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DOI: 10.1177/1476750306063991 2006; 4; 183 Action Research

Lai Fong Chiu Critical reflection: More than nuts and bolts

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Critical reflection

More than nuts and bolts

Lai Fong ChiuUniversity of Leeds, UK

A B S T R A C T

Critical reflection is commonly seen as central to social trans-formation in Participatory Action Research (PAR). However, the groundings and practice of the concept and its associatedapplications are seldom questioned or examined. The lack of aclear conceptual basis upon which reflective practice could bedeveloped is manifested in the routinized presentations of ‘lessons learnt’ in writings. This article inquires into the conceptof critical reflection and its current practice in PAR, drawing onkey contributors and current PAR writings. This exploration hasprompted a construction of a conceptual framework groundedon the principle of extended epistemology (Heron, 1992), inwhich the role of reflection or critical reflection in the creation ofdifferent forms of knowledge can be clearly discerned. In addi-tion, the framework explicitly incorporates first-, second- andthird-person research practice (Reason & Torbert, 1999) to allowfor the different aspects of reflective practice to emerge.Examples from my own reflective practice are given to illustratethe various dimensions of the framework. I argue this frameworkprovides a clearer conceptual basis upon which reflective prac-tice can be developed, with important implications for the futuredevelopment of PAR.

Action Research

Volume 4(2): 183–203Copyright© 2006 SAGE PublicationsLondon, Thousand Oaks CA, New Delhiwww.sagepublications.comDOI: 10.1177/1476750306063991

A R T I C L E

K E Y W O R D S

• concepts

• critical reflection

• extended

epistemology

• reflective practice

183



Introduction

Emancipation and transformation are the twin goals of Participatory ActionResearch (PAR). Freire’s concept of conscientization through ‘critical reflection’is commonly recognized as central to research practice and it is often linkeddirectly to social transformation (Gaventa, 1998, p. 153). However, the assump-tion that critical reflection will automatically lead to learning and action and ultimately to social transformation is rarely questioned. Indeed, in developmentstudies where participatory research proliferates, very little ‘[ethical] reflectionabout the whole issue of the relationship between science and politics and power’has been observed (Tvedt, 1999, p. 144).

The lack of development of the concept of critical reflection in PAR mightbe attributed to the false dichotomies between theory and practice, and the lackof clarity in the complex relationships between knowledge, action and reflection.Many writers appear to have placed implicit value on processual knowledge,asserting reflection on fieldwork as evidence of good practice (e.g. Cornwall &Jewkes, 1995; Dockery, 1996; McTaggart, 1997; Meulenberg-Buskens, 1996;Seymour-Rolls & Hughes, 1995) without questioning what exactly constitutescritical reflection or reflective practice. The concept thus appears to have beentaken for granted – this is often manifested in a routinized presentation of ‘lessonslearnt’. This claim to learning or transformation is commonly supported by adescription of events. Interpretations or analyses of these events and outcomes are often based on researchers’ implicit frames of reference. Seldom are social theories drawn upon explicitly to support analysis.

In a review of literature, it appears the concept of reflection has undergoneuneven development across various disciplines under the umbrella of ActionResearch (AR). In education, reflective practice has long been developed throughthe writings of Dewey, Schön, Boud, and many others, as a crucial process forimproving teaching practice. This influence can also be seen recently in nursingeducation (e.g. Greenwood, 1993; Jarvis, 1992; Johns, 1995) and in social work(Beresford, 2001). In particular, the critical dimension of reflective practice andits emancipatory function has been highlighted (Carr & Kemmis, 1986; Mezirow& Associates, 1990), drawing essentially from the work of Paulo Freire (1972).Although the interpretation of critical reflection as an unmasking of the assump-tions underlying oppressive explanations of prevailing social order appears to becommon among action researchers, interpretations of the ‘who’ and the ‘how’ ofcritical reflection are diverse.

I believe that careful consideration of critical reflection is essential for thedevelopment of good practice in PAR. This article presents my attempt to makesense of critical reflection conceptually through existing literature, as well asthrough my PAR practice in the context of health promotion in the UK. The firstpart of the article is an exploration, through writings, of the current understand-

Action Research 4(2)184 •



ing of the concept in general and the current forms of ‘reflective practice’ in PAR.It is evident from this exploration that a clear conceptual framework for reflec-tion and crucially of critical reflection is necessary to guide reflective practice.Since PAR subscribes to a participatory worldview, such a framework needs to begrounded upon the extended epistemology espoused by Heron (1992) and sincethe most compelling and enduring kind of action research engages first-, second-and third-person research practice (Reason & Bradbury, 2001, p. xxvi), such aframework needs to account for these different dimensions. In seeking to articu-late the different aspects of reflective practice and their roles in the creation of different ways of knowing, I venture to propose a framework, illustrating itspotential and using examples of my own reflective practice from different PAR projects. Through attending to different aspects of reflection, the notion ofcritical reflection can be clarified and appropriately located.

