aceh: can autonomy stem the conflict? · aceh: can autonomy stem the conflict? executive summary...

ACEH: CAN AUTONOMY STEM THE CONFLICT?

27 June 2001

ICG Asia Report No. 18Jakarta/Brussels

TABLE OF CONTENTS

MAP OF INDONESIA.......................................................................................................................... i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................ ii

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................1

II. THE HISTORY OF AUTONOMY IN ACEH ..........................................................................2

III. THE DYNAMICS OF AUTONOMY.........................................................................................5A. THE ECONOMY ................................................................................................................................... 5B. “TRAUMA” ......................................................................................................................................... 6

IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK....................................................................................................6A. THE AUTONOMY LAW ........................................................................................................................ 6B. THE CONTENTS OF THE DRAFT LAW ................................................................................................... 7C. ISLAMIC LAW ..................................................................................................................................... 9

V. THE MAJOR PLAYERS ..........................................................................................................10A. THE ACEH LIBERATION MOVEMENT (GAM) .................................................................................... 10B. GAM AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT..................................................................................................... 12C. LEGISLATORS AND CIVIL SERVANTS................................................................................................. 13D. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOS) .............................................................................. 14E. STUDENT-BASED GROUPS ................................................................................................................. 14F. THE ULAMA...................................................................................................................................... 15G. THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT, PARLIAMENT AND MILITARY........................................................ 16H. FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS................................................................................................................... 17

VI. CONSTRAINTS TO IMPLEMENTATION ...........................................................................17A. OPPOSITION FROM GAM .................................................................................................................. 18B. THE SECURITY FORCES..................................................................................................................... 18C. THE CREDIBILITY GAP...................................................................................................................... 19

VII. CONCLUSIONS .........................................................................................................................20A. THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IN ACEH......................................................................................... 20B. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ........................................................................................................... 20C. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ................................................................................................... 22

APPENDICES

A. TABLE: COMPARISON OF DRAFT LAW ON SPECIAL AUTONOMY.......................................................... 23B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ..................................................................................... 24C. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS............................................................................................... 25D. ICG BOARD MEMBERS..................................................................................................................... 29

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ICG Asia Report No 18 27 June 2001


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Indonesia is offering broad autonomy to theprovince of Aceh in the hope of ending anincreasingly bloody conflict with Acehneseseparatists. The aim of autonomy is to allayAcehnese resentments at the political dominationand economic exploitation of the province by thecentral government, thereby reducing support forindependence.

This autonomy is encapsulated in a law now beingdebated by Indonesia’s parliament. Although itsfinal details have yet to be determined, the law islikely to give Aceh a greater share of income fromits natural resources, chiefly gas, to allow it thefreedom to run its internal affairs, to refashionlocal government in line with local traditions andto base the legal system of the province on theIslamic Sharia. This “special autonomy” for Acehis much broader than the “regional autonomy”applied across Indonesia since the start of this year.

Indonesia’s armed forces are currently mounting amilitary offensive with the aim of destroying thearmed wing of the Aceh Liberation Movement(GAM). An earlier ICG report concluded that thismilitary solution is unlikely to succeed becausehuman rights abuses by the security forces willfurther alienate ordinary Acehnese.1 Since GAMcannot defeat the Indonesian forces either, andgiven that there is no international support forAcehnese independence, the autonomy plan is theonly alternative at the moment to prolongedconflict.

ICG’s research for this report focussed on thebetter-educated, urban minority of Acehnese, 1 “Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace”;ICG Asia Report No 17, 12 June 2001.

whose views are nonetheless likely to influencepublic opinion among the largely rural population.This research suggests that if Acehnese were askedto choose now between autonomy andindependence, a deep distrust of the governmentwould lead most to choose independence.However, if autonomy reduces poverty and bringspeople in Aceh a greater sense of justice andidentification with the governance of theirprovince, then support for independence maygradually diminish.

There are varying views within Aceh on the meritsof autonomy. GAM is opposed, because it wantsindependence, and the movement’s control overlarge parts of Aceh’s territory means that it may beable to block or impair the implementation ofautonomy in many places. Acehnese legislators inthe provincial and national parliaments are infavour of autonomy and played a key role indesigning the law, but they appear to commandonly weak legitimacy in much of Aceh.

Some religious leaders and NGO activists supportself-determination for Aceh via a referendum onindependence, an event ruled out by Jakarta.Others believe autonomy is a good option, whileyet others assert that the priority is peace,irrespective of political arrangements. After ahistory of broken promises by the government thatdates back to the 1950s, there is little belief inAceh that Jakarta means to implement theautonomy law in good faith.

Amongst those Acehnese who are prepared toconsider autonomy as an alternative toindependence, the redistribution of revenues isconsidered the most important issue, followed by

Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict?ICG Asia Report N° 18, 27 June 2001 Page iii

clauses in the draft law that would give theprovince a greater say in its own securityarrangements. The latter clauses may not surviveinto the final law, however, because of objectionsby the Indonesian military and police. ManyAcehnese may support the application of IslamicSharia to the legal system, but this provision is notgenerally seen as relevant to the conflict oracceptable as a substitute for political and financialautonomy.

Autonomy will have to be implemented in themidst of a conflict in which both armed sides usemurder and terror to intimidate civilians. GAMcould prevent autonomy from being successfullyimplemented in areas under its control by blockingor disrupting government programs. Thewidespread practices of murder, torture androbbery by members of the Indonesian military andpolice could erase any goodwill that autonomycreates amongst the Acehnese.

There is also a risk that if the central governmentmeets its commitments under the autonomy law inan ambivalent or poorly coordinated way, or if theimplementation of autonomy within Aceh itself isnot seen to be transparent, then many Acehnesewill conclude that the government is deceivingthem again. The likely result would be a rise insupport for independence.

RECOMMENDATIONS

TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA

In order to ensure the successful implementation ofa special autonomy law that reflects the aspirationsof the Acehnese and reduces support forindependence, it would be appropriate for theGovernment of Indonesia to consider the followingsteps:

In the short term:

1. Ensure that the final version of the autonomylaw is as close as possible to the draft lawsubmitted by Acehnese legislators

2. Cease offensive military operations in Aceh,which are likely to erode any goodwillgained through the autonomy law.

3. Resume the legal process initiated by theIndependent Commission on Aceh for humanrights abuses by the military, using courttrials to establish the command responsibilityfor such abuses

4. Consider wider compensation for victims ofmilitary and police abuses

After the special autonomy law is passed:

5. Appoint a Coordinating Minister or SpecialMinister for Aceh, with the task ofoverseeing all aspects of Aceh policy

6. Ensure that all funds due to Aceh under thespecial autonomy law are obtained promptlyand in full by the provincial government

7. Make public the amount of funds that Acehcan expect each year under special autonomyand the calculations by which this amount isdecided

8. Continue negotiations with GAM on thefuture of Aceh, with a view to involvingother Acehnese parties (such as NGOs andulama) as soon as is practicable.

9. Ensure that the forthcoming revision of thenational election law allows political partiesbased on one province, and that the law’sprovisions are not so restrictive as to preventGAM members joining such a party.

TO THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IN ACEH

10. Prioritise development spending on small-scale, labour-intensive projects that generatean immediate economic benefit for localcommunities, such as infrastructure repairprojects using local labour and materials.

11. Involve local communities as fully aspossible in the planning, implementation andmonitoring of development projects, makinguse of locally accepted mechanisms such asmusyawarah (a process of communityconsultation guided by local elders)

12. Ensure transparency by publishing publicspending plans in the media and consider

Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict?ICG Asia Report N° 18, 27 June 2001 Page iv

commissioning independent audits of publicspending.

13. Involve NGOs as fully as possible in themonitoring of public spending, after a vettingprocess to ensure these NGOs’ suitability.The latter could be organised in conjunctionwith foreign or multilateral aid agencies.

TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

14. Continue to press Indonesia to ceaseoffensive military operations in Aceh

15. Make clear that continued human rightsviolations by the military and police in Acehwill incur tangible sanctions such as thesuspension of existing military cooperationand sales of military equipment

16. Insist that humanitarian workers be given fullaccess to the field in Aceh, and that thesecurity forces cease the intimidation of localNGO workers

17. Make clear to GAM that human rights abusesby its members, including acts of terroragainst non-Acehnese civilians, will lead todirect measures such as designation as aterrorist organisation or action to cut externalsources of funds

18. Offer to provide technical assistance andtraining to support the implementation ofautonomy in Aceh.

19. Consider ways to continue providingcapacity-building assistance to NGOs inBanda Aceh, to help them act as monitors inthe implementation of autonomy, even ifconditions are too dangerous to workelsewhere

Jakarta/Brussels 27 June 2001

ICG Asia Report No 18 27 June 2001


I. INTRODUCTION

Indonesia’s government is hoping to end its armedconflict with separatists in Aceh by offering thepeople of the province more autonomy over theirown affairs, with the aim of reducing support forAcehnese independence. This autonomy is to beoffered in the form of a law, now being discussedby Indonesia’s parliament and likely to be finalisedwithin the next few months.

Indonesia’s armed forces have recently launchedan offensive against the guerrillas of the Free AcehMovement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka – GAM). Theconflict is becoming increasingly bloody: morethan six hundred people have been killed since thestart of this year and the daily death tolls arerising.2The violence not only undermines thegovernment’s attempts to negotiate with GAM: itis also marginalising the many people in Aceh whooppose the use of force to resolve the conflict.

An earlier ICG report, “Aceh: Why Military ForceWon’t Bring Lasting Peace” concluded that theIndonesian military’s attempts to crush therebellion are unlikely to succeed.3 This reportexamines the autonomy law and asks whether itsimplementation could stem the conflict, which isdriven by Acehnese resentment of economicexploitation and human rights abuses by the centralgovernment. 2 For this year’s death toll see Associated Press, 16 June2001. The level of violence is now as bad as, if not worsethan, during past rebellions in Aceh. An independentIndonesian commission, which reported in 1999,concluded that between 1,000 and 3,000 people werekilled during the nine years between 1989 and 1998 andanother 900-1,400 were missing, believed dead. Deathtolls are disputed and some estimates by Acehnese NGOsgo higher.33“Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring LastingPeace”; ICG Asia Report No 17, Jakarta/Brussels 12 June2001.

The details of the law are still being debated inparliament, but it would be likely to offer Aceh agreater share of the income from its naturalresources than that offered to other parts ofIndonesia under the recently-introduced regionalautonomy laws. It would also give the Acehnesethe freedom to run their own internal affairs, torefashion local government in line with localtraditions and to introduce a legal system based onthe Islamic Sharia.

This report takes no stance on what the ultimatestatus of Aceh should be. At the moment,Indonesia rejects any possibility of Aceh’ssecession and foreign governments support thisposition, albeit with strong misgivings about thehuman cost of military operations. GAM is tooweak to defeat the Indonesian forces, but willprobably survive attempts to crush it. Under theseconditions, Aceh is unlikely to becomeindependent in the near future. The autonomy planis therefore the only conceivable alternative at themoment to a protracted war that neither side canhope to win.

The report analyses the history of the autonomyplan, its likely contents and the attitudes towards itof those groups in Acehnese society who are in aposition to influence public opinion. The report isbased mainly on interviews with legislators,bureaucrats, NGOs, political and religious activistsin the provincial capital, Banda Aceh. Their viewswill be important for the outcome of specialautonomy in Aceh, though they are not necessarilysynonymous with the views of the majority ofAcehnese, who are farmers or labourers and theirfamilies.

All parties in the conflict make generalisingstatements about the aspirations of Aceh’s people,from GAM’s insistence that most people wantindependence, to the government’s claim that they

Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict?ICG Asia Report N°18, 27 June 2001 Page 2

do not, to the view that the majority of Acehneseare more worried about poverty and the risk ofviolence than about the issue of who holdssovereignty over Aceh.

The only objective way to find out what Acehnesethink on this issue would be to hold a referendumwith the options of independence or autonomy, orto carry out a province-wide opinion poll.Indonesia has ruled out such a referendum, for fearthat Aceh would choose independence as EastTimor did in 1999, while an opinion poll would bedifficult to carry out in the midst of a guerrilla war.All claims about Acehnese aspirations shouldtherefore be treated with caution.

Caveats aside, ICG’s research in Aceh stronglysuggests that a majority of Acehnese, if they weregiven the choice now, would probably chooseindependence rather than autonomy. However, theautonomy law might succeed over several years inallaying Acehnese grievances, leading to a falloffin public sympathy for the independencemovement. For this to happen, several majorobstacles have to be overcome, including theopposition of GAM, the abusive behaviour of thesecurity forces and the central government’s lackof credibility in Aceh.

II. THE HISTORY OF AUTONOMY INACEH

Indonesia’s attempt to resolve the conflict throughan offer of greater autonomy is taking place againsta historical background of Acehnese resistance todomination from outside. Aceh emerged as asovereign state in the 16th century and preserved itsindependence until a conquest by Dutch colonialforces which began in 1873 but took more than 30years to complete. At the end of a Japaneseoccupation during the Second World War, localresistance prevented the Dutch from returning.Aceh gave financial and material help to thenascent Indonesian republic in the late 1940s, andthere is a widespread sentiment amongst Acehnesethat they entered Indonesia as equal partners, notsubordinates, of the national leadership in Java.

