accounting and control in the founding of the new settlements of sierra morena and andalucia,...

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Accounting and controlin the founding of theNew Settlements ofSierra Morena andAndalucia, 1767-72Concha Álvarez-Dardet Espejo , JuanBaños Sánchez-Matamoros & FranciscoCarrasco FenechPublished online: 25 May 2010.

To cite this article: Concha Álvarez-Dardet Espejo , Juan BañosSánchez-Matamoros & Francisco Carrasco Fenech (2002) Accounting andcontrol in the founding of the New Settlements of Sierra Morena andAndalucia, 1767-72, European Accounting Review, 11:2, 419-439, DOI:10.1080/09638180220145678

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The European Accounting Review 2002, 11:2, 419–439

Accounting and control in the founding ofthe New Settlements of Sierra Morena andAndalucia, 1767–72

Concha Alvarez-Dardet Espejo, Juan BanosSanchez-Matamoros and Francisco Carrasco FenechUniversidad Pablo de Olavide

ABSTRACTRecently, a growing literature in accounting history has provided sociological inter-pretations of historical facts in which accounting was involved. Foucault’s govern-mentality concept has contributed to such analysis, speci� cally in 19th and 20thcentury’s cases. However, the analysis of 18th century and, specially, colonialorganizations has not been made yet. Thus, this work is devoted to analyse howaccounting is implicated in the control of a Spanish colonial project. The relationshipsbetween accounting and the enlightened discourses that improved the colonies are clear.Conversely, the role of the resistance in this case allows questioning the refereedaccounting literature in governmentality.

1. INTRODUCTION

Recently, critical studies of accounting history have capitalized on new inter-pretations of the role of accounting in society and government (for example,Hopper and Armstrong, 1991; Miller, 1990; Miller and Napier, 1993). Inparticular, Foucauldian analyses of the evolution of cost accounting techniquesamong nineteenth-century, and to a lesser extent twentieth-century, manufacturersin Britain and the US have occasioned vigorous historical debate amongstaccounting historians. Disagreements have centred around the relevance foraccounting of Foucault’s views on the relationship between power and knowledge(Armstrong, 1994; Neimark, 1994). This paper attempts to extend Foucauldiananalysis beyond the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the eighteenth, inparticular to relate it to the Enlightenment (as in, for example, Carmona et al.,1997); to move beyond cost accounting; and to apply the concept of rationaliza-

Address for correspondenceConcha Alvarez-Dardet Espejo, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Crta. de Utrera,Km. 1., 41013. Seville, Spain. Tel.: ‡34 954 34 93 57; Fax: ‡34 954 34 93 39;E-mail: [email protected]

Copyright # 2002 European Accounting AssociationISSN 0963-8180 print=1468-4497 online DOI: 10.1080=09638180220145678Published by Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd on behalf of the EAA

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tion of government to the role of accounting in governing wisely (Ezzamel et al.,1990; Rose, 1991).

This work uses Foucault’s concept of governmentality to analyse the relation-ships between accounting and governmental discourses in the case of the NewSettlements (NSs) of Sierra Morena and Andalucia, a farming project begun bythe Enlightenment Spanish government in the third quarter of the eighteenthcentury. The control devices used in that context are explained mainly in terms ofthe economic discourses – agronomism, populationism, physiocracy andcameralism – that dominated the government of those days. Moreover, carryingout Enlightenment ideas in agriculture was awkward, because it meant challen-ging the established order. Using primary archival evidence1 gathered fromthe Archivo Historico Nacional (National Historic Archive, AHN), the ArchivoGeneral de Simancas (General Archive of Simancas, AGS), and the Archivo delConde de Campomanes (Archive of the Count of Campomanes, ACC), this papershows the importance of Enlightenment techniques of calculation to the emer-gence of rationality in government in Spain. These techniques were used bygovernmental – especially the military – and private organizations to enhancecontrol, mainly through monitoring performance information. It is the Enlight-enment ethos that explains the new links between government and accounting.

The next section brie� y explains the concept of governmentality. We thenpresent the salient features of the case study, starting with a descriptive summaryof governmental discourses in the Enlightenment Spanish government. We nextpay special attention to the control devices used in the NSs. The � nal sectionoutlines some conclusions and identi� es some weaknesses in the theoreticalframework that will open the discussion to further interpretations and improve-ments in the theory of governmentality.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Governmentality arises as a method for analysing government, assuming thatgoverning is done in a rational way (Dean, 1999). Foucault (1981) contended thatthe eighteenth century witnessed a change in ideas of how to govern that impliedthe development of a strategy of vigilance, rationalization and schematization ofhuman behaviour, and the functional sharing out of individuals in strict and stablespaces, where each one must play a pre-established role. It meant the creation of anew way of government based on discipline and knowledge: discipline in spacesand knowledge about spaces; discipline and knowledge of individuals’ bodies,and discipline and knowledge of individuals’ minds. In this way, knowledge, ortruth; discipline, or power; and ethics in Foucauldian terms are the three pillars ofgovernmentality (Dean, 1999).

Knowledge, as Rose and Miller (1992: 175) argue, ‘is thus central to theseactivities of government and to the very formation of its objects, for governmentis a domain of cognition, calculation, experimentation and evaluation’. The

420 The European Accounting Review

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improving and embracing of such knowledge produces a discourse. Thus,governmental knowledge is used as political rationalities:

the changing discursive � elds within which the exercise of power is conceptualized, themoral justi� cations for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities,notions of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics, and conceptions of theproper distribution of such tasks among secular, spiritual, military and familial sectors.

(Rose and Miller, 1992: 175)

Political rationality, as knowledge, does not simply mean ideas. It covers a vastassemblage of people, theories, projects, experiments and techniques (Rose andMiller, 1992). Also, political rationality is discursive because it needs a languageto explain the rationales that underlie it. But language is more than rhetoric. Itshould be seen, rather, as a kind of intellectual machinery or apparatus forrendering reality thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to politicaldeliberations (Rose and Miller, 1992). The case of the NSs shows how thedifferent rationales present in the Spanish government (mercantilism, cameralism,physiocracy and populationism) were mixed. Each theory understood the Spanishreality from its point of view, but they shared a common ideal of reform.

