abstract - mbienenstock.free.frmbienenstock.free.fr/docs/hermann_cohen_s_concept_of_history.pdfkarl...

$: Abstract - mbienenstock.free.frmbienenstock.free.fr/docs/Hermann_Cohen_s_Concept_of_History.pdfKarl Lowith, a German author of Jewish origins, launches a \iolent attack against Jewish$
H E R M A N N C O H E N O N T H E C O N C E P T O F H I S T O R Y : A N I N V E N T I O N O F P R O P H E T I S M ?

M y r i a m Bienenstock Universite Francois Rabelais, Tours

Abstract

A t the beginning of his best seller Meaning in History, K a r l Lowi th launches a violent attack against Jewish prophetism, using the philosophy of histor\ of H e r m a n n Cohen as his first and foremost example. This aracle pui-jDoits to show that Lowith misinterpreted the thought of Hermann Cohen. I t also reclaims Cohen's own posi-don on history and on the philosophy of history by identifying the questions Cohen himself had asked i n his time. A t the end of the article, some paths of research are indicated that might prove themselves fruitful today, in a further studv" of Cohen's diought.

K e y w o r d s H e r m a n n Cohen; secularization; prophetism; philosophy of history

A t the v e r y b e g i n n i n g o f his best seller Meaning in History (1949), K a r l L o w i t h , a G e r m a n a u t h o r o f Jewish or igins , launches a \ io lent attack against Jewish prophet i sm. H e r o d o t u s a n d the prophet Isa iah , he wri tes , were almost contemporaries . I f we recoenize th i s , we w i l l appreciate the

unbr idgeab le gu l f chat separates Greek w i s d o m f r o m Jew-sh r j i i j - . . The b i b l i c a l a n d pos t -Chr i suan o u t l o o k o n histon.- is fu tunst i c . per.-en:r.s the classical m e a n i n g o f hutorein, w h i c h is re lated to present and past events. I n the Greek a n d R o m a n mytholog ies a n d genealogies the past is r e - p r e s e n t e d as a n e v e r l a s t i n g f o u n d a t i o n . I n the Hebrew- and C h r i s t i a n v i e w of h i s t o ry the past is a promise to the fu ture ; conseq u e n t l y , the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the past b e c o m e s a p r o p h e c y i n reverse. '

' K . Lowith , Meaning in History: The 'Dieological Implications of the Philosophy of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 6. The German edition was published in 1953 under the tide Weltgeschichte und Heilsgesctwhrn: Die theologischen Voraussetzungen der Geschichtsp/iilosophie (Mainz: Kohlhammer) .

© Koninklijke Bri l l NV, Leiden, 2012 Also available online - br i l l .n l / j j tp

J J 7 P 2 0 . 1 D O L 10.1163/147728512X629817

56 MYRIAM BIENENSTOCK

I n the postwar p e r i o d w h e n the book appeared, the a r g u m e n t that the Jewish f a i t h , a n d also Chr i sdani ty , h a d " p e r v e r t e d " Greek classicism i n t o some k i n d o f " f u t u r i s m " must have been perceived as a t h r e a t e n i n g accusation, p a r t i c u l a r l y w h e n one reflects o n the fact tha t " f u t u r i s m , " a n d n o t a b l y a n d j u s t i f i a b l y the I t a l i a n avant-garde a r t m o v e m e n t that i n i t i a t e d the t e r m , have o f ten been associated w i t h fascist movements ! A l t h o u g h n o t made expl i c i t i n the i n t r o d u c tion to Meaning in History, the association was most cer ta in ly a lready there. I t also was none o ther t h a n the Jewish phi losopher H e r m a n n C o h e n w h o m L o w i t h q u o t e d i n support . I n his book's f irst pages he excerpted l o n g passages f r o m Cohen's works :

The concept of history is a product of prophetism WTiat Greek intellectualism could not produce, prophetism has achieved, h i Greek consciousness, historein is equivalent to inquiry, narration, and knowledge. To the Greeks, history remains something we can kno \ because i t is a matter of "fact" [factum'\. that is, of the past. The prophet, however, is a seer, not a scholar; his prophetic \ision has created our concept of historv- as being essentially of the future. T ime becomes pr imar i ly future, and future the priman,- content o f our historical thought. For this new future the "creator of heaven and earth" is not sufficient. He has to create "a new heaven and a new earth." I n this transformation the idea of progress is implied. Instead of a golden age in the mythological past, the true historical existence on earth is constituted by <m eschatological future.^

L o w i t h argued that a phi losophy o f h i s t o i y o f the k i n d developed by H e r m a n n C o h e n w o u l d be n o t h i n g else, at b o t t o m , than escha-to logy i n disguise. H e r e again , the cr i t i ca l tone, a n d the accusation, were not h a r d to perceive. L o w i t h drew a straight l ine connec t ing Cohen's concept ion o f history' w i t h m a n y od ier conceptions o f hi>-toiy, Jewish a n d C h r i s t i a n , ancient and m o d e r n , also i n c l u d i n g H e g e l a n d M a r x i n his survey; a n d he c o n d e m n e d them a l l . a r g u i n g that they h a d depar ted f r o m the scholarly aims o r ig ina l l y set for h i s t o r i o g r a p h y b y the Greeks. H i s b o o k was read as an u n a m b i s u o u s dec larat ion o f w a r against the phi losophy o f history' as such, as a disc ipl ine. I t also was this dec larat ion o f w a r that accounted for the

- Meaning in History, 17—8; Weltgeschichte und ^eitgeschehm, 25. Lowith's quotations f rom Cohen are f rom Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentwns. 2nd ed. (Wiesbaden: Fourier, 1978), 305-8, 291-2 ; English translation i n Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism, trans. Simon Kaplan (Adanta: Scholars Press, 1995), 261-3, 249—50. Lowi th also uses Cohen's Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, 4th ed., i n Werke, vol. 6 p i ldeshe im: Ohns, 2005), 153-4 (hereafter abbreviated as Logik).

