General ictor H. Krulak, ' MC(Ret); the late General Keith B.Mc utcheon. IC; the late lajorGeneral Wilburt S. BrO\vn, U M ;and the Ime Major General ThomasA. Wornham. During my research on

eneral Thoma~, Gen >rals Krulakan I Tickerson furnished me withpersonal papers and did so again onthis project. more extensive discus­sion of 1arine orps sources may befound in the Thomas biography andm el11per Fidelis: The 11i tory of thel 'nited lale, Marine COlpS, re\'o ed.( ew York: The Free Press, 1991).

The official documents and per­specti es of the senior officers of the

orp~ and 1st Marine Di i ion donot provide a complete picture of thecampaign of 1951 in human tel1l1S.\1' ith his complete cooperation Iused the story of orporal ClarenceJackson Davis, lTSMCR, as a " ay tosee the fighting from the persp ctiveof the enlisted combat 1arine. Ifocu. ed on the experiences of a spe­cial group of larine officers, the 7thBasic Cia ,those Maline lieutenantscommissioned in the spring of 1950'V ho became the platoon comman­der of 1 't Marine Di\'ision in 1951.Their contribution began with aninter\'i W with Captain Frederick F.Br wer, 'M (Ret) in 1998 andwent on to access to LieutenantGeneral Chari'S G. Cooper, l MC(Ret) "Blo d and Tears," an unpub­lished memoir; Mr. John E. olan,

"Korea omment,"' 11 De 'ember1999; and interviev,,', at the 50thReunion of the th Bail' Class (+May 20 0) with Colonel Earl T. Roth,US 1C (Ret), Mr. Harold Arutinian,and Colonel David J. lIytrek, MC(Ret).

For ,ardonic \'ie\\'~ of the cam-paign of 19'51, 'ee PaulMcCloskey, Jr., The Takillg of llil!610 (Eaglet Books, 1992); LieutenantColonel Gerald P. Averill, L'SMC(Ret), Mustang' A Com hat Man'ne(Presidio Pres~, 198 ); [Prival First

lass] Burton F. Anderson, IFe Claimthe Title (Tracy Publishing, 1994);and [ergeant] ndy ndo, ,Letters lo Big Jim Regardillg Narnl!Purigo. Casbil1um /man (Vantage,199~).

The official hi. t rie of the 1951campaign ~ r the (arine Corps andArmy are much used and often-cited,but. hould not be used as , 'ripture:Lynn Montross, Major Hub~lrd D.Kuokka, U'M , and Major ormanI licks, MC, tbe East-CeJltm! Front,Vol. TV, U. . MariJJe Operaliolls il1Korea, 1950-1953 (HistoricalBranch, G-3, Headquarter.I\larine Corps, 1962) and Billy C.

lo.-sman, Ebb and Flou': SOl'ember1950:l1l!)' 1951 in £l. . Army ill theK01'eC/ll War, five volumes to date(Office of [he hi f of MilitaryIlistory, .. Army, ]990) and \1 alter

, I Jermes, Truce TeJlt and Fip,htiJlgFrollt (966), another voluJl1 in the

same s >ries. The ir Force officialhi. tory is Robert F. Futrell, ThellUted tales Air Force in Korea.1950-1953 (rev. ed., Office of AirForc Hi. t ry, 198.3). The documen­tation for the close air support con­trO\ersy ma be found coli ted inSubject File K239-01291-1," lose AirSupport." Re'earch rchives. irPower Jlistorical Research Center, irFor 'e Cniversity, Maxwell ir ForceBase, labama. lIan R Millett,"Korea, 1950-1953," in Benjamin F.

ooling, ed., Case ludies in tbeDel'e!opmellt of Close Air upport( ffice of Air F rce II is tory, 1990)cover. the issues and the sourcematerial in detail. Lynn MontrosCalla!r)' of the ky: tbe l01)' (~/ .s.MarineCo111hal Helicopter.- ( ewYork: Harper c' Bros., 195-1.) is a pop­ular account of H 1R-161 's Korean\1' ar servic '. A more conventionalofficial account is Lieutenant olonelEugene W. Rawlins, MC, l1arilleand lJe/icopters, /946-1962 (] listolYand Museum' Division, IIQMC.1976).

1 vi'ited mo t f the battle site'described in this stud in 199~ and199 , and I have profited from theadvice of Brigadier General Edwin H.

immons, USMC (Ret) and ColonelFranklin B. '\ihaI1, l S 1C (Ret), bothveterans of the campaign in infantrybattalions. Gunnery Sergeant Leo J.Daugherty 1Il, SM R. providedvaluable research as. istance.

About the AuthorThe Raymond E. Mason, Jr., Professor of

Military History, Ohio State University, AllanR. Millett is a specialist in the history of Americanmilitary policy and institutions. He is the authorof four books: The Politics of Interven-tion: TheMilitary Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909 (1968);The General: Robert 1. Bullard and Officership inthe United States Army, 1881-1925(1975); SemperFidelis: The History of the United States MarineCorps (1980, revised edition, 1991); and In Manya Strife: General Gerald C. Thomas and the U.S.Marine Corps, 1917-1956 (1993). His most recent

book, co-authored with Williamson Murray, is AWar to be Won: Fighting the Second World War(2000). He also co-authored and co-edited sever­al other works on military affairs and has con­tributed original essays to 25 books and numer­ous journals on American historiography, foreignand defense policy, and military history. A notedlecturer and officeholder in many prestigious mil­itary history societies, Dr. Millett is now presidentof the U.S. Commission on Military History.

A graduate of DePauw University andOhio State University, Dr. Millett served on bothactive and reserve duty, retiring in 1990 with arank of colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.

