three sites. There is acentral shrine for the Sun Goddess (thekashikodokoro賢所) , which is flanked by thekōreiden皇霊殿, a shrine dedicated to the

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imperial ancestors (the spirits, that is, of alldeceased emperors since the time of themythical Emperor Jinmu), and by a shrine forthe myriad gods of heaven and earth (theshinden神殿). It is worth noting in passing thatthe rites which Akihito and his father beforehim performed at the shrine-complex since1945 are precisely those of prewar Japan; theydiffer only in that they are private, and nolonger public, events.

Emperor Akihito enters the kashikodokoroshrine in the imperial palace to report hisabdication to the Sun Goddess, 12 March201920

There is every reason to believe that PrimeMinister Abe shared the concerns of his fellowNK members. He appears to have known of theemperor’s wishes since the autumn of 2015,but denied him permission - or so it is claimed -to raise the matter at his birthday pressconference in December that year. Theemperor’s frustration grew thereafter, and inJuly 2016, he had the Imperial Household tellNHK of his wish to abdicate. NHK informed thenation in a broadcast on the night of 13 July,and this paved the way for the emperor’saddress on 8 August.21 Opinion polls quicklymade it clear that a large majority of Japanesewere sympathetic to the emperor; thebroadcast and print media generated supportand sustained interest. The prime minister had

no choice but to act.

The choice facing Prime Minister Abe wasbetween a change to the Imperial HouseholdLaw, allowing abdication for all futureemperors, and the enactment of an abdicationbill, applicable to Emperor Akihito alone. Theemperor was known to favor the former; theprime minister would only countenance thelatter. He moved swiftly to appoint a council ofexperts to advise him. Over a six-month periodstarting in autumn 2016, he consulted twentyexperts, eight of whom were affiliated with, oropenly sympathetic to, NK.22 Their final reportrecommended the enactment of a one-offabdication bill. The bill was duly drafted andapproved by the Diet.

3. Succession

Emperor Akihito was reportedly shocked by thecriticism leveled at him by certain expertsduring the consultation period, and he wasdispleased, too, with the compromisedoutcome.23 Still, it rendered abdication possiblefor the first time in 200 years. The emperorduly abdicated on 30 April 2019 in a brief ritein the Matsu no Ma 松の間chamber of thepalace.24 He stood with the empress before anaudience of some 300 dignitaries. PrimeMinister Abe faced them, and delivered a shortspeech, expressing his respect and gratitudefor the emperor’s reign on behalf of theJapanese people. The emperor responded byarticulating his love and respect for the peopleof Japan. He thanked them for supporting hissymbolic role, and concluded with a prayer thatthe new Reiwa 令和era might be one of peaceand happiness.25

Then, at 10.30 am on 1 May, Crown PrinceNaruhito received the sword and jewel of theimperial regalia in the very brief rite known askenji tō shōkei no gi 剣璽等承継の儀.26 Thisregalia transfer took place in the same Matsuno Ma chamber in the presence of the prime

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minister, the chief justice of the SupremeCourt, the speaker of the Lower House and thepresident of the Upper House, among others,and was an entirely male affair. In line withprewar practice, the participation of theempress and the many other female membersof the imperial family was not permitted. Afterthe transfer of regalia, the emperor proceededdirectly to the palace shrine-complex to informthe Sun Goddess and his ancestors of hissuccession. In a third ritual phase, EmperorNaruhito, accompanied now by the empress,returned to the Matsu no Ma to receive theheads of the three branches of government andsome 250 dignitaries, and deliver his inauguraladdress to the nation.27 Here, he spoke of hisdeep respect for his father and mother for theirunwavering devotion to the people. He, for hispart, promised to think always of the peopleand be with them.

He committed himself to fulfi l l ing hisconstitutional role as symbolic emperor, andprayed for peace.