HERMANN COHEN ON THE CONCEPT OF HISTORY 57

book's great success: g iven the oppos i t i on to c o m m u n i s t countr ies that character ized the C o l d War , c r i t i c i sm o f so-called M a r x i s t p h i losophies o f h i s tory was o n l y too readi ly accepted.

L o w i t h ' s b o o k is s t i l l i n use, also a m o n g specialists i n J e w i s h t h o u g h t . B u t can i t serve as a guide for s tudy ing H e r m a n n Cohen's concept ion o f h i s t o i y or even, m o r e generally, Jewish conceptions o f history? Ref lect ion o n history, a n d u p o n the theoret ical a n d c o n ceptual paradigms accord ing to w h i c h h is tory should be studied, is most cer ta in ly one o f the m a j o r fields o f research i n w h i c h specifi ca l ly Jewish modes o f t h o u g h t , a n d Jewish sources, m i g h t reveal themselves to be f r u i t f u l . M o r e t h a n t h i r t y years ago, Yosef H a y i m Y e r u s h a l m i h a d d r a w n a t t ent i on to this field o f research w i t h his much-ce lebrated l i tde book ent i t l ed âkhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory.^ Y e r u s h a l m i , w h o also drew o n L o w i t h . ^ insisted u p o n the tension between the Jewish c o m m a n d m e n t o f r emembrance and the re lat ive ly n e w interest o f Jewish h istor ians i n h is tor iography . H e p o i n t e d out that there m i g h t be a split , an oppos i t i on , bcrween die two . B u t he also left m a n y questions open. Shou ldn ' t chose o f u< w h o are interested i n f u r t h e r i n g m o d e r n Jewish t h o u g h t be p a r t i c u l a r l y interested by the questions he r a i s e d — t h e ep i s temolog i ca l , ph i losophica l questions raised by the w r i t i n g o f history, m o r e p a r t i cu lar ly o f Jewish histo iy?

M y c o n t e n t i o n is, however, that i f we are to move f o r w a r d o n these questions, there also is an imperat ive need to first k n o w the w o r k that has already been done: othen.\ise we stand in danger o f t r a m p i n g paths already t rodden , a n d o f repeat ing pas: e r n : - . Even t h o u g h i n m y vie^v L o w i t h ' s book cannot be o f m u c h u-e :: r r u r h e r research, I t h i n k chat the power fu l influence ic exerced up n.^nv o ther c o n t e m p o r a r y authors , i n c l u d i n g Jewish ones, makes it necessary to reconsider its arguments . I n this paper. I shall therefore begin w i t h such a reconsiderat ion. T o i l lustrate the basic i n i e n a o n ' : f : h r book , I shall give a te l l ing example , one that bears u p o n the famous debate b e t w e e n H a n s B l u m e n b e r g a n d L o w i t h o n the issue o f

^ Yosef H a y i m Yerushalmi, ôMor Jfezwiyy History and Jewish Memory T'ni\ersir\of Washington Press, 1982). The lectures on which the book is based were first given at the University of W'ashington i n 1980; in turn , they are derived f r o m a lecture delivered i n Jerusalem i n 1977 and published under the tide "Cl io and the Jews: Reflecdons on Jewish Historiography i n the Sixteenth Century," Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 46 /47 (1980): 607-38.

* Cf., for example, âhhor, 90.


secu lar i zat i on . T h i s e x a m p l e shows h o w L o w i t h i n t e r p r e t e d the t h o u g h t o f H e r m a n n C o h e n , a n d m y purpose w i l l be to r e c la im Cohen's o w n pos i t ion o n h istory a n d o n secularization. I n the second p a r t o f this paper, I w i l l show that the conste l lat ion o f t h o u g h t that gave rise to Cohen's ideas o n h i s tory was complete ly d i i ferent f r o m the context i n w h i c h L o w i t h wro te . M y purpose w i l l be to b r i n g o u t the quesdons C o h e n himsel f h a d asked, a n d also some o f die answers he gave to those questions. I n m y conc lus ion , I shall indicate some paths o f research that m i g h t prove f r u i t f u l f or the f u r t h e r study o f Cohen's t h o u g h t .

I

T h e s tory goes that w h e n the phi losopher a n d phi lo logist H e > T n a n n S t e i n t h a l ( 1 8 2 3 - 1 8 9 9 ! i n t r o d u c e d his p r o t e g e , i h e y o u n g D r . H e r m a n n C o h e n , to L e o p o l d Z u n z . die already famous founder o f the Wissenschaft des JiidentwTis. he presented h i m as follows: " H e r r D r . C o h e n , ehemal iger Theologe , j e tz iger P h i l o s o p h " H e r r D r . C o h e n , f o r m e r theo log ian , n o w a phi losopher) . Z u n z is said to have re tor ted , " E i n ehemal iger Theo loge ist i m m e r e in P h i l o s o p h " (A f o r m e r theol og ian is always a phi losopher) .

T h i s anecdote is one o f m a n y to ld by Franz Rosenzweig i n his i n t r o d u c t i o n to H e r m a n n Cohen's Jiidische Schnflen.^ T h e a u t h e n t i c i t y o f these anecdotes is unclear^ However , it is not m y purpose in this paper to settle that quest ion. WTiat interests me ra ther is thai the tale was once taken over by K a r i Lo\sith. T h i s must ha\ happened quite late i n his career, w h e n , back i n G e r m a n y after the w a i ; he was once asked to w r i t e a laudatio f or C o h e n . Seeking informarion o n this author , o f w h o m he does n o t seem to have h a d firsthand knowledge , he a p p r o p r i a t e d n o t j u s t the image o f h i m that he had

^ N o w i n Franz Rosenzweig, Gesammelte Schriften (hereafter abbre\iated "GS") , vol. 3, Z^eistromland (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1984), here 185.