477

STALEMATE

U.S. Marines from Bunker Hill to the Hookby Bernard C. Nalty

n a typical night dur-ing 1952, a Marinepatrol set out fromthe very center of acompany position on

the Jamestown Line in west-centralKorea. The group was followingthe trace of an abandoned trench-line when a Chinese machine guncut loose, killing the leader,wounding some of his men, andforcing the patrol to return withoutcompleting its mission of setting anambush.

Shortly afterward, about twohours before midnight, SecondLieutenant William A. Watson, whohad recently joined the 1st MarineDivision, received orders to moveout with a squad from his platoonand set up the ambush, finishingwhat the ill-fated patrol had begun.The powerful searchlight aimedskyward to warn airmen of thelocation of Panmunjom, where theUnited Nations forces were con-ducting truce talks with the NorthKorean and Chinese, reflectedfrom the clouds creating theimpression that Watson's patrolwas "walking in bright moonlight."

The lieutenant and his menmoved between the spine of a

ridgeline and the trench they werefollowing, watching carefully forsigns of a Chinese ambush andmaintaining enough space be-tween Marines to minimize theeffect of a sudden burst of fire."Creep, sit, wait," Watson told hismen. "Move on my order. A fewfeet and be still." The Marines were

confident that their cautiousadvance, the 50 or so yards sepa-rating their route from the nearestconcealment the enemy could use,the artificial moonlight, and thetrench itself, which provided readycover in case of an attack, wouldcombine to prevent the Chinesefrom surprising them.

AT LEFT: The 1st Marine Divisionengaged in static warfare dur-ing 1952 from typical segmentsof trench-line on the JamestownLine. Department of Defense Photo(USMC) A167091

479

While two Marines provide protection by watching for enemy snipers, two othermembers of a patrol probe Jbr mines. The Marines in the foreground weararmored vests. By November 1952 delivery of the new vests to the division wascompleted, including more than 400 sets of lower torso armor.

National Archives Photo (U5MC) 127-N-A160817

believed, than from exertion.Fighting took place by day as

well as by night, but an earlymorning attack often depended onpreparations made under cover ofdarkness. For example, beforeLieutenant Watson's platoon tookpart in an early morning attack ona Chinese outpost, Marine engi-neers moved Out shortly after mid-night to mark a path through theminefields protecting the James-town Line. This work took thempast marshy ground inhabited byfrogs that fell silent at the approachof the Marines, only to resumetheir croaking at about 0300 whenthe passage had been marked andthe engineers returned to the mainline of resistance. After daybreak,Watson's platoon advanced, stay-ing between the lines of white-tape Xs that marked the presenceof mines.

New Mission

The night patrol by Watson'sMarines was one in a succession ofprobes and patrols—interspersed

The patrol drew no fire as it

made its way to the objective,where the trench the two patrolshad followed intersected withanother shallower trench. Watsondeployed the fire teams in aperimeter. The Marines strainedtheir eyes and ears to detect move-ment over sandy soil that gleamedalmost white in the cloud-reflectedlight. Nothing moved; Chinese

mortars and machine gunsremained silent.

At 0300 Watson's patrol startedback, the fire team that had led theway out was now at the rear. Thereturn, as cautious and methodicalas the advance, took roughly twohours. When the lieutenant at lastcame through the wire, he realizedhe was soaking wet from perspira-tion, more from tension, he

480

with attacks and counterattacks—that occurred during 1952 after the1st Marine Division moved ontothe Jamestown Line. The movethere in March 1952 confirmed ashift to position warfare. Instead ofmaking amphibious landings as atInchon or Wonsan or seizingground either to break out ofencirclement or to advance, thedivision had the mission of defend-ing its portion of the JamestownLine and preparing to counterat-tack as ordered to contain or elim-inate any Chinese penetration.

The enemy maintained pressureon the United Nations forces. Heprobed the line of combat Out-posts, which provided warning ofattacks and disrupted or delayedthem until the troops posted therecould withdraw, and also tested attimes the defenses of the main line

and 83 railroad cars, along with 14Landing Ships Dock and LandingShips Tank that sailed fromSokoho-ri and unloaded at Inchon.Two transport aircraft also figuredin the move. By the time the divi-sion took over its segment of theJamestown Line on 25 March, com-pleting the relief of a Korean divi-sion, the officers who directed themove realized all too well howmuch excess equipment the unithad accumulated during the periodof comparative stability that fol-lowed the capture of the Punch-bowl in the summer of 1951.

Area of Operations

of resistance. Because of the threatof a major Chinese offensive, thedivision assumed responsibility fortwo other lines, Wyoming andKansas, which might serve as fall-hack positions if Jamestownshould fail. More important thankeeping the Wyoming and Kansaslines ready to be manned, was thedivision's mission, assigned onApril 19, of standing by to rescuethe United Nations truce negotia-tors, should the enemy try to trapthem at Panmunjom.

Operation Mixmaster, the trans-fer of Major General John T.Selden's 1st Marine Division fromX Corps positions in the vicinity ofthe Punchhowl in eastern Korea tothe Jamestown Line north of theImjin River under I Corps control,began on St. Patrick's Day, 17March 1952. The division's majorinfantry units—the 1st, 5th, and 7thMarines, and the 1st KoreanMarine Corps Regiment—theorganic artillery of the 11thMarines, and the service and othersupport units moved over steep

and twisting roads, with almost6,000 truckloads required for thedeployment. The heaviest equip-ment, totaling an estimated 50,000tons, traveled on 63 flatbed trailers

The segment of the JamestownLine assigned to the 1st MarineDivision extended southwest fromthe Samichon River and the leftflank of the British 1st Common-wealth Division, crossed the 38thParallel (the original demarcationbetween North and South Korea),shifted to the south hank of theImjin in the vicinity of Munsan-ni,

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A160928

A landing ship disgorges a Marine tank at Inchon during Operation Mixmaster,the deployment of the 1st Marine Division from east-central to western Korea.

