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SadieXinxinYangHarrietKuyangLogo

UNDP SOUTH SUDAN                                   ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND RULE OF LAW PROJECT 

Mid‐termEvaluationReport 

   

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Contents Abbreviation ................................................................................................................................................. 3 

Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................................... 5 

I.  Project Background ............................................................................................................................ 10 

1.  Project History ................................................................................................................................ 10 

2.  Project Description ......................................................................................................................... 13 

II.  Evaluation Objectives and Methodology .......................................................................................... 14 

1.  Evaluation Purpose and Scope ....................................................................................................... 14 

2.  Evaluation Methodology ................................................................................................................ 14 

III.  Main Findings ................................................................................................................................. 18 

1.  Relevance ........................................................................................................................................ 18 

2.  Effectiveness ................................................................................................................................... 20 

3.  Efficiency ......................................................................................................................................... 27 

4.  Project Management ...................................................................................................................... 32 

5.  Results ............................................................................................................................................. 34 

6.  Sustainability .................................................................................................................................. 36 

IV.  Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................... 38 

V.  Lessons Learned ................................................................................................................................. 39 

VI.  Recommendations ......................................................................................................................... 42 

1.  Overall strategic recommendations .............................................................................................. 42 

2.  Recommendations for each evaluation criterion.......................................................................... 43 

 

 

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Abbreviation  A2J AccesstoJustice

AWP AnnualWorkPlan

BCPR BureauforCrisisPreventionandRecovery

BPPS BureauforPolicyandProgrammeSupport

CBO Community‐basedOrganization

CES CentralEquatoria

CMS CaseManagementSystem

CPAP CountryProgrammeActionPlan

CSA ConflictSensitivityAnalysis

CSO CivilSocietyOrganisation

CTA ChiefTechnicalAdvisors

DAC DevelopmentAssistanceCommittee

DFA DailyFieldAllowance

DFID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment

DGSU DemocraticGovernanceandStabilisationUnit

DSA DailySupportAllowance

DSS DepartmentofSafetyandSecurity

ECC EmergencyCallCenter

EES EasternEquatoriaState

FGD FocusedGroupDiscussion

FTP FastTrackPolicy

GFP GlobalFocalPoint

GRSS GovernmentoftheRepublicofSouthSudan

HQ HeadQuarters

ICPR IntegratedCrisisPreventionandRecoveryProject

ID IdentityCard

IDLO InternationalDevelopmentOrganisation

IDP InternallyDisplacedPersons

IGAD Inter‐GovernmentalAuthorityofDevelopment

IRC InternationalRescueCommittee

IUNV InternationalUnitedNationsVolunteer

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JCC JusticeandConfidenceCenter

JoSS JudiciaryofSouthSudan

LEA LawEnforcementAdvisor

MoI MinistryofInterior

MoJ MinistryofJustice

NBGS NorthernBahrelGhazalState

NPSSS NationalPrisonsServiceofSouthSudan

OECD OrganizationforEconomicCo‐operationandDevelopment

PB ProjectBoard

PC ProgrammeCriticality

PCRC PoliceCommunityRelationsCommittee

PPSU ProgrammeandPartnershipSupportUnit

RoL RuleofLaw

RoLO RuleofLawOfficer

RRF ResourceResultFrameworks

SGBV SexualandGender‐basedViolence

SPU SpecialProtectionCenter

SSDP SouthSudanDevelopmentPlan

SSNPS SouthSudanNationalPoliceService

ToC TheoryofChange

ToR TermsofReference

ToT TrainingofTrainers

UKAID UnitedKingdomAid

UN UnitedNations

UNDAF UnitedNationsDevelopmentAssistanceFramework

UNMISS UnitedNationsMissioninSouthSudan

UNPOL UnitedNationPolice

WBGS WesternBahrelGhazalState

WES WesternEquatoriaState

   

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Executive Summary  

Projectbackground

TheAccess to JusticeandRuleofLaw(A2J/RoL)ProjectsupportstheRoL institutions inSouthSudanthroughasector‐wideholisticapproachdesignedtoincreasetheavailability,affordability, adaptability and acceptability of justice services in the country. Thecounterpartsof theA2J/RoLProject include: JudiciaryofSouthSudan (JoSS),MinistryofJustice(MoJ),SouthSudanNationalPoliceService(SSNPS)andNationalPrisonsServiceofSouth Sudan (NPSSS)within theMinistryof Interior (MoI), the customary justice actors,and civil society organizations (CSOs). The project provides policy support and capacitydevelopmentaimedatincreasingservicedeliverytogovernmentcounterparts,traditionalleadersandCSOsthroughco‐locatedChiefTechnicalAdvisors(CTAs)atthenationallevel,andRuleofLawOfficers(RoLOs)andLawEnforcementAdvisors(LEAs)atthestatelevel.

TheDecember 2013 crisis interrupted project implementation asmostUNDP staffwereevacuated and government rule of law functions were discontinued. UNDP resumedimplementation in the second quarter of 2014 when the security situation improvedslightly,buthadtoreduceitspresencefromninetofivestatesofCentralEquatoria,EasternEquatoria,WesternEquatoria,WesternBahrElGhazelandNorthernBahrElGhazelstate.

EvaluationPurposesandMethodology

A mid‐term evaluation was commissioned by the UNDP South Sudan Country Office toassesstheperformanceof theA2J/RoLProjectover thepastoneandhalfyears, i.e. fromOctober 2013 – June 2015, in order to (1) ascertain the progress towards achieving theagreed project outputs and targets; (2) determine appropriate measures for refocusingproject strategieswhere necessary; (3) highlight areas of strength and opportunities forachievingthedesiredprojectresults;and(4)capturelessonslearned.

The evaluation team used a mixedmethodology, including quantitative, qualitative, andparticipatory approaches, to collect primary and secondary data. The evaluationmethodologyisexplicitlyframedaroundOECD/DACevaluationcriteria,namelyrelevance,effectiveness,efficiency,impact/results,andsustainability.Inaddition,theevaluationalsoassessed UNDP project management and coordination functions. Specific data collectionmethods included documentation review, key informant interviews, focus groupsdiscussions(FGDs)andobservation.Thisevaluationfacedtwomajorlimitations:thelackofanexplicitlystatedTheoryofChange(ToC)andtheunavailabilityofdata.TheCountryProgramme Action Plans and Annual Work Plans (AWPs) were the major guidingdocumentsfortheevaluationteamtomeasureprojectprogress.

MainFindings

Relevance. Project activities are closely aligned with the mandate of the relevant RoLinstitutionsinSouthSudanandareguidedandinformedbyaseriesofthoroughanalysesatboththestrategicandoperationallevels.Inthedesignstage,asubstantialeffortwasmadetoconsultwithcounterpartsatalllevels.However,statelevelparticipationwaslimitedduetothehierarchicalnatureoftheRoLinstitutionsandinadequatetimegiventoRoLOsandLEAstosolicittheneedsoftheircounterpartsandreflectsuchneedsintheAWPs.

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Theuniquenessoftheprojectliesinitssector‐wideapproachtoaddressthefullcycleofcriminaljustice,allowingfortheinstitutionalisationofactivitiessuchascasemanagementandcrimestatistics intotheexisting frameworkof theRoLinstitutions.Theobjectivesofthe project are still extremely relevant after themost recent conflict inDecember 2013.While the deepening of transitional justice mechanisms became a priority, continuedsupportforA2J/RoLiscrucialtosustainpost‐conflictreconciliationandreconstruction.Torespond to thisneed,UNDPreadjusted its strategic focus to strengthen theprotectionofvulnerablegroups,particularlywomenandchildren,byprovidingsupporttoestablishtheSpecialProtectionUnits(SPU)andtheEmergencyCallCenter(ECC).Thus, indirectly, theA2J/RoLProjectstillcontributestotheextensionofstateauthorityinitsfiveprojectstates.

Effectiveness.Overall, theproject isontrack in termsofdeliveringtheplannedoutputs.Thespecificachievementsundereachplannedoutputweredocumentedinprojectreportsandwereconfirmedbythekeycounterparts.

The project provides extensive outreach through the co‐location of project staff thatmentor and coach staff of the respective RoL institutions at both the national and statelevels. At the national level, the CTAs have played an important role in providing policyadvice, trainingand strategic thinking for thehost institutionsoncriticalA2J issues.TheprojecthasprovidedtechnicalandlogisticalsupporttotheRoLinstitutionsfordevelopingnewfunctions,suchasmanualandcomputerisedCaseManagementSystems(CMS)andthecompilationofstatisticswithinthecriminaljusticesystem.ThreeCMS,i.e.thosewithinMoJ,NPSSSandSSNPS,areinplaceandoperationalinsevenstates.

Theprojecthas implementedtrainingandoutreachactivities tobalance thedemandandsupply sides of A2J. Almost all the project training reports demonstrated an increase inparticipants’knowledgeandconfidenceintherelevantsubjectsasaresultofthetraining.

Itshouldbenotedthattheeffectivenessoftheseinterventionsislimitedbyvariousfactors,such as individual initiatives of RoLOs and LEAs in the states, the commitment andresources fromproject counterparts, aswellas the individualistic traitsof some trainingparticipants,includingtheireducationlevel,Englishproficiencyandage.

In spite of all the progress it has made, the project has met substantial challenges indeliveringtheoutputsaccordingtothetimeframespecifiedintheAWPs.In2014,sixoutofthe17Projecttargetswereaccomplishedand11werepartiallyaccomplished.Clearly,withan unforeseen crisis erupting at the end of 2013, the targets originally set have becomeoverlyambitiousinthenewandmoreadverseenvironment.

Efficiency.Theprojectmobilisedadequatefinancialresources.However,ineachyear,onlya certain percentage of the budget was used. At the same time, the project was under‐resourced with respect to personnel. From time to time, the CTAs were pulled intomanagementissues,whichreducedthetimetheycouldhavespentonprovidingtechnicaladvice.Atthestatelevel,efficiencywaspartiallyaffectedduetolackofclearunderstandingoftheRoLOs’andLEAs’mandatebythecounterpartswhohavesignificantlyengagedthemin administrative and logistical tasks, hence under‐utilising them as technical assistanceresources.Theavailabilityof toolsandequipmenthasalsoposedefficiencychallenges tothe project, especially in the field, including vehicles and service repairs, internetconnections,aswellasaccommodationandofficearrangementsforRoLOsandLEAs.

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Several good practices in cost‐efficiency were identified in project implementation,includingpartnershipwithCSOs,deploymentof InternationalUnitedNationsVolunteers,introduction of cost‐saving and environmentally friendly technology (e.g solar power togenerate electricity forECC) and sourcingexperts from the IntergovernmentalAuthorityonDevelopment(IGAD)regiontosupportnewRoLfunctions.

ProjectManagement. TheA2J/RoLproject ismanagedby a ProjectManager under theoverall leadership of the Democratic Governance and Stabilisation Unit (DGSU) TeamLeader.TheProjectBoardprovidespolicyguidanceduringimplementation.However,theboardwasnotfunctionalduring2014asaresultofthecrisisandonlybecomefunctionalin2015andhelditsfirstmeetinginMay2015.

Duringevaluationperiod,theprojectwasabletomaintaincoordinationwithkeyagenciesin the RoL sector. The change of UNMISS mandate after the crisis directly affected thepartnership between UNDP and UN Police in the implementation ofactivities involvingsupport forpolice and prison services. This change also affected the support that UNDPSouth Sudan can receive from the headquarters, especially support from the Bureau forCrisisPreventionandRecoverythroughtheinitiativeoftheGlobalFocalPoint.

Goodmonitoringandevaluation(M&E)toolssuchasthestandardreportingtemplatehavebeendeveloped to facilitate thesharingof lessons learnedatboth thenational andstatelevels. The usefulness of such tools can be further improved by timely updating thedocumentationof challengesand theways inwhich theyare tackled.The lackof regularcommunicationbetweenJubaandthefieldisanotherobstaclethatconstrainsthesharingoflessonslearned.Althoughsupervisorymissionstothefieldweremade,thesetripsneedtobemorestructuredandconductedmorefrequently.Onthepositiveside,theevaluationteam found that communications and lessons‐sharing among theRoLOs andLEAs in thestates (not through Juba) has been pretty active. It is envisaged that the arrival of theProjectManagerwillimprovetheM&Eoftheproject,especiallyatthestatelevel.

Results.There is initialevidenceshowingthat theA2J/RoLProject iscontributing totheachievement of long‐term results for the RoL sector in South Sudan. Project partnersinterviewed during evaluation have acknowledged the benefits that they have receivedfrom the UNDP project. They concluded that without UNDP, theywould not havemadeprogressinmostoftheprojectinitiativesontheirown.However,alongwiththeiroverallrecognition of UNDP’swork, the partners raised concerns about the turnover of projectstaffandtherigidUNDPprocurementrequirements.

The lackof a follow‐updesign tomeasure the changes in the trainingparticipants’workperformance or to identify what institutional changes have occurred as a result of thetraining,ledtheevaluatorstorelyonanecdotalevidencefrominterviewsandFGDswhichpointedtothechiefs’ increasedunderstandingoftheroles/dutiesofthejudgestoreviewtheir decisions and clarify jurisdictional issues such as adhering to hearing civil cases. AnewpractiseofwritingjudgementsintheEnglishlanguagevalidatedthetransferabilityofacquired knowledge and skills to thework environment in the Judiciary. The evaluationteamobserved thePoliceCommunityRelationCommittee as a goodexampleofhow theproject support has linked and built trust between the community members, and theformalandtraditionalRoLinstitutions.

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The achievements under the project were made in an extremely difficult workingenvironment.Thespecificchallengesincludehardshipenvironment,delayscausedbythecounterparts,andthelowcapacityoflocalCSOs.ThemajorchallengesemanatingfromtheUNDPsystemarethechangesofmandateofUNMission,lengthyhiringprocesses,andrigidprocurementrules.Inspiteofthesechallenges,theevaluationteamfoundthattheprojectoutputsarelikelytoleadtotheplannedoutcome,namely“accesstojusticeandruleoflawimproves.”Under the sector‐wide approach,manyproject activities, such asRoL forumsand the ascertainment of customary law, contribute to more than one output, creatingstrongsynergiesandamorelevelplayingfieldbetweenthedifferentactors,especiallyforvulnerablegroupsatthecommunitylevel.

Sustainability.Capacitybuildingandsustainabilityhavebeenbuiltintotheprojectdesignandimplementation.Acrossvariousprojectinterventionareas,signsofownershipcanbeidentified.Forexamples,RoL institutionshave incentives tocontinueprojectactivities incertainareas, suchascasemanagementsystem(by JoSSandMoJ), criminalstatistics (bySSNPS)andinmates’statistics(byNPSSS),astheyhavebecomeintegralfunctionsoftheseinstitutions,aswellastheoperationofSPUsandECC.

The long‐term sustainability of the project depends on several factors: security andpoliticalstability inSouthSudan;projectcounterparts’commitment,especiallytomakingfinancial contributions; and UNDP’s exit strategy, which requires a gradual phase‐outapproach. Self‐sustenance will not be immediate for the counterparts given the limitedfinancial,technicalandinstitutionalcapacities.MostcounterpartsdonotanticipatethattheprojectactivitieswillbecontinuedifUNDPcompletelyclosestheprojectintwoyearsorso.