Cf. on this question Steven Schwarzschild, "Franz Rosenzweig's Anecdotes about H e r m a n n Cohen," in Gegenwart im Ruckblich Festgabe Jur die jUdische Gemeinde zu Berlin 25Jahre nachdemJVeubeginn, ed. H . A. Strauss and K . Grossmann (Heidelberg: L . Stiehm, 1970), 209-18.


f o r m e d o n the basis o f earlier readings o f Rosenzweig , ' b u t also the anecdote c i ted above.^

I n his rete l l ing , however, he also w e n t a step beyond the vers ion t o l d by Rosenzweig. L o w i t h c o m m e n t e d t h a t the p r o p o s i t i o n ("a f o r m e r theo log ian is always a ph i l osopher " ) " m i g h t also be taken i n reverse": " T h e phi losopher C o h e n always also r e m a i n e d a Jewish theo log ian; [over d m e . . . ] he even became m o r e a n d m o r e o f one."^ B y a r g u i n g that C o h e n h a d always r e m a i n e d a "Jewish theo log ian , " L o w i t h mani fest ly a i m e d at f u r t h e r i n g his o w n ideas, m o r e specif i cally the thesis that he h imsel f h a d developed i n his Meaning in History: tha t ph i l osophy o f h i s tory as such, as a disc ipl ine , w o u l d be n o t h i n g else, at b o t t o m , than theology i n disguise, i.e., eschatology, a n d w o u l d therefore need to be c r idc ized o n that account . L o w i t h seems not to have been at a l l aware o f the objections that C o h e n h imse l f h a d repeatedly raised against eschatology: his p i c ture o f C o h e n was bor r o w e d f r o m Rosenzweig, a n d Rosenzweig h a d spared no etfort to convince his readers that Cohen had always remained a " t l i eo l og ian . "

Quite early i n his career, Lowi th had looked not so much into Cohen's but into Rosenzweig's work. This happened when he worked on German Idealism: he then used Hegel und der Staat, Rosenzweig's doctoral thesis, which had been published i n 1920 (2 vols., M u n i c h / B e r l i n : R. Oldenbourg, 1920; repr i n one volume, Aalen: Scientia, 1962). Cf. the new German edidon by Frank Lachmann, w i t h a postscript by Axe l Honneth i^Frankfurt am M a i n : Suhrkamp. 2010). C f also Rosenzweig's edidon of die "Oldest System-Program of German I d e a l i s m . f i r s t published in 1917 ("Das alteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Ideal i imi j i . Ein handschnldicher F u n d , " available today in GS 3:3—44 . .At one point, he also began to dc%Tk>p same interest i n Rosenzweis's \mQn£rs on Judaism. This must ha\ happened ai die beginning of the 194Lis: Lowi th . who was then in re\-olt against the atnuide of Us teacher M a r d n Heidegger co "ards h i m as a Je\s'. and alsC' agair-sc Heidegger^ at dmes unconcealed support of National Socialism. :c«jked into Rosenzweig's Slm^af Redemption for help against his former teacher: his qmte famous "Postscript to B c n ^ and T i m e , " on " M a r d n Heidegger and Franz Rosenz%s"eig or Temporalic\ and Eternity," goes back to 1942-1943. A first version of this '"Postscript'' was pubii^ied i n English (in Philosophy and Phenomenological Rfsearch 3 [1942]: 53-77 , and has been much discussed. See, e.g., Peter El i Gordon, Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Betwim Judaism and German Philosophy (Berkelev and Los Angeles: L'niversirv of California Press. 2003).

^ C f K . Lowi th , Philosophie der Vernurift und Religion der Ojfcnbamng in H. Coni'is Religionsphilosophie (Heidelberg: Carl 'Winter, 1968), 9. Although Lowith's reladonship to Heidegger has often been studied, quite often i n the context of German-Jewish thought, i t does not seem to have been either noticed or elaborated upon that Lowi th owed much of what he knew about Jewish thought to Rosenzweig.

^ "Der Satz lasst sich aber auch umkehren: der Philosoph Cohen ist immer auch ji idischer Theologe geblieben, er ist es sogar immer mehr geworden." L o w i t h , Philosophie, 9.


i n the sense o f a n eschatologically m i n d e d prophet . H i s reliance o n Rosenzweig must be the reason w h y L o w i t h took n o account o f Cohen's o w n objections, o r o f Cohen's real concept ion .

Before e x p o u n d i n g o n these object ions a n d present ing Cohen's o w n concepdon o f history, i t w i l l be he lp fu l a n d indeed en l i ghten ing to note that there was a t h i r d rehearsal o f the anecdote: the anecdote was taken over b y none o ther t h a n H a n s B l u m e n b e r g (1920-1996) i n his famous book, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age}^ T h i s fact by itself bears witness, once aga in , to the m i g h t y inf luence o f L o w i t h . I n the present case, however, this inf luence is rather surpr is ing , for B l u m e n b e r g was one o f L o w i t h ' s staunchest opponents : o n several m e m o r a b l e occasions, this G e r m a n a u t h o r — a Catho l i c , w i t h Jewish o r i g i n s — a r g u e d against L o w i t h . ' ^ Yet he too seems to have taken over the image o f C o h e n as a prophet , pu t f o r w a r d by Rosenzweig a n d t h e n conveyed by L o w i t h . B u t he went one step f u r t h e r — o r rather one step b a c l u v a r d s — f r o m w h a t he had read i n L o w i t h : it m a y be t m e , he said, that "a f o r m e r theologian alwavs is a phi losopher . " T h a t is, i t m a y be true that theologians, whenever thev a b a n d o n t h e i r c r e e d a n d p r o f e s s i o n , a l m o s t a lways a l t h o u g h n o t invar iab ly ) become philosophers. B u t L o w i t h w o u l d have been m i s taken w h e n he added that " the propos i t i on m a y also be taken i n reverse"—i.e . , that phi losophers m a y be taken to be r e b o r n theo lo gians. For " t h a t , precisely, is n o t the case" (gerade das ist nicht der Fall): i f indeed i t is qui te c o m m o n for f o r m e r theologians to become p h i losophers, i t is n o t as f requent to see phi losophers t u r n back :o theolo,gy.

