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EXTRINSICALLY MOTIVATED PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT MANAGERS:

DISCOVERING THEIR WORK MOTIVATION AND WORK HOURS

Abstract

Contemporary public and nonprofit management research has disproportionally

emphasized the importance of intrinsic motivation and internal rewards but failed to deliberately

examine managers’ extrinsic motivation to the extent that extrinsic motivation has been deemed

an antagonistic side in an intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy. However, this dichotomy oversimplifies

one’s motivational styles. Self-determination theory (SDT) hints that extrinsically motivated

people may vary with respect to various organizational behaviors due to the differences of their

locus of control. The authors tested this proposition by using variables from the National

Administrative Studies Project-III (NASP-III) data. The results of factor analysis support that

extrinsic motivation is multi-dimensional and it involves a unique type named “amotivation.”

Regression results show that work motivation is higher and work hours are longer among

extrinsically motivated managers whose locus of control is more internal. In addition, the

association of all types of extrinsic motivational styles with work motivation and work hours is

either less positive or more negative among nonprofit managers than among public managers.

Statistical analysis is followed by discussion and conclusion.

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Introduction

Contemporary motivation studies in the field of public and nonprofit management have

strongly emphasized the importance of intrinsic motivation and internal rewards, perhaps due to

the mission-oriented nature of these two sectors. In public management, the upsurge of public

service motivation (PSM) research in recent decades has been widely embraced, in part because

it helps public administration scholars carve out a disciplinary identity. The PSM literature

includes not only works extending theory and empirical findings but studies focused on assessing

and building constructs, developing new methodological approaches and examining antecedents

and consequences of PSM (Brewer, Selden, and Facer II 2000; Coursey and Pandey 2007; Perry

1996; Perry and Hondeghem 2008; Perry and Wise 1990; Moynihan and Pandey 2007). On the

side of nonprofit management, although research efforts do not converge as seamlessly as public

management does on PSM, nonprofit management has been constantly associated with intrinsic

factors such as volunteering and philanthropy (Hager and Brudney 2004; Lohmann 1992; Hall

2002), altruism (Rose-Ackerman 1996, 1997), pro-social behaviors (Tidwell 2005; Mathews and

Kling 1988), ideological currency (Thompson and Hart 2006; Thompson and Bunderson 2003),

and many others.

In both public and nonprofit management, topics pertaining to extrinsic motivation have

of late received much less attention. Perhaps extrinsic motivation is somewhat less exciting

because there is less reason to expect departures in findings from private or generic studies

(Rainey and Bozeman, 2000). Moreover, intrinsic motivation especially PSM provide an

“aspirational theory,” focused on hopes for managers’ motivations and for the field in general.

When one finds evidence of PSM, it perhaps more uplifting than when that the strongest

motivation expressed by public managers is a need for security (Crewson 1997; Feeney 2008).

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However, the allure of PSM and intrinsic motivation, while certainly understandable, does not

diminish the empirical reality of pervasive and behaviorally relevant extrinsic motivation

(Houston 2000). Many cross-sector comparison studies have repeatedly indicated that public

sector workers demonstrate strong desires for job security, high pay, promotion, and benefits

(Crewson 1997; Baldwin 1987; Karl and Sutton 1998; Houston 2000; Jurkiewicz, Massey, and

Brown 1998; Khojasteh 1993; Lyons, Duxbury, and Higgins 2006; Lewis and Frank 2002;

Posner and Schmidt 1996). Public managers’ desires for these externally-controlled motivational

objectives (especially job security) are quite often even stronger than their desires for intrinsic

rewards such as interesting work, usefulness to the society, serving the public interest. As

compared to private sector workers, public managers’ desires for extrinsic rewards (especially

job security, fringe benefits, and promotion) are not conspicuously weaker. Despite such

findings, discussion of extrinsic motivation has of late been less prominent in the public

management literature and empirical results have become increasingly scarce. Clearly both

extrinsic and intrinsic motivations are important to virtually all worker groups and this relative

neglect seems to us unwarranted.

Nonprofit sector employees’ work needs are seldom investigated in cross-sector

comparisons. Among limited evidence, nonprofit sector workers do have a stronger tendency

than public and private sector workers to care about pride in organizations and the chance to

“make a difference” (Light 2002), but their desires for a pleasant physical environment, job

security, benefits, pay, and promotion are not significantly lower (and are sometimes even higher)

than that of public sector workers (Vinokur-Kaplan, Jayaratne, and Chess 1994; Borzaga and

Tortia 2006). In cases where external attractions are generally sparse in nonprofit organizations

(Preston 1989; Mirvis and Hackett 1983; DeVaro and Brookshire 2006), will those driven by

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extrinsic motivators encounter a person-environment mismatch in a nonprofit working context,

and because of this detrimental effect, exhibit compromised attitudes and behaviors?

Unfortunately, no systematic research is available on this question.

The current study attempts to fill in the gap in our knowledge about extrinsic motivation

in public and nonprofit management. We employ self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan

1985; Ryan and Deci 2000), widely used in psychology, but quite uncommon in public

management, to more deeply analyze multiple dimensions of extrinsic motivation and their

impacts on public and nonprofit managers’ overall level of work motivation. We select work

motivation as the main research focus in part because it requires a unique distinctive research

agenda to broaden the knowledge base of the motivational context in the public sector (Wright

2001, 2007). Given that the scope of work motivation is broad and sometimes hard to clearly

define, scholars tend to use work attitudes such as job satisfaction, organizational commitment,

and job involvement as auxiliary variables to comprehend to what extent people are motivated to

work (Rainey 2009). The current study employs, in addition to work motivation, work hours as

another proxy for work motivation. Research has found considerable differences among those

who work many more hours than is typical (Feeney and Bozeman 2009).

