abstract - university of southern california · 9/26/2015 · first, inside traders live close to...
TRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS:
EVIDENCE FROM ILLEGAL INSIDER TRADING TIPS
KENNETH R. AHERN†
Abstract
This paper exploits a novel hand-collected dataset to provide a comprehensive analysis of the social relation-
ships that underlie illegal insider trading networks. I find that inside information flows through strong social
ties based on family, friends, and geographic proximity. On average, inside tips originate from corporate ex-
ecutives and reach buy-side investors after three links in the network. Inside traders earn prodigious returns
of 35% over 21 days, with more central traders earning greater returns, as information conveyed through
social networks improves price efficiency. More broadly, this paper provides some of the only direct evidence
of person-to-person communication among investors.
This version: 26 September 2015
JEL Classification: D83, D85, G14, K42, Z13
Keywords: Illegal insider trading, information networks, social networks
† University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business, 3670 Trousdale Parkway, Los Angeles, CA 90089.E-mail: [email protected] useful comments, I am grateful to Patrick Augustin, Harry DeAngelo, Diane Del Guercio, Chad Kendall, JeffNetter, Annette Poulsen, Marti Subrahmanyam, Paul Tetlock, participants at the 2015 Napa Conference on Finan-cial Markets Research, and seminar participants at Cass Business School, Erasmus University, HEC Paris, INSEAD,London Business School, London School of Economics, McGill University, Ohio State University, Tilburg University,University of Arizona, University of Bristol, University of Cambridge, University of Georgia, University of Missouri,University of Oregon, University of Texas at Dallas, University of Southern California, University of Warwick, Van-derbilt University, and Yale University.
![Page 2: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Information Networks: Evidence from Illegal Insider Trading Tips
Abstract
This paper exploits a novel hand-collected dataset to provide a comprehensive analysis of the social relation-
ships that underlie illegal insider trading networks. I find that inside information flows through strong social
ties based on family, friends, and geographic proximity. On average, inside tips originate from corporate ex-
ecutives and reach buy-side investors after three links in the network. Inside traders earn prodigious returns
of 35% over 21 days, with more central traders earning greater returns, as information conveyed through
social networks improves price efficiency. More broadly, this paper provides some of the only direct evidence
of person-to-person communication among investors.
![Page 3: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 1
Though it is well established that new information moves stock prices, it is less certain how
information spreads among investors. Shiller and Pound (1989) proposes that information spreads
among investors following models of disease contagion. More recent papers model the transmission
of information through direct communication between investors (Stein, 2008; Han and Yang, 2013;
Andrei and Cujean, 2015). The predictions of these models suggest that the diffusion of information
over social networks is crucial for many financial outcomes, such as heterogeneity in trading profits,
market efficiency, momentum, and local bias.
Empirically identifying the diffusion of information through social networks is challenging. Di-
rect observations of personal communication among investors is rare. Instead, existing evidence
relies on indirect proxies of social interactions, such as geographic proximity (Hong, Kubik, and
Stein, 2005; Brown, Ivkovic, Smith, and Weisbenner, 2008), common schooling (Cohen, Frazzini,
and Malloy, 2008, 2010), coworkers (Hvide and Ostberg, 2015), and correlated stock trades (Oz-
soylev et al., 2014). While these proxies might reflect social interactions, they could also reflect
homophily, in which investors act alike because they share similar backgrounds, not because they
share information. In addition, indirect proxies cannot distinguish the quality of information that
investors share. For example, the information could be an informed investor’s private observations,
a noise trader’s uninformative beliefs, or news reported in public media sources. Different quality
information is likely to have different implications for financial outcomes.
In this paper, I address these challenges by studying one particular form of information sharing:
illegal insider trading. Though sharing illegal insider tips does not represent all forms of informa-
tion sharing, it is an attractive setting for this study. First, legal documents in insider trading cases
provide direct observations of person-to-person communication, including details on the social net-
works between traders. This means I do not rely on indirect proxies of social interaction. Second,
by definition, insider trading is only illegal if people share material, nonpublic information. This
means that I exclude irrelevant, public information. Finally, illegal insider trading represents an
important component of the market. In particular, Augustin, Brenner, and Subrahmanyam (2014)
estimate that 25% of M&A announcements are preceded by illegal insider trading.
I identify 183 insider trading networks using hand-collected data from all of the insider trading
cases filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ)
![Page 4: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
2 INFORMATION NETWORKS
between 2009 and 2013. The case documents provide highly detailed data on both inside traders
and people who shared information but did not trade securities themselves. (For brevity, I use the
term ‘inside trader’ to refer to both types of people.) The data include biographical information
and descriptions of social relationships, such as family, friends, and business associates. The case
documents also include the specific information that is shared, the date the information is shared,
the amount and timing of insider trades, and the types of securities traded. The data cover 1,139
insider tips shared by 622 inside traders who made an aggregated $928 million in illegal profits.
I organize the paper as follows. First, I provide an in-depth profile of inside traders, their
relationships, and the flow of information over their networks. Then, I investigate how social
networks affect two financial outcomes: market prices and individual trading gains. Finally, I
discuss the generalizability of the findings.
The average inside trader is 43 years old and about 90% of inside traders in the sample are men.
The most common occupation among inside traders is top executive, including CEOs and directors,
accounting for 17% of known occupations. There are a significant number of buy side investment
managers (10%) and analysts (11%), as well as sell side professionals, such as lawyers, accountants,
and consultants (10%). The sample also includes non-“Wall Street” types, such as small business
owners, doctors, engineers, and teachers.
Inside traders share information about specific corporate events that have large effects on stock
prices. Mergers account for 51% of the sample, followed by earnings announcements, accounting
for 26%. The remaining events include clinical trial and regulatory announcements, sale of new
securities, and operational news, such as CEO turnovers. The firms in which inside traders invest
tend to be large high-tech firms with a median market equity of $1 billion.
Trading in advance of these events yields large returns. Across all events, the average stock
return from the date of the original leak through the official announcement date of the event is
35%, over an average holding period of 21 trading days. M&A tips generate average returns of
43% in 31 days. Earnings tips generate relatively smaller returns of 14% in 11 days. Of the people
who trade securities, the median inside trader invests about $200,000 per tip, though some invest
as little as a few thousand dollars, and others invest hundreds of millions. For these investments,
the median trader earns about $72,000 per tip.
![Page 5: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 3
Inside traders are connected through strong social relationships. Of the 461 pairs of tippers and
tippees in the sample, 23% are family members, 35% are friends, and 35% are business associates,
including pairs that have both family and business links. Sibling and parental relations are the
most common type of family connections. Of the pairs with available data, 64% met before college,
16% met in college or graduate school, and 20% met after completing school. While these results
provide validation that information flows over school-ties, as proposed in Cohen et al. (2008), they
also show that information is mostly shared between people who met before college.
Inside traders are connected in other ways, too. First, inside traders live close to each other.
The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This finding validates the use of
geographic proximity as a proxy for information sharing (e.g., Hong et al. (2005)). Second, inside
traders tend to share a common surname ancestry, even excluding family members.
One concern with this analysis is that I only observe connections between people who received
inside information. Ideally, I would also observe people who could have received a tip, but did not.
To address this concern, I use social network data from the massive LexisNexis Public Records
Database (LNPRD) to identify family members and associates. Thus, for each tipper in the sample,
I observe a broad social network, including people not listed as tippees in the SEC and DOJ
documents. Using these counterfactual observations as a benchmark, I find that inside traders tend
to share information with people that are closer in age and of the same gender. Among family
relationships, inside traders are more likely to tip fathers and brothers than mothers and sisters.
These results provide evidence that information flows locally through clusters of inside traders
with similar backgrounds and close social relationships. This finding is consistent with Stein’s
(2008) prediction that valuable information remains local, even though social networks are broad.
This finding is also consistent with the importance of trust in criminal networks (Morselli, 2009).
While inside traders share information to win favor with others, doing so increases their chances of
prosecution. Thus, inside traders share information selectively.
Next, I find that inside information flows across the network in specific patterns. Information
tends to flow from subordinates to bosses, from younger tippers to older tippees, and from children
to parents. These patterns suggest that social hierarchies may lead lower status tippers to try to
ingratiate themselves with higher status tippees. As information flows away from the original source,
![Page 6: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
4 INFORMATION NETWORKS
business associates become more prevalent than friends and family, and buy side managers and
analysts become more prevalent than corporate insiders. However, buy side traders only account for
the majority of tippees after three links in the network, on average. Thus, information eventually
reaches well-capitalized and sophisticated traders, but not immediately. Once the information
reaches the buy side traders, they tend to share information faster, invest larger amounts, make
smaller percentage returns, and earn larger dollar gains.
To complete the profile of inside traders, I study the structure of insider trading networks. Of 183
insider networks in the sample, 59 contain only one person. These are original sources who trade
on inside information, but do not tip anyone else. On the other end of the spectrum, the network
surrounding the hedge fund SAC Capital has 64 members. In the cross-section, larger networks are
less dense with fewer clusters of links. This means that insider networks sprawl outward, like a tree’s
branches, rather than through one central node. Larger networks have younger members, fewer
women, and are more likely connected through business relationships of buy side professionals.
I next investigate whether the social networks of inside traders influence financial outcomes.
First, I show that insider trading moves stock prices toward their fundamental values. In panel
regressions that control for event-firm fixed effects, event-day fixed effects, trading volume, and
daily risk factors, I find that on days with greater insider trading, stock returns are significantly
higher for positive events and significantly lower for negative events. These results show that the
flow of information over social networks increases market efficiency.
Second, I test whether the backgrounds of inside traders are related to the price impact of their
trades. For example, trades by an older trader who receives information from a family member
might have a stronger impact on stock prices than the trades of a younger trader who receives
information from a friend. Alternatively, since the market is anonymous, the backgrounds of
traders may not have any effect on market prices. I find that most characteristics of inside traders,
such as age, occupation, and network position are unrelated to the price impact of trading. These
results imply that while social networks are important conduits for the transmission of material
information, prices reflect the information, not the provenance of the information.
Finally, I test whether social networks are related to the gains of individual inside traders. In
cross-sectional regressions, I find that more central inside traders in larger networks realize both
![Page 7: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 5
greater returns and profit. These results are consistent with the theoretical models of Ozsoylev
and Walden (2011) and Walden (2013), in which more central insiders exploit their information
advantage to earn greater profits. It is important to note that because my results show that
centrality is related to returns, not just profit, it implies that more central inside traders receive
more valuable information, not just more information.
Though insider trading is an attractive setting for studying the flow of information, its primary
drawback is generalizability. First, my results might not apply to the flow of less factual or public
information. Without fear of prosecution, investors are likely to share public information more
broadly than inside information. Second, like most studies of criminal activity, my results might
not generalize to the general population of illegal inside traders. I attempt to address this concern
in a couple of ways. First, as mentioned above, I identify counterfactual observations of relatives
and associates not named by regulators. Second, based on biases in the detection methods used by
regulators, I infer that my sample tends to under-represent small, opportunistic traders and over-
represent traders that are more likely to impact stock prices: wealthy CEOs and fund managers in
larger networks who invest larger sums.
This paper contributes to two lines of research. First, this paper contributes to research on the
importance of social networks for the diffusion of information among investors, discussed above.
This paper provides some of the first direct evidence of how investors share material, nonpublic
information through social connections. Rather than focusing on one particular social connection,
such as common schooling, I provide a profile of a wide range of social connections that underlie
the spread of inside information. In addition, this is one of the first papers to show that the spread
of information across social networks affects market efficiency, not just individual trading gains.
Finally, to my knowledge, this is the first paper that identifies a counterfactual social network
among traders, and this is the first paper to exploit the vast social network data in the LNPRD.
Second, this paper provides the most detailed description of illegal insider trading to date. The
most closely related paper is Meulbroek (1992), which uses SEC cases from the 1980s to show that
insider trading affects takeover prices. Other papers focus on the effect of illegal insider trading on
merger runups, including Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Schwert (1996), and Fishe and Robe (2004), or
the prevalence of insider trading, including Augustin et al. (2014), Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002),
![Page 8: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
6 INFORMATION NETWORKS
and Del Guercio, Odders-White, and Ready (2013). Bhattacharya (2014) provides an overview of
the literature on insider trading. In contrast to these papers, I provide new evidence on the profile
of inside traders and the social connections that underlie their networks.
Finally, though I do not focus on the legal issues surrounding insider trading laws, my results
inform the current policy debate about the definition of illegal insider trading. In December 2014,
the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the guilty verdicts of Anthony Chiasson and
Todd Newman. A key part of Chiasson and Newman’s defense was that they were separated from
the original source by many links in the network. Under the new definition of illegal insider trading,
my results predict that serial inside traders in large networks who have the most capital will be
less likely to be prosecuted. I discuss legal issues of insider trading in more detail in the Internet
Appendix.
1. Data Sources
1.1. Legal Documents
The primary sources of data in this paper are legal documents filed by the SEC and the DOJ
as part of illegal insider trading cases. To identify SEC cases, I record the titles of all of the cases
reported in the SEC’s annual summaries of enforcement actions, “Select SEC and Market Data,” for
each fiscal year between 2009 and 2013, the most recent publication date. I start data collection in
2009 because the SEC and DOJ both had regime shifts around 2008 in enforcement and investigative
power. In particular, President Obama appointed a new chair of the SEC in January 2009 and the
DOJ brought its first case that used wiretap evidence in 2009.1 Because some cases involve multiple
SEC violations, an insider trading case could be categorized in a different section of the “Select
SEC and Market Data” publication. Therefore, I also search in Factiva for SEC publications that
include the text “insider trading.” This search finds seven cases that involve insider trading that
are categorized as Investment Advisers/Investment Companies or Issuer Reporting and Disclosure
cases. The Factiva search also identifies cases filed prior to fiscal year 2009 which were amended
after 2009, and new cases filed during calendar year 2013, but after the end of fiscal year 2013. I
include all of these cases in the sample. I drop 26 cases of fraud in which insiders release false or
1More details of the regime shift are discussed in the Internet Appendix.
![Page 9: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 7
misleading information, such as pump and dump cases. These cases are fundamentally different
because the insider wants to broadcast false information as widely as possible, whereas in the
sample cases, inside traders share factual information locally. I also drop nine SEC cases that do
not name specific individuals. These cases are based on suspicious trading activity, typically from
an overseas trading account. All cases were filed in calendar years 2009 to 2013, except one case
that was filed in December 2008. I include this case because the DOJ case was filed in 2009.
Unlike the SEC, the DOJ does not provide summary lists of all the insider trading cases it brings.
Therefore, I search Factiva for all DOJ press releases with the words “insider trading” and record
the name of the case from the press release. In the sample, only two cases filed by the DOJ are not
also charged by the SEC.
I use a number of sources to collect the original case documents. First, I search the SEC’s website
for official documents, the most useful of which is a civil complaint. Complaint filings typically
include a detailed narrative history of the allegations, including biographies of defendants, trading
records, and descriptions of the relationships between tippers and tippees to justify the allegations.
Some cases are not available on the SEC web page. For these cases and for all DOJ cases, I
search for the case documents using Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER). The
most useful DOJ documents are the criminal complaints and “information” documents. These are
similar to civil complaints, but contain less information. Transcripts of hearings, while potentially
informative, are typically not available on PACER.
The search procedure yields 335 primary source documents comprising 5,423 pages supporting
203 SEC cases and 114 DOJ cases. There are 2.6 defendants in the average SEC case and 1.4 in
the average DOJ case. Some people named in the documents were not charged with a crime and
some people did not trade securities. However, everyone named in the documents shared material,
nonpublic information. In addition, cases may also cover multiple events of one or many firms. In
some instances, the same event is covered in unrelated cases in which different sets of inside traders
shared information about the same event.
Because the documents provide data in narrative histories, they must be recorded by hand.
Manually reading each individual case is also necessary to sort out the identities of all of the
inside traders named in the cases. In particular, in many DOJ documents, co-conspirators remain
![Page 10: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
8 INFORMATION NETWORKS
anonymous. Some co-conspirators’ identities are revealed in future cases, but other co-conspirators’
identities are never revealed by the DOJ. However, these same people are often named in the SEC
documents. Therefore, it is necessary to read all of the cases and their amendments in order to
piece together the identities of as many people as possible. For instance, in many cases it is easy
to infer who the co-conspirator is by the description of their job and relationship to the defendant
in connection with another DOJ case in which the co-conspirator is the named defendant. In
some instances, the identities of certain inside traders are never revealed. In these cases, I rely on
investigative journalism in media reports, when available, that uncover the identities of people that
the SEC and DOJ do not name explicitly.