In governmental terms, subjects who manage political rationalities are knownas experts because of the truth that they possess (Rose and Miller, 1992; Foucault,1994). Experts, on one hand, formulate and thus create new problems for thegovernment by articulating discourses that they call truths. On the other hand,they search for techniques that will allay the resulting worries and concerns. Thepower of the truths that experts enclose in their discourses legitimates thesolutions that they offer (Rose, 1991). For example, the eighteenth-centurySpanish government expert Pedro Rodrõ guez de Campomanes, governmentattorney and promoter of the NSs, re� ected in his writings on how to solve theproblems engendered by the condition of agriculture in Spain under Carlos III.2

The solutions adopted by the government were, in Foucauldian terms, part of theexpert truth that underpinned those political rationales.

These solutions are brought into reality as government programmes. These arenot simply formulations of wishes or intentions. As Rose and Miller (1992: 182)recognize, ‘programmes lay claim to a certain knowledge of the sphere or problemto be addressed’, and this knowledge is used in the name of a particular theory thatbelongs to a discourse, to a particular political rationality. Programmes, then, makesense in terms of the political rationalities that support them (Miller and Rose,1990). Thus, Miller and Rose (1990: 4) pointed out the ‘programmatic character ofgovernmentality’; government elaborates programmes in order to reform reality,since it considers that reality is programmable.

The analysis of government lies in a complex linking of procedures forrepresenting and intervening (Dean, 1999). It makes no sense to think aboutgovernment only in terms of representing. In the same way, it is impossible toexplain action without prior planning. In Foucauldian terms, the techniques of theself were used to intervene in the life of the individual in the name of a discourse

New Settlements of Sierra Morena and Andalucia, 1767–72 421

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(Smart, 1985: 64). From a governmental point of view, technologies of govern-ment intervene in the existence of a population (Rose and Miller, 1992). Thesetechnologies cover ‘the complex of mundane programmes, calculations, tech-niques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities seek toembody and give effect to governmental ambitions’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 177).Technologies of government allow shaping, normalizing and instrumentalizingthe conduct of others in order to achieve the objectives the governors considerdesirable, always working in the name of a government programme.

But Foucault does not specify the links between disciplinary techniques andgovernmentality (Armstrong, 1994: 42). Latour (1987) offers a connectionthrough the concept of action at a distance. By watching over distant placesand persons, powerful actors can successfully enrol and mobilize persons,procedures and artefacts in the pursuit of their goals. Techniques of governmentinvolve ‘the exercise of a form of intellectual mastery made possible by those at acentre having information about persons and events distant from there’ (Millerand Rose, 1990: 9). The information about population � ows to this centre, whichis, in Latour’s terms, a centre of calculation. Government depends upon calcula-tions in one place about how to affect things in another. ‘Events must bemobilized and accumulated in a central locale, where they can be aggregated,compared, compiled and calculated about’ (Rose, 1991: 676). Accounting‘provides a form of knowledge that may have a greater potential for action at adistance than many others. The quantities of accounting inscriptions by no meansentirely secure the legitimacy of accounting as a measure of value’ (Robson,1992: 685) in control terms. Thus, it plays a key role as a means of controllingindividuals through the management of information, creating a powerful tool inthe hands of government.

Foucault does not conceptualize power purely as domination, and emphasizesthe dualism between power and freedom (Foucault, 1994: 284–5). To exert powerin the name of the technologies of the self implies freedom. In governmentalterms, freedom ‘was also an indispensable element for the functioning of thestate . . . [because the individual] . . . was to be constituted in a � eld of freedom,governed by an ethic which has as its goal to produce subjectivities of the self ’(Miller, 1987: 210–11). The characteristic ethos of Enlightenment governmentsconstricted the freedom of the individual to Enlightenment norms by starting froma precise and concrete knowledge about him=her. However, government proposalswere designed to improve the individual’s prosperity, longevity and, among otherbene� ts, health. The NSs demonstrate how deep was this knowledge and how itwas used to lead individuals and, as a consequence, populations to desiredobjectives through government programmes and techniques of calculation.

3. THE SETTING

The Enlightenment for Foucault implies a period in which man rewrote the world,God and him(self ) (Foucault, 1991; Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983).3 The conse-


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quences of that period pervade twenty-� rst-century society yet. From a politicalperspective it meant a change in the way that individuals thought. Adherents ofthe Enlightenment rebelled against the traditional ethos, and against the nobilityand clergy as leaders in that ethos. Thus, and for example, the reform of theAncien Regime in the eighteenth century implied (1) the removal of clericalpower; (2) the rendering impotent of the last feudal in� uences over the agrariansociety; and (3) the improvement of education in Enlightenment values andculture (Domõ nguez Ortiz, 1990).

However, in the search for the new ideals it was necessary to have an absoluteand unchallenged power to put into practice the ways to attain them. As Maravallpointed out, ‘that power belonged to the King’ (1991: 455). The reformers’hazardous task of overthrowing the Ancien Regime made it necessary for them tograsp that power, and they used their vast knowledge to locate themselves asclose to the King as his advisers. They occupied a variety of jobs that allowedthem to develop (royal) decisions. The reformers resembled experts who usedtheir political rationalities in the name of the king to discover problems and solvethem using their knowledge. They legitimated their decisions with sentences like‘the royal aim is devoted to the best ways’ or ‘the King cannot do harm’ (Lluch,2000: 715). Thus the despotic character of the Enlightenment resembles earlierattitudes.