The 5th Marines with reinJbrcing artillery, slowed by muddy roads, moves intoits sector as the division occupied new positions along the Jamestown Line north-east of Seoul.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A160346

481

Amphibian Battalion providingartillery support (thirty-six 75mmguns) and a battalion of the divi-sion reserve, at this time the 7thMarines, serving as a maneuverforce.

continued to the conflux of theImjin and Han, and then followedthe south bank of the Han past theKimpo Peninsula. Initially, the 1stMarines, under Colonel Sidney S.Wade, held the right of the mainline of resistance, the regiment'sright flank on the heights beyondthe Imjin River, some 1,100 yardsnorth of the 38th Parallel. The 5thMarines, commanded by ColonelThomas A. Culbane, Jr., held thecenter of the new line, with a reg-iment of Korean Marines on theleft. Colonel Russell E. Honsowetz'7th Marines served as divisionreserve. An adjustment in Aprilresulted in the insertion of the 1st

Amphibian Tractor Battalion on theleft of the Korean Marines.

The Kimpo Peninsula, boundedby the Han and Yom Rivers, com-plicated the defense of the 1stMarine Division's segment of theJamestown Line, even though anattack there would require theChinese to cross the broad andsometimes raging Han. Defendingthe peninsula became the missionof the Kimpo ProvisionalRegiment, led by Colonel EdwardM. Staab, Jr., an improvised forcemade up of American and SouthKorean soldiers and Marines froma variety of combat and serviceunits, with the 1st Armored

482

The 1st Marine Division—including the Kimpo ProvisionalRegiment, the amphibian tractorbattalion, the Korean Marines, andthe two Marine regiments on line—defended some 60,000 yards,two to four times that normallyassigned to a similarly reinforceddivision. Within the division, a bat-talion, one third of the infantrystrength of a regiment, held a

frontage of from 3,500 to 5,000yards, while a rifle company, one-third the infantry strength of a bat-talion, could man a sector as wideas 1,700 yards. A line of outpostsof varying strength located on hillsas far as 2,500 yards in front of themain line of resistance, improvedthe security of the Jamestown posi-tions, but forced the Marines tospread themselves even thinneralong the front. To defend the divi-sion's broad segment of theJamestown Line, General Seldencommanded a total of 1,364 Marineofficers, 24,846 enlisted Marines,1,100 naval officers and. sailors—mostly doctors, dentists, and med-ical corpsmen—and 4,400 KoreanMarines.

The Imjin River, flowing south-west from the division's right flank,lay behind the main line of resis-tance until the defenses crossedthe river west of Munsan-ni. Sinceonly three bridges—all of themvulnerable to damage from floods—spanned the Imjin, the stream,when in flood, posed a formidableobstacle to the movement of sup-plies and reinforcements. A singlerail line to Munsan-ni served theregion and the existing road netrequired extensive improvement tosupport militaiy traffic. The terrainvaried from mountainous, with

sharp-backed ridges delineatingnarrow valleys, to rice paddies andmud flats along the major rivers.West-central Korea promised to bea difficult place for the reinforcedhut widely spread 1st MarineDivision to conduct sustained mili-tary operations.

General Selden's Marines tookover their portion of theJamestown Line from SouthKorean soldiers manning an areathat had become something of abackwater, perhaps because of itsproximity to Kaesong, where trucetalks had begun, and Panmunjomwhere they were continuing. "Itwas quite apparent," Seldon noted,"that the relieved ROK [Republic ofKoreal Division had not been con-ducting an aggressive defense." Asa result, the Marines inheritedbunkers built to protect more

against the elements than againstenemy mortars and artillery.Korean noncombatants, takingadvantage of the lull, had resumedfarming in the area, moving aboutand creating concealment for pos-sible Chinese infiltration.

To oppose the Marines on theJamestown Line, the ChineseCommunist Forces (CCF) had the65th and 63d Armies, totaling49,800 troops. Probing the Marineoutposts and the main line of resis-tance were an estimated 15infantry battalions, equipped withsmall arms, automatic weapons,and mortars, and supported by 10battalions of artillery, totaling 106guns ranging from 75mm to155mm. Unlike the defenses theMarines had inherited, the solidlybuilt Chinese bunkers were pro-tected by barbed wire, minefields,

and other obstacles, and organizedto provide defense in depth. Avariety of automatic weapons,including 37mm guns, providedantiaircraft protection.

1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Under the command of MajorGeneral Christian F. Schilt, whohad earned the Medal of Honorduring the Nicaraguan campaignfor a daring rescue in January 1928,the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing con-sisted of land- and carrier-basedfixed-wing aircraft plus helicopters.The land-based fighter and attacksquadrons, whether flying jets orpropeller aircraft, came under theoperational control of the Fifth AirForce, which in early 1952 wasattempting to direct Marine Corpsand Air Force activity from a JointOperations Center at Seoul. Withthe exception of Marine AircraftGroup 12 (MAG-12), the compo-nents of the wing based in easternSouth Korea remained there whenthe division moved westward.MAG- 12's night fighter squadron,VMF (N)-513, shifted to the airfieldat Kunsan, and the rest of thegroup, including two fighter Out-fits, began flying from Pyongtaek,also in April. Unlike the land-basedfighter-bombers and attack air-craft—and the new jet-equippedphotographic squadron, VMJ-1—the wing's helicopters, light obser-vation planes, and carrier-basedfighter-bombers directly supportedthe 1st Marine Division.