In 1950 the central government curbed the de-factoautonomy that Aceh had enjoyed within therepublic by merging it into the province of NorthSumatra. This threatened the influence of localelites and unnerved the ulama, Aceh’s influentialIslamic scholars, who feared that the role of Islam

would be undermined. The result was an armedrebellion that began in 1953 and only petered outin the early 1960s, after President Soekarno hadreturned Aceh’s provincial status and its autonomyin religious and cultural matters. The settlementcalmed tensions between Aceh and Jakarta formore than a decade.4

The notion that Aceh should secede fromIndonesia does not seem to have becomewidespread until the late 1970s, after thecentralising and authoritarian government ofPresident Soeharto had stripped the content out ofthe autonomy promised by President Soekarno.The growth of oil and gas-based industries alongAceh’s northeastern coast also created socialdislocations and fuelled resentment at the way theprofits of these industries were siphoned out of theprovince by the Soeharto regime and its allies inIndonesian and foreign business, with little benefitaccruing to the Acehnese.5

At the same time, the Soeharto regime fostered anew class of Acehnese administrators with a stakein Indonesian rule. Often the children of the ulama,they were educated in state universities and rosethrough the civil service and military, in somecases reaching high rank. Though strongly awareof their distinctive Acehnese identity, these peoplewere nonetheless able to thrive within thecentralised bureaucracy and political system ofSoeharto’s New Order. Members of this group nowform an influential constituency in favour of broadautonomy for Aceh within Indonesia, as opposedto independence, though they share the generaldiscontent in the province at its treatment byJakarta.

The first secessionist uprising against Indonesianrule began in 1976, under the leadership of Hasandi Tiro, who founded the Aceh LiberationMovement (GAM). The movement had littlemilitary strength and was quickly contained by theIndonesian security forces.6 Hasan di Tiro fled to

4 This rebellion was linked to several other revolts acrossthe country, known collectively as the Darul Islam (Houseof Islam) because of their advocacy of a central role forIslam in the state. The aim of these revolts, like the PRRIand Permesta rebellions of the same period, was to changethe character of the government in Jakarta, not to separatefrom Indonesia.5 Tim Kell: “The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992”; Cornell 1995, pp 14-18.6 An elderly man in North Aceh told ICG there had beenonly 150 rebels in 1976, including himself, and few guns.


Sweden where he lives in exile, now ageing butstill regarded by GAM members as Aceh’s head ofstate (wali negara).

The uprising erupted again in 1989, aided by thereturn to Aceh of a group of guerrillas, reportedlymore than 250 strong, who had been trained inLibya.7 The rebellion was most intense in theregions along Aceh’s northeastern coast, which arehome to the major industries of the province andhalf its population, and led to a guerrilla war whichhas continued intermittently to this day. Jakartaresponded with persistent military repression. Thebrutality of Indonesian soldiers and policemen,manifested in murder, rape, torture, robbery andother abuses, created a deep resentment anddistrust of the government which continues to fueldemands for independence, particularly in thenortheastern areas.

The fall of President Soeharto in May 1998 createdan opportunity to break with the repressive policyadopted a decade earlier. The government ofPresident B.J. Habibie scaled back the activities ofthe security forces in Aceh, known as the DOM, inAugust 19988. Habibie visited Aceh in March 1999and made a number of pledges to its people. Thesepromises included legal action against humanrights abusers, scholarships for children orphanedduring the conflict and measures to boost theeconomy, such as the repair of a defunct railway toneighbouring North Sumatra and the reopening ofthe port of Sabang, closed a decade before.

The Habibie government offered more politicaland economy autonomy to all of Indonesia’sprovinces, including Aceh, through Laws No 22and 25 of 1999. These laws, which did not takeeffect until the start of this year, transferredextensive governmental powers from the centre tothe regions, along with a share of the net incomefrom natural resources in each region. The aim ofthese two laws was to forestall the rise ofseparatism by giving more autonomy and funds tothose regions of Indonesia which, like Aceh, are

He had not taken part in later rebellions, he said, becausehe was too old.7 “Roots of Acehnese Rebellion”, p 73. Hasan di Tiro wasbased in Libya during the late 1980s.8 Short for Daerah Operasi Militer or Military OperationsZone, this term is widely used to refer to the period ofmilitary operations from 1989 to 1998.

comparatively rich in natural resources and mightbe tempted to secede in future.9

Aceh was given its own additional law, No 44 of1999, which defined the ‘special status” of theprovince as the right to organise its own religious,cultural and educational affairs within the nationalguidelines set by Jakarta. This law offered nosignificant economic or political rights to Acehbeyond those already contained in Laws No 22 and25. It was passed a month before Habibie fell frompower and has since been overtaken by plans for amuch more extensive autonomy law which is nowbeing discussed by Indonesia’s parliament, theDPR. The Habibie government also authorised anindependent commission which investigatedhuman rights abuses in Aceh and produced adamning indictment of the military, but only twoof the 11 cases it investigated were actuallybrought to trial.10

With hindsight, it can be said that the Habibiegovernment missed a valuable opportunity toresolve the conflict. It failed to deliver on itspromises and the level of military violence againstcivilians increased during its tenure, includingsome of the worst recent massacres by Indonesiansoldiers in Aceh.11 GAM re-emerged during thisperiod and spread outwards from the northeasterncoastal areas into the west, the south and themountainous centre of the province. By offering areferendum on independence to the people of EastTimor, Habibie inadvertently encouragedAcehnese civil activists to widen their demandsfrom justice to self-determination for Aceh.

By the time President Abdurrahman Wahid tookoffice in October 1999, opposition to the central 9 The laws allot the regions 15 per cent of net publicincome from their oil, 30 per cent from natural gas and 80per cent from forestry, mining and fishing. These funds,and the powers delegated by the centre, are dividedbetween the provinces and their constituent districts andmunicipalities in such a way as to stop the provincesbecoming too powerful.10 See “Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring LastingPeace”; page 3.11 The worst massacre was of Islamic preacher TeungkuBantaqiah and followers in Beutong Ateuh, West Aceh, on23 July 1999, which claimed at least 56 lives. The casewas investigated by the independent commission andeventually went to trial, but only low-ranking personnelwere jailed. An account by one of the investigators, AmranZamzami, is “Tragedi Anak Bangsa”, PT Bina RenaPariwara, February 2001. See also “Indonesia, ImpunityVersus Accountability for Gross Human RightsViolations”; ICG Asia Report No 12, 2 February 2001.


government – both violent and non-violent – wasbroader and more entrenched in Aceh than it hadbeen in 1998. There was some hope that Wahid, anIslamic leader and a scholar with a reputation forbroadmindedness, would lead the government toembrace a new approach. Once in office, he didindeed try to negotiate a solution, at first throughinformal discussions with the ulama and otheropinion-leaders and later through formalnegotiations between the government and GAM.

But Wahid raised, then dashed, Acehneseexpectations by first stating that Aceh had the sameright to a referendum on independence as EastTimor, then scaling this back to an offer of a balloton the far more limited question of whether IslamicSharia law should be implemented in the province.It seems likely that his initial stance met strongopposition from the military leadership, whichregarded East Timor’s secession as a nationaldisaster. The referendum on Sharia has sincedropped off the agenda.

There has been constant wrestling in Jakarta sincelate 1999 between politicians who favour anegotiated solution in Aceh, including thepresident, and military leaders who want to useforce. Both approaches have been pursuedsimultaneously and in mutual contradiction, withnegotiations in Aceh and overseas taking placeagainst a backdrop of intermittent militarycrackdowns.12

The government’s current policy is a six-pointplan, outlined in March 2001, which attempts toreconcile these two conflicting approaches. Thepoint that has attracted the most attention is amilitary operation against GAM. The other pointsinclude the passing of the autonomy law, therevitalisation of Aceh’s local government,economy and society, the reassertion of the rule oflaw and an information campaign to explain thestrategy to the Acehnese.

This policy is reflected in Presidential InstructionNo 4 of 2001 on “Comprehensive steps in thecontext of resolving the Aceh problem”. Thisinstruction, generally referred to in Indonesia bythe abbreviation Inpres, was issued to ministers,security chiefs and senior Acehnese civil servantsand reported by the press on 11 April 2001. TheInpres defines the problem as “the dissatisfaction

12 See “Aceh: Why military force won’t bring lastingpeace”; page 4.

of the people and the existence of an armedseparatist movement”. It does not specify how thesix points are to be implemented, nor is it clearhow the various government agencies will worktogether.13

The Inpres is said to have disappointed militarycommanders who wanted a much strongerendorsement for offensive operations, includingsome legal protection against future accusations ofhuman rights abuses.14 Nonetheless, the Inpres isseen in Aceh as an attempt to justify a militarycrackdown by presenting it as only one part of abroader strategy. Indeed, the military began toscale up its operations against GAM even beforethe Inpres was issued, according to Acehneseactivists, and an offensive was officiallyannounced on 2 May.15 There has been nodiscernible progress on the other five points of theprogram.

In theory, both the government and GAM arecommitted to resolving the conflict throughdialogue, with a new round of negotiations nowplanned to start in Geneva in July.16In practice, theIndonesian military appears to have takenadvantage of the president’s political weakness topush its own agenda in Aceh, while GAMcontinues to attack the security forces.17 At thetime this report was written in June 2001, PresidentWahid seemed to be on the point of losing hislong-running power battle with the DPR, and thathe would either be replaced within months by hisdeputy, Megawati Soekarnoputri, or would have tocede his presidential authority to her whileremaining a symbolic head of state.18 Eitheroutcome would be likely to increase the influenceof Megawati over Aceh policy. She is generallyseen as more sympathetic than Wahid to the viewsof the military and nationalist politicians.

The view in Aceh is that a Megawati-ledgovernment would be more likely to allow the 13 Text of “Instruksi Presiden Republik Indonesia No 4Tahun 2001 Tentang Langkah-Langka Komprehensifdalam Rangka Penyelesaian Masalah Aceh.”14 Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2 May 2001.15 The Australian, 17 May 2001.16Jakarta Post, 16 June 2001.17 Throughout the first half of 2001, President Wahid waslocked in a political battle with the DPR. Thirty-eight ofthe DPR’s 500 seats are reserved for the military and thepolice, making them an influential political force to becourted both by the president and by his opponents.18 See ICG Indonesia Briefing: Indonesia’s PresidentialCrisis: The Second Round, 21 May 2001


military a free hand. At the same time, thegovernment will be obliged to implement theautonomy law for Aceh which is expected to bepassed soon by the DPR. The dualism withingovernment policy is therefore likely to continueand there may be an increasing emphasis on theuse of force against GAM. Such a strategy wouldprobably be counter-productive, however, as theresentment and fear caused by prolonged offensivemilitary action could well erase any gains inpopular support that the government might win bygranting autonomy.

III. THE DYNAMICS OF AUTONOMY

There are important dynamics that underpin boththe conflict and prospects for autonomy and help toshape the debate both in Aceh and Jakarta. Theviews of the main actors on both sides are detailedin Section V but there are several broader factorswhich influence perceptions of autonomy andshape the environment in which it will beimplemented. These are economic conditions inAceh and the prevalence of fear and suppressionof open debate in the province.

A. THE ECONOMY

The conflict in Aceh is underpinned by povertyand lack of economic opportunities. ManyAcehnese believe Aceh is a rich province but itspeople are poor because Jakarta skims off thewealth. There is some truth to this perception, forAceh has been a significant contributor toIndonesian exports but little of the resultingincome has returned to the province, and a third ofits people live below the official poverty line.19 Ifthe autonomy plan is to succeed in reducing theconflict, it will need to create a sense in Aceh thatautonomy is bringing more jobs and better livingstandards to the province and not merely benefitinga narrow political and business elite with links toJakarta.

Aceh’s economy is mainly agricultural, though itsbiggest source of income is the PT Arun naturalgas complex near Lhokseumawe in North Aceh,which is operated by US company ExxonMobil onbehalf of Pertamina, Indonesia’s state oil company.This complex and the downstream industries whichrely on its gas are described by economists as an

19 ICG interviews with senior officials of Aceh’sprovincial government.

“enclave” industrial economy which is focussedoutwards, towards its export markets in northeastAsia, and has few linkages with the agriculturalareas around it.20 The complex grew up during the1970s. The appropriation of its revenues by thegovernment and its business cronies createdresentments in the surrounding regions of Acehwhich fuelled the growth of an independencemovement.

Oil and gas-related industries account for about 40per cent of Aceh’s gross domestic product (GDP)but employ less than 10 per cent of theworkforce.21 Farming and fishing, by contrast,account for only a quarter of GDP but employmore than half the workforce. The importance ofnatural gas is slowly declining, with productionexpected to fall from an average of 11.3 millionmetric tonnes a year in the late 1990s to threemillion metric tonnes a year in 2010.22

Aceh has been affected by the economic crisis thatafflicted Indonesia after 1997. The provincialeconomy contracted by 5.3 per cent in 1998,compared to a contraction of nearly 14 per cent inthe Indonesian economy as a whole, and contractedanother 2.9 per cent in 1999 when nationaleconomic growth was flat.23 Official statisticssuggest that Aceh’s economy is capable of creatingnew jobs at a rate equal to the number of peopleentering the job market, but not fast enough to dealwith the existing backlog of unemployed people.