From the primary source documents, I record five key types of information. First, I record the
names, locations, employers, and ages of all people named in the document. Second, I record
the social relationships between tippers and tippees, including family relations, friendships, and
co-worker relationships. Third, I record the original source of the information and how the source
received the information. For instance, the documents might explain that a lawyer was assigned to
work on an upcoming acquisition. Fourth, I record the timing of information flows. This includes
the days when tippers and tippees communicated in person, by phone, or electronically. In some
cases, the documents record the timing of phone calls to the minute. Finally, I record detailed
descriptions of trading behavior, including the dates of purchases and sales, the amount purchased,
the types of securities purchased (e.g., shares or options), and the profits from the sales.
1.2. LexisNexis Public Records Database
The second major source of data in this paper is the LexisNexis Public Records Database
(LNPRD). The LNPRD includes a wide array of biographical information, including age, address,
real property ownership, employers, licenses, liens, bankruptcies, and criminal records. With over
300 million people from the US in the database, including living and dead, this is the most compre-
hensive database for demographic information on the general public. Because the case documents
include name, age, and location, I am able to identify people named in the filing documents with
a high degree of accuracy. For instance, in one case, the SEC complaint only states, “Richard
Vlasich is a friend of Michael Jobe and resides in Fort Worth.” I find the entry for Vlasich on
![Page 11: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 9
LNPRD using his name, city, and approximate age. The LNPRD data states that his employer is
Vlasich Associates. Using this information, I find his resume on an online professional networking
site, which describes his role in Vlasich Associates as the owner of a small real estate business.
I also record data on family members and person associates from the LNPRD. The specific
type of familial relation is not identified in the LNPRD, though the data do indicate first or second
degree connections and through whom the connections run. For example, using married and maiden
names, I identify wives as women who are roughly the same age as the inside trader who also share
a history of common addresses and own property jointly. The second degree connections through a
wife could include the wife’s parents or siblings, which I can identify by age, surname, and address
of the second degree relatives. If a familial relationship can not be identified, I record it as unknown.
Person associates are non-family members with whom an inside trader shares a relationship. The
exact algorithm for identifying person associates is proprietary to LexisNexis using their vast public
and private records database. In general, these are people with whom an inside trader may have
shared an address, had business dealings, or is connected in some other way through primary source
records. The Internet Appendix provides more details on the LNPRD.
1.3. Additional Sources of Data
Not all documents contain all information. In particular, the job titles of many people are
not listed. To find occupations, I search online professional social networking sites. Using the
reported employer and location helps to identify the particular person on these sites. However,
because people charged with insider trading often wish to hide their connection with the illegal
trading charges, they may not list their old employer on online resumes. In these cases I use the
employment records in the LNPRD. However, the LNPRD doesn’t report job titles. To overcome
this obstacle, I use the Internet Archive’s “Wayback Machine” to search company websites on dates
before the insider trading charges were filed to identify job titles and other biographical information.
Finally, I use web searches to try to find any remaining data.
In addition to the case documents and the LNPRD, I estimate home values as a proxy for
wealth using estimates from the online real estate website, Zillow.com. I also record the gender
of every person in the dataset based on the person’s first name. For unfamiliar names, I rely
![Page 12: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
10 INFORMATION NETWORKS
on two databases: namepedia.org and genderchecker.com. Finally, I record the ancestry of every
inside trader’s surname using the Onomap database. The Onomap database codes surnames into
14 different ethnic origins.2
2. Illegal Insider Trading Events and Firms
2.1. Events
The sample includes 465 events. The earliest event is in 1996, and the most recent is in 2013,
though 89% of the events occur within 2005 to 2012. The cases that involve insider trading in the
earlier periods typically concern a defendant that is charged with a long-running insider trading
scheme. In 25 events, I cannot identify an announcement date because the SEC and DOJ documents
do not specify a specific event.
Table 1 presents statistics on the frequency of different types of events, stock returns, and holding
periods surrounding insider trading. Panel A shows that the most common type of event with 239
instances, or 51% of all events, is a merger or acquisition (M&A). The large majority of these events
are acquisitions, though I also include 12 joint ventures, licensing agreements, strategic alliances,
and restructuring events, plus eight events related to developments in merger negotiations, such as
the collapse of a deal. Of the 219 acquisition events, informed investors traded in the target’s stock
in 216 cases, and the acquirer’s stock in just three cases.
The next most common type of event in the sample is earnings-related announcements, with
123 events, or 26% of the sample. The large majority of these events (112 events) are regularly
scheduled earnings announcements. The rest of the earnings-related events are announcements of
earnings restatements and earnings guidance.
The remaining 22% of the sample comprises drug clinical trial and regulatory announcements
(8.0%), the sale of securities (7.5%), general business operations, such as the resignation or appoint-
ment of a senior officer, employee layoffs, and announcements of new customer-supplier contracts
(2.8%), and other announcements (3.9%), such as analysts reports, dividend increases, and the
2The ethnic origins are African, Anglo-Saxon, Baltic, Celtic, East Asian and Pacific, European-Other Eastern,European-Other Western, Hispanic, Japanese, Jewish, Muslim, Nordic, South Asian, and Unclassified. The eth-nicity groupings reflect the the multi-dimensional view that defines ethnicity based on kinship, religion, language,shared territory, nationality, and physical appearance (Mateos, 2007).
![Page 13: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 11
addition to a stock index. The other events category also contains events that are not specified in
the SEC and DOJ documents. All but two of the sale of securities events involve private investment
in public equity transactions, with the vast majority for Chinese firms traded in the United States.
Table 1 also distinguishes whether the inside information contains positive or negative news at
the time the information is tipped. To make sure I do not create a forward-looking bias in trading
returns, I base this distinction on information available to the inside traders at the time they trade
by using long positions and call options to indicate positive news and short positions and put
options to indicate negative news. Almost all M&A announcements are positive news events (234
vs. 5). Earnings events are more evenly split between positive and negative news, with 66 positive
events and 54 negative events. Clinical trials tend to be positive news events with 24 positive events
compared to 13 negative events. The sale of securities is overwhelming bad news in the sample with
34 negative events and one positive event. In 18 cases, the details provided in the SEC complaints
do not provide enough detail to classify an event as positive or negative, including the 12 cases
in which the events themselves are not specified. A detailed breakdown of the types of events is
presented in Internet Appendix Table 1.
2.2. Stock Returns from Insider Trading
Panel B of Table 1 presents average stock returns for each event type. The stock returns are
calculated as the return from buying stock on the first trading date after the original tipper first
receives the information through the date of the corporate event. If the date that the original
source receives the information is not available in the filing documents, I use the first date that
the original source tips the information. Panel C presents averages of this holding period. Not all
tippees earn returns equal to those in Table 1 because many tippees do not receive the information
until closer to the event date and some do not trade stock. The final column of Table 1 aggregates
stock returns by taking the average of the returns for a long position in positive events and a short
position in negative events.
Stock returns from insider trading are large by any measure: on average, trading on inside
information earns returns of 34.9% over 21.3 trading days. Because the returns are based on
idiosyncratic inside information, the trades bear virtually no financial risk, though there is legal
![Page 14: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
12 INFORMATION NETWORKS
risk. Clinical trial and drug regulatory announcements generate the largest returns, on average,
with gains of 101.2% for positive events and −38.6% for negative events, with an average holding
period of just 9.2 days. M&As generate average returns of 43.1% in 30.5 days. Insider trading
based on earnings announcements generates relatively smaller returns of 13.5% in 11.3 days. Also,
median trading periods are small: 16 days for M&A events and 10 days for all types of events.
As a comparison, panel D of Table 1 presents the one-day raw return on the announcement
of the event. For nearly every type of event, inside traders’ investments (positive or negative)
correctly predict the direction of the average stock returns on the announcement date. In addition,
comparing the announcement day returns (panel D) to the total returns (panel B) reveals that a
substantial fraction of the total return is realized in the runup period. Across all event types, the
runup accounts for 49% of the total return when the news is positive. Consistent with short sale
constraints, the runup only accounts for 28% of the total return when the news is negative. Later
in the paper, I test whether the runup is attributable to insider trading.
2.3. Firms
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the firms at the event level. The sample includes 351 firms
whose stocks are traded by inside traders and whose data are available on the CRSP-Compustat
merged database. The missing observations tend to be small firms or foreign firms, primarily
Chinese, which are traded on OTC markets. Because there are 465 events, many of the firms have
information tipped about multiple events. For instance, Best Buy Co. has five different earnings
announcements in the sample.
The firms in the sample are relatively large, though they vary widely. The average firm’s market
equity is $10 billion and the median firm’s market equity is $1 billion. As a comparison, the median
firm listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in December 2011 has a market equity of $1.2
billion. These statistics suggest that the sample firms include a representative sample of NYSE
firms, plus a number of smaller firms in the left tail of the distribution.
The dollar trading volume of larger firms may be attractive for illegal inside traders because they
are less likely to affect the stock price through their trades. The median firm has a daily trading
volume of about 680,000 shares and a daily dollar trading volume of $13.08 million. To compare the
![Page 15: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 13
normal trading volume of the sample firms to the illegal trading volume, I first aggregate the total
dollars invested by inside traders over all the days in the period between when the original source
receives the information and the event date. The total amount traded by tippees is $370,000 for the
median event and $4.06 million for the average. I next calculate the daily average dollar amount
of illegal trades divided by the firm’s average daily dollar volume during a non-event period. The
ratio is 0.63% at the median and 4.66% at the mean. At the 75th percentile, the ratio is 3.71%, a
significant fraction of the daily volume.
Internet Appendix Table 2 presents the fraction of events by firms’ industries. Compared to all
firms in the CRSP database, the sample of industries represented in the illegal trading database
overweights high-tech industries. Using industry distributions for firms in CRSP may be an inac-
curate benchmark because a large fraction of the sample involves trading around mergers, which
tend to cluster by industry. Using a sample of public, U.S. merger targets from 2004 to 2012 from
SDC as a benchmark, I still find that the sample overweights high-tech industries.
3. Who Are Inside Traders?
3.1. Demographics
The dataset includes 622 people. Of these, 162 people are tippers only, 249 are tippees only, 152
are both tippees and tippers, and 59 are original information sources who do not tip anyone else.
399 people traded securities. Table 3 presents summary statistics of the 622 people in the sample,
constrained by data availability.
Across the entire sample, the average age is 44.1 years and 9.8% of the people are women.
The youngest person is 19 years old and the oldest is 80. I use an inside trader’s home value as
an imperfect proxy for wealth. Because identifying the specific timing of real estate purchases is
difficult in the LNPRD, for each inside trader, I compute his median house value across all of the
real estate he owned at any time. I restrict real estate holdings to those that are listed both as
real property and as a residence in the LNPRD to filter out investment properties. The average
inside trader’s home is worth an estimated $1.1 million in September 2014, with a median of
$656,300. According to data from the National Association of Realtors, the national median sales
price of single-family homes at the same time is $212,400, which is less than the 25th percentile of
![Page 16: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
14 INFORMATION NETWORKS
inside traders’ home values. Thus, the inside traders in the sample tend to be among the nation’s
wealthiest people.
The average person gives 1.5 tips, which equals the number of tips received by the average person
since every tip is received by someone else in the sample. In untabulated statistics, of those who
only share tips, the average number of tips shared is 2.36. Of those who only receive tips, the
average number of tips received is 1.96. Of those who both give and receive tips, the average
person receives 2.99 tips and gives 3.68 tips.
Among those who traded securities, inside traders predominately invest in common shares. Of
all people that traded securities, 83% traded stock and 39% traded options at least once. Other
securities are traded in a tiny minority of tips, including spread bets, mutual funds, employee
stock options, contracts-for-difference, and CDS contracts. The total amount invested per trader
ranges from a minimum of $4,400 up to a maximum of $375 million invested by Raj Rajaratnam,
the founder of the Galleon Group hedge fund. For most cases, total profit or losses avoided are
reported in the SEC filings. In contrast, total invested is not always reported, which limits the
sample. In some cases, I can infer total invested by using information on number of shares or
options traded reported in the filings. The average total amount invested is $4.3 million and the
median amount is $226,000. The median amount invested per event is $200,000, with an average of
$1.7 million. These large amounts are explained in part by the composition of the types of people
that receive inside information, including portfolio managers, and also because people invest more
money in insider trades than they normally would when the investment’s return is risky. Many of
the SEC complaints document that inside traders sell all of the existing assets in their individual
portfolios and borrow money to concentrate their holdings in the insider trading firm. As evidence,
the median inside trader invests an amount worth 39% of his median home value.
Across all tips, the median investor realizes a total gain of $136,000 in ill-gotten profits and
losses avoided. The average investor realizes gains of $2.3 million. Per tip, the median investor
gains $72,400. The average percentage return for inside traders is 63.4% and the median is 26.4%.
These returns are higher than the average event returns presented in Table 1 because of the use of
options.
![Page 17: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 15
Internet Appendix Fig. 1 shows that inside traders are located all across the country, including
both urban and rural locations. However, based on either state-level population, aggregate income,
or the population of people invested in the stock market (using participation rates from the Health
and Retirement Study), the sample of inside traders is overweighted in California, New York, and
Florida, and underweighted in Texas, Ohio, and Virginia. The sample also includes inside traders
located in other countries, including Brazil, China, Canada, Israel, and Thailand.
Table 4 presents summary statistics of inside traders by nine types of occupations. The most
common occupation among inside traders is top executive with 107 people. Of these, 24 are
board members and the rest are officers. The sample includes 55 mid-level corporate managers
and 59 lower-level employees, including 8 secretaries, 11 information technology specialists, and
a few nurses, waiters, and a kindergarten teacher. There are 61 people who work in the “sell
side” of Wall Street including 13 accountants, 24 attorneys, 4 investment bankers, and 3 sell side
analysts. I divide the “buy side” into two groups by rank in investment firms: 60 portfolio and
hedge fund managers and 65 lower-level buy side analysts and traders. Small business owners
and real estate professionals account for 39 people in the sample and 38 people have specialized
occupations, including 16 consultants, 13 doctors, and 9 engineers. For 135 people, I cannot identify
an occupation. Internet Appendix Table 3 provides a more detailed breakdown of occupations.
Of those that invest, buy side managers invest the largest amount per tip (median of $6 million),
followed by people who work in the sell side ($3.8 million) and buy side analysts ($2 million). Small
business owners invest the least with a median investment of $203,900 per tip. It is interesting to
note that the median mid-level manager invests more than the median top executive ($2 million
compared to $376,800). This likely represents the higher scrutiny on the investments of top ex-
ecutives. Buy side analysts have the highest median return of 117.7%. Buy side managers have
median returns of 37%, among the lowest returns across occupations. However, buy side managers
earn the highest dollar gains for their trades at $5.8 million per tip, at the median.
3.2. Inside Traders Compared to their Neighbors
Based on the above demographic profile, it is not clear if inside traders are unusual among their
peers. To give context to the profile of inside traders, I compare inside traders to their neighbors.
![Page 18: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
16 INFORMATION NETWORKS
For the 448 inside traders that I can identify in the LNPRD, I pick a neighbor of the same gender
that lives on the same street as the inside trader with the closest street number to the inside trader’s
street number. I require the neighbor to have a social security number and date of birth recorded in
the LNPRD. Choosing a comparison sample from the same neighborhood and of the same gender
helps to control for wealth, age, and occupation, and highlights the remaining differences between
inside traders and non-insiders.3
Internet Appendix Table 4 shows that inside traders are statistically different than their neighbors
in many ways. Inside traders are younger, less likely to own real estate, and have fewer family
members and significantly more associates. This could reflect that inside traders have large external
networks with whom they are more likely to share information.
In addition, inside traders are considerably more likely to have a criminal record (53.7%) than
their neighbors (12.8%). Of the 246 instances of criminal records, the overwhelming majority of
identifiable criminal charges are for traffic violations. Though the greater prevalence of criminal
records among inside traders could reflect that they are just more likely to get caught breaking
the law than are their neighbors (whether speeding or illegal trading), it seems more likely that
inside traders are either less risk averse or generally have less respect for the rule of law than their
neighbors.
4. How Are Inside Traders Connected to Each Other?
In this section, I investigate the relationships between tippers and their tippees. First, I describe
their social relations based on direct observations. Second, I describe their geographic proximity
and shared attributes to provide indirect observations of their social relations.
4.1. Social Relationships
Table 5 presents the prevalence of information flows by the type of relationship between the
461 pairs of tippers and tippees in the sample. Of these relationships, 23% are familial, 35% are
3Because many fields of LNPRD data are provided at the state level, missing data (i.e., licensing, criminal records)will be missing at the state level, too. Therefore, using neighbors mitigates any concerns about selectively missingobservations. I only collect one random neighbor as a counterfactual observation because identifying neighbors in thedata requires substantial search time and effort.
![Page 19: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 17
business-related, 35% are friendships, and 21% do not have any clear relationships. Multiple types
of relationships are allowed. In untabulated numbers, 11 pairs of inside traders have both familial
and business relationships, 56 pairs of relationships are both business-related and friendships, and
4 relationships are both family and friends (typically in-laws and distant family members).