The inventory of Marine rotary-wing aircraft included Bell HTL-4and Sikorsky HO3S-1 light heli-copters and the larger SikorskyHRS-1. The fixed-wing, piston-engine aircraft ranged in size fromthe unarmed, lightweight CessnaOE-1 to the Douglas AD-2Skyraider the most powerful, heav-iest, and deadliest single-engineattack plane of the era. Marines

LtGen John W "Iron Mike" O'Danie4 USA, I Corps commander; right, joinsMajGen John T Selden, center, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division,and Col Thomas A. ulhane, left, commanding officer of the 5th Marines, on aninspection of the regiment sector of the main line of resistance.

Ntjoal Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A160325

483

ArIDi tice Talks

D uring the 'ummer of 1951. the ·ucces... ion ofoffensi\' and counteroffensives ended ~vith theestablishment of a line that stretched acros... the

Korean peninsula generally along the 38th Parallel. TIll'hin se had suffered gtievous losses after inten ening in

late 1950. Ithough the dro\'e the l 'nited ;\"ati ms forcesout of orth Korea, they failed to hold a bridgehead inth' . outh that for a time included the capital 'ity, :eoul.As th' names of two l'nited rations counlerattacks,

permions Killer and Ripper, indicated. the United State:-.and its allies sought to inflict casualties rather than recap­tur' ground. Thi. strategy magnified the effect of the'nem ,'s earlier losses and succeeded so well thatommunist hine.e Forces (CCF)-and Chinese soci 'ty,

as \ ell-needed a respite from the cumulative attritionof late 19-0 and early 19'51.

n armistice also seemed attractive to the l'nited:tates for I' asons of b th strategy and domestic politics.The lengthening list of nerican asualties, and the con­tinuation into a second and third year of a war describ 'din 'ovember 1950 as on the \'erge of being \yon, under­mined puhlic support for the onflic£. derisi\'elydescribed a' ,vIr. Truman's war, as though the Presidenthad somehow started the fighting. In terms of strategy,Europe, where the. oviet Union and its satellites seemedready to te't the new orth tlantic Treaty Organization( l' ), seemed more imponant than the Far East.

Indeed. a cea.dire that would free American forces fromtheir commitment in Korea. enahling th 'm to strengthen'AT ,sh ukl \york to the long-term strategic ath'antage

of the l'nited 'tates.... a result. \\'hen the SO\ iet delegate to the ('nited

'ations. Jacob lalik, suggested discussing the possihili­ty of negotiating an armisti 'C in Korea. th' l'nited :tatesand it.... allies agreed. The preliminary discussions h 'ganon 8 July 1951 at Kaesong, south of the 38th Parallel andsom ' 5'5 miles northeast of S 'Old. The ,hinese and orthKoreans showed little nthusia:-.m for negotiations untilthe United '\lations, in July and August mounted a limit­ed offensive that resulted in the caplllre of thePunchhowl. On 25 October negotiations resumed atPanmunjom, a \'illage iu ... t south or the 38th Parallcl.\\ hich h 'came a demilitariLed island in a sea of fightingand wa ... linked by a road to .outh Korean territory,

13) the end of )lQ\'emher, the negotiators had agreedthat the hattie line, rather than the 38th Parallel. would:-.en ' t 'mporarily as the line of demarcation bet~veen thet\yO Koreas. a boundary that heclme permanent, essen­tially hy default as other issues LOok pr' 'edence in then ·gotiations. liIitaly operations slQ\\'(~d. as did the paceof the talks. \\'hich, by the time the ~larines entered thJamestown Line. had encountered several obstacles. themost seriolls dealing \" ith the repatriation of prisoners ofwar.

484

also flew the Vought F4U-4 Corsair,a piston-powered fighter-bomber, adozen of which operated from theescort carriers Bataan (CVL 29)and Bairoko (AKV 15), and laterthe light carrier Badoeng Strait(CVE 116). A more heavily armoredversion of the Corsair, the AU,served as an attack aircraft. TheMarine Corps jets were theGrumman F9F Panther fighter-bomber, the McDonnell F2H-2Pphoto plane, and the Douglas F3DSkyknight, a two-seat night fighter.The Skyknight by year's end

became the principal Marine nightfighter, replacing the piston-engineGrum-man F7F Tigercat, whichcontinued until the spring of 1953to fly interdiction and close air sup-port during darkness.

Like their fellow Marines on theground, the airmen operated underrestrictions peculiar to a limitedwar. Air strikes were prohibited inthe vicinity of Panmunjom to avoidjeopardizing the truce talks.Moreover, to ease the task of theJoint Operations Center in exercis-ing centralized control over tactical

485

aviation, the number of close-sup-port sorties flown over the battle-front could not exceed 96 eachday. In general, the allocation of airpower proved flexible enough tosatisfy General Schilt. Althoughconceding that Marines on theground "did not always get all thatthey wanted" because the wingwas "sometimes ... tied up withthe Air Force," Schilt found that "ifthere was anything we particularlywanted to do and thought it neces-sary to support our ground forces,we'd go over and talk to them [rep-resentatives of the Fifth Air Force]and they'd go along with us."

Besides affecting aerial opera-tions, the neutral zone aroundPanmunjom influenced the missionof the Marine division. On 19 April,General Selden, reacting to ordersfrom higher headquarters, directedthe regiment with the best accessto Panmunjom to draft a plan torescue the United Nations TruceTeam if it should be trapped there.The regiment that fit this descrip-tion, initially the 5th Marines, orga-nized a tank-infantry team fromwithin its reserve battalion. Sup-ported by tanks and fire from mor-tars and artillery, a covering forcewould advance along the demilita-rized corridor leading to the nego-tiation site and seize the dominantground beyond Panmunjom so thata second group could move in andpick up the negotiators. A thirdcontingent would escort the pick-up force as it brought the truceteam to a safe area behind theJamestown Line.