Local officials say the rate of unemployment isabout 30 percent of the labour force: severalthousand college graduates, perhaps the mostpoliticised segment of Acehnese society, enter thejob market each year. A majority of theunemployed live in the three districts most affectedby the rebellion: Pidie, North Aceh and East Aceh.With no stake in the existing political andeconomic order, this group will continue to be asource of support for independence.24

The conflict itself creates disruptions in theeconomy. Farm production has fallen off in someareas because farmers are afraid to go to the fields,while the frequent blockages of roads and the

20 See Kell: “The Roots of Acehnese rebellion”; page 28.21 Source: Central Statistics Bureau (BPS) . These figuresdate from 1998.22 Estimate supplied by ICG source.23 Paper prepared for Aceh’s governor by BPS.24 Source: ICG interview with Iskandar Daud, head of theRegional Planning Authority in Aceh.


illegal tariffs extorted principally by members ofthe security forces have raised the costs oftransporting goods and sometimes mean that notransport is possible at all. Those banks which usedto serve the towns and villages aroundLhokseumawe, one of the worst-hit areas, haveclosed their branches outside the town for securityreasons, making it harder for farmers and traders toraise credit. The conflict has also led to much ofAceh’s heavy industry either suspendingoperations or closing down: the closure of the Arungas facility in March 2001 forced two nearbyfertiliser plants and a paper factory that use its gasto stop production.25

B. “TRAUMA”

The autonomy law will have to be implemented inthe midst of an armed conflict in which both sidesmake use of organised terror - ranging from verbalintimidation to assassination - to silence peoplewho oppose their views. Few Acehnese, whatevertheir views, are willing to speak if there is a risk ofbeing overheard. The principal source of this terrorfrom 1989 until now has been the security forces,though GAM is also responsible for violentintimidation on a significant scale.26

The daily lives of civilians in the areas worstaffected by the fighting are lived in a state ofconstant insecurity where there is no guarantee ofbeing able to earn a living wage and a constant riskof being caught in crossfire or harassed by thesecurity forces. A word commonly used byAcehnese to describe this atmosphere is “trauma”.This may apply less in remote regions wherefighting is rarer, but it is very strong in the heavilypopulated areas. For autonomy to ease the conflict,people in Aceh will need to be convinced that itsimplementation – and the government’s overallapproach to the province – will make their livesmore secure.

Acehnese who openly support autonomy, orsimply advocate peace, risk being labelled astraitors by GAM, while those who want self-determination or independence risk being seen assubversives by the security forces even if they haveno direct relationship with GAM. The recentassassinations of Syafwan Idris, the rector of theIAIN Ar-Raniry religious college, and of retiredgeneral and local politician Teungku Djohan, have 25 Kompas, 12 March 2001.26 See Section V below.

made government officials and human rightsactivists very nervous, although (or perhapsbecause ) the identity and motive of the killers isnot yet clear. In other cases the identity of thekillers is known, as in the case of the abductionand murder of three activists from RATA, an NGOworking with torture victims and funded by theDanish government, in December 2000. A fourthactivist who escaped described the killers assoldiers and Acehnese civilians known to workwith the military, and a villager is also thought tohave been killed in the same incident.29

The local press also receives threats, direct orimplicit, leading it to censor itself.30 Any kind ofpublic consultation or debate about autonomy willbe difficult in this climate of fear, meaning that theautonomy law will be implemented in a situation inwhich it may be difficult to solicit inputs from thepublic or to measure its impact on popularsentiments.

IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A. THE AUTONOMY LAW

There have been discussions in Indonesian politicalcircles since the Habibie presidency about grantinga form of “special autonomy” to Aceh and IrianJaya that would go beyond the regional autonomyoffered to other regions through Laws No 22 and25. The aim of this special autonomy is to stem thegrowth of separatism in the two provinces byalleviating the sense of injustice that feeds it.These discussions resulted in October 1999 in aruling from the MPR, Indonesia’s highest law-making body, that laws should be prepared by 1st

May, 2001 to grant special autonomy to Aceh andIrian Jaya.31 These laws do not involve anamendment to the constitution.

A draft of the Aceh law is being discussed by aspecial committee (pansus) of the DPR beforebeing presented to a plenary session of theparliament. The deadline of 1 May was not metbecause of delays in the drafting process and the

29 “Indonesia: Sole Survivor of Attack on HumanitarianAid Workers Speaks”; Human Rights Watch press release,13 December 2000, on www.hrw.org.30 ICG interview with local newspaper editor.31 “Special autonomy” (otonomi khusus) has no specificlegal meaning, but only implies that the law will offermore than the “regional autonomy” (otonomi daerah) ofLaws No 22 and 25.


government and DPR agreed to take jointresponsibility for failing to meet the MPR’sstipulations.32 A new deadline of 19 July has beenagreed: if the law is accepted by the DPR on thatdate, then it will be sent to the president forapproval. If the president does not approve the lawwithin one month, it comes into effect anyway.There had been suggestions from the DPR that thelaw might be finished before the end of June.33 It ispossible, however that the completion of the lawwill be delayed for weeks or even months by theongoing conflict between President Wahid and theDPR. The law only needs the votes of a simplemajority of legislators to pass and is likely to doso: the political battle is over the contents of thelaw, not over whether or not it should be passed.

The draft law emerged from long discussionsinvolving Acehnese legislators, civil servants,academics and businesspeople. This group is quitediverse but combines a sense that Aceh has beentreated unfairly with a desire that the provinceremain part of Indonesia. Some members of thisgroup are also said to have business interests inAceh which they hope will benefit underautonomy.34 ICG’s research suggests there hasbeen little consultation with the majority ofAcehnese who do not belong to this elite, and sucha consultation would be difficult in the midst of theconflict. Most people appear to know little aboutthe law and its implications for their own lives, andthere has been no serious attempt to explain it tothem.

The draft was finalised at the end of last year, butaccording to Acehnese involved in the process, thegovernment was unhappy with the broad-rangingpowers offered to Aceh and decided to submit itsown, much more restrictive draft to the DPR.However, the DPR decided in January to base itsdiscussions on the draft prepared by Acehneselegislators, and the government then agreed towithdraw its draft. The political manoeuvringsbehind this are unclear, but the efforts ofgovernment officials to tone down the autonomylaw through their own draft were in effectoutflanked by the DPR. Yet although DPRmembers in general support greater autonomy forAceh, there are deep differences amongstlegislators on what its contents should be. 32 The MPR is distinct from and superior to the DPR, but500 of its 700 seats are reserved for DPR members, so thatthe two institutions are in practice overlapping.33 DPR legislator quoted in Jakarta Post, 20 June 2001.34 ICG confidential interview.

B. THE CONTENTS OF THE DRAFT LAW

The draft law gives the central governmentauthority over Aceh’s foreign political relations,external defence and monetary affairs, with allother responsibilities falling to the provincialgovernment. Aceh would receive 80 per cent of theincome from its natural resources, with the other20 per cent going to the central government, andtake equity stakes in state-owned companiesoperating in the province. The implications of thislast clause for the state-owned oil companyPertamina and for ExxonMobil, which jointly ownthe PT Arun natural gas plant, are not made clearin the draft law.

Civil and criminal law within Aceh would be basedon the Islamic Sharia and the province would havethe right to form its own police force and to beconsulted on the deployment of Indonesianmilitary units. The senior official in the provincewould be the governor, as at present, but he wouldbe chosen by a body of Acehnese experts. Themakeup and nature of this body is not clearlydefined in the law. An Advisory Council of Ulamawould also be created, composed of religiousscholars, to give inputs to local government policyand the legal system.

As well as these substantive issues, the draft lawalso has a large symbolic element in the form ofnew practices and institutions which are intendedto give Acehnese a greater sense of ownership overautonomy, but have little practical impact. Forexample, Aceh would be allowed its own flag andits own, non-executive head of state, called theWali Nanggroe35, and the terminology of localgovernment could be changed to replaceIndonesian terms with Acehnese ones.

The draft law, if enacted in its present form, wouldtransfer unprecedented amounts of power andresources from the central government to Aceh,giving the province much greater control over isown affairs than that granted to other regions. Thetable below contrasts the main points of the draftspecial autonomy law, the aborted governmentversion and Laws 22 and 25. An importantdistinction is that under Laws 22 and 25, the mainbeneficiaries of autonomy are not the provinces buttheir constituent districts and municipalities. Thisappears to have been done in order to prevent the 35 Wali Nanggroe literally translates as “guardian of thestate.” It has Islamic connotations but is not a religiousterm.


latter from becoming powerful enough to secedefrom Indonesia. In the draft special autonomy law,on the other hand, the devolved power rests withthe province of Aceh, not its districts, for thedecision to grant more power to the districts wasseen by some Acehnese as an attempt by Jakarta tofoster rivalries within the province in order to keepit weak.

1. Redistribution of revenues

The most important provision of the draft law,from an Acehnese perspective, is that 80 per centof the revenues generated from Aceh’s naturalresources would be allocated to the province, withthe remaining 20 per cent going to the centralgovernment. This is more generous to Aceh thanLaws 22 and 25, which allot to the centralgovernment 85 per cent of oil revenues and 70 percent of natural gas revenues from each provinceand divide up the rest between that province and itsconstituent districts and municipalities. For othernatural resource income, derived from fishing,mining and forestry, the percentage derived byAceh would be 80 per cent under both sets oflegislation.

The main source of such income in Aceh is thehydrocarbon complex around Lhokseumawe,which is operated by ExxonMobil of the US andproduces natural gas, and its associateddownstream industries. This complex is regardedby many Acehnese as a symbol of the status quo’sunfairness, since Jakarta takes the lion’s share ofits earnings and returns little to Aceh. It was shutdown in March because of the conflict. Theeconomic value of this complex is already indecline: ExxonMobil had extracted 70 per cent ofthe gas from the surrounding fields by last year andtwo of the six gas liquefaction trains were closed.36

Little consideration seems to have been given toAceh’s economic prospects after the gas runs outand the issue is not dealt with in the draftautonomy law.

Aceh’s gross revenues from oil and gas exports,mostly gas, were thought to be between U.S.$1.2billion and U.S$1.5 billion a year. Indonesia’sbudgeting processes so are complex and opaquethat it is hard to calculate what Aceh’s share of thiswould be, once operating costs and fees have beendeducted. One Acehnese legislator estimates that ifthe 80 per cent figure is kept intact in the final law,

36 Petroleum Report 2000 on usembassyjakarta.org.

Aceh would receive U.S.$500-600 million a year.37

A more conservative estimate by foreigndevelopment experts is that Aceh would receive amaximum of about U.S.$240 million a year.

Even this lower figure would be a significant boostto Aceh’s public revenues from all sources, whichwere estimated at around U.S.$160 million in the1999-2000 financial year, though it may disappointthose Acehnese who believe their province to befabulously wealthy. In fact, the 80 per cent figureappears to be a bargaining position and someAcehnese legislators might be willing to accept alower figure.38 Regardless of the final figure, it isimportant that the allocation be calculated anddistributed in a transparent way, to avoid theperception that Aceh is being cheated.

It is not clear whether Acehnese legislators will gettheir way on an important and related clause in thedraft, which says that natural resource incomewould be collected directly by the provincialgovernment, which would then pay Jakarta its 20per cent share. At the moment, all revenues arecollected by Jakarta and then disbursed to theregions. The aim of this clause is to stop the centralgovernment from delaying or even withholding themoney, whether because of its own financialconstraints or as a way of putting pressure on Acehin future. However, there may well be strongopposition to it from non-Acehnese legislators andgovernment officials who do not want to set aprecedent for other regions which would lessenJakarta’s control over the national finances anddeprive it of a powerful tool for exerting influenceover the regions.

2. Governmental structures

In terms of political and administrativearrangements, the draft is a compromise betweenexisting nationwide structures and demands for therevival of Acehnese tradition. Like otherprovinces, Aceh will still have a governor andlocal legislatures at the provincial and the districtlevel (DPRD Levels One and Two). These will berenamed using Acehnese terms, as will the variousunits of civil administration: for example, thedistrict (kabupaten) may be renamed the sagoe.

The draft law envisages several new institutions,the most symbolically important of which is the

37 ICG interview.38 ICG confidential interviews.


Wali Nanggroe. The Wali Nanggroe will be a headof state who embodies the distinct history andtraditions of the province, but will not have anypolitical powers. To reflect this non-politicalstatus, the Wali Nanggroe is to be chosen not bythe local legislature but by a separate body calledAhlul Halli Wal Akdi, whose nature and powers arenot defined in the law but left to secondarylegislation.39 Acehnese legislators agree that thispost would be offered to Hasan di Tiro, leader ofthe Free Aceh Movement, as a way of inducingGAM to abandon its fight for independence. GAMdismisses this possibility.40

The draft is a sketch rather than a detailedblueprint: numerous details, such as the roles andinterrelationships of the new institutions, remain tobe worked out. It does not touch on the roles ofethnic minorities within Aceh, notably the Gayo ofcentral Aceh and the Alas and other minorities ofsoutheastern Aceh, or the exact status ofIndonesians of non-Acehnese origin (like thesizeable populations of Javanese transmigrants)41.These details are all left to be filled out by localregulations. The reason for this lack of detail is tostop the debate over the draft being caught up inargument over specifics and to ensure thatdecisions on detail are taken within Aceh, not inJakarta.42

3. Security arrangements and guarantees

The draft stipulates that an Acehnese police forcewill be set up to handle internal security: it wasenvisaged by the drafters that GAM guerrillascould be absorbed into this force as part of asettlement of the conflict. Indonesian military unitswould be deployed only for external defence andafter prior consultation with the Acehneseparliament. The military’s territorial system, anetwork of posts that parallels the civilian

39 This is an Arabic term which translates as “Those whoLoose and Bind” and refers to a group of expert decision-makers.40 ICG interview with Amni Ahmad Marzuki, a member ofGAM’s delegation at the negotiations with the Indonesiangovernment in Banda Aceh.41 ICG has found no firm data on Aceh’s ethniccomposition, though the proportion of ethnic minoritieswas estimated by one ICG source at roughly 10 per centand by another at 30 per cent. The Acehnese majority itselfhas quite diverse ethnic origins, and some people in theprovince like to say that Aceh stands for “Arab, China,Europe, Hindi”.42 ICG interview with Acehnese legislator in Jakarta.

bureaucracy down to the village level, would beabolished within Aceh.