Enlightenment proposals were based on modern conceptions of the state inwhich knowledge and discourses were important (Foucault, 1991). There werethree dominant discourses in Enlightenment Spain: (1) cameralism, a late form ofmercantilism (originally it came from Prussia); (2) agronomy, which emphasizedthe need for a large population of small farmers to improve agriculture and lay thegroundwork for industry; and (3) physiocracy, which advocated larger farms witheconomies of scale. Physiocracy had a relatively slight in� uence over Spanishreformist discourse (Gonzalez Gonzalez, 1990); thus, the Spanish Enlightenmentaimed mainly to update the productive techniques of agriculture and to reorganizethe trade with the Spanish American colonies (Lluch, 2000). These objectives,based on cameralism, populationism and agronomy, in� uenced the NSs.

All these discourses in� uenced colonialism. Oliveras (1998: 67–9) describescolonialism as ‘a response to the mercantilist and generally agronomic discoursesthat dominated the last third of the eighteenth century’. In this way, the case of theNSs shows a parallel with the North American colonization of Savannah in 1733or the practice in Pennsylvania c. 1720 regarding land distribution (Oliveras,1998).

The development of colonialism pointed out an essential relationship betweengovernment and information in America and Europe. Contemporary commenta-tors like Von Justi, Bielfeld or Sonnefelds, who in� uenced the Spanish reformers,thought that information was a means to exert action at a distance:

a vital link is constructed between a politics of calculated administration of thepopulation – with the ends of wealth, public order, virtue and happiness – and


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information. There can be no well-ordered political machinery or enlightened admin-istration, they argue, without a knowledge of the state of the population, and thenumbering of persons, goods, activities, births, crimes, deaths and much else providesthe material on which administrative calculation can operate.

(Rose, 1991: 676)

The army signi� cantly in� uenced the development of colonies. Cameralistsconsidered the army as a main cause of waste in the royal treasury but also as theway to maintain colonies; thus they sought to make the army more ef� cient.Army accountants were employed in the most in� uential industries (see, e.g.,Carmona et al., 1997). At the same time, engineers and surveyors played animportant role in improving land management by translating the ideas of themilitary camp to the colonies (Foucault, 1984; Lluch, 2000). The Prussian modeldeveloped by Frederick II between 1740 and 1780 used soldiers to support asuccessful colonization involving over 300,000 settlers in Silesia (Germany). Thismodel spread out to the rest of Europe and affected the NSs (Lluch, 2000;Oliveras, 1998).

As Maravall (1991: 457) indicated, an important concept of Enlightenmentdiscourse was uniformity. ‘In the theoretical and administrative writings of theepoch terms such as ‘‘uniform’’ and ‘‘uniformity’’ were repeated over and overagain’. The idea of homogenization manifested in different forms. For example,there were proposals to split Spain into different zones of the same dimensionscalled ‘Number 1, Number 2, etc.’ (Maravall, 1991: 457). As will be noted below,the NSs were a clear example of uniformity. Every settler would receive the sameallotment in order to reach the ‘desired happiness’ (see, e.g., Article 40 of theFuero de Poblacion, the main rule of the NSs).

However, the government lacked � nancial resources to put in practice acomprehensive deployment of its planned reforms and, thus, focused on someparticular areas (e.g., agriculture). For example, the town councils collectedtaxes, and if the town interests diverged from those of the central government,the town council could underreport or misrepresent residents’ assets to under-mine the government aims (Maravall, 1991). As a consequence, the reformersimplemented only a few reform proposals. One of these projects was the NSs.Agronomism, populationism and cameralism, as part of the Enlighten-ment discourse, drove the establishment and development of the NSs(Perdices, 1995).

The NSs and the appointment of Pablo de Olavide

The NSs were placed in an isolated royal property through which ran the silverroute from the harbour of Cadiz to Madrid. This 700-km route crossed Spainfrom the south coast to Madrid, through what are now the southern provinces ofSeville, Cordoba, Jaen and Ciudad Real. Until the colonies were built, this routewas notorious for attacks on bullion transports.


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The person appointed by the government of Carlos III to manage the two NSswas the Spaniard Pablo de Olavide, who was born in Lima in 1725. Afterreceiving two different of� cial appointments in the town of Lima, in 1754Olavide went to Spain. During the following years (1757–65) he travelledacross Europe, acquiring a high level of training in economics, especiallyagronomy and philosophy; maintaining relationships with European intellectualsincluding Voltaire and Mirabeau (Deforneaux, 1990); studying Enlightenmentideas; and acquiring a vast library (Perdices, 1995).

When he came back to Spain, given his wealth,4 his knowledge and hisbrilliance, he quickly made his way in the Court of Carlos III. The revolt ofEsquilache in 1766, in which the poor and disabled had to be suppressed by thearmy, provoked a signi� cant change in the government of Carlos III. The Countof Aranda, newly appointed as president of the Consejo de Castilla (Council ofCastile), and Campomanes, the Council’s attorney, procured for Olavide anappointment as director of a new hospice at Madrid (Deforneaux, 1990: 130).

When the New Settlements were founded – partly with funds con� scated uponthe expulsion of the Jesuits, another consequence of the revolt of Esquilache –Olavide was the obvious candidate to become Superintendent, the settlements’highest authority (AHN, Inquisicion, Box 3.608). First, he was rich and hebelonged to the highest social class. Second, his knowledge and brillianceclassi� ed him as ‘enlightened’. Third, he had demonstrated his ability in themanagement of the Hospice of Madrid. Finally, he had the support of the Countof Aranda and Campomanes, as they both made clear in letters to the Council ofCastile (AHN, Gobernacion, Box 2.152, No. 5). In 1767, Olavide was given aninitial period of two years to establish the NSs, with the support of an appointedarmy composed of 130 soldiers. Simultaneously, he was designated quartermastergeneral of the Army in Andalucia. As quartermaster, he carried out an admin-istrative task inside the Army, but he never belonged to it, working, in general, asa manager and politician. He attempted to deploy control of the money resourcesof the Army in Andalucia (AHN, Inquisicion, Box 3.600), knowing its structuresand control systems.