Artfflery and Air

During the spring of 1952, thefighting along the Jamestown Linegradually intensified, requiring thesupport of artillery and aircraft. The105mm and 155mm howitzers ofthe 11th Marines joined tanks andother weapons in battering Chinese

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A133271

BGen Clayton C. Jerome, right, the new commanding general of the 1st MarineAircraft Wing, tours the front in a transport helicopter piloted by Col Keith B.McCutcheon, commanding oJjIcer of Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron161. BGen Jerome replaced MajGen Christian F Schilt in command of the wingon 12 April1952.

Offshore Islands

Battalion Tactical Air Control Party

On the Jamestown Line, the Tactical ir Control Parry assigned to

'ach batLa!ion on the main line of resistan 'e linked the groundforces \ ith the aircraft sUI porting them. t this stage of the war,

th ,e IXlIties 'onsisted of two larine orps officers, both of th m navalaviators, and eight enlisted men who handled radio and wire communi­catie ns and drove the truck assigned to the group. Earlier in the fighting,lhe truck prOVided necessary mobility, but the controllers could no\\ oper­ate from command bunkers using radios located there instead of relyingon th ' temperamental set mounted in the \·ehicle.

'\ hill' the battlefront remained fluid, one officer served as a forward aircontroller with each of the two infantry companies. the third companynormally being in reserve. After the move to the Jamestown Line, one ofthe offi 'ers took his pia 'e at a forward command post, usually a I unkerm re solidly built than those that shelwred the infantrymen, calling strikesin SUPPOJ1 of the Marines manning the defens s. The other remained atthe balla!ion commander's suppoJ1ing ann center, serving as air liaisonoffi ·er. Every \vcck or two. the airmen changed places.

Even before the Marines occupied positions on the Jamestown Line,they were involved in the defense of several offshore islands on the

_ east and west coasts of Korea. The 1st Marine Division prOVided offi­cers and enlisted men to direct the Korean Marines actually manning thedefenses, but in January Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, took over, usuallyemploying Marines who volunteered for this duty after recovering fromwounds suffered while selving with the division. The West Coast IslandDefense Unit bore responsibility for six islands astride the 38th Parallel,while the East Coast Defense Unit guarded nine islands, seven clusteredaround Wonsan, within artillelY range of the mainland, and the other two

near Songjin.The eastern islands proved tempting to the Chinese, who occasionally

took them under fire, and attacked the two Yang-do Islands, 160 milesnortheast of Wonsan, where the South Korean defenders, backed byUnited Nations ships, beat off the invaders. In March, the United NationsCommand sought to strengthen its hold on the western islands by seizingHo-do, an unoccupied islet north of the 38th Parallel, even though it laywithin range of enemy snipers on the mainland and might be attacked inwinter by advancing across the ice. The occupation neveltheless wentahead, but a Chinese amphibious attack on the night of 25-26 March over­whelmed the South Korean platoon that held Ho-do. Only six members ofthe platoon slllvived, and the United Nations Command made no attemptto recapture the tiny island. The Chinese refrained from fUlther amphibi­ous activity, but instead struck back with a rare aerial attack, bombing Cho-do, one of the western islands, though ineffectually.

that General Selden's division wasgetting a lion's share of close airsupport in the theater.

Stabilization of the battle lineenhanced the value of ground­based radar in nighttime close airsupport. The Air Force had begunusing an improvised system inJanualY 1951, and September ofthat year marked the introductioninto combat of the Marine-devel­oped MPQ-14 radar. Despite nag­ging technical problems, theMarine radar and its operatorsbecame increasingly precise until,by mid-1952, the Fifth Air Forcegranted permission to usc theMPQ-14, supplemented by a tacti­cal air controller with the troops onthe ground, to direct close air sup­port.

One supporting arm, artillery,sometimes came to the aid ofanother, Marine Corps aviation.Even before the 1st Marine

close air support. Although thenumber of these daily trainingsources increased to 20, the pro­gram lasted only until 3 August,largely because of Army complaints

positions. The artillerymen experi­mented successfully with variable­time fuses, actuated by radiowaves. When fitted to a standardhigh-explosive shell, the fuseachieved airbursts at a height ofabout 20 meters above Marinedefensive positions, which hadoverhead cover. Logs, sandbags,and earth protected the Marines,while a deadly hail of shell frag­ments scourged the attackers.Concentrations of variable-timefire, delivered in conjunction withso-called "box-me-in" barrages thatplaced a curtain of fire aroundfriendly forces, became standardtactics. On 18 May 1952, for exam­ple, Chinese troops cut off aMarine platoon led by SecondLieutenant Theodore H. Watson, asit withdrew from the outpost line.Watson shepherded his men intotwo abandoned bunkers and calledfor airbursts overhead, whichhelped scatter the enemy.

Marine aviation also supportedoperations along the JamestownLine. In May 1952, the Fifth AirForce granted the Marines an addi­tional dozen sorties per day to traincontrollers, ground commanders,and pilots in the techniques of

486

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A161586

Marine 105mm howitzer crews of the 11th Ma rifles prepare to fire in support ofthe Jamestown Line by "clobbering" Chinese command posts bivouac areas,artillery and mortar positions, and observation outposts.

Division deployed to the James-town Line, the 11th Marines wasfiring flak suppression missions insupport of close air strikes. Thebatteries tried to neutralize ordestroy known antiaircraft posi-tions, some of them discoveredwhen aircraft began an attack onlyto break it off deliberately afterforcing the Chinese guns to cutloose and reveal their locations.