The implications of these points are very far-reaching because the territorial system is thecornerstone of the Indonesian military’s influencein politics and an important source of revenues,both licit and illicit. Military and police leaders saythese clauses are unacceptable because they wouldcompromise the ability of the security forces todefend the state, and this is a point that theAcehnese legislators are unlikely to win.43 ICG hasearlier recommended that the Indonesian militaryphase out the territorial system as part of becominga politically neutral force under civilian control.44

Another key provision of the draft is that anychange in the law, once enacted, must be approvedthrough a referendum of the Acehnese people. Thisclause is intended to stop the central governmentreneging on its promises as it has done in the past.It is not clear, however, that this provision wouldbe legally binding on the government or the DPR,whose authority is set out in the constitution.

C. ISLAMIC LAW

A provision of the draft law which has attractedmuch attention within and outside Indonesia is thatAceh’s legal system should be based on the IslamicSharia. This is a sensitive issue for secularnationalists in the DPR and the military, as well asfor devout Muslims. There has been an intermittentdispute since the founding of the republic in 1945over whether the state and its laws should be basedon Islam or on secular models inherited from thecolonial period. The secularists won the argumentby a large margin, and calls for an Islamic state inIndonesia were treated as subversion by theSoeharto regime. There seems to be a generalacceptance in Jakarta that Aceh is more “Islamic”in character than the rest of Indonesia, but there isstill unease amongst some politicians and militaryofficers about a clause in the draft law allowingAceh to base its legal system on the Sharia with norecourse to Indonesia’s Supreme Court. Acompromise has been discussed whereby the lawwould allow recourse to the Supreme Court inJakarta, but the latter would create a special “Aceh

43 Jakarta Post, 5 April 2001, quoting Armed ForcesCommander Admiral Widodo A.S. and national policechief General Surojo Bimantoro.44 See “Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control”;ICG Asia report No 9, 5 September 2000


chamber” with Sharia-qualified judges to hearappeals.45

The Sharia is a body of precepts touching on manyaspects of social and religious life. Although itcontains legal injunctions, its range is broader thanthat of the discrete legal codes commonly used bymodern states. Aceh was granted the right toimplement Sharia precepts in its cultural andeducational affairs by Law No 44 of 1999: theprovincial government has since issued severalregulations concerning appropriate Muslim dress,alcohol, gambling and other issues, but there hasbeen little attempt until now to enforce them. Oneacademic familiar with the issue says that Jakartafailed to provide the necessary funds to back up theimplementation of Sharia.46

The provincial government and the localparliament are discussing ways to implementSharia once the special autonomy law is passed.There are now plans to create an Advisory Councilof Ulama, which would be selected by its peers,within the next few months. The law itself sayslittle about how implementation would be carriedout, so this body could play a significant role. Thesigns are that it plans to give itself a fairly freehand in adapting Sharia precepts to Acehneseconditions.47

The debate could be quite protracted and complexbecause, although there is no overt oppositionamongst Acehnese to the idea of Sharia beingimplemented, there seems to be little consensuseither about how Sharia would be applied and inwhat contexts. ICG’s research found a range ofviews from those people who regarded theimplementation of Sharia as a religious necessity,to those who valued the Sharia as an element ofAceh’s distinct identity, to those who said that theydid not see the issue as relevant. One religiousfigure said Sharia was as necessary as politicalautonomy: a DPR legislator said by contrast thatthe phrase “implementation of Sharia” was largelyrhetorical and what he preferred was a law that was“influenced” by Sharia precepts, a milderformulation.48

Some critics have raised concerns about the socialimpact: feminists, for example, worry that the 45 ICG interview with Acehnese legislator.46 ICG interview with Dr Alyasa Abubakar, assistant rectorof the IAIN Ar-Raniry religious college in Banda Aceh.47 As above.48 ICG confidential interviews.

concerns of women may not be adequatelyheeded.49 Popular religiosity in Aceh can takeforms that many people find disturbing. There hasbeen a popular campaign, led by men but alsojoined by some women, to force all Muslimwomen to wear the jilbab, or Islamic headscarf.This campaign reached a peak in late 1999 with thepublic shaving of the heads of several prostitutes inBanda Aceh, but seems to have diminished sincethen.50 It cannot be ruled out that the application ofSharia could spark this kind of behaviour, even ifthis is not the intention of the implementers.

Almost all Acehnese are Muslims and the level ofpopular religiosity appears to be quite highcompared to many other regions of Indonesia,though highly-educated Acehnese bristle at thesuggestion that the people of the province arereligious fanatics. Given the high level ofreligiosity, and the social pressures to conform toreligious norms, it seems likely that manyAcehnese will either support the idea of Sharia orwould at least passively accept it.

The most important point about Sharia in thecontext of autonomy, however is that fewAcehnese believe it has any relevance to theconflict. The issue is seen as one that concerns theAcehnese themselves and does not touch on theroot of the conflict, which is Aceh’s relationshipwith the central government. ICG’s intervieweesemphasised that the a greater role for the Shariawould not be accepted as a substitute for thetransfer of political power and resources to theprovince from Jakarta.

V. THE MAJOR PLAYERS

A. THE ACEH LIBERATION MOVEMENT(GAM)

GAM rejects the concept of special autonomywithin Indonesia because its goal is a separatestate. The movement maintains that Aceh’sabsorption into Indonesia in 1949 was illegitimatebecause the Acehnese people were not consulted,

49 See for example Jakarta Post, 27 April 2001 for thecomment of Indonesian feminist Chusnul Mariyah duringconsultations with the DPR over the draft law: “I am notagainst Islamic law but we have to admit that such a lawcould lead to violence against women…it needs furtherdiscussion and a definition as to what aspects of lifeIslamic law can apply to.”50 ICG interview with Acehnese woman activist.


and says it is fighting for the return of Aceh’ssovereignty. GAM has no explicit position on whatan independent Aceh would be like, other than thatit would be a monarchy headed by its exiled leaderHasan di Tiro, and there appear to be variety ofviews within the movement on what the form ofthe state should be. GAM says it is not fightingspecifically for an Islamic state, though some of itsmembers may support the idea.51

GAM’s goal is in direct opposition to the positionof the government, which rejects any possibility ofindependence. During negotiations in Geneva inJanuary 2001, the two sides agreed to seek apeaceful resolution of the issue and hold a“democratic consultation” involving other groupswithin Acehnese society. These negotiations havenot formally been abandoned though in practice,both GAM and the Indonesian military are tryingto achieve their aims through violence and there isno sign that either side is willing to compromise onthe core issue of sovereignty.

GAM’s political influence in Aceh is quite large inrelation to its military power. The membership ofits armed wing, Angkatan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka(AGAM) has been estimated at between 15,000and 27,000 people, but they only have a fewthousand modern firearms between them.52

Nonetheless ,the movement holds sway over largeareas of Aceh’s territory. The size and nature ofthis influence is open to debate. GAM controls“almost 75 per cent” of Aceh at the village level,according to one of its representatives.53

Some Acehnese sources think this claim is near thetruth, though others argue that GAM’s influence insouthern and western Aceh and in the mountainouscentre of the province is not as strong as in itsheartlands near the northeastern coast. All sourcesagree that its influence in this latter area,comprising the districts of North Aceh, East Aceh,Pidie and Bireun, is very powerful, and this is thearea where most armed clashes take place. It ishard to see how GAM could operate so openlyacross such a wide swathe of territory without thefreely given support of much of the population, or

51 ICG interview with GAM spokesman Amni AhmadMarzuki. Hasan Di Tiro has said in the past that a freeAceh would be an Islamic state, but GAM is not areligious movement and is regarded with suspicion bysome Islamic activists.52 “Aceh: why military force won’t bring lasting peace”;page 7.53 ICG interview with Amni Ahmad Marzuki.

at least its passive acquiescence. This does notimply that all the people in these districtsnecessarily sympathise with GAM, however, andthere are reports of disgruntlement with thebanditry and extortion practised by some GAMguerrillas.54

In its propaganda, the movement has made muchof the riches that will accrue to all Acehnese if theprovince becomes independent. GAM membershave on occasions told villagers that education willbe free in an independent Aceh, that every familywill receive monthly payments from the state, andthat Aceh will be “like Brunei”. The wealth ofAceh’s natural resources, notably the Arun gascomplex at Lhokseumawe is an important symbolin this propaganda.55 The movement has alsoencouraged the idea that independence wasimminent, though the failure of this prediction issaid to have made some Acehnese disillusionedwith GAM.

Acehnese NGO activists, who do not necessarilysupport GAM, often explain its influence bydepicting it as a vehicle for a deeply-rooted angerin Aceh at the exploitation of its natural resourcesby Jakarta and, most of all, the abuses of humanrights committed by the security forces. Theimplication is that even if the current incarnation ofGAM were to be driven back underground, ashappened in the late 1970s and again in the early1990s, then the movement will re-emerge as longas the underlying causes of Acehnese discontentare not comprehensively addressed.

At the same time, GAM is ruthlessly single-minded in suppressing dissent. People suspected ofcollaboration with the Indonesian authorities havebeen killed, while NGOs or local politicians andreligious figures who do not espouse GAM’smessage have been threatened and in some casesabducted.56 ICG has heard credible accounts ofatrocities by members of GAM, including themurders of 19 people over a period of several 54 ICG confidential interviews with Acehnese and foreignsources.55 ICG interviews with Acehnese activists.56 Three prominent Acehnese activists from differentorganisations told ICG they had been verbally threatenedby GAM members for not taking a stance in favour ofindependence. ICG has heard two accounts of locallegislators being detained by GAM: one was merelylectured and released, but the other was reportedlythreatened with death and only freed because of a familyconnection to local GAM members. ICG has corroboratedthe first report but not the second.


months in 2000 and the recent killings of ten non-Acehnese residents of Central Aceh who wereaccused of collaborating with the security forces.Since the latter event, dozens more people havebeen killed in the same area in circumstances thatremain unclear.57

GAM’s sympathisers tend to play down this aspectof the movement, while its Acehnese enemies putgreat emphasis on the role of terror (having oftenexperienced it themselves.) It seems unlikely that aguerrilla-based movement like GAM couldbecome as powerful as it has without a significantlevel of genuine support from the population. Atthe same time, fear is a factor in some cases andthere is a clear threat to Acehnese who disagreewith GAM, as well as to non-Acehnese peopleliving in the province.

There have long been complaints in Aceh thatGAM’s original focus has been diluted by its rapidgrowth since 1998, which has loosened its internalcontrols and led to various forms of gangsterism.One activist told ICG of a local GAM leader whoin was a former hoodlum. Since joining themovement, his house had been filled withelectronic gadgets and other expensive furnishings.In another area, an source reported claims byvillagers that the local GAM leader was growingmarijuana, a major cash crop. There have also beenpersistent claims, by GAM leaders and others, thatthe Indonesian military makes use in its operationsof armed Acehnese groups bearing the name ofGAM, as a way of discrediting the guerrillas

It is hard to judge how important opportunities forpersonal gain are as a motivation for GAMmembers. Victims of extortion say they cannot tellif the perpetrators are really members of GAM orpeople using the name of the organisation for their

57 The first report is unconfirmed but relayed to ICG by acredible source. In the second case, ICG spoke to ajournalist who was told by a GAM leader in May 2001 thathis men had recently killed ten non-Acehnese“collaborators” in Central Aceh. In June there was anotherspate of killings in the same area, with as many as 80people, including children, reported dead by mid-monthand a thousand houses burned. The security forces blameGAM, and there is some independent evidence that this isthe case, according to an ICG source. GAM says, however,that the victims belonged to a militia formed by themilitary and the killers were either local people or themilitary itself. See Kompas, 12 and 13 June 2001; KoranTempo, 12 June 2001: Serambi, 13 June 2001, Reuters, 13June 2001.

own ends.58 The picture is further complicated bythe fact that members of the security forces areinvolved in various kinds of financial and propertycrime, ranging from the extortion of protectionmoney to demanding illegal fees (pungutan liar)from truck drivers to the looting of shops whichare then burned. As discussed in other ICG reports,illegal fund-raising is a structural problem withinthe Indonesian military and police.59.Administration and gangsterism can be difficult totell apart on both sides of the conflict.

The Indonesian military officially launched anoffensive in Aceh in May. Given GAM’s roots inthe local population, the rugged nature of theterrain and the poor quality of many Indonesiantroops, the offensive will likely fail to destroyGAM although it could damage it. The Indonesianmilitary leadership, under considerable domesticand international pressure to avoid further humanrights abuses, has made some effort to avoidatrocities, such as issuing guidelines instructingsoldiers not to harm civilians or fight in built-upareas.60

However, numerous reports from the field suggestthat security personnel are still killingcivilians.61The upshot could well be that GAMsurvives while abuses by the military create aready source of new recruits for the guerrillas. Anycalculation about the outlook for special autonomyhas to consider the likelihood that there will still bean armed rebellion in Aceh, though possibly aweaker one than at the moment.

B. GAM AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The strength of GAM means that, in effect, theIndonesian government no longer operates in thoseparts of Aceh under its influence. At the village(desa) and subdistrict (kecamatan) level, state

58 ICG interview with commodities trader in Banda Aceh.59 Both sides blame each other for burning buildings. Someburnings appear punitive, others to cover the evidence ofrobbery. On fund-raising activities by the security forces,see ICG reports “Indonesia; Keeping the Military UnderControl”, “Indonesia: National Police Reform” (AsiaReport No 13, 20 February 2001) and “Aceh: WhyMilitary Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace.”60 The idea has also been floated by the Indonesianmilitary itself of inviting foreign military observers tomonitor operations in Aceh. See The Australian, 17 May2001.61 See for example Jakarta Post, 15 June 2001, in whichhuman rights activists describe bodies being fished from ariver in East Aceh after a military and police raid.


officials are widely said to have either left theirposts or come to an arrangement with their localGAM guerrillas. Even at the district (kabupaten)level, civil servants are reported in some areas tobe inactive, while a number of bupatis (districtchiefs) have moved to Banda Aceh for their ownsafety.62The legal system has almost ceased tofunction: out of eighteen district courts, only twocourts have their normal complement of threejudges. Five had no judges at all and the rest hadonly one or two.63

Local government has not ceased altogether inGAM-controlled areas. A senior local governmentofficial told ICG that GAM allowed state healthand education programs to continue in areas underits control, for example a campaign of inoculationagainst polio. GAM objected to family planning,however, possibly on religious grounds. GAMitself is purely a political and military force andprovides no social welfare services.