Existing ideas about reflection in AR

In AR literature, it appears that opinion over what constitutes reflection isdiverse. Different writers have proposed different models to understand the concept. In education, reflection was defined by Dewey (1933, p. 9) as ‘An activepersistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledgein the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which ittends’. In other words, Dewey views reflection as a necessary component ofknowledge production through experience (Pettegrew, 2000). He suggested thatreflection is often triggered when the practitioner is confronted with problematicaspects of practice and introduced five aspects of reflection in a process of think-ing and problem solving:

1 intuition of solutions; 2 rationalization of difficult experience into a problem; 3 experimentation and observation of solutions; 4 mental elaboration of the supposition of an idea; and 5 testing the hypothesis by imaginative action.

The model has been criticized as individualistic, over-cognitive, and lacking atten-tion to the emotive and dialogic aspects of reflection (Cinnamond & Zimpher,1990). Addressing the emotive aspect of reflection, Boud, Keogh and Walker(1985) reworked Dewey’s model by simplifying the five aspects into three: (1) recalling in detail salient events; (2) attending to feelings associated with these events; and (3) evaluating and re-examining experience in the light of one’sintent and existing knowledge, and incorporating this new knowledge into one’s conceptual framework. By emphasizing reflection as a deliberate and con-scious mental activity of the individual, Boud et al.’s model thus ignores the

Chiu Critical reflection: more than nuts and bolts • 185



social, situational and dialogic aspects of reflection (Cinnamond & Zimpher,1990).

The contemporary development of the concept of reflection has been widely influenced by Schön. Reflective practice has become a standard curricu-lum in teachers’ and health professionals’ education programmes (Hopkins &Antes, 1990; Tate & Sills, 2004). For Schön (1983, 1996), reflective practice isnot only a conscious mental activity but also an unconscious one. He distin-guishes between two forms of reflection, in other words, reflection-in-action andreflection-on-action with the former as ‘tacit and spontaneous and often deliveredwithout taking thought’ (Schön, 1987, p. 3) and the latter as retrospective, ‘anintellectual [activity which] requires verbalisation and symbolisation’ (p. 5). This distinction illuminates the differences between formal and informal know-ledge. Knowledge gained from doing (reflection-in-action) is informal, a kind of‘artistry’ developed through the dialogue of reciprocal reflection-in-actionbetween an apprentice and his master, ‘not only in words but in doing, in per-formance’ (p. 7).

Drawing from the above perspectives, reflection can be seen as a necessarycomponent of knowledge production through experience with different aspects:cognitive, emotive and dialogic. Different kinds of knowledge, in other words,formal and informal, are generated by different forms of reflection, in otherwords, reflection-on-action and reflection-in-action. Despite Schön’s allusion to the dialogic aspect of reflection through the master/apprentice relationship,mental activity of the first person remains the major focus of these key contribu-tors.

While much has been written about reflection in AR, little can be found inrelation to PAR. Although there has been no explicit discussion of the genesis ofthe concept in PAR writings, reflection appears to be closely bound up withFreire’s (1972) concept of conscientization or critical reflection which refers to aprocess in which the consciousness of the disadvantaged, the poor and the powerless is awakened through critical pedagogy and reflection. Conscientizationhas been assumed to be central to the process of learning (Blackburn & Holland,1998), knowledge creation (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2001), and a source of emanci-pation and social transformation (Park, 2001). However, it is often difficult todiscern from any of these writings how critical reflection was actually facilitated.

It is also difficult to find critical reflection-in-action or on-action asresearchers facilitate conscientization with their participants, thus many of thecontradictions inherent in the theory of critical pedagogy, for example, the simple dichotomies of the oppressors and the oppressed; the polarization of popular and expert knowledge; and the colonizing connotation of ‘magical con-sciousness’ of the marginalized versus the ‘critical consciousness’ of the educator,have simply gone unchallenged (Dei & Sheth, 1997). Since facilitation of consci-entization often relates only to the third-person reflection, it becomes effectively




blind to the dynamics and mutuality of the community of inquiry in which first-and second-person reflections can make significant contributions to different levels of transformation (Fisher & Torbert, 1995). If we accept that transforma-tion is always situated and that different forms of reflection all play a part inbringing about transformation, it is then clear that the present conceptualizationof reflection is inadequate, as it not only takes for granted the different mentalaspects inherent in the reflective process, but also fails to capture the complexityand the richness of the underlying processes.