Despite the doctrinal emphasison close air support, in the sum-mer of 1952 Marine pilots wereattacking targets far beyond thebattle line as a part of the Fifth AirForce's Operation Pressure,designed to destroy importantNorth Korean industrial facilities.During one such mission, ColonelRobert E. Galer, who commandedMAG-12 in Korea and had earnedthe Medal of Honor at Guadalcanalin World War II, led 31 attack air-craft against targets in the moun-tains southwest of Wonsan. HisVought AU Corsair sustained dam-age from antiaircraft fire thatforced him to parachute. One footbecame wedged in the cockpit, buthe managed to kick free of the

in 10 feet of his crashed aircraft.He got away from the wreckage,which was sure to attract theenemy, found concealment, andwith his survival radio contacted arescue force orbiting overhead. Asa helicopter darted in his directionat treetop height, he ignited asmoke grenade to mark his posi-tion and enable the rescue craft topick him up. The flight to a shipoff the coast proved more danger-ous than the actual pick up, forenroute to safety antiaircraft shellsexploded so close that the concus-sion spun the helicopter around,fuel ran low, and patches of fogconcealed landmarks making navi-gation difficult.

Ground Fighting Intensifies

The Marines and the Chinesesoon began clashing over the highground between the frontlinesthat could accommodate combat

doomed airplane, which almostran him down in its gyrations. Hesucceeded, however, in openinghis chute and drifted to earth with-

Gen Holland M. Smith, a leader of the amphibious war against Japan and whoseMarines fought their way from Tarawa to Okinawa, visits the Jamestown Line inKorea. From the left are: Col Russell E. Honsowetz, commander of the 7thMarines; Col Frederick P. Henderson, commander of the 11th Marines GenSmith; and MajGen John T Selden, commanding general of the 1st MarineDivision.

Department of Defense Photo (usMc) A161123

487

outposts or observation posts. Aseries of objectives that theMarines designated by letters ofthe alphabet became a bone ofcontention early in May. Thesewere Objective S, a small outcrop-ping northwest of the main line ofresistance, and V, X, Y, and Z,three separate peaks on a ridgeextending northeastward from Sand forming an angle of roughly45 degrees with the main line ofresistance. As part of the continuedprobing that occurred almost everynight, First Lieutenant Ernest S.

Lee, commander of Company A,1st Battalion, 5th Marines, led hisunit, reinforced with light andheavy .30-caliber machine guns, tooccupy the high ground south ofObjective Y, arriving there beforesunrise on 4 May. The Chineseimmediately opened fire with mor-tars, but an aerial observer spotteda half-dozen of the weapons andcalled in Marine F4U-4Bs that

destroyed them. The enemy thenattacked unsuccessfully, but sincemore powerful attacks seemed cer-tain, the reinforced platoon pulledback.

Twice during the withdrawal,Chinese troops tried to ambush thepatrol, which used its ownweapons to beat off the firstattempt and called down artilleryfire to help frustrate the second.Forced from their route by the sec-ond ambush, Marines carrying thepatrol's casualties, one dead andfour wounded, entered anunmarked and uncharted mine-field left behind by United Nationstroops; two stretcher bearers werekilled and three others woundedby the mines, which later werecleared.

Colonel Thomas A. Cuihane, incommand of the 5th Marines,directed the 1st Battalion, underLieutenant Colonel Franklin B.

Nihart, to drive the enemy from the

vicinity of Objective Y, in theprocess taking prisoners andinflicting casualties, before seizingObjective Z. Nihart decided to cap-ture Objectives S, V, and X beforeattacking Objective Y; if all wentwell, he could then move againstz.

Nihart used his battalion'sCompany C to feint towardObjective T, located between theridge and the Marine division'smain line of resistance, in anattempt to neutralize the Chinesethere and prevent them from inter-fering with the attack, which beganwhen Company A, the 1st Platoonleading the way, quickly overranObjective S. Fire from the Marinedivision's rocket battery shook thedefenders of Objective V, enablingthe attackers to capture it. BothMarine and Chinese artillerystepped up their firing as theNihart's men reorganized toadvance on Objective X. in prepa-ration for that move, friendly firefrom artillery, mortars, tanks, andeven machine guns scourged theknob raising a cloud of dust thatenveloped it and blinded theattacking Marines, who encoun-tered increasingly savage fire asthey climbed the slope.

At this point, the Chinese coun-terattacked. Although the Marinesbeat back this thrust, other probesfollowed, as infiltrators tried to iso-late the 1st Platoon from the rest ofCompany A. To maintain theintegrity of his unit, the companycommander, First Lieutenant ErnestS. Lee, pulled back the endangeredplatoon, while Chinese artilleryrained fire on Objective X, some400 rounds exploding in five min-utes. The deadly fire forcedCompany A to abandon the toe-hold on X and then fall back to themain line of resistance under thecover of fire from the division'stanks. The Marines, however, setup a part-time outpost on

Marines on patrol forward of the main line check out a cache of enemy ammu-nition Jbund in an abandoned farmhouse. In addition to denying the enemyuse of critical terrain, inflicting casualties and capturing prisoners were addedtasks assigned to daily patrols.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-442340

488

Objective Y, at first manning itmostly during daylight. In thebloodiest single day of fightingsince the capture of thePunchbowl, the Marines sufferedseven killed and 66 wounded, per-haps one-fourth the number of theChinese casualties.

The fighting now shifted east-ward. After relieving the 5thMarines, the 7th Marines, com-manded by Colonel Russell E.