I t is easy to grasp the significance of this a d d i t i o n for the famous debate over the issue o f secularizat ion. Aga ins : L o w i t h . who had argued that phi losophy o f histor\ w o u l d be n o t h i n i i c'. e. at b o t t o m , t h a n theology i n disguise, a n d w h o h a d denied any ki:i i :n-.ac\ :: as a disc ipl ine, B l u m e n b e r g rose to defend i t . H e r e m i n d e d his readers o f the fact tha t ph i losophy o f history- as a discipl ine had onl\

O n Rosenzweig's reading of Cohen, cf. my book, Cohen face a Rosenz'w-eig: Dehat sur lapensie alkmande (Paris: V r i n , 2009), esp. chap. 6, 149-80; and also Pierfrancesco Fiorato, "Notes on Future and Histor) ' i n Hermann Cohen's Anti-Eschaiolosical Mcssianism," i n Hermann Cohen's Critical Idealism, ed. Reinier M u n k Springer: Dordrecht, 2005), 133-60.

" Cambridge, M A : M I T Press, 1985. I n addition to The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, c f especially " 'Sakularisadon':

K r i t i k einer Kategorie historischer I l legit imitat ," in Die Philosophie und die Frage nach dem Fortschritt, ed. H . K u h n and F. Wiedmann (Munich: Pustet, 1964), 240-66.


arisen i n the m o d e r n age, a n d that its m a i n purpose h a d been to fight earlier, theological ly o r i ented ways o f w r i d n g history. H i s m a i n a r g u m e n t i n his famous book p u r p o r t e d to defend " t h e l eg i t imacy o f the m o d e r n age." T h e t it le o f the book itself is a lready te l l ing , as is the French q u o t a t i o n B l u m e n b e r g chose as the e p i g r a p h , w h i c h is w e l l w o r t h r e p r o d u c i n g here: "C 'est c u r i e u x c o m m e le p o i n t de vue diflfere, suivant q u ' o n est le f r u i t d u c r i m e o u de la l e g i d m i t e . . . " ( I t is cur i ous to see h o w the v i e w p o i n t di f fers , d e p e n d i n g u p o n w h e t h e r one is the f r u i t o f c r ime , or o f l e g i t i m a c y . . . ) .

T h e q u o t a t i o n is b o r r o w e d f r o m A n d r e Gide's Les faux-monnayeurs {The Counterfeiters), a novel that retraces the story o f a y o u n g m a n w h o suddenly discovers that he is a n i l l eg i t imate c h i l d , a n d then wonders at the change o f i d e n t i t y due to such a discovery. Isn ' t i t also " c u r i o u s " or strange, one m a y ask, to observe the diflFerence i t makes to o u r v i e w p o i n t o n "secular izat ion , " depending u p o n whether w e cons ider the process to w h i c h i t refers as a n i l l e g i t i m a t e o r leg i t imate one? Those w h o c l a i m that the process o f secularization rested u p o n a t h e f t — t h e theft o f l a n d , a n d o f propert ies be l ong ing to the C h u r c h — d o indeed deem i t i l l eg i t imate . W h a t e v e r they say about the process w i l l then be complete ly d i i ferent f r o m the pos i t ion o f those w h o believe that secularization was leg i t imate , a n d w h o a i m to u p h o l d the process: the defenders o f m o d e r n i t y ra ther see the process o f secularization itself as one o f the v e r y means to ach iev ing m o d e r n i z a t i o n . B o t h sides resort to the same d e n o m i n a t i o n , that o f " secu lar i za t i on . " B u t w h a t they describe is very dif ferent, the reason be ing that they have other quesdons i n m i n d . B l u m e n b e r g thus says that the category o f " s e c u lar i za t i on " is i n his o p i n i o n " n o t r i g h t , historical ly . ' "^

I n his book, a n d also i n his dif ferent intervent ions againsc L o A v i c h .

B l u m e n b e r g was always keen to defend " t h e m o d e r n age." i n c l u d i n g that u n d e r s tan d in g o f the m o d e r n age that c ou ld be f o u n d i n the phi losophy o f history, taken as a discipl ine. H e u n d e r l i n e d the difference between eschatological a n d phi losophical perceptions o f history; n o t i n g that eschatological discourses are always about those sorts o f events that break i n t o h i s to ry from the outside, a n d that are hetero geneous o r transcendent w i t h respect to history. T h e phi losophica l

The first part of the book bears the telling title "Sakularisation. Eine Kategorie des geschichdichen Unrechts" (Secularization: Critique of a Category of Historical Wrong).


discourse o n histoiy, by contrast, makes use o f the n o t i o n o f progress, a n d does n o t give to h is tory a n eschatological meaning . Instead , the progress ph i l osophy talks about is i m m a n e n t i n history. I t is to be f o u n d i n its ve ry laws, i n its i m m a n e n t structure . '*

M y c o n t e n t i o n is t h a t H a n s B l u m e n b e r g is, i n this a r g u m e n t , t read ing the p a t h o f H e r m a n n C o h e n , w h o , for reasons v e i y s imi lar to those B l u m e n b e r g spelled o u t l o n g after h i m , h a d already u n d e r l i n e d the s ingular i ty o f an "eschatological " discourse, but h a d also w a n t e d to defend the m o d e r n age, a n d to this e n d resorted to a phi losophy o f history. A l t h o u g h C o h e n d i d acknowledge the existence o f "eschatological" trends o f t h o u g h t i n J u d a i s m , he also t h o u g h t that a clear d i s t inc t i on should be d r a w n between these trends a n d w h a t he called "prophet i c messianism." I shall n o w t u r n to Cohen's concept i on a n d endeavor to assess its value as h istor ica l t h i n k i n g .

