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Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Generator
Kai Masuda1, T. Masawa2, Y. Yakahashi2, T. Yagi2, R. Nakamatsu1, S. Fushimoto3
1 Inst. Advanced Energy, Kyoto Univ.2 Research Reactor Inst., Kyoto Univ.3 Pony Industry Co. Ltd.
R&D Program for Implementation of Anti-Crime and Anti-TerrorismTechnologies for a Safe and Secure Society promoted by JapanScience and Technology Agency
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Talk Outine
Introduction
Background
Project overview
Neutron-Based Rapid Screening System
System layout – container trucks, IECs, detectors,
Pulsed IEC and HV power supply
Detection Methods & Exp. Results
Delayed Neutron Noise Analysis (DNNA)
Threshold Energy Neutron Analysis (TENA)
Concluding Summary & Plans1
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Nuclear Terrorism Threats
3.14m
Conventional gun-type nuclear weapon: 30 – 60 kg of 235U
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Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Nuclear Terrorism Threats
3.14m
Conventional gun-type nuclear weapon: 30 – 60 kg of 235U
Modern tactical nuclear weapon: 10 – 30 kg of 239Pu
2
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Nuclear Terrorism Threats
3.14m
Conventional gun-type nuclear weapon: 30 – 60 kg of 235U
Modern tactical nuclear weapon: 10 – 30 kg of 239Pu
235U Hiroshima-type is more troublesome.
2
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Nuclear Terrorism Threats
3.14m
Conventional gun-type nuclear weapon: 30 – 60 kg of 235U
Modern tactical nuclear weapon: 10 – 30 kg of 239Pu
235U Hiroshima-type is more troublesome. passive detection is impossible unlike 239Pu
Pony Industry Co. Ltd.
Passive Gamma-ray detectors Effective to 239Pu
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Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Nuclear Terrorism Threats
3.14m
Conventional gun-type nuclear weapon: 30 – 60 kg of 235U
Modern tactical nuclear weapon: 10 – 30 kg of 239Pu
235U Hiroshima-type is more troublesome. passive detection is impossible unlike 239Pu easy to make w/o test bans assembling in the target nation is possible
2
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Nuclear Terrorism Threats
3.14m
Conventional gun-type nuclear weapon: 30 – 60 kg of 235U
Modern tactical nuclear weapon: 10 – 30 kg of 239Pu
235U Hiroshima-type is more troublesome. passive detection is impossible unlike 239Pu easy to make w/o test bans assembling in the target nation is possible identification by shape is not effective enough
2
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Nuclear Terrorism Threats
3.14m
Conventional gun-type nuclear weapon: 30 – 60 kg of 235U
Modern tactical nuclear weapon: 10 – 30 kg of 239Pu
235U Hiroshima-type is more troublesome. passive detection is impossible unlike 239Pu easy to make w/o test bans assembling in the target nation is possible identification by shape is not effective enough
Transportation of tens kg of 235U – air cargo, land transportation, spy ship, sea container.
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Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Megaports Initiative (2007) Mandatory SNM screening of all US-bound containers at their
port of origin from 2012.
400 containers / day from Yokohama
Photo by Gunnar Ries20ft container
8 ft x 8 ft x 20 ft
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Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Megaports Initiative (2007) Mandatory SNM screening of all US-bound containers at their
port of origin from 2012.
It has been delayed 2x2 years (until 2016), due to lack of SNM detection system.
400 containers / day from Yokohama
Photo by Gunnar Ries20ft container
8 ft x 8 ft x 20 ft
3
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Megaports Initiative (2007) Mandatory SNM screening of all US-bound containers at their
port of origin from 2012.
It has been delayed 2x2 years (until 2016), due to lack of SNM detection system.
400 containers / day from Yokohama
Photo by Gunnar Ries20ft container
8 ft x 8 ft x 20 ft
JPN gov. will setup 2-3 central seaports. Our proposal is to built SNM screening facilities in those
central seaports.
Very rapid (2 min/container) inspection system is required.
3
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Project Overview
1. Neutron-based system
2. X-ray image
3. LCS γ-ray beamfor isotope identification 10 min / point
6m
400 containers / day 4
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Project Overview
1. Neutron-based system
2. X-ray image
3. LCS γ-ray beamfor isotope identification 10 min / point
6m
400 containers / day
Scanning whole volume impossible.