The family relationships are led by siblings (24% of familial relationships) and parent-child
(19%). About 14% of the family relations are between married couples and 12% are through in-law
relationships. The ‘other’ category, which includes cousins, uncles, aunt, etc., accounts for 9% of
family relations. The ‘unspecified’ category (15% of family relationships) includes observations
where the SEC and DOJ filings indicate that people are relatives, but don’t specify the exact
relationship.
Among the business-related relationships, 55% are among associates. Business associates are
people that work together or know each other through their profession. In comparison, boss-
subordinate relationships account for 26% of business-related ties and client-provider relationships
account for 20%. This means that slightly more than half of business-related relationships are
between people of equal status, and half are relationships where one person holds a supervisory
role over the other.
For friendship relations, the filings commonly describe relationships as either friends or close
friends, and occasionally as acquaintances. In the sample, just three pairs are described as ac-
quaintances, compared to 115 described as friends, and 44 described as close friends.
The 98 pairs in Table 5 in which no social relationship is listed comprise a sizable number
of expert networking firm relationships, where inside traders are paid consultants to clients of
the expert networking firm. Of the 98 pairs, 22 are related to the expert network firm Primary
Global Research LLC (PGR). Expert networking firms provide industry experts that work as paid
consultants to investment managers. However, in the case of PGR, the consultants provided illegal
insider trading tips. Thus, the relationships between PGR consultants and investment managers
are not just missing observations. Instead, these pairs actually have no social relationships other
than sharing inside information.
To test the importance of common educational backgrounds, I investigate when relationships
are formed. In 51 pairs, the filings provide the time when the individuals first met: before college,
![Page 20: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
18 INFORMATION NETWORKS
during college, in graduate school, or after completing school. To these 51 pairs, I append 69 pairs
of family relations in which I can assume the traders knew each other before college.4 I also assume
that the 22 pairs of inside traders connected through PGR met after completing school.
For the 142 pairs of inside traders with available data, 64% met before college, 10% met in college,
6% met in graduate school, and 20% met after completing school. Excluding family members, 29%
met before college, 20% met in college, 11% met in graduate school, and 40% met after completing
school. These patterns imply that people who share inside information have long-standing and
close relations with each other. It also implies that the presence of school-ties are related to actual
social interactions, as assumed in a number of papers (e.g., Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008,
2010), though information is mostly shared between people who met before college, once family
relations are included.
4.2. Geographic Proximity in Relationships
Table 6 presents summary statistics of the geographic distance between inside traders. Distance
is calculated as the great circle distance in miles between the cities of the people in a pair. Longitude
and latitude for each city are taken from Google Maps. Therefore, if two people live in the same
city, they have a distance of zero miles.
Across all pairs of inside traders, the median distance is 26.2 miles, with an average of 581.1 miles.
The maximum distance is from Hong Kong to Schwenksville, Pennsylvania at 8,065 miles. At the
median, the geographically closest relationships are familial relations, with a median of 14.3 miles,
followed by business-related relationships with a median of 18.9 miles, and friendship relationships
at 28.4 miles. If no social relation is listed, the members of a pair are located substantially farther
from each other, at 80.9 miles at the median, though still relatively close. In unreported tests, I find
no statistically significant difference in the medians of family, business, or friendship relationships.
These statistics suggest that relatively small geographic zones are reasonable proxies for a large
fraction of information flows, across all types of interpersonal relationships, as assumed in prior
research (e.g., Brown, Ivkovic, Smith, and Weisbenner, 2008).
4The data do not provide information on when in-laws, engaged, and married couples met, so I exclude them fromthe calculation. One pair of “other” family relations met before college, so I do not double-count this observationwhen I calculate 69 remaining family pairs.
![Page 21: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 19
4.3. Shared Attributes of Inside Traders
The above results show that information flows through inside traders with close social relation-
ships. In this section, I present corroborating evidence from indirect measures of social connections,
including similarity in occupation, age, and ancestry.
First, Fig. 1 provides a heat map of the connections between tippers and tippees by occupation.
These relations are based on binary connections between people, where a cell entry reports the total
number of pairs where the tipper occupation is listed on the row heading and the tippee occupation
is listed on the column heading. Unknown occupations are not detailed in the figure, but they are
included in the totals for each row and column.
The heat map provides an indication of the direction of information flow. Top executives are
by far, the most frequent tippers. Their tippees are spread over all occupations. Top executives
tip other top executives (15% of top executive pairs), specialized occupations like doctors and
engineers (13%), buy side analysts (10%), and managers (11%), and all other occupation categories
in the sample. In contrast, buy-side analysts are the next most common tippers with 90 pairs,
but their tippees are concentrated among other buy side analysts (34% of their tippees) and buy
side managers (21%). Comparing the number of pairs in which a particular occupation is a tippee
compared to a tipper, top executives are 2.85 times more likely to be a tipper than a tippee. In
contrast, buy side managers are tippees roughly twice as often as they are tippers.
Fig. 2 presents a similar analysis by age. The strong diagonal component of the figure reveals that
tippers and their tippees tend to be close in age. The eight groups where tippers and tippees are the
same age account for 35% of all pairs, compared to 12.5% if pairs were randomly distributed. In the
off-diagonal regions, substantially more relationships include younger tippers sharing information
with older tippees than vice versa (108 pairs versus 79 pairs).
Fig. 3 presents the prevalence of pairs by surname ancestry. As before, the strong diagonal in the
figure reveals that people are more likely to tip other people who share the same surname ancestry.
For example, of the sample of tippers with South Asian surnames, one-third of the tippees also have
South Asian surnames, out of nine possible ancestries. Similarly, of tippers with Muslim surnames,
about half of their tippees also have Muslim surnames. In unreported tests that exclude family
![Page 22: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
20 INFORMATION NETWORKS
relationships, a similar though weaker pattern emerges where tippers and tippees share a common
surname ancestry.
Finally, in untabulated statistics, I find that subordinates are more likely to tip supervisors than
vice versa. In 63% of boss-subordinate relationships the tipper is the subordinate, a significant
difference from 50%. Similarly, in parent-child relationships, the tipper is the parent in 30% of
cases, statistically less than 50%. These results show that inside traders might share information
in an attempt to please higher status individuals, such as employers and parents.
4.4. Counterfactual Observations to Analyze Who Gets Tipped and Who Doesn’t
The above results show that the people in the sample are connected by strong social relationships.
However, because all of the people in the sample received inside information at some point, there
is no counterfactual observation of someone who could have received a tip, but did not. In this
section, I construct a counterfactual sample of potential tippees to better understand how inside
information flows across the population.
For each inside trader in the data that I can identify in the LNPRD, I record the family and
personal associates listed in the LNPRD, as described above. Then I append to this set any insider
traders in the SEC and DOJ documents that do not appear in the list of a tipper’s family and
associates. From this broader set of social relations, I create a dummy variable equal to one for
each person that receives inside information from the tipper.
Table 7 provides logit regressions tests on the likelihood of receiving a tip. Columns 1 and 2
include gender, age, and the type of social relationship as explanatory variables. Columns 3 and 4
include tipper fixed effects to account for all observable and unobservable characteristics that could
influence with whom a tipper chooses to share information.
Across all specifications, I find that potential tippees that are close in age and are of the same
gender as the tipper are more likely to receive inside information. Family members are less likely
to be tipped than are associates. However, compared to non-family associates, husbands are more
likely to be tipped, while wives, sisters, and in-laws are less likely to be tipped. Brothers and
fathers are equally likely to be tipped as associates. These results suggest that information flows
among family and friends in specific patterns.
![Page 23: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 21
To my knowledge, in the literature on social networks in finance, this analysis is the first to
provide a counterfactual sample of connections. The LNPRD offers a unique opportunity to observe
social networks for virtually any person in the US. However, I acknowledge that the data are limited.
First, the list of potential tippees that I record from LNPRD is certainly not exhaustive. Family
members are capped at 10 people and associates are only identified through records available to
LexisNexis. However, if anything, the LNPRD will be biased towards finding closer relatives and
associates, which likely makes it harder to find any distinction between actual and potential tippees.
Second, it is likely that a tipper shares information with other people than just those named in the
legal documents. These people may appear on the list of potential tippees from the LNPRD, but
I would not correctly identify them as an actual tippee. For instance, mothers, sisters, and in-laws
may receive information but either not trade or not get caught.
5. How Does Information Diffuse Across Inside Traders?
In this section of the paper, I trace out the path through which information flows from the
original source to the final tippee. Internet Appendix Tables 5 and 6 provide a detailed breakdown
of the identities of the original sources of the leaks.
5.1. Tip Chains
To understand how information transmits away from the original sources through social networks,
I identify “tip chains.” An inside trader’s order in the tip chain is the number of links he is removed
from the original source. The first order in the tip chain is the connection between the original
source and his tippees. If a tipper tips multiple tippees, than each of these tippees is in the same
order in the tip chain.
Table 8 shows that as information progresses across the tip chain, a number of patterns emerge.
Officers become less common tippees, going from 9.2% of all tippees in the first link to 0% of
tippees in fourth and subsequent links. Corporate managers, lower-level employees, and people
in specialized occupations follow the same decreasing pattern. Inside traders in these occupations
are much more likely to receive the information from an original source than an intermediary. In
![Page 24: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
22 INFORMATION NETWORKS
contrast, buy side managers and analysts are increasingly the tippees as the information travels
further from the source, accounting for 34.5% and 25.5% of all tippees in the fourth and later links.
Table 9 presents additional information about the characteristics of tippers and tippees along the
tip chain. Tippees are women in 8.4% of first tips, declining to 2.3% in fourth and later links in the
tip chain.5 Tippers and tippees become younger as the information flows further from the original
source. In the first link, tippees are 42.4 years old on average, declining to 38.7 by the fourth and
subsequent links. The average tipper’s age declines from 42.8 years to 34.4 years old. Tippees and
tippers further from the original source are wealthier than those earlier in the tip chain.
I also identify clear patterns of social connections over the tip chain. In the first link, tippers
and tippees are primarily friends (42.4%) and family members (24.6%) and then steadily decline
as the tip moves further from the source to 18.6% for friendship connections and 11.9% for family
connections by the fourth and later links. In contrast, business connections grow in prevalence
from 28.4% in the first link to 66.1% by the fourth and later links. Greater similarity in tipper
and tippees’ house values and surname ancestry also decline over the tip chain, though common
ancestry remains high at 42.5% even in fourth and later tips. These results suggest that original
sources share information with their most trusted relations — family members — but once the
information moves further from the original source, tippers become less discerning.6
Table 9 next documents trading behavior of the tippees by their position in the tip chain. The
median amount invested rises monotonically from $200,400 for the first tippee to $492,700 for the
fourth and subsequent tippees. Median profits rise as well from $17,600 to $86,000 per tip. However,
trading returns decline over the tip chain, indicating that the information is moving stock prices.
The initial tippee earns returns of 46.0% on average and 25.2% at the median. By the fourth link,
the returns have dropped to 23.0% for the average and 18.8% for the median. The drop in returns
is partially caused by an increase in the use of shares rather than options over the tip chain. These
patterns are consistent with information flowing to professional traders over the tip chain. These
traders invest large amounts of money using shares, rather than options. In return, they earn lower
percentage returns, but greater dollar returns.
5The jump to 16.8% for women in the third link in the tip chain is driven by one set of serial inside traders.6Internet Appendix Table 7 presents OLS and ordered logit regression tests with similar results.
![Page 25: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 23
Next, Table 9 shows that the average time between receiving information and sharing it with
others decreases over the tip chain. The original source waits 12.1 days, on average, before tipping
the information. At the second link in the chain, the delay is 9.2 days, followed by 5.0 days at the
third link, and then 0.4 days for the fourth and higher links. The fraction of tippers who tip the
same day that they receive information is 46.5% for the original source, increasing to 92.1% in the
fourth and higher links. This delay means that the period between when the tippee receives the
information and the event date declines over time, from an average of 13.9 trading days in the first
link to 9.1 days in the later links. Thus, information travels with a delay which helps to explain
why stock price runups occur gradually, not immediately.
6. The Networks of Inside Traders
As a final set of descriptive statistics, I investigate the structure of inside trading networks. Of
the 183 inside trader networks in the sample, 59 contain only one person. These are people who
obtained inside information and did not tip anyone else. The remainder of the size distribution of
the networks is as follows: 60 networks with 2 members, 18 networks with 3 members, 18 networks
with 4 members, 11 networks with 5 or 6 members, 11 networks with 7 to 10 members, and 6
networks with more than 10 members.
Fig. 4 presents the largest network in the sample, which centers on the expert networking firm,
Primary Global Research (PGR) and hedge funds owned by SAC Capital. Though this network is
an outlier in the sample, with 64 members, its size makes it an interesting illustration of the inside
trader network of professional traders. Of the 64 inside traders in the network, 27 are affiliated
with hedge funds.
PGR’s business was to connect original sources of information with buy side portfolio managers.
The PGR employees in the network include Winnie Jiau, James Fleishman, Walter Shimoon, and
Bob Nguyen, located at the top right of the network. Among other experts, they connected Daniel
Devore and Mark Longoria, supply chain managers at Dell Inc. and Advanced Micro Devices, with
various hedge fund managers. SAC Capital is connected to PGR through Winnie Jiau’s tips to Noah
Freeman, a portfolio manager at SAC. In addition to Freeman, the other 10 inside traders within
the dashed region in the figure are all affiliated with SAC Capital or its subsidiaries. Alec Shutze,
![Page 26: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
24 INFORMATION NETWORKS
Eric Gerster, Mathew Martoma, and Donald Longueuil were portfolio managers and Ronald Dennis
was a tech analyst at the CR Intrinsic Investors unit of SAC. Gabriel Plotkin and Michael Steinberg
were portfolio managers and Jon Horvath was a tech analyst at the Sigma Capital Management
unit of SAC. Richard Lee was a portfolio manager at SAC’s main unit. At the center of the network
is Steven Cohen, the founder and principal of SAC Capital.
Cohen’s centrality in the network reflects his centrality within SAC Capital. Cohen surrounded
himself with his portfolio managers who collected information from various sources. Noah Free-
man received information from Winnie Jiau. Mathew Martoma received information from Sidney
Gilman, a medical doctor who oversaw clinical trials of a new drug. Steinberg and Gerster each
received information from their analysts, Horvath and Dennis, who received information from a
number of original and intermediate sources. Thus, Cohen received information from a wide va-
riety of sources, but is not directly tied to any original source. In addition, Cohen never tipped
anyone else.
As a comparison, Fig. 5 presents the network surrounding Raj Rajaratnam, the second largest
network in the sample. Like Cohen, Rajaratnam was the founder and principal of the Galleon Group
hedge fund. Unlike Cohen, Rajaratnam had direct links to multiple original sources of information,
including Rajat Gupta, a director at Goldman Sachs, Rajiv Goel, an executive at Intel, and Anil
Kumar, a director at McKinsey & Company. Other key inside traders in this network include
Roomy Khan, an independent investor who hoped to be hired by Rajaratnam, and Zvi Goffer, a
former trader at the Galleon Group. Other large networks are presented as examples in Internet
Appendix Figures 2, 3, and 4.
Table 10 presents summary statistics by the size of insider trading networks. As insider trading
networks grow in size, they become less connected. For networks with six or more members, only
20% of possible information connections actually exist (density). Second, the diameter of a network
increases as more members are added. The diameter of the network is the longest of all shortest
paths between any two members. This provides additional evidence that networks become more
dispersed and sprawling, instead of compact and closely tied to a central hub. Third, the average
clustering coefficient across nodes in the network decreases as networks expand. A node’s clustering
coefficient is the fraction of a node’s links that are also linked to each other. These network statistics
![Page 27: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 25
reveal that as a network gets larger, it spreads out from its outer members like a tree, rather than
like a hub and spoke network. The Rajaratnam and SAC-PGR networks both exhibit this trait.
Next, as networks increase in size, they have a smaller fraction of female tippers, the ages of tip-
pers and tippees decrease, and there exist fewer family connections and more business connections.
Friendship connections remains roughly the same across network size. The median geographic dis-
tance also increases as networks get larger. As networks increase in size, the average and median
amount invested per tippee increase. The median profit increases as well, though percentage re-
turns decrease. Finally, the time lapse between tips is lowest in the larger networks. These results
suggest that large networks include professional traders who trade larger stakes and have lower
percentage returns. Since the larger networks still experience time delays between tips, it is likely
that the returns are lower because they are receiving the tip after insider trading has already begun
to move stock prices.