Lessons learned. (1) Proactive vs. Reactive. An over‐emphasis on flexibility andresponsivenesstoemergingneedscanleadtoareactiveratherthanaproactiveapproach,withtheresultthattheprojectcontinuestoadoptnewinterventionareaswhilelosingtheoriginalproject’sfocus,causingdelaysorfailuresofdelivery.(2)Directimplementationvs.Sector Leadership. The need for RoL and A2J is tremendous in South Sudan; no singleagencycanaddressallofthem.ToUNDP,leadershipdoesnotmeanhowmuchUNDPhasimplementedbyitself,butmeanshoweffectivelyitcanuseitsexistingresourcestoengagedifferent counterparts from both the government and development partners in order toapproachRoL development in a strategic and coordinatedmanner. (3) Sustainability vs.Dependency. Sustainability requires putting the counterpart in the driver’s seat. Theownershipofprojectcounterpartsstillneedstobestrengthened,especiallyinlightofthestrongsignsoftheRoLinstitutions’dependencyonUNDPforbothtechnicalandfinancialassistance.Managingexpectationsisanimportantpartofincreasingownership.(4)Capitalvs. Local. Given that local communities have the greatest needs and some donors aremovinginterventionsoutofJuba,UNDPneedstoconsiderwhetherastrengthenedbottom‐upapproachisanoptioninthecontextofSouthSudaninordertoaddressA2J.

Recommendations

Overallstrategicrecommendations

‐ Conductingaself‐assessmentofUNDPcapacitiesandidentifywhereitscomparativeadvantagesare.Basedontheself‐assessment,communicatingwithbothdonorsandthecounterpartsabouttheareaofinterventioninwhichUNDPwantstoengage

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‐ Engagingdevelopmentpartnersinastrategicrepositioningexercisetoidentifyeachother’scomparativeadvantagesandcreatinganeffectivecoordinationvehicle

‐ Encouraging indigenous solutions from the counterparts and strengthening localownershipofprojectactivities

Recommendationsforeachevaluationcriterion

Relevance

‐ leavingproper roomand time to allow theRoLOs andLEAs to consultwith theircounterpartsandprovideinputtothedraftAWPsinordertoreflectlocalneeds

Effectiveness

‐ staff in Jubamaking regular visits to the states to strengthen communication andenhanceprojecteffectiveness

‐ collaboratingwithgovernmentcounterpartsanddevelopmentpartnerstodevelopacentralizedandcoordinatedtrainingplanforindividualRoLinstitutions

‐ usingsocialmediaandtraditionalmediatogenerateawarenessoftheavailabilityofnewA2Jservicestothelocalcommunity

Efficiency

‐ clearlydefiningandcommunicatingtheroleofnewProjectManagertoprojectteam‐ providingmoretrainingsessionsinthestatestoenablebroadparticipation‐ meetingwithcounterpartstodiscusstheirplantouseUNDP‐suppliedequipmentto

thestates

Management

‐ developingaToCtoprovideaclearresultschaintoallthecounterparts‐ consideringrecruitinganM&Eorreportingspecialisttoimproveprojectmonitoring

andreporting

Sustainability

‐ consideringa two‐to‐three‐yearsurge insometargetedareasbeforescalingdowntheproject

‐ encouragingmoregovernmentcontributionstowardsplannedactivities‐ discussing with the counterparts about an exit strategy along the planning and

implementationoftheproject 

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I. Project Background 

1. Project History  

TheAccess to Justice andRuleof Law (A2J/RoL)Project contributes to the SouthSudanDevelopmentPlan’s(SSDP)ConflictPreventionandSecurityPillar.TheobjectiveofSSDP’sRuleofLawSectoris“tostrengthentheRuleofLaw(RoL)inSouthSudanbyenforcingandmaintaininglawandorder,providingequitableaccesstojusticeandafunctioningcriminaljustice system, increasingsecurity incommunities, andpromotingandprotectinghumanrightsforall.”TheprojectalsocontributestotheUnitedNationsDevelopmentAssistanceFramework(UNDAF)OutcomeFive,“Accesstojusticeandtheruleoflawimproves.”

Sector‐wideapproach

ThehistoryoftheA2J/RoLProjectcanbetracedbacktoasimilarUNDPinitiativelaunchedin 2005 for the whole Sudan to strengthen the RoL sector through partnerships withvarious counterparts in thecountry.At its inception, the initiativewas implemented inafragmentedmanner,withimportantcomponentssuchasthepoliceandprisonhavingtheirown project documents and being funded separately from the rest of the A2J/RoLcomponents. In 2012, various components of this overall initiative were realigned andconsolidatedintooneA2J/RoLProjectinthenewlyindependentSouthSudan.

ThisrealignmentreflectedafundamentalshiftinUNDP’sapproachtowardssupportingtheRoL sector in South Sudan, i.e. from delivering discrete interventions to individual RoLinstitutionsandcommunitiestoacoherentandholisticsector‐wideproject.Thisentailedinterventionsaimedat increasingA2J from “entry to exit”within the justice system,andfocusedonstructuralandsystemic impediments toaccess,suchasaddressingcourtcasebacklogs, increasing the capacity of the police to investigate cases, and improving theprocesses through which cases are prosecuted. This strategy was based on theunderstanding that all institutions of the criminal justice chain, including the police,prosecutors,thejudiciaryandtheprisons,mustworkeffectively.Ifthereisabottleneckinoneinstitution,thentherestofthejusticesystemwillsuffer.

ThisapproachwaswellarticulatedinUNDP’sproposaltotheNetherlandsin2013.Astheproposalputit,“TheproposedA2J/RoLprogrammeisconsolidatingcurrentUNDPprojectssupporting discrete RoL institutions and community level interventions into a holisticprogramme designed to increase the availability, affordability, adaptability andacceptabilityofjusticeservicesinSouthSudan(seeDiagram11).UNDPaimstoconsolidateitsprogrammebyfocusingonfivestrategicobjectivesthataddressconstraintstoaccesstojustice across the criminal justice chain and implement activities that enable coherenceacrossinstitutionalfocus.”Underthisapproach,theA2J/RoLProjectincludedcomponentson harmonization between the customary and formal legal systems, and building a casemanagementsystem(CMS)totracktheprogressionofcriminalcasesfromarrestthroughtoprosecution,adjudication,andimprisonment.

                                                            1UNDPSouthSudan,SupporttoAccesstoJusticeandRuleofLawProgrammeProjectDocument,p7.

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Diagram1.Sector‐wideholisticRoLprogrammingapproach2

PostDecember2013crisisProgramming

TheDecember2013crisisinSouthSudanledtoadiscontinuationofprojectactivitiesasmostgovernmentandUNDPstaffwereevacuatedduetosecurityconcerns.UNDPprojectstaff returned to their duty stations in late February and March 2014. However, theproject was forced to reduce its presence from the original nine states to five states,namely Central Equatoria (CES), Western Equatoria (WES), Eastern Equatoria (EES),Western Bahr el Ghazal (WBGS), andNorthern Bahr el Ghazal (NBGS). Themap belowshowsthecurrentfiveprojectstates:

Diagram2.Projectcoveragemap

                                                            2 Id. 

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The crisis brought about new patterns of vulnerability in the country. The UN CountryTeamtogetherwiththeUNMissionconductedaProgrammeCriticality(PC)exercisewhichresulted in the identification of six strategic objectives for UN programming, includingpromotinggoodgovernance,democraticparticipationandtheRoL.”Atthedonors’request,UNDP conducted a specific Conflict Sensitivity Analysis (CSA) for the A2J/RoL Project,whichconsideredtheactors,causesanddriversoftheconflict;linkedthisunderstandingofthe context to the objectives and process of carrying out project activities; and offeredpossible adjustments within the project that would avoid potential negative effects andmaximizepositiveoutcomes.3Asaresult,somenewactivities,suchasbuildinginstitutionalcommitment for credible transitional justice processes and providing support for theSSNPS through strengthening Special Protection Units (SPUs), community policing andestablishingofEmergencyCallCentre(ECC)wereincorporatedintotheAWPstoaddressthenewneedsinthecountry.

Similarly, UNDP,with the support from the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery(BCPR),developedatwo‐yearIntegratedCrisisPreventionandRecovery(ICPR)Project‐Programme. The ICPR Project‐Programme focused on enhancing national capacities foreconomicrecovery,reconciliation,conflictpreventionandtheprotectionofcivilians.Theprojectwasbuiltonthreeinterrelatedpillars:(1)peacebuildingandconflictpreventiontofacilitatereconciliation;(2)governanceandRoLtoenhanceprotectionofcivilians;and(3)economicrevitalizationfor livelihoodsandemployment.Aspartofthesecondpillar,                                                            3SupporttoAccesstoJusticeandRuleofLawProject,FirstQuarterlyReport,January–March2014.

Access to Justice and Rule of Law Project Coverage: South Sudan

Legend 

       Project sites

 

 

   

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the ICPR supporteddialogueon transitional justice, trainingofprosecutors, support forECC,SPUsandJusticeandConfidenceCenters(JCCs).

2. Project Description  

Projectstrategicobjectivesandoutputs

TheA2J/RoLProjectpromoteRoLinSouthSudanthroughasector‐wideholisticapproachdesignedtoincreasetheavailability,affordability,adaptabilityandacceptabilityofjusticeservicesinthecountry.ThecounterpartsoftheA2J/RoLProjectinclude:JudiciaryofSouthSudan (JoSS),Ministry of Justice (MoJ),Ministry of Interior (MoI) ‐‐ SSNPS andNationalPrisons Service of South Sudan (NPSSS), the customary justice actors, as well as civilsocietyorganizations(CSOs).

The Project has the following four outputs: (1) IncreasedA2J to citizens of South Sudanwith special focus on vulnerable groups and women; (2) Reduced case backlog andprolongedandarbitrarydetentionat thestate level; (3)Ascertainmentofcustomary lawthroughcontinuousresearch;(4)Capacityofpolice,prisons,MoJandJoSSstrengthened.

ImplementationMethodology

Inspiteof thedifficultoperatingenvironment, theprojectcontinues toprovide technicaland advisory support to its partners in the country, mainly through co‐located ChiefTechnical Advisors (CTAs) at the national level, Rule of Law Officers (RoLOs) and LawEnforcementAdvisors(LEAs)atthestatelevel.Toachievetheprojectoutputs,theA2J/RoLProject utilizes three implementation tools: to provide policy support to governmentpartners, to build the capacity of the key project counterparts, and to facilitate servicedeliverybyitspartnersinordertofulfilltheseinstitutions’mandatesandmeetthedemandforA2Joftheendbeneficiariesoftheproject.

PolicySupport.At thenational level, twoCTAs convenemulti‐institutionaldialoguesonsector‐wide issues, such as prolonged pre‐trial detention and case backlog, which are aresult of constraints in multiple institutions, and support the respective institutions todevelopCMS.

Capacity development. To foster ownership and sustainability, the project focuses oncapacity development of the key counterparts of the justice sector. The CTAs providetrainingactivitieson specific subjects and crosscutting issues, suchas casemanagement,andsharegoodpracticesandlessonslearnedfromSouthSudanandotherjurisdictions.

ServiceDelivery.UndertheguidanceoftheCTAs,theRoLOsandLEAsprovideday‐to‐daycoachingandmentoring to the line institutions, supporting themtoprovideefficientandeffectiveservices.Twinnedwiththeministriesresponsiblefortheadministrationofjusticeat the state level and the state Police Commissioner, the staff provide advice concerninginstitutional operation, including supporting infrastructure development; assist inconveningRoLForumstopromoteinter‐institutionaldialogueandcommunityengagement;assistinthecollectionofcrimestatistics;andorganizehumanrightsawarenesstrainingforcommunitiesandtraditionalauthorities.

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II. Evaluation Objectives and Methodology 

1. Evaluation Purpose and Scope 

Evaluationpurpose

As the Terms of Reference (ToR, see Appendix I) indicate, the purpose of thismid‐termevaluationistoassessanddeterminetheperformanceoftheA2J/RoLProjectoverthepastoneandhalfyearsof implementation,i.e.fromOctober2013–June2015,withregardtothekeyprojectobjectives,inorderto

(1) ascertaintheprogresstowardsachievingtheagreedprojectoutputsandtargets;(2) determineappropriatemeasuresforrefocusingprojectstrategieswherenecessary;(3) highlight areas of strength and opportunities for achieving the desired project

results;and(4) captureeffectivelylessonslearned.4

The users of the evaluation results include UNDPmanagement, programme and projectstaff,developmentanddonorpartnerandSouthSudanesecounterparts.

Scopeandobjectivesoftheevaluation

The mid‐term evaluation is forward‐looking. Its scope reflects the diverse range ofactivities asdefined in theResults andResourceFramework (RRF) and theAWPsof theproject.Specifically,thismid‐termevaluationseeksto:

Determine whether the project outputs are on track, in line with the projectstrategyandbeabletocontributetothestatedobjectives;

Collect preliminary information which will be used as a baseline with whichactivitiesinyearstwoandthreewillbecompared;

Determine the immediateeffectofUNDP’s specialized trainingandco‐locationonjusticesectorprofessionals;

Determinewhetherthereareanypreliminaryprojectresults;and Make recommendations to guide the implementation of the remainder of the

project.5 

2. Evaluation Methodology 

2.1OverallApproach

AMixedMethodology

Giventhespecificobjectivesandprojectedusesoftheevaluation,aswellasitsbroadscope,amixedmethodology,includingquantitative,qualitativeandparticipatoryapproaches,wasusedbytheevaluationteamtocollectprimaryandsecondarydata.Thequalitativemethodallowed for an in‐depth understanding of the key issues from different stakeholders’perspectives and provided explanations for the information reflected in the quantitativedata collection. Quantitative methods further identified overall trends by examining a

                                                            4TermsofReferencefortheUNDPAccesstoJusticeandRuleofLawProjectMid‐termEvaluation,p2.5TermsofReferencefortheUNDPAccesstoJusticeandRuleofLawProjectMid‐termEvaluation,p3.

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broader spectrum of information and data. Broad participation by the key stakeholderswith strict observance of confidentiality ensured the truthfulness and accuracy of theinformationcollected.Thismixedapproachallowseffectivetriangulationofdatacollectedfromdifferentresources, includingbothprimaryandsecondarydata, thusenhancing thequalityandcredibilityof the findingsof theevaluation.Given the limitedbudget for thisevaluationandthehighbusinesscostofconductingevaluations inSouthSudan,themostcost‐effectiveapproachwasalsoappliedindatacollection.

OECD/DACCriteria

TheToRincludesalistofkeyquestionstoguidethemid‐termevaluation.Thesequestionsreflect the evaluation criteria of the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation andDevelopment/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC), namely: relevance,effectiveness,efficiency,impact/results,andsustainability.Inaddition,theevaluationteamwas asked to assess the UNDP project management and coordination. Accordingly, theevaluationmethodologyisexplicitlyframedaroundOECD/DACevaluationcriteria,aswellasincorporatingUNEP’sgeneralguidingprinciplesongenderandhumanrights.Interviewsandfocusgroupdiscussions(FGDs)weredrivenbythesecriteria,asdescribedbelow,andthisevaluationreport’sfindingsarestructuredaroundthesamecriteria.

Fieldvisitstothestates

The evaluation teamheld discussionswithUNDP in order to define a clear and realisticscope for the field visit to the states. Based on the requirements in the TOR and thesuggestionsbyUNDP,WauinWBGSandToritinEESwereselectedforthefieldtrip.

2.2DataCollectionMethods

Deskstudy

Throughout theevaluationprocess, fromthe inceptionphase to the final reportdrafting,the evaluation team consulted a largenumberof documentsmade availablebyUNDP.Acomplete list of documents aswell as other relevant studies – for potential comparativeanalysis–canbefoundinAppendixII(Bibliography).

KeyInformantInterviews

Duringthedatacollectionphase,theevaluationteamconductedkeyinformantinterviewsinbothJubaandthetwostates.AlistofthekeyinformantsisprovidedinAppendixIII(ListofKeyInformants).

FocusGroupDiscussions

Inaddition,theevaluationteamconductedFGDsinbothJubaandthestates(pleaserefertoTable 1 below). During the FGDs, a semi‐structured approach was taken and theparticipants were encouraged to speak with each other instead of answering themoderator’squestions.

Observation

The evaluation team made maximum use of firsthand observation during theirparticipation in some project activities on the ground. For example, the team visited aPoliceIDProcessOfficeinJubaandattendedaPCRCmeetinginTorit.

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The table below shows the different categories and the total number of people theevaluationteamhasconsulted.