4
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Project Overview
1. Neutron-based system
2. X-ray image for determination of point(s) of interest
3. LCS γ-ray beamfor isotope identification 10 min / point
6m
400 containers / day
Pony Industry Co. Ltd.
4
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Project Overview
1. Neutron-based systemfor rapid screening false alarm rate < 10% 2 min. per container
2. X-ray image for determination of point(s) of interest
3. LCS γ-ray beamfor isotope identification 10 min / point
6m
400 containers / day
40
360
4
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Project Overview
1. Neutron-based systemfor rapid screening false alarm rate < 10% 2 min. per container
2. X-ray image for determination of point(s) of interest
3. LCS γ-ray beamfor isotope identification 10 min / point
6m
Proof-of-principle, reduced-scale prototype experiments,& scale-up design
400 containers / day
40
360
5-year R&D from FY2010 R&D budget: 5.5M$ Estimated cost: 26.5M$
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Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Neutron-Based Screening Facility
2 containers / 10 min5 min for neutron-irradiation/detection, and5 min for replacement of container trucks.
10 m
container truck
driver
IECs
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Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Neutron-Based Screening System
Poly-Roof
Poly-Wall
Fast Neutron Detectors
Thermal Neutron Detectors
DD IECs
Two container trucks are inspected simultaneously with Three pulsed DD-IECs (108 n/sec), 450 3He detectors (1” dia., 1m length) or more BF3 detectors, 54 NE213 detectors (5” dia., 4” length) or fewer TMFDs.
Pulsed HV Power Supplies 6
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Newly Developed Pulsed IEC
IECchamber
anode
cathode
3-stage HV feedthrough
DC PS switchescapacitor oil tank (7000L)
All in one grounded tank Low EM noise emission Dual 200 kV switches Quick pulse fall-off
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Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Typical Pulse Shapes of V, I and NPR
0 20 40 60 80 100 1200
-20
-40
-60
-80
-100
time [μsec]
volta
ge [k
V]
0.45 Pa(D2)
0
5
10
15
curr
ent [
A],
neut
ron
coun
t rat
e [a
.u.]
Details will be given tomorrow.
8
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Experimental Pulsed Neutron Yield Experimental tests were carried out with two pulsed HV PSs. 100kV-20A PS will be used for demo. because of transportation/
space limitations and oil/radiation regulations in KUCA facility where 235U can be used.
0 20 40 60 80 100106
107
108
109
100kV-20A PS 200kV-05A PS
norm
. neu
tron
yiel
d pe
r pul
se c
harg
e [n
/C/P
a]
peak discharge voltage, Vpeak [kV]
Details will be given tomorrow.
~109n/sec(peak) with 20A
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Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Neutron-In Neutron-Out Detection of SNMs
HEU
incidentneutrons
delayed neutrons (<1%)
Easier approach, but much less signals.
cf. Delayed Neutron Analysis (DNA)
prompt neutrons (>99%)
Much more plentiful, but need to separate out from probing neutronscf. Differential Die-Away Analysis (DDAA)
t
delayed
prompt
probing neutrons
A principal challenge is to distinguish the secondaryneutrons from the probing neutrons.
Either DNA or DDAA requires very intense NGs (DT mandatory).
10
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Neutron-In Neutron-Out Detection of SNMs
HEU
incidentneutrons
delayed neutrons (<1%)
Easier approach, but much less signals.
cf. Delayed Neutron Analysis (DNA)
prompt neutrons (>99%)
Much more plentiful, but need to separate out from probing neutronscf. Differential Die-Away Analysis (DDAA)
t
delayed
prompt
probing neutrons
A principal challenge is to distinguish the secondaryneutrons from the probing neutrons.
New techniques are being developed.1. Delayed Neutron Noise Analysis (DNNA)2. Threshold Energy Neutron Analysis (TENA)
Either DNA or DDAA requires very intense NGs (DT mandatory).