Current reflective practice in PAR

Because PAR researchers draw strength from a wide range of disciplines, there isan apparent diversity in how reflections are presented. Without an explicit con-ceptual framework of reflection in PAR, it is often difficult to distinguish PARwriting from other forms of analytic and journalistic writings. However, the following three forms of representation and their implicit purposes can be dis-cerned from PAR literature.

As a form of validity claim

By the very presentation of transformational experience in journals or books,these writings constitute an implicit claim to validity. However, on what basissuch claims can be made is unclear. Many writers report (though do not necessaryreflect) on changes effected on local communities (many examples can be foundin Blackburn & Holland’s [1998] book, Who changes?) with no explicit reflec-tion upon the change processes. Even if we believe the researcher’s claim, does themere documentation of the process of change constitute a sufficient basis for such a claim? Would an evaluation of our research according to what we haveaccomplished be sufficient for such a claim?

Influenced by anthropology, PAR researchers may employ the techniquesof ‘thick description’ to describe significant events so as to engage readers to participate vicariously in the experience and thus to appraise the interpretationfor themselves (Winter, 1987). However, this form of presentation of reflectionoften turns into a nuts-and-bolts account of experiences – describing who doeswhat to whom without a clear indication as to how these experiences have beendefined, recognized, organized and selected for presentation. Sometimes, the logics and meta-narratives presented appear to be independent of the researcher’scontext, rhetoric and discipline. Crucially, this form of reflection does not appearto address the central tenets of PAR, in other words, participation, empowerment(Finn, 1994) and praxis (Lather, 1986; Maguire, 1987). Reflection on the partici-patory process, analysis of power dynamics and researcher reflexivity are often




missing. Rarely do we discern any reflection on the relationship between theoryand practice and critical awareness of the personal–political dialectic in thesereports. The different criteria of validity formulated within the debate of AR, forexample, interpersonal validity (Heron, 1988); contextual validity (Torbert,1981); and catalytic validity (Lather, 1991) are increasingly accepted in the academic arena. Most recently, Reason (in press) has suggested that the quality ofinquiry comes from awareness of and transparency about choices and judgementsthat researchers made along the four characteristic dimensions of AR: worth-while practical purpose, democracy and participation, many ways of knowing,and emergent developmental form. However, there is little evidence that reflectivepractice in PAR is responding to this conceptual development.

Giving voice through reflection

Drawing on postmodernist and feminist writings that lived experiences are to becelebrated and multiple realities are to be taken seriously, some have taken theview that emancipation can be achieved by giving voice to the oppressed throughhonouring and narrating their experiences. Thus, many have assumed that the re-creation through representation of the participants’ lived experiences will helpreaders’ understanding of the phenomenon (Denzin, 1994). From this vantagepoint, the voices of the oppressed are all important. However, it is intellectuallyunsatisfying to hear these voices without knowing how they were generated andencouraged in dialogues, how they were previously disrupted and silenced, andhow they reveal multiple identities and social locations thus leading to the unset-tling of existing power relations. Voices that are just voices have no intrinsicclaim to truth (Reason, 1994), neither do they have the practical value of inform-ing others of how the central concerns for engagement, dialogue and pragmaticoutcomes have been addressed.

Giving voice through researchers’ reflections has sometimes led to the presentational dilemma experienced by researchers. For example, George (1996),writing on behalf of her research team, recognized the significant contributionthat researchers made in terms of using their own experiences to uncover theexperiences of the participants. Nevertheless, she stated that they did not presentthe researchers’ narratives in the report as they wanted to focus on the partici-pants’ experiences and wished to avoid difficulties inherent in presenting a collective experience: ‘How do we responsibly report this process, this shared dialogue, such that the interactive, collaborative nature of the dialogue is repre-sented?’ (George, 1996, p. 126).

It is, however, precisely reflection on the interactions between theresearcher and the participants that is likely to illuminate how changes occur.Moreover, the part played by researchers is of great interest to other researchers.Keeping the researchers’ hands hidden has the effect of systematically distorting




the power positioning of all those who participated in the project. This onlyserves to misrepresent the participatory and empowerment processes that consti-tute essential claims to validity as discussed above.

George’s dilemma highlights that the problematic in reflective practice asobserved by Clegg (2004), where the reflective self often appears to have no par-ticular gendered, classed or racialized position. This lack of self-reflexivity canundermine the very process of reflexive engagement. The underlying emotional,social and cultural assumptions in the dialogic processes of the self and othersremain unchallenged. Thus the researcher may not be aware that the presentationof voices could be framed and constructed by her own cultural assumptions andexpectations.