Villagers still need official stamps for certainforms of documentation, such as identity cards,which they get from local officials who operatediscreetly from their homes or in coffee shops,rather than from their offices. However, GAMmembers officiate over other legal and socialissues and collect taxes, said to be eight per cent,on transactions such as land purchases. GAM’sfund-raising activity targets businesses of all sizes,from small traders to the Arun oil and gas complexnear Lhokseumawe. As discussed earlier, thisactivity is often hard to distinguish from banditryand extortion for private gain.

In parts of North and East Aceh and Pidie, theuniform structure of administration imposed by theSoeharto regime on all villages in Indonesia isbeing replaced by Acehnese institutions whichhave lain dormant for years. One example of this isthe revival of the tuha peut, a group of four villageelders including the headman (keucik) and theimum meunaseh, a person who looks after thevillage place of worship and leads the five dailyIslamic prayers. This group is responsible formanaging village affairs and leading debatesamongst villagers on community issues. Disputesthat cannot be dealt with at the village level arepassed upwards to the mukim, a group of severalvillages with a shared mosque, which has its owngroup of eight elders. 62 ICG interview with member of local parliament inBanda Aceh.63 Kompas, Agence France-Presse, 5 June 2001.

It is unclear how extensive these arrangements areor how they work in practice: the underlying pointis that GAM is sponsoring the dismantling ofIndonesian rule in parts of Aceh and itsreplacement by Acehnese structures and practices.This is theoretically in accordance both with LawNo 44 of 1999 and with the special autonomy law,both of which offer more freedom to the Acehneseto deploy adat, or customary law, in the public lifeof the province. But to the extent that the newarrangements are managed by people sympatheticto GAM, which opposes autonomy, it may well bedifficult in practice to smoothly implement theautonomy law in the villages.

C. LEGISLATORS AND CIVIL SERVANTS

Aceh is unlike other Indonesian regions withseparatist movements, notably Irian Jaya and(formerly) East Timor, in that its political elite iscomparatively well-represented in national politics,in proportion to the size of Aceh’s population. Togive only a few examples, there have been severalrecent cabinet ministers from Aceh, one head of anopposition political party, at least one seniorgeneral, a number of legislators and two formerheads of the state commodities agency, Bulog. 64

Acehnese are also well-represented in academia.

The draft special autonomy law is the work of adiverse group of legislators, academics, stateofficials and businesspeople of Acehnese origin.The members of this group have found roles forthemselves within the Indonesian state and somealso have business interests in Aceh which theyhope will benefit from the grant of specialautonomy to the province. At the same time, thereis great scepticism amongst supporters of theautonomy package that the central government willimplement it in good faith. This is why the law’s

64 The Aceh-born Bustanil Arifin was Minister ofCooperatives and head of Bulog, the state commoditiesboard, and the latter post was also held by former Acehgovernor Ibrahim Hasan.H. Ismail Hasan Metereum was the former head of theUnited Development Party, one of two opposition partiespermitted by Soeharto, as well as a deputy speaker of theMPR. Fachrul Razi was deputy commander of the armedforces until the post was abolished by President Wahid,who also appointed the Acehnese Hasballah Saad asHuman Rights Minister. The current head of the GeneralElection Commission (KPU), Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, isan Acehnese academic. By contrast, two Irianese haveserved as ministers (both under Wahid) and no EastTimorese.


drafters have tried to “lock in” the centralgovernment with the stipulation that any futurechanges to the law must win the consent of theAcehnese through a referendum.

It could be argued that this group is an elite whichis not particularly representative of Acehneseopinion in general, since many of its members arebased in Jakarta rather than in the province. Thepopular legitimacy of the current generation ofAcehnese legislators throughout the province isopen to question. These legislators were elected inthe general election of June 1999, which wascancelled in North Aceh and Pidie, which accountfor more than a third of Aceh’s population,because of the conflict.65 ICG’s urban, educatedinterviewees in Aceh generally praised the draftautonomy law and did not voice strong criticism ofits drafters. There does appear, however, to besuspicion amongst the poor and less-educatedmajority towards legislators, particularly in theprovincial parliament.66

D. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS(NGOS)

NGOs have proliferated in Aceh since the fall ofSoeharto, as they have across Indonesia. Accordingto one NGO umbrella group, there are now morethan 300 NGOs in the province. As elsewhere inthe country, the ranks of NGOs include bothgenuine organisations and others set up tomisappropriate aid or development funds for thebenefit of their members, sometimes in collusionwith state officials.

The most politically significant role carried out byAcehnese NGOs is human rights activism. Humanrights NGOs in Aceh have been active in exposingabuses by the security forces though, according toone activist, they have been reluctant until recentlyto report on similar abuses by GAM. As a result,the Indonesian police and military tend to regardhuman rights NGOs as being in league with GAM.Human rights groups are often harassed by thesecurity forces, the most gross recent examplebeing the RATA murders in December.67 Some

65 Figures from the General Election Commission (KPU).The turnout was just over 60 per cent on average acrossthe province.66 One civil servant who works in the DPRD, or localparliament, complained to ICG that his neighbours hadaccused the DPRD members of being “dogs”, a harshinsult in a Muslim society.67 See Section III B above.

human rights activists in Aceh are forging linkswith international activists based in the West,including some of those who campaigned againstIndonesian rule in East Timor. If reports continueto emerge from Aceh of human rights violations bythe security forces, it is likely that these links willstrengthen.

Amongst NGO members, there are a variety ofviews on autonomy and independence. While allthe activists interviewed by ICG were critical ofthe government and the security forces inparticular, some were also hostile to GAM and itsattempts to repress Acehnese who do not supportthe movement. Others were reluctant to criticiseGAM, possibly out of sympathy for the goal ofindependence. One prominent activist, expressinga common view amongst educated Acehnese, saidhe believed the best solution was for Indonesia tobecome a federation, of which Aceh would be amember.68

ICG interviewed nearly a dozen NGO activists anddespite this range of views, almost all of themagreed that the autonomy law was a good thing intheory, particularly its stipulations about the returnto the province of most of its natural resourceincome and about the formation of an Acehnesepolice force in place of the Indonesian securityforces. All of them said, however, that they hadlittle or no confidence that Jakarta wouldimplement the law.

E. STUDENT-BASED GROUPS

There are a number of campaigning groups whoseprincipal support comes from students and formerstudents, and whose main demand is a referendumoffering the Acehnese a choice between Indonesianrule and independence. The biggest of these groupsis the Centre for an Aceh Referendum (SIRA)which was formed in January 1999, followingPresident Habibie’s offer of a referendum onindependence for East Timor.

SIRA has campaigned for self-determination forthe Acehnese because it believes that this approachwill be more palatable internationally than callingfor outright independence. Nonetheless, SIRA’sown polling suggests that more than 90 per cent of

68 The federation concept is taboo in Jakarta because of itshistorical association with Dutch attempts to underminethe new born Indonesian republic in 1949-50. It is not onthe agenda of any major political party and remains ahighly sensitive subject.


all Acehnese would choose the independenceoption in a referendum, so that the call for areferendum is in practice a call for independence.SIRA only accepts the idea of special autonomy asone option in this referendum, not as a substitutefor it.

GAM is said to have been initially suspicious ofSIRA, whose leading members are students orformer students, but swung round to a position oftacit support for a referendum campaign.69 Somemembers of SIRA are now thought to be close toGAM, though comments in private by othermembers suggest that they are wary of themovement and its espousal of armed struggle.

SIRA and the various student groups with similarviews are committed to non-violence. SIRA wasvery successful during 1999 in converting populardemands for independence into demands for areferendum, with its high point being mass ralliesin November 1999 and November 2000. The firstrally was peaceful and brought hundreds ofthousands of people onto the streets of BandaAceh. In the runup to the second rally as many as32 people were killed by the security forces.70

SIRA depends heavily on freedom of movement tospread its message amongst the people and toorganise rallies. In recent months the securityforces have put heavy pressure on the group: itsmost public figure, Muhammad Nazzar, iscurrently serving a ten-month prison term for“displaying hostile intentions towards the state.”71

Following a bomb blast at a dormitory forAcehnese students in Jakarta in May 2001, thepolice began investigating members of SIRA.Press reports suggest that the police have no strongcase that activists were involved in the blasts.SIRA’s office in Banda Aceh has been ransackedand is now empty, and its members in other areashave taken to meeting in private to avoid attention.SIRA’s influence on the autonomy question is hardto measure, though it may well have been dimmedby the constrictions imposed by the security forces.

F. THE ULAMA

The ulama, or Islamic scholars, are still aninfluential force in Acehnese society though they

69 ICG discussion with foreign observer visiting Aceh.70 Jakarta Post, 15 November 2000. The security forcessaid 14 people were killed, while the rally organisers saidthere were 32 deaths.71 Jakarta Post, 29 March 2001.

no longer have the same political prominence thatthey did during the Darul Islam rebellion, whichwas led by an ulama called Daud Beureueh72.There are said to be less than a thousand ulamascattered across the province and while someindividual scholars are highly respected in theirdistricts, none have the prestige that DaudBeureueh enjoyed across the province.

The ulama were associated with Acehneseresistance to Dutch occupation in the late 19th

century and their political influence wasconsolidated by the weakening of the Acehnesearistocracy, the uleebalang, in the turbulence thatfollowed the Second World War. But the Soehartoregime managed to co-opt or intimidate manyscholars, turning them into propagandists for thecentral government through the institution of theCouncil of Indonesian Ulama (MUI). MUIendorsed the military crackdown against GAM inafter 1989.73 Those scholars who refused to be co-opted were pushed to the political margins and inat least one case in the early 1990s, killed.74

There has been one recent attempt to build apolitical movement from the ranks of the ulamasince 1998, a group called Himpunan Ulama DayaAceh (the League of Ulama of the ReligiousSchools of Aceh). HUDA gathered togetherAcehnese ulama in support of a non-violentresolution to the conflict through a referendum onindependence. Its youth wing, the RabithaThaliban Aceh, claims 75,000 members across theprovince. HUDA is said to have some influence onPresident Wahid but fell foul of one or both of thearmed parties: its secretary-general had his houseburned down and is now living in Jakarta.75

Many educated Acehnese outside the ulama arguethat the scholars have lost their ability and theirdesire to play an active part in politics, partlybecause of intimidation from GAM and themilitary, and now confine their attention to ritualand social matters. An alternative view is that theulama, being highly respected within Acehnese 72 Acehnese sources variously define ulama as Islamicscholars who head a religious school (pesantren or daya)or a major mosque, or as scholars who can understand coreIslamic texts in Arabic. There is no formal hierarchy,though some ulama are more respected than others.73 “Roots of Acehnese Rebellion”, page 78.74 Reuters, 30 April 1991, on the disappearance of AchmadDewi, an outspoken ulama who was believed to have beenkilled by the military.75 ICG interview with Acehnese source who said that theintimidation had come from GAM.


society, could still be a powerful voice againstviolence and in favour of a peaceful solution to theconflict, but choose not to exercise their influencefor fear of losing public support or being targetedby the armed parties to the conflict.

G. THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT,PARLIAMENT AND MILITARY

There are two dominant perceptions of the Acehproblem amongst civilian politicians and militaryleaders in Jakarta. One is that the Acehnese havebeen unfairly treated in the past and thereforedeserve some recompense in the form of greaterautonomy. The other is that the Acehnese areperennial troublemakers who are asking for morethan they deserve. Both these sentiments arewidespread in Jakarta and it is possible for thesame person to hold both of them at once.

The first and more conciliatory view is quitefrequently stated by civilian politicians and someformer generals, including the architect of thecurrent Aceh policy, former Coordinating Ministerfor Politics, Social Affairs and Security SusiloBambang Yudhoyono.76 This view provides theimpetus behind the autonomy law, though peoplewho hold it can be further divided into opponentsof any offensive military operation in Aceh(Acehnese legislators, for example) and those likeYudhoyono who believe military action is anecessary part of a wider solution. There is strongresistance in Jakarta, from all quarters, to thepossibility that Aceh could become independentfrom Indonesia.

The second and more hard-line view appears to bewidely held within the military leadership, as wellas by some civilian politicians. There is a commonassumption amongst Indonesia’s elite that ordinarypeople are ignorant of politics and essentiallypassive in their political behaviour unless guidedby members of the elite or misled by malcontents.This assumption, applied to Aceh, implies thatGAM and the Indonesian government arecompeting to influence the majority of Acehnesewho would otherwise be passive. If GAM can bedestroyed by military force, then the Acehnese will

76 “Aceh Perlu Keadilan, Kesejahteraan dan Keamanan,”Kantor Menko Polsoskam, Jakarta, April 2001.Yudhoyono was abruptly replaced in June 2001 forreasons not connected to Aceh.

automatically drift back into acceptance ofIndonesian rule.77

At the moment, the second view has not carried thedebate in Jakarta but it is dictating events on theground in Aceh, where the political weakness ofthe Wahid government has enabled the military toobtain a licence in the form of the Inpres and thento launch offensive operations. This is not to saythat the military leadership necessarily approves ofthe atrocities against civilians that are committedby troops in the field. But despite a rhetoricalinsistence by senior officers on the need to preventhuman rights abuses, there has been no sustainedattempt to punish troops who commit them. Recentcases from Aceh, notably the RATA murders,suggest that violence aimed at terrorising thepopulation is still seen in some quarters within themilitary as a necessary part of operations againstseparatism. Reports of people being abducted andmurdered appear daily in the local press: althoughperpetrators are rarely identified, it seems likelythat many killings are committed by securitypersonnel, though some may be the work of GAMor third parties.78

The Aceh conflict is often seen in Jakarta not in itsown terms, but in terms of what it might signify forthe country as a whole. There is a fear amongst thepolitical and military leadership that Aceh is thekeystone of the unitary state: if it becomesindependent, other regions will follow and therepublic will disintegrate. This fear is probablyoverstated, both within Indonesia and abroad, but itis a powerful factor influencing attitudes towardsthe Aceh conflict.