Table1.Numberofpeopleconsultedbytheevaluationteam

Evaluation Methods  Institutions/Actors  Male  Female  Total 

National 

Interviews 

UNDP team  5  2  7 

MoJ  3  0  3 

MoI  8  0  8 

Joss  5  0  5 

Donors  3  0  3 

Partner organizations 

4  1  5 

FGDs  CSO  3  0  3 

Sub‐total     31  3  34 

Torit 

Interviews 

UNDP team  0  2  2 

Legal Administration 3  0  3 

Judiciary  2  0  2 

Prisons Police 

2 1 

0 0 

2 1 

FGDs 

PCRC   4  3  7 

Traditional leaders  5  0  5 

CSOs  4  3  7 

SPU  3  2  5 

Sub‐total     24  10  34 

Wau 

Interviews 

UNDP team  1  1  2 

Legal Administration 1  0  1 

Prisons  2  0  2 

Police  1  0  1 

FGDs 

PCRC      7  1  8 

Chiefs  3  2  5 

Two SPU Officers  4  3  7 

Beneficiaries  of  two SPUs  

1  3  4 

Sub‐total     20  10  30 

Total     75  23  98 

2.3LimitationofEvaluation

This evaluation has faced two major limitations: the lack of a clearly well‐articulatedTheoryofChange(ToC)andtheavailabilityofdata.

LackofTheoryofChange

TheA2J/RoLProjectisamulti‐donorfundedprojectwithdifferentdonorscontributingtothedifferentareasof theproject.TheproblemsassociatedwiththeRoLsector inapost‐conflict context are alarmingly sophisticated and intimidating. However, the evaluation

17  

teamcouldnot locateanoverallToC thatclearlyoutlines the interventionstrategiesandresults chainof theproject.Theproject teamexplained thatwhen theproject documentwasproducedin2013,theUNDPsystemdidnotrequireanexplicitToC.Nevertheless,theprojectteamsuggestedthatthestrategicapproachandinterventionlogicoftheproject,aswell as the expected results at various levels, could be captured in different UNDPdocuments, including the Country Programme Documents, Country Programme ActionPlans(CPAP)6andAWPs.Together,theCPAPandAWPsconstitutethe“projectdocument,”which has been the major guiding document for the evaluation team to measure theproject’sprogress.

ItshouldbenotedthatduetotheunstablesituationinSouthSudan,eachyear’sworkplanis slightly different from that of the previous year as a result of the adjustment ofprogramming approach. Nonetheless, the data collected through this evaluation still canserveasavaluablebaselinefortheprograminfutureevaluationsorassessments,shouldaresult‐basedimplementationstrategyorplanfortheA2J/RoLProjectbedevelopedinthenearfuture.

AvailabilityofData

Somemethodsusedintheevaluationarebasedontheassumptionthattherequireddataisavailable. However, the team understands the challenges of obtaining data in the post‐conflictcontext,especiallywhen theaccessibilityof the interventionsat thestate level islimited.Forexample,toascertaintheeffectivenessoftrainingactivitiesandtheirimpactontrainees’performanceatwork, theevaluation teamdesigneda survey (seeAppendix IV)forthetrainingparticipantstoreflectupontheirexperience.Thesurveywasdistributedto70trainingparticipantswhotookpartinthetrainingsessionsbetweenOctober2013andDecember2014inthefiveUNDPprojectstates.However,only3responses(allfrommen)werereceived.Althoughtheinformationcollectedcannotserveasstatisticalevidence,theevaluationteamstillincludeditinthereportasanecdotalevidence.

In addition, the evaluation team was not able to visit all the five project states due tosecurityandtimeconstraints.Toavoidselectionbiasandinformationgaps,theevaluationteam addressed this issue through face‐to‐face meetings with the RoLOs from someunvisitedstateswhohappenedtobeinJuba.

2.4EthicalConsiderations

ConsideringthemeslikeA2Jandtheinclusionofthemostvulnerablepopulations,suchaswomenandchildren,ininterviewsandFGDs,theevaluationteamtookethicaldimensionsintoaccount.Theteamconsultedtheparticipants intheprocesstoobtaintheir informedconsent. In addition, the evaluation teamprotected the anonymity and confidentiality ofindividualinformationandobservedethicalguidelinesassetoutbyUNEvaluationGroupstandardsandnorms7.   

                                                            6TheCPAPisalegalagreementbetweenthehostgovernmentandUNDPtoexecutetheCountryProgramme.CPAPincombinationwithAWPs—whichformanintegralpartof,andareincorporatedbyreferenceintotheCPAP—aretheminimumlegalagreementsbetweenUNDPandImplementingPartnerstoimplementaspecificprojectincludedintheCPAP.7http://www.uneval.org/normsandstandards/index.jsp?doc_cat_source_id=4 

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III. Main Findings 

1. Relevance 

Toensurerelevanceof interventions, theA2J/RoLProject conducteda seriesofbaselineassessments to informtheprioritiesof theproject.Forexample, theprojectsupportedAPerceptionSurveyonAccesstoJusticeandRuleofLawinMayandJune,2013.TheSurveyresults were disseminated and validated at both the state level and the national level.Recommendationsfromtheconsultationsinformedtheprojectindevelopingits2014AWP.

When the 2013 December Crisis occurred, the project swiftly conducted CSAs andresponded by incorporating the emerging needs of transitional justice and protection ofcivilians, as well as adjusting its geographic coverage to five states to ensure actualimplementationontheground.ThePerceptionSurveyonTruth,Justice,ReconciliationandHealing (2014 – 2015) conducted by the Project fed into the whole programme andprovidedamoreevidence‐basedway to approach transitional justiceprogrammingwithgovernment,CSOsandtheotherpartners.

Inaddition toresponding to theevolvingsectorneeds, theco‐locationarrangementshasenabledtheprojectteamto identifyandrespondtotheongoingoperationalneedsinthekeyRoLinstitutions..Thefactthattheprojectteamisembeddedwithintheseinstitutionsatboththenationalandstatelevelsavailstheteamtheaccesstogainfirst‐handknowledgeof their key partners’ needs and respond to them in a timely manner, which ensurescontinuedrelevancethroughoutprojectimplementation.

TheSouthSudanVision2040statesthatSouthSudanisademocraticstateandacountrywheretheRoLisupheld.Likewise, theSSDPispremisedontheneedtopromoterespectforRoLthroughastrengthenedJudiciarythatisabletoholdtheexecutivetoaccountandensure the protection of citizen rights.8The UNDP A2J/RoL Project clearly fits into thenationalprioritiesandneedsofSouthSudan. Inaddition, it alignswith themissionsandvisionsofthejusticesectorinstitutions.9

Theproject teamengagesamulti‐levelpersonnel fromitskeycounterpart institutions indesigningprojectactivitiesandsuccessfullyobtainpoliticalcommitmentfromthetoplevelofRoLinstitutions,asalmosttheentireleadershipoftheRoLinstitutionsconfirmedtotheevaluationteamthattheywereconsultedattheprojectdesignstage.However,itwasnotclearhowmuchengagementwasactuallydoneat the technical staff/technocrat level, assome of the Directors confirmed that they were only given ready‐made activities to

                                                                                                                                                                                                http://www.uneval.org/normsandstandards/index.jsphttp://www.unEvaluation.org/ethicalguidelines8TheSouthSudanDevelopmentPlan2011–2013,p16.9JOSS’vision:AnindependentandtransparentJudiciarystaffedbyjudgesandsupportstaffwithhighprofessionalandethicalstandardswhoseperformanceisenhancedbycontinuingeducationandevaluation.MOJ’svision:ToprovidelegalservicesandpromotejusticeforallpeopleofSouthSudaninpartnershipwithotherruleoflawinstitutions.SSPS’vision:TotransformtheSouthSudanNationalPoliceServiceintoademocraticallyoriented,fullyfunctionalprofessionalpoliceservice,sensitivetohumanrights,genderandage.SSNPS:Toenhancecommunitysafetybyprovidingsecureandhumanecontainmentanddetentionservicesandprovidingfunctionalandsecureprisonsatnational,stateandcountylevelsprovidingcoherentandhumanetreatmentofprisoners.

19  

implement.Theprojectteamclarifiedthatbottomlevelconsultationswereinhibitedbythehierarchal nature of the RoL institutionswhich limits consultationswith the lower levelofficials. . In spite of the challenge, Directors of ECC and police ID card component, andsome prison Directorates were closely involved in the design, prioritization andimplementationofprojectactivities.

Inlightofthefluidsecuritysituation,somecounterpartsatthenationalleveladvisedUNDPto extend a participatory approach to the county level in order to capture and respondappropriately to the changing RoL trajectory. Realizing that the flow of informationbetweentheheadquartersofRoLinstitutionsandthestatesandcountiesisineffective,theproject team has made tangible efforts to strengthen the communication channels.Howevergapsstillexistincapturinglocalneeds.Insomecases,inadequatetimewasgiventotheRoLOsandLEAstoconsultwiththeirstate‐levelcounterpartsandthatexplainswhysomecrucialactivitieswerenotincludedinthefinalAWPs.

.TheuniquenessoftheprojectliesinthefactthatitapproachesRoLissuesinasector‐widemanner and addresses the full cycle of justice. Under this approach, the projectinstitutionalized and embedded some activities such as case management and crimestatisticsintotheRoLinstitutionsframework.

ThisinterventionmodelismadepossiblebyseveralcomparativeadvantagesUNDPhasinthe RoL sector in South Sudan. First, UNDP has a long‐term good relationship with thegovernment counterparts at both the national and state levels. UNDP’s state presenceprovides a comparative advantage and bolsters its capacity for nation‐wide outreach.UNDP’s unprecedented decision to remain in South Sudan following the events ofDecember2013significantlyunderscores itspositionasa trusteddevelopmentalpartnerin the young country. Second, UNDP’s global presence as an expert on RoL issues hasgaineditthetrustandcredibilityfromthedonorsidetomobilizetherequiredresourcestomakethisholisticapproachfinanciallyfeasible.

TheobjectivesoftheA2J/RoLProjectarestillrelevantasSouthSudancontinuestosufferthe negative impact of lack of A2J after themost recent conflict inDecember 2013. The2013 Crisis raises questions regarding the achievement of social cohesion, sustainablepeace, and a break in the cycle of violence in the country. While the deepening oftransitionaljusticemechanismshasbecomeamatterofpriority,continuedsupportforA2JandRoLremainscrucialtosustainpost‐conflictreconciliationandreconstruction.Thereisabroadrecognitionthatmultipleinterventionsandinstitutionalchangesarenecessaryforstability.Infact,thechangesinthecontextrequireasurgeinthedepthofUNDP’sA2J/RoLProjectintermsofsupporttoSouthSudan’sRoLinstitutions.10

Againstthisbackground,UNDPreadjusteditsstrategicfocustostrengthentheprotectionofvulnerablegroups,particularlywomenandchildren.Tothisend,UNDPestablishedandsupported theECC in JubaandstrengthenedexistingSPUs in the five stateswith fundingsupport from the Governments of Japan and the UK and UNDP. Furthermore, theestablishmentofPCRCshasbuilttrustbetweenthepoliceandcommunities,andresultedinasignificantuseofpoliceservicesbythepublic.                                                            10RowlandCole,ExploringTransitionalJusticeOptionsforPost‐conflictSouthSudan,May2015.

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RestorationandextensionofstateauthorityhavebeenacoreprogrammingprincipleoftheentireUN.11Theextensionofstateauthority,definedas theconstructionofa functioningstate,remainsafundamentalchallengefortheGovernmentoftheRepublicofSouthSudan(GRSS).Restoring and extending state authority involves rebuilding its legitimacy andpeople’sconfidenceinstateinstitutions.

Allof the initiativesundertheprojectcontributedtotheextensionofstateauthorities toremoteareasofSouthSudanbefore2013.However,aftertheDecember2013crisis,andinresponsetoarevisedUNmandate,majorprojectsupporttogovernment institutionswasreducedorstayedfor“donotharm”reasonsandtominimisereputational,humanrightsand impartiality risks. Additionally, support to the security institutions, such as SSNPS(whichwasimplicatedinhumanrightsviolations)wasscrutinisedthroughtheapplicationof United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. Furthermore, insecurity forcedUNDP to reduce its physical presence from nine to five states and mainly focused onrespondingtoemergingissuessuchasSGBV,communitysecurity,transitionaljustice,etc.Despite these challenges, UNDP continued to implement the A2J/RoL Project because acasefortheimplementationofsomeactivitiesalignedtothenewUNmissionmandateandalongthenewlyadoptedprojectcomponentscouldstillbe justified. Thus, indirectly, theA2J/RoLProjectstillcontributestotheextensionofstateauthorityinitsfiveprojectstates(CES,WES,EES,WGSandNGS).2. Effectiveness 

Overall, the project is on track to deliver the planned outputs. The specific achievementunder each planned output is documented in project reports and confirmed by the keycounterparts. Below is a summary of the key milestones/outputs achieved during theevaluationperiod:

‐ EightCSOsreceivedsmallgrantstoestablishJCCsinsix12outofthe10statesinSouthSudan. A2J/RoL Project supported community‐based organizations (CBOs) in sevenstates in providing quality legal services, including awareness raising, AlternativeDispute Resolution, legal aid and/or mediation. A total of 130 persons (61 female)receivedlegalaidandlegalservices.Thirty‐two(25female)havereachedcourtfortrialwithrepresentation.

‐ Eight SPUs are providing services to the vulnerable groups, especially women andchildren,inthefiveprojectstates.193(77female)policepersonnelandsocialworkerswere trained in dealingwith SGBV. These SPUs served a total population of 817,557,including380,073women,duringtheevaluationperiod.13

                                                            11AstheCapstoneDoctrinestates,“Multi‐dimensionalUnitedNationspeacekeepingoperationsmaysupporttherestorationandextensionofstateauthority[which]mayincludeeffortstodeveloppoliticalparticipation,aswellasoperationalsupportfortheimmediateactivitiesofstateinstitutions.”SeeUnitedNationsPeacekeepingOperations:PrinciplesandGuidelines(“CapstoneDoctrine”,2008),section2.4.12ThesestatesareWesternEquatoria,Lakes,Jonglei,EasternEquatoria,NorthernBahrelGhazalandUpperNilestates.13ThebeneficiariesofSPUarefromfivecities:upto372,413(166,739female)inJuba,CES;upto152,257(73,926female)inYambio,WES;upto99,740(49,096female)inTorit,EES;upto151,320(70,684female),inWau,WBGS;andupto41,827(19,628female)inAweil,NBGS.

21  

‐ A pilot ECCwas established in Juba. The project provided training to 648 (9 female)policepersonnel inECCoperations.By June2015,ECChadresponded to9,757phonecalls.14TheprojecthasinitiateddiscussionswithWBGSwithregardtotheestablishmentofanECCinWau.

‐ Withsupportfromtheproject,byJune2015,atotalof1,393police(174female)outof2,081 recruited since December 2012 were registered and entered into a personneldatabasebytheNationalJointRegistrationCommittee.

‐ 59state‐levelRoLForumswereconductedinsevenstates,involving1,572participants(486female).15

‐ Communitymemberswerereached through33A2J communityoutreachactivities,42communitypolicingoutreachactivities,and44PCRCmeetingsatthecountyandpayamlevelsinfivestates.Theseactivitieswereattendedby7,691people(3,021female)fromthe communities, Judiciary, Legal Administration, SSNPS, NPSSS, UNMISS, andCSOs/CBOs.16345(109female)policepersonnelandcommunitymembersweretrainedincommunitypolicingandoperationalizingPCRC.

‐ Theascertainmentofcustomarylawsof14communitiesinSouthSudanwascompleted.The publication consists of three volumes, all of which were already printed anddisseminated to the public. The ascertainment of the customary laws of a further 10communitieshavebeencommissioned.

‐ Standardised documentation were developed and provided for Police, including 21standard forms, six registers, aswell as laws and hand books on six subjects. Similardocumentationwasprovidedtootherinstitutions,includingsixregistersand12formstothePrison;45formsfortheJudiciary;andfivelegalaidformsandcasemanagementregistersforMoJ.