As knowledge creation

Unlike conventional research, PAR is concerned with the creation, rather than thediscovery, of knowledge or different forms of knowledge that help us relate inter-nally to ourselves and externally to the social world. Reflection is recognized asan essential part of the knowledge generation process with actions (Rahman,1991). However, current reflective practice and its presentation as ‘lessons learnt’might have an effect of over-simplifying the complex process of knowledge creation. For example, although Bhatt and Tandon (2001) claim that they brokethe monopoly over knowledge through pedagogy with forest movements, theyhave presented neither the exact mechanism nor processes by which tribal peoplegained their new knowledge that led to collective action. Nor have they provideda broader analysis of the power relations between the State, the catalytic organi-zation Lok Jagriti Kendra (LJK) and the tribal people. Although readers mightnot doubt the transformational outcomes claimed, they are uninformed about the‘how’ of the critical pedagogy and other facilitation processes that brought aboutsuch transformation through reading this chapter. The mere ‘documenting’ ofprocess and ‘reporting’ of outcomes rather than ‘reflecting’ on the researchprocesses prevents the readers from gaining insights into and learning from theresearchers’ practice, thus missing the very aim of sharing one’s research experi-ence through writing. Coupled with the antinomy of practice and knowledge generated in the prevailing debate (Gustavsen, 1996), the role of reflection in theknowledge and practice dialectic has thus been lost.

Re-conceptualizing reflection in PAR

It is clear from the exploration above that the concept of reflection is under-developed in PAR. Critical reflection is taken for granted and largely seen asthird-person reflective practice – ‘they’ rather than ‘we’ or ‘I’. If we accept




Dewey’s assertion that reflection is a necessary component of knowledge pro-duction through experience, the concept of reflection then needs to take accountof the dialectic relationship between reflection, knowledge and experience. In thecontext of the participatory world-view in which the nature of knowledge ismulti-dimensional (Reason & Bradbury, 2001), reflection in PAR is necessarilymulti-perspectival, in other words, first, second and third person (Reason &Torbert, 1999). I believe that by incorporating these perspectives into the extended epistemology developed by Heron and Reason (Heron, 1992, 1996a,1996b; Heron & Reason, 1997), a compelling framework can be generated. Thisframework can capture the complexity and multi-dimensionality of reflection,thus enabling a clearer conceptualization of the part played by critical reflectionin the process of knowledge creation.

Grounding reflection in an extended epistemology is useful because itespouses the holistic being of personhood by attending to the affective, imaginal,conceptual and practical modes of human psychic functioning from which thefour forms of knowing – experiential, presentational, propositional and practical– spring. These forms of knowing are arranged in a hierarchy with experientialknowing as the foundation of all the other forms – the person experiences a feltencounter, which is grasped and presented intuitively, expressed propositionallyand extended into practical action. Action creates a new experience of a feltencounter and the cycle begins anew. Practical knowing is deemed to be ‘the high-er branching and flowering out of, and bearing fruit of the lower’ (Heron, 1992,p. 20). These forms are interdependent and dynamically and cyclically inter-related. For example, from experience of other minority ethnic women’s difficul-ties in accessing the health services (Chiu, 2000), I strengthen what I alreadyknow of their difficulties by sharing this knowledge with other people throughnarrating and presenting their stories in both verbal and written forms. However,experiential and presentational knowledge is not enough to bring about changesto their plights. I then extend my presentational knowledge by inquiring into thisphenomenon through conceptualizing – reading and thinking, experiencing/sensing and interacting, and practice/doing health promotion.

Because all other forms of knowing, in other words, presentational, propo-sitional, and practical, are grounded on experiential knowing parented by theaffective and imaginal modes of the psyche, this framework provides a spacewithin which the participatory and relational aspects of PAR can be conceivedand articulated through first-, second- and third-person reflection, therebyaccounting for the dialogic and social aspects of reflection. Figure 1 illustrates theschematic representation of the proposed conceptual framework.

I venture in the following to illustrate how different forms of reflectivepractice can be articulated through this framework using examples from my pastand current research/practice.




Experiential reflection (experiential knowledge)

Experiential knowing refers to direct encounters with persons, places or things. ‘Itis knowing through participatory, empathic resonance with a being, so that as theknower, I feel both attuned with it and distinct from it’ (Heron & Reason, 1997,p. 281). Experiential reflexivity therefore should focus on everyday lived engage-ment with the world, abstracting from the primordial, pre-reflective, lived expe-rience (Merleau-Ponty, 1962) that we consider to be significant.