The preoccupation with national unity isparticularly strong in the military. Senior officersare determined that Aceh should not follow theexample of East Timor, whose secession in 1999 isregarded as a humiliating blow to the integrity ofthe state.79 It has also been suggested that bykeeping the conflict going in Aceh, the militarycan portray itself as the only force capable ofpreventing national breakup. This perceptionwould boost its political influence and strengthen

77 Discussion between the author of this report and seniorgeneral in mid-2000.

79 ICG discussion with Asian military official in regularcontact with the Indonesian military.


the case for keeping the territorial system, thesource of much of its income.80

The fear of national disintegration is the drivingforce behind Jakarta’s offer of special autonomy toAceh, but autonomy itself creates ambivalentfeelings amongst some politicians and militaryleaders. They fear that if the province is givenbroad powers to run its own affairs, other regionswill demand the same treatment, and the net effectwill be to weaken the unitary state. This view wasexpressed in a statement by the governor ofLemhanas, a think tank close to the military that ifthe law were implemented, “the possibility cannotbe ruled out that other regions will make the samedemands.” This objection was rejected, however,by the DPR committee discussing the draftautonomy law.81

At the same time, Aceh is only one of numerousproblems facing a government and legislature thattend to give more priority to power struggles inJakarta than to problems in outlying regions. Thereis a risk that even if the autonomy law isimplemented, there may be little political will inJakarta to carry it out in a sustained andcoordinated fashion. The government’s decision toissue its own draft of the special autonomy lawearlier this year was a clear indication that some ofits officials were unhappy with the broad powersoffered by the DPR draft. Even though thegovernment draft has been withdrawn, it may bethese same officials who oversee theimplementation of autonomy. But any sign ofreluctance or stalling by Jakarta would be seen inAceh as evidence of bad faith, and this could havea significant negative effect on efforts to reduce theconflict.

H. FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

Foreign governments, without exception, believethat Aceh should remain part of Indonesia but mostprefer that the conflict be solved peacefullythrough the implementation of special autonomy,not through military means.82 In theory all foreigngovernments accept the right of the Indonesianstate to use force against insurgents, but in

80 See “Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring LastingPeace”, page 14.81 Kompas, 16th May 2001.82 Libya provided military training to GAM in the late1980s, but there have been no reports since then to suggestthat Libya, or any other state, provides support to theguerrillas.

practice, many doubt that the Indonesian securityforces have the discipline and self-control to do sowithout committing widespread human rightsabuses against civilians. The behaviour of themilitary and its paramilitary proxies in East Timorin 1999 has made foreign governments moresensitive about its practices elsewhere.83

A number of foreign governments, notably that ofthe United States, have expressed strongmisgivings about military operations in Aceh intheir meetings with the Indonesian government.The United States is said to have made detailedproposals to Indonesia on a negotiated solution inAceh, and these proposals are reflected in five ofthe six points in the government’s plan forresolving the conflict. The sixth point, added bythe government itself, was the current militaryoperation. The United Kingdom, which suppliedHawk combat aircraft to Indonesia during theSoeharto period, has reportedly delayed the exportof spare parts for these aircraft for fear they will beused for ground attack in Aceh.84This diplomaticpressure , combined with the ambivalence ofPresident Wahid and other civilian politicianstowards a military operation, may have helped todelay an offensive by several months. However,the limits of lobbying are indicated by the fact thatthis operation has now begun.

The United States and other governments are saidto be willing to support the implementation ofautonomy in Aceh with funds, expertise andtraining for Acehnese officials and NGOs. Foreigngovernments have a vested interest in seeingautonomy succeed because of their desire thatAceh remain part of Indonesia and their uneaseabout attempts to solve the problem by force.International opinion is not static, however. Grossabuses of human rights by the Indonesian militarycould tilt it towards greater sympathy for Acehneseself-determination, just as abuses by GAM coulderode the objections to more forceful measuresagainst the separatists and their sources of support.

VI. CONSTRAINTS TOIMPLEMENTATION

The passing of the draft autonomy law by the DPRwould be only the first step in the long process ofwinning back Acehnese sympathies to Indonesia.

83 ICG interviews with Jakarta-based diplomats.84 Far Eastern Economic Review, 24th May 2001.


The Indonesian government will need to make aconcerted and holistic effort, both in Jakarta andwithin Aceh, to overcome three interlinkedobstacles to the successful implementation ofautonomy. These are the opposition of GAM, thebehaviour of the security forces and thegovernment’s lack of credibility amongst theAcehnese.

A. OPPOSITION FROM GAM

The first priority of the provincial government,once the autonomy law is passed, will be to use theextra funds allocated to Aceh to stimulate the localeconomy and create jobs. GAM has no interest inseeing these efforts succeed, however, because thiswould undercut its own campaign forindependence. Given that GAM either controls orinfluences large areas of Aceh’s territory, themovement clearly has the capacity to block ordisrupt economic development projects. Even ifgovernment officials were able to run such projectsin GAM-controlled areas, it is likely that themovement would demand a cut of the publicmoney involved. Thus there is a risk that publicmoney spent in GAM areas will end up subsidisingthe rebellion.85

This means that the provincial government maynot be able to implement effectively projects thatmake people less poor, for example by creatingjobs and improving infrastructure, in areas whereGAM is strong: in other words, in the areas wherethese projects are most needed. Developmentprojects may therefore have to concentrate onthose areas where GAM has relatively lessinfluence, or where the security forces can betrusted to protect these projects in a way that doesnot antagonise local people. There is someevidence that villagers are more willing tochallenge the authority of the guerrillas if theyhave a direct material interest of their own toprotect, such as a farming project or a localindustry that generates income for them.86

In the longer term, most of ICG’s Acehneseinterviewees agreed that GAM cannot simply becut out of the autonomy process. The movementcan be damaged by military force but probably notdestroyed, which means that its members cancontinue to disrupt the implementation ofautonomy unless it is given an incentive not to.

85 ICG confidential interview.86 As above.

One possible way to involve GAM is to hold localelections in Aceh. Indonesia’s current electoralrules do not allow political parties to be based in asingle province, but these rules are due to beamended, possibly within a year. This would allowa GAM proxy party to run in the elections and sitin the provincial and district parliaments in Aceh87.This would not resolve the underlying issue ofsovereignty, for GAM shows no signs of giving upits demands for independence and Jakarta isunlikely to allow any political party in Aceh to runwith a call for independence or self-determinationas its platform. But should the other aspects ofautonomy be making progress, this route might atleast attract some GAM members.

Some members of GAM may be very unwilling togive up the armed struggle, whether out ofideological commitment to an independent Aceh,the desire to avenge murder of their relatives bythe security forces or because their mainmotivation is banditry. In other words, theautonomy package is unlikely to end the violencecompletely even if it is generally successful. Itcould reduce the conflict, however, to the levelwhere it no longer disrupts the lives of mostAcehnese or appears to threaten Indonesia’sterritorial integrity.

B. THE SECURITY FORCES

As noted earlier, the brutal behaviour of theIndonesian security forces is one of the mainreasons, possibly the dominant reason, why theindependence movement enjoys broad support.The autonomy plan is unlikely to win the supportof civilians in areas of conflict if their dailyexperience of Indonesian government is violence,intimidation and extortion by its soldiers andpolice, and if there is no redress for past abuses. Ifthe government does not address this problem, thenany of the support from Acehnese that it mightgain by the grant of autonomy is likely to beeroded away.

As discussed earlier, the military leadership isaware of this issue and has taken some steps, atleast on a formal level, to curb the possibility ofmore human rights abuses. There is, however, littleevidence to suggest that the behaviour of the 87 Aceh, like all Indonesian provinces, has a legislature forthe province (the DPRD Level One), plus legislatures foreach district (DPRD Level Two).


security forces in Aceh has decisively changed.Killings of civilians continue, whether intended oraccidental, and recent atrocities like the RATAmurders remain unpunished, and there is still anunwillingness to admit the problem.In practice, soldiers and policemen who commit orinstigate human rights abuses in Aceh remainunaccountable to the law.88

The Indonesian security presence in Aceh ispredatory in many ways. Security personnel arepaid what amount to poverty wages: one Acehneseactivist told ICG that the Brimob paramilitarypolice, a notoriously ill-disciplined unit, were paid7,000 rupiah (U.S.$0.60) a day, while a packet ofcigarettes cost 5,000 rupiah.89 As a result, extortionand robbery are common. The drivers of trucksthat ply the main road between Banda Aceh andMedan, the main source of imports into Aceh, havegone on strike twice this year to protest at illegalfees (pungutan liar) demanded by securitypersonnel at the numerous checkpoints. As a result,the prices of basic goods in Aceh soared.90

The military cannot drastically scale back itspresence in the absence of a political solution tothe conflict because if soldiers move out of an area,GAM guerrillas will move in. It is also true thatthere are some civilians in Aceh who feelthreatened by GAM and might welcome a militarypresence if soldiers and police could be trusted notto commit abuses. That said, the larger and moreentrenched the military presence in Aceh, theharder it will be for the government to win backthe sympathy of most Acehnese.

C. THE CREDIBILITY GAP

The credibility of the central government in Acehis close to zero, amongst all sections of thepopulation. Given a history of promises made and

88 In a recent case, policemen killed three high schoolstudents and hurt several others in a punitive raid afterbeing attacked by GAM. The comment of the policespokesman, Sudarsono, was “maybe the three were killedby stray bullets.” See Agence France-Presse, 18th June2001.89 ICG confidential interview. The Brimob, meaningMobile Brigade, are policemen armed with infantryweapons and used mostly in Aceh for patrolling andguarding roads. They tend to be in their early twenties andhave only a few months” basic training.90 Press reports and ICG discussions with Acehnesedrivers. For a discussion of the military’s economicinterests in Aceh, see “Aceh; Why Military Force Won’tBring Lasting Peace.”

broken since the 1950s, even the minority ofAcehnese who see autonomy as the best solutionhave little trust in Jakarta’s good faith. Thisdistrust is applied by many people to the provincialgovernment and the local legislators as well. Ifautonomy is to achieve its aim, people in Acehneed to see that it is bringing tangible benefits totheir lives.

Aside from the problems posed by the military andGAM, the biggest potential snag is that of funding.The scale of the problem depends on whether thefinal version of the autonomy law gives the right tocollect revenues to the provincial government or toJakarta. If the revenues are collected by Acehitself, as stated in the draft law, then the issue iswhether the provincial government can spend themoney effectively. There is no guarantee that itwill, but at least the supporters of autonomy will beable to claim that Aceh is at last receiving its fairshare of its own natural wealth.

If the right to collect this revenue remains withJakarta, then the potential risk is much greater. Therisk is that the money will be delayed or withheldby central government officials to put pressure onAceh, to fill holes in the national budget or becauseof administrative incompetence or corruption.Jakarta is already holding back some of the fundsthat should be paid to Indonesia’s regions underLaw No 25 in an attempt to fill a growing deficit inthe 2001 annual budget. If Jakarta promises moneyto Aceh then is seen as failing to deliver it, theresulting disappointment will strengthen the voicesof those who argue that Aceh would be a better offas a separate state.

The implementation of autonomy will also requirethe provincial government to cooperate with alarge number of government ministries andagencies in Jakarta to arrange the smooth handoverof responsibilities. There is a risk here thatministries may drag their heels during this process,whether because of poor management or the desireto protect their own prerogatives. The moreproblems emerge during the transition toautonomy, the more likely that Acehnese ingeneral will suspect manipulation by Jakarta.

At the provincial level there are other issues whichcould undermine the effectiveness of autonomy. InAceh, as everywhere else in Indonesia, the statebureaucracy is permeated by corruption. This doesnot necessarily mean that all officials are corrupt,


but it does mean that the risk of public funds beingmisused is quite high.

The current deputy governor of Aceh, AzwarAbubakar, is aware of the problem of corruptionand says that he plans to get round it, as far aspossible, by publishing spending plans in the localpress and inviting local NGOs to monitor the useof public money.91 These are not panaceas inthemselves, for published figures can bemanipulated and not all NGOs are bonafide.92

There is also a need to involve the intendedrecipients of public spending in the process ofspending it. If local communities can be involvedas far as possible in the planning, execution andmonitoring of public spending in their areas, thismay reduce the scope for abuse and give localpeople a sense of participation in their owngovernance which has been lacking until now. Thiscould be done through a practice known asmusyawarah, by which local communities cometogether to discuss local issues under the guidanceof respected community elders.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The aim of the autonomy law is to stem thedemand for independence within Aceh by offeringthe people of the province more control over itsaffairs and the revenues generated by its economy.The law is the work of a small elite with weaklegitimacy within Aceh and there is little activepopular support for the idea of autonomy.Nonetheless, the law could achieve its aim – andthereby reduce the violence – if four interlinkedconditions are met.