On 4 May, members of the general public wereadmitted to the palace grounds, and theemperor and empress appeared on the verandaof the Chōwaden building to greet them. Theemperor thanked the public for theirfelicitations, and expressed his wish that Japanmight work with other nations to promotepeace in the world. On 22 October, theemperor and empress ascended theirrespective thrones before an assembly ofdignitaries, Japanese and foreign, in the riteknown now as the Sokuirei seiden no gi 即位正殿の儀 enthronement rite.28 In his briefaddress, Emperor Naruhito pledged to actaccording to the Constitution, “while alwayswishing for the happiness of the people and thepeace of the world, turning my thoughts to thepeople and standing by them.” The afternoonparade, in which emperor and empress were toride in an open-top car west through the city toAkasaka, was postponed out of considerationfor the victims of the recent typhoon, and was

re-scheduled for 10 November. The abdication,regalia transfer and enthronement were held as“acts in matters of state.” It is worth pointingout that, although they are broadly secular innature, they are not entirely so. At the veryleast, the sword and the jewel that featured inall three rites are sacred objects, and aretreated as such. According to Japan’s seventhcentury state foundation myths, they, alongwith a sacred mirror, were handed by the SunGoddess to her grandson before he descendedto earth. These objects are testament, in otherwords, to the sacred nature of Japaneseemperorship.

The climax of the enthronement sequence isindisputably sacred in character. This is thedaijōsai 大嘗祭or “rite of great feasting,” whichtook place on the night of 14-15 November. Acomplex of wooden buildings, featuring twomain pavilions (the Yukiden悠紀田and Sukiden主基田), was erected on the palace grounds.Both pavilions were furnished with bed andshroud to welcome the Sun Goddess. Twodifferent districts of Japan – the Yuki field inTochigi Prefecture to the east of Tokyo and theSuki field in Kyoto to the west – supplied therice and millet for feasting. In each pavilion,the emperor offered the Sun Goddess meals ofrice and millet and rice wine, before partakingof them himself. He emerged at dawn onNovember 15, transformed by his mysticalcommunion with his ancestress. The process ofemperor making was now complete.

This enthronement sequence – regalia transfer,enthronement and daijōsai – is of great vintage.In some form or other, the rites can be tracedback to the 7th Century. They have played avital role in producing and reproducing Japan’semperor -centered order fo r over amillennium.29 The daijōsai, in particular, hasundergone multiple interpretations over time,and its mise-en-scène has changed drastically,too. Only in modern times has it been regardedas the mos t impor tan t o f the th reeenthronement rites, and this is because it was

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interpreted now as the ultimate act of imperialpiety. It served, by the same token, as dramaticproof that the emperor was indeed descendedfrom the Sun Goddess. It was for this reasonthat the modern daijōsai as performed by theMeiji, Taishō and Shōwa emperors were stagedas truly national events; they sought to engagethe whole of Japan and, indeed, the empire withthe imperial myth.

Emperor Akihito’s daijōsai, the first in thepostwar era, took place on the night of 22-23November 1990. It had the distinction of beingthe first ever to cause legal controversy. Thecontroversy and its resolution deserve to bemore widely known. Articles 20 and 89 of theConstitution provide for the separation of stateand religion. And yet, the state funded thedaijōsai, which is “religious” to the extent thatit features the Sun Goddess. The governmentfended off accusations of unconstitutionality byciting the “object and effect” principleestablished in a landmark Supreme Courtruling in 1977.30 The essence of the ruling wasthat the state may engage with religion, so longas neither the “object” nor the “effect” of itsengagement amounts to the promotion of anyspecific religion. The government’s positionwas that public funding of the daijōsaicontravened neither criterion. Many citizens’groups disagreed, and took legal action, buttheir suits all foundered on the “object andeffect” principle.31

Prince Akishino no Miya Fumihito 秋篠宮文仁with the Princess at his birthday pressconference, November 201832

Controversy surrounded the 2019 daijōsai, too,with citizens’ groups poised once more to takelegal action against the government, eventhough they stand little chance of success. Thistime, however, they had the moral support ofPrince Akishino no Miya Fumihito, the newemperor’s younger brother and next in line tothe throne. At his birthday meeting with thepress on 11 November 2018, the prince queriedthe wisdom of the government underwriting thedaijōsai as it had in 1990. He confessed it lefthim feeling “uneasy.” The cause of hisuneasiness was this: the government sets asidetwo funds for imperial family use. There is the“court fund” (kyūteihi宮廷費), totaling some$83 million, which covers all of the emperor’spublic activities – his “acts in matters of state.”There is also a much more modest “imperialfamily fund” (naiteihi内廷費) of some $2.7million, which is for the private use of theemperor and his family.33

Both funds are, of course, tax payers’ money,but the prince was uneasy at the government’sinsistence on using the “court fund” tounderwrite the “religious” daijōsai. Thisimplied that the daijōsai was, after all, a publicnot private act.34 The prince’s radical idea,intended to preserve the constitutionalseparation of state and religion, was that thedaijōsai be scaled back to a point where itmight be covered entirely by the “imperialfamily fund.” The prince had raised this mattertime and again with Imperial Householdofficials, but, he lamented, they had “refused topay him heed.” He was, indeed, ignored byboth the Imperial Household and the Abeadministration.35 No one doubts that the princewas articulating views shared by his olderbrother and father.