I suggest that reflection on lived experience is an imperative as well as anecessity during and after research. In the first person, it concerns ethics and con-duct of research. The researcher is motivated sometimes by the desire to solve aparticular problem and/or to improve her practice. For example, in one of myprojects (Chiu, 2000), I encountered difficulties with one of the collaborators(Rosie) who threatened to withdraw her support for the project and we met toconfront the problem in an atmosphere of mutual mistrust and hostility. Myimmediate response to this challenge was one of shock and miscomprehension.My behaviour was defensive and guarded. I could not believe my collaboratorwould allow anything to undermine such a ‘wonderful’ project as it purported toempower women in disadvantaged communities. By reflecting on events leading


Figure 1 A framework for reflective practice

1st person reflection

Practical knowing

Propositional knowing

Representational knowing

Experiential knowing

affective

conceptual

conceptual

practicaleffective

practical

2nd person reflection3rd person reflection

imaginal

imaginal



up to the confrontation, I recognized that my assumption that collaboration canbe secured purely by virtue of the empowering principles of PAR had led me toneglect my (a lead researcher’s) responsibility to build and establish collaborativerelationships through mutual understanding of expectations, clear communica-tion, empathy and continual dialogue. Rosie had been absent from her work dueto a serious illness. Her return was laden with deep emotion. By attuning to the affective content of our encounter, I was able to reconnect with her and renegotiate her commitment to the project.

In the first-person perspective, reflection on experience is important toincrease researchers’ awareness of the situation, helping to unearth the deepestheld frames that limit our responses to problems as well as our capacity to formulate strategies to move the project on. I have worked in collaboration withcolleagues from different professions in the National Health Service in all thePAR projects. It is inconceivable that these projects could have gotten off theground, let alone be implemented, without engaging with other persons. Forexample, my colleague Jane challenged my framing of an experience in theresearch process. In preparing a presentation of the project, Jane described thetimidity of minority ethnic women and the restrictions that they faced in out-of-town travelling. This outraged me as I thought that she was stereotyping minorityethnic women. I was unconscious of my own professional-cultural framing of theresearch participants – that minority ethnic women should not be seen as weak,timid or subservient. Her insistence on presenting what she perceived as her experience and the fact that she was white had caused me to conclude that shewas prejudiced. Our reflection on our own subjectivity helped to expose the contradictions that are immanent within a PAR project of this kind. When bothof our assumptions were made clear, we were able to resolve this contradiction by enabling the women to present their own participatory experiences. Theirpresentation thus reflected cultural images that are multiple and diverse.

In the third-person perspective, at the first stage of each project, partici-pants were invited to reflect on their own experiences with the screening servicesand become conscious of the lack of information about it and the poor quality ofservices that they experienced (Chiu, 2000). These critical awareness-raising sessions with the disadvantaged groups that we worked with are closely based onFreire’s concept of conscientization.

The presentation of these experiences helped women to voice their dissatis-faction with the treatments they received and uncovered the unethical practice ofopportunistic screening in which minority ethnic women, due to their languagebarrier, were subjected to smear testing without being informed of its purposeand procedure (Chiu, 2000).

Experiential reflection on the third-person level requires us not only toattune to the affective and imaginal aspects of the experiences of others, but also,as researchers, we need to grasp the conceptual (health and experiences in a social




context) and the imaginal as a process of conscious-awareness raising, so thatparticipants can be guided by the researcher to make sense of these experiences.In other words, while empathy and imagination are important, the conceptualmode of the researcher is required to grasp these experiences so as to facilitateconscientization with others.

Presentational reflection (presentational knowledge)

If we assume that the role of reflection is crucial to different forms of knowledgecreation, presentational reflection is then important to facilitate the emergence ofpresentational knowledge from experience. The expression of such knowledge isthrough the symbolic and aesthetic media such as drawing, writing, dance andother visual or aural presentations (Heron & Reason, 1997). I believe that ourresearch experiences have found practical expression through visual and auralpresentations on different levels.

For example, third-person presentational reflection was facilitated explicit-ly in the Woman to Woman (W2W) and the Straight Talking (ST) projects (Chiu,2000, 2002). Women from participating communities were asked to reflect upontheir experience of accessing the screening services and to evaluate the effective-ness of available information. They identified the lack of linguistically and cul-turally appropriate information about the screening procedures and services.Also, upon reflecting on the presentational deficiency of the available informa-tion, women suggested that a photo-story depicting a woman going through thescreening service be produced. The photo-story is supported by a narrativerecorded on audiotapes. Presenting minority ethnic women’s experience usingvisual and aural media through their own participation in the production has notonly given voice to their felt experiences of the screening services, but also givenexpression to their ethnic identities through languages and images (Figure 2).


