activist arbitrage: a study of open-ending attempts of closed-end
TRANSCRIPT
Activist Arbitrage: A Study of Open-Ending Attempts of Closed-End Funds
Michael Bradley, Alon Brav, Itay Goldstein, and Wei Jiang*
December 2008
Abstract
This paper documents frequent attempts by activist arbitrageurs to open-end discounted closed-
end funds, particularly after the 1992 proxy reform which reduced the costs of communication
among shareholders. Open-ending attempts have a substantial effect on discounts, reducing
them, on average, to half of their original level. The size of the discount is a major determinant
of whether a fund gets attacked. Other important factors include the costs of communication
among shareholders and the governance structure of the targeted fund. Our study contributes to
the understanding of the actions undertaken by arbitrageurs in financial markets beyond just pure
trading.
JEL Classification: G14; G34; K22.
Key Words: Activist arbitrage; Closed-end funds; Proxy reform.
* Bradley is from the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. Brav is from the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University and National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Goldstein is from the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Jiang is from the Graduate School of Business, Columbia University. Bradley can be reached at phone: (919) 660-8006, email: [email protected]; Brav at phone: (919) 660-2908, email: [email protected]; Goldstein at phone: (215) 746-0499, email: [email protected]; and Jiang at phone: (212) 854-9679, email: [email protected]. An earlier version of this paper circulated under the title: “Costly Communication, Shareholder Activism, and Limits to Arbitrage: Evidence from Closed-End Funds.” We thank an anonymous referee, Lucian Bebchuk, Jonathan Berk, Martin Cherkes, Franklin Edwards, Ron Gilson, Jarrad Harford, Ayla Kayhan, Ronald Masulis, Jeffery Pontiff, Andrei Shleifer, Laura Starks, and Jeremy Stein for useful comments and discussions. We also thank seminar participants at Berkeley, Binghamton, Columbia, Emory, Kellogg, Minnesota, Rice, Stockholm School of Economics, Tsinghua, and Yale, and participants in the following conferences: the 2nd Annual Meeting of the Financial Research Association, the 2nd Bi-Annual Conference of the Financial Intermediation Research Society, the Annual Conference of the Center for Asset Management at Boston College, the 2006 NBER Summer Institute in Corporate Governance, the SIFR Conference on Institutions, Liquidity, and Asset Prices, and the AFA 2007 Annual Meeting . We would like to thank Phillip Goldstein from ‘Bulldog Investors’ (previously, ‘Opportunity Partners’) for his insights on the closed-end fund industry and on key aspects of activism in this area.
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1. Introduction
Closed-end funds (CEFs) are among the most interesting assets in financial markets.
Trading at substantial discounts from their net asset values (NAVs), closed-end funds constantly
attract arbitrageurs who take positions and wait for the eventual convergence of the CEF share
price to its NAV.1
A phenomenon that has not received much attention in the literature is activist arbitrage.
Unlike the traditional pure-trading arbitrage, activist arbitrageurs do not simply wait for
convergence, but rather take actions to open-end the target fund, knowing that upon open-ending
the price of the fund’s shares will be forced to converge to the NAV.
We conduct a comprehensive empirical study of the attempts of activist arbitrageurs to
open-end closed-end funds in the U.S. We show that this form of arbitrage has become quite
common since the mid-1990s. We study the extent to which activist arbitrage activities can
eliminate or reduce CEF discounts, and analyze the factors that determine which funds are
targeted by activist arbitrageurs. Overall, our study contributes to the understanding of the full
spectrum of activities taken by arbitrageurs attempting to eliminate deviations of market prices
from intrinsic values.
Our analysis is based on a unique hand-collected dataset consisting of all activist
arbitrageurs’ activities in U.S. based CEFs between 1988 and 2003. Activist arbitrage in closed-
end funds was quite rare until the early 1990s. However since 1993—the year after which the
SEC significantly relaxed constraints on communication among shareholders of public
corporations—this type of arbitrage has become very common. Several arbitrageurs—hedge
funds, endowment funds, banks, and financial arms of corporations—have become quite active
in initiating proxy contests and proposals targeted at open-ending discounted CEFs. In the peak
years of 1999 and 2002, about 30% of the funds in our sample were targets of such attacks.
We find that activist arbitrage has substantial impact on CEF discounts. While most of
the open-ending attempts in our sample were met with resistance from the funds’ managements,
quite a few led to successful open-endings despite such resistance. In addition, activists’
1 The profitability of arbitrage strategies in the CEF market has been studied by Thompson (1978), Brauer (1988), and Pontiff (1995). Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991), Pontiff (1996), and Gemmill and Thomas (2002) provide evidence on the limits to this arbitrage. For a survey of the CEF literature, see Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (1999).