The sparseness of insider trading networks is more similar to criminal networks than innocuous
social networks. For example, the Global Salafi jihad (GSJ) terrorist network has a diameter
of 9 among 356 members and the Methworld narcotics trafficking network has a diameter of 17
among 924 members (Chen, 2006). In contrast, non-criminal social networks of person-to-person
communication have shorter diameters, consistent with small-world networks. For example, a
network of high school friendships has a diameter of 6 among 70 students, a network of university
friendships has a diameter of 4 among 217 members, and a network of local physicians who share
information about a new medical innovation has a diameter of 5 among 241 members.7 In contrast,
the SAC insider trading network has a diameter of 13 among 63 members and the Rajaratnam
network has a diameter of 10 among 50 members.
7. Insider Trading and Financial Outcomes
In this section, I test whether the social relationships that underlie insider trading networks
affect financial outcomes. First, I investigate whether insider trading affects stock prices. Second,
I test whether the price impact of a trade depends upon the identities and relationships of inside
traders. Third, I test whether social networks influence individual gains from insider trading.
7See the network statistics for Highschool, Residence, and Physicians at http://konect.uni-koblenz.de/networks.
![Page 28: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
26 INFORMATION NETWORKS
7.1. Insider Trading and Stock Prices
To test whether insider trading is related to stock returns, I estimate the following model using
a panel of daily observations from 120 trading days before the announcement to one trading day
before the announcement:
rit = α+ β Insider tradingit + δ ln(1 + Volumeit) + γFactorsit + κi + λt + εit, (1)
where i indexes the event (e.g., Abaxis Q3 2007 Earnings) and t indexes days in event time
(−120, . . . ,−1). The dependent variable, rit, is the stock return of event firm i on day t and
Insider trading it is a measure of the extent of insider trading in event firm i on day t. Volumeit is
the daily volume for event firm i, Factorsit are the daily Fama-French factors (market, SMB, and
HML) in event time. I also control for event fixed effects (κi) and event-time fixed effects (λit)
in some specifications. The event fixed effects account for all time invariant explanatory variables
in the period −120 to −1, including firm characteristics and event characteristics. The event-time
fixed effects are dummy variables for each event day, from −120 to −1, which account for any
common factors that affect returns for each day in the period before an announcement. Thus,
this model is designed to control for all unobserved time invariant factors related to an event, all
unobserved factors related to a particular day in the period before the event is announced, and
the most important time-varying factors, including volume and market-wide risk factors, in order
to isolate whether insider trading on a particular day has any effect on stock returns. The data
include 410 events in which stock prices are available and in which inside traders traded common
shares. Stock returns and market factors are multiplied by negative one for negative events.
Table 11 presents the results of the regressions. In column 1, Insider trading it is measured with
a dummy variable for the presence of any insider trading on day t. The estimated coefficient is
positive and statistically significant. Stock returns are 20 basis points higher on days in which
insiders trade. In column 2, the number of unique insider traders that trade on a particular day
is also positively and significantly related to stock returns. This result holds after controlling for
event-time fixed effects in column 3. Columns 4–6 shows that when inside traders buy more shares,
returns are higher. This result holds after controlling for event-time fixed effects and when only
including days in which inside traders are active.
![Page 29: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 27
These results provide consistent evidence that illegal insider trading has a significant effect on
stock prices, consistent with early research using smaller samples (Meulbroek, 1992; Cornell and
Sirri, 1992). This implies that insider trading moves stock prices closer to their fundamental values,
and hence, makes prices more efficient. Though prior research on information diffusion through
social networks shows that information sharing can lead to greater personal gains (Cohen, Frazzini,
and Malloy, 2008) or correlated stock market behavior of individual traders (Hong, Kubik, and
Stein, 2005), my results show that information diffusion through social interaction is related to
market efficiency.
7.2. Inside Traders’ Characteristics and Stock Returns
Though the above results show that insider trading makes prices more efficient, it is not clear
whether the underlying social networks influence this relationship. For instance, is the price impact
greater if the tipper is the trader’s brother, rather than a business associate? Moreover, does the
identity of the inside trader affect a trade’s price impact?
On one hand, the identity of the trader or the relationship between the tipper and the trader could
influence the aggressiveness of an inside trader. Perhaps an inside trader has greater confidence in
information he receives from his brother, and hence, trades large volumes. On the other hand, the
social relationships and identities of inside traders may be unrelated to price impact. In the setting
of illegal insider trading, the quality of information may be sufficiently uniform that all insiders
trade aggressively. Therefore, whether a trader receives information from his brother or a business
associate, the credibility of the information is roughly the same.
To test these hypotheses, I estimate the same model as above, except I replace the daily volume
of inside trading by variables that measure the characteristics of the traders for each day in event
time. In particular, I include the average age of inside traders per day, the fraction of insiders that
are female, the wealth of inside traders, and the fraction that are buy side managers and analysts.
I also include measures of centrality: instrength (the number of tips received by an average inside
trader), outstrength (the number of tips given by an average insider trader), and network size (the
![Page 30: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
28 INFORMATION NETWORKS
size of the average trader’s network).8 I also include variables that measure the geographic distance
between tippers and traders and the fraction of relationships between tippers and traders that are
business associates, family members, and friends. As before, these tests are conducted using event-
firm fixed effects and market factors. Thus, these tests identify for a particular event, whether
time-series changes in the characteristics of inside traders influence changes in stock returns.
The results in Internet Appendix Table 8 show that inside traders’ age, gender, wealth, occu-
pation, and network positions do not have significant relationships with stock returns. Internet
Appendix Table 9 shows that when traders receive information from a family member, stock re-
turns are significantly higher. This result holds after controlling for event fixed effects and event
time fixed effects. This could indicate that tips from family members are more reliable, which leads
to more aggressive trading. In contrast, tips from business associates and friends are unrelated to
stock returns. Geographic distance is also unrelated to stock returns.
Overall, most of the characteristics of inside traders are unrelated to stock returns. As I men-
tioned, this could be because the information on which these trades are made is highly credible,
regardless of its provenance, though there is some evidence that stock returns are higher if inside
traders receive information from a family member, which is consistent with more aggressive trading
when information is more credible. It is important to note that these results do not mean that social
networks are unimportant for stock prices. Rather they imply that I cannot identify any variation
in the type of social network that is related to variation in the price impact of the information.
7.3. Inside Trading Networks and Individual Gains
Next, I test whether underlying social networks influence individual gains from insider trading.
Theories of information networks predict that individuals that are more central have an information
advantage and hence, capture greater profits (Ozsoylev and Walden, 2011; Walden, 2013). These
predictions can be loosely applied to the setting of insider trading networks, though there are
some key assumptions that are violated. Most importantly, these theories assume there is no cost
8I use instrength and outstrength rather than a recursive measure of centrality, such as eigenvector centrality, becausestrength measures are not influenced by network size, whereas eigenvector centrality is. Since there is large variationin network size, eigenvector centrality is less comparable across individuals in different networks.
![Page 31: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 29
to sharing information: investors are price-takers and there are no legal consequences to sharing
information.
Table 12 presents the results of cross-sectional regressions of inside traders’ gains on their network
centrality. The sample only includes people that traded on inside information, not people who just
passed information without trading. The dependent variable in columns 1–3 is ln(returns), where
returns are in percentages. I winsorize returns at the 1% and 99% levels to minimize the impact of
outliers. I use logged returns because the raw returns are highly skewed in the cross-section. The
dependent variable in columns 4–6 is logged gains and losses avoided.
To measure an inside trader’s network centrality, I use outstrength, instrength, outdegree, and
indegree, where outdegree (indegree) measures the number of different tippees (tippers) a trader
has. I also include network size as an explanatory variable to measure how many insider traders
are in a trader’s network. For example, Roomy Khan from Fig. 5, has an outstrength of 19, an
instrength of 6, an outdegree of 7 and an indegree of 4. Her network size is 50, for the 50 insider
traders in the Raj Rajaratnam network. I also control for the amount of money an inside trader
invests and a dummy for whether the trader used options in any trade. Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity.
The results in Table 12 show that inside traders who receive more tips (instrength) from more
people (indegree) realize higher returns and profit. When instrength and indegree are both included
in the same specification, only instrength has a significant relation with insider trading gains.
Second, inside traders in larger networks have higher returns and greater profits. Finally, returns
are significantly less when an inside traders invests more money and significantly greater when he
uses options. In unreported tests, I interact network size with the strength and degree measures.
There is no consequential change to the results. In other tests, I also control for age, gender, and
the relationship between the trader and tipper and find no significant relationships.
In sum, since greater instrength is positively related to investment returns, not just dollar profits,
these results suggest that more central inside traders get more valuable information, not just more
information. Second, because indegree has less explanatory power than instrength, these results
imply that having many tippers is less valuable than having many tips, even if they come from
![Page 32: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
30 INFORMATION NETWORKS
relatively few tippers. Finally, controlling for a trader’s number of tippers and the number of tips
they give, all else equal, insiders in large network receive more valuable information.
8. Generalizability
The results presented so far paint a detailed picture of illegal insider trading networks. However,
my results are not based on a random sample. Instead, some types of inside traders are likely
over-sampled relative to the population, and some types are likely under-sampled. The sample
weights are proportional to the likelihood of getting caught by the regulators. Unfortunately, it
is impossible to know these sample weights because I would need to observe both inside traders
that are caught and inside traders that are not caught. Compared to studies of corporate fraud,
understanding selection bias in illegal insider trading is particularly challenging because I cannot
even observe a benchmark sample of individual traders who were not charged with a crime, as can
be observed in a sample of firms not charged with corporate fraud.9
Though generalizability is a problem common to virtually all studies of illegal activity, it would
be useful to have some sense of how my sample differs from the population at large. One approach
to evaluate the generalizability of the findings is to consider how regulators detect and prosecute
inside trading. Biases in the detection methods or incentives of regulators might help to understand
how my sample differs from the general population.
A number of different methods, employed by various organizations, are used to catch inside
traders. First, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and the Options Regulatory
Surveillance Authority (ORSA) monitor equity and option markets on a daily basis for abnormal
trading activity. They mine text from major newswires to identify events and then search for
unusual price or volume activity in the preceding period. If the monitors detect unusual activity,
they start an investigation by matching individuals that traded during the abnormal period with
information on individuals who possessed private information during the same period, provided by
the event firms. If warranted, FINRA and ORSA refer the case to the SEC, which can choose to
pursue an investigation. In addition, not all investigations start with FINRA or ORSA; the SEC
has its own investigative unit with greater subpoena power to gather information. Other agencies,
9Such a benchmark would still be insufficient because there are firms that commit fraud that are not detected (Wang,Winton, and Yu, 2010).
![Page 33: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 31
such as the DOJ and the Federal Bureau of Investigation may get involved, as well. A more detailed
explanation of insider trading investigations is provided in the Internet Appendix.
According to FINRA, they are more likely to start an investigation if a trader makes larger
trades and especially if a trader makes suspicious trades across multiple events (FINRA, 2015). A
serial inside trader who trades in seemingly unrelated companies that can be traced to a common
source (e.g., an M&A lawyer) is easier to detect than an opportunistic inside trader who makes one
illegal trade based on a once-in-a-lifetime tip (e.g., a brother’s company is acquired). Moreover,
inside traders in larger networks are more likely to get caught because more traders will create
greater abnormal trading activity. Even if every insider tries to camouflage his individual trades,
the aggregate trading volume may be abnormally high.
Second, according to the SEC’s Enforcement Manual, the SEC considers a number of criteria
when deciding whether to pursue an investigation. These criteria include the magnitude of the
violation, the size of the victim group, the amount of profits or losses avoided, and whether the
conduct is ongoing or widespread (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013). Consistent
with these criteria, in conversations with a former Chief Economist of the SEC, I was informed that
the SEC’s lawyers are evaluated based, in part, on the amount of penalties that they collect from
their cases. Because penalties are typically based on the size of an inside trader’s ill-gotten profits
and losses avoided, SEC lawyers have an incentive to find inside traders that make large gains.
Finally, compared to a single inside trader who does not share information, it seems reasonable to
believe that inside traders in large networks are more likely to get caught because there are more
people in their network who may reveal themselves to the regulators, intentionally or accidentally.
This discussion suggests that all else equal, inside traders who invest larger amounts and are part
of larger networks are more likely to get caught than traders who trade small amounts in smaller
networks. This means that the inside traders in my sample are likely to make bigger trades than
the average inside trader in the population. Moreover, insiders in my sample are more likely to
be serial inside traders, rather than one-time opportunistic traders, which are likely to be more
common in the general population.
It is tempting to compare other characteristics of large inside traders compared to small inside
traders to infer selection bias. For instance, in my sample, inside traders in larger networks are
![Page 34: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
32 INFORMATION NETWORKS
younger and are more likely to receive information from business associates than inside traders in
smaller networks. However, it is not certain that this comparison applies to the general population.
Perhaps the inside traders in large networks that are caught are different than the inside traders
in large networks that are not caught. Therefore, to be conservative, I acknowledge that it is
impossible to know all of the dimensions in which my sample varies from the general population.
I acknowledge that this approach is imperfect, though having any sense of generalizability of
criminal activity is valuable. Nevertheless, the results on the main sample still provide a new
contribution to our understanding of illegal insider trading among those who are caught.
8.1. Selection on Guilt
A final selection issue is whether the facts presented in the documents are true. First, the track
record of the DOJ is impressive: between 2009 and 2014, the DOJ has won 85 cases and lost just
once. The DOJ’s track record could be impressive because it only brings cases it can win. Even
so, this suggest that the facts reported in the cases that I use are likely to be true. Second, in SEC
cases that are subsequently dropped, the facts presented in the case are typically not contested.
The cases are usually dropped based on technical issues about what constitutes insider trading.
For example, as discussed above, some defendants argue that they didn’t violate insider trading
rules because they were three to four links removed from the original source, but do not dispute
the facts of the case.
9. Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence on the importance of social networks for the diffusion of private
information among investors by studying illegal insider trading networks. I first provide a detailed
profile of inside traders, the social ties that connect them, and the information they share. Second,
I study the relationship between social networks and financial outcomes, including market efficiency
and individual trading gains.
The results show that information about significant corporate events tends to originate from
corporate insiders, often top executives. Information proceeds from the original source through a
number of links before ending up with buy side analysts and managers. Along the way, information
![Page 35: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 33
tends to flow from younger people to older people, from children to parents, and from subordinates
to bosses, all through close social ties. Tippers and tippees are more commonly friends and family
in the early links of an information chain and more commonly business associates in later links.
Though tippers and tippees tend to live close to one another geographically, networks of inside
traders are sprawling, rather than centralized, where larger networks are more likely based on
business relationships than family or friends.
Second, the results show that insider trading is associated with efficient stock price movements.
When there is more insider trading, stock prices move closer to their fundamental values. Inside
traders realize significant gains from their investments of about 35% over 21 days. However, inside
traders who receive more tips and are in larger networks realize significantly larger gains.
The results of this paper validate existing findings and suggests new directions for future re-
search. In particular, the paper shows that social connections based on trusting relationships are
an important mechanism in the diffusion of important information across market participants, as
suggested by Hong and Stein (1999). More broadly, this paper contributes to a burgeoning field of
finance concerned with the role of social interactions in financial decision-making, which Hirshleifer
(2015) calls “social finance.”
![Page 36: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/36.jpg)
34 INFORMATION NETWORKS
References
Andrei, D., Cujean, J., 2015. Information percolation, momentum, and reversal. University of
California - Los Angeles and University of Maryland Working Paper.
Augustin, P., Brenner, M., Subrahmanyam, M. G., 2014. Informed options trading prior to M&A
announcements: Insider trading? McGill University and New York University Working Paper.
Bhattacharya, U., 2014. Insider trading controversies: A literature review. Annual Review of Fi-
nancial Economics 6, 385–403.
Bhattacharya, U., Daouk, H., 2002. The world price of insider trading. Journal of Finance 57,
75–108.
Brown, J. R., Ivkovic, Z., Smith, P. A., Weisbenner, S., 2008. Neighbors matter: Causal community
effects and stock market participation. Journal of Finance 63, 1509–1531.
Chen, H., 2006. Intelligence and security informatics for international security: Information sharing
and data mining. Springer Science+Business Media, Inc., New York, NY.
Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., Malloy, C., 2008. The small world of investing: Board connections and
mutual fund returns. Journal of Political Economy 116, 951–979.
Cornell, B., Sirri, E. R., 1992. The reaction of investors and stock prices to insider trading. Journal
of Finance 47, 1031–1059.
Del Guercio, D., Odders-White, E. R., Ready, M. J., 2013. The deterrence effect of SEC enforce-
ment intensity on illegal insider trading. Unpublished working paper, University of Oregon and
University of Wisconsin–Madison.
FINRA, 2015. Monitoring for insider trading and understanding FINRA’s regulatory tip
process. Online Webinar: https://www.finra.org/industry/monitoring-insider-trading-and-
understanding-finra
Fishe, R. P., Robe, M. A., 2004. The impact of illegal insider trading in dealer and specialist
markets: evidence from a natural experiment. Journal of Financial Economics 71, 461–488.