‐ The project delivered the hardware and software capacity related torenovation/construction of police and prisons facilities, including SPUs, Rajaf FemaleDormitoryandJubaUniversityCollegeofLaw.

Unplanned outputs have been delivered. They have been necessitated by a dynamiccontextwhichdemandedflexibilityinplanningandimplementation.TheestablishmentofanInter‐MinisterialCommitteeisagoodexample.UNDPandUNMISSjointlyconductedatrainingsessiononHumanRightsMonitoring,ReportingandDocumentation.Inadditiontotheroutineoutputoftrainingactivities,suchasincreasingparticipant’sknowledgeofthe

                                                            14Thesephonecallsincluded6,083in2014,1,755inthefirstquarterof2015and1,919inthesecondquarterof2015.15TheseRoLforumsincludedthreeforumsinWarrapStateinthe4thquarterof2013,involving96participants(23female);39forumsin2014,involving947(299female),eightforumsin1stquarterof2015,involving315(109female);andnineinthe2ndquarterof2015,involving214(55women).16In2014,21communityoutreachactivitieswereconductedand1,376people(402female)participated;18communityawareness activities were conducted by the police in schools and communities, attended by 1,955 participants (600female).Inthe1stquarterin2015,therewerefiveA2Joutreachactivities,13communitypolicingoutreachactivitiesand22PCRCmeetings.Theseactivitieswereattendedby1,761participants(629female).Inthe2ndquarterin2015,sevenA2Joutreachactivities,11communitypolicingoutreachactivities,and22PCRCmeetingswereconductedatthecountyand payam levels. These activities were attended by 2,559 participants (1,390 female) drawn from the communities,judiciary,legaladministration,UNMISSHumanRightsDivision,andCSOs/CBOs.

22  

training subject, some consensus among the participants was reached at the end of thetraining,whichrequiresfurtherconsultationswiththenon‐RoLlineministriesrelevanttoprepare the Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights. As a result, an inaugurationmeetingtoconstituteanInter‐MinisterialCommitteewilltakeplaceinfall2015.Moreover,UNDPandUNMISSwillprovide training to theCommitteenotonly in relation tohumanrightsmonitoringbutalsoinpreparationforthenextroundofUniversalPeriodicReview.

Although the project is making progress in delivering the planned outputs, it has metsubstantialchallengesinachievingprogresswithinthetimeframespecifiedintheAWPs.In2014, six out of the 17 Project targets were accomplished and 11 were partiallyaccomplished.17The implementation status of targets under each output is illustrated inthediagrambelow:

Diagram4.AchievementofPlannedTargetsin2014

During the Evaluation team’s interviews with the donors, serious concerns regardingdelayed delivery were raised. According to the donors, these delays occurred for tworeasons: (1) over‐ambitiousness of the original UNDP work plans; and (2) the 2013political crisis. As much as the December 2013 political crisis could not have beenpredicted, its impact on project implementationwas substantial. Tomitigate such risks,UNDPscaleddown itspresence to five states, and realigned its programming to suit thechanging context. As part of the accountability systemwithin their own systems, donorrepresentativesinJubahavefacedpressurefortimelydeliveryandtangibleimpactoftheprojectactivitiesfromtheirhomecountries.Somedonorshavegrantedno‐costextensionstoallowUNDPtofinishtheplannedactivitiesandreachtheexpectedtargets.Othershavesuggested thatUNDPscaledown the targets to anachievable level towhich they canbeheld.ThedelaysindeliveryarestretchingtolevelsthatarebeginningtodoseriousdamagetoUNDP’sreputationandcredibilityasareliabledevelopmentpartnerandraisequestionsaboutUNDP’scapacitytodeliverresults.Therearesomeotherfactorscontributingtothe

                                                            17Dataissummarizedfrom2014AnnualReportofSupporttoAccesstoJusticeandRuleofLawProject.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 Output 4 Total

12

3

0

6

53

4 5

17

Number of Targets

Achievment of Planned Targets in 2014

Achieved targets Original targets

23  

delayeddelivery,includingholdupsinthereleaseoffunds.Forexample,thePoliceIDcardcomponent,whoseenddatewasMarch2014,had its fundsreleased inSeptember2014.Furthermore,significantchallengeswerefacedintheprocurementofitems,whichhadtobeimportedintothecountryandsubjecttoUNDPstringentprocurementrules.

How to demonstrate value formoney to donors in a short period of time is a commonchallenge to all implementation agencies in post‐conflict countries, as quick returns andfastimplementationareverydifficulttoachieve.Inadditiontothiscommonchallenge,theevaluation team has also identified several specific challenges that led to the delayeddeliveryofprojectoutputsintheResultsSection.

Theactivitiesandoutputshavebeenplannedandorganizedtoachievethedesiredresults.Thedetailsinsomemajorinterventionareasareillustratedbelow:

The effectiveness of the co‐location arrangement can be identified in variousways. Themostvisibleoneistheachievementoftargetsineachprojectoutput.Inaddition,theCTAshaveplayedanimportantroleinpolicyadvisingbydevelopingregularlegaladvisorynotesforthehostinstitutionsoncriticalA2Jissues,suchaslegalaid,traditionaljusticeandcasemanagement.Takinglegalaidasanexample,theCTAtoMoJpreparedlegaladvisorynoteson various legal aid subjects, from legal aid models to legal aid forms. The MoJ, withtechnicalsupportfromUNDP,validatedtheLegalAidStrategyanddevelopedaLegalAidAction Plan in 2014. Other significant achievements include the draft legislation todomesticate international crimes, the finalisation of ascertainment of customary lawreports,thedevelopmentofatrainingmanualfortraditionalleaders,andthedevelopmentofacasemanagementsystemandcasemanagementreports

Each RoLO and LEA implements activities based on the overall project AWPs. They canadapttheAWPactivitiestotheirspecificcontextsolongastheseactivitiesarewithintheAWPoutputsandresults.Theirsupervisorsoccasionallyaskthemtoprepareandshareadetailedimplementationplan.Theevaluationteamfoundthatallofthefieldstaffhasbeeneffectiveincarryingoutregularactivities,suchasRoLForums,outreaches,gatheringCMS,and PCRC meetings, etc. From time to time, they received instruction from Juba onsupportingadditionalactivitieswithintheoverallAWPs.AsthereisnospecificindividualAWP,toagreatextent,theeffectivenessoftheco‐locationarrangementatthestatelevel,intermsofthefrequencyandqualityoftheactivities,dependsontheindividualinitiativesofRoLOsandLEAs.

It is important to note that the effectiveness of the co‐location arrangement at both thenationalandstatelevelsiscompromisedbecausetheprojectstaffhavetoprovidetechnicalsupport,implementprojectactivities,andhandleadministrativeworkallatthesametime.At the national level, during the evaluation period, the two CTAs had to undertakeadditional tasks in order to oversee administrative functions of the project such asprocurementprocesses.Additionally,theybothspentasignificantamountoftimeactingasaprojectmanager,duetotheirtechnicalleadroleintheirareas,whichaffectedtheircoreroleofprovidingtechnicaladviceasrequired.TherecentrecruitmentofaProjectManagerhasalleviatedthischallengetoacertainextent.

At thestate level, thestrugglewasmainlycausedby theunclearperceptionofUNDPco‐locationstaff’smandates.Forsomecounterparts,themainresponsibilityoftheco‐location

24  

staffwastoprovidesupportintransportationandotherlogisticalarrangementsrelatedtothe training activities organized by UNDP rather than using them as a resource fortechnical issues, including coaching and mentoring services. For example, in Torit, onegovernment official interviewed could only point to logistical support, and failed toarticulateanysupportonthetechnicalsideprovidedbythecolocationstaff.

The communication gap is partially caused by the turnover of the state head of LegalAdministration,PoliceCommissionersandPrisonDirectors.Itisthereforeessentialthatatthe state levelRoLOsandLEAs constantly clarify their rolesand responsibilities to theircounterparts. A consensus between the co‐location staff and their host governmentagenciesastothetargetactivitiesandoutputs,andwhatroleeachpartyshouldundertakeinordertoachievethesetargets,shouldbeinplace.

The project provided technical and logistical support to RoL institutions for thedevelopmentofmanual/computerisedCMSandthecollectionandcompilationofstatisticswithin the criminal justice system. A series of capacity building activities wereimplementedduringtheevaluationperiod, including(1)South‐SouthstudytoursforMoJandJoSSstafftoobserveandlearnfrombestpracticesincasemanagementinUgandaandKenya;and(2)anationwide“trainingoftrainers(ToT)”coursefor32prisonofficials(fourfemale) to improveNPSSS’ ability to generate anduse inmate‐related information at thecounty,state,andnationallevelsandtoenhanceinmatecareandinteragencycoordination.Theproject alsoprovided technical assistance indevelopingguidelines for the collectionand analysis of data. For example, it supported JoSS to develop a case managementtemplate for collecting data by the county and state High Courts. To facilitate regularcollection and analysis of inmates’ statistics, the project provided information andcommunicationtechnology,equipment,andfurnituretothePrisoners’AffairsDirectorateatthenationalandstatelevels.AsaresultofA2J/RoLsupport,threeCMS,i.e.thosewithinMoJ,NPSSSandSSNPS,areinplaceandoperationalinsevenstates.18

To date, the casemanagement statistics have enabled the project counterparts to trackremands.The inmates’statisticshasallowedNPSSStoascertainremandedandconvictedinmates by male, women and juveniles, as well as to identify ways of reducing prisonovercrowding.ThecrimestatisticsofSSNPShashelpedtheRoLinstitutionstounderstandthe seasonality and patterns of crimes. For example, statistics revealed that convictedprisonersoutnumber remandedprisonersand that Jubahas themost crowdedprions inthecountry.Basedonthisanalysis,policepostswereopenedandpatrollingwasintensifiedinhotspotsinJuba.ThesestatisticsalsoenabledMoJtoassesstheworkloadperstateandto identifycasebacklogs.TheaveragecaseprocessingandcompletionrateatMoJduringthefirsttwoquartersof2015was19%,whichexceededtheprojecttargetrateof12%.Theachievement shouldnotbeoverstated, as the rate shouldbe interpreted in tandemwithotherindicators,suchashowlongthecaseshavebeeninthesystem.

ThestatisticsalsoeffectivelyinformedtheRoLForumsatthestateleveltoaddressissuesrelatedtovulnerablegroups.Reducingprolongedandarbitrarydetentionandexpediting

                                                            18Duetocontinuedinsecurity,theProjecthasbeenunabletoaccessJonglei,UpperNile,andUnitystatessinceDecember2013.

25  

casemanagementhavebecometwomajorthemesoftheseForums.InWBGS,forexample,interventions by the Forum led to the release of 17 persons and the conviction of 10accused persons who had been held in prolonged detention. In NBGS, 31 persons (17female) held in prolonged and arbitrary detentionwere released. Two female detaineeswhowerechargedwithadulterybythecustomarycourtwerereleasedbythemagistrateonthegroundsthattheyweresubjectedtounfairtrials.

Compared tootheractors in the justicechain,whohave finalised theproductionof theirCMSreportsandstatistics,theJudiciarywithsupportfromtheA2J/RoLProjectteamisintheprocessoffinalisingitsowncasemanagementreport/statisticstobedulypublished.ItisenvisagedthatuponthecompletionofamanualCMSattheJOSS,aprogressionwillmadeto a digitalised CMS. In 2014, the project provided assets, such as ICT equipment to theJoSS.However,JoSSisyettodistributetheequipmenttothestateJudiciaries.

Targeted training andworkshops are among themain tools usedby theproject team tosensitize the RoL actors on various topics and build their capacity to carry out theirmandate.The tablebelow shows themajor target groupsat thenational, state andevencountylevels,andtherelatedtrainingtopicsduringtheperiodunderevaluation.

Table2.Selectedtrainingtopicsandtargetgroups

Targetgroups Topics

PoliceandPrisonsOfficers SexualandGenderBasedViolence,casemanagement

Police

Communitypolicing

Emergencycallcenter

SpecializedTrainingonFingerPrintScience

ProsecutorsandJudgesInternationalCriminalJusticeCaseManagement,includinguseofformsandregisters

Traditionalleaders

PrinciplesofLawandhumanRights

TraditionalLeadersinPeaceandReconciliation

ValidationofCustomaryLawParalegals LegalOrientationTraining

Allactors,includingCSOs TransitionalJustice

Various interactive and participatory methodologies were used to conduct the trainingsessions. These included presentations on topics by resource persons, large and smallgroup discussions, role playing exercises and case studies in which participants wereobservedonhowtheywouldrespondtospecificscenariosorcasesbroughtbeforethem.

To build local capacity, some training activities were co‐facilitated by the project teammembers, subjectexperts fromotherUNagencies,and leaders fromthenationalpartneragencies. It should be noted that although building the local capacity to sustain similaractivities in thenear future isalwaysan integratedobjectiveofUNDP trainingactivities,sometimes it is hard to engage the local trainers, especially those working in the

26  

government agencies. UNDP’s and the national government’s policies do not allow agovernmentemployeetoderivebenefitfromparticipatinginaprojectthat isintendedtobuild the capacity of the same government, as they are considered the implementingpartnersor responsibleparties.To allow this typeof practice creates conflict of interestandundermineseffectiveprojectimplementationandpartnershipbuilding.

Theprojecthasusedstandardizedtemplatestoreporteachtrainingactivity,whichincludetrainingobjectivesandexpectedresults, trainingsubjectsandmethodology.The trainingreport also contains a systematic method to collect pre‐ and post‐training data on thechangesinparticipants’confidence,knowledgeandattitudeinthetrainingsubjects.Mosttrainingreportshavedemonstratedasubstantial increaseinparticipants’knowledgeandconfidenceintherelevantsubjectsasaresultofthetraining.

The effectiveness of the training activities was confirmed during the key informantinterviews. The interviewees acknowledged the observable improvement of their staff’sdaily performance after attending the relevant training sessions. For example, afterreceiving the training on English, substantive and procedural laws, some judges haveapplied the principles from the trainings conducted for them by writing judgements inEnglish.

ThetrainingonCMShasbeensuccessfulbecauseafterthetraining,50%ofthetrainedstaffofMoJcouldsetuptheCMS.UNDPusedtofacilitatemostaspectsoftheCMS,butcurrentlyoneoftheMoJstaffisdoingtheanalysisandregularlyconsultswithUNDPwhendifficultiesare encountered. In the past, the MoJ and JoSS did not share statistics very willingly.However, through sustained engagement coupled with exposure visits and in‐housetraining,bothinstitutionscametounderstandtheimportanceofcasemanagementandarenowwillingtosharetheircasemanagementstatistics.

Another indicator of training effectiveness is the drafting and enactmentof newpoliciesand regulations. For example, the project organized several training sessions to supportMoJ’s understanding of the international criminal justice system. After these trainingsessions,theMinistrydraftedlegislationtodomesticateinternationalconventions.

It should however be noted that the effectiveness of the training activities has beenhinderedbyseveralfactors.Thefirstistheeducationleveloftherecipients.Manytrainingparticipantsonlyhavebasicliteracy,whichpreventsthemfromfullyabsorbingthecontentof the training. The second factor is the language barrier, as training fully conducted inEnglish(withlimitedArabictranslation)isabigchallengeforthosewhoarestillstrivingtoenhancetheirproficiencyinthelanguage.Thethirdfactoristheageofthetrainees,manyofwhomareapproachingretirement.Asaresult,theydiffersubstantiallyfromtheyoungerlearners in their way of thinking, motivation to learn and comprehensive capacity. Theprojectteamhastakensomemeasurestoaddresstheseissues.Forexample,intherecenttraining of judicial support staff on case management, it was ensured that all of theparticipantscouldspeakEnglishandhadsomecomputerskills.   