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activities were sufficiently credible in many instances to induce fund managers to take actions
themselves to reduce the size of the discount. We show that open-ending attempts reduce the
discount of the targeted funds by more than 10 percentage points on average (considering both
the successful and unsuccessful attempts). This is substantial, given that discounts of targeted
CEFs are around 20% of NAV in the years before an open-ending attempt. We show that this
effect of activist arbitrage is above and beyond the mean reversion in discounts that has been
documented in previous literature.
A key variable that guides activist arbitrageurs in choosing which fund to target is the
fund’s discount from its NAV. Our empirical results suggest that a one percentage point increase
in the discount is associated with a 0.77 percentage point increase in the probability of an attack
in a given year. This correlation is the result of a dual relation between CEF discounts and open-
ending attempts. While the probability that a fund will be attacked by activists should increase
with the size of the discount because of the increased profit opportunity, forward-looking
discounts should decrease in anticipation of future attacks. Using an instrumental-variables
approach and an econometric technique that allows us to estimate a simultaneous system of an
endogenous dummy variable and an endogenous continuous variable (based on the work of
Rivers and Vuong (1988)), we disentangle the two effects and show that a one percentage point
increase in the discount leads to a 1.03 percentage point increase in the probability of an open-
ending attempt. The increase is substantial given that the unconditional probability of an open-
ending attempt in our sample is about 15%.
The fact that discounts shrink in anticipation of future attacks suggests that activist
arbitrage affects CEF discounts not only via the direct effect on the targeted funds, but also via
an indirect anticipation effect. That is, some funds’ discounts may decrease without any
noticeable attacks, simply because such attacks are anticipated in the future.2 Hence, the above
effect of activist arbitrage on discounts should be considered a lower bound.
Another important determinant of activist arbitrage is the ease of communication and
coordination among shareholders. Shareholder communication is crucial because in order to
open-end a fund, an activist needs to communicate with many other shareholders and convince 2 Despite this strong effect, however, discounts have not decreased after 1992, when attacks became much more common, compared to their levels during 1988-1992. This suggests that other forces that generate discounts became stronger in the late 1990s. After 2000 discounts have been declining overall.
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them to support his plan of action. Indeed, one of the main activists in our sample, Phillip
Goldstein, notes that: “The first thing you have to do as an activist is to form a good network.
You have to be able to call up institutional investors and ask, ‘What would you think about
this?’”3 The fact that open-ending attempts became so common after the SEC’s 1992 proxy
reform that relaxed constraints on shareholder communication highlights the importance of
communication in the process of activist arbitrage. To investigate the role of communication
further, we conduct tests using cross-sectional measures of the costs of communication in
different funds.
We use three proxies for the ease of communication among the stockholders of a
particular fund. The first is turnover, which measures the frequency at which the shares of the
CEF change hands. A high turnover rate indicates greater costs of communication because
frequent changes of shareholders make it difficult to locate and inform them of an activist’s
intent. The second variable is the average size of trade in the fund’s shares. Larger trades
indicate that, on average, shareholders hold bigger positions in the fund, and thus, the fund has
fewer shareholders which are easier to communicate with. The third variable is the percentage of
institutional ownership in the fund. Institutional investors typically hold larger positions, are
more informed, and are more likely to cast votes for shareholder proposals and proxy contests
than retail investors (who are often blamed for apathy). Due to regulatory disclosure
requirements (such as the quarterly 13F filings of holdings), they are also easier to locate and
notify regarding an activist’s intent. The results of our empirical tests are consistent with the
hypothesis that smaller costs of communication enhance activist arbitrage. Interestingly, the
effects of the above proxies are present only after the legal reform of 1992. Our results suggest
that before the 1992 Reform, communication among shareholders was so severely restricted by
the SEC that cross-sectional differences in the shareholder base did not matter much for activist
arbitrageurs.
Finally, the governance of funds also plays an important role in determining the
probability of an open-ending attempt. Funds that have pro-manager governance structures (i.e.,
have staggered board, supermajority voting, and ability of the board to call a special meeting) are
more likely to be targets for activism after the legal reform of 1992, but not before. This is likely
3 See: Harvard Business School Case N9-208-097: “Opportunity Partners,” by Robin Greenwood and James Quinn.
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because communication among shareholders is particularly important when managers have more
power. While managerial entrenchment attracts more attacks after 1992, we find that it
lengthens the time needed to implement a successful open-ending. This result is related to the
study by Del Guercio, Dann, and Partch (2003) on governance in closed-end funds. They find
that board characteristics regarding the funds’ governance structure affect the implementation of
restructuring proposals.
The literature on closed-end funds has evolved along two major strands. Studies by
Barclay, Holderness and Pontiff (1993), Ross (2002), Berk and Stanton (2007), and Cherkes,
Sagi