The � rst stages of the New Settlements, 1767 to April 1769

The NSs constituted a governmental project with two main objectives. On oneside, it tried to ensure the economic feasibility of farms established using newfarming techniques, such as new ploughs taken from England and France, andcrop rotation on a four-part cycle (Perdices, 2000). On the other side, it attemptedto develop a new population and society, establishing the appropriate structures toensure the social viability of the settlements. As part of the project, specialattention was paid to details such as the size of pieces of land for the settlers inorder to create Campomanes’s dreamed-of new middle-ranking agrarian society(Lluch, 2000). Attention also was paid to teaching activity in order to implement


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the social and cultural values of the Enlightenment. The employees of the NSswere chosen for their ability to enhance the new farming techniques.

To achieve these objectives, Olavide drew upon two contemporary socialstructures, military and municipal. The military structure was used to designsystems of � nancial management and project control. The municipal structure ofthe villages was applied to satisfy the social needs of the new towns that wouldbe built in the NSs. Olavide also got access to resources available from his postas quartermaster. He specially resorted to accountants and treasurers from theArmy. He also copied some typical Army posts – paymasters, inspectors, warcommissioners – developing their functions in the same way that they werede� ned in the Army (Deforneaux, 1990; Perdices, 1995).

From the early stages of the NSs, Olavide tried to control all the economic andmaterial resources of the colonies, so military discipline was a really good model;Foucault (1984) identi� ed the military as among the most disciplined structuresof the eighteenth century. The organizational scheme of the NSs during the period1767–72 was as follows: the superintendent, who appointed two sub-delegates,one for the New Settlements of Sierra Morena and another for those ofAndalucia, dominated the management hierarchy (see Figure 1). From there, ahierarchical line was drawn through Directors and Inspectors to the new farmersor settlers. Only after 1772, as the colonies became self-supporting, were thedirectors and inspectors replaced by mayors chosen by the settlers themselves.

In the meantime, Olavide called the NSs a ‘well-adjusted machine’ (Letter fromOlavide to the Count of Aranda, 27 September 1769, AHN, Gobernacion, Box328), implying highly de� ned roles in the structure. To avoid problems that couldmodify the objectives, the disciplinary and � nancial–administrative controls were

Figure 1 The organizational structure of NSs through a current days’ representation (ownelaboration)


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well de� ned and written in rules called Instrucciones (Instructions), such as theInstruction for Inspectors that is analysed below. These instructions covered allthe work that the employees had to do to achieve the settlements’ objectives. Theyalso legitimated the authority of such employees to exert power in the NSs.

Olavide used the structure of mid-eighteenth-century Spanish villages, whichwere headed by mayors who were responsible for public functions. Thus, eachvillage in the NSs had certain standard of� cial roles (except for the mayor, whoin the early years of the NSs was replaced by the director): the parroco (priest),the medico y cirujano (doctor and surgeon), the maestros (teachers for children)and the guardalmacen (storekeeper) (AHN, Inquisicion, Box 3.604).

The NSs had an overarching rule that covered all the key essentials of theproject, expressing the political rationalities of the reformers under Carlos III.That rule was the Fuero de Poblacion, written by Campomanes and Olavide andpublished in July 1767. The Fuero set out the organizational structure: the controlsystem of the NSs and the distribution of the land.

After the reformers chose the areas to be developed for the NSs, a highlydetailed study was made of the areas’ natural resources,5 identifying themountains, rivers, lakes and soils suited to different seeds (Oliveras, 1998) todetermine whether these really were good zones. In order to organize theforecasted large population of the NSs (Oliveras, 1998), the spatial organizationof the land followed military control procedures and the design of military forts.Olavide took with him as military engineers Simon Desnaux (Captain of theEngineers Corps), Carlos Lemaur and Joseph Branly. All of them came fromoutside Spain – Desnaux and Lemaur from France and Branly from Holland(Oliveras, 1998). These military engineers divided up the land, following theFuero, which established two spatial structures, feligresõas (parishes6) anddepartamentos (departments). The parish was the basic administrative unitunder the control of the director. The departments constituted the minimalproductive units and were the responsibility of the inspectors. The departmenthad between � fteen and thirty allotments of land, each with its house. Each familyof settlers received its allotment of land and house (Article 6 of the Fuero). Eachparish was divided methodically into three, four or � ve departments (Arts 14–15),and minimal distances were established between parishes – around 6.5 kmdepending on the orography and the productivity of the land (Art. 13). Also,the Fuero forbade the acceptance of settlers from nearby villages in order to avoiddepopulating them (Art. 31).

This distribution was designed under the strict ideas of order and rationalitythat the reformers wanted to impose as a social model. In order to facilitate themanagement of and accounting for the NSs, the Fuero forbade splitting or sellingthe land parcels (Art. 10). Parcels had to be demarcated using signals andlandmarks (Art. 11) registered in the Libros de Distribucion (Distribution Books)of each department (Art. 12). The settlers, mainly Swiss and German, wereaggregated according to their languages so that they could practise their Catholicfaith (Art. 27). Thus, Olavide assumed responsibility for 6,000 settlers from


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Central Europe who had been previously scheduled for the South Americancolonies (Oliveras, 1998) but instead were taken to the NSs.