Han, B., Yang, L., 2013. Social networks, information acquisition, and asset prices. Management
Science 59, 1444–1457.
Hirshleifer, D. A., 2015. Behavioral finance. Annual Review of Financial Economics 7.
![Page 37: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/37.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 35
Hong, H., Kubik, J. D., Stein, J. C., 2005. Thy neighbor’s portfolio: Word-of-mouth effects in the
holdings and trades of money managers. Journal of Finance 60, 2801–2824.
Hong, H., Stein, J. C., 1999. A unified theory of underreaction, momentum trading, and overreac-
tion in asset markets. Journal of Finance 54, 2143–2184.
Hvide, H. K., Ostberg, P., 2015. Stock investments at work. Journal of Financial Economics 117,
628–652.
Jarrell, G. A., Poulsen, A. B., 1989. Stock trading before the announcement of tender offers: Insider
trading or market anticipation? Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 5, 225–248.
Mateos, P., 2007. A review of name-based ethnicity classification methods and their potential in
population studies. Population, Space and Place 13, 243–263.
Meulbroek, L. K., 1992. An empirical analysis of illegal insider trading. Journal of Finance 47,
1661–1699.
Morselli, C., 2009. Inside criminal networks. Springer, New York, NY.
Ozsoylev, H. N., Walden, J., 2011. Asset pricing in large information networks. Journal of Economic
Theory 146, 2252–2280.
Ozsoylev, H. N., Walden, J., Yavuz, M. D., Bildak, R., 2014. Investor networks in the stock market.
Review of Financial Studies 27, 1323–1366.
Schwert, G. W., 1996. Markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics
41, 153–192.
Shiller, R. J., Pound, J., 1989. Survey evidence on diffusion of interest and information among
investors. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 12, 47–66.
Stein, J. C., 2008. Conversations among competitors. American Economic Review 98, 2150–2162.
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013. Enforcement Manual, Washington, D.C.
Walden, J., 2013. Trading, profits, and volatility in a dynamic information network model. Unpub-
lished working paper, University of California – Berkeley.
Wang, T. Y., Winton, A., Yu, X., 2010. Corporate fraud and business conditions: Evidence from
IPOs. Journal of Finance 65, 2255–2292.
![Page 38: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/38.jpg)
36 INFORMATION NETWORKS
Top
executives
Corporate
man
agers
Low
er-level
employees
Sell
side
Buyside:
man
agers
Buyside:
analysts
Smallbusiness
owners
Specialized
occupations
Total
15 6 7 5 11 10 9 13 100
6 5 2 2 10 9 3 1 44
3 2 8 1 5 2 10 5 45
1 1 4 13 3 14 8 1 51
1 2 3 0 24 8 0 0 44
4 0 6 0 19 31 2 2 90
1 0 3 4 1 2 3 1 29
1 0 0 2 8 1 2 2 21
35 17 38 39 85 86 41 29 473
Tippers
Tippees
Topexecutives
Corporatemanagers
Lower-levelemployees
Sell side
Buy side:managers
Buy side:analysts
Small businessowners
Specializedoccupations
Total
Fig. 1Number of Connections between Tipper-Tippee by OccupationThis figure shows the number of tipper-tippee pairs sorted by the occupation of the tipperand the tippee. Darker colors represent more pairs. Totals include connections to peoplewith unknown occupations, so row and column sums do not add up to the totals. Occupationdefinitions are detailed in Table 3.
![Page 39: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/39.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 37
Tipper
Age
Tippee Age
Total
≥60
55–59
50–54
45–49
40–44
35–39
30–34
≤29
22 46 54 44 46 33 13 31 289
1 2 3 1 2 5 0 8 22
1 0 0 0 5 2 3 3 14
0 1 4 3 6 2 3 3 22
3 3 4 8 16 11 1 5 51
1 3 5 15 8 2 0 2 36
1 8 25 12 4 2 0 4 56
7 25 12 5 3 5 5 2 64
8 4 1 0 2 4 1 4 24
≤29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 ≥60 Total
Fig. 2Number of Connections between Tipper-Tippee by AgeThis figure shows the number of tipper-tippee pairs sorted by the ages of the tipper and thetippee. Darker colors represent more pairs.
![Page 40: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/40.jpg)
38 INFORMATION NETWORKS
Tipper
SurnameAncestry
Tippee Surname AncestryWestern
European
Celtic
Sou
thAsian
Muslim
EastAsian
&Pacific
Eastern
European
Hispan
ic
Jew
ish
Nordic
Total
WesternEuropean
Celtic
SouthAsian
Muslim
East Asian& Pacific
EasternEuropean
Hispanic
Jewish
Nordic
Total
77 10 9 1 5 10 2 7 1 128
24 14 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 42
8 0 10 8 2 0 0 2 0 31
4 0 4 16 1 1 1 1 0 29
8 0 5 0 14 1 0 0 0 28
9 1 1 0 1 3 0 2 0 18
9 0 0 1 1 1 4 0 0 17
9 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 16
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 5
156 29 30 28 24 20 8 18 6 329
Fig. 3Number of Connections between Tipper-Tippee by Ancestry of SurnameThis figure shows the number of tipper-tippee pairs sorted by the ancestries of the tipperand the tippee. Darker colors represent more pairs. Totals include connections to peoplewith unknown ancestries, so row and column sums do not add up to the totals. Ancestryof surnames is from the Onomap database.
![Page 41: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/41.jpg)
INFORMATION
NETW
ORKS
39
3Com Consultant
Actel Source
Adondakis Aggarwal
Bao
Barai
Bednarz
CW-2 at Hedge Fund 3
CW-3 at Hedge Fund 3
Chiasson
Choi
Cohen
Dennis
Devore
Dosti
Fairchild Source
Fleishman
Freeman
Gilman
GoyalGoyal
Greenfield
Hedge Fund 2
Hedge Fund 4
Horvath
Intel Insider
J Johnson
Jiau
John Lee
Karunatilaka
Kuo
L Higgins
Lim
Lipacis
Longoria
Longueuil
Martoma
Marvell Source
Microsoft Insider
Newman
Nguyen
PGR Clients
PGR Consultants
PMCS Insider
Pacchini
Pflaum
Plotkin
Purwar
R Lee
Ray
Riley
Senior 3Com Executives
Senior Salesmen
Shimoon
Shutze
Steinberg
Tai
Teeple
Teeple Contacts
Teeple Friend
Teeple Manager
Tortora
Volterra Insider
Gerster
Fig. 4SAC-PGR NetworkThis figure represents the illegal insider trading network centered on the hedge funds controlled by SAC Capital and theexpert networking firm, Primary Global Research. Arrows represent the direction of information flow. Insiders in the dashedregion are affiliated with SAC Capital or its subsidiaries. Data are from SEC and DOJ case documents, plus additionalsource documents to identify individuals not named in the SEC and DOJ documents.
![Page 42: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/42.jpg)
40
INFORMATION
NETW
ORKS
Bhalla
Cardillo
Chellam
Chiesi
Choo-Beng
Cutillo
Drimal
Emanuel
Far
Feinblatt
Fortuna
Goel
Goldfarb
Gupta
Hardin
Hariri
Hussain
Kieran
Kimelman
Kronos Source
Kumar
Kurland
Lin
Liu
M Tomlinson
Mancuso
Miri
MoffatPalecek Panu
Plate
Raj
Rengan
Rengan Friend
Rogers
Roomy
Ruiz
Santarlas
Scolaro
Shah
Shankar
Smith
Smith Source
Tudor
Unnamed Hedge Fund Principal
Unnamed Schottenfeld Traders
Unnamed others at Schottenfeld
Whitman
Yokuty
Zvi
Fig. 5Raj Rajaratnam NetworkThis figure represents the illegal insider trading network centered on Raj Rajaratnam. Arrows represent the direction ofinformation flow. Data are from SEC and DOJ case documents, plus additional source documents to identify individuals notnamed in the SEC and DOJ documents.
![Page 43: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/43.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 41
Table 1Corporate Events and ReturnsThis table presents statistics for 465 corporate events over the years 1996 to 2013. PanelA reports the number of occurrences of an event type. Panel B reports the average rawstock return from the date that the original tipper receives the information through theannouncement date of the event. Panel C reports the average number of trading days overthe same time period. Panel D reports the average raw stock return on the announcementdate of the event. “Negative”, “Positive”, and “Unknown” columns indicate the expectedeffect on stock prices, based on the trading behavior of tippees. Stock returns in the “All”column are calculated as long positive events and short negative events.
Outcome
Event Type Negative Positive Unknown All
Panel A: Frequency of events
Clinical Trial/Drug Regulation 13 24 0 37Earnings 54 66 3 123M&A 5 234 0 239Operations 3 8 2 13Sale of Securities 34 1 0 35Other 3 2 13 18Total 112 335 18 465
Panel B: Information to event returns (%)
Clinical Trial/Drug Regulation −38.6 101.2 79.7Earnings −12.2 14.7 13.5M&A −20.3 43.7 43.1Operations −29.7 22.9 24.9Sale of Securities −12.8 0.0 12.8Other −28.9 −4.8 8.9Total −16.8 42.4 34.9
Panel C: Information to event time (trading days)
Clinical Trial/Drug Regulation 5.3 11.2 9.2Earnings 10.2 12.3 11.3M&A 7.8 31.1 30.5Operations 2.0 7.9 6.1Sale of Securities 11.1 5.0 10.9Other 101.1 3.0 1.3 44.3Total 12.2 25.0 1.3 21.3
Panel D: Announcement day returns (%)
Clinical Trial/Drug Regulation −45.4 52.4 50.0Earnings −10.7 7.9 9.2M&A −6.7 22.3 21.9Operations −28.0 12.1 16.9Sale of Securities −0.2 0.2Other −11.2 −2.7 4.4Total −12.0 21.8 18.9
![Page 44: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/44.jpg)
42
INFORMATION
NETW
ORKS
Table 2Event Firms Summary StatisticsThis table presents summary statistics of the firms whose stocks are illegally traded based on inside information, using datafrom 465 corporate events over the years 1996 to 2013. “Total dollars invested by tippees” is the total dollar amount of acompany’s stock purchased or sold across all trades by all inside traders in the data. “Daily invested/Daily dollar volume”is the average daily dollars invested by tippees divided by daily dollar volume.
Percentiles
Mean S.D. Min 25th 50th 75th Max Observations
Market equity (billions) 10.09 37.39 0.01 0.30 1.01 3.56 422.64 391Employees (thousands) 13.71 41.63 0.00 0.37 1.70 6.55 398.46 387Tobin’s Q 2.54 2.41 0.35 1.31 1.87 3.06 36.24 391Daily trading volume (millions) 3.18 8.85 0.00 0.21 0.68 1.85 71.98 393Daily dollar trading volume (millions) 114.32 372.91 0.02 2.64 13.08 47.19 3456.96 393Total dollars invested by tippees (millions) 4.06 12.99 0.01 0.08 0.37 1.43 132.64 269Daily Invested/Daily dollar volume (%) 4.66 12.48 0.00 0.09 0.63 3.71 95.44 243
![Page 45: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/45.jpg)
INFORMATION
NETW
ORKS
43
Table 3Summary Statistics of People Involved in Insider TradingThis table presents summary statistics for the 622 people in the sample of insider trading from 1996 to 2013. Data are fromSEC and DOJ case documents, plus additional sources detailed in the paper. “Median house value” (“Median house size”) isthe median estimated value (square footage) over all properties owned by a person that are also listed as a person’s residencein the LexisNexis data. Home values and square footage are as of September 2014 from Zillow. “Tips given” is the number ofinsider trading tips given to others. “Tips received” is the number of insider tips received. “Total invested” is the aggregateddollar amount of all trading positions in absolute value. Thus, this includes the size of short positions. “Total gains” is theaggregated dollar amount received by a person across all events and trades. “Average return” is the average of a person’strades, based on actual buy and sell dates from the SEC and DOJ documents.
Percentiles
Mean S.D. Min 25th 50th 75th Max Observations
Demographics
Age 44.1 11.5 19.0 35.8 42.7 51.5 80.0 454Female (%) 9.8 29.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 498Median house value ($1,000s) 1, 114.3 1, 846.5 49.6 390.0 656.3 1, 170.5 25, 600.0 365Median house size (100 ft.2) 30.0 21.3 7.5 18.6 26.5 35.4 316.4 351
Information sharing
Tips given 1.5 3.2 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 29.0 622Tips received 1.5 2.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 24.0 622
Trading
Ever traded stock 82.5 38.1 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 399Ever traded options 38.8 48.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 399Total invested ($1,000s) 4, 288.0 25, 334.9 4.4 74.5 226.0 1, 116.2 375, 317.3 255Average invested per tip ($1,000s) 1, 690.3 6, 088.6 4.4 65.0 200.0 701.4 72, 427.5 255Total invested/median house value (%) 581.6 3, 609.5 0.6 13.2 38.9 140.3 44, 183.1 159Total gains ($1,000s) 2, 331.6 13, 207.1 0.9 34.2 136.0 606.0 139, 500.0 399Average gains per tip ($1,000s) 1, 289.9 10, 036.0 0.1 20.6 72.4 285.0 139, 000.0 399Average return (%) 63.4 231.8 0.0 14.0 26.4 46.5 3347.3 255
![Page 46: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/46.jpg)
44
INFORMATION
NETW
ORKS
Table 4Summary Statistics by OccupationThis table presents averages of age, gender, tipping activity, investment, and returns by occupation for the 622 people in thesample of insider trading from 1996 to 2013. Data are from SEC and DOJ case documents, plus additional sources detailedin the paper. Table 3 defines the variables. Table 3 presents a breakdown of occupations into narrower categories.
Occupation Count Percent Age FemaleHousevalue
($1,000s)
TipsGiven
TipsReceived
Medianinvestedper tip($1,000s)
Mediangainsper tip($1,000s)
MedianReturn
Top executive 107 17.3 50.9 6.1 1, 152 1.5 0.5 377 2, 903 33.7Corporate manager 55 8.9 41.3 5.6 624 1.6 0.6 1, 973 286 71.8Lower-level employee 59 9.5 41.5 25.5 621 1.7 1.5 558 149 47.5Sell side/lawyer/accountants 61 9.9 41.7 11.1 1, 164 3.0 1.9 3, 756 255 58.8Buy side: manager 60 9.7 42.6 6.4 3, 006 1.4 2.6 5, 972 5, 768 37.0Buy side: analyst/trader 65 10.5 35.5 5.2 1, 061 2.7 3.1 2, 051 442 117.7Small business owner 39 6.3 47.4 5.3 678 0.9 2.3 204 196 62.0Specialized occupation 38 6.1 52.0 2.8 729 1.2 1.6 599 234 32.8Unknown 135 21.8 41.5 20.4 613 0.5 1.1 584 355 77.0
![Page 47: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/47.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 45
Table 5Tippers and Tippees Social RelationshipsThis table reports the frequency of different types of social relationships among the 461pairs of people in the insider trading data. When one person tips insider information toanother person, they are are considered a pair. Pairs can have more than one type of socialrelationship, so the sum of relationship types is greater than 445. The type of relationshipis defined based on the text in SEC and DOJ case documents. “Business Associates” arepeople who work together or know each other through business relationships where neitherperson has a supervisory role over the other. “Boss” refers to business relationships whereone person is subordinate to another. “Client” is a relationship where one person is businessclient of the other.
Type of relationship CountFraction ofAll Pairs
Fraction ofRelationship
Type
Family
Dating/Engaged 7 1.5 6.7Married 15 3.3 14.4Parent-child 20 4.3 19.2Siblings 25 5.4 24.0In-laws 12 2.6 11.5Other 9 2.0 8.7Unspecified 16 3.5 15.4
All Family Relationships 104 22.6
Business
Business associates 87 18.9 54.4Boss 41 8.9 25.6Client 32 6.9 20.0
All Business Relationships 160 34.7
Friends
Acquaintances 3 0.7 1.9Friends 115 24.9 71.0Close Friends 44 9.5 27.2
All Friendship Relationships 162 35.1
No social relation listed 98 21.3
![Page 48: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/48.jpg)
46
INFORMATION
NETW
ORKS
Table 6Geographic Distance by RelationshipGeographic distance is measured in miles using the great circle distance between the cities of residence of the people in a pair.Residences are from the SEC and DOJ case documents. Acquaintances and unknown family relations are omitted becausethey have very few observations.