Honsowetz, attacked Hill 104 andthe adjacent ridgeline, located onthe regimental right. Advancingduring darkness on the early morn-

ing of 28 May, Companies A and Cof Lieutenant Colonel George W. E.Daughtiy's 1st Battalion, seizedtheir objectives but could not holdthem against fierce Chinese reac-tion and fell back to theJamestown Line. The fightingproved costlier than the strugglefor Objectives S, T, V, W, and X,with seven Marines killed and 107wounded. Two of those killed inaction were honored posthumous-ly with the Medal of Honor:Corporal David B. Champagne forthrowing himself on a grenade tosave the lives of other Marines; and

489

Private First Class John D. Kelly forsacrificing his life while gallantlyattacking enemy positions.

Despite the developing stale-mate, the Marine division contin-ued probing, sending out patrolsas large as a company to raidChinese positions, killing orwounding the defenders and keep-ing the enemy off balance. BothAmerican and South KoreanMarines conducted these actions,and the Chinese retaliated in kind,as on the night of 24 June, whenthey cut off the elements of the 5thMarines manning an outpost onObjective Y, now redesignated Hill159. Hostile mortar and artilleryfire prevented the Marines fromwithdrawing over the trails leadingback to the Jamestown Line, butthey were able to take cover intheir bunkers while fire from the11th Marines helped frustrate theattack. The Marines could not holdthe hill against a determinedenemy, and by the end of themonth, a Chinese battalion occu-pied it.

The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,used its Company G to attack Hill159, occupying an assault positionon the night of 2 July and attackingat dawn of the following morning.The first phase went smoothly, andthe assault began at 0630. Deadlyfire from the battalion holding Hill159 stalled the attack until theleader of a Marine machine gunsquad, Staff Sergeant William E.Shuck, Jr., took over a rifle squadwhose leader had been wounded.Shuck maneuvered the combinedsquads up the hill and clung to theexposed position until ordered towithdraw. While pulling hisMarines back, the sergeant suf-fered a third and fatal wound.Shuck's daring and initiativeearned him a posthumous Medalof Honor, but the hill remained inChinese hands, even though thedefenders may have suffered 200

Situation on the Night of16-17 May 1951

01234

casualties compared to fourMarines killed and 40 wounded.

On the right of the division'sline, the portion now held by the5th Marines, Company A of theregiment's 1st Battalion overrantwo unoccupied outposts on thenight of 2-3 July before receivingorders to return to the main line ofresistance. A patrol from the regi-ment's 2d Battalion ambushed aChinese patrol shortly before mid-night on 2 July, suffering no casu-alties while killing six of the enemyand wounding eight. Anotherpatrol from the same battalion setout shortly after dawn on 3 Julyand engaged in an hour-long fire-fight that killed or wounded anunknown number of Chinese atthe cost of one Marine killed and11 wounded.

Within the next few days, twoambitious operations wouldinvolve the 1st Marine Division.The first was OperationFirecracker, a fire mission plannedfor 4 July when I Corps wouldmass artillery fire on targets allalong the battle line, timing theshoot so that all the shells woulddetonate within one minute, a

technique known as time on tar-get. The 11th Marines opened firewith its howitzers, and the 4.5-inchrocket battery joined in as didcorps artillery, so that 3,202 shellsdetonated almost simultaneouslyon Chinese positions in front of theMarine division.

Besides thus helping celebrateIndependence Day, the Marinestook part, over General Selden'sobjections, in large-scale raids,directed by Major General Paul W.Kendall, USA, I Corps commander,to gather additional intelligence onChinese defenses. The division'scommanding general believed thathis Marines were spread so thinthat he could not pull together aforce strong enough to conductsuch a raid without jeopardizingthe overall security of theJamestown Line. Selden suggestedthat smaller patrols could obtainthe necessary information with lessrisk. The Marine general alsopointed out that 2,651 officers andenlisted men were in the processof returning to the United Statesand that their replacements wouldnot be in place until 11 July.Although the British commander ofthe adjacent 1st CommonwealthDivision, Brigadier C. N. Barclay,agreed that the more ambitiousraids might well prove too costlyfor the results achieved, Selden's

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A162789

On the forward slope of Outpost Yoke (Hill 159) exhausted members of the 34-man 5th Marines outpost relax on the morning of 25 June. The night before theywithstood an assault on the position by an estimated enemy battalion, killing orwounding more than 100 Chinese soldiers.

One enemy soldier reached the Marine entrenchment at Yoke before being killed.He was armed with nothing but stick hand grenades carried in a belt under hisarm and a gas mask, the first known instance qf the enemy being equipped withmasks in the division's sector of the line.

Department of Defense Photo (usMc) A162793

490

Corporal Duane E. Dewey

Born in 1931 in Grand Rapids, Michigan, he enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserves

in 19'51. .In K~rea, h~ served as a ma~l~ine gun squad leader with C~mpany E,2d 13attalton, ')th Mannes, and was cntlcally wounded near PanmunJom on 16

AI ril 19'52. J lis Medal of Iionor citation reads, in part:

When an enemy grenad ' landed clo e to this position. while he and hi. assistant gun­ner \\ ere receiving medical :Jltention for their \younds during a fierce night attack bynumerically superior hostil ' forces, Corporal Dewey, although suffering intense pain,immediately pulled the corpsman to the ground and, shouting a warning to the otherMarines around him, bravely smothered the dea lIy missile with his body, personal­ly ahsorhing the full force of th xplosion t sa his comrades from possible injuryor death.

Th' survivors of his h 'roic s If-sacrifice never forgot his remark1ble shout, as hethrew himself on the grenade, "Do', [ got it in my hip pocket!" After presenting the

Iedal on 12 March 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower told him: ''You must ha\'e a body of teel."