Variousactivitieshaveenabledtheprojecttoreachouttodifferentlocations.Inthestates,whereUNDPhas apresence, the localproject teamsareable to conductoutreach to thecounties. Inaddition,partnershipwithCSOshasassistedUNDP inpenetratingareas thatare inaccessibleduetotheprevailingsecuritysituation.Bycontrast, theactivitiesinJuba

27  

are limited to the city periphery due to the availability of numerous RoL actors in thecapacityarea.

UndertheA2J/RoLProject,variousactivitiesweredesignedtoengagetheRoLinstitutionsat the community level.Trainingactivitieshave reached county,payamandboma levels.These include community policing training of police officers at the grassroots level andgender and human rights training of the community level chiefs. During the FGDs, theparticipants in the training acknowledged that these activities have effectively changedtheirperceptionoftheirresponsibilitiesandtransformedtheirrolefromauthorityholderstothatofserviceproviders.Asaresultofthistransformation,strongtrusthasbeenbuiltbetweentheseRoLinstitutionsandthecommunities.

AlsoinTorit,attheendofoneUNDPtrainingsessionforthechiefs,theparticipantsdrafteda resolution to extend their jurisdiction to cover more civil cases so as to relieve thepressureonthestatutorycourtsandalsotoreduceprolongeddetention,whichhadledtoprisoncongestion.Thisresolutionhasbeenendorsedbythestatutorycourtjudges.

InadditiontobuildingcapacityonthesupplysideofA2J,theprojecthasalsoimplementedactivities tosupport thedemandsideof justice throughregularoutreachactivitiesat thegrassrootsleveltoraisecommunityawarenessonissuesofhumanrights,RoL,securityandgender. This two‐pronged approach has led to somepositive changes. For example, as aresultofcommunityengagementactivities, thechiefs inTorit setasideaday tohear theSGBVcases in their jurisdictions. In somestates, the chiefsnowappointwomen to sit incourttoadviseonissuesaffectingwomen.

Theeffectivenessoftheseactivitiesislimitedtosomeextentbytheresourcesavailabletothe RoL institutions at the community level. Several institution members, such as thejudgesandpoliceofficersintheSPUs,havetoldtheevaluationteamthatwiththeincreasedcapacity, they feel they canhandlemore cases.However, the poor infrastructures at thecommunity level and their limited transportation means have prevented them fromreachingouttoexercisetheirimprovedcapacityfully.

3. Efficiency  

DespitethehighcostsofmaintainingstaffinSouthSudanandthechallengingsituationinthe country,UNDPhasmaintained a presence in five states and continues to implementactivities.Severalgoodpracticesincost‐efficiencyareidentifiedinprojectimplementation:

PartnershipwithCSOs

TheA2J/RoLproject’sreachhasbeenstrictlylimitedto5statesduetosecurityconstraints.Toextendthereachoftheproject,UNDPisdeliveringactivitiesthroughitsCSOgrantees,whose reach includes states where UNDP has no presence. The CSOs are running JCCs,providinglegaladviceandraisingawarenessofRoLandA2Jissues.InoneoftheFGDsforCSOsinJuba,itwasevidentthatthereisawidenetworkofCSOfocalpersonsinnearlyallthe10states.Additionally,someoftheCSOshavetrainedparalegalsthatmonitorcasesatthegrassrootslevelwithinthecommunities.

DeploymentofIUNVs

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Comparedwithrecruitingregularprojectstaff,thecostofdeployingIUNVstothestatesismore cost‐efficient. More importantly, the RoLOs and LEAs have gained significantexperienceinrelevantprojectareasfromworkinginothercountries,andmanyofthemareinnovative inusing theirpast experience in theSouthSudan context in order to achieveprojecteffectivenessandefficiency.

Introductionofcost‐savingtechnologyandnewresourcesfornewRoLfunctions

The ECC is a joint venture among government institutions, mobile telecommunicationscompaniesandthedevelopmentpartners.Toaddressthechallengeswithregardtopowersource, UNDP has installed solar panels that require minimal maintenance. The public‐privatepartnershipensuresthattheECCisfunctionalandself‐sustaining.

UNpolice(UNPOL)wereexpectedtoassistSSNPSinvariouspolicingfunctionsthroughco‐location, including data entry, report writing, investigation and asset management.Unfortunately,thissupportwasinterruptedbythechangeintheUNMISSmandateafterthecrisisofDecember2013.UNDPissourcingexpertsfromtheIntergovernmentalAuthorityonDevelopment(IGAD)RegionInitiativeProjecttobridgethegap.

Theevaluationteamalsonotedseveralconcernsrelatedtocost‐efficiency:

Training.UNDPhassupportedthecapacitybuildingofMOJ,JOSS,MOI(SSNPS,NPSSS)andCSOsthroughtrainingactivities.Thesesessionshavebeenconductedbothin‐countryandwithinthelargerEastAfricanRegion.TheRoLinstitutionshaveindicatedapreferencetotravelabroadortoJubaforsomecourses.Buttheresultantcostsofupkeepandtravelneedtobebettermanagedthroughfindingalternativessuchassendingconsultantstotrainthejudgesortheprosecutors intheir locations.Thisapproachwouldallowa trainertotrainmorestaffinthestates.Thetraineeswouldnothavetobeoutofofficeforovertwoweeks,which always adversely affects the normal operation of their offices. As a result, bothfinancialresourcesandextendedabsencesfromdutyarebettermanaged.

Equipment.EquipmenthasbeenprocuredanddistributedbyUNDPtotheRoLinstitutions,butmostofthemarenotbeingusedduetopowershortages.InTorit,thephotocopierthatwas handed over to the Judiciary has not been put to use since it was delivered. Theevaluation teamnotedadisintereston thepartof the institutions inprovidingpower torunthephotocopier.InJuba,theevaluationteamwastoldthatthenationalRoLinstitutionscouldnotdelivertheequipmenttothestateinstitutionsinatimelymanner.ItisessentialthatUNDPexpediteadoptionof a fit andsupplymodel toknowwhere theequipment isgoingandwhereitwillbeplaced.

Stafftime.Technicalstaffspendssubstantialamountsof timeonadministrativematters,especially financial and procurement issues, instead of delivering technical advice to theinstitutions.Thispredicamenthasbeenadistraction from theoverall implementationoftheprojectactivities.

Adequate financial resources. During the evaluation period, the project obtainedfinancial support from the Governments of the Netherlands, Japan, Norway, the UnitedKingdomandUNDPBureau forPolicyandProgrammeSupport(BPPS).While theannualbudgetincreasedduringthisperiod,onlyacertainpercentageofthebudgetwasused.Thetablebelowshowstheannualbudgetanddisbursementundereachoutputoftheproject.

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Table3.Annualbudgetanddisbursementundereachoutputoftheproject:

Outputs  October – December, 201319   January – December, 201420  January –June, 201521 

Budget   Expenditure (%)22  Budget   Expenditure (%)  Budget   Cumulative Expenditure (%) 

Output 1      2,056,612  1,223,328.86 (59%)  2,517,057  438,227 (17%) 

Output 2  151,940  7,062 (4.6%)  2,633,903  2,394,137.27 (91%)  1,686,832  446,974 (26%) 

Output 3      328,764.00  192,823.83 (59%)  319,299  131,238 (41%) 

Output 4  244,201.07  0 (0%)  3,029,334  1,801,090.99 (59%)  3,631,245  1,352,351 (37%) 

Output 5  144,096.00  6,848.48 (4.8%)   ‐‐  ‐‐  ‐‐  ‐‐ 

Total  540,237.07  13,910.48 (2.6%)  8,048,613  5,611,380.95 (70%)  8,154,433  2,368,790 (29%) 

   

      

                                                            19UNDP2013FourthQuarterlyReportfortheAccesstoJusticeandRuleofLawProject,p8.20UNDP2014AnnualReportfortheAccesstoJusticeandRuleofLawProject,p27.21UNDP2013SecondQuarterlyReportfortheAccesstoJusticeandRuleofLawProject,p14–15.22AccordingtothelastQuarterlyReportof2014,forsomeactivitiesduringthereportingperiod,theonlycostwererefreshmentswhichwerecoveredbyUNDP’spartner:UNMISS.

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

October ‐ December, 2013

Budget Expenditure

01,000,0002,000,0003,000,0004,000,0005,000,0006,000,0007,000,0008,000,0009,000,000

January ‐ December 2014

Budget Expenditure

01,000,0002,000,0003,000,0004,000,0005,000,0006,000,0007,000,0008,000,0009,000,000

January ‐ June, 2015

Budget Cumulative Expenditure

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Thereareseveralfactorscontributingtotheslowdisbursementofprojectfunds:

Themajorreasonforslowdisbursementisthelengthyprocurementprocessofgoodsandservices on the part of UNDP. In addition, long consultation with RoL institutions forimplementationofagivenactivityalsoaffectstimelydisbursementanduseoffunds.

For some interventions, there is no expenditure in the first few months of the year.Substantialamountoftimeisspentfiguringoutandsettinguptherequisiteitemsbeforeprojectimplementationcanbegin.Sometimesonly10%ofthebudgetisspentinthefirstquarter, and the donors and the RoL institutions become concerned. It is essential thatUNDPandthedonorsengageindiscussionsateachandeverystageofimplementationtounderstandtheprocessandsomeofthechallenges.ThePoliceIDcardcomponentisoneofthe interventions that needed many inputs before the start of implementation. Theproject’sinitialtimelinewassetforMarch2015,butthereweresignificantsetbacksduetodelaysindisbursingfundsandalongverificationprocessofover35,000policepersonnelinallthestates,involvingUNPOLandUNMISSHumanRightsDivision,whichcouldnotbecompleted in the stipulated timeframe. The change of the UNMISS mandate alsoconsiderablyaffectedimplementationastheexpectedsupportfromUNPOLwasnolongerfeasible.Asaresult,ano‐costextensionhasbeensoughtfromDFID.Todate,1,500IDcardshavebeenproducedandover22,000personnelhavebeenverified.Exceptfortwostates,theprocessisproceedingasexpected.

Thereis littledoubtthatslowdisbursementhashadanimpactonthedeliveryofprojectoutputs and potential outcomes. Donors noted that in the context of the financial crisis,UNDP should demonstrate the achievement of results, especially impact, and itscomparativeadvantagesinordertocontinuereceivingthesameleveloffunding.Someofthe donors were concerned about some ambitious targets that are impossible to meetwithin the specified timeframe, and suggested that UNDP set more manageable andrealistic targets. The donors further noted that the budgetary allocations result insignificantfundinginsomeareas,butlessinotherareas.Howtoallocatefundingoptimallyis another challenge that UNDP has to address. In the rest of the project duration, it iscriticalthatUNDPmaintainitsvisibilityandcredibilitywithdonorssoastomaintainandexpandthemomentumofworkbeingcarriedoutundertheA2J/RoLProject.

Humanresourcesareunderresourcedandnotallocatedoptimally.Therecruitmentof the projectmanager has significantly eased theworkpressureon the project team inJuba.However,fromtimetotimetheCTAsarestillpulledintomanagementissuesbecausethereisalotofinformationrequiredbythenewprojectmanagerduringthistransitionalperiod,whichconsumesasignificantamountoftheirtime.

At the state level before 2014 UNDP had field finance and operation associates to helpUNDPprojectsinapooledmodality;howeverthesepersonnelwereseparatedfromUNDPasaresultofthecrisiswhichunderminedfieldpresence.

UNDP is strategizing its position in the light of the signed peace deal and need tomakeappropriate human resources plans. For instance after the crisis, transitional justice hasbeenincorporatedasacomponentwithintheA2J/RoLproject.ThisisaprojectionofthemanpowerforwhichUNDPwouldplan.

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Tools. The project staff has observed substantial improvement in the availability ofinformation‐sharing and reporting tools during the evaluation period. For example, thecurrent reporting template is better structured than before and allows them to reportactivities,outputsandoutcomestoacertainextent.SomeoftheprocesseswithregardtothepaymentoftheDailyFieldAllowance(DFA23)forbeneficiarieshaveimprovedwiththecreationofaformtocapturethedetailsofabeneficiarywhodoesnothaveanIdentityCardandeventuallyexpeditestheprocessingofDFA.

However,furtherimprovementswerealsorecommended.Onepriorityistoputallproject‐relatedcontactsandreportsof theRoL institutions inanexistingbutunder‐usedshareddrive that can be easily accessed by all staff. There is also need to have a coherentknowledgeof thebusinessmanagementprocesses toavoidgettingmixedmessages fromstaffofprocurementandotherunitsthatsupporttheadministrativeworkoftheA2J/RoLproject.

Equipment.Forunderstandablereasons, thechallengeson theequipmentsidearemoresalientinthefieldthantheyareinJuba.

‐ Vehiclesandservicerepairs.Thedilemmafacingtheprojectteamishowtomaintainafieldpresencewhileprovidinganefficienttransportationsystem,wherefundingisnotavailable to procure vehicles and/or UN rules do not allow the renting of privatevehicles.Intheeventofafieldmissionoutofthestatecapital,UNrulesdemandthattwovehiclesaccompanythemissionteam.Thishasbeenachallengebecausethereisusuallyonlyonevehicleanditisinaterriblecondition.InWauforinstance,theevaluationteamnotedthatnotonly is thevehicleveryold,butalso Jubaofficesecuredthethirdpartyinsuranceforthevehicleonlyrecently.

‐ Accommodation arrangements for RoLOs and. Most IUNVs stay at UN agencies’compoundsinthestates;butinAweil,UNDPdoesnothaveanagreementwiththehostinstitutionyetand is in theprocessof formalisingaccommodationarrangementswiththeconcernedagencies.

‐ Internet access. In the field, UNDP’s request for Internet connections was notaccommodated by UNMISS and some other UN agencies as a matter of policy. Theinstallation and subscriptionofVSAT is costly to accommodate theneedsof two staffmembersper state.After consultationwith theRoLOsandLEAs, the projectprovidedmodems to thesestaff.However,according to the fieldstaff, themodemsare tooslowandcanhardlyenhanceeffectiveInternetcommunicationwiththestaffinJuba.

‐ The co‐locationarrangement at the state level serves the purpose of having UNDPstaff embedded in the RoL institutions, but it is not viable in the long run. The staffmembers squat in government facilities that have no power or Internet connectivity,makingworkextremelyfrustrating.SomeofthemarenotassignedtoofficeswithinthestateRoLinstitutions.ThesituationcausesdelaysinremittinginformationtoJubaandhenceaffectstheefficiencyofprojectimplementation.

                                                            23UndercurrentUNsystem,paymentforcounterparts(governmentandnon‐government)iscalledDFA,whilepaymentforUNstaffiscalledDSA,standingforDailySubsistenceAllowance. 

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4. Project Management 

ProjectManagement.TheprojectismanagedbyaProjectManageronadailybasisunderthe overall leadership of the DGSU Team Leader. The Project Manager is supported byprojectstaff,e.ginfinance,admin/logistics,andengineer,inthedeliveryofprojectoutputs.

Project Oversight. The Programme Specialist closely coordinates with other teammembersinensuringthatmanagementsystems(finance,procurement,humanresources,M&E,etc)areimplementedefficientlyandeffectivelyandactsasliaisonwithUNagencies,counterparts,implementingagenciesanddonorrelations.

Technical implementation. The CTAs lead the technical implementation of the project.TheysuperviseRoLOsandLEAsco‐locatedatstateinstitutionsandprovidestrategicpolicyadvice to national RoL institutions. To ensure quality delivery of project results, it isexpected that the CTAs carry out field missions regularly to provide training, addressprogramme implementation challenges, and discuss feedback from communities andgovernmentcounterparts.

ProjectBoard. In theoriginalprojectdesign, theProjectBoard (PB).TheBoardensuresthat theproject is contributing to the relevantSSDPandUNDAFoutcomes.TheBoard iscomposed of the representatives fromMOJ, JOSS, MOI (SSNPS and NPSSS)who provideexecutiveandbeneficiaryroles.CSOsarebeneficiariesintheBoard.UNDPandthedonorrepresentativesarethesuppliers.TheprojectteamalsoserveassecretariatforthePB.