Figure 2 Giving voice through image presentation



Recently, the value of presentational reflection in the role of creating presentational knowledge that serves practice has also been attested in our Com-munication for Health project (2004–present). In this project, women from boththe South Asian and Chinese communities have been involved in the productionof breast screening videos. Working with professional writers and artists, womenhave participated in developing scripts through video and drama workshops(Figure 3). Rigorous presentational reflections have been facilitated to createaccurate presentational knowledge about women in these communities. Imagesthat portrayed minority ethnic women having linguistic (English) and culturaldeficiency have been rejected in favour of portraying a diverse community inwhich women are of various educational and cultural backgrounds, speaking different dialects and languages.

During the filming process, women have participated as actors, some as on-set language and cultural directors. Cultural artefacts such as South Asian cook-ing equipment like a roti-pan and tongs, a Chinese tea-set and a scroll-paintingwere brought onto the sets to articulate cultural images. Participants’ contribu-tions have demonstrated their intuitive grasp of cultural presentation. It has alsoshown that presentational reflection requires cultural and symbolic knowledgeembedded in participants (Chiu, 2005).

In terms of second-person presentational reflection, there was no formalagreement made with producers of photo-stories and videos in relation to reflection-on-action. Although there were productive discussions, they cannot be


Figure 3 Women presenting their own images



categorized as second-person reflection. In terms of the first person, writing this article is the first time this kind of reflection has been consciously presented ‘off-line’. I am struck by the presentational power of women in the communities andmy own capacity and enthusiasm in the creation of presentational knowledge. Ihave begun to explore the potential of such knowledge to give voice and form tothose who have been silenced and made invisible by dominant health promotionpractice.

Critical reflection (propositional knowledge)

The knowledge ‘about’ does not come from direct sensory perception or experi-ence, but is mediated by intellectual processes of concept forming and conceptualorganization, analysis, inferences and synthesis; and in which reflectivity plays acrucial part. In the PAR paradigm, critical reflection that generates propositionalknowledge cannot be divorced from the other three forms of reflection. Althoughthis form appears to be privileged and most developed in academic discourse ingeneral, there appears to be ambivalence or confusion towards the creation ofpropositional knowledge.

The philosophical tradition of critical theory that derives from Kant, Marx,and the Frankfurt School is congruent with the philosophical groundings of PAR, where critical propositional knowledge is differentiated from positivisticknowledge of cause and effect through its orientation to self-reflection and emancipation (Bohman, 2002). Understanding that is generated is pragmatic andmulti-perspectival (Brandom, 1994; Bohman, 2003) and located within situa-tional, institutional, cultural, and historical contexts (Bourdieu, 1991).

In the first person, this aspect of critical reflection is concerned with, on the one hand, the reflexivity of the researcher; self-questioning to unearth the cultural frame from which we understand or make sense of our own actions andinteractions, and on the other, in-depth analysis of research encounters using theoretical resources after researchers temporarily or permanently withdrawfrom the field. Mezirow’s notion of ‘critical reflection’ (1990) as the uncoveringof the embedded social and cultural assumptions and presuppositions of one’sbeliefs can be suitably located and developed in the former. In the latter, criticalreflection will likely generate quality propositional knowledge about the socialworld by turning the researcher’s gaze back onto themselves and examining the hidden assumptions that structure their research (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

In the second person, critical reflection concerned specifically with thepower relations between participants, and those between participants andresearchers, examines how these relations are structured in the institutional andsocietal context and shaped by ideologies that support them. In the third person,critical reflection refers to the facilitation of Freire’s notion of collective criticalreflection among participants. All the above aspects of critical reflection take




experiences as content, and explicit critical theories as lenses through whichreflections can be focussed. It is where double confrontations of theory and datatake place (Winter, 1987). The following examples of the use of critical theoriesto make sense of my encounters are taken from the W2W project (Chiu, 2000).

The different perspectives on the problem of low uptake of the screeningservices held by health professionals and minority ethnic women were understoodthrough the uncovering of imbalanced social and power relations using blackfeminist theories, for example, Aziz, 1994; Bhavnani, 1993 and Brah, 1992. Theresulting analysis rejected the normative explanation that uptakes are caused bylanguage and cultural deficits on the part of minority ethnic women and reframedit as a symptom of the routinized professional practice perpetuated through colo-nial ideologies and racialized practice. The issue of uptake was then reframed asan issue of access, shifting the responsibility for improving service accessibility forminority ethnic women back to the health professionals. The power relationsbetween participants were manifested in conflicts that arose between profes-sionals and bilingual minority ethnic women who were recruited and trained asCommunity Health Educators (CHEs) to promote access to services. The exist-ence of CHEs brought about a crisis of ‘expert’ authority among the health pro-fessionals as their legitimacy and capacity in health education were challenged. AsI withdrew from the field, the transformation process was better understood bydrawing on Bourdieu’s theory of practice and the concepts of ‘habitus’ and ‘field’(Bourdieu, 1977).