In the following sections, the authors begin by introducing the traditional intrinsic-

extrinsic dichotomy and comparing this conceptualization with self-determination theory (SDT)

(Deci and Ryan 1985; Ryan and Deci 2000). Next, the issues concerning public-nonprofit

sectoral comparison will be brought into the discussion so as to show how extrinsic motivation

may generate disparate effects in these two respective sectors due to different levels of person-

environment fit. The third theme of the study is linking multiple extrinsic motivational styles to

work motivation and work hours and exploring whether the relationships appear in different

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scenarios between the public and nonprofit contexts. The authors will use variables extracted

from the National Administrative Studies Project-III (NASP-III) dataset to analyze their

associations. The paper concludes with a discussion of implications of the findings for both

future research and practice.

Extrinsic Motivation: Old and New Perspectives

Conventional wisdom suggests that motivation styles are either intrinsic or extrinsic, and

extrinsic motivation and intrinsic motivation are viewed as separate dimensions. Herzberg’s

(1966) two-factor theory and McGregor’s (1960) Theory X and Theory Y are typical examples

of intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy. Both Herzberg and McGregor laid more emphasis on Maslow’s

(1954) “higher-order needs” such as growth, development, and actualization.1 This tradition

leads later organizational behavior (OB) studies to disproportionately address intrinsic

motivation and intrinsically motivated people’s attitudes and behaviors (Lawler and Hall 1970;

Hackman and Lawler 1971; Brief and Aldag 1975; Hackman and Oldham 1975; Lambert 1991;

Venkatesh 2000). Extrinsic motivational factors appear in the literature as well, but the

discussion mainly centers on whether the influx of extrinsic incentives undermines individual

intrinsic motivation (Deci 1971; Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999; Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett

1973), not on behavioral patterns of extrinsically motivated people. To the extent that extrinsic

motivation receives focus, it tends to be in the pay-for-performance literature, work especially

popular among labor economists and work usually giving short shrift to psychological aspects of

motivation (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Prendergast 1999).

The dearth of studies aiming at extrinsic motivation also stems from the belief that

extrinsic motivation pertains to behaviors performed in the absence of self-determination, such

that extrinsically motivated people can only be prompted by external contingencies (Vallerand

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and Blssonnette 1992; Ryan and Deci 2000). This stereotype leads scholars to treat extrinsic

motivation as a unidimensional category but to neglect possible distinctions in extrinsic

motivational needs. Not until the late 1980s did Deci and Ryan (1985) examine multiple genres

of extrinsic motivation and carefully differentiate them. Their self-determination theory (SDT)

(Deci and Ryan 1985; Ryan and Deci 2000), unlike previous perspectives that viewed

extrinsically motivated behavior as invariantly non-autonomous, holds that various extrinsically

motivated people have different levels of autonomy. The following sections will provide a brief

introduction of autonomy, a typology of extrinsic motivation, and findings of some of the most

relevant empirical research grounded in SDT.

Autonomy and Locus of Control

SDT views motivational styles as a spectrum moving from intrinsic motivation, different

levels of extrinsic motivation, to “amotivation,” as displayed in Table 1. A fundamental element

that makes each motivational style distinctive is autonomy, a concept connoting “an inner

endorsement of one’s actions, the sense that they emanate from oneself and are one’s own” (Deci

and Ryan 1987). Taking intrinsic motivation as an example, the measurement of intrinsic

motivation in previous research has rested primarily on the “free choice” measures (Ryan and

Deci 2000), implying that intrinsically motivated people enjoy absolute autonomy: they consider

themselves as initiators of their own behavior, select desired outcomes, and choose their own

ways to achieve them (Deci and Ryan 1987). Therefore, SDT infers that intrinsically motivated

people are internally regulated and have a strong “internal locus of control” (Rotter 1954;

Spector 1982, 1988), a psychological term referring to whether individuals believe that they are

active causal agents. Those having a strong internal locus of control believe that they have full

control over consequences of their choices and behaviors.

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[Insert Table 1 Here]

A Deliberate Typology of Extrinsic Motivation

Autonomy of extrinsically motivated activities is characterized by inflexibility and the

presence of pressure. For example, some students do homework because they fear parental

sanctions; workers take the current job because they have a basic security requirement.

Individual autonomy is low in both cases. However, autonomy of extrinsic motivation can vary.

Students may also do homework because it is valuable for their chosen career; workers may take

the current job because the position provides more opportunities for advancement and training

opportunities. Autonomy is relatively higher in latter two cases because terminating current

tasks will not trigger immediate pressure and negative sanctions. .

The logic of “hierarchical autonomy” induces Ryan and Deci (2000) to develop a more

sophisticated typology of extrinsic motivation. Just to the left of internal regulation (i.e. intrinsic

motivation) is integrated regulation, a category that represents the most autonomous forms of

extrinsic motivation. Integration occurs when individuals bring new regulations into congruence

with their values and needs, and integrated forms of motivation share some similarities with

intrinsic motivation such as an internal locus of control and high autonomy. For example, a firm

manager may join a variety of training programs in order to increase the opportunities of

promotion because a higher position is accompanied by higher prestige (Jason 2005). Next to

integrated regulation is identified regulation. This regulatory style slightly differs from

integrated regulation in that people accept the regulation because the activity is judged valuable,

not because the activity has been integrated into their value system. That is, the locus of control

is less internal. For example, a manager may join training programs because she sees new

abilities as necessary for her job.2

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Introjected regulation is the third type of extrinsic motivation. People falling into this

category perform an action out of obligation in order to avoid anxiety, shame, and pressure