n

For us to appreciate Cohen's h istor ica l t h i n k i n g , we must first take i n t o account the histor ica l context , a n d also the context o f the discussion, the " cons te l la t i on" o f phi losophica l discourse i n w h i c h his t h i n k i n g developed. I t must be kept i n m i n d that Cohen's v e r y de f i n i te theses o n the re la t i on o f the concept o f h i s t o i y to the future , i.e., to " t imes to c ome" '4ukanjt\y o r i g i n a t e d i n his i n t e n t i o n to respond to a hon mot given currency by the G e r m a n R o m a n d c a u t h o r F r i e d r i c h Schlegel: that the h is tor ian is "a backward- faLins p r o p h e t " idn ruckucarts gekehrtin ProphetThat perspicacious rerr.a. 'ii has lost none o f its interest or currency, even todav: D o we noc know-m a n y historians or wou ld -be historians w h o c la im to \NTite or speak a b o u t h i s t o r y — a b o u t m o d e r n histor\-. but also about the earliest o r i g i n s o f h i s t o r i c a l t i m e s — y e t do n o t h i n g else, at b o t r o m . but prophesy f r o m a p o i n t o f v i e w o n the past, a n d then find the entire fu ture deve lopment o f a people already i n its remotest, supposed

* "Die Eschatologie redet von einem i n die Geschichte einbrechenden. ihr selbst transzendcnten und heterogenen Ereignis; die Fortschritddee extrapoliert \n einer der Geschichte iinmanenten und i n jeder Gegenwart mitprasenten Struktur aus in die Zukunft . " H . Blumenberg, " 'Sakularisation. ' K r i t i k einer Kategorie historischer I l legit imitat , " 243.

"Heinr i ch Heine und das Judentum," in Jiidische Sclinften ^Berlin: Schwetschke, 1924), 2:12.


origins? D u r i n g the n ineteenth c e n t u r y m a n y G e r m a n p r e - R o m a n -tic a n d R o m a n d c authors h a d evinced a keen interest i n a n Urzeit o f Urvolker, i.e., i n the " p r i m a l " or " p r i m o r d i a l " t ime o f " p r i m a l " o r " p r i m o r d i a l " peoples, for w h i c h a n d for w h o m they made a p o l ogy. T h e i r a t t e n t i o n h a d been d irected first a n d foremost towards the p a s t — a n d towards the or ig ins , m y t h i c a l , o f the G e r m a n people. For t h e m , w r i d n g the h i s tory o f a people thus consisted i n b r i n g i n g o u t the necessity o f its deve lopment , perhaps even its " f a t e " : they " p r o p h e s i e d " backwards , i n t o the past. I t was to this k i n d o f r o m a n t ic , h is tor i ca l w r i t i n g tha t H e r m a n n C o h e n objected. I t also was i n o r d e r to oppose this k i n d o f h is tor i ca l w r i d n g that he related h i s t o i y to the f u t u r e : to "dmes to c o m e " — a n d also to f reedom.

O n e f u r t h e r reason w h y C o h e n w a n t e d to reject the R o m a n t i c a p p r o a c h to history, a n d also, significantly, the t e m p t a t i o n , w h i c h arose at the same dme , to adopt a R o m a n t i c stance i n the w r i t i n g o f Jewish history; was that he saw there a d i s t o r t i on o f Juda i sm, a n d indeed o f the image o f prophecy : accord ing to C o h e n , prophecy r a t h e r has to do w i t h ethics, i.e., w i t h m o r a l act ion . Such ac t i on , inasmuch as i t orients us towards w h a t ought to be done, also necessarily orients us towards " t imes to come, " towards the future . E t h i c a l concepts, concepts that are supposed to d irect men's actions, necessarily look t o w a r d times to come, to the future. '^ A c c o r d i n g to C o h e n , the v a l u a t i o n o f the future that one finds i n the prophets must be unders tood as a v a l u a t i o n o f h u m a n ac t ion .

T h i s means that the "histon*"'" to w h i c h C o h e n refers w h e n he wr i tes that the H e b r e w prophets m a y be considered the in\-entors o f the " concept " o f h i s tory ' " is the histor\ m e n n'uu:^:. w i t h the ir o \ s t i

deeds: i t is h i s t o i y as Geschichte. res gestae. I t is no t h i s t o n ' a^ Hisuyru, historia rerum gestarum: h i s tory as a science, h is tory taken as an ir . qu irv ' a b o u t an object , as the knowledge o f that object . T h e "cassical m e a n i n g o f historein, w h i c h is related to present a n d past events." to w h i c h L o w i t h refers at the b e g i n n i n g o f Meaning in Histon" - is related to this second sense o f the w o r d . I n d e e d i t is w o r t h n o t i c i n g here that i t is qu i te possible to find i n Cohen's w o r k a sustained ref lect ion o n h i s t o ry i n this second sense, i.e., o n h i s t o ry as h is tor iography .

16 " W h y Ethics?" as Robert Gibbs asked i n his book, i f not because of the notion o f responsibility, which bears upon the future. Robert Gibbs, Why Ethics.^ Signs of Responsibilities (Princeton: Princeton Universit) ' Press, 2000).

" Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, 305. See the discussion at the beginning of this article.


history as a science. T h e r e is i n the w o r k o f C o h e n a wel l -developed ref lect ion n o t j u s t o n history, b u t also o n the status o f a l l those sciences w h i c h i n the G e r m a n y o f his t i m e were often gathered u n d e r the generic appel lat ion o f Geisteswissenschaflen, "sciences o f the s p i r i t . " T h a t appe l la t i on , w h i c h became fashionable m a i n l y because o f a n d t h r o u g h the w o r k o f W i l h e l m D i l t h e y , was also used b y C o h e n . I n t e r e s t i n g l y e n o u g h , however , C o h e n d i d n o t l ike the t e r m : he pre ferred the French t e r m sciences morales, a preference that is qu i te surpr is ing , for C o h e n , be ing a K a n t i a n , was a strict defender o f the w e l l - k n o w n K a n t i a n d i s t i n c t i o n between Sein a n d Sollen, " i s " a n d " o u g h t " ; a n d the n o t i o n o f sciences morales does r u n counter to this d i s t inc t i on . W h a t he seems to have dis l iked even m o r e strongly than the association o f " i s " w i t h " o u g h t " — i . e . , that w h i c h today is called " e th i ca l n a t u r a l i s m " — w a s R o m a n t i c i s m , h i s t o r i c i s m — a n d the w o r k o f D i l t h e y h i m s e l f Faced w i t h two evils, he then manifest ly decided to choose the one that appeared to h i m less dangerous: '^ over a n d over aga in , he underscored the l ink between ethics and the h u m a n sciences, a m o n g t h e m histon," as a science, also d r a w i n g a t tent i on to the centra l "di f f iculn, ' o f m e t h o d " to w h i c h such an association o f h is tory w i t h ethics w o u l d lead: he p o i n t e d o u t that i n the so-called Geisteswissenschqften, the " e n d " {^weck), o r the " concept " that directs men's actions, plays a double role. O n the one h a n d , i t is a " concept " i n the c o m m o n sense o f the w o r d , one w h i c h is supposed to p u t o rder i n t o some facts. W i t h regard to historv; these are past facts, a n d i n that case the " e n d " is a concept t u r n e d t o w a r d :he pa^: O n the od ier h a n d , however, the ""concept" that is supp>osed to also O i r c c i men's actions is an ethical , m o r a l concept, a n d thus i n this lancr m e a n i n g o f d i re c t ing men's actions it looks f o r w a r d . io\%"ajd a time to come, t o w a r d the future . I n his Logic of Pure Knowledge, C o h e n argued that