In any case, the daijōsai rite remains essential

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to emperor-making in Japan. In its postwarmanifestation, it merits attention as one furtherpiece of evidence of the sacred encroachinginto Japan’s public sphere. By “the sacred,” Irefer specifically to ritual performancesinvolving the Sun Goddess, and to the myth ofthe emperor’s descent from the Sun Goddess,which the rites serve to animate. The postwarConstitution sought to confine the sacred to theprivate sphere of the imperial court, and yet, inthe seven decades since its promulgation – andespecially during Abe Shinzō’s premiership –the sacred has become ever more public. Abe’sactive association with the Ise Shrines is a casein point. In 2013, when the Ise Shrinesunderwent their vicennial rebuild, he played akey ritual role, escorting the Sun Goddess onher solemn progress through the night from oldshrine to new.36 In 2016, he hosted the G7summit in Ise, and took heads of the G7 statesto the shrines as though they were a nationalsite. In law, of course, they are a privatereligious juridical entity. In both 2017 and2018, Abe participated in the niinamesai 新嘗祭court rite, which also celebrates the SunGoddess. The rite is held within the palace’sshrine complex annually on 23 November.37 Itwas in this broader context that the Abeadministration funded Emperor Naruhito’sdaijōsai in November 2019.

Prime Minister Abe Shinzō at the palaceshrine-complex, 23 November 201838

2018 marked the 150th anniversary of the MeijiRestoration, which brought emperors out of theshadows of the premodern court, allowing themto occupy the center of modern Japan’s publicculture. The myth of the emperor’s descentfrom the Sun Goddess, which the Meijigovernment actively promoted and exploited,remains alive and well today. The myth, and therites that sustain it, will be on more securefooting if the Abe administration effects itspromised revisions to the Constitution. Article20 deals with the separation of state andreligion. The government plans to retain theprinciple of separation, of course, but wishes torender the daijōsai and other imperial courtrites as non-religious “social rituals orcustomary practices.”39 If, and when, therevisions are effected, there will be no furtherimpediment to the state’s sponsorship of, andengagement with, such events. Their place in

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the public sphere will be assured.

We have seen evidence that the imperialinstitution itself is highly contested. Theemperor’s 2016 address, the abdication billthat it produced, and the very fact that anemperor abdicated for the first time in twohundred years, have highl ighted themultiplicity of views on emperorship in 21st

Century Japan. The prohibition of abdication, itshould be stressed, is modern. There are fifty-eight known cases of emperors abdicatingbefore the practice was prohibited in the late19 t h Century. Meiji bureaucrats endedabdication, fearful that it threatened the myththat guaranteed the stability of the imperialline. Their concerns are shared today by NKmembers w i th c lose t i es to the Abeadministration.

Let us not forget that there is, objectivelyspeaking, a graver challenge to the imperialinstitution than abdication. It is the absence ofmale heirs. Emperor Naruhito’s youngerbrother, Crown Prince Akishino no Miya, is nownext in line to the throne, and his son the 13-year-old Hisahito 悠仁will succeed him. IfHisahito produces no male heirs, that is it. Thisdire situation has generated impassioneddebate about the pros and cons of femalesuccession to the throne. According to thelatest polls, 76% of the population would behappy to see a woman enthroned. There is,after all, ample precedent for this: women havesucceeded to the throne on ten previousoccasions. What is striking is that 74% have noobjection to the offspring of a woman emperorsucceeding to the throne. If this were tohappen, it would be an historical first.40

Finally, it should be pointed out that, forultraconservatives, the abdication issue and thefuture of the imperial line are intimatelyrelated. Yagi Hidetsugu八木秀次, a radicalconservative intellectual, who is sometimesreferred to as Prime Minister Abe’s “brain,”puts it like this:

If an emperor is free to abdicate, itwon’t be long before a man is freeto decline the throne. Abdication,as the free choice of the emperor,can only lead in time to a man’sright to refuse succession. [Whenthis comes to pass,] the emperorsystem, which depends on anunbroken line of male heirs, willcollapse.41

The historic precedent set by Akihito’sabdication and the absence of male heirs willensure that Japanese emperorship is contestedfor years to come.