(Vallerand and Ratelle 2004). Therefore, introjected behaviors are not experienced as a part of

the self and thus have an external locus of control. For example, a manager may have a desire

for fewer conflicting demands so she can work more smoothly. Although she is obligated to

work itself, her main concern is to buffer herself from the vexation and pressure originating from

a conflicting environment. The last form of extrinsic motivation is external regulation, the type

that is generally portrayed in the literature (Vallerand and Ratelle 2004). When people are

externally regulated, their behaviors are performed to satisfy an external demand or obtain an

external reward contingency. Craving for bonus pay (as a positive end state) and avoiding

reprimands (as a negative end state) are typical examples. The locus of control is purely external

for externally regulated people.3

A unique classification of motivational style in SDT is amotivation, a regulatory style

implying “not valuing an activity” and consequently “not believing it will yield a desired

outcome” (Ryan and Deci 2000). Amotivation is at work when individuals display a relative

absence of motivation (Vallerand and Ratelle 2004), so it is deemed a continuum of extrinsic

motivation and should not go beyond the scope of the current study. Amotivated people

frequently feel helpless and question the usefulness of engaging in an activity, so they are likely

to quit the current task or activity (Vallerand and Ratelle 2004). For example, under the pressure

of economic recession, a manager can be forced to choose a “repugnant” job among extremely

limited alternatives. As a result, this manager will neither value this job nor expect any reward

from accomplishing a task. The locus of control for amotivated people is accordingly not only

external but impersonal.4

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Empirical Research Grounded in SDT

By employing the SDT spectrum, educational psychologists have obtained fruitful

research findings regarding how different motivational styles are related to performance and

behavior. A study by Hayamizu (1997) indicates that students’ active coping behavior, interest

in a subject, and perceived self-efficacy were the weakest among those amotivated, stronger

among those externally regulated, and even stronger among those introjectedly, identically, and

intrinsically regulated. However, he failed to find an obvious difference of interest and efficacy

among the latter three motivational styles. In another study, Vallerand and Blssonnette (1992)

found that persistence in behavior was positively related to integrated and identified regulation,

not related to external and introjected regulation, and negatively related to amotivation (i.e.

impersonal regulation). That being said, not all extrinsic motivational styles lead to negative

effects. Pelletier et al. (1995) studied how university athletes’ motivational styles influence their

perceived competence, caring, effort, and future intentions to participate sport activities. The

findings showed a similar pattern: consequences are decreasingly positive from intrinsic

motivation to amotivation. A study of the quality of couples’ relationships (e.g. dyadic

adjustment, potential problem checklist, and marital happiness) also confirms this perspective

(Blais et al. 1990).

As yet, there is no published empirical research applying SDT theory to work motivation

in government and nonprofit organizations. Through the application of SDT to public and

nonprofit organizational contexts and discovering how different motivational styles are related to

managers’ overall work motivation and work hours, the present study attempts to fill in the

knowledge gap of extrinsic motivation (and amotivation) in public and nonprofit sector human

resources management.

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Comparing Public and Nonprofit Organizational Contexts

Public and nonprofit organizations are similar in many respects. For example, those

working in these two sectors often have less interest in personal gain and, instead, seek to serve

and to engage in prosocial behaviors (Houston 2006). Similarly, both public and nonprofit

organizations provide limited financial rewards to their employees, and both of them lack

objective indicators for performance measurement (Berman 2006). Typically, both public and

nonprofit organizations operate under severe external constraint. Nonprofits must confront

conflicting interests among their funders whereas public agencies are subject to legislative

control, administrative supervision, and public scrutiny (Brooks 2002; Campbell 2002).

Despite the similarities, public and nonprofit organizations’ contexts are by no means

identical. The most distinctive difference is the existence of merit protection in the public sector.

Although intensive and formalized personnel rules emanating from merit systems limit public

managers’ flexibility in rewarding and punishing their subordinates (Feeney and Rainey 2010),

they are an important source of public sector employees’ high level of job security (Chen 2010).

Job security is not the only external attraction in public organizations. Some of the most

distinctive advantages of government employment in the United States include fringe benefits,

paid vacation days, routine employer pension contributions, earlier retirement, among others

(Cox and Brunelli 1994). Empirical studies have also concluded that fringe benefits and pension

plans in the nonprofit sector are inferior to those in the public sector (Mirvis and Hackett 1983;

Preston 1989).

Often, governmental agencies provide more opportunities for promotion than nonprofits.

Several reasons account for this difference. First, public organizations are usually larger in size,

and size implies job openings, a long vacancy chain, and opportunities for promotion (White

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1970; Su and Bozeman 2009). Second, nonprofit organizations from time to time suffer from

constrained funding and a need to rely on flexible staffing such as the use of contract workers

and on-call, contingent workers. Finally, merit protection in the public sector reduces

discrimination and facilitates a balanced representation of women and minorities (Baron,

Mittman, and Newman 1991), thereby diminishing status distinctions, resource exploitation, and

opportunity hoarding for dominant groups (Jason 2005). In general public organizations,

compared to nonprofits, are larger, older, and have more resources routinely at their disposal

(Berman 1999).

Working conditions in these two respective sectors imply possibly different person-

environment fit (Blau 1987; Caplan 1987; Moynihan and Pandey 2008) for extrinsically

motivated people. For example, those motivated by opportunities for promotion and training

may perceive a better fit in public organizations than in nonprofit organizations. A typical

consequence of a “harmonious match” is more positive work attitudes such as higher levels of

job involvement and organizational commitment (Blau 1987). The concern of person-

environment fit leads the authors to more carefully compare how each extrinsic motivational

style affects public and nonprofit managers’ overall work motivation and work hours in the

following sections.