The first condition is that the main points of thefinal law, as passed by the DPR, should not bemuch less generous to the Acehnese than those ofthe draft law proposed by legislators. The morerestrictive the law, the harder it will be to convincepeople in Aceh that it is a viable alternative toindependence. The second condition is thatwhatever the final form of the law, the central

91 ICG interview with Abubakar.92 To give one example offered to ICG by a source inAceh, officials budgeted a certain sum to build benches fora school. The contractor used inferior materials andproduced poor-quality benches at a fraction of this sum.The rest of the money was stolen. This kind of fraud iswidespread in Indonesia, not just in Aceh, and afflicts alllevels of government.

government must carry out its obligations underthe law in good faith, to avoid the impression inAceh that Jakarta is once more making emptypromises.

The third condition is that Acehnese outside theelite should to be involved in the implementationof the law as active participants, not merely asspectators, and they must begin to feel directmaterial benefits, in the form of jobs, better publicfacilities and infrastructure. This could be donethrough the use of accepted practices such asmusyawarah. The fourth condition is that theIndonesian security forces stop committing humanrights violations which turn the civilian populationagainst Indonesian rule.

A. THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT INACEH

Autonomy will be undermined if it is implementedwithout transparency or is seen only to benefit anelite group of Acehnese with links to Jakarta.Some Acehnese leaders involved with the draft lawappear to have one eye on their own businessinterests. The measures already considered by theprovincial government to increase transparency–notably bringing NGOs into the oversight of publicspending and publishing detailed spending plans inthe local press – should be expanded andencouraged.

Ultimately the autonomy plan will only achieve itsaim if it involves the Acehnese themselves in ameaningful way. The provincial government needsto find ways to involve local communities in thedesign, execution and monitoring of developmentprojects. In the early stages of autonomy, suchprojects should as far as possible be small-scale,use local labour and deliver immediate benefits forlocal communities. Examples include therebuilding of public buildings and repair of roads,bridges and irrigation systems. Such projects, ifwell-implemented, are more likely to deliver rapidgains than large and expensive developments suchas the Sabang port and the Banda Aceh-Medanrailway, and should be given priority over theselatter projects.

B. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

The stakes for the Indonesian government in Acehare high. If autonomy does not reduce the conflict,the only alternative is a prolonged militaryoccupation which, apart from its human and


economic cost, will be damaging to Indonesia’sreputation. International human rights activistswho worked in East Timor are already turning theirattention to Aceh. Although foreign governmentsrecognise Aceh as part of Indonesia and areunlikely to alter that stance, the climate ofinternational opinion may become more hostile toIndonesia if the government is seen to be resortingto repression.

After a long history of broken promises onautonomy, the onus is on the Indonesiangovernment to demonstrate to the Acehnese that itmeans to keep its word this time. Since GAM willnot accept autonomy as a substitute forindependence, the government should press aheadwith the implementation of autonomy in the hopethat as it brings greater prosperity to the Acehnese,support for independence may fade. At that point,some GAM members may decide that it is better tocampaign peacefully for Acehnese rights than tocarry on fighting. The electoral laws needs to bepromptly changed to allow political parties to bebased only in one province. This would open thepossibility for GAM members to enter the politicalarena via an Aceh-based proxy party that could runin local elections.

At the same time, the government should continuenegotiating with GAM representatives overseas,using the autonomy law as a basis for discussions,and with a view to opening out the negotiations toinvolve other groups from Acehnese society suchas the ulama and NGOs. Opposition from GAMshould not be used as an excuse to abandon orscale back the autonomy plan. Even if the plan issuccessful, violence is likely to continue for sometime given the hatred felt by some GAM memberstowards Indonesia and the opportunities forbanditry and other crime. Eventually, however, theconflict may diminish to the point that it no longerdisrupts the lives of the majority of Acehnese.

The most important part of the autonomy law,from an Acehnese perspective, is the allocation ofincome from Aceh’s natural resources. The finalsplit between the province and the centralgovernment should not be much less than the 80per cent requested by the Acehnese. If control overthe distribution of the money remains with thecentral government, then the money needs to bepaid to Aceh promptly and in full. There is a needfor greater clarity in the mechanisms for allocatingfunds to Aceh and other regions.

The other key element of the law is greaterinfluence for Aceh over the Indonesian securityforces. Whether or not the central government isready to grant the province its own police forceand a say in military deployments, it needs toconsider unilateral steps to bring the securityforces under control. A first step could be thereactivation of the legal process advocated by theIndependent Commission on Aceh93, which lapsedafter the flawed Bantaqiah trial last year.

The investigation and trial process needs toestablish command responsibility for human rightsabuses, not simply to scapegoat low-rankingpersonnel in the field. The law on human rightscourts of 2000 provides a framework for this.94

Normative statements from the military leadershipin Jakarta about the need to avoid such abuses areunlikely to have a lasting effect in the field unlesssoldiers and policemen are made truly accountableto the law for any abuses they commit. Thegovernment could also consider more extensivecompensation for the victims of past abuses by themilitary.

The issue of Islamic Sharia is important to manyAcehnese, but few are willing to accept it as asubstitute for a meaningful transfer of power andresources from Jakarta. There are concerns in somequarters about the question of Sharia, such as itsprecise relationship with the national legal systemand whether women will play an appropriate rolein its implementation, but these concerns should bedealt with outside the framework of the conflictand not used as a reason to slow down or block theother aspects of autonomy. The administrativefreedoms in the draft law, such as the right to useindigenous terminology in local government, willnot be accepted in Aceh as a substitute for morepower and money.

Many technical and administrative issues will needto be negotiated between Aceh and centralgovernment agencies during the implementation ofautonomy. It is important that such negotiationsmove smoothly, and that people in Aceh do not getthe impression that Jakarta is trying to claw back inpractice what it has offered on paper. Thegovernment might consider appointing a SpecialMinister or Coordinating Minister to take charge ofAceh policy, which would include the coordination 93 The full title of this body is the IndependentCommission for the Investigation of Violence in Aceh.94 See “Indonesia: Impunity Versus Accountability forHuman Rights Violations.”


of the agencies involved in implementingautonomy. This official should ideally be ofcabinet rank, or report directly to the CoordinatingMinister for Politics, Social Affairs and Security,and have regular access to the president.

C. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Foreign governments should keep up thediplomatic pressure on Indonesia to stop offensivemilitary operations in Aceh, because theseoperations are likely to erode any support forIndonesian rule that might be won throughautonomy. Governments can also offer the carrotof development funds and expertise to support theimplementation of autonomy. If military operationsintensify, foreign governments must be prepared toback up their diplomatic pressure with action, forexample by the suspension of arms sales ormilitary contacts by those countries which stillmaintain them.

At the same time, those foreign governmentswhich have contacts with GAM should continue tostress that given the huge disparity of militaryforce in Indonesia’s favour, the alternative toautonomy is not independence but continuing warwith no guarantee of eventual victory for theguerrillas. GAM leaders should therefore be urgedto consider whether they cannot achieve theirsubstantial goals by taking part in the politicalprocess within an autonomous Aceh. The killingsof civilians and off-duty security personnel, as wellas the expulsion of non-Acehnese residents fromAceh, should stop. It should be made clear thatcontinued abuses by GAM forces could lead toGAM being declared a terrorist organisation byforeign governments and/or action being taken todirectly pursue its external sources of funding andarms.

The ability of foreign governmental andmultilateral donors to play a role within Aceh islimited at the moment by the conflict, and by whatappears to be an effort by elements of the militaryand police to keep external actors out of theconflict zone under the pretext that their securitycannot be guaranteed.95 The threat to the securityof aid workers comes more from the securityforces than from GAM, which has an interest ininternationalising the conflict. Governments shouldtherefore lobby for better access to the field inAceh for humanitarian workers.

9595 ICG discussions with aid workers in Aceh.

Even at times when it is too dangerous for aidworkers or other humanitarian personnel to workin the countryside, foreign and international donorscan still play a role by providing assistance forcapacity-building amongst local NGOs in BandaAceh, which is relatively safe even during periodsof intense conflict elsewhere in the province.

Jakarta/Brussels, 27 June 2001


APPENDIX A: COMPARISON OF DRAFT LAWS ON SPECIAL AUTONOMY

Table: Comparison of draft laws on special autonomy, as proposed by Acehnese legislators, withgovernment’s draft and regional autonomy law No 22 of 19991 Only new institutions are mentioned, not old institutions which have been renamed. All provinces in Indonesia have agovernor and a legislature (DPRD-I) at the provincial level. Provinces are divided into districts (kabupaten) headed by a regent(bupati) and municipalities headed by a mayor (walikota). Both of these have their own legislatures (DPRD-II).

DPR draft Government draft (defunct) Law No 22

Powers of centralgovernment

External defenceForeign relationsMonetary policy

As Law No 22 exceptCivil lawCertain local revenues

Defence/securityMonetary/fiscal policyLegal systemNational planning,development andadministrationSetting of national standards

Region’s share ofnatural resourceincome

80 per cent 15 per cent of oil30 per cent of gas80 per cent of forestry, mining andfishing

15 per cent of oil30 per cent of gas80 per cent of forestry,mining and fishing

New Structures andinstitutions1

Wali NanggroeSharia CourtNanggroe Aceh PoliceUlama Advisory CouncilGovernor’s Advisory BoardJustice CommissionAhlul Halli Wal AqdiGeneral Election Agency

Sharia CourtAdvisory board of ulamaJustice Commission

None

Appointments Wali Nanggroe chosen by Ahlul HalliWal Aqdi

Governor chosen by Ahlul Halli walAqdi, or by elections if conditions permit

Legislature chosen in separate localelections

Governor chosen by Jakarta

Legislature chosen via nationalelections

Governor chosen by locallegislature

Legislature chosen vianational elections

Legal system Based on Islamic Sharia, includingappeal level, for both civil and criminalcases

Civil law based on Sharia, with appealto Supreme Court in Jakarta

National law for criminal cases

National law

Security Internal security run by Aceh police.Military for external defence only

Police and military Police and military


APPENDIX B: ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is aprivate, multinational organisation committed tostrengthening the capacity of the internationalcommunity to anticipate, understand and act toprevent and contain conflict.

ICG’s approach is grounded in field research.Teams of political analysts, based on the groundin countries at risk of conflict, gatherinformation from a wide range of sources, assesslocal conditions and produce regular analyticalreports containing practical recommendationstargeted at key international decision-takers.

ICG’s reports are distributed widely to officialsin foreign ministries and internationalorganisations and made generally available at thesame time via the organisation's internet site,www.crisisweb.org . ICG works closely withgovernments and those who influence them,including the media, to highlight its crisisanalysis and to generate support for its policyprescriptions. The ICG Board - which includesprominent figures from the fields of politics,diplomacy, business and the media - is directlyinvolved in helping to bring ICG reports andrecommendations to the attention of seniorpolicy-makers around the world. ICG is chairedby former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari;former Australian Foreign Minister GarethEvans has been President and Chief Executivesince January 2000.

ICG’s international headquarters are at Brussels,with advocacy offices in Washington DC, NewYork and Paris. The organisation currentlyoperates or is planning field projects in nineteencrisis-affected countries and regions across threecontinents: Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda, theDemocratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone,Sudan and Zimbabwe in Africa;Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Asia; Albania,Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro andSerbia in Europe; and Colombia in LatinAmerica.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitablefoundations, companies and individual donors.The following governments currently providefunding: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland,France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, theNetherlands, Norway, the Republic of China(Taiwan), Sweden, Switzerland and the UnitedKingdom. Foundation and private sector donorsinclude the Ansary Foundation, the William andFlora Hewlett Foundation, the Charles StewartMott Foundation, the Open Society Institute, thePloughshares Fund, the Sasakawa Foundation,the Smith Richardson Foundation, the FordFoundation and the U.S. Institute of Peace.

June 2001


APPENDIX C: ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERSReleased since January 1999

AFRICA

ALGERIA

Algeria: The Press in Crisis, Africa Report N°8, 11 January1999Algérie: La Crise de la Presse, Africa Report N°8, 11 January1999The People’s National Assembly, Africa Report N°10, 16February 1999Assemblée Populaire Nationale: 18 Mois de Législature, AfricaReport N°10 16 February 1999Elections Présidentielles en Algérie: Les Enjeux et lesPerspectives, Africa Report N°12, 13 April 1999

The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet, Africa Report N°24, 20October 2000La Crise Algérienne n’est pas finie, Africa Report N°24, 20October 2000

BURUNDI

Burundi: Internal and Regional Implications of the Suspensionof Sanctions, Africa Report N°14, 27 April 1999Le Burundi Après La Suspension de L’Embargo: AspectsInternes et Regionaux, Africa Report N°14, 27 April 1999Quelles Conditions pour la reprise de la Coopération auBurundi? Africa Report N°13, 27 April 1999Proposals for the Resumption of Bilateral and Multilateral Co-operation, Africa Report N°13, 27 April 1999Burundian Refugees in Tanzania: The Key Factor in theBurundi Peace Process, Africa Report N°19, 30 November 1999L’Effet Mandela: Evaluation et Perspectives du Processus dePaix Burundais, Africa Report N°20, 18 April 2000The Mandela Effect: Evaluation and Perspectives of the PeaceProcess in Burundi, Africa Report N°20, 18 April 2000Unblocking Burundi’s Peace Process: Political Parties,Political Prisoners and Freedom of the Press, Africa Briefing,22 June 2000Burundi: Les Enjeux du Débat. Partis Politiques, Liberté de laPresse et Prisonniers Politiques, Africa Report N°23, 12 July2000Burundi: The Issues at Stake. Political Parties, Freedom of thePress and Political Prisoners, Africa Report N° 23, 12 July 2000Burundi Peace Process: Tough Challenges Ahead, AfricaBriefing, 27 August 2000Burundi: Ni guerre ni paix, Africa Report N° 25, 1 December2000Burundi: sortir de l'impasse. L'urgence d'un nouveau cadre denégociations, Africa Report N°29, 14 May 2001