Bibliography

Asahi shinbun

Breen, John and Mark Teeuwen. A New historyof Shinto. Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Gomi Yōji. Seizen taii o meguru Abe shushō nosakubō. Takarajimasha Shinsho, 2017

Guthmann, Thierry. “Nationalist Circles inJ a p a n T o d a y : T h e I m p o s s i b i l i t y o fSecularization.” Japan Review 30 (2017).

Hara Takeshi. Heisei no shūen: taii to tennō,kōgo. Iwanami Shoten, 2019

Hosaka Masayasu. Tennō heika “seizen taii” eno omoi. Mainichi Shinbun Shuppan, 2016

Jiyūminshutō comp. Nihonkoku kenpō kaiseisōan. 2012

Kobori Keiichirō. “Tennō = shōchōkan nokonjaku.” Kōdō (January 2018)

Mainichi shinbun

Murata Haruki. “Sakunen hachigatsu yōka noHeika no Okotoba wa.” Seiron 326 (1 October

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2017)

Shirai Satoshi. Kokutairon: Kiku to seijōki.Shūeisha Shinsho, 2018

Teeuwen, Mark and John Breen. A SocialHistory of the Ise Shrines: Divine Capital.Bloomsbury, 2017.

Note

This is a revised, updated and expandedversion of an article that was first published inSpanish as “El emperador ha hablado”(Vanguardia Dossier: 71 Japón debilidad yfortaleza (2018), pp. 39-42.) A much-abridgedvers ion w i l l appear i n J oy Hendry .Understanding Japanese Society. Routledge,2019. The author would like to thank GeoffreyWilkinson, Nick Breen and Mark Selden forhelpful comments on earlier drafts.

A new history of Shinto (co-authored withMark Teeuwen). Wiley-Blackwell, 2010

P u r c h a s e(https://www.amazon.co.jp/dp/B005UNUOJE/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20)

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Girei to kenryoku: Tennō no Meiji Ishin 儀礼と権力　天皇の明治維新 Heibonsha, 2011.

Purchase (https://www.amazon.co.jp/儀礼と権力-天皇の明治維新-平凡社選書-ジョン・ブリーン/dp/4582842313/ref=sr_1_fkmrnull_1?__mk_ja_JP=カタカナ&keywords=儀礼と権力+天皇の明治維新&qid=1556660859&s=gateway&sr=8-1-fkmrnull)

Shinto monogatar i : I se J ingū nokingendaishi 神都物語：伊勢神宮の近現代史.Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2015.

P u r c h a s e(https://www.amazon.co.jp/dp/4642058052/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20)

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A Social History of the Ise Shrines: DivineCapital (co-authored with Mark Teeuwen).Bloomsbury, 2017.

P u r c h a s e(https://www.amazon.co.jp/Social-History-Is e - S h r i n e s -Bloomsbury/dp/1474272797/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20)

John Breen is a professor at the International Research Center for Japanese Studies inKyoto, where he edits the journal Japan Review.(http://publications.nichibun.ac.jp/pc1/en/announce/jr/) He taught Japanese and Japanesehistory at SOAS (University of London) before joining Nichibunken in 2009.

Among his recent publications are the following books in English: A Social History of the IseShrines: Divine Capital(https://www.amazon.com/Social-History-Shrines-Bloomsbury-Studies/dp/1350081191/?tag=theasiapacjo0b-20) (with Mark Teeuwen) Bloomsbury, 2017, and A New History of Shinto(https://www.amazon.com/New-History-Shinto-John-Breen/dp/1405155167/?tag=theasiapacjo0b-20) (with Mark Teeuwen) Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. He is also the author of two books inJapanese, Shinto monogatari: Ise jingū no kingendaishi(https://www.amazon.co.jp/%E7%A5%9E%E9%83%BD%E7%89%A9%E8%AA%9E-%E4%BC%8A%E5%8B%A2%E7%A5%9E%E5%AE%AE%E3%81%AE%E8%BF%91%E7%8F%BE%E4%BB%A3%E5%8F%B2-%E6%AD%B4%E5%8F%B2%E6%96%87%E5%8C%96%E3%83%A9%E3%82%A4%E3%83%96%E3%83%A9%E3%83%AA%E3%83%BC-%E3%82%B8%E3%83%A7%E3%83%B3-