it is imperative to clearly and strictly distinguish these r\%o meanings from one another, in order not to violate on the one hand the interest of historical research in all its fields, and on the other hand the interest

" Cohen takes recourse to the not ion o f sciences morales i n the essay entitled "Religion und Sitdichkeit" (Jiidische Schriften 3:98-168, here 105), but also, e.g. i n Logik, 386. O n this question, cf. M y r i a m Bienenstock, ed., JVeokantisme et sciences morales. Revuegermanique iniernationale 6 (2007), and in pardctilar M y r i a m Bienenstock, "Sciences de I'esprit, ou sciences morales? Cohen et les sciences humaines" (ibid., 61 -75) , and H e l m u t Holzhey, "Concept et fonct ion des sciences de I 'esprit (Geistcswissenschaften) dans la philosophie de H e r m a n n Cohen" (ibid., 77-90).


of ethics, which in all those fields should claim for its problem the dominant position, the leading position. {Logik, 386-7)

I take this to show that C o h e n , even i f he d i d , as I have j u s t said, pre fer the F r e n c h expression sciences morales to Geisieswissenschaften, k n e w v e r y w e l l h o w i m p o r t a n t i t is to d ist inguish clearly between the h is tor i ca l sciences a n d ethics, i n o ther words between h i s tor i og r a p h y a n d prophecy. C o n t r a r y to w h a t L o w i t h writes , he h a d no i n t e n t i o n at a l l o f perver t ing h i s t o i y — h i s t o i y as a science, the h istory we w r i t e , h i s t o r i o g r a p h y — i n t o some k i n d o f prophecy. B u t he d i d believe that i n the histor ical sciences, as i n any mat te r l inked to men's actions a n d the i r study, the discipline o f ethics should always preserve a l ead ing pos i t ion .

I t has become customary i n o u r day to cr it ic ize H e r m a n n C o h e n for h a v i n g c la imed , at least at cer ta in points d u r i n g his career, that re l ig ion dist inguished itself so l i t t le f r o m ethics that it cou ld p r a c t i ca l ly be assimilated in to i t . However , w h a t seems to m e interest ing i n Cohen's w o r k is n o t so m u c h the quest ion o f t h e re lat ionship o f r e l i g i on to ethics, a n d o f a d i s t inc t i on between the t w o t h a t m i g h t appear necessary, as the m u c h m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l quest ion o f the re lat ionship o f re l ig ion to m y t h . C o h e n was the staunch defender o f a strict d i s t inc t i on between a "Jewish" concept ion o f G o d , one w h i c h w o u l d have been a m a i n l y ethica l one, a n d m y t h i c a l ideas o f d i v i n i t y : he opposed any " m i x i n g u p o f m y d i i n the concept o f G o d " {Beimischung des Mytltos in dem Gottesbegnff T h e reasons w h v it h a d been so c ruc ia l for h i m to d is t inguish re l ig ion f r o m m v c h . w h i c h a g a i n are l i n k e d to his fight against G e r m a n R o m a n d c i M : i , a n d against w h a t G e r m a n R o m a n t i c i s m stood for. are w e l l w o r t h spe/ l in? out , for they shed l i g h t u p o n Cohen's o w n conceptions o f e i h i L S a n d o f m o r a l responsibility.^' A l t h o u g h i t w o u l d lead m e t O ' j far u W . - . \

f r o m the theme o f the present paper to e x p o u n d t h e m h e r e . I w o u l d l ike to p o i n t o u t tha t i t is also Cohen's fight against t h e " m i x i n g up o f m y t h i n the concept o f G o d " that accounts for his emphasis, i n his unders tand ing o f history, u p o n " t imes to come," u p o n the f u t u r e . For m y t h , accord ing to h i m , knows no future . I t cannot have any image o f the fu ture , whereas i t is precisely that image , that idea, a n d also t h a t c o n c e p t , w h i c h l i n k s r e l i g i o n to ethics a n d to m o r a l responsibility.^^

Cf., e.g., "Religion u n d SittUchkeit," 119 and 124-5. See here my Cohen face d Rosenzweig, esp. chap. 7. C f here, e.g., Logik, 405.