Percentiles
Mean S.D. Min 25th 50th 75th Max Observations
All 581.1 1, 190.8 0 0.0 26.2 739.3 8, 065.9 229
Family 466.3 1, 080.1 0 0.0 14.3 322.5 5, 350.4 59
Married/Dating 47.3 183.4 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 710.2 15Parent-child 326.8 603.6 0 14.3 26.2 160.1 1, 986.5 13Siblings 783.3 1, 490.8 0 6.2 28.0 1, 063.6 5, 350.4 14In-laws 1, 110.5 1, 751.5 0 9.6 216.5 1, 626.3 5, 350.4 9Other 88.0 128.3 0 8.1 11.5 237.3 307.6 7
Business ties 327.5 709.5 0 3.5 18.9 219.9 4, 452.0 98
Associates 334.5 751.6 0 0.0 16.8 236.8 4, 452.0 57Boss 198.4 395.1 0 3.9 24.8 53.4 1, 235.4 22Client 455.9 857.2 0 10.7 19.0 625.6 2, 666.9 19
Friendship 715.1 1, 352.4 0 4.0 28.4 1, 045.8 8, 065.9 106
Friends 708.2 1, 247.7 0 4.5 32.1 1, 077.6 6, 622.1 72Close friends 694.6 1, 581.8 0 0.0 26.2 835.3 8, 065.9 32
No social relation listed 962.2 1, 680.0 0 15.0 80.9 1, 117.4 5, 358.7 14
![Page 49: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/49.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 47
Table 7The Likelihood of Receiving a Tip Using Potential TippeesThis table presents logit regression coefficients where the dependent variable equals one ifa person receives an insider trading tip and zero otherwise. Observations include a tipper’sfamily members and person associates. Family members and person associates are identifiedusing the Lexis Nexis database. Person associates are non-family members who have aconnection to the tipper. Columns 3 and 4 include tipper fixed effects. In columns 2 and4, the omitted benchmark category is “Person associates,” which means the coefficients onthe family members are relative to the likelihood that a person associate receives a tip.“Other” are family members other than immediate family and in laws, such as uncles andgrandparents. Standard errors are clustered at the tipper level. Significance at the 1%, 5%,and 10% levels is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗.
Likelihood of Receiving a Tip
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Same gender 1.447∗∗∗ 1.351∗∗∗ 1.223∗∗∗ 1.155∗∗∗
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Age difference −0.049∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Family member −1.097∗∗∗ −0.618∗∗∗
(< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Omitted baseline category: Person associates
Husband 1.651∗∗∗ 1.862∗∗∗
(0.007) (< 0.001)
Wife −1.862∗∗∗ −1.513∗∗
(0.003) (0.017)
Brother −0.435 −0.111(0.128) (0.704)
Sister −2.820∗∗∗ −2.407∗∗
(0.007) (0.018)
Father −0.024 0.652(0.957) (0.157)
Mother −1.057 −0.387(0.171) (0.615)
Son 0.468 0.698(0.433) (0.183)
Daughter −0.300 −0.223(0.781) (0.831)
Other 0.644 0.987∗∗
(0.205) (0.042)
In law −1.588∗∗∗ −1.070∗∗∗
![Page 50: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/50.jpg)
48 INFORMATION NETWORKS
Likelihood of Receiving a Tip
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(< 0.001) (0.003)
Unknown −3.907∗∗∗ −3.569∗∗∗
(< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Tipper fixed effects No No Yes YesPseudo R2 0.187 0.252 0.099 0.150Observations 2,604 2,604 2,604 2,604
![Page 51: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/51.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 49
Table 8Tipper and Tippee Occupations by Order in Tip ChainThis table presents the distribution of occupations for each link in a tip chain. The order ina tip chain is the distance from the original source of the inside information, where distanceis measured as information links between people. “1” indicates the first link in the chainfrom an original source to all the people to whom the source shared the information. “2”indicates the links from the first people to receive the tip from the original source to all ofthe people with whom they share the information. “3” and “≥ 4” are defined analagously.Entries in the table present the fraction of all people at a given order in the tip chain thatare employed in each of the listed occupations. Thus, columns sum to 100%. “Number”indicates the number of relationships for each position in the tip chain.
Order in Tip Chain
1 2 3 ≥ 4
Tippee Occupation
Top executive 9.2 2.4 2.3 0.0Corporate manager 5.5 2.1 0.8 0.0Lower-level employee 9.6 12.8 9.9 0.0Sell side/lawyer/accountants 10.8 14.1 13.7 7.3Buy side: manager 12.5 22.1 16.0 25.5Buy side: analyst/trader 19.3 14.5 28.2 34.5Small business owner 10.4 10.7 10.7 3.6Specialized occupation 10.4 4.8 3.1 0.0Unknown 12.3 16.6 15.3 29.1Number 415 290 131 55
Tipper Occupation
Top executive 34.0 6.6 0.8 0.0Corporate manager 13.7 8.6 3.1 0.0Lower-level employee 16.1 5.2 11.5 3.6Sell side/lawyer/accountants 26.3 6.9 29.8 7.3Buy side: manager 1.0 15.2 17.6 12.7Buy side: analyst/trader 1.9 27.9 27.5 70.9Small business owner 0.7 6.9 7.6 1.8Specialized occupation 1.4 13.4 1.5 0.0Unknown 4.8 9.3 0.8 3.6Number 415 290 131 55
![Page 52: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/52.jpg)
50 INFORMATION NETWORKS
Table 9Tipper and Tippee Characteristics by Order in Tip ChainThis table presents the characteristics of tippers and tippes for each link in a tip chain. Theorder in a tip chain is the distance from the original source of the inside information, wheredistance is measured as information links between people. “1” indicates the first link in thechain from an original source to all the people to whom the source shared the information.“2” indicates the links from the first people to receive the tip from the original source to allof the people with whom they share the information. “3” and “≥ 4” are defined analagously.
Order in Tip Chain
1 2 3 ≥ 4
Characteristics
Tippee female 8.4 4.8 16.8 2.3Tipper female 11.5 14.8 4.5 10.5Tippee age 42.4 41.6 40.7 38.7Tipper age 42.8 41.4 35.7 34.4Tippee house value - median ($1,000s) 668.7 724.5 833.7 1, 072.0Tipper house value - median ($1,000s) 811.7 840.1 758.5 1, 072.0
Connections
Family connection 24.6 15.5 28.4 11.9Friendship connection 42.4 35.2 36.6 18.6Business connection 28.4 47.0 34.3 66.1No connection 20.9 19.7 15.7 11.9Geographic distance - median (miles) 15.8 40.2 46.9 0.0Same house value quintile 49.6 36.2 15.2 20.0Same surname ancestry 51.9 33.8 42.1 42.5
Trading
Amount invested - median ($1,000s) 200.4 250.1 280.1 492.7Gross profit - median ($1,000s) 17.6 36.3 39.5 86.0Tip return - average (%) 46.0 43.5 29.2 23.0Tip return - median (%) 25.2 27.9 28.2 18.8Use shares dummy (%) 50.8 56.2 77.1 76.4Use options dummy (%) 27.0 23.4 16.8 21.8
Timing
Time lapse from information to tip (days) 12.1 9.2 5.0 0.4Tipped passed on same day as received (%) 46.5 62.7 49.5 92.1Holding period - average (days) 13.9 16.8 11.3 9.1Holding period - median (days) 5.2 7.0 4.0 5.0
![Page 53: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/53.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 51
Table 10Tipper and Tippee Characteristics by Size of Insider NetworkThis table reports characteristics of people in information networks of increasing size. “Sizeof Network” refers to the number of people in an insider network (where every member canbe reached by every other member through at least one path). Density is the proportion ofall possible connections that actually exist. The diameter of a network is the longest of allshortest paths between any two members. Average cluster is the average node’s clustering,where clustering is the fraction of a node’s links that are also linked to each other.
Size of Network
1 2 3-5 ≥ 6
Network Characteristics
Density 1.0 0.6 0.2Diameter 1.0 2.3 4.4Average cluster 2.0 0.2 0.1
Personal Characteristics
Female tipper (%) 3.4 22.7 11.7 7.2Female tippee (%) 8.6 10.6 8.5Tipper age 47.8 45.4 43.6 42.1Tippee age 44.9 44.5 42.3Tippee house value - mean ($1,000s) 856.8 893.2 1, 311.6Tippee house value - median ($1,000s) 594.8 476.2 768.0Tipper house value - mean ($1,000s) 849.6 884.2 796.2 1, 548.4Tipper house value - median ($1,000s) 572.7 560.7 620.6 960.8
Social Connections
Family connections (%) 43.2 28.2 23.8Business connections (%) 20.5 34.0 36.4Friendship connections (%) 36.4 37.8 39.7Geographic distance - mean (miles) 523.8 326.0 583.6Geographic distance - median (miles) 7.2 33.6 36.6
Trading
Amount invested - mean ($1,000s) 725.3 1, 054.0 1, 227.7 2, 457.3Amount invested - median ($1,000s) 131.6 294.8 154.9 303.1Gross profit - mean ($1,000s) 2, 666.1 1, 248.1 255.7 526.6Gross profit - median ($1,000s) 67.4 154.3 41.7 216.1Tip return - mean (%) 137.7 82.0 51.0 37.3Tip return - median (%) 32.4 34.8 34.2 28.0
Timing
Time lapse from information to tip (days) 11.3 15.4 9.3
![Page 54: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/54.jpg)
52
INFORMATION
NETW
ORKS
Table 11Insider Trading and Daily ReturnsThis table presents fixed effects regresssions on daily stock returns for the event firms in the sample. Observations are from120 trading days before the public announcement of the event to one day before the announcement. All regressions includeevent fixed effects, which controls for all characteristics of the event and of the firm that are time invariant over the 120trading days before the announcement. All regressions also include ln(1+daily volume) and daily returns for the market,SMB, and HML factors. Event time fixed effects are dummy variables for days in the (−120,−1) period. Insider tradingdays only include observations in which an insider traded on a particular day. Insider trading dummy is a dummy variablethat takes the value of one if an insider traded on a particular day. ln(1+# of inside traders) is the log of one plus thenumber of unique inside traders that trade on a particular day. ln(1+# of shares traded by inside traders) is the log of oneplus the total number of shares traded by insiders on a particular day. p-values from standard errors clustered at the eventlevel are presented in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗.
Dependent variable: Daily stock return (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Insider trading dummy 0.204∗∗∗
(0.006)ln(1+# of inside traders) 0.270∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗
(0.001) (0.024)ln(1+# of shares traded by inside traders) 0.109∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗
(< 0.001) (0.007) (0.049)Control variables:Volume, MKTRET , SMB, and HML Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesEvent fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesEvent time fixed effects No No Yes No Yes YesInsider trading days only No No No No No YesObservations 48,445 48,445 48,445 48,445 48,445 2,338Adjusted R2 0.154 0.155 0.155 0.155 0.155 0.135
![Page 55: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/55.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 53
Table 12Insider Characteristics and Individual Trading GainsThis table presents OLS regresssions on daily stock returns for the event firms in the sample.Observations are for all inside traders that traded securities for whom data are available.The dependent variable in columns 1–3 is the log of one plus the inside trader’s total returnover all trades, calculated as total profit divided by total invested. The dependent variablein columns 4–6 is the log of the inside trader’s total profit over all trades. Network instrengthis the number of tips received by a trader in the entire sample. Network outstrength is thenumber of tips given by a trader in the entire sample. Network indegree is the number ofdifferent tippers that gave tips to an insider. Network outdegree is the number of tippees towhom a trader gave tips. Network size is the number of inside traders in a trader’s networkof insiders. ln(investment) is the total dollar amount of the inside trader’s investments.Uses options is a dummy variable that indicates if a trader every traded options on insideinformation. p-values from robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significanceat the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗.
ln(return) ln(profit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Network outstrength −0.025 0.010 −0.017 −0.016(0.222) (0.693) (0.703) (0.823)
Network instrength 0.085∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Network outdegree −0.089 −0.128 0.021 −0.003(0.133) (0.131) (0.813) (0.982)
Network indegree 0.132∗ −0.026 0.314∗ −0.039(0.079) (0.767) (0.061) (0.825)
Network size 0.012∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
ln(investment) −0.308∗∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗ −0.310∗∗∗
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Use options 1.547∗∗∗ 1.664∗∗∗ 1.546∗∗∗ 1.253∗∗∗ 1.254∗∗∗ 1.255∗∗∗
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 7.063∗∗∗ 6.730∗∗∗ 7.122∗∗∗ 10.734∗∗∗ 10.789∗∗∗ 10.753∗∗∗
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Observations 249 249 249 399 399 399Adjusted R2 0.314 0.284 0.314 0.235 0.182 0.232
![Page 56: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/56.jpg)
Internet Appendix for
“Information Networks: Evidence from Illegal Insider Trading Tips”
This internet appendix contains 1) a description of the legal environment surrounding illegal
insider trading, 2) a detailed explanation of the data sources used in the paper, 3) a discussion of
how illegal insider trading is detected and investigated by regulators, and 4) additional figures and
tables, referenced in the main paper.
1. Legal Environment
According to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), insider trading refers to “buying or
selling a security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence, while in
possession of material, nonpublic information about the security.”1 Under U.S. law, insider trading
is both a crime punishable by monetary penalties and imprisonment and a civil offense requiring
disgorgement of illegal profits and payment of civil penalties. Criminal offenses are charged by the
DOJ and civil offenses are charged by the SEC. Civil and criminal charges can be made at the
same time for the same offense. Criminal charges are less common, because criminal law requires
evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict someone of a crime. In contrast,
civil cases only require evidence of guilt based on the preponderance of the evidence.
Prosecution of illegal insider trading usually falls under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Act of 1934.
Whether a trade is covered by Rule 10b-5 is based on two theories. The classical theory applies to
corporate insiders that purchase or sell securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information.
Insiders include both employees of the firm and others who receive temporary access to confidential
information, such as externally hired lawyers and accountants. The misappropriation theory applies
to anyone who uses confidential information for gain in breach of a fiduciary, contractual, or similar
obligation to the rightful owner of the information (typically the firm). Thus, sharing material,
nonpublic information, even without trading securities, is a crime under this interpretation of the
law. A tippee, on the other hand, cannot be prosecuted unless he also shares the information or
trades based on the inside information.
1From the SEC’s website: http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm.
![Page 57: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/57.jpg)
2 INFORMATION NETWORKS
Most practitioners agree that the definition of illegal insider trading is not well defined in the U.S.
The definition became more defined in December 2014, when a U.S. Court of Appeals overturned
the convictions of Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson. The court argued that for a guilty verdict,
prosecutors would need to show that Newman and Chiasson were aware that the original source of
the leak received a personal benefit. Since, Newman and Chiasson received the tip through multiple
links, they successfully argued that that they did not know that the original source received any
personal benefit. The Court also defined personal benefit more strictly. It rejected that friendship
could constitute a personal benefit, as previously defined, and instead required that the tipper
expected to receive something “of consequence.” In April, 2014, the U.S. 2nd Circuit rejected the
DOJ’s petition for a rehearing of the case. If the DOJ intends to challenge the case, it would need
to go to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The December ruling became even stronger in January 2015 when it was successfully used to
vacate previously accepted guilty pleas in United States v. Conradt, 12 Cr. 887 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y.)
and to throw out a pending criminal case against Benjamin Durant. The DOJ argued that the
Newman and Chiasson ruling does not apply to the Conradt case because the Conradt and Durant
cases were brought under the misappropriation theory, whereas the Newman and Chiasson case was
brought under the classical theory. The judge ruled that there should be no distinction between
the two theories.
By overturning Newman and Chiasson’s convictions on these arguments, the Court’s ruling has
been a landmark in the definition of what constitutes illegal insider trading. As I show in the paper,
many of the inside traders named in court documents are many steps removed from the original
source. Moreover, those that are many steps removed tend to be buy side portfolio managers
who make large investments based on inside information. Based on my evidence, the December
2014 ruling is likely to lead to appeals for many of the convictions of serial inside traders. It
has already led to a number of appeals, including those by Michael Steinberg, Michael Kimelman,
Doug Whitman, and Rajat Gupta. In addition, two bills have been introduced to Congress to
define insider trading in a statutory law, rather than common law. For more detail on the legal
environment of insider trading see King, Corrigan, and Dukin (2009).
![Page 58: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/58.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 3
1.1. Regime Shift in Enforcement
In the main paper, I state that I begin collecting data in 2009 because there was a regime shift in
the enforcement of insider trading at this time. I discuss this regime shift in greater detail here. In
early 2009, the SEC came under public pressure for its failure to detect the ponzi schemes run by
Bernard Madoff and Alan Stanford. At a Congressional hearing in early 2009, lawmakers attacked
the SEC’s enforcement record, with one lawmaker telling the SEC’s officials, “We thought the
enemy was Mr. Madoff. I think it is you.” (Henriques, 2009). In 2009, the Investor Protection Act
of 2009 was introduced in Congress (H.R. 3817) which was designed to give greater enforcement
power to the SEC.