Data and Variables

The National Administrative Studies Project-III (NASP-III) dataset is employed in this

study. NASP-III includes data on public and nonprofit managers. The population of NASP-III

covers both the state of Georgia and Illinois. The population of public managers in Georgia was

drawn from the list provided by the Department of Audit (DoA), in which people who have been

on a state agency’s payroll during 2003/2004 fiscal year were included. The population of public

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managers in Illinois was developed through a Freedom of Information Act request. The NASP-

III research group purchased a list from Infocus Marketing, Inc. This list includes members of

the American Society of Association Executives (ASAE) with titles such as operation managers,

executive director, company president, development manager, education director, CEO, etc.

This list provides 280 nonprofit managers from Georgia and 1048 from Illinois. At the end of

this survey, the NASP-III research group obtained 790 responses out of 1849 reduced N with a

response rate of 43% (47% in Georgia and 38% in Illinois) for public sector respondents, 430 out

of 1307 reduced N with a response rate of 33% (39% in Georgia and 31% in Illinois) for

nonprofit sector respondents, and the overall response rate of 39% for their study (for full

discussion of the data, the sample, and procedures see Bozeman and Feeney, 2009).

Variables of extrinsic motivation in the current study are extracted from the NASP-III

dataset. Similar to educational psychologists engaged in SDT who generally ask students why

they go to school, do their homework, and study science (Hayamizu 1997; Vallerand and

Blssonnette 1992; Ryan and Connell 1989), these items were designed to solicit information

about reasons for respondents to accept their current jobs. The original question was stated as:

“We are interested in the factors that motivated you to accept a job at your current organization.

Please indicate the extent to which the factors below (some personal and family, some

professional) were important in making your decision to take a job at your current organization.”

Respondents were asked to score from very important (4), somewhat important (3), somewhat

unimportant (2), to very unimportant (1). The authors selected nine items that best represent

different dimensions of extrinsic motivation:5

Opportunity for advancement within the organization’s hierarchy

Opportunity for training and career development

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Job security

The organization’s pension or retirement plan

Desire for less bureaucratic red tape

Desire for a low conflict work environment

Benefits (medical, insurance)

Few, if any, alternative job offers

Relatively low cost of living in the region

Given that construct development of extrinsic motivational styles in the field of public

and nonprofit management is in the burgeoning stage, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is an

appropriate tool that helps sorting out variables. The results of EFA are reported in Table 2. The

first factor includes two items: opportunity for advancement within the organization’s hierarchy

and opportunity for training and career development. According to the typology of SDT, this

factor should belong to either integrated regulation (i.e. act because it is congruent with personal

values) or identified regulation (i.e. act because it is judged valuable), as we analyzed earlier.

Managers falling into this category have an internal locus of control. The second factor

embraces two items: desire for less bureaucratic red tape and desire for a low conflict work

environment. This factor should reflect introjected regulation (i.e. act out of obligation to avoid

anxiety and pressure) as respondents treat work as their obligation but their paramount concerns

are less red tape and low conflict. This type carries a somewhat external locus of control.

[Insert Table 2 Here]

The third factor is comprised of three items: job security, the organization’s pension or

retirement plan, and benefits. Our traditional understanding of extrinsic motivation, which is

associated with external regulation, covers these three items. According to SDT, externally

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regulated managers have an even more external locus of control in comparison to introjected

regulated managers. The last factor is a combination of two items: few alternative job offers and

relatively low cost of living in the region. These two job selection reasons perfectly reflect

amotivation as being forced to choose a job among limited alternatives implies people’s lack of

ability, adaptability, and control over the current job. No incentive can be provided at the

workplace to motivate those who are concerned about cost of living in the region as well.

Regarding overall level of work motivation, one of the main dependent variables in the

current study, the authors employ four ordinal items with 4 referring to strongly agree and 1

referring to strongly disagree:

I put forth my best effort to get the job done regardless of the difficulties

Time seems to drag while I am on the job (inverse)

It has been hard for me to get very involved in my current job (inverse)

I do extra work for my job that isn't really expected of me

The four-item work motivation construct, which was first developed by Patchen and his

colleagues (Patchen, Pelz, and Allen 1965), asks respondents how involved they are in their

work (attitude) and how hard they work (behavior). This construct has been repeatedly used

(Wright 2004, 2007; Baldwin 1984, 1990) in the history. Although the Cronbach’s alpha value

(α = .61) is lower than the rule of thumb (α = .70),6 several fix indexes of confirmatory factor

analysis (CFA) have reached or approached the cut-off level (please refer to Table 3 for results).

Moreover, Cronbach’s alpha has severe limits as a test of the utility of factor dimensions.

Cortina (1993) indicates that the level of alpha is a function of the size of the average

correlations among items and can be large despite a wide range of item intercorrelations. For

instance, for a 3-item scale with α = .80, the average correlation is .57; for a 10-item scale with

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α = .80, the average correlation is only .28. In other words, internal consistency estimates are

relatively invariant when many items are pooled. Acknowledging the drawbacks of alpha, the

authors calculated the index score of factor analysis, labeled the calculated index as “work

motivation,” and used it as the first dependent variable.7 The other dependent variable is work

hours, measured by an item asking respondents: “During a typical week, about how many hours

do you work (including work done away from the office but as part of your job)?”