The Fuero consolidated the operating rules of the new enterprise, giving allpower to the superintendent. Olavide chose the priests of the NSs (Arts 18 and20) and stipulated the bene� ts that would be given to the settlers (Arts 35–49).7

He was free to choose and delegate to any employee, and he could de� ne eachemployee’s salary (Art. 51). All accounting and non-accounting information wasto be delivered to him, with all the ‘clearness and subdivision needed’ (Art. 6).The Fuero established a Contadurõa (Accounting Of� ce) (Art. 3) that shouldregister all the features that the Superintendent speci� ed: a Pagadurõa (PayOf� ce) (Art. 4) to register and audit the cash movements; and the accountingof� ce should map the territory (Art. 26). In this way, Olavide could obtain theinformation he needed to govern the colonies; as, for example, a 1769 studycalculated the daily cost of a bed in the hospital of the NSs (AGS, Secretarõa ySuperintendencia de Hacienda, Box 498). The Instruccion de Contadurõa(Accounting Of� ce Instruction), which ruled the functions of the AccountingOf� ce, was steeped in Enlightenment discourses, especially agronomy andpopulationism. For example, the Accounting Of� ce was required to managethe census of the population using the Libro de Poblacion (Book of Population)(Art. 2 of the Accounting Of� ce Instruction) and to manage the land registryusing the Libro de Becerros (Book of Cows) (Art. 3 of the Fuero).

Taken together the Fuero and the Accounting Of� ce Instruction contained allthe rules for governing the new enterprise. However, operative control was not yetde� ned. The Instruccion que deben observar los Inspectores (AHN, Inquisicion,Box 3.601) (Instruction for the Inspectors), like the Fuero and Accounting Of� ceInstruction, followed Enlightenment rationality, explaining in detail how the NewSettlements were to be managed with the comprehensive control necessary toachieve their objectives.

The Instruction for the Inspectors detailed how to apply the new farmingtechniques and exercise daily control. To enhance productivity a minimal area ofground was stipulated which settlers had to break up each day. Settlers wereorganized in work teams, coached by the inspector. These groups had to clear allthe parcels, at least one parcel per day. The work was organized to allow visualcontrol of the task: settlers were disposed in a single line so the inspector couldsee everyone at his task at every moment. A standard duty (the media tarea) wasestablished, after the completion of which each settler could go back to his ownland. If the settler did not complete his standard duty he could be penalized in anumber of ways, including carrying shackles and imprisonment. As a lesson toothers, the punishment was usually exercised at times of public festivity (AHN,Inquisicion, Box 3.601). Thus, one of the sub-delegates reported that ‘[the idlesettlers] who do not work the land have been incarcerated’ (AHN, Inquisicion,Box 3.601).

A military discipline was enforced over the settlers, for, as Olavide pointedout: ‘for the settlers to work, they have to be industrious, taking off all the


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possible ways to distract them’ (AHN, Inquisicion, Box 3.601). Accordingly, theInspector could prevent the settlers from leaving their department without awritten licence. Also, settlers were forbidden to engage in any type ofcommercial agreement with the nearby villages, nor could a settler work as alabourer for another settler. If any settler broke any of these rules, he could beimprisoned.

Keeping accurate records was the key to the control system. The settler was anessential variable to control. Each settler was easy to quantify and verify, so thatsettlers could be used as a measure. Thus, the control system of the NSs waserected to get standards of performance.

Upon the settlers’ arrival in Spain their agricultural skills and religion werechecked. If a settler was not Catholic or not a farmer he was rejected, as appearsin the monthly check reports that the Accounting Of� ce received (AHN,Inquisicion, Box 3.601). After the checks were made, the pay of� cer of theport signed a receipt for the settlers delivered in each consignment, describing thenumber and type of settlers received by age, gender, status in the family,provenance, skills and religion. These lists were used as passports. Theyauthorized the settlers to reach the colonies (AHN, Inquisicion, Box 3.600) –and allowed the contractor who brought them to Spain to be paid in cash. Oncethe settlers passed all the assessments, everyone was given a number andallocated to a group on its way to the NSs of either Sierra Morena or Andalucia(as it is re� ected in a 1767 letter of one of the employees at the harbours; AHN,Inquisicion, Box 3.600).

Once the settlers arrived at their destinations, they were checked again andassigned to their parcels. Following a procedure laid down in a November 1768Accounting Of� ce report, of� cials entered the information from the settlers whohad arrived, and the details of the parcel assigned, on a record card in theAccounting Of� ce and in the Of� ce of the Secretary (AHN, Inquisicion, Box3.606). The � le containing those cards was called the Libro de Registro(Registration Book). Monthly, the pay of� ces in each port made summaries ofthe settlers who arrived. These were then checked against the � les managed bythe Accounting Of� ce and the Of� ce of the Secretary.

According to the Instruction, the inspector was responsible for conducting adetailed census of each parcel and each family, each of which was located on amap with an identifying number. Settlers were required to know their number andto provide it whenever requested. The inspector registered all this information inthe Libro de Distribucion (Distribution Book), which had on its � rst page a mapof the department (see Figure 2). The following pages of that Distribution Bookcontained information on each parcel, with details (age, gender, kinship) aboutthe family that occupied it. The last page of the Distribution Book had a summaryof all the parcels, showing occupied and empty ones. The purpose of thisinformation was to provide a fair idea of the population for a General Census,as well as a clearer sense of the settlers of the department to enhance theeffectiveness of the inspector’s control.


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Once the settlers were living on their allotted land, the control over theminvolved three elements. The Inspector, as has been seen, managed their dailywork; the Paymaster managed all their acquisitions and all deliveries to them;and Olavide sometimes assumed direct control over the settlers. The inspectorsreported every four days, using a standardized statement that suppliedinformation about births, deaths, deserters and new arrivals, as one of thesub-delegates of the NSs corroborated in a letter to Olavide (AHN, Inquisi-cion, Box 3.601). Drawing on this information, the paymaster updated hisarchives. The war commissioners were in charge of making monthly checks.Every month, they sent to the Accounting Of� ce the distribution of all thesettlers by age, gender, parcels and departments (for example, the reportfor November 1768 that can be found in AHN, Inquisicion, Box 3.601).The Of� ce of the Secretary received the reports from the hospital, takingaccount of births and deaths. The priests also brought information to theOf� ce of the Secretary about marriages, births and deaths. Monthly, the Of� ceof the Secretary, the paymaster, and the Accounting Of� ce updated theirrecords, making all the changes needed to co-ordinate these � les. This checkwas expressly ordered by Olavide, who thought that this system of co-ordination was the only way to know at any moment the census of the settlers(AHN, Inquisicion, Box 3.604).