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Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
What is “Neutron Noise” ?
time [sec]
neut
ron
coun
t rat
e, n
(t)[
cps]
“neutron noise” example observed in KU critical assembly (KUCA)
time avg.
fluctuation
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Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
“Neutron Noise” Contains Signature of
Fission Chain Reactions
Y(∞) = 0 random neutrons (Poisson distribution)Y(∞) > 0 correlated neutrons
( )( ) 1)(2
−=tnttY σ
time [sec]
neut
ron
coun
t rat
e, n
(t)[
cps]
“neutron noise” example observed in KU critical assembly (KUCA)
time avg.,
fluctuation,
gate width, t( )tn
( )tσ
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Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Basic Neutron Noise Analysis (NNA) Well developed method in fission reactor physics field. Characterizes neutron multiplication factor due to fission
chain reactions.
time [sec]
neut
ron
coun
t rat
e, n
(t)[
cps]
“neutron noise” example observed in KU critical assembly (KUCA)
time avg.,
fluctuation,
gate width, t( )tn
( )tσ
Y(∞) = 0 random neutrons (Poisson distribution)Y(∞) > 0 correlated neutrons
( )( ) 1)(2
−=tnttY σ
11
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Delayed Neutron Noise Analysis (DNNA)
n(t)
time, t
w/ HEUw/o HEU
incident neutron pulses from IECs
neutron count rate in detector
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Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Delayed Neutron Noise Analysis (DNNA)
n(t)
time, t
w/ HEUw/o HEU
neutron count rate in detector
U
d
U-235fission fragmentdelayed neutron precursorprobing neutrons from IECdelayed neutronsneutrons from chain reactions
U
d
U
13
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Delayed Neutron Noise Analysis (DNNA)
n(t)
time, t
w/ HEUw/o HEU
neutron count rate in detector
U
d
U-235fission fragmentdelayed neutron precursorprobing neutrons from IECdelayed neutronsneutrons from chain reactions
U
d
Ud
d
13
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Delayed Neutron Noise Analysis (DNNA)
n(t)
time, t
w/ HEUw/o HEU
neutron count rate in detector
U
d
U-235fission fragmentdelayed neutron precursorprobing neutrons from IECdelayed neutronsneutrons from chain reactions
U
d
Ud
d
U U13
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Delayed Neutron Noise Analysis (DNNA)
n(t)
time, t
w/ HEUw/o HEU
neutron count rate in detector
U-235fission fragmentelayed neutron precursorprobing neutrons from IECdelayed neutronsneutrons from chain reactions13
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Delayed Neutron Noise Analysis (DNNA)
n(t)
time, t
dump dump dump
w/ HEUw/o HEU
Y(∞) = 0 random neutrons (Poisson distribution)Y(∞) > 0 neutrons from fission chain reactions
( )( ) 1)(2
−=tnttY σ
U-235fission fragmentelayed neutron precursorprobing neutrons from IECdelayed neutronsneutrons from chain reactions13
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Delayed Neutron Noise Analysis (DNNA)
n(t)
time, t
Y (t
) time, t
w/ HEUw/o HEU
dump dump dump
w/ HEUw/o HEU
dump dump dump
Y(∞) = 0 random neutrons (Poisson distribution)Y(∞) > 0 neutrons from fission chain reactions
( )( ) 1)(2
−=tnttY σ
14
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
3He: 1”dia., 20cmL, 5atm
U-235:1.3 kg (keff = 0.12)
NPR (DT):~105 n/sec
10 μsec, 10 Hz
ROI in DNNA: 50-100 msec
HEU
DNNA Experimental Setup in KUCAp p p p p p p p
p H5 H1 H2 H3 H4 H6 p
p p
p F F p
p F F p
p p
p p
p p p p p
F
p
HEU
10” Poly
T-Target
D-Beam
H Detector
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Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
DNNA Experimental Results
Clear difference in Y(t) was seen from BG w/o HEU.
w/ HEU
w/o HEU
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Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Threshold Energy Neutron Analysis (TENA)
A significant portion of the fission neutrons is above DD neutron energy.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
核分裂中性子スペクトル
χ(E) [
MeV
-1]
Energy [MeV]
2.45 MeV
DD中性子源から発生する中性子のエネルギー
30%
neutron energy from DD source (2.45 MeV)
fission spectrum
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Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Threshold Energy Neutron Analysis (TENA)
A significant portion of the fission neutrons is above DD neutron energy.Use of DD neutron source is mandatory. Neither DT
nor RI source is applicable.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
核分裂中性子スペクトル
χ(E) [
MeV
-1]
Energy [MeV]
2.45 MeV
DD中性子源から発生する中性子のエネルギー
30%
neutron energy from DD source (2.45 MeV)
fission spectrum
17
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Threshold Energy Neutron Analysis (TENA)
A significant portion of the fission neutrons is above DD neutron energy.Use of DD neutron source is mandatory. Neither DT
nor RI source is applicable.Either dc or pulsed source is applicable.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
核分裂中性子スペクトル
χ(E) [
MeV
-1]
Energy [MeV]
2.45 MeV
DD中性子源から発生する中性子のエネルギー
30%
neutron energy from DD source (2.45 MeV)
fission spectrum
17
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
TENA Experimental Setup
Cf-252
150cm
150cm
DD-IEC
detector + shielding(Pb, poly)
Cf-252
DD IEC (DC)
NE213 liquid scintillator+ 5cm Pb + 10cm Ploy
DD IEC0.1, 1.0, 2.0, 3.0x107 [n/sec]
Cf-2522.9 x104 [n/sec]
X/γ-rays are rejected, making use of induced pulse shape difference.