ThePBonlymetinDecember2013andwasnotabletomeetintheentire2014duetothecrisis,duringwhichthedonorssuspendedtheirengagementwiththegovernmentbecauseof the conflict. In this period, the project continuously engaged with both donors andgovernment counterparts through the provision of monthly and quarterly reports.Currently (2015), thePB is functional,with the firstmeetingheld inMayof2015even ifsomedonorscouldnotattendforvariousreasons.

ItshouldbenotedthatinadditiontotheoverallPBtotheA2J/RoLProject,theRelocationof Juba University sub‐project has its own board. This board has been active in theevaluationperiodbymeetingregularly.

Althoughthemanagementstructureisfunctionalinpractice,thereisstrongexpectationforit to be more effective from both the project team members and the donors, includingdevelopingaclearToCforthecomingyear.GiventhatmanynewstaffdidnotworkwiththeUNDPsystembefore,thenewteammembersfindthattheAWPsaretheonlytoolsthathelp them to understand the original project design and current implementation status.However, they also find the current AWP confusing and the link between differentinterventionareasunclear.Thereisneedforbetterarticulatingthelinkageandcoherenceacrosstheprojectareas,sotheultimateobjectivesoftheentireprojectcouldbeclearlyandproperlyframed.Basedonthat,eachprojectteammember’srolecouldbefurtherclarified.

The project has been able tomaintain coordinationwith key stakeholders and agencies,especiallyUNagencies,throughvariousmechanisms.TheRoLWorkingGroup,co‐chairedbyUNDPandInternationalRescueCommittee(IRC),isavehiclefortheRoLactorsinSouthSudantocoordinatewitheachotheronaregularbasis.This is intendedtoovercomethecommunicationandcoordinationchallengesofnational‐levelRoLimplementationpartners.

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However,somedonorsfeelthattheRoLWorkingGroupisnotdeliveringtheexpectedlevelof coordination optimally, which is partially due to the intense competition that existsbetweenallactorsforscarceresources.

The collaboration between UNDP headquarters and UNDP South Sudan has improvedsubstantiallywithinthepastthreeyears,especiallyafteramissionbytheBCPR(nowBPPS)toSouthSudaninJune2013.ThemissionwasessentialforBCPRtounderstandthatintheSouthSudancontext,quickreturnsandfastimplementationareverydifficult.ThestrengthofthecordialrelationshipbetweenJubaandtheheadquarterswasevidentwhen,in2013,BCPRmainly funded the continueddeploymentofRoLOsandLEAs in the statesand theconductoftheA2J/RoLHouseholdPerceptionSurvey.

The project has developed some good M&E tools. In accordance with the UNDPProgrammingPoliciesandProcedures,theprojecthasbeenmonitoredwithintheAnnualProject Cycle. The project baseline, indicators, targets, and progress towards thecompletion ofkey results are recorded in Atlas on a quarterly basis. At the state level,RoLOs and LEAs are responsible for conductingmonitoring activities on the ground. AnIssueLoghasbeenactivatedinAtlasandisupdatedbytheProgrammeSpecialistquarterlytofacilitatetrackingandresolvingpotentialproblemsorrequestsforchange.Basedontheinformation recorded in Atlas, a quarterly ProjectProgressReport (PPR) has beensubmitted by the Project Manager in 2015to the PB throughthe project assurancemechanism, using the standard report format available inthe Executive Snapshot. Inaddition,aMonitoringSchedulePlanhasbeenactivatedinAtlasandupdatedtotrackkeymanagementactions/events.

TheRRF,statingoutputs,indicators,meansofverification,andfrequencyofthemonitoring,canstillbeimproved.TheEmbassyoftheNetherlandsiscurrentlysupportingtheprojecttodevelopaToCandadrafthasbeenprepared.Althoughsupervisionmissionstothefieldweremade,thesetripsneedtobemorestructuredandconductedmorefrequently

On thereportingside, theprojecthaspreparedmonthly reports, inaddition toquarterlyreportsandannualreports,andsharedthemwiththekeystakeholders.Theprojectteammembers have noted that the reportwriting process is extremely lengthy. As toomuchtimeisspentonreporting,thefinalreportlosestheoriginalthoughtprocess.Itshouldbenotedthat,inadditiontothecomplicatedprocedure,thelackofteammembers’compliancewith reporting requirements, such as providing full information of their activities,sometimesalsocontributestothelengthyprocess.

Otherchallengesobservedrelatetothedifficultyofmeasuringtheimpactofsomeactivities.SomeM&Echallengescomefromtheavailabilityof thebeneficiariestoparticipate intheM&Eactivities.WhentheevaluationteamtriedtoreachsomebeneficiariesoftheSPUsinthe states, it was not possible to trace some of the beneficiaries in Wau. Some of thereasonspertain to the reluctanceof thebeneficiaries to reveal their contact information;othersstemfromconcernsonprivacyusuallyinfluencedbyculturalnorms.

UNDP is theonlydevelopmentagency that co‐locateswithin theRoL institutionsatboththe national and local levels. The wealth of experience and information regarding theformative stages of the RoL institutions and a lengthy programming history with theseinstitutionsprovideUNDPwitha complete institutionalmemory thatotherdevelopment

34  

partnersmaynothave.TheUNDPprojectteamhascontinuouslymonitoreditsoperatingenvironment to leverage its comparative advantages. The sector‐wide interventionapproachintheRoLsectorhasbeenwidelyacceptedbytheinternationalpartnersinSouthSudan. Almost all these organizations agree that all the components in the justice chainmust be supported, andmost of themare in theprocess of identifying their own strongpoints for interventionswith the expectation that otherpartners canprovide support inother areas. All the stakeholders interviewed agreed that the idea of undertaking jointeffortseliminatesduplicationandenhancesspecializationcommunications.

Within the project, some mechanisms are in place to facilitate the sharing of lessonslearned at both the national and state levels. The standard reporting template is a goodexample.However,theevaluationteamfindsthattheuseofsuchtoolsisnotfullyexplored.For example, some challenges are presented in the quarterly reports for a long timewithoutupdatesonwhetherandhowsuchchallengeshavebeentackled.

The existing communication between Juba and the field can be further improved,whichwillenhancethesharingoflessonslearned.ManyRoLOsandLEAstoldtheevaluationteamthat they do not have enough opportunities to speak with their supervisors in Juba inperson.Itshouldbenotedthatcommunicationsandlessons‐sharingamongthestatesarepretty active. From time to time, the RoLOs and LEAs initiated discussions amongthemselvesconcerningtheircommonchallengeseitherbyphoneorbyemail.Theimpactofsuchcommunicationcanbefurtherstrengthenedifsomedocumentationandsharingcanbeorganizedandinstitutionalized.

5. Results 

The results or impacts ofRoL interventions are long‐termpropositions. Interventions inthedomainsofindividualandinstitutionalcapacitybuilding,organizationaldevelopment,awareness raising, and demand for A2J may take decades to show results. TheEffectivenesssectionhasdemonstratedsomenoticeableortangiblebenefitsbroughtaboutby the project. These findings present clear evidence that UNDP A2J/RoL Project iscontributingtotheachievementofthelong‐termresultsofRoLinSouthSudan.

Almostall theministries, institutionsand traditional leaders interviewedexpressed theirgratitudetoUNDPandsatisfactionwithitsservices.Themajorgovernmentcounterparts,i.e.JoSS,MoI(SSNPSandNPSSS)andMoJ,acknowledgedUNDPasareliabledevelopmentpartner in South Sudan, asmost donors and international organizations left the countryaftertheDecember2013crisisorwithdrewtheirassistancetotheRoLsector,especiallytothepolice.TomanySouthSudanesegovernmentagencies,receivingsupportfromUNDPisanimportantsymboltoshowthatthecountryisamemberoftheUnitedNations.

The CSOs acknowledge the benefit they have received from working with the project.AccordingtosomeCSOs,notonlyhastheprojectprovidedopportunitiesforthemtocarryout their mission, it has also significantly built their capacity for developing proposals,financialandM&Emanagement.

Forthetraditionalleaders,theyappreciatethetrainingopportunitiesthathavere‐shapedtheir understanding of their jurisdictions and responsibilities. Many of them stated that

35  

theyarenowapplyingtheRoLprinciples,includingthosepertainingtohumanrightsandgenderequality,inthecourseofadjudicatingcases.

Aside from the overall recognition of UNDP’s work, these partners also raised someconcerns. Some government agencies pointed out that they have experienced someturnover of UNDP staff. A few institutions at the state level complain that the financialassistancefromUNDPdoesnotcaterforcostsofofficerenovation,vehicleandequipmentbecauseofalimitedunderstandingofUNDP’sprocurementandfinancialrules.

According to some CSOs, UNDP’s financial and procurement process does not take intoconsideration South Sudan’s specific context, as a well‐functioning system within theapplicantorganizationsisrequiredforaccessingfundsthroughthesmallgrantmechanism.Being unable tomeet these rigid requirementsmeans that they could be excluded fromworkingwiththeproject.ThisisparticularlythecaseforsmallandemergingCSOs.

Concrete examples on the result of trainings are provided in the Effectiveness Section.According to the trainingparticipants interviewedby the evaluation team,noneof themreceived a follow‐up inquiry to capture institutional improvements resulting from thetrainings. Due to the lack of systematic data collection on institutional change, all theevidence in the Effectiveness Section is anecdotal, not empirical, as it emerged from theevaluationteam’sinterviewsandFGDs.

PCRC shows theways inwhich the project support has linked the communitymemberswiththeformalandtraditionalRoLinstitutions.TheparticipantsinPCRCmeetingsincludepolice, core PCRC members (including women). According to the community members,PCRC’s jointpatrolshavesignificantlyrestoredorderandreducedthecrimerate,makingthe community a safer place. PCRC also provides an opportunity to protect vulnerablegroups.Forexample,sincePCRCmeetingsinvolveissuesrelatedtowomenandchildreninthecommunity,someissuesonSGBVareforwardedtothepoliceafterthemeetings.

ThespecificchallengescomefromboththehostcountryandtheUNDPsystem.Thehighlyinsecureenvironmentisaconstantchallengeasitaffectstheproject’soverallefficiencyindelivering outputs in a timelymanner. Not only did the December 2013 crisis lead to areduction of project locations, but the Ministry of Finance and Economic PlanningreallocatedfundsmeantforRoLfunctionstootherareasofpriority.ThelocalcapacitiesofCSOs are generally low and it takes UNDP additional time to advertise the request forproposalsforseveralroundsbeforeobtainingtherightCSOgrantee.Onceonboard,UNDPhas to still provide additional financial and technical training to the grantee effectivelyimplementactivitiesandaccountaccordingtoUNDPfinancialrules.ThechangeoftheUNmandatesignificantlyaffecteddevelopmentrelatedprogrammingasthefocuswasshiftedto the protection of civilians. The strict procurement rules and those related to thedisbursement ofworking advance to staff slowdown implementationof activities at thestatelevel,becausethestaffonthegroundareIUNVsandnotUNstaff.

Thesecurityuncertaintiesandthemultiplelayersofsubbusinessprocessesthathavetobefollowed imply that considerable delayswill be encountered in the recruitment process.Theprojecttookoveroneandahalfyeartorecruitthecurrentprojectmanager.

TheevaluationteaminterpretedoutcomesasUNDAFOutcome5:Accesstojusticeandtherule of law improves. The project has four outputs: (1) Increased access to justice for

36  

citizensofSouthSudan,witha special focusonvulnerablegroups; (2)Reductionof casebacklogs and addressing prolonged and arbitrary detention at the state level; (3)AscertainmentofCustomaryLawthroughcontinuousresearch;and(4)CapacityofPolice,Prisons,MoJ, Judiciaryand legalaidservicesstrengthened.It shouldbenoted thatunderthe sector‐wide approach, many project activities contribute to more than one output,whichhascreatedstrongsynergiesandamorelevelledplayingfieldbetweenthedifferentactors,especiallyforvulnerablegroupsatthecommunitylevel.Herearesomeexamplesofhowtheoutputsofthekeyprojectareasarecontributingtoprojectobjectives:

TheRoLForumsat the state level serve as one of themain platforms for addressingissues and challengeswithin the justice sector at both the national and local levels. TheForums, facilitated on monthly basis, fosters coordination between state and non‐stateactors in order to address gaps such as prolonged detention and others that affect theprovision of legal services. Key themes at these RoL Forums include casemanagement,roles and responsibilities of counterparts, jurisdiction of traditional leaders, and humanrightsintheadministrationofjustice.

Theascertainmentofcustomary laws is completed in 14 communities: Toposa, Lopit,Lango, Lotuko, Azande, Jur‐bel, Avukaya, Moru, Ndogo, Mundaru, Wadi, Balanda Biviri,Baka and Bongo. The reports for additional 10 communities are being finalized. ThepublishedascertainmentreportshavebeenprescribedforusebytheFacultyofLawatJubaUniversityaspartof itsBachelorofLawscurriculum.TheascertainmentprocessaimstoidentifyanddocumentthecustomsandtraditionsoftheethnicgroupsofSouthSudan.Thisendeavor is expected to contribute to promoting a locally‐owned and demand‐drivenprocessofreformandanincreaseinA2Jthroughthecustomarycourts.

6. Sustainability 

A2J/RoLprojecthas takenan inclusiveandholisticapproach topromotingownershipatvariouslevels,fromnationalandstateRoLinstitutionstoCSOsandcommunitymembers.Theproject teamat both thenational and state levels, promotenational ownership as aguiding principle in project design and implementation, and are committed to aparticipatory and gender‐responsive approach throughwhich theneeds andviewsof allstakeholderscanbearticulatedandaddressed.

Acrossvariousprojectinterventionareas,strongsignsofownershipcanbeidentified.First,theprojectdidnotcreateanynewinstitutions,butworkedwiththeexistingoneswithinthehostcountry’ssystem,suchasJoSS,MoI(SSNPSandNPSSS),andMoJ.Furthermore,theco‐location of staff at both the national and state levels restricted their role to that offacilitators and technical advisors, to ensure that their government counterparts are theoneswhoactuallyimplementprojectactivities.Asaresult,theprojectoutputssuchasCMSand criminal statistic reports have become integral functions of the existing RoLinstitutions.TheseRoL institutionshavestrong incentives tocontinuecarryingout theseactivitiesastheycaneffectivelyimprovetheirperformance.

Theapplicationofthenationalownershipprinciplethroughaparticipatoryapproachhas,however, encountered somechallenges.The firstone isproject counterparts’ capacity toarticulatetheirneeds.Insomecases,theprojectpartnersarenotclearaboutwhatexactlythey need. The second one is the lack of communication between the national and local

37  

levels onboth theproject and counterpart sides,whichprevents local needs frombeingreflectedintheAWPs.Duringimplementation,theinflexibledesignoftheAWPspreventedstafffromimplementingwhattheyperceivedascriticalandurgentneedsontheground.

Cost‐sharing is a strong indicator that demonstrates the ownership and sustainability ofdevelopment interventions.However, due to the government’s fragile financial situation,theRoLinstitutionscanonlyprovideverylimitedinputtotheprojectinitiatives,e.g.officespace for UNDP staff free of charge. They are unable to provide supplemental financialresources to complement the available funds from UNDP. For example, the Ministry ofFinance andEconomicPlanningallocated fivemillion SouthSudanPounds to theMoJ tofacilitate the provision of legal aid services, but to date, theMinistry of Finance has notreleasedthefunds,citingbudgetaryconstraints.

ThesustainabilityoftheprojecthastobeexaminedwithafullconsiderationofthespecificlocalcontextinSouthSudan.Itdependsonseveralfactors:securityandpoliticalstabilityinSouthSudan,projectcounterparts’commitment,andUNDP’sexitstrategy.