C o h e n d i d allow, for example i n his Ethik des reinen Willens, that the Greek m y t h o f a golden age h a d already been " a characterisdc s y m p t o m o f the beginnings o f an ethical d isquiet . " B u t he also added that such an idea, insofar as i t r e m a i n e d o r i ented t o w a r d the past, was " a n idea be long ing to poetry , " one tha t c ou ld ne i ther cont inue to develop, n o r evolve i n t o a n e th i ca l appeal , i n t o m o r a l a c d o n . A c c o r d i n g to h i m , o n l y t h o u g h t — a s w e l l as the idea a n d image o f the future—^would p e r m i t such a n appeal . I n his Religion of Reason, he therefore believed i t possible to c l a i m that the Greeks, c o n t r a r i l y to the H e b r e w prophets , h a d aga in a n d again succumbed to m y t h , i n par t i cu lar the m y t h o f another w o r l d . Plato, too, i n his concept ion o f the Ideas,

succumbs to the m y t h o f eschatology', w h i l e m o n o t h e i s m m a t u r e d i n t o the prac t i ca l ideal ism o f messianology. Platonic courage here becomes flight f r o m the w o r l d a n d escape f r o m this e a r t h i n t o the b e y o n d , insofar as the b o d y is p u r e l y a n d s i m p l y the pr ison o f the soul.-^

T h e fight o f C o h e n against m\T;h. a n d against m y t h i n re l ig ion , also sheds l i ght u p o n his at t i tude t o w a r d Greek philosophy, a n d t o w a r d Plato : a c cord ing to C o h e n , Plato was the true " creator o f i d e a l i s m . " A n d yet, because he fel l back i n t o m y t h , he cou ld n o t develop the idea o f history. Plato was unable to a t t a i n e i ther a h i s tory o f e thica l actions, o r a n idea o f the future : " H e does n o t t h i n k about a future at a l l , o ther t h a n one w h i c h w o u l d on ly be the unceasing repet i t i on o f the present."^"*

m

T o appreciate the f u l l m e a n i n g a n d phi losophical interest o f Cohen's concept ion o f history, a n d m o r e p a r t i c u l a r l y o f his concept ion o f t ime , they must be c o m p a r e d n o t o n l y w i t h Greek conception^, or w i t h those developed i n the bosom o f G e r m a n R o m a n t i c i s m . I t is

Religion der Vernunft, 505: " H i c r erliegt auch Platon dem Mythos der Eschatologie. wahrend der Monotheismus zum praktischen Idealismus der Messianologie ausgereift ist. Die platonische Tapferkeit w i r d hier zur Weltflucht und zur Erdcnflucht in das Jenseits hiniiber, da der Leib schlechtcrdings der Kerker der Seele sei." Religion of Reason, 437, translation modified.

" E r denkt iiberhaupt an keine Zukunft, es sei denn eine solche, welche nur die unaufhorliche Wiederholung der Gegenwart ware." Religion der Vernunft, 340. Religion of Reason, 292, translation modified.


also necessaiy to c on f ront conceptions that may, b r o a d l y speaking, be said to be C h r i s t i a n , o r i n any case those that , a m o n g the three phases o f t i m e — p a s t , present, a n d f u t u r e — p r i v i l e g e the d imens ion o f the present. I a m a l l u d i n g here to Hegel 's famous sentence i n the preface to the Philosophy of Right t h a t the task o f ph i losophy is to "recognize reason as the rose i n the cross o f the present a n d thereby to enjoy the present."^^ B ey ond the image o f the rose i n the c r u x o f the present, there are also the paragraphs i n the Philosophy of jYature that pr iv i lege the present a m o n g the three dimensions o f time:

I f one considers time positively, one can therefore say that only the present is, before and after is not, but the concrete present is the result of the past, and is pregnant wi th the future. The true present is therefore eternity.^**

Rosenzweig, w i t h a n d i n spite o f a l l his c r i t i c i sm o f Hege l , r emained v e r y close to these theses, w h i c h i n Jewish t h o u g h t a n d phi losophy have also been br i l l i ant ly interpreted by E m i l Fackenheim.-" H e r m a n n C o h e n was m u c h more cr i t i ca l , not on ly o f the assertions o f H e g e l — a n d i n fact n o t so m u c h o f Hegel 's assertions at a l l — b u t most certa in ly o f the basic C h r i s t i a n presuppositions that under l ie t h e m . T h e bases o f Cohen's c r i t ique h a d already been sketched i n his v e r y first works o n K a n t : for example , w h e n i n his c o n t r i b u t i o n to the debate between K u n o Fischer a n d F r i e d r i c h A d o l f T r e n d e l e n b u r g he treats the quest ion o f a " g a p " [Ukke] i n K a n t , specifically i n the d e m o n strat ion o f the " sub jec t iv in - " o f the categories o f space a n d time.--B u t i t was on ly m u c h later, i n die Logik der reinen Erhr,ntnis. that C o h e n developed fu l ly his c r i t ique o f al l conceptions o f t ime a n d o f Temp o r a l i t y that are centered on the present, a long w i t h his OWTI concept i o n o f t i m e as " a n t i c i p a t i o n " o f the future . T h e r e he takes up a g a i n

the c r i t i c i sm that he h a d f o r m u l a t e d against T r e n d e l e n b u r g , w h o h a d c o m p a r e d to m o t i o n the capacity to "produce ' ' b o t h space a n d time, thus setting aside the ir a p r i o r i t y T h i s established his c onc lu sions no t , as he c la imed , o n a metaphysic , b u t o n considerations o f

25 Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M . K n o x (Oxford University' Press, 1967), 12. * Cf. Hegel's Philosophj of Nature, ed. and trans. M . J . Petry, 3 vols. (London: Al len

& U n w i n , 1970), §259, A d d . , 1:235. 2' See Emi l L . Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought (Bloomington:

Indiana University Press, 1967), esp. chap. 5 and app. 3, and Encounters between Judaism and Modern Philosophy (New York: Basic Books, 1973), particularly chap. 3: "Moses and the Hegelians."

2« Schriften zur Phibsophie und ZeitgeschichU (Berlin: Akademie, 1928), 1:229-75.


a psychological order : o n "a psychological i m i t a d o n o f the f o rms o f space a n d dme, given i n themselves, independent ly o f consciousness" {Logik, 226). A l r e a d y there, a n d w i t h o u t m u c h o f a t r a n s i t i o n , C o h e n made a connect ion to his o w n theory o f time, t h e n p r o c l a i m i n g t i m e to be " a n t i c i p a t i o n o f the f u t u r e , " a n a n t i c i p a t i o n that h a d " t h e retrospective o n t o the past as its necessaiy corre late . " C o h e n w a n t e d to c learly make the p o i n t that as far as the present is concerned , i t is never but a " m o m e n t o f space" {Logik, 228). T h i s idea was to be reprised a n d developed i n the Ethik des reinen Willens, v e r y specifically w i t h re ference to its possible p r a c t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r e th ics . Repeat ing that " t i m e is ant i c ipat i on ; i t is d irected immedia te ly t oward the f u t u r e " {die ^eit ist Antizipation; sie geht unmittelbar auf die ^ukunft hin),^^ C o h e n explains that i n the end the present is never o f any account except as o r o ther t h a n as a n appearance, a n d that ne i ther the past n o r the present but on ly t h e idea o f t h e future c a n l e a d t o a correct concept o f t ime .