[Insert Table 3 Here]

Several control variables related to work motivation and work hours are included:

organizational size, a Georgia/Illinois dummy, a promotional position, age, gender, education,

number of children, and marital status. Larger organizational size (number of full time workers)

implies stronger inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Singh and Lumsden 1990) and more red

tape (Bozeman 2000; Bozeman and Feeney 2011), factors detrimental to work motivation. Civil

service reform in Georgia accompanied by the expansion of at-will workers is a decisive

predictor of work motivation and work hours (Feeney and Rainey 2010; Condrey and Battaglio

Jr 2007; Nigro and Kellough 2006). A promotional position, including internal promotion and

upward move from external organizations, denotes the success in one’s job career and can

enhance one’s work motivation. Women often report higher levels of job stress and other factors

related to job satisfaction (Feeney and Bozeman 2009), so the effect of gender needs to be

controlled for. Age represents differences of general values that influence work motivation and

work hours (Jurkiewicz, Massey, and Brown 1998). The days of absence because “you were not

sick but couldn’t face working” implies one’s unwillingness to work, a deleterious antecedent for

work motivation. Higher levels of education may be required to contribute longer time to

organizations. Marriage and children may drive one to work harder for their family.

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Statistical Findings

We first employ OLS regression with the use of Beta values (standardized coefficients)

to examine whether, in both the public sector sample and the nonprofit sample, the relationships

between extrinsic motivational styles and the dependent variables (i.e. work motivation and work

hours) follow the SDT pattern—decreasingly positive and increasingly negative from integrated-

identified regulation (IIR), introjected regulation (IR), external regulation (ER), to non-

regulation or amotivation (AM). We also examine whether coefficients of these motivational

styles significantly differ after controls are added into the model. We present models without

controls in Table 4 and models with controls in Table 5.

[Insert Table 4 and Table 5 Here]

Results in Table 4 show that the “decreasingly positive and increasingly negative” pattern

exists in both samples in general. However, exceptions exist. Regarding the association with

work motivation, the order of IR (a desire for less red tape and conflict) and ER (a desire for job

security, pension plans, and benefits) deviates from the pattern in both the public (Beta = -0.06

and -0.03 respectively) and nonprofit (Beta = -0.10 and -0.06 respectively) samples.8 Regarding

the association with work hours, the order of ER and AM (limited job alternatives and low cost

in the region) is not consistent with the pattern in the nonprofit sample (Beta = -0.18 and -0.12

respectively).9 After we control for several confounding variables, the aforementioned SDT

order and exceptions do not change significantly.

We notice two additional findings that deviate from the theory. Technically speaking,

IIR (a desire for advancement and job training) people have a rather internal locus of control, so

IIR should be positively associated with work motivation and work hours. However, in the

nonprofit sector sample, IIR is negatively related to work hours. Its association with work

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motivation is also negative, although not statistically significant. ER (a desire for job security,

pension plans, and benefits) in the theory should be a negative predictor for the dependent

variables in that ER people have a strong external locus of control. However, in predicting work

motivation, ER is not statistically significant in both the public and nonprofit samples. We will

more deliberately discuss reasons leading to these deviations in the next section.

Next, we introduce OLS regression and dummy variable moderation to examine whether

each motivational style generates different impacts on the DVs between public and nonprofit

samples. Regression models with dummy interactive terms can be expressed as following

(“NPO dummy” denotes nonprofit = 1 and public = 0):

( )

is the impact of IR in the public sector sample. Statistically significant implies that

the impact of IR on work motivation is significantly different between public and nonprofit

samples. The real impact of IR in the nonprofit sample is , and post-regression Wald-

tests with a null can help us obtain the p value of IR coefficient in the nonprofit

sample. We report regression results without control variables in Table 6 and results with

control variables in Table 7.

[Insert Table 6 and Table 7 Here]

In Table 6, all interaction terms are negative, an indication that the impacts of extrinsic

motivational styles on work motivation and work hours are more negative among nonprofit

managers than among public managers. Among them, three out of eight interaction terms are

statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. In addition, one interaction term (ER in the

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model of work hours) is approaching the 90% confidence level (p < .11). In order to look more

deeply into the difference between two types of managers, we compare coefficients in the public

and nonprofit samples by using eight Wald-tests with a null .

The most salient differences appear in IIR (a desire for advancement and job training),

the first row of the table. Its effect on work motivation is both significant and positive for public

managers (B = 1.92; p < 0.00) but negative for nonprofit managers (B = -0.19; p < 0.67); its

effect on work hours is positive for public managers (B = 0.40; p < 0.16) but both negative and

significant for nonprofit managers (B = -0.88; p < 0.00). Differences appear in IR (a desire for

less red tape and conflict) and ER (a desire for job security, pension plans, and benefits) as well.

The impact of IR on work hours is significant for nonprofit managers (B = -1.06; p < 0.00), but

not for public managers (B = -0.13; p < 0.63). Regarding ER, the negative effect on work hours

seems to be larger in the nonprofit sector sample (B = -1.48; p < 0.00) than in the public sector

sample (B = -0.76; p < 0.01). Coefficients in the last row (AM) are both negative and

statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, although they appear to be (slightly) more

negative in the nonprofit sample. Finally, the most obvious difference between Table 6 and

Table 7 is the coefficient of ER in the public sector sample: it is negative in Table 6 but positive

in Table 7. However, both coefficients are not statistically significant.

Concerning control variables, size, education, and the state of Georgia are more

influential in the model of work hours whereas marriage and the number of children are more

influential in the model of work motivation. A move-up position and age are statistically

significant in both models. An interesting finding is that female managers are likely than male to

report that they work hard, but meanwhile they also report that their working time is shorter.

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Discussion

There are two discussion foci in the present study. The first discussion focus is findings

that deviate from the self-determination theory. The second focus is public-nonprofit difference.

Deviations from SDT

SDT hints that the negative impact of ER (job security, pension plans, and benefits) on

work motivation and work hours should be stronger than IR (less red tape and low conflict).