Corporal David B. Champagne

Born in Wakefield, Rhode Island, in 1932, Corporal '.1ampagne enlisted in theMarine Corps in 19'51. Serving as a fire team leader with Company A, 1stBallalion, 7th Marine', he was killed on 28 May 1952. lIis Medal of (lemor

citation reads, in palt:

orporal Champagne skillfully led his fire team through a vclitablc hail of inten~e

enemy machine-gun, . mall-arms and grenade fire, overrunning trenches and a seri 'sof almost impregnable bunker positions before reaching the crest of the hill and plac­ing his men in defensive p()~itions. Suffering a painful leg wound while assisting inrepelling th ensuing hostile counterattack, which was launched under cover of amurderous hail of llloltar and artillery fire, he steadfastly refused evacuation and fear­lessly continued to control his fire team. When the enemy counterattack increasedin intensity, and a ho,~tile grenade landed in the midst of the fire team, CorporalChampagne unhesitiltingly seized the deadly missil and hurled it in the direction of Ikp"nment oillek-n.," ""010(\ "ICl \2,OW

the approaching enemy. ~ the grenade left his hand, it exploded, blowing off his hand and throwing him out ofthe tr ·nch. [He \vasJ mOltall wounded by enemy mOltar fire while in this e 'posed position.

orporal Champagne's IVledal of Ile)llor was presented to hi, younger brother during ceremonies held in July 1953 atthe Old Mountain Baseball Field in Wakefield.

Private First Class John D. Kelly

A 23-year-old native of YoungslO\ n, Ohi , he enlist d in the Marine Corps in1951. As a radio operator in Company C, lst Battalion, 7th Marines, he vol­unteered to join an assault and was killed on 28 May 1952. His kdal of

lIonor citation read', in part:

Fearles~ly charging forward in the face of a murderous hail of machine-gun fireand hand grenades, he initiated a daring attack against a hostile strongpoint andpersonally neutralized the position, killing two of the enemy. Unyielding in theface of heavy odds, he continued forward and Single-handedly assaulted amachine-gun bunker. Although painfully wounded, he bravely charged the bunkerand d 'strayed it, killing three of the enemy. Courageously continuing his one-manassault, he again stormed forward in a valiant attempt to wipe out a third hunkerand boldly delivered point-blank fire into the aperture of the hostile emplacement.- aptain John C. Chapin. SMCR (Ret)

491

l:k:pJnmt'llt (JI Ikklhc: Ph()\.llil .... \1< .• \ II).~)I;;

National Archives Photo (LJSMC) 127-N-A161138

Marines hug the trench as a Communist mortar lands near- blesome enemy mortar positions in support qf the divisionby. Marine Corsairs were often called upon to destroy trou- outpost line.

arguments for waiting until his The war on the Jamestown Line became a battle for the combat outposts that pro-

division returned to full numerical vided security for the main line of resistance. These Marines are preparing to join

strength and in the meantime dis- in the fIghting on the outpost line.Department of Defense l'hoto (LJSMC) A163311

patching smaller patrols did notprevail.

A tank-infantry team made theMarine division's contribution tolarge-scale patrolling with Buck-shot 2B, an operation launched on6 July. At 2200, two companies ofLieutenant Colonel Daughtry's 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, supportedby elements of the 1st TankBattalion, advanced against Hill159. The assault force braveddeadly fire to gain a lodgment onthe hill. Because they were in dan-ger of encirclement, the Marineshad to pull back before daylight.General Selden had been correct;the intelligence gained did not jus-tify the effort and the casualties—12 dead, 85 wounded, and fivemissing. Until the incorporation of

492

stoutly defended hill.

Siberia

The hunker symbolized thefighting along the Jamestown Lineand its combat outposts likeSiberia. To build hunkers for futurefighting, Marine engineers andtruck drivers, and some 500 mem-bers of the Korean Service Corps,cut trees, shaped timbers, andhauled the rough-hewn beamssome 50 miles to the sector held bythe 1st Marine Division. Whensome 35,000 timbers proved insuf-ficient, the Eighth Army made upthe difference, and work wentahead on the Jamestown Line, itscombat outposts, and the twohack-up lines, Wyoming andKansas. Although a company ofM.arine engineers, assisted as nec-essary by members of the 1st ShoreParty Battalion, provided supervi-sion, infantrymen did most of thework, following plans prepared by

deep, excavated using shovels,without the aid of earth-movingmachineiy. Once the timbers werein place, some of them shapedfrom tree trunks eight inches indiameter, and the basic structurefinished, the Marines covered theroof, some four feet of timbers,with another three or four feet ofearth, rock, and sandbags. If care-fully built, the structure could with-stand a direct hit from a 105mmshell, besides affording protectionagainst shrapnel from time-fusedshells exploding overhead. The liv-ing bunker provided sleepingquarters and the fighting bunkerfeatured firing ports for machineguns and rifles.

Bunker construction failed,however, to keep pace with plansor achieve the desired degree ofprotection. Fatigue contributed tothe shortcomings, since theinfantrymen who by day dug holesand manhandled timbers into

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A164200

Marine ohsevers direct an air strike on Hill 122, later called Bunker Hill, aCommunist position critical to the fighting.

replacements had restored thestrength of the division, emphasisshifted to smaller patrols with lessambitious objectives than raiding a

the Army for the assembly of theready-cut timbers. The Marines setup each standard bunker in a hole12-feet square and seven-foot

PFC James McIntosh of Company H, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, aims a .50-cal-iber machine gun with mounted scope at Communist positions from Hill 229.The 750-foot-high Paekhak Hill, a mile east of the road leading to Panmunjomand Kaesong, was the goal of Communist forces who hoped to acquire the dom-inant terrain necessary for controlling access to Seoul.

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-5C411556

493