Bourdieu suggests that cultural resources, practices and institutions func-tion to maintain unequal social relations. Attempting to transcend the dualist anddichotomous thinking of western culture, Bourdieu integrates the concepts ofagency and structure, subjectivity and objectivity, the micro and the macro, andvoluntarist and determinist antinomy, by conceptualizing these into a single con-ceptual movement. He proposes a structural theory of practice that connectsaction to culture, structure and power. He views the actor as a practical strategistembedded in the social structure through the concept of habitus, which is definedas ‘A system of durable, transposable dispositions, which functions as the gener-ative basis of structured, objectively unified practices’ (Bourdieu, 1990 [1979],quoted in Harker, Mahar & Wilkes, 1990, p. 10).

The concept of habitus stresses the deterministic, cognitive and embodiedcharacteristics of the actor, who possesses a disposition, created and reformulatedthrough the conjuncture of objective structures and personal history. S/he is theproduct of particular social conditions, but is not determined by them. Bourdieuasserts that individuals and groups draw upon a variety of cultural, social andsymbolic resources in order to maintain and enhance their positions in the socialorder. Cultural capital is defined by Bourdieu as a wide variety of resourcesincluding verbal facility, general cultural awareness, aesthetic preferences, infor-mation about the social system and educational credentials. Cultural capital is an




individual’s power resource. For Bourdieu, the theory of change describes thesocial action produced at the intersection of habitus and field. Field is defined as a set of structured relations that has its own specific logic or rules that guidepractice. In the context of this article, health services can be defined as a socialfield.

Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and field have not only provided lensesthrough which the issue of ethnic identities in post-colonial social relations andthe contradictions of professional practice in complex institutional organizationssuch as the National Health Service can be better understood, but also strategicinsights into what changes could be made through the contestation and legiti-mization of knowledge production (Chiu, 2000). Part of the strategy for trans-formation of practice was through the use of Bourdieu’s concepts of symbolic andcultural power by which bi-lingual minority ethnic women were encouraged toexploit their own linguistic skills and cultural knowledge, so as to take control ofthe production of health education resources and materials that support theirhealth promotion work, for example, the photo-stories, packs and educationalresources mentioned above.

First-person critical reflection is similar to the methodological stance ofreflexivity advocated by Bourdieu’s sociology (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).However, putting the self back into critical reflection is more than situating andhistoricizing a scholarly viewpoint – it is central to the development of knowledgeand the professional practice of the researcher. In facilitating transformation,there is an ever-present danger in challenging dominant ideology. Putting oneselfat personal and professional risk can be depressing, frightening and demoralizing.Critical theory is a resource for unearthing and exploring complex questions andcontradictions that may be found in specific situations in practice. For example,it has helped me to understand the constraints imposed by structural forces and thus avoid anxiety and self-laceration when confronted with a myriad ofproblems that had no immediate solutions.

In one of my first-person critical reflective moments, I recognized that itwas through the intuitive grasp of my own ethnic identity (bi-lingual BritishChinese) and social and cultural position (as a health promotion practitioner andresearcher) that the mobilization of symbolic and cultural power for the strugglehad been made possible. This embodied knowledge by its very nature was implicitand personal. Thus only through critical reflection on significant transforma-tional events does such knowledge become propositional, explicit and transfer-able. My hope is that writing about this will help others to become aware of theuse of symbolic and cultural power in health promotion practice whatever theirethnic identity.




Practical reflection (practical knowledge)

Practical reflection is an aspect of reflection that generates practical knowledge. Itis crucial for the production of the most important knowledge for transforma-tion. If practical knowledge presupposes a conceptual grasp of rules of practice,presentational elegance, and experiential grounding in the situation within whichthe action occurs (Heron, 1996b), practical reflectivity then equally requires thesynthesis of the aforementioned aspects of reflection.

Practical reflection in the first person concerns the effectiveness of our ownactions in terms of the ‘how’ we bring about change, improve and develop ourpractical skills in light of reflection. In the second person it concerns how othersin the process have transformed their practice through working with us on theproject. The third-person practical reflection is key to sustaining transformation.It concerns the transferring of a range of collective reflective skills to participants,so that they can develop their ‘know-how’ to bring about changes once theresearcher withdraws from the field.