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

How Kabila Lost His Way, DRC Report N°3, Africa ReportN°16, 21 May 1999Africa’s Seven Nation War, DRC Report N°4, Africa ReportN°17, 21 May 1999The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic ofCongo, Africa Report N°18, 20 August 1999Kinshasa sous Kabila, à la veille du dialogue national, AfricaReport N°19, 21 September 1999Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, AfricaReport N° 26, 20 December 2000From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo,Africa Report N°27, 16 March 2001Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Prevention,Africa Briefing, 12 June 2001

RWANDA

Five Years after the Genocide: Justice in Question, AfricaReport N°11, 7 April 1999Cinq Ans Après le Génocide au Rwanda: La Justice enQuestion, Africa Report N°11, 7 April 1999

Uganda and Rwanda: Friends or Enemies?Africa Report N°15, 4 May 2000Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda:l’urgence de juger, Africa Report N°30, 7 June2001

SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy,Africa Report N° 28, 11 April 2001

ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe: At the Crossroads, Africa Report N°22, 10 July 2000Zimbabwe: Three Months after the Elections, Africa Briefing,25 September 2000


ASIA

BURMA/MYANMAR

Burma/Myanmar: How Strong is the Military Regime?, AsiaReport N° 11, 21 December 2000

INDONESIA

East Timor Briefing, 6 October 1999Indonesia’s Shaky Transition, Indonesia Report N°1, AsiaReport N°5, 10 October 1999Indonesia’s Crisis: Chronic but not Acute, Indonesia ReportN°2, Asia Report N°6,31 May 2000Indonesia’s Maluku Crisis: The Issues, Asia Briefing, 19 July2000Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control, Asia ReportN°9, 5 September 2000Aceh: Escalating Tension, Asia Briefing, 7 December 2000Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, AsiaReport N° 10, 19 December 2000Indonesia: Impunity Versus Accountability for Gross HumanRights Violations, Asia Report N°12, 2 February 2001Indonesia: National Police Reform, Asia Report N°13, 20February 2001Indonesia's Presidential Crisis, Indonesia Briefing, 21 February2001Bad Debt: The Politics of Financial Reform in Indonesia, AsiaReport N° 15, 13 March 2001Indonesia’s Presidential Crisis: The Second Round, IndonesiaBriefing, 21 May 2001Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace, AsiaReport N° 17, 12 June 2001

CAMBODIA

Back from the Brink, Asia Report N°4, 26 January 1999Cambodia: The Elusive Peace Dividend, Asia Report N°8, 11August 2000

CENTRAL ASIA

Central Asia: Crisis Conditions in Three States, Asia ReportN°7, 7 August 2000Recent Violence in Central Asia: Causes and Consequences,Central Asia Briefing, 18 October 2000Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, Asia Report N°14,1 March 2001Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia’s Localised Poverty andSocial Unrest, Asia Report N°16, 8 June 2001

BALKANS

ALBANIA

The State of Albania, Balkans Report N°54, 6 January 1999Albania Briefing: The Refugee Crisis, 11 May 1999Albania: State of the Nation, Balkans Report N°87, 1 March2000Albania Briefing: Albania’s Local Elections, A test of Stabilityand Democracy, 25 August 2000Albania: The State of the Nation 2001, Balkans report Nº111,25 May 2001

BOSNIA

pBrcko: A Comprehensive Solution, Balkans Report N° 55, 8February 1999Breaking the Mould: Electoral Reform in Bosnia &Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 56, 4 March 1999Republika Srpska: Poplasen, Brcko and Kosovo – Three Crisesand Out? Balkans Report N°62, 6 April 1999Why Will No-one Invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina? BalkansReport N°64, 21 April 1999Republika Srpska in the Post-Kosovo Era: Collateral Damageand Transformation,Balkans Report N°71, 5 July 1999Rule over Law: Obstacles to the Development of anIndependent Judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina, BalkansReport N°72, 5 July 1999Balkans Briefing: Stability Pact Summit, 27 July 1999Preventing Minority Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina: TheAnatomy of Hate and Fear, Balkans Report N°73, 2 August1999

Is Dayton Failing? Policy Options and Perspectives Four YearsAfter, Balkans Report N°80, 28 October 1999Rule of Law in Public Administration: Confusion andDiscrimination in a Post Communist Bureaucracy, BalkansReport N°84, 15 December 1999Denied Justice: Individuals Lost in a Legal Maze, BalkansReport N°86, 23 February 2000European Vs. Bosnian Human Rights Standards, HandbookOverview, 14 April 2000Reunifying Mostar: Opportunities for Progress, Balkans ReportN°90, 19 April 2000Bosnia’s Municipal Elections 2000: Winners and Losers,Balkans Report N°91, 28 April 2000Bosnia’s Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the InternationalCommunity Ready? Balkans Report N°95, 31 May 2000War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Balkans ReportN°103, 02 November 2000Bosnia’s November Elections: Dayton Stumbles, Balkans ReortN°104, 18 December 2000Turning Strife to Advantage: A Blueprint to Integrate theCroats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 106, 15March 2001

No Early Exit: NATO’s Continuing Challenge in Bosnia,Balkans Report Nº110, 22 May 2001


KOSOVO

Unifying the Kosovar Factions: The Way Forward, BalkansReport N°58, 12 March 1999Kosovo: The Road to Peace, Balkans Report N°59, 12 March1999Kosovo Briefing: Atrocities in Kosovo Must be Stopped, 29March 1999Kosovo Briefing: The Refugee Crisis, 2 April 1999Kosovo: Let’s Learn from Bosnia, Balkans Report N°66, 17May 1999The New Kosovo Protectorate, Balkans report N°69, 20 June1999Kosovo Briefing: Who Will Lead the Kosovo Albanians Now?28 June 1999The Policing Gap: Law and Order in the New Kosovo, BalkansReport N°74, 6 August 1999Who’s Who in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°76, 31 August 1999Waiting for UNMIK: Local Administration in Kosovo, BalkansReport N°79, 18 October 1999Violence in Kosovo: Who’s Killing Whom? Balkans ReportN°78, 2 November 1999Trepca: Making Sense of the Labyrinth, Balkans Report N°82,26 November 1999Starting From Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon is Over,Balkans Report N°83, 10 December 1999Kosovo Albanians in Serbian Prisons: Kosovo’s UnfinishedBusiness, Balkans Report N°85, 26 January 2000What Happened to the KLA?, Balkans Report N°88, 3 March2000Kosovo’s Linchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica, BalkansReport N°96, 31 May 2000Reality Demands: Documenting Violations of InternationalHumanitarian Law in Kosovo 1999, 26 June 2000Elections in Kosovo: Moving toward Democracy? BalkansReport N°97, 7 July 2000Kosovo Report Card, Balkans Report N°100, 28 August 2000Reaction in Kosovo to Kostunica’s Victory, Balkans Briefing, 10October 2000Religion in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°105, 31 January 2001

MACEDONIA

Challenges and Choices for the New Government, BalkansReport N°60, 29 March 1999Toward Destabilisation? Balkans Report N°67, 21 May 1999Macedonia Briefing: Government Holds Together, Eyes Fixedon Upcoming Presidential Poll, 11 June 1999Macedonia Briefing: Update of Recent Political Developments,14 June 1999Macedonia: Gearing up for Presidential Elections, BalkansReport N°77, 18 October 1999Macedonia’s Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf, BalkansReport N°98, 2 August 2000Macedonia government expects setback in local elections,Briefing Paper, 4 September 2000The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion, BalkansReport N°109, 5 April 2001

Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, Balkans Report N°113, 20 June 2001

MONTENEGRO

Montenegro Briefing: Milosevic to Move on Montenegro, 23April 1999Montenegro Briefing: Calm Before the Storm, 19 August 1999Montenegro: In the Shadow of the Volcano, Balkans ReportN°89, 21 March 2000Montenegro’s Socialist People’s Party: A Loyal Opposition?,Balkans Report N°92, 28 April 2000Montenegro’s Local Elections: Testing the NationalTemperature, Background Briefing, 26 May 2000Montenegro’s Local Elections: More of the Same, BriefingPaper, 23 June 2000Montenegro: Which way Next? Balkans Briefing, 30 November2000Montenegro: Settling for Independence? Balkans ReportN°107, 28 March 2001Montenegro: Time to Decide, Balkans Briefing, 18 April 2001

SERBIA

Sidelining Slobodan: Getting Rid of Europe’s Last Dictator,Balkans Report N°57, 15 March 1999Milosevic’s Aims in War and Diplomacy, Balkans Report N°65,11 May 1999Yugoslavia Briefing: Wanted for War Crimes, 1 June 1999Back to the Future: Milosevic Prepares for Life After Kosovo,Balkans Report N°70, 28 June 1999Transforming Serbia: The Key to Long-Term Balkan Stability,Balkans Report N°75, 10 August 1999Serbia’s Embattled Opposition, Balkans Report N°94, 30 May2000Serbia’s Grain Trade: Milosevic’s Hidden Cash Crop, BalkansReport N°93, 5 June 2000Serbia: The Milosevic Regime on the Eve of the SeptemberElections, Balkans Report N°99, 17 August 2000Current Legal Status of the Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) andof Serbia and Montenegro, Balkans Report N°101, 19September 2000Yugoslavia’s Presidential Election: The Serbian People’sMoment of Truth, Balkans Report N°102, 19 September 2000Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Sanctions Briefing, BalkansBriefing, 10 October 2000Serbia on the Eve of the December Elections, Balkans Briefing,20 December 2000A Fair Exchange: Aid to Yugoslavia for regional Stability,Balkans Report N° 112, 15 June 2001

REGIONAL REPORTS

War in the Balkans, Balkans Report N°61, 19 April 1999Balkan Refugee Crisis, Balkans Report N°68, 1 June 1999Balkans Briefing: Stability Pact Summit, 27 July 1999


After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting BalkansPeace, Balkans report N°108, 26 April 2001

ICG ISSUES REPORTS

HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue, ICG Issues Report N°1, 19 June2001EU Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes forConflict Prevention and Management, ICG Issues Report N°2,26 June 2001The European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO): CrisisResponse in the Grey Lane, EU Briefing, 26 June 2001


APPENDIX D: ICG BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Martti Ahtisaari, ChairmanFormer President of Finland

Stephen Solarz, Vice-ChairmanFormer U.S. Congressman

Gareth Evans, PresidentFormer Foreign Minister of Australia

Morton AbramowitzFormer U.S. Assistant Secretary of State; former U.S.Ambassador to Turkey

Kenneth AdelmanFormer U.S. Ambassador and Deputy PermanentRepresentative to the UN

Richard AllenFormer Head of U.S. National Security Council andNational Security Advisor

Hushang AnsaryFormer Iranian Minister and Ambassador; Chairman,Parman Group, Houston

Louise ArbourSupreme Court Judge, Canada;Former Chief Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunalfor former Yugoslavia

Oscar Arias SanchezFormer President of Costa Rica; Nobel Peace Prize, 1987

Ersin AriogluChairman, Yapi Merkezi

Paddy AshdownFormer Leader of the Liberal Democrats, United Kingdom

Zainab BanguraDirector, Campaign for Good Governance, Sierra Leone

Alan BlinkenFormer U.S. Ambassador to Belgium

Emma BoninoMember of the European Parliament; former EuropeanCommissioner

Maria Livanos CattauiSecretary-General, International Chamber of Commerce

Eugene ChienDeputy Secretary General to the President, Taiwan

Wesley ClarkFormer NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Jacques DelorsFormer President of the European Commission

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen

Former Foreign Minister of Denmark

Gernot ErlerVice-President, Social Democratic Party, GermanBundestag

Mark EyskensFormer Prime Minister of Belgium

Yoichi FunabashiJournalist and author

Bronislaw GeremekFormer Foreign Minister of Poland

I.K.GujralFormer Prime Minister of India

Han Sung-JooFormer Foreign Minister of Korea

El Hassan bin TalalChairman, Arab Thought Forum

Marianne HeibergSenior Researcher, Norwegian Institute of InternationalAffairs

Elliott F KulickChairman, Pegasus International

Joanne Leedom-AckermanNovelist and journalist

Todung Mulya LubisHuman rights lawyer and author

Allan J MacEachenFormer Deputy Prime Minister of Canada

Graça MachelFormer Minister of Education, Mozambique

Barbara McDougallFormer Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada

Matthew McHughCounsellor to the President, The World Bank

Mo MowlamFormer British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland

Christine OckrentJournalist

Timothy OngChairman, Asia Inc magazine

Wayne OwensPresident, Center for Middle East Peace and EconomicCo-operation

Cyril Ramaphosa


Former Secretary-General, African National Congress;Chairman, New Africa Investments Ltd

Fidel RamosFormer President of the Philippines

Michel RocardMember of the European Parliament; former PrimeMinister of France

Volker RuheVice-President, Christian Democrats, German Bundestag;former German Defence Minister

Mohamed SahnounSpecial Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General

William ShawcrossJournalist and author

Michael SohlmanExecutive Director of the Nobel Foundation

George SorosChairman, Open Society Institute

Eduardo SteinFormer Foreign Minister of Guatemala

Pär StenbäckFormer Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland

Thorvald StoltenbergFormer Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway

William O TaylorChairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe

Ed van ThijnFormer Minister of Interior, The Netherlands; formerMayor of Amsterdam

Simone VeilFormer Member of the European Parliament; formerMinister for Health, France

Shirley WilliamsFormer British Secretary of State for Education andScience; Member House of Lords

Grigory YavlinskyMember of the Russian Duma

Mortimer ZuckermanChairman and Editor-in-Chief, US News and WorldReport

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