Figure 2 Distribution Book (Source: AHN, Inquisicion, box 3.601)


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In the � rst stages of the NSs, the settlers were fed through the bread and prestsystem. This system, based upon military practice of delivering a daily piece ofbread and a monthly sum of money to soldiers (Terron, 1997), gave each settleran amount of bread and a regular payment ( prest) free of charge until householdswere able to work the land and obtain the harvest needed to sustain them. Breadand prest were given every four days, and the paymaster and the inspector � leda report called the Ajustamiento (Tally) (AHN, Inquisicion, Box 3.601; seeFigure 3), summarizing the bread and money spent in the department, withcalculations about the daily expenditure on each settler. Daily allowances of breadand prest were arranged at three levels according to age: under ten years old,between ten and sixteen years old, and over sixteen years old.

Settlers in the hospital also received a daily allowance of prest and bread.Monthly, the paymaster submitted a statement that classi� ed the settlers bydepartments and parishes, describing new entries as either newly arrived settlersor births, while any blanks were attributable to deaths or desertions. The reportconcluded with a balance of the number of settlers against the bread and prestdelivered. Olavide, as the of� cial ultimately responsible for the NSs and as thecash-drawer, received a copy of this report, which he used to make out the bills ofexchange to pay the bread and prest to the paymaster for the next month. Andagain, he used this report to get an exact idea of the census by department andparish. Given the weight of bread and prest in the total expenditure, it was strictlycontrolled. A copy of this report was sent to the Accounting Of� ce so that it couldregister for future payment the bills of exchange that Olavide used as promissorynotes (AHN, Inquisicion, Box 3.603).

Once the settlers were able to harvest, it was necessary to control their returns.In particular, it was essential to know whether the settlers could sustainthemselves. In the early years, at the beginning of each autumn, the storekeeper

Figure 3 Tally translation (Source: AHN, Inquisicion, Box 3.601)


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delivered the seeds to the inspector, � lling out a document specifying the seedsdelivered and the settler who received them. The settler signed his con� rmation ofthe delivery and made himself responsible for it. Once the settler obtained hisharvest in the following summer, he carried it to a threshing � oor, where aquantity of seeds equal to those delivered the autumn before was split off from therest and returned to the storekeeper; the remainder the settler kept. Takingaccount of all this information, the inspector � lled a statement reporting thereturns of his department. The Accounting Of� ce received these data andsummarized them for the entire parish. Finally, Olavide received the informationabout sown seeds and gathered harvests, distributed by parishes (an example ofsuch a report can be seen in Figure 4).

Figure 4 Original and translation of the resume of seeds sown and harvested (Source:AHN, Inquisicion, box 3.601). Note: The fanega is a measure of extent. It covers around5.945 sq. m. (note of the authors)


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Olavide knew the settlers’ harvest capacities and the needs for bread andprest of those who were still non-productive (AHN, Inquisicion, Boxes 3.606and 3.607). On 22 May 1772, Olavide sent a letter to the Minister of the RoyalTreasury in which he explained a practice he had begun in 1770, of classifyingthe settlers into three groups. First, those who had obtained ample harvests andshould repay the seeds advanced the autumn before. Second, those who hadobtained minor harvests and need not return the seeds advanced. Finally, settlerswho had obtained only a tiny harvest. For these last, Olavide decided to deliveragain the bread and prest system – but without specifying that these settlers wereuseful to the colonies. In 1770 he had tolerated such low harvests (on grounds ofthe disruptions in production explained below); now, however, he felt that thosesettlers should be dismissed (AHN, Inquisicion, Box 3.606) – and, some monthslater, he did decide to dismiss them (AHN, Inquisicion, Box 3.605).

The collapse and reorganization of the New Settlements,April 1769 to 1772

Two main complaints about the NSs reached the Council of Castile. One of themcame from the villages near the NSs. In accordance with the Fuero, the NSscon� scated some properties along their borders, creating con� icts between thecolonies and the former owners of these lands (see, e.g., the complaint sent to theCouncil of Castile by the neighbour Juan Plazides in AHN, Inquisicion, Box3.601). The other complaint came from Joseph Yauch, one of the centralEuropeans who transported the settlers to the colonies. Yauch criticized employ-ees’ bad manners towards the settlers in a letter sent to the Council of Castile,14 March 1769 (AHN, Gobernacion, Box 328). The Council created a committeethat decided to send a Visita, an audit of the NSs, in order to clarify various pointsrelated to these complaints: ‘the money spent in the project; the mode in whichthe employees do their work, the complaints of the nearby villages, and themanners [of these employees] towards the settlers’ (Report of the Committeeabout the New Settlements, November 1769, AHN, Gobernacion, Box 2.152).The person appointed to develop the Visita – the Visitador,8 Pedro Perez Valiente,who was Professor of Law at the University of Granada (Deforneaux, 1990) –arrived at the NSs in April 1769, removed Olavide from his post, and received fullauthority from the Council of Castile to modify arrangements that violated theFuero (see note 8). Once Olavide moved away from the NSs, the Visitador alteredsome of the superintendent’s arrangements. He moved an established parish fromone place to another; veri� ed the money invested in the NSs, negotiated someconcessions to the colonies’ neighbours, and made a detailed description of theNew Settlements. However, at the same time, he undermined the authority of theinspectors in front of the settlers by criticizing their disciplinary methods(explained above in connection with the Instruction for Inspectors). Also, hedecided to locate more than 200 settlers in a barrack that provoked a high level ofillness and mortality, which also extended to the inspectors caring for them


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(AHN, Inquisicion, Box 3.606). As a consequence, in some departments, thesettlers rebelled against the inspectors, and some inspectors deserted (see, forexample, Olavide’s letters to the inspectors, in AHN, Inquisicion, Boxes 2.467and 3.608). Thus, the information system collapsed because it was impossible forthe inspectors to collect detailed information.