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%E3%83%96%E3%83%AA%E3%83%BC%E3%83%B3/dp/4642058052/?tag=theasiapacjo06-20), Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2015 and Girei to kenryoku: Tennō no Meiji ishin(https://www.amazon.co.jp/儀礼と権力-天皇の明治維新-平凡社選書-ジョン・ブリーン/dp/4582842313/?tag=theasiapacjo06-20), Heibonsha, 2011.

Among recent articles in English are “Ornamental Diplomacy: Emperor Meiji and theMonarchs of the Modern World.” In Robert Hellyer and Harald Fuess eds. The MeijiRestoration: Japan as a Global Nation(https://www.amazon.com/Meiji-Restoration-Japan-Global-Nation-ebook/dp/B084SDVNDC/?tag=theasipacjo06-20). Cambridge University Press, 2020, and “Abdication, Succession andJapan’s Imperial Future: An Emperor’s Dilemma (https://apjjf.org/2019/09/Breen.html).” TheAsia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 17:9, 3 (2019).

Notes1 The official designation of the emperor’s address is Shōchō toshite no o-tsutome ni tsuite notennō heika no o-kotoba象徴としてのお務めについての天皇陛下のおことば. The address canbe replayed on the Kunaichō website, where the Japanese and English transcriptions can alsobe found: here (http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/page/okotoba/detail/12#41) and here(http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/page/okotoba/detailEn/12#41).2 The full Japanese title of the bill is Tennō no taii tō ni kansuru kōshitsu tenpan tokureihō 天皇の退位等に関する皇室典範特例法. The bill’s nine articles can be accessed here(http://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/search/elawsSearch/elaws_search/lsg0500/detail?lawId=429AC0000000063&openerCode=1).3 Source (http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/page/okotoba/detail/12#41)4 The emperor’s address in the aftermath of the Great East Japan earthquake can be replayedon the Kunaichō website; the Japanese text and English translation can be accessed there too:here (http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/okotoba/01/okotoba/tohokujishin-h230316-mov.html#h02)and here(http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-okotoba/01/address/tohokujishin-h230316-mov.html#h02).5 For an overview of the activities of the emperor and empress at this time, see here(http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/okotoba/01/okotoba/saigai-01.html#h230312).6 The closest critical reading of the emperor’s address can be found in Hara Takeshi原武史.Heisei no shūen: taii to tennō, kōgo平成の終焉：退位と天皇皇后. Iwanami Shoten, 2019,pp.11-68.7 Abdication is hardly a new issue for the imperial family. In 1946, Prince Mikasa no Miya三笠宮, Akihito’s uncle, famously attacked the government’s refusal to sanction abdication. Thegovernment was effectively “binding the emperor in chains, making him a slave of thecabinet.” (Asahi Shinbun 17 December 2017)8 For the original Japanese, see here(http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/okotoba/01/kaiken/kaiken-h13e.html). There is an Englishtranslation at here (http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-okotoba/01/press/kaiken-h13e.html).