Security and political stability is a prerequisite for all development initiatives in SouthSudan,includinghumanrightsandRoLinitiatives.TheDecember2013crisisisareal‐lifeexampleofhowtheUNDPprojecthasbeenforcedtoshrinkinbothgeographicreachandteam size, especially at the local level. Without a predictable political and securityenvironment,thedonorcountriesmaynotcontinueinvestingintheRoLsector,ashasbeenshownbythewithdrawalofstaffandresourcesrightafterthe2013crisis.

Commitmentfromprojectcounterpartsisalsocrucial.DuringthefirsthalfoftheA2J/RoLProject,theprojectcounterpartshaveshownacertaincommitmenttothesustainabilityofprojectactivities.Trainingactivitieshave receivedstrong support from the leadershipofRoLinstitutions,suchasjusticesandprosecutors‐general.Theseinstitutionsareinterestedin theToT andhave expressed theneed tohave South Sudaneseundertake someof thetraining sessions, andhaveconsistentlyaskedUNDP to increase thenumbersof trainingparticipants. After the training sessions, theyhave also askedUNDP to provide resourcematerials for futureuse.Thecommitment to sustainability is evidentamong the topandmid‐levelprosecutorsandjudges.

The evaluation team observes less commitment to financial resources, compared withhumanresources,fromprojectcounterparts.Themajorityofthegovernmentintervieweesstated that they need financial support fromUNDP and the donors for a longer term inorder to continue project activities. RoL institution personnel consistently perceived theallocationof financialresources, technicalexpertise,andsustainabilityof theprojectasaroleanddutythatUNDPmustcontinuetobearforaverylongtimebecauseSouthSudanisstill a young country.Given the fragile economic situation in the country, this request isunderstandabletoacertainextent. Itshouldalsobenotedthatsustainabilityisshowninsomeexceptionalcases.Forexample, thegovernmenthassignificantlycontributedtotheimplementationoftheECCinJubabyproviding14vehicles,communicationequipmentandbearingallrecurringcostslikefuel,foodandincentivestotheSSNPSstaff.

However, there isgenerallyverylittlesignofseriousconsiderationofatimetabletotakeover the project activities from UNDP or any cost‐sharing steps with which the RoLinstitutionshaveexperimented. Instead,afterreceivingthetechnicalsupporttobuildthe

38  

capacity of the core staff to run the project activities independently, the projectcounterparts have raised more requests for furniture, buildings, vehicles, etc. How tomanage partners’ expectations and explain UNDP’s rules and policies clearly will be animportanttaskfortheprojectteaminthesecondhalfoftheproject.

UNDP’s exit strategy is also crucial to maintain sustainability. According to the currentworkplan,theprojectwillbeclosedinMarch2017.Duetothedelayeddeliveryofsomeoutputs, some no‐cost extension agreementsmight be reached between the donors andUNDPtoallowplannedactivitiestobefullyimplemented.Giventhefinancial,technicalandinstitutional capacity of the RoL institutions in South Sudan, most stakeholders do notforeseethattheprojectactivitiesarelikelytobecontinuedifUNDPcompletelyclosestheproject intwoyearsorso.Clearly, theRoL institutionsstillhavea longwaytogobeforetheycanachieveself‐sustenance.Forexample, the trainingactivitieswill immediatelybedramaticallyreducedifUNDPpullsoutfromsupportingtheinstitutions.Therefore,UNDPshoulddevelopaphase‐outplanwithina longerprojectperiodsoas toenableasmoothandorderlytransferofprojectresponsibilitiestoitslocalpartners,especiallytoencouragegovernmentsatvariouslevelstousetheirownresources.

TheprojecthasextensivelyusedToTtoequiplocaltrainerswiththeskillstoconductthesessionsontheirown.Forexample,atthetraditionalleaders’annualforumin2015,onlynationalexpertsdeliveredpapersandtrainingsessions.Although therewasstill roomtoimprove the capacities of the presenters, the trainees showed a strong preference anddemandfortheirownnationalstotakechargeofsuchevents.

The operation of ECC is an example of how new practices have been institutionalizedwithintheRoLinstitutions.TheECCisajointventurebetweenthecommunity,publicandprivate sectors (e.g.mobile telecoms)within the country. Therewas collaborationby allpartnerstoensurethattheECCisfunctional.Sincereceivingtraining,theECChasbecomeself‐sustaining.TheECCtask force is takingthe lead inmaintaininga log,writingweeklyandmonthlyreportswithdetailsofthetypeofcaseshandled.

It shouldbenoted that the sustainability ofUNDPproject couldbeoffset by someof itscounterparts’ institutional practices. The practice of changing or rotating staff is anexample. Those trained in specific skills are not always retained in the departments forwhichtheyweretrained.Toresolvethisissue,theMoItoplevelleadershiphasapprovedapolicyoftraineeretentionintherolesforwhichtheyweretrainedforat leasttwoyears.Similarly,new institutionalpractices shouldbeadopted inorder toenable thesystemtofunctionandtopromptsustainability.

IV. Conclusions 

Basedonthefindingspresentedintheprevioussections,themid‐termevaluationteamhasreachedthefollowingconclusionsregardingtheUNDPA2J/RoLProject:

The project design benefitted from UNDP’s long‐term engagement in the RoL sector inSouth Sudan, which enabled UNDP to develop a proficient understanding of the RoLinstitutions’ needs and capacity in the country. During implementation, the project hasbeen further informed by various ongoing assessment and studies, especially thoseconductedaftertheDecember2013crisis.Asaresult,theA2J/RoLProject is in linewith

39  

the mandate of the RoL institutions and responsive to country’s current needs for A2J.However, continued relevance should be ensured not only by regularly engagingcounterpartsatthenationalgovernmentlevel,thoughit iscriticalandstrategicgiventhehierarchicalnatureoftheRoLinstitutions.Co‐locationarrangementsatthestatelevelhaveprovidedagoodchannelforthelocalneedstobeheardandreflected.Toachievethat,theprojectneeds to further improvecommunicationsbetween Jubaand the fieldandclarifytheroleofRoLOsandLEAstoitscounterpartsatvariouslevels.

ComparedwiththeRoL initiatives inmanyothercountries, theRoL/A2Jproject inSouthSudan isoperating inamorechallengingenvironmentand,consequently, takinga longertime to demonstrate progress. The delivery of planned outputs is on track and animpressive volume ofwork has been produced by the project. At the result level, initialevidence of attribution and contribution for improved capacity of national and statecounterparts,institutionalizationofnewRoLfunctionsandincreasedawarenessofhumanrightsandRoLamongthekeycounterpartscanbeestablished.

Atthesametime,theprojecthasmetsubstantialchallenges inachievingprogresswithinthetimeframespecifiedintheAWPs.Ineachyear,onlyacertainpercentageofthebudgetwas used. These delays have begun to do serious damage to UNDP’s reputation andcredibility as a reliable development partner and have raised questions about UNDP’scapacity to deliver results, especially among the donors. Setting realistic intervention,scope,andpracticaldeliverytargetsaretheissuesthattheprojectteamhastoconsider.

Someoftheimplementationchallengesaffectingtheeffectivenessandefficiencyofprojectimplementation lie within the operational environment in South Sudan. Others can betackledbyfurtherimprovingtheproject’sinternalmanagementsystem.Infact,theprojecthasmadeimprovementrecentlybyrecruitingnewstafftofillinstrategicpositions,andbydevelopingeffectivereportingtoolstomonitorandreportprojectprogress.However,thesector‐wideapproachitselfisanambitiousengagementandisfurthercompoundedbytheunstable situation in South Sudan which requires constant adjustment. As a result, theproject team is still facing a major challenge in articulating a clear results chain anddemonstrating strong synergy between current intervention areas that allows them tocontributetoachievingtheultimateprojectobjectivesinanefficientandeffectivemanner.Basedonaclearunderstandingofthesefactors,furtheradjustmentisrequiredinordertoallocatehumanandfinancialresourcesoptimally.

The sustainability issuemust be examinedwith a full consideration of the specific localcontext.Clearly, if theproject isclosedasscheduled, theprojectcounterpartswillnotbeabletosustainfundingandimplementationofmost,ifnotall,oftheprojectinterventionsin the absence of UNDP. Managing counterparts’ expectations and reinforcing theirownershipoftheprojectactivitieswillbecrucialinordertobuildsustainability.ToUNDP,whether donor funding is likely to be sustained will to a great extent depend on theperformanceanddeliveryrateoftheprojectintherestofitsduration.

V. Lessons Learned 

Severallessonscanbelearnedfromthefirstphaseoftheproject,whichcouldinformUNDPinmakingsomestrategicdecisionsinplanningandimplementingprojectactivitiesinboththesecondphaseoftheA2J/RoLProjectandfutureinterventions.

40  

Proactivevs.Reactive

LikemanyotherRoLprojects,theoriginalprogrammingapproachoftheA2J/RoLProjectwastobuildthecapacityandmechanismsofvariousRoLinstitutionsand,atthesametime,to increase the demand for A2J at the community level through proactive rights‐basedinterventions.Asector‐widecoreprogrammingstrategyistheblueprintguidingthewholeproject. However, due to the political turmoil and deteriorating security situation in thecountry, the project has to maintain a high degree of flexibility and responsiveness toemerging needs. The changes to the mandates of UN agencies also affect the scope ofinterventionareasandavailablepartnerstotheproject.Forexample,therecentsigningofthepeaceagreementbetweenthegovernmentandtheoppositionwillfurtherchangethemandatesandprioritiesofUNagencies,whichwill in turnaffectthesupportavailabletosomeprojectareas,especiallythoserelatedtopoliceandprison.

Itshouldbecautionedthatwhileprogrammeflexibilityisnecessary,anover‐emphasisonflexibility can lead to a reactive rather than a proactive approach. A proactive approachmeans that the existing resources and environment are analyzed and priorities areestablishedduringtheprojectplanningprocess.Thisapproachaimstoenabletheprojectteam to set the agenda, lead and plan for crisis, rather than respond to crises. Takingtransitional justiceasanexample, it isa loadedconcept that ishardtodefineaccurately,butwhichalsorequiresasubstantial levelofexpansionoftheoriginalprojectscope.Oneriskofkeepingadoptingnewareasofworkistolosetheoriginalprojectfocusandstrategicobjectives,andfurtherdivertthealreadylimitedhumanandfinancialresources.Eventually,itwill lead to delaysor failures in delivery anddamageUNDP’s credibilitywith theRoLstakeholders,particularlythedonors.

Directimplementationvs.SectorLeadership

Relatedtothefirstlessonslearned,facingtheconstantlychangingoperationenvironmentandemergingnewneeds,UNDPneedstogivefurtherthoughttoitsuniquenicheintheRoLsector in South Sudan, especially how to balance the call to implement interventionactivities directly and the call to coordinate and lead the sector‐wide interventionsstrategically, as the change in the mandate of UNMISS and the withdrawal of somedevelopmentactorsinthesectorgaveUNDPahugeresponsibilitytofillthegap.

TheneedforRoListremendousinSouthSudan;nosingleagencycanaddressthatneedinitsentirety.Neworganizationsareengagedbythedonorstoimplementvariousinitiatives.WithintheUNsystem,thereisalsoaRoLcomponentanddifferentagenciesaredesigningand implementing their own interventions following their specific mandates. Mostdevelopment partners in South Sudan are expecting amore coordinated RoL landscape,whereallthepartnerscouldbringintheircomparativeadvantages.Governmentalsoseesthevalueofhavingacoordinatedapproachtoachieveitsowndevelopmentpriorities.

ThecomparativeadvantageofUNDPisobvious.IthasbuiltstrongtrustwiththekeyRoLinstitutions,whichhasenableditastheonlydevelopmentpartnertodesignandimplementinterventions targeting thewhole justicechain.ToUNDP, leadershipdoesnotmeanhowmuch UNDP has implemented by itself, but how effectively it can utilize its existingresources, includingtechnicalexpertise,humancapital,andnetworks, toengagedifferentstakeholders fromboth thegovernmentanddevelopmentpartnersides toapproachRoL

41  

developmentinastrategicandcoordinatedmanner.UNDPshouldmarvelatitsexceptionalreputation and acknowledge that other partners are in the sector to offer collaborativesupport in areas where they have comparative advantages. Partners who have beeninterviewedhavenotedthataself‐assessmentandmappingofstrengthsandweakareasofUNDPiswhatwillmaintainUNDP’sleadership,andnotanoverspreadofinterventions.

Sustainabilityvs.Dependency

The A2J/RoL Project has some strong mechanisms in place to ensure the continuedrelevanceoftheprojecttomeetitscounterparts’needs,especiallythroughtheco‐locationarrangements at both the national and state levels. While such mechanisms ensurecontinuedcontributionstorelevance,theownershipofprojectcounterpartsstillneedstobestrengthened,especiallyinlightofthestrongsignofdependencyoftheRoLinstitutionsonUNDPforbothtechnicalandfinancialassistance.

Managingexpectationsisanimportantpartofincreasingownership.InthefirsthalfoftheA2J/RoLProject,UNDPhassuccessfullybuilt theminimumrequiredtechnicalcapacityofthe RoL institutions and provided the basic infrastructure and equipment to enable thenewinitiativestobeoperational.Thesenewinitiatives includetheCMS,criminalstatisticreports,SPU,ECC,etc.Whentheseinitiativesaremovingintotheoperationalphase,mostRoLinstitutionsstillexpectUNDPtocontinueputtinginsubstantivefinancialsupportforthenormaloperationofthesenewfunctions.UNDPneedstoencourageitscounterpartstodevise indigenous solutions to meet their needs, instead of mainly relying on foreignassistance. Cost‐sharing is one way that UNDP could consider to increase gradually itscounterparts’investmentintheseinitiatives,asshowninthecaseofECC.

Capitalvs.Local

Bothtop‐downandbottom‐upprogramingapproacheshavetheirprosandcons.Insomecases,supportforcentralgovernmentministriesisextremelyusefulinreachingcitizensatthe lowest administrative unit level, since the structures necessary for effectiveimplementation already exist at state and local government levels.However, thisbenefitcannot be fully achieved in the case of South Sudan, as the central government cannoteffectively reach out to the states due to its limited capacity and security constraints.Instead,theA2J/RoLProjecthasexperiencedsomedifficultiesinlearningaboutlocalneedsand incorporating them into its AWPs, even when effort was made through the GRSShierarchyorthroughitsownfieldoffices.

The local communities in South Sudan have the greatest needs. Some donors areconsideringmoving interventionsoutof Juba towhere the communities arebased.Theyplanonworkingwiththelowerandlocallevelsofgovernmentbecausethenationallevelhasnotmadestrides in improving the livesof thecitizens.With itspresence in the field,UNDPhasacomparativeadvantageinadoptingthebottom‐upapproachandstrengtheningitsprogramsatthestateandlocallevels.GiventhecomplexitythatsuchanapproachmayinvolveamongUNDP,thedonors,andthecentralandlocalgovernments,carefulmapping,consultation,monitoringandstrategizingshouldbeconducted.

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VI. Recommendations 

1. Overall strategic recommendations  

Carve out a niche. UNDP should conduct a self‐assessment of its own capacities andidentifywhere its comparative advantages are, to ensure effective and efficient delivery.TherecentsigningofthePeaceAgreementprovidesanidealtimingtodoso,astherearenewopportunitiesforUNDPtouseasentrypointsstrategizingwithintheRoLsector.

Communicationwithdonorsandgovernment.UNDP needs to communicatewith thedonors about the area of intervention in which UNDP wants to engage. Being a well‐recognized expert in RoL, UNDP should be able to articulate its position. Similarconversationsneedtobeconductedwiththegovernmentpartners,asUNDPhasbeenputinasituationwhereitfeelsobligatedtodoeverythingwithintheRoLsector,whichtosomeextenthasencouragedunreasonablerequestsfromitscounterparts.

LeadingthecoordinationwithintheRoLsector.UNDPshouldconsidertakingtheleadinengagingdevelopmentpartners inastrategicrepositioningexercise, throughwhichallactorsknowwhatothersaredoingespeciallyatthestate levelwheretheactorsareveryfew. Increasing the level of coordination will enable the development partners to avoidoverlappingandimproveefficiency,especiallyinimplementingcommunity‐basedprojects.