The Visitador � nished his work in July 1769. Olavide came back to thecolonies and reported to the Count of Aranda, ‘Respecting the advance of thecolonies, in the construction of houses, as in the land work, there is a harmfuldelay . . . there is no way to explain how the settlers rebelled; how they have losttheir respect and obedience’. There was a high level of disorder and misunder-standing ‘in the rest of the government and administration’; the NSs, previouslydescribed by Olavide as ‘a well-adjusted machine’, were now a ‘machine thatgoes to its own destruction’ (letter from Olavide to the Count of Aranda, 27September 1769, AHN, Gobernacion, Box 328).

Once Olavide got a sense of the situation, he blocked all the gateways of thecolonies through a royal decree of 13 October 1769 that ‘everyone who seems tobe a foreigner without a passport can be detained and taken back to the colonies’(AHN, Inquisicion, Box 3.608). He decided to make a detailed census andrelocated employees and settlers in their respective roles as before the Visita(AHN, Inquisicion, Box 3.603).

4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study examines Foucault’s notion of governmentality in the process ofimplementation of the NSs. Governmentality helps to explain how discoursesreach the government and how the thoughts framed by discourses are brought intoreality. Those discourses are always seeking to capture the government, andFoucault offered a superior explanation of the dynamics of discourses ingovernmental terms (see Hoskin and Macve, 2000). The case of the NSs re� ectshow Enlightenment discourses developed rules in whose practical applicationaccounting played an essential role.

The NSs, as a governmental experiment, sought to perform a social andagrarian model based on Enlightenment paradigms. As an experiment, the projectattempted to control all relevant variables, such as settlers, seeds sown, harvestsgathered, land distributed and resources invested in the NSs. Campomanes, as anexpert in the cameralist and agronomic discourses of the Enlightenment ration-alities, endeavoured to discover problems and support solutions; he consideredthe NSs as an experimental solution for the problem of agriculture. Thus, inaccord with these discourses, the colonies were regulated through the Fuero. Thedespotic character of Enlightenment governments supported experimentation inorder to hold out solutions to the problems uncovered in the name of theirpolitical rationalities.

From a Foucauldian perspective, the NSs are the output of political rationalitiescarried out through a governmental programme and supported by techniques of


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government (Rose and Miller, 1992). The Fuero, as that programme, was used toenact the reformers’ political rationalities. It brought into reality a new middle-ranking social class. By using new farming techniques to improve the productiv-ity of the land, it enabled both population growth and self-suf� ciency in thesettlements. It made logic, order and homogeneity the colonies’ guides. The dailycontrol of the settlers was legitimated through the Instruction for Inspectors,whose aims (economic and social control of settlers) de� ned the department asthe operative centre of the colonies, and gave the authority over them to theinspectors, who improved the implementation of new farming techniques throughtechniques of government.

The NSs reveal the governmental techniques (Rose and Miller, 1992) used toput political rationalities into practice. The control of the project was based onthree variables: the individual, the distribution of the population and productivity.Upon arrival, the settlers were checked to determine their ability to serve theproject’s aims. A military system was implemented to establish and manage thesettlers in their respective departments. These departments were the centres ofcalculation (Latour, 1987) through which all three variables were controlled. AsRobson (1992) pointed out, accounting played an important role because of itsability to render those variables thinkable and, as a consequence, controllable.Rose (1991) remarks that Enlightenment of� cials believed in control mechanismsas the way to manage the population. They used the census of population in thisway. In a less direct way, during the � rst stages of the NSs, they used the breadand prest system and its reports to manage population and to run the resources inone of the main cost headings. The settler’s productivity was measured and usedto check his ability with the new farming techniques, to determine his degree ofself-suf� ciency and to weed out undesirable elements.

These re� ections are corroborated in the Visita. The Visitador replacedOlavide, removing his powers and making decisions that were not in agreementwith those of the previous manager. In this way, the Visitador undermined theauthority of inspectors and, indirectly, the functions developed at the AccountingOf� ce of rendering the world thinkable (Robson, 1992). The centres of calcula-tion rooted in the inspectors disappeared because information no longer � owed tothem and to the Accounting Of� ce. Action at a distance was not working becausewithout that information it was impossible to know the situation of the settlers. Inthe absence of accounting, the world cannot be thinkable and no decisions can betaken. As a consequence, the order and rigidity of the NSs could not bemaintained, the concept of the machine in the NSs was damaged, and theFuero was at stake. In response to the Visitador’s distrust of them, the inspectorshad relaxed the disciplinary control over the colonists, which had been the maindevice to procure order. When Olavide regained power, he re-established all thathad gone because of the Visita; he closed the frontiers of the NSs, recounted thesettlers and re-established the inspectors, recovering the legitimation of the NSsand, therefore, of the Enlightenment order. Meanwhile, as a consequence, thediscourse focused on the control system to prove that control was broken, makingsense of an inconsistency between the discourse and its reality.