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9 Asahi shinbun 28 October 2004.10 The emperor offered this view of the postwar constitution at a press conference to celebratehis 50th wedding anniversary. Note that here, too, he mentioned his struggle to interpret themeaning of “symbol of the state and of the Unity of the People.” For the original Japanese andan English translation, see: here(http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/okotoba/01/kaiken/kaiken-h21-gokekkon50.html andhttp://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-okotoba/01/press/kaiken-h21-gokekkon50.html).11 The occasion for this statement was the emperor’s birthday press conference. See, for theJapanese original, here (http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/okotoba/01/kaiken/kaiken-h25e.html) and,for the English translation, here(http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-okotoba/01/press/kaiken-h25e.html).12 For a survey of polls, see Hosaka Masayasu保阪正康. Tennō heika “seizen taii” e no omoi天皇陛下生前退位への思い. Mainichi Shinbun Shuppan, 2016, pp.85-88.13 The latest poll conducted by the Asahi newspaper in April 2019 shows that 76% of thepopulation “feel an intimacy” with the imperial family. This is the highest “intimacy factor”ever recorded. (Asahi Shinbun, 19 April 2019.)14 For a recent academic study of Nippon Kaigi, see Thiery Guthmann. “Nationalist Circles inJapan Today: The Impossibility of Secularization.” Japan Review, 30 (2017), pp.207-235.15 Source (https://www.nipponkaigi.org/about/20years)16 Kobori Keichiirō has articulated his views most cogently in Kōdō弘道, the journal of theconservative organization, Nippon Kōdōkai日本弘道会. See “Tennō = shōchōkan no konjaku.”天皇象徴感の今昔 Kōdō (January 2018), pp. 6-11. Kobori refers frequently in his recentwritings to the “kokutai-wrecking Constitution.”17 Murata Haruki. “Sakunen hachigatsu yōka no heika no o-kotoba wa.” 昨年八月八日の陛下のお言葉Seiron 326 (1 October 2017), p. 3.18 Ibid.19 Source (http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/page/okotoba/detailEn/12#41)20 Source (https://www.sankei.com/premium/news/190315/prm1903150005-n1.html)21 For the events behind NHK’s July broadcast, which was watched by 14 million people, seeGomi Yōji五味洋治. Seizen taii o meguru Abe shushō no sakubō生前退位をめぐる安倍首相の策謀. Takarajimasha Shinsho, 2017, pp. 20-24, and Hosaka. Tennō heika, pp. 14-16 and pp.81-83.22 On the advisory council (yūshokusha kaigi有職者会議) and its experts, see Hara. Heisei noshūen, pp. 4-6, and Gomi. Seizen taii, pp. 104-109. The agenda and the minutes of the severalcouncil meetings are accessible on the website of the Prime Minister’s Office(http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/koumu_keigen/).23 For the emperor’s shock, see both Mainichi shinbun 21 May 2017 and the discussion inShirai Satoshi白井聡. Kokutairon: Kiku to seijōki菊と星条旗. Shūeisha Shinsho, 2018,pp.16-19.24 The official name given to the abdication is Taii rei seiden no gi 退位礼正殿の儀or (Palacerite of abdication.)25 The emperor’s address in both English and Japanese can be accessed on the ImperialHousehold website: here (http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/page/okotoba/detail/46#155) and here(http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/page/okotoba/detailEn/46#155).

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26 Ken is “sword” and ji is “jewel.” Tō, meaning “et cetera,” refers to the fact that the emperorreceives other objects, too. These objects include the state seal (kokuji 国璽) and the imperialseal (gyoji 御璽) and also the entire palace shrine-complex. This rite used to be known simplyas the senso 践祚 or succession rite.27 This audience is officially known as the Sokuigo chōken no gi 即位後朝見の儀or “Rite ofaudience after succession.”28 This rite was formerly known simply as the sokui rite.29 For a concise critical history of the daijōsai, see John Breen and Mark Teeuwen. A Newhistory of Shinto. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), Chapter 5.30 This principle is known in Japanese as mokuteki kōka kijun 目的効果基準31 For a summary view of the legal controversy concerning the 1999 daijōsai, see Breen andTeeuwen 2011, Chapter 5.32 Source (http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/page/kaiken/show/23)33 It is, incidentally, this latter fund which pays for the rites performed by the emperor andempress at the palace shrine-complex.34 The total budget for the 2019 daijōsai is set by the government at $21 million.35 The full text of the prince’s statement on the daijōsai can be accessed on the ImperialHousehold home page (http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/page/kaiken/show/23).36 On postwar conservative administrations’ cultivation of the Ise shrines, see Mark Teeuwenand John Breen. A Social History of the Ise Shrines: Divine Capital. Bloomsbury, 2017,especially Chapter 10.37 The niinamesai is the annual version of the once-in-a-reign daijōsai. The prime ministerinformed the nation of his participation on Twitter.38 Source (https://twitter.com/abeshinzo/status/1065966577214865409)39 For the LDP’s proposed revisions to Article 20, see Jiyūminshutō comp. Nihonkoku kenpōkaisei sōan (https://jimin.jp-east-2.storage.api.nifcloud.com/pdf/news/policy/130250_1.pdf)(2012), p.740 The poll referred to was conducted by the Asahi shinbun, and published on 19 April 2019.41 Asahi Shinbun 10 September 2016. For Yagi’s intimate relationship to PM Abe, see alsoAsahi Shinbun 28 March 2018.