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Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
TENA Experimental Results
Clear difference between Green (signal + BG) and Black (BG only) is seen above 2.45 MeV.
0 200 400 600 800 1000
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
DD only Cf only DD + Cf
Cps
Channel
DD only (BG) Fission only Fission + DD (BG)
MCA channel (neutron energy)
Cou
nt ra
te [c
ps]
2.45MeV neutrons from DD fusion
19
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
TENA Experimental Results
Clear difference between Green (signal + BG) and Black (BG only) is seen above 2.45 MeV.BG counts above 2.45 MeV are seen due to X/γ-rays and pile-
up of less energetic neutrons.
0 200 400 600 800 1000
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
DD only Cf only DD + Cf
Cps
Channel
DD only (BG) Fission only Fission + DD (BG)
MCA channel (neutron energy)
Cou
nt ra
te [c
ps]
2.45MeV neutrons from DD fusion
19
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Y = (5.8E-06) X2 + (6.8E-04) X + (1.1E-02)
BG count rate below 2.45 MeV [cps]
BG
cou
nt ra
te a
bove
2.4
5 M
eV [c
ps]
TENA Experimental Results (Contd.)
BG count rate above 2.45 MeV is seen to increase nonlinearly as increase of incident DD neutrons (and X-rays) from IEC.
0.1
1.0
2.0
DD-IEC NPR3.0 x 107 n/sec
20
Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Estimation of Required Detection Time
Poly-Roof
Poly-Wall
Fast Neutron Detectors
Thermal Neutron Detectors
DD IECs
Pulsed HV Power Supplies
Two container trucks are inspected simultaneously with Three pulsed DD-IECs (108 n/sec), 450 3He detectors (1” dia., 1m length), and 54 NE213 detectors (5” dia., 4” length).
Estimation made based on the exp. results and MCNP6 simulations.
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Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Detection Time for 1kg HEU
Assumption:Nothing in the container except for 1-kg HEU.
8ft
(2.4
m)
8ft (2.4m)
0.5 1(1) 0.8
0.8 1(5) 1
0.7 0.7 0.7
0.5 0.5 0.7
0.5 0.7(1) 0.7
0.7 0.7(5) 0.8
corner: 5.8 min
detection time by DNNA(TENA) [min]
NE213
IEC
He-3
He-
3
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Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Tensioned Metastable Fluid Detector (TMFD)
Centrifugal TMFD Acoustic TMFD
Blind to X/γ-rays. Blind to neutrons below a threshold energy. The threshold neutron energy variable. ~90% efficiency with 10cm x 10cm volume. Directional detection by ATMFD.
Developed by Prof. Taleyarkhan’ group in Purdue Univ. See for example, R.P. Taleyarkhan, et al., Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1820.
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Kai Masuda et al. “Active Interrogation of SNMs by use of IEC Fusion Neutron Source, IEC2013, Oct. 6-9, 2013, Kyoto, Japan
Concluding Summary & Plan
Nondestructive screening as fast as 2 min/container is required in order not to block sea container distribution.
Experiments have been made for the two neutron-based methods, namely DNNA and TENA.
An inspection facility has been designed, which can handle two container trucks per 10 min, including mandatory 5 min for trucks replacement.
5’x5’x5’-scale tests are planed Dec 2014 – Feb 2015 by use of a single IEC, reduced number of detectors and U-235 (natural uranium).
We also plan to test a novel fast neutron detector, TMFD, which is ideal for TENA because it is blind to X/γ-rays and neutrons below 2.45 MeV. 24