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This inconsistency between the discourse and its reality opens the opportunityfor a deeper analysis. As we said at the beginning, this case has not been studiedbefore from an accounting point of view. This allows for further research. Thedisciplinary control over the settlers and their resistance together create a situationwhere governmentality does not offer a clear explanation. As Armstrong pointedout, ‘little attention has so far been paid in the governmentality studies toresistance and the material practices of power’ (1994: 42–3). Just as Foucaultanalysed resistance in his Panopticon model, it could be interesting to appreciatethe disciplinary techniques used in the NSs in the framework of resistance.Potentially, this case enables in-depth study of the role of legitimation in therelationships between power and knowledge. Such in-depth study would make itable to explain this whole case through the Foucauldian frame. The Visita periodis remarkable for research that uses Foucault’s disciplinary model of thePanopticon (1984) to specify, in terms of accounting, exactly what role wasplayed by the governed in the Panopticon structures of eighteenth-centuryorganizations. Olavide, as superintendent, understood that during this earlyperiod in the settlements’ development, the government’s prime objective mustbe to establish that system. Perhaps because of his own colonial background, heunderstood that the system depended on maintaining both the goodwill of theforeign settlers and the authority of the inspectors. Unlike the Visitador, he neveroverrode an inspector’s interpretation of the Instruction. The inspectors were hismain source of information, and Olavide had a deep faith in his informationsystem – he once boasted in a letter to the Count of Aranda that in less than anhour he could get all the information he needed on any given settler (AHN,Inquisicion, Box 3.608). This assertion makes clear the detailed information thatOlavide received about the settlers and the spirit of control that pervaded theinformation system that Olavide had.

Furthermore, the control systems used in both the NSs and the army introducean opportunity for institutional theory: what made possible such similaritiesbetween the two organizations? This opens the case for a deeper explanation ofthe NSs and their relationships with one of the most disciplinarian organizationsof the eighteenth century. Also, the spatial similarities between the developmentof the NSs and the creation of the states in the US – as Oliveras (1998) claims –invite study of the role of accounting in both cases, which could be analysedthrough institutional theory.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors are grateful to Professors Michael Gaf� kin and Warwick Funnell fortheir constructive comments. They would also like to thank the two anonymousreferees and, not least, the editors of this issue of the European AccountingReview, for their support and constructive comments at various stages. Theauthors remain responsible for mistakes and the views expressed. Supported(in part) by: SEJ-0111, SEC2001-2633 and PB97-1358.


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NOTES

1 Primary sources are noted henceforward as: Name of Archive, Section, box no. TheAHN is a state public archive located in Madrid (Spain) that contains twenty boxesabout the NSs. The bulk of them are grouped in two sections called Inquisicion(Inquisition) and Consejos (Councils). The AGS is a state public archive located inSimancas (Valladolid, Spain) that contains three boxes about the NSs and StateCouncils. They are grouped in a section called Secretaria y Superintendencia deHacienda (Secretary Of� ce and Superintendence of the Royal Treasury). The ACC is astate public archive located in Oviedo (Spain) that contains the correspondencebetween the manager of the NSs in their early stages and one of the attorneys of theSpanish government during the closing years of the eighteenth century. Access to thewhole of the material is allowed and it can be reproduced.

2 Campomanes tried to develop an institution called the Sociedad (Society) in whoseprospectus he wrote, ‘Agriculture is simple in its operations, but it requires a particularattention from the government, and a general regulation about the ways to improve it.As the government protects it, so the nation’s wealth grows . . .’ (Campomanes, 1762;quoted in Llombart, 1976: 68).

3 Foucault used the metaphor of Velasquez’s picture Las Meninas where the man isconsidered as both painter and painted, as observer and observed (Dreyfus andRabinow, 1983).

4 Because he was rich, he did not receive any payment from the government, as is statedin the list of employees of the NSs in 1768 (AHN, Inquisicion, Box 3.604).

5 The NSs covered around 324 sq. km (Deforneaux, 1990).6 This was similar to the ‘parish’ in Louisiana, a US governmental and geographical unit

like a county in other US states (Oliveras, 1998).7 ‘. . . Each family will receive a pickaxe; a mattock; a torch; a hammer; a plough and

such other tools as Pablo de Olavide may approve [Art. 40]; 2 cows; 5 sheep; 5 fowls;1 chicken and a fertile pig [Art. 41]; the � rst year will be delivered to them the seeds toget the harvest; rough crockery; 2 blankets; a portion of hempen cloth; wool andesparto . . .’ (Fuero, Madrid, 1767).

8 The Visitador, as an of� cial post, had to verify if the rules (in this case the Fuero)were applied to the projects. However, in this case, his task was limited to the threemandates of the committee. Also, his authority was limited to the New Settlements,without access to other powers that Olavide had, as for example, quartermaster ofthe army.

REFERENCES

Primary sources

Archive of the Count of Campomanes, Bundle XL.General Archive of Simancas, Section: Secretarõa y Superintendencia de Hacienda, Box

498.Fuero de Poblacion (1767) Madrid: Antonio Sanz Printing.National Historic Archive, Section: Gobernacion, Boxes 328 and 2.152, Nos. 2–5.National Historic Archive, Section: Inquisicion, Boxes 3.600, 3.601, 3.603, 3.604, 3.605,

3.606, 3.607 and 3.608.


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Dean, M. (1999) Governmentality. Power and Rule in Modern Society. London: Sage.Deforneaux, M. (1990) Pablo de Olavide el afrancesado. Sevilla: Padilla Libros.Domõ nguez Ortiz, A. (1990) ‘Sociedad y Hacienda durante el reinado de Carlos III’, in

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Gonzalez Gonzalez, J. M. (1990) ‘Campomanes y Jovellanos ante los problemas demodernizacion del Antiguo Regimen’, in Carlos III y la Hacienda Publica. HaciendaPublica Espanola n. 2. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Ministerio de Economõ ay Hacienda.

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Miller, P. and Napier, C. (1993) ‘Genealogies of calculation’, Accounting, Organizationsand Society, 18(7=8): 631–47.

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Perdices, L. (2000) ‘Agronomõ a y Fisiocracia en la obra de Pablo de Olavide’, in FuentesQuintana, E. (ed.) Economõa y Economistas espanoles, 3: La Ilustracion. Barcelona:Galaxia Gutemberg. Cõ rculo de Lectores.

Robson, K. (1992) ‘Accounting numbers as ‘‘inscription’’: action at a distance and thedevelopment of accounting’, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 17(7): 685–708.

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accounting and control in the founding of the new settlements of sierra morena and andalucia,...

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