While the findings in the models of work hours follow this pattern, the findings in the models of

work motivation show the opposite in both the public and nonprofit samples (see both Table 4

and Table 5). In addition, the findings also demonstrate that ER significantly and negatively

predicts work hours in both the public and nonprofit samples, but its significance diminishes, if

not disappears, in the models of work motivation. A possible reason leading to both deviations is

that ER people overestimate their work motivation.

The present study employs the most typical approach to measure work motivation: asking

respondents how hard they work, how often they do extra work, and how involved they feel in

their work (Patchen 1965; Rainey 1993; Wright 2007). Although researchers have reported

successful use of this approach, Rainey (1983) indicates that respondents tend to give high rating

to their won work effort, which to some degree reflects the cultural emphasis on hard work in the

United States (Rainey 2009). Compared to the measurement of work hours, the measurement of

work motivation is more likely to suffer from subjective bias. If ER people’s work motivation is

not as high as what they report, the negative relationship between ER and work motivation

would be more significant, which is more in line with the relationship between ER and work

hours. This possibly explains why the order of ER and IR does not follow the SDT pattern as

well. A remedy to the measurement of work motivation is to use some alternative measures such

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as job involvement, organizational confidence (Feeney and Boardman 2010), and different

dimensions of public service motivation (Vandenabeele 2007) as DVs and correlate them with

motivational styles.

Another deviation occurs in the nonprofit sample: the order of ER (job security, pension

plans, and benefits) and AM (selecting the current job because of limited choices and low cost in

the region) does not follow the SDT pattern in the model of work hours, although the same order

perfectly follows the SDT pattern in the model of work motivation. In the public sector sample,

this order is also consistent with the SDT pattern in the models of both work motivation and

work hours (see both Table 4 and Table 5). This implies that AM nonprofit managers should

have worked even less (in comparison to their self-reported work hours) due to a low level of

work motivation. A possible explanation is the nonprofit sector’s work nature. Different from

most public agencies, nonprofits usually lack strict job descriptions and classification, indirectly

freeing workers to work beyond their job descriptions (Rainey 2009). Many nonprofit

organizations are relatively small in size, and this requires workers to take on more than their

share of work (Feeney and Bozeman 2009). In addition, pervasive use of voluntary workforce

also creates additional duties for paid nonprofit managers to work extra hours (Netting et al.

2004; Hager and Brudney 2004), despite their willingness. Indeed, nonprofit managers having a

higher level of AM do work less than those having a lower level of AM, but their work hours

should have been even shorter if the aforementioned features did not exist in nonprofits.

Public-Nonprofit Comparison

In the public sector sample, the impact of IIR (a desire for advancement and job training)

on both DVs are positive whereas the rest of the extrinsic motivation and amotivation factors

have negative impacts, reflecting different levels of internal and external locus of control in SDT.

21

However, in the nonprofit sample, IIR has either a zero or negative impact on the DVs. In

addition, the negative impacts of the rest of extrinsic motivation factors on the DVs are generally

stronger than those in the public sample, and three out of six extrinsic motivation interaction

terms are even statistically significant (see Table 6 and Table 7). We thus question: why is IIR

an ineffective or negative predictor for work hours and work motivation, and moreover, why do

most extrinsic motivation factors appear to be more negative in the nonprofit sample?

The theory of person-environment fit may help answer these two questions. First,

compared to governmental agencies, nonprofits provide limited opportunities for promotion due

to their small size, resulting in fewer job openings and a short vacancy chain (White 1970).

Their scarcity of resource also implies obvious disadvantage in offering professional training and

the opportunity for career development (Berman 1999). Although IIR managers have a rather

strong internal locus of control, the person-environment mismatch in nonprofits compromises a

positive impact of IIR on work motivation and work hours. Second, although red tape is less

prevalent in nonprofits than in governmental units, nonprofits are indeed notorious for their job

ambiguity and work conflict originating from the shortage of manpower (Feeney and Bozeman

2009; Mirvis and Hackett 1983). This feature furthers the negative impact of IR on work

motivation and work hours in nonprofits. Finally, job security grounded in merit protection,

abundant benefits, and pension plans are the privilege for public sector managers only (Cox and

Brunelli 1994). That is, ER managers may experience a better person-environment fit in public

sector organizations than in nonprofit sector organizations.

Conclusion

The discussion of extrinsic motivation has long been underemphasized in public

administration research, this despite indications that public managers are strongly motivated by

22

extrinsic motivations, especially guarantees of security (Lewis and Frank 2002). The current

study proposes that the theory of self-determination provides a lens through which scholars may

obtain a more deliberate understanding of extrinsic motivation. This more sophisticated

typology of motivational styles in SDT helps us more precisely capture behavioral consequences

of different EM and AM styles. However, the application of SDT requires our caution in taking

sectoral contexts into consideration to the extent that person-environment value fit can moderate

the relationships between motivational styles and behavioral consequences. As a preliminary

study of SDT in public and nonprofit administration, our findings basically support the

“decreasingly positive and increasingly negative” SDT pattern with respect to work motivation

and work hours. Although some exceptions can be attributed to different levels of person-

environment fit in public and nonprofit organizations, we need more empirical evidence to

espouse our arguments. By treating the present study as a cornerstone, efforts to be made in the

future can be oriented to multiple dimensions of behavioral outcomes such as organizational

citizenship behaviors, confidence in organizational performance, and many others.

Another approach that helps improve the quality of SDT-based research is to identify

more job selection factors that represent different regulatory styles. For example, we fail to

successfully separate integrated regulation and identified regulation in the current study due to

the limitation of the dataset itself. It will also be valuable if each motivational construct has

more than three items. In sum, SDT is a useful tool that helps both practitioners and researchers

more deeply analyze human motivation. We encourage scholars engaged in public sector

motivation studies to brainstorm and contemplate a way that broadens the scope of SDT-based

empirical research.