At the same time as the SEC was under increased scrutiny for not catching Madoff and Stanford
sooner, Barack Obama was sworn in as President on January 20, 2009. On January 27, 2009, Mary
Schapiro became the Chair of the SEC, replacing Christopher Cox. In testimony before the U.S.
Senate in June 2009, Schapiro discussed her implementation of “reforms to improve investor protec-
tion and restore confidence in our markets.” (Schapiro, 2009) She describes how she had removed
bureaucratic hurdles for quicker enforcement, hired a new enforcement director, implemented over-
sight of broker-dealers, and reinvirgorated enforcement efforts at the SEC. She ends her prepared
testimony by asking for more resources. Del Guercio, Odders-White, and Ready (2013) provide
empirical evidence that the SEC did receive additional resources. The SEC’s budget authority in-
creased by 6.3% in fiscal year 2009 and by 14.7% in 2010, compared to the prior year. In contrast,
the budget shrank every year from 2006 to 2008. In the end, the fiscal year budget in 2011 was
21% higher than it was in 2008.
At the DOJ, a new era of enforcement was beginning at roughly the same time. The SEC had
opened an investigation into Raj Rajaratnam in 2006. Though this investigation had gathered a
large amount of circumstantial evidence, the SEC eventually put the case on hold in 2007 because it
did not have enough direct evidence to bring a case against Rajaratnam. However, the DOJ started
their own investigation and in March 2008, the DOJ’s request to place a wiretap on Rajaratnam’s
cell phone was granted by a federal judge. Prior to this case, wiretaps had been authorized mainly
for violent organized crime and drug-related crimes. The authorization to use wiretaps in the
![Page 59: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/59.jpg)
4 INFORMATION NETWORKS
Rajaratnam case was a groundbreaking development since it allowed regulators to use a new and
powerful tool for enforcement of insider trading (Maglich, 2013).
2. Data Collection
2.1. SEC and DOJ Data
The SEC brings civil cases in two ways: civil complaints and administrative proceedings. In many
cases, both a complaint and an administrative proceeding are filed. For the purposes of this paper,
the legal distinction is unimportant. However, complaints typically include a detailed narrative
history of the allegations, including biographies of defendants, trading records, and descriptions of
the relationships between tippers and tippees to justify the allegations. In contrast, administrative
proceedings typically include far fewer details, providing summaries instead. Therefore, with one
exception, I only include cases that have a complaint. The exception is the well publicized case
against SAC Capital. The SEC does not explicitly name Steven Cohen in the complaint document,
but the related administrative proceeding does.
The DOJ cases include a number of different documents. The most useful are the criminal
complaints, and “information” documents. These are similar to civil complaints, but contain less
information. Transcripts of hearings, while potentially informative, are typically not available on
PACER. DOJ cases are usually filed against a single individual. SEC complaints are often filed
against multiple people. This means in the DOJ documents, the co-conspirators remain anonymous,
but they are named in the SEC documents. This makes the DOJ documents less useful. In some
cases, the SEC documents discuss people anonymously too. Often cooperating witnesses are not
named until the SEC brings a future case against this person. Therefore, it is necessary to read all
of the cases and their amendments in order to piece together the identities of as many people as
possible. For instance, in many cases it is easy to infer who the co-conspirator is by the description
of their job and relationship to the defendant in connection with another DOJ case in which the
co-conspirator is the named defendant. I also rely on investigative journalism in media reports that
uncovers the identities of people that the SEC and DOJ does not name explicitly.
The data include 203 SEC cases and 114 DOJ cases. The 335 documents comprise 202 SEC
complaints; 15 amended complaints; one SEC administrative proceeding against Steven Cohen;
![Page 60: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/60.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 5
114 DOJ case documents plus two extra DOJ documents: an appeals court decision and a bill of
particulars; and one class action lawsuit against SAC Capital. The average number of defendants
in SEC cases is 2.6. Excluding firms that are listed as defendants, there are 2.32 defendants per
case, on average. Therefore, individuals account for the majority of defendants, but there are some
firms named as defendants as well. In some cases, multiple firms are named. Of the 2.32 defendants
per case, on average, 2.13 are primary defendants and 0.19 are relief defendants. Relief defendants
are people or firms who benefited from the insider trading, but did not participate in the crime. In
DOJ cases, the average number of defendants is 1.4.
2.2. LexisNexis Public Records Database
The LexisNexis Public Records Database (LNPRD) provides biographical details on over 300
million individuals, living and dead, that have resided in the United States. These data are taken
from state licensing authorities, utility records, criminal files, and property records, among others.
The data include month and year of birth, prior addresses, real estate owned, liens and judgments,
bankruptcy filings, criminal filings, hunting and sport licenses, and professional licenses.
The LNPRD also includes family members and person associates. Family members are limited
to 10 people, but person associates are not limited. Family members are identified as first or second
degree relations. Second degree relations are in-laws. The LNPRD also identifies through which
relative the in-laws are related.
To identify the specific familial relationship of family members listed in the LNPRD, I use the
age, addresses, and real estate ownership records to identify relationships. For example, for a male
inside trader, if the LNPRD lists a first degree female family member with the same last name,
plus a maiden name, of about the same age as the male inside trader, the family member could be
a wife or a sister. If the male inside trader and the female family member own real estate in which
they both reside, I code the female family member as a wife. Otherwise, I code the relative as a
sister. In this case, if a second degree male relative of the female relative is listed who has the same
last name as the female relative and shares a residence, I assume this is the husband or the female
relative, which implies the female relative is a sister. As another example, children are typically 20
to 40 years younger than the observed person in the LNPRD and when young enough, they have a
![Page 61: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/61.jpg)
6 INFORMATION NETWORKS
history of sharing the same address. I also use external sources, such as online obituaries, to assess
family relationships, when available.
3. How Do Inside Traders Get Caught?
Though formal charges of insider trading are brought by the SEC and the DOJ, multiple orga-
nizations are involved in the investigation of insider trading. In addition to the SEC’s and DOJ’s
internal investigation units, self-regulatory organizations (SROs) also help to identify illegal insider
trading. These include the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and the Options
Regulatory Surveillance Authority (ORSA). In criminal cases, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) may also participate. Each of these organizations has two primary means of detecting illegal
trading: 1) monitoring trading behavior and 2) tips submitted by the public. In this section, I
describe each of these organizations role in insider trading investigations.
3.1. Monitoring for Insider Trading
The first method of detecting insider trading is through monitoring the stock market for unusual
trading activity. Daily monitoring of financial markets is conducted by self-regulatory organiza-
tions, not the SEC itself. Equity markets are monitored by Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA). FINRA was formed in 2007 to consolidate the regulatory actions of the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the regulatory organization of the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE). Following the Stanford and Madoff ponzi scheme scandals in 2009, FINRA created the
Office of Fraud Detection and Market Intelligence (OFDMI) and the Office of Whistleblower. One
of the four units of the OFDMI is the Insider Trading Surveillance Group. In 2010, FINRA took
over more regulatory responsibility from NYSE Euronext, which led FINRA to monitor 80% of the
activity on U.S. equities markets. The consolidation into one regulatory agency allowed FINRA
to create an audit trail to follow transactions across multiple markets. Options markets are mon-
itored by the Options Regulatory Surveillance Authority (ORSA). ORSA was established in 2006
to monitor the six options markets for insider trading. In 2014, ORSA monitored all 11 options
exchanges in the U.S. In 2015, FINRA took over ORSA’s regulatory role. This means that FINRA
is the primary monitor for both equity and option markets on a daily basis.
![Page 62: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/62.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 7
FINRA’s primary method for detecting insider trading is monitoring software called Securities
Observation, News Analysis, and Regulation (SONAR). Each day, SONAR receives between 10,000
and 20,000 news stories from multiple news wire services, about 1,000 SEC filings from Edgar, and
equity market activity data, including trades, quotes, orders, volume, and prices from the exchanges.
First, SONAR uses text-mining algorithms to identify corporate events in real time using the news
stories and Edgar filings. Then SONAR computes abnormal price and volume movements in the
period before the event date. SONAR uses a double exponential cross-over model to identify the
timing of when illegal insider trading may have taken place and when profits would be largest.
Using these inputs, SONAR runs a logistic model to generate a probability of illegal insider trading
for each event. If the estimated probability is high enough, SONAR flags the event for further
inspection by FINRA agents (Goldberg, Kirkland, Lee, Shyr, and Thakker, 2003).
Once an event is flagged by SONAR, FINRA agents start a deeper investigation. They first
contact the firm in which insider trading could have occurred to get a chronology of the event.
They request information on who knew what about the event and when they knew it. FINRA’s
jurisdiction allows it to request information from broker-dealers, firms, and other entities that were
informed about the event before it was made public, such as investment banks and public relations
firms. However, FINRA does not have subpoena power over the general public. Second, FINRA
requests ‘blue sheets,’ which are trade data from the broker dealers, to identify who traded in the
stock in the period before the public announcement. Third, FINRA sends out letters to associated
firms that ask them to identify relationships among people who both traded in the stock and had
access to the nonpublic information. Finally, they match account statements with the individuals
who had access to material nonpublic information. According to FINRA, the majority of their
investigations are triggered by SONAR. In addition, more than half of FINRA’s investigations
involve opportunistic, one-time traders (FINRA, 2015).
Once the SEC receives a referral, it chooses whether to open an investigation. According to the
SEC’s Enforcement Manual, the SEC considers a number of criteria when deciding whether to open
an investigation. These criteria include the magnitude of the violation, the size of the victim group,
the amount of profits or losses avoided, and whether the conduct is ongoing or widespread (U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013). Since 2009, when the enforcement division of the
![Page 63: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/63.jpg)
8 INFORMATION NETWORKS
SEC was re-organized, the SEC has become more aggressive in its investigations. In particular, it
maintains a database of telephone, instant message records, and trading histories to find patterns to
connect potential inside traders. For instance, in the case of Raj Rajaratnam, the SEC subpoenaed
Rajaratnam’s instant message history. They asked Rajaratnam to identify the sender of a particular
message, which he identified as Roomy Khan. The SEC was able to get Khan to cooperate and
wear a wire to record Rajaratnam sharing inside information. This evidence allowed the SEC to
get a wiretap on Rajaratnam’s cellphone, which led the SEC to many other inside traders that
shared information with Rajaratnam (Leonard, 2012).
3.2. Whistleblower Tips
The second method of detecting insider trading is through tips submitted by the public to
the SROs or to the SEC, DOJ, or FBI directly. FINRA receives tips through its Office of the
Whistleblower, but does not provide any bounty for tips. FINRA receives about 1,000 whistleblower
tips per year, resulting in about 200 to 300 referrals to the SEC, though these numbers are for all
types of tips, not just insider trading tips (Varano, 2014). The SEC provides a website for people
to anonymously submit tips or complaints regarding possible violations of securities laws.2
Following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the SEC revamped its whistleblower unit
in August 2011. The new SEC’s whistleblower program provides awards equal to 10 to 30% of the
sanctions collected if enforcement actions result in over $1 million in sanctions. From fiscal year
2012 through 2014, the SEC’s whistleblower program received 3,286 tip per year, on average. Of
these, 214 tips are related to insider trading per year, on average. The program has paid awards
to 14 whistleblowers, since its inception (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2014), though
none of these awards went to insider trading whistleblowers. Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC
had the authority to reward whistleblowers in insider trading cases (U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2011). However, from 1989 to 2011, it only paid five awards for a total of $159,537
(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2010).
2See https://denebleo.sec.gov/TCRExternal/disclaimer.xhtml.
![Page 64: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/64.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 9
3.3. Statistics on Detecting Insider Trading
The SEC does not publish aggregate statistics on the original sources of its investigations. How-
ever, when the SEC files an insider trading case, it typically publishes a press release about the
case. The press releases often acknowledge the assistance of other organizations, such as FINRA and
ORSA. In addition, FINRA’s website lists the referrals to the SEC that resulted in SEC charges.
Using these data, I find that of the 216 SEC case documents in my sample, 79 originated from
FINRA and 12 originated from ORSA. In 19 cases, the SEC acknowledges the assistance of the
FBI, though the assistance is probably after the original investigation has begun.
In sum, inside traders are detected through a number of different mechanisms. Abnormal price
and volume changes before public announcements account is one of the primary ways inside trading
is detected. This is true for equity markets more than options markets. Whistleblower tips may
also lead to insider trading cases. The remaining cases appear to be originated by the SEC’s
own investigations. How the SEC identifies these cases is not clear as they do not publicize their
methods. I have attempted to contact the SEC to discuss these issues, but they have not responded
to my inquiries, as they probably prefer to keep their internal policies secret.
References
Del Guercio, Diane, Elizabeth R. Odders-White, and Mark J. Ready, 2013, The deterrence effect
of SEC enforcement intensity on illegal insider trading, Unpublished working paper, University
of Oregon and University of Wisconsin–Madison.
FINRA, 2015, Monitoring for insider trading and understanding FINRA’s regulatory tip
process, Online Webinar: https://www.finra.org/industry/monitoring-insider-trading-and-
understanding-finra
Goldberg, Henry, Dale Kirkland, Dennis Lee, Ping Shyr, and Dipak Thakker, 2003, The NASD
Securities Observation, News Analysis & Regulation System (SONAR), Innovative Applications
of Artificial Intelligence 2, 11–18.
Henriques, Diana B., 2009, At Madoff hearing, lawmakers lay into S.E.C., New York Times Feb-
ruary 4.
![Page 65: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/65.jpg)
10 INFORMATION NETWORKS
King, Matthew R., Elizabeth Corrigan, and Craig Francis Dukin, 2009, Securities fraud, American
Criminal Law Review 46, 1027–1098.
Leonard, Devin, 2012, The SEC: Outmanned, outgunned, and on a roll, Bloomberg April 19.
Maglich, Jordan, 2013, Once reserved for drug crimes, wiretapping takes center stage in white collar
prosecutions, Forbes May 21.
Schapiro, Mary, 2009, Testimony before the subcommittee on financial services and general gov-
ernment, U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, June 2, 2009, Discussion paper Securities
and Exchange Commission.
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2010, Assessment of the SEC’s bounty program, Dis-
cussion Paper 474 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Washington, D.C.
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2011, SEC’s new whistleblower program takes effect
today, https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-167.htm.
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013, Enforcement ManualEnforcement Manual, Wash-
ington, D.C.
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2014, Annual report to congress on the Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower Program, Discussion paper U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
Varano, Christopher M., 2014, Whistleblower tips continue to rise in 2014, Online: http://
securitiescompliancesentinel.foxrothschild.com/compliance-and-supervision/whistleblower-tips-
continue-to-rise-in-2014/.
![Page 66: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/66.jpg)
INFORMATION
NETW
ORKS
11
Copyright © Free Vector Maps.com
Internet Appendix Figure 1Location of Tippers and Tippees
Larger circles represent cities with more tippers and tippees.
![Page 67: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/67.jpg)
12
INFORMATION
NETW
ORKS
Castelli
Cupo
Deprado
Foldy
Grum
Lazorchak
Pendolino Tippee 1
Tippee 2Tippee 3Tippee 4
Tippee 5Tippee 6
Tippee 6 Spouse
Tippee 7
Internet Appendix Figure 2Lazorchak-Foldy NetworkThis figure represents the illegal insider trading network centered on John Lazorchak and Mark Foldy who shared insideinformation with others. Arrows represent the direction of information flow. Data are from SEC and DOJ case documents,plus additional source documents to identify individuals not named in the SEC and DOJ documents.
![Page 68: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/68.jpg)
INFORMATION
NETW
ORKS
13
B Holzer
BoucharebBowers Checa
Corbin
DevlinFaulhaber
Glover
Holzer
L Corbin
N Devlin R Bouchareb
T Bouchareb
Internet Appendix Figure 3Devlin NetworkThis figure represents the illegal insider trading network centered on Matthew Devlin who received inside information fromhis wife, Nina Devlin. Arrows represent the direction of information flow. Data are from SEC and DOJ case documents, plusadditional source documents to identify individuals not named in the SEC and DOJ documents.
![Page 69: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/69.jpg)
14
INFORMATION
NETW
ORKS
Berry
C Jackson
CainCain Contact
Chattem Director
Coots
Coots Contact
Doffing
Jinks
Jinks Contact
Melvin
Rooks
Rooks Contact
Internet Appendix Figure 4Melvin NetworkThis figure represents the illegal insider trading network centered on Thomas Melvin who shared inside information from anunnamed Chattem Director with others. Arrows represent the direction of information flow. Data are from SEC and DOJcase documents, plus additional source documents to identify individuals not named in the SEC and DOJ documents.
![Page 70: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/70.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 15
Internet Appendix Table 1Event TypesThis table provides a breakdown of the types of corporate events in the sample. The datainclude 465 corporate events over the years 1996 to 2013 from SEC and DOJ case documents.