An example of the practice of first-person practical reflection can be foundin the W2W project. Securing an agreement from the health professionals forchange through a series of critical workshops was a result of my ability to graspthe conceptual understanding of how gender and ethnicity structured the socialrelations between the health professionals and minority ethnic women throughthe analysis of their discussions in respective focus groups, and presenting suchanalysis back to the health professionals ‘on-line’ to uncover their assumptionsand frames of reference vis-à-vis those of the minority ethnic women. Thisbrought about their willingness to participate in critical awareness workshops forchange (Chiu, 2000). Although the demand for practical reflection is often on-line, it can be practiced ‘off-line’. This process is analogical with Schön’sreflection-in-action and reflection-on-action. In subsequent sessions, health pro-fessionals reflected on their change in practice. They had become more aware ofcultural diversity in their clinical encounters and more ready to communicatewith minority ethnic women. Although there had been no prior explicit agree-ment to undertake such reflection (as would have been the case if co-operativeinquiry into professional practice had been explicitly incorporated into the project), this could be identified as informal second-person practical reflection.

To facilitate an enduring capacity for change among participants in a community-based project, practical reflection in the third person is fundamentalfor this will sustain future transformational action. It uses critical learning activi-ties to pass on a wide variety of facilitation skills, such as environmental mapping, visioning, goal setting, dialoguing, bracketing, reframing, and so on forfacilitating collective reflection. For example, recently, in one of my participatoryevaluation projects, reflective meetings have been held as part of the evaluationprocess. Participants have been systematically introduced to the practice of




reflecting upon their work by using simple storytelling methods as well as the useof more structured reflective tools adopted from Williams and Harris (2001).Although these meetings provide rich developmental data for evaluation, theintention is to skill-up participants to practice reflection on their own. So far, theeffectiveness of this aspect of reflection remains unexplored.

Concluding thoughts

PAR is often characterised as third-person inquiry with critical reflection seen ascentral to social transformation. However, the concept appears to have beentaken for granted and reflections of the first and second persons are seldom con-sidered. My experience has taught me that a successful PAR project requires theintegration of all three. It is clear that the present reflective practice in PAR doesnot seem to align with the concept’s overall development in AR.

As Reason (2003, p. 119) has rightly pointed out ‘part of our task as actionresearchers is to re-describe inquiry’. Rather than becoming caught in the taken-for-granted dualism that underlines much of the orthodox research, we need tofashion our own language to describe our inquiry. When PAR writers communi-cate with the wider world about their research experience, we are precisely creat-ing and sharing our knowledge with others.

We need to question our own taken-for-granted concepts, in other words,critical reflection and conscientization, and seek to re-describe them, so that theybecome useful in our research/practice. If we assert that our work is based on different forms of knowing that go beyond the conventional western epistem-ology, and our research validity and quality is enhanced by the engagement withself, persons and communities (Reason, 2003), grounding reflection practice onan extended epistemology (Heron, 1992, 1996a), then taking account of first-,second- and third-person reflections seems a logical starting point.

I have in this article ventured to outline a reflective practice framework andillustrated how different forms of reflection emerge by attending to the generationof different ways of knowing from different personal perspectives. Critical reflex-ivity hereby finds its expressions through self-reflexivity, relational-reflexivityand collective-reflexivity in the generation of propositional knowing. The powerof such reflexivity will be increased through the use of critical theories in theunearthing of our embedded assumptions and beliefs, as well as in our under-standing of how relationships are socially structured and related to the widersocial and political context. This kind of propositional knowing will then con-tribute to strategies for transformation and praxis. This framework is useful, Ibelieve, for it aligns with the extended epistemology and the participatory world-view, in which the integration of first-, second- and third-person perspectives ispossible. Improving first-person reflexivity improves our PAR practice, through




thinking, doing and facilitating change, with not just our rationality but our intuition and creativity. From the second-person perspective, the challenge is toimprove our conversations and interconnectedness with others, while reflexivityfrom the third-person perspective highlights the need for deepening social andpolitical analysis that contributes to strategies for social change.

So, I come to the end of my reflective journey about critical reflection inPAR and my re-description of the concept based on my own research experience.I hope this re-description will be of some use and that it will help us to developour reflective practice mindfully, imaginatively and courageously.

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Lai Fong Chiu (PhD, MSc, BA (Hons) CAES) is a Senior Research Fellow at theUniversity of Leeds. She is the originator of the Community Health Educator Model,and has extensive experience as a health researcher and health promotion practi-tioner in the National Health Service in the UK. Her career spans a number of professional roles – community work, health promotion, project management, clinical effectiveness, and public health and health promotion research – within avariety of organisations such as local authorities, voluntary organisations, and healthtrusts. She is an advisory member of the World Health Organisation’s Task Force onMigrant Friendly and Culturally Competent Healthcare and the co-ordinator of itsWorking Group for Patient and Community Empowerment. For more details of heractivities and publications, please visit http://www.leeds.ac.uk/hsphr/hsc/research/healthcommunication.htm Address: University of Leeds, 71–75 Clarendon Road,Leeds LS2 9PL, UK. [Email: [email protected]]




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