TheRoLWorkingGroup,whereUNDP isChair, couldbeagoodvehicle forcoordination.Another possibility is government‐led coordinationmechanisms. As initiated by the RoLinstitutions,thelegitimacyandreflectionofthecountry’sneedsarenotquestionable.ThePolice Development Committee is one such mechanism, which is led by the Police andincludesallstakeholders(includingsomedonors)andisfullyfunctional.However,politicalconsiderationscouldaffectcoordinationandsupportfromtheinternationalcommunityforgovernment‐ledfora.Despitetheanticipateddifficultiesinleadingcoordination,UNDPhassignificant advantages with regards to wealth of experience, knowledge and goodrelationshipswithallthestakeholdersintheRoLsector.

Encouragingindigenoussolutions.UNDPshouldstrengthenSouth‐Southcooperationtoexpose the RoL institutions in South Sudan to the good practices in its neighbouringcountrieswithintheIGADregion,thusinspiringthemtoexploreindigenoussolutionsandfigureouthowtousetheirlimitedresourcestoachieverealistictargets.

UNDPshould consider sourcingareaexperts to theRoL institutions fromtheregionandtwin themwithSouthSudanesegovernmentofficers forat least twoyears.ThispracticehasbeenexperimentedwithinPoliceandPrisons,asexpertsinIT,engineeringandfinancearebeinginductedinstrategicareastoenhancecapacitythroughlong‐terminterventions.In the near future, it would be beneficial to have an expert casemanagement specialistmanagingtheJOSSprojectonadailybasistosupportthedigitizationoftheCMS.

Strengthening local ownership. UNDP could consider improving GRSS ownership bybetterfacilitatingtheuseoflocallyengagedstaffandotherlocallysourcedresources.Thecoreprojectmembersshouldregularlyvisitthestatesandbringthemeetingstothestateswhen feasible. This will enhance state working relationships so as to avoid highdependenceonthechangesinnationalgovernment.

43  

2. Recommendations for each evaluation criterion 

Belowaresomerecommendationsbasedonevaluationcriteria:

Relevance

‐ ToallowlocalneedsandprioritiestoplayaroleintheformulationandimplementationofAWPs,theprojectshouldleaveproperroomandtimetoallowtheRoLOsandLEAstoconsult with their counterparts and provide input to the AWPs. UNDP could equallyinfluencethetoplevelleadershipoftheRoLinstitutionstoconsiderintroducingflexibleandconsultativeapproachestocapturetheirowninstitutions’needsatthelocallevels.

Effectiveness 

‐ ItisessentialforstaffinJubatomakeregularvisitstothestates,(1)toconsultwiththelocalpartnersontheeffectiveness,efficiency,coordination,andsynergyofactivities;(2)tocoordinatewithRoLinstitutionsinthestatessoastoclarifythemajorroleofRoLOsandLEAsastechnicalcounterparts,(3)toprovidesupporttosolvetheaccommodationandofficeissuesforIUNVsworkinginthestates.

‐ To improve the sector‐wide effectiveness of training, UNDP should explore a holisticapproach by collaborating with its government counterparts and other trainingproviders,suchasIDLO,todevelopacentralizedandcoordinatedtrainingplanthatwillreflectthetrainingneedsofdifferentRoLinstitutions,andmeetsuchneedsbyengagingavailable training providers based on their comparative advantages. Moreover, astandardized approach to monitoring and evaluating training activities should beadoptedbyallthetrainingprovidersinordertomeasuretrainingresults.

‐ TofurtherimprovetheeffectivenessofsomenewRoLfunctionsandservices,e.g.SPUsandECCs,UNDPshouldconsiderusingsocialmediaand traditionalmedia togenerateawareness of the new service availability to the local communities. It should alsoconsider enhancing cooperationwith other UN agencies at the state level in order toincreasethequalityandmaximizetheuseofthesenewservices.

Efficiency

‐ Onthehumanresourceside,theprojectshouldclearlycommunicatetheresponsibilitiesof the new Project Manager to staff in Juba and in the field in order to enable themaximumuseofthisnewresource.Atthesametime,theCTAsshouldbeabletofocusonprovidingtechnicalandadvisoryservicesatthepolicylevel.

‐ On the financial resource side, the project should consider providing more trainingsessionsinthestatestoenablebroadparticipationinacost‐efficientmanner.

‐ Theproject should initiate a candid conversationwith its counterparts to learn abouttheir plan to deliver UNDP‐sponsored equipment to the states. Rather than simplyhanding over equipment in boxes, UNDP should ensure that the point of use andrelevantusersareidentifiedbeforeinstallationtakesplace.Ifsuchequipmentcannotbedeliveredtothedestinationsorcannotbeeffectivelyusedbythepartners,UNDPshouldavoidprovidingsimilarequipmentinthefuture,butconsultthepartnersforanewlistofequipmentthatcanbefullyutilizedintheintendedusers’workingenvironment.

44  

Management

‐ The project team should develop a ToC to provide a clear results chain to all thestakeholders.SuchaToCshouldanswerthequestionofhowtheactivitiescontributetooutputsandoutcomesineachprojectareaandhowdifferentprojectareascontributetotheshort‐,intermediate‐andlong‐termresultsoftheoverallproject.

‐ To improve project monitoring and reporting and highlight project successes, theprojectshouldconsiderrecruitinganM&Eorareporting/communicationspecialistonthe premise that this will not duplicate the work of the Project Specialist. Such aspecialistshouldundertaketheresponsibilitiesofdevisingacommunicationstrategyforthe project. Following a result‐based reporting structure, the period reports shouldhighlighthowtheactivitiesandoutputsineachprojectareacontributetotheoutcomesofthejusticesectorchain.Inaddition,challengesandlessonslearnedinimplementationshouldbecapturedandfolloweduponinatimelyfashion.Theactionstakentoresolvethesechallengesshouldbewelldocumented.

‐ ThePBshouldplayasignificantoversightroleandenhancedecisionmakingatthemoststrategic level. The project management should avoid having more than one projectboardinordertofosterstrategicdiscussionsandmanagement.

‐ Continuousengagementwithdonors,includingregularupdatesonprojectplanningandimplementation,isimportanttogaindonors’understandingofthechallengesofprojectimplementationandfortheteamtorespondeffectivelytounexpectedchangesintheoperatingenvironment.

‐ UNDP Juba should maintain constant engagement with the headquarters. With fullawareness of the importance of following the standard UNDP procurement rules toallowforaccountability,theprojectshouldobjectivelyreportthechallengesinapplyingthese rules in a country like South Sudan, and seek proper interpretation of theseuniversalrulesfromtheheadquarterstoreflectspecificlocalneeds.

Sustainability

‐ UNDPshouldseriouslyconsideratwo‐to‐three‐yearsurgeinsometargetedareasbeforescaling down the project if the security situation allows it to do so. Such a surgewillensure that certain levels of capacitywill be developed in the targeted areas, so thatafter theproject isclosed, therewillbeagoodchance for therelevantRoLministries,departmentsorunitstooperateonitsown.

‐ UNDPacknowledges the initialsteps takenbygovernment toestablishownershipandsustainability in certain intervention areas, but needs to encourage government’scontributiontowardsplannedactivities.

‐ UNDP should build sustainability mechanisms into the project document to transferskillsandknowledgegraduallyinanticipationofanexitstrategy.Suchanexitstrategyshouldbediscussedwithitscounterpartsalongwiththeplanningandimplementationoftheproject.

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Appendix I. Terms of Reference 

   

46  

Appendix II. Bibliography 

Subject Documents

DevelopmentFrameworks

‐ SouthSudanDevelopmentPlan‐ UnitedNationsDevelopmentAssistanceFramework‐ UNDPCountryProgramDocument(CPD)‐ UNPDCountryProgramActionPlan(CPAP)

ProjectDocumentandAnnualWorkPlans

‐ AccesstoJusticeandRuleofLaw–NetherlandsProposal‐ SupporttoJudiciaryofSouthSudan‐ SupporttoAccesstoJusticeandRuleLawforConflictAffectedPeople

andReturnees(Japan)‐ EmergencysupporttowomenandvulnerablegroupsinConflictAffected

AreasinSouthSudan–PhaseI(Japan)‐ EmergencysupporttowomenandvulnerablegroupsinConflictAffected

AreasinSouthSudan–PhaseII(Japan)‐ JointIntegratedCrisisPreventionandRecoveryProgram(ICPRP)

document(BCPR/BPPS)‐ PoliceIDCardProjectDocumentfundedbyDFIDandtheUNHRD

Taskforcecleareddocument‐ AccesstoJusticeandRuleofLawAnnualWorkPlans(2013,2014,2015)‐ AccesstoJusticeandRuleofLawConflictrelatedDevelopmentAnalysis

Projectreports

‐ AccesstoJusticeandRuleofLawAnnualReports(2013and2014)‐ AccesstoJusticeandRuleofLawMonthlyReports(Oct2014–June

2015)‐ AccesstoJusticeandRuleofLawQuarterlyReports(Oct2013–June

2015)‐ AccesstoJusticeandRuleLawBi‐WeeklyReporttoJapan(April‐May

30,2015)‐ RuleofLawForum,CommunityPolicingOutreachtrainingreportsand

theUniversityofJubaCollegeofLaw(UJCL)progressreports‐ Strategicpaperandconceptnotes

Knowledgeproducts

‐ AscertainmentStudyof14Communities(Volume1–3)‐ TraditionalLeadersTrainingManual‐ NationalAccesstoJusticeandRuleofLawPerceptionSurvey‐ QuarterlyCrimeStatistics(2012–March2015)‐ PrisonRapidAssessment(PhotobookletandNarrativeReport)‐ TransitionalJusticePerceptionSurvey‐ LegalAdvisoryNotes(1–10)

   

47  

Appendix III. List of Key Informants 

Location Institution Name Title

Juba(National)

UNDPTeam

BalazsHorvath CountryDirectorLealemBerhanuDinku TeamLeaderDGSUJulievanDassen Project ManagerSurendraKumarSharma ChiefTechnicalAdvisor,MOIDr.RowlandCole ChiefTechnicalAdvisorMOJ/JOSS

NikkiFrenckenAccesstoJusticeTechnicalCoordinationSpecialist

VicentMuseke RuleoflawofficerGovernmentCounterparts

MOJ

Hon.JeremiahMosesSwakaWani Undersecretary

Hon.FibertoMayuotMareng ProsecutorGeneralHon.StephenKangIllario Headoflegalaid

MOI

GeneralPiengDengKuol TheInspectorGeneralofPoliceLieutenantGeneralAndrewKuol DeputyInspectorGeneralofPolice

BrigadierDavidDutMarial DirectorateofLegalAffairs

ColonelJamesMonday DirectorforMoralOrientationandCommunityPolicing

LieutenantColonelMangar OperationsofficerinchargeoftheEmergencycallcenter

LieutenantColonelAnthonyLegge DeputyDirectorofprisonproduction

LieutenantGeneralJosephSebitMakelele

ChairmanoftheNationalJointRegistrationCommittee

ColonelSamuelGarang OfficerInChargeoftheDataBaseCenter

JOSS

Hon.JusticeReubenMadolArol

DeputyChiefJustice

Hon.JusticeDr.BenjaminBaakDeng

DirectorforResearchandTrainingandJusticeoftheSupremeCourt

Hon.JusticeKurkurLopitaPresidentoftheCourtofappealGreaterEquatoriacircuit

Hon.JusticeDr.JamesAlalaDeng

Hon.JusticeDr.GeriRaimondoLegge

DonorsDepartmentofInternationalDevelopment(DFID)

Dr.PiusJara ConflictAdvisor,PolicyandPeaceBuilding

JapanEmbassy KojiIto EconomicCooperationSectionNetherlandsEmbassy MartijnBeerthuizen

FirstSecretaryPoliticalAffairs,SecurityandRuleofLaw

   

48  

Location Institution Name Title

Juba(National)

OtherUNAgenciesUnitedNationsMissioninSouthSudan(UNMISS)

Dr.FredYiga CommissionerUNPoliceCharlesBent DeputyPoliceCommissionerUNPoliceIrenaAngelova HumanRightsSection

OtherinternationalorganizationsinRoLInternationalDevelopmentLawOrganisation(IDLO)

RomauldoMadvedzenge CountryDirector

EmmanuelJoof TrainingAdvisor

Torit

UNDPTeamAnnetNabaggala LawEnforcementadvisorLuciaGiovani RuleofLawofficer

GovernmentCounterparts

LegalAdministration

Hon.JohnWani, ActingheadofLegalAdministrationHon.AbrahamAwan PublicProsecutorHon.AbrahamArop, LegalCounselandPublicProsecutor

JudiciaryHon.JusticeBolLulWang PresidentoftheHighCourtHon.JusticeKulangJeroboamMacuor

HighCourtJudge

PrisonsMajorGeneralWilliamDengBrigadierAlhajKhamis

Police MajorGeneralEdwardDmitry

PoliceCommissioner,EasternEquatoriaState

Wau

UNDPTeamAlieBSesay RuleofLawOfficer

FionaMuchbetterLawEnforcementAdvisor,WesternBahrelGhazal

GovernmentCounterpartsLegalAdministration

HonBarnabaAkauc Prosecutor

PrisonsBrigadierMichaelButakuArkengelo

ActingStateDirector

BrigadierCeaserTombe DirectorWauCentralPrisons

Police MajorGeneralCholThuchPoliceCommissioner,WesternBahrelGhazal

 

   

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Appendix IV. Survey on Training  

SurveyonUNDPA2J/RoLTraining

Thankyoufortakingthetimetocompletethissurvey.YourfeedbackisimportantforustobetterunderstandtheresultsofthetrainingsessionsconductedundertheAccesstoJusticeandRuleofLawProject.

The survey should take nomore than 10minute to complete.Wewant to assure you that yourresponsesarecompletelyanonymous.Responsestoanonymoussurveyscannotbetracedbacktothe respondent. No personally identifiable information is captured unless you voluntarily offerpersonal or contact information in any of the comment fields. Additionally, your responses arecombinedwiththoseofmanyothersandsummarizedinareporttofurtherprotectyouranonymity.

Nameofyourcurrentorganization:

Yourstate:; Yourgender: Male;Female .

YouparticipatedinUNDPtrainingasastafffrom

MinistryofJustice,

MinistryofInterior,

JudiciaryofSouthSudan,

Customarycourts,or

Civilsocietyorganizations

WhendidyouparticipateintheUNDPtraining?.

Onwhatsubject(s)?.

 

 

AsaresultoftheUNDPtraining…Stronglyagree

Somewhatagree

Neitheragreeordisagree

Somewhatdisagree

Stronglydisagree

A. ThetrainingtopicswererelevanttomyworkwhenIparticipatedinthetraining.

5 4 3 2 1

Ifnot,pleaseexplainwhy?

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Please share your suggestions to similar training in the future:           

                         

                         

                        . 

Thank you!

AsaresultoftheUNDPtraining… Stronglyagree

Somewhatagree

Neitheragreeordisagree

Somewhatdisagree

Stronglydisagree

B. Thetrainingtopicsarestillrelevanttomywork.

5 4 3 2 1

Ifnot,pleaseexplainwhy?

C. Ihaveappliedandusedtheknowledgeandpracticalguidancefromthetrainingdirectlyinmyworkafterthetraining.

5 4 3 2 1

Ifnot,pleaseexplainwhy?

D. MyworkingenvironmentisconductiveformetoapplywhatIhavelearnedtowork.

5 4 3 2 1

Ifnot,pleaseexplainwhy?

E. UNDPtraininghelpsmetoperformmyrolebetteratwork.

Ifnot,pleaseexplainwhy?

F. IhavenoticedimprovementintheperformanceofmycolleagueswhohaveattendedtheUNDPtraining.

5 4 3 2 1

Ifnot,pleaseexplainwhy?