Clinical Trial/Drug Regulation 37Clinical trial results 7Regulatory approvals and rejections 30
Earnings 123Earnings announcements 112Earnings guidance 7Earnings restatements 4
M&A 239Acquisition announcement (trading in target stock) 216Acquisition announcement (trading in acquirer stock) 3Merger negotiation developments 3Failed acquisitions 4Joint ventures 3Licensing 2Restructuring 3Target seeking buyer 1Share repurchase 1Strategic alliances/investments 3
Operations 13Appointment/resignation of CEO 2Business agreement/contract 9Layoff 1Other operations 1
Sale of Securities 35
Other 18Analyst report 1Dividend increase 1Financial distress 2Fund liquidation 1Addition to stock index 1Unspecified 12
Total 465
![Page 71: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/71.jpg)
16
INFORMATION
NETW
ORKS
Internet Appendix Table 2Events by IndustryThis table presents the frequency of illegal insider trading events by two-digit NAICS level industry definitions, using datafrom 465 corporate events over the years 1996 to 2013. “Example firms in sample” presents non-exhaustive lists of samplefirms for each industry definition.
IndustryNumberof events
Fractionof total
Example firms in sample
Computers and electronics 91 23.1 Dell, Intel, Nvidia, Sun MicrosystemsChemical manufacturing 90 22.8 Celgene, MedImmune, Pharmasset, SepracorFood and apparel manufacturing 40 10.2 Carter’s, Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Smithfield FoodsInformation 39 9.9 Akamai, Autodesk, Clearwire, Google, MicrosoftFinance and insurance 27 6.9 East West Bancorp, Goldman Sachs, Mercer Insurance GroupProfessional and technical services 20 5.1 Alliance Data Systems, F5 Networks, Perot SystemsWholesale trade 18 4.6 Herbalife, InVentiv Health, World Fuel ServicesMining and oil extraction 13 3.3 Delta Petroluem, Mariner Energy, Puda CoalRetail trade 12 3.0 Albertson’s, Best Buy, J. Crew, Walgreen CompanyHealth care 8 2.0 Humana, LCA Vision, Option CareReal estate 8 2.0 Bluegreen Corporation, Mitcham IndustriesAdministrative support 8 2.0 Comsys IT Partners, DynCorp International, PeopleSupportGeneral merchandise stores 6 1.5 Barnes & Noble, Office Depot, SearsTransportation 4 1.0 Airtran Holdings, K-Sea Transportation PartnersAccomodation and food services 4 1.0 CKE Restaurants, Hilton, Rubio’s RestaurantsUtilities 2 0.5 SouthWest Water Company, TXU Corp.Construction 2 0.5 Complete Production Services, Warrior Energy ServicesEducation 1 0.3 Global Education and Technology Group LimitedOther 1 0.3 Berkshire Hathaway Inc.
![Page 72: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/72.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 17
Internet Appendix Table 3Job Titles of InsidersThis table provides a breakdown of the job titles in the sample. The data include 611 peopleinvolved in insider trading over the years 1996 to 2013 from SEC and DOJ case documents.
Top executive 107Chairman 11Board member 14CEO 12CFO 7Officer 64
Mid-level corporate manager 55
Lower-level employee 59Unspecified 40Secretary 8IT 11
Sell side: lawyer, accountant, investment banker 59Investment banker 4Sell-side analyst 5Attorney 24Accountant 13Principal 15
Buy side: manager 60Hedge fund manager 30Portfolio manager 29Investor 2Venture capitalist 1
Buy side: analyst, trader 65Trader 43Buy-side analyst 22
Small business owner 39Small business owner 35Real estate broker 4
Specialized occupation 38Consultant 16Doctor 13Engineer 9
Unknown 135
Total 622
![Page 73: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/73.jpg)
18 INFORMATION NETWORKS
Internet Appendix Table 4Inside Traders Compared to their NeighborsThis table presents averages and t-tests of characteristics of inside traders compared totheir neighbors (columns 1–3) and logit regression coefficients where the dependent variableequals one if a person is in the insider trading data and zero if the person is a neighbor(columns 4 and 5). Column 5 includes insider-neighbor pair fixed effects, which accountsfor all time invariant characteristics of the neighborhood. Neighbors are identified as peopleof the same gender who have a residence on the same street as the inside trader. “Age iscalculated for insiders and neighbors based on the insider trading dates. “Owns property” isa dummy variable equal to one if a person has any real assets, as recorded in the Lexis Nexisdatabase. “Bankruptcy” equals one if a person filed for backruptcy, as recorded in the LexisNexis database. “Judgments and liens” is a dummy variable. For insiders, bankruptcies,judgments, and liens are recorded as one only if the event occurred before the end of theinsider trading dates in the sample. This means that these events are not the direct outcomeof any prosecution for insider trading. For neighbors, these variables are recorded as a oneif the event happens at any time. ‘UCC liens,” “Licenses,” “Criminal record,” “Democrat,”and “Republican” are dummy variables if a person has any UCC liens filed against him, hasa license, any criminal record (non-Federal crimes, mostly traffic violations), registered as aDemocrat or a Republican. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ∗∗∗,∗∗, and ∗.
Averages Logit Regressions
Insiders Neighbors Difference Likelihood of insider
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 43.1 41.7 1.5 −0.015∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
(0.814) (0.017) (< 0.001)
Owns property (%) 85.3 77.7 7.6∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.170(0.001) (0.000) (0.988)
Bankruptcy (%) 2.2 4.3 −2.0∗ −0.005 −0.012(0.072) (0.253) (0.146)
Judgments and liens (%) 23.0 14.3 8.7∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.002(0.001) (0.729) (0.538)
UCC liens (%) 21.0 11.0 10.1∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(< 0.001) (0.002) (0.009)
Family members 7.3 7.5 −0.1 −0.017 −0.112∗∗
(0.386) (0.604) (0.048)
Person associates 6.5 5.1 1.4∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.044)
Licenses (%)Insurance 0.9 0.7 0.2 0.001 0.002
(0.655) (0.950) (0.844)
Accounting 3.3 1.1 2.2∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.012(0.018) (0.091) (0.156)
![Page 74: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/74.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 19
Averages Logit Regressions
Insiders Neighbors Difference Likelihood of insider
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Engineering 0.7 1.8 −1.1 −0.007 −0.016(0.132) (0.326) (0.188)
Attorney 2.7 0.9 1.8∗∗ 0.010 0.010(0.045) (0.237) (0.272)
Real estate 1.8 2.9 −1.1 −0.010∗∗ −0.013(0.276) (0.018) (0.125)
Medicine 3.1 2.9 0.2 −0.003 0.002(0.842) (0.451) (0.713)
Other 3.6 3.8 −0.2 0.000 0.003(0.862) (0.983) (0.586)
Criminal Record (%) 53.7 12.8 40.9∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Republican (%) 46.3 38.8 7.5(0.173)
Democrat (%) 21.8 40.8 −19.0∗∗∗
(0.000)
Insider-neighbor pair fixed effects No YesPseudo R2 0.096 0.329Observations 674 498
![Page 75: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/75.jpg)
20 INFORMATION NETWORKS
Internet Appendix Table 5Original Source in M&A and Earnings LeaksThis table presents the frequency of different original sources of inside information in M&Asand earnings announcements. For information leaks related to M&As, internal sources arethose that are employed by the acquirer, target, or other firms, or are unknown. Other firmsinclude potential and failed bidders. External sources include people that are employed byfirms other than the merging firms. Consulting firms include human relations firms, investorrelations firms, medical consultants, credit rating agencies, etc. For information leaks relatedto earnings, internal sources are people that are employed by the firm releasing the earningsstatements.
M&A Earnings
Acquirer TargetOther/
UnknownTotal
Internal sourcesDirector 0 19 1 20 4Officer 22 31 7 60 36Employee 21 15 1 37 44
Total internal 43 65 9 117 84
External sourcesAccounting firm 15 6 0 21 20Consulting firm (HR, IR, etc.) 4 3 0 7 13Investment bank 13 10 14 37 0Law firm 11 20 35 66 0Stock market employee 0 0 0 0 5Stolen 11 14 5 30 0Other 2 1 0 3 1
Total external sources 56 54 54 164 39
Unknown sources 0 0 4 4 3
Total 99 119 67 285 126
![Page 76: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/76.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 21
Internet Appendix Table 6Original Source in Other EventsThis table presents the frequency of different original sources of inside information in in-formation events other than M&As and earnings announcements. These events includeannouncements about clinical trial results, operations, sale of securities, and others. “TipFirm”’ refers to the firm for which the information is relevant. Internal sources are thosethat are employed by the tip firm. External sources include people that are employed byfirms other than the merging firms. Service providers include human relations firms, investorrelations firms, medical consultants, law firms, credit rating agencies, and others.
Tip FirmFailed/Potentialbidder
RegulatoryAgency
Other/Unknown
Total
Internal sourcesDirector 2 0 0 0 2Officer 9 0 0 0 9Employee 12 0 0 3 15
Total internal sources 23 0 0 3 26
External sourcesPotential investor 0 34 0 0 34Regulatory agency 0 0 27 0 27Service providers 10 0 4 2 16
Total external sources 10 34 31 2 77
Unknown 0 0 0 3 3
Total 33 34 31 8 106
![Page 77: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/77.jpg)
22 INFORMATION NETWORKS
Internet Appendix Table 7Tip Chain Position RegressionsThis table presents OLS regressions (columns 1 and 2) and order logit regressions (columns3 and 4) where the dependent variable is the position in the tip chain, where the variableequals one if the observed tipping relationship is the first link from the original source, two ifit is the second link from the original source, and so on. The omitted benchmark occupationfor tippers and tippees is “Top executive”. Heteroskedaticity-robust p-values are reportedin parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗.
OLS Ordered logit
Dependent Variable: Position in Tip Chain
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tippee is female 0.206 0.249∗ 0.519 0.929∗∗
(0.129) (0.084) (0.128) (0.050)
Tipper is female −0.176∗ −0.369∗∗∗ −0.201 −0.587(0.069) (< 0.001) (0.421) (0.126)
log(Tippee age) −0.232 0.359∗ −0.838∗ 0.452(0.237) (0.083) (0.092) (0.554)
log(Tipper age) −0.776∗∗∗ −0.609∗∗∗ −1.731∗∗∗ −2.485∗∗∗
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Family relationship −0.435∗∗∗ −0.099 −1.076∗∗∗ −0.703∗
(0.002) (0.413) (0.004) (0.097)
Friend relationship −0.478∗∗∗ −0.221∗∗ −1.016∗∗∗ −0.702∗∗
(< 0.001) (0.020) (< 0.001) (0.029)
Business relationship 0.080 −0.029 0.217 −0.257(0.368) (0.732) (0.370) (0.396)
No social relationship −0.505∗∗ −0.142 −1.135∗ −0.750(0.019) (0.458) (0.051) (0.315)
log(1+geographic distance) −0.014 −0.017 −0.030 −0.055(0.302) (0.202) (0.389) (0.248)
Same surname ancestry −0.202∗∗ −0.104 −0.636∗∗∗ −0.428(0.019) (0.163) (0.006) (0.107)
Tipper job: Buy side: analyst 1.214∗∗∗ 3.993∗∗∗
(< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Tipper job: Buy side: manager 1.261∗∗∗ 4.150∗∗∗
(< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Tipper job: Low-level employee 0.398∗∗∗ 1.672∗∗
(0.004) (0.015)
Tipper job: Corporate manager 0.193∗ 1.561∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.005)
![Page 78: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/78.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 23
OLS Ordered logit
Dependent Variable: Position in Tip Chain
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tipper job: Sell side 0.306∗∗∗ 1.457∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007)
Tipper job: Small business owner 1.089∗∗∗ 4.290∗∗∗
(< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Tipper job: Specialized 0.624∗∗∗ 3.087∗∗∗
(< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Tipper job: Unknown occupation 0.416∗∗∗ 2.271∗∗∗
(< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Tippee job: Buy side: analyst 0.145 0.563(0.298) (0.403)
Tippee job: Buy side: manager 0.100 0.690(0.484) (0.329)
Tippee job: Low-level employee −0.062 0.376(0.650) (0.588)
Tippee job: Corporate manager −0.194 −0.343(0.171) (0.658)
Tippee job: Sell side 0.258 0.837(0.143) (0.273)
Tippee job: Small business owner 0.215∗ 1.373∗∗
(0.094) (0.042)
Tippee job: Specialized −0.303∗∗∗ −0.891(0.004) (0.201)
Tippee job: Unknown occupation −0.072 0.050(0.692) (0.952)
Adjusted R2 0.168 0.398Pseudo R2 0.089 0.253Observations 515 515 515 515
![Page 79: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/79.jpg)
24 INFORMATION NETWORKS
Internet Appendix Table 8Insider Personal Characteristics and Stock ReturnsThis table presents regresssions on daily stock returns for the event firms in the sample.Observations are from 120 trading days before the public announcement of the event toone day before the announcement in which an insider trades. Columns 3 and 4 includeevent fixed effects, which controls for all characteristics of the event and of the firm thatare time invariant over the 120 trading days before the announcement. All regressions alsoinclude ln(1+daily volume) and daily returns for the market, SMB, and HML factors.Columns 2 and 4 include event time fixed effects which are dummy variables for days in the(−120,−1) period. Inside trader age is the average age of all insiders trading on a particularday. Inside trader female is the fraction of inside traders that are female on a particularday. ln(1+inside trader wealth) is the log of one plus the median house value of insiderstrading on a particular day. Network instrength is the number of tips received by a traderin the entire sample. Network outstrength is the number of tips given by a trader in theentire sample. Network size is the number of insiders in a trader’s network of insiders. Buyside insider is the fraction of insiders that are buy side managers or analysts trading on aparticular day. p-values from standard errors clustered at the event level are presented inparentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗.
Dependent variable: Daily stock return (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inside trader age −0.004 −0.003 −0.017 −0.009(0.604) (0.701) (0.408) (0.677)
Inside trader female −0.289 −0.227 −1.281 −1.121(0.447) (0.570) (0.287) (0.418)
ln(1+Inside trader wealth) −0.042 −0.055 0.409 0.308(0.579) (0.481) (0.139) (0.308)
ln(1+Network instrength) 0.097 0.104 0.011 0.012(0.266) (0.255) (0.971) (0.970)
ln(1+Network outstrength) 0.059 0.042 −0.150 −0.163(0.491) (0.629) (0.514) (0.528)
ln(1+Network size) 0.029 0.022 0.369 0.510(0.725) (0.792) (0.621) (0.521)
Buy side insider −0.027 0.016 0.678 0.743(0.851) (0.916) (0.252) (0.264)
Control variables:Volume, MKTRET , SMB, and HML Yes Yes Yes YesEvent fixed effects No No Yes YesEvent time fixed effects No Yes No YesInsider trading days only Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291Adjusted R2 0.134 0.153 0.134 0.161
![Page 80: Abstract - University of Southern California · 9/26/2015 · First, inside traders live close to each other. The median distance between a tipper and his tippee is 26 miles. This](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022070822/5f29505dc9776b37a6426e98/html5/thumbnails/80.jpg)
INFORMATION NETWORKS 25
Internet Appendix Table 9Insider Pair Characteristics and Stock ReturnsThis table presents fixed effects regresssions on daily stock returns for the event firms in thesample. Observations are from 120 trading days before the public announcement of the eventto one day before the announcement in which an insider trades. All regressions include eventfixed effects, which controls for all characteristics of the event and of the firm that are timeinvariant over the 120 trading days before the announcement. All regressions also includeln(1+daily volume) and daily returns for the market, SMB, and HML factors. Event timefixed effects are dummy variables for days in the (−120,−1) period. Tip from businessassociate (family member, friend) are dummy variables that indicate from whom a traderrecieved a tip. ln(1+geographic distance) is the log of one plus the average geogrpaphicdistance between traders on a given day. Column 5 includes Distance missing dummy, adummy variable equal to one if geogrpahic distance is missing and geographic distance is setto the average distance in the sample. p-values from standard errors clustered at the eventlevel are presented in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicatedby ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗.
Dependent variable: Daily stock return (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tip from business associate −0.043 −0.125 −0.261 −0.046(0.845) (0.536) (0.217) (0.840)
Tip from family member 0.980∗∗ 0.897∗ 1.040 1.053∗∗
(0.025) (0.052) (0.113) (0.025)
Tip from friend −0.240 −0.214 0.444 0.040(0.520) (0.569) (0.411) (0.925)
ln(1+geographic distance) 0.149 0.161 0.134(0.214) (0.203) (0.243)
Distance missing dummy 0.772(0.121)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes YesEvent fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes YesEvent time fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes YesInsider trading days only Yes Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 1,731 1,731 1,264 1,264 1,731Adjusted R2 0.166 0.214 0.210 0.211 0.215