23

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29

Tables and Figures

Table 1 Self-Determination Theory

Behavior Nonself-Determined Self-Determined

Motivation Amotivation Extrinsic motivation Intrinsic

motivation

Regulation Non-regulation External

regulation

Introjected

regulation

Identified

regulation

Integrated

regulation

Intrinsic

regulation

Locus of control Impersonal External Somewhat

external

Somewhat

internal

Internal Internal

Regulatory

processes

Nonintentional,

nonvaluing,

incompetence,

lack of control

Compliance,

external

rewards and

punishments

Self-control,

internal

rewards and

punishments

Personal

importance,

conscious

valuing

Congruence,

awareness,

synthesis

with self

Interest,

enjoyment,

inherent

satisfaction

Source: Ryan & Deci (2000)

Table 2 Exploratory Factor Analysis for Extrinsic Motivational Styles

Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4

Opportunity for advancement within the organization’s hierarchy 0.85

Opportunity for training and career development 0.86

Desire for less bureaucratic red tape 0.88

Desire for a low conflict work environment 0.82

Job security 0.71

The organization’s pension or retirement plan 0.86

Benefits (medical, insurance) 0.86

Few, if any, alternative job offers 0.88

Relatively low cost of living in the region 0.70

Factor 1: Integrated-identified regulation (IIR)

Factor 2: Introjected regulation (IR)

Factor 3: External regulation (ER)

Factor 4: No regulation or amotivation (AM)

30

Table 3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Work Motivation

Chi square df RFI NFI GFI CFI RMSR RMSEA

Suggested cut-off >.90 >.90 >.90 >.90 <.08 <.08

Values of the model 29.61 2 .87 .96 .98 .93 .01 .09

Items Factor loadings

I put forth my best effort to get the job done regardless of the difficulties 0.63

Time seems to drag while I am on the job (inverse) 0.78

It has been hard for me to get very involved in my current job (inverse) 0.79

I do extra work for my job that isn't really expected of me 0.55

Table 4 OLS Regression in the Public and Nonprofit Samples (without Controls)

Dependent variables Work Motivation Work Hours

Public Nonprofit Public Nonprofit

Beta Coef p Beta Coef p Beta Coef p Beta Coef p

IIR

0.17 1.92 0.00** -0.02 -0.19 0.63 0.06 0.40 0.10† -0.11 -0.46 0.03*

IR

-0.06 -0.64 0.10† -0.10 -0.85 0.04* -0.02 -0.13 0.59 -0.13 -1.06 0.00**

ER

-0.03 -0.40 0.34 -0.06 -0.45 0.27 -0.11 -0.76 0.00** -0.18 -1.06 0.00**

AM -0.16 -1.60 0.00** -0.19 -1.88 0.00** -0.17 -1.07 0.00** -0.12 -0.96 0.02*

N 758 394 751 399

Adjusted R-square 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.06

** p < .01; * p < .05; † p <.10; deviations from the SDT pattern are highlighted

31

Table 5 OLS Regression in the Public and Nonprofit Samples (with Controls)

Dependent variables Work Motivation Work Hours

Public Nonprofit Public Nonprofit

Beta Coef (p) Beta Coef p Beta Coef p Beta Coef p

Extrinsic motivation

IIR 0.18 2.06 0.00** 0.02 0.20 0.64 0.06 0.39 0.12 -0.06 -0.46 0.27

IR -0.07 -0.75 0.06† -0.11 -0.94 0.03* -0.02 -0.11 0.67 -0.13 -1.06 0.01*

ER -0.06 -0.73 0.09† -0.01 -0.05 0.91 -0.11 -0.82 0.00** -0.13 -1.06 0.01*

AM -0.13 -1.32 0.00** -0.14 -1.40 0.01* -0.13 -0.81 0.00** -0.10 -0.96 0.05*

Controls

Size (log) 0.03 0.21 0.41 -0.09 -0.36 0.08† 0.09 0.39 0.01* 0.04 0.15 0.47

State of GA 0.03 0.72 0.34 0.03 0.59 0.58 0.21 2.69 0.00** 0.06 1.25 0.23

Move-up position 0.09 2.17 0.01* 0.06 1.16 0.24 0.04 0.57 0.26 0.06 1.16 0.23

Age 0.16 0.19 0.00** 0.18 0.17 0.00** 0.13 0.10 0.00** 0.09 0.08 0.11

Female 0.13 2.75 0.00** 0.07 1.22 0.22 0.00 0.05 0.91 -0.21 -3.67 0.00**

Education -0.03 -0.28 0.37 0.12 1.01 0.02* 0.03 0.17 0.38 0.10 0.82 0.05*

Married 0.04 1.10 0.24 0.11 2.35 0.04* -0.02 -0.33 0.57 -0.01 -0.18 0.87

Number of children 0.04 0.33 0.34 0.08 0.66 0.12 -0.03 -0.16 0.47 -0.02 -0.16 0.69

Constant -- 39.60 0.00** -- 40.13 0.00** -- 35.20 0.00** -- 43.22 0.00**

N 739 377 732 382

Adjusted R-square 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.12

** p < .01; * p < .05; † p <.10

32

Table 6 OLS Regression and Sector Moderation in the Full Sample (without Controls)

Dependent variables Work Motivation Work Hours

Coef p Coef p

IIR 1.92 0.00** 0.40 0.16

IR -0.64 0.09† -0.13 0.63

ER -0.40 0.31 -0.76 0.01*

AM -1.60 0.00** -1.07 0.00**

NPO dummy 2.58 0.00** 4.49 0.00**

IIR*NPO -2.11 0.00** -1.28 0.00**

IR*NPO -0.21 0.72 -0.93 0.03*

ER*NPO -0.05 0.93 -0.72 0.11

AM*NPO -0.28 0.66 -0.06 0.90

Constant 53.42 0.00** 45.29 0.00**

N 1152 1150

Adjusted R-square 0.07 0.16

Post-regression Wald-tests under ( ) ( )

Work Motivation

Work Hours

Public Nonprofit Public Nonprofit

Coef p Coef p Coef p Coef p

IIR 1.92 0.00** -0.19 0.67 0.40 0.16 -0.88 0.00**

IR -0.64 0.09† -0.85 0.06† -0.13 0.63 -1.06 0.00**

ER -0.40 0.31 -0.45 0.32 -0.76 0.01* -1.48 0.00**

AM -1.60 0.00** -1.88 0.00** -1.07 0.00** -1.13 0.00**

** p < .01; * p < .05; † p <.10

33

Table 7 OLS Regression and Sector Moderation in the Full Sample (with Controls)

Dependent variables Work Motivation Work Hours

Coef p Coef p

Extrinsic motivation

IIR 2.07 0.00** 0.41 0.15

IR -0.63 0.10† 0.05 0.86

ER -0.57 0.15 -0.76 0.01*

AM -1.30 0.00** -0.85 0.00**

NPO dummy 2.32 0.01* 6.30 0.00**

IIR*NPO -2.12 0.00** -1.01 0.02*

IR*NPO -0.38 0.52 -1.22 0.01*

ER*NPO 0.22 0.72 -0.45 0.32

AM*NPO -0.19 0.77 -0.15 0.76

Controls

Size (log) -0.07 0.65 0.28 0.02*

State of GA 0.70 0.26 2.34 0.00**

Move-up position 2.02 0.00** 0.89 0.06†

Age 0.19 0.00** 0.10 0.00**

Female 2.18 0.00** -1.21 0.01*

Education 0.13 0.61 0.45 0.02*

Married 1.52 0.04* -0.22 0.69

Number of children 0.46 0.09† -0.14 0.49

Constant 39.60 0.00** 35.13 0.00**

N 1116 1114

Adjusted R-square 0.11 0.20

Post-regression Wald-tests under ( ) ( )

Work Motivation

Work Hours

Public Nonprofit Public Nonprofit

Coef p Coef p Coef p Coef p

IIR 2.07 0.00** -0.05 0.91 0.41 0.11 -0.60 0.14

IR -0.63 0.12 -1.11 0.01* 0.05 0.84 -1.17 0.00**

ER -0.57 0.22 -0.35 0.36 -0.76 0.01* -1.21 0.00**

AM -1.30 0.00** -1.49 0.01** -0.85 0.00** -1.00 0.05*

** p < .01; * p < .05; † p <.10

34

Endnotes

1 The use of intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy exists ubiquitously in the classic literature of motivation

research, both incentives and human needs. In addition to Maslow (1954), Herzberg (1966), and

McGregor (1960), Lawler (1971) developed his extrinsic-intrinsic rewards dichotomy, indicating that

rewards extrinsic to individuals reflect lower-order physiological, safety, and social needs whereas

intrinsic rewards can satisfy higher-order self-esteem and self-actualization needs. Wilson’s (1973)

material/tangible incentives and solidary/intangible incentives were designed to satisfy extrinsic needs

and intrinsic needs respectively.

2 In providing examples, Vallerand and Ratelle (2004) used some cases of educational psychology. The

example of integrated regulation is: “A ballet dancer might choose not to go to a party with friends in

order to be in shape for dance class early on the next morning.” The example of identified regulation is:

“A boy in high school who decides to get up an hour earlier to review his chemistry notes because he

feels it is personally important to do so.”

3 Vallerand and Ratelle (2004) provided examples for introjected regulation and external regulation as

well. The example of introjected regulation is: “A woman may vote municipal elections because she feels

she has to, because it is her duty as a citizen.” The examples of external regulation are “getting money”

and “avoiding a parent’s reprimands.”

4 The example of amotivation in Vallerand and Ratelle’s (2004) article is: “Students who cannot see what

staying in school will bring to their future decide to drop out of high school.”

5 In this study, both “opportunity for advancement” and “opportunity for training and career development”

are deemed extrinsic motivation as they are not internally-embedded desires and are controlled by

external parties. Our view is grounded in the taxonomy by Lawler (1971), who argues that extrinsic

rewards are those external to individuals and given by others, whereas intrinsic rewards stem directly

from job performance itself (e.g. using one’s own abilities and serving the public interest). Besides,

treating advancement as extrinsic motivation is not unprecedented (please see Word and Park, 2009 for an

example).

6 In fact, the value of Cronbach’s alpha in most of the previous research, such as Wright’s (2004, 2007)

empirical studies, was below .70.

7 The saved index ranged between -5.44 and 0.87. In order to avoid confusion, the authors added 5.44 to

every saved score so the range became 0 ~ 6.31. However, this rage is too small in comparison to the

other dependent variable: work hours (ranging between 20 and 70). We then multiplied the index by 10

and obtained the index used in this study. The range of this new index is between 0 and 63.1.

8 We conducted post-regression Wald-test under ( ) ( ) in the nonprofit sample and

found that p < 0.13. That being said, this gap in terms of statistical significance is approaching the 90%

confidence level. The result of the same test in the public sample showed that p < 0.97, implying that the

difference is little and ignorable.

9 We conducted post-regression Wald-test under ( ) ( ) in the nonprofit sample and

found that p < 0.56. Although the result is not statistically significant, substantive difference between

these two coefficients requires some discussion.