I t is no t the past and the present that characterize the correct corre la t i o n i n w h i c h t h o u g h t a n d w i l l p roduce their content , b u t the fu ture a n d the past. T h e present does n o t constitute a specific characterist ic o f t i m e at a l l ; i t o n l y comes a b o u t by w a y o f the m e d i a t i o n o f the " a t the same t i m e , " a n d therefore by w a y o f space. B u t w h a t matters for the p r o p e r knowledge o f t ime is that one take the f u t u r e as one's p o i n t o f depar ture . T h e future is ant i c ipated , a n d i t is by b e g i n n i n g f r o m i t tha t the a p p a r e n t l y present c ontent detaches itself as the past—so energeucal ly does thought depend on the future, and find itself i n the future.^"

I n the Ethik, C o h e n also underl ines more a n d more strongly that the fact o f fixing o n the present itself does n o t h i n g b u t "parah-ze" the w O l {Ethik, 400). Such a r e m a r k raises anew t h e ver\s o f p r a c t i cal ideal ism i n K a n t ' s sense, a n d more p ar t i cu l ar l y the d i s t inc t i on

23 Ettiik des reinen Willens, 5di ed., Werke, vol. 7 (Hildesheim: Olms. 1981 . 137. Hereafter abbreviated as Ethik

' ^ "Nicht Vergangenheit und Gegenwart bezeichnen die richtige Korrelarion. in welcher das Denken und der Wille ihren Inhalt erzeugen, sondern Zukunft und Vergangenheit. Die Gegenwart bildet iiberhaupt nicht ein spezifisches Merkmal der Zeit; sie entsteht erst durch die Vermittelung des Zugleich, also durch den Raum. Worauf es aber fiir die richtige Erkenntnis der Zeit ankommt, das ist das Ausgehen von der Zukunft. Sie wird andzipiert, und von ihr aus hebt sich der anscheinend gegenwartige Inhalt als Vergangenheit ab; so energisch hangt das Denken an und in der Zukunft." Ethik, 399.


between " i s " a n d " o u g h t , " Sein a n d Sollm—a d i s d n c d o n that C o h e n always a t t r i b u t e d to K a n t a n d that led h i m to insist, i n a m o r e a n d m o r e m arked w a y progressively throughout his career, o n the primacy, i n t i m e , o f the future .

I n accordance w i t h this c o n c e p t i o n o f t i m e , C o h e n there fore always u n d e r l i n e d w i t h force that

the fu ture must never become a present N o d o u b t must r e m a i n that a l l h i s tor i ca l existence, a n d thus also that o f the fu ture , must r e m a i n preserved i n the course a n d the d e v e l o p m e n t o f progress A t n o p o i n t i n humem h i s t o ry can we accept a c o m p l e t i o n o f this rea l i zat ion [i .e. , the rea l i zadon o f the e th i ca l ] . {Ethik, 408)

O r i e n t e d towards the future , Cohen's concept ion o f historv- develops subsequently i n t o a phi losophy o f progress, a n d also a po l idca l p h i losophy: C o h e n transforms messianism itself in to a po l i t i ca l concept i o n , n o t h e s i t a t i n g to w r i t e i n the Religion of Reason t h a t a cons iderat ion o f the b ib l i ca l passages concern ing messianism establishes that w i t h one lone except ion they al l refer to

an ear th ly future , be i t o f Israel or o f a l l the peoples A l l the p r o p h ets by contrast , before a n d after the exile, always u n d e r s t a n d by the " e n d o f d a y s " . . . o n l y the poht i ca l f u t u r e o f the i r o w n people a n d o f h u m a n k i n d O n l y u p o n the f u t u r e do they focus t h e i r gaze, a n d o n l y to i t do they w a n t to d irect the gaze of m a n , a n d o n l y to the ear th ly fu ture w i t h its duties, cares, and hopes. T h i s is the great e n i g m a i n c u l t u r a l h i s tory posed by messianism. .All peoples transfer die G o l d e n Age in to the past, in to the p r i m e v a l t ime t ime o f o r i e i . i T V _ i / : o.nly the J e w i s h people hopes to see i n the f u t u r e the d e ' . e l o p ~ e r . : o f h u m a n k i n d . O n l y messianism affirms the de\-elo:jr-.er.: of the h u m a n species, w h i l e the G o l d e n Age signifies decline. Hence the common designation o f the Messianic Age as the G o l d e n A£:e is a gross mistake, w h i c h effectively inverts the idea. I n Mess ian isn : past a n d present disappear i n the face o f the fu ture , w h i c h alone lulhls ihe ronsc ious -ness o f dme.^'

C o h e n was convinced that his concepdon o f t ime a n d o f histon. . a n d moreover that o f the messianism o f the prophets , is altogether compat ib le w i t h a pract ica l ideal ism such as that o f K a n t . T h i s m u c h debated question o f the c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f Cohen's "mess ianism" w i t h K a n t ' s phi losophy o f history is n o t the most interesting one i n Cohen's

Religion der Vernunft, 336-7; Religion of Reason, 289-90, translation modified.


w o r k . For i n m a n y ways Cohen's concept ion w e n t w e l l beyond that o f K a n t ; a case i n p o i n t m i g h t be, as I have j u s t t r ied to indicate , his concept ion o f t i m e , w h i c h w h e n p r o p e r l y studied m i g h t reveal i tsel f to be as f r u i t f u l as tha t o f Heidegger, i f n o t m o r e so.

abstract - mbienenstock.free.frmbienenstock.free.fr/docs/hermann_cohen_s_concept_of_history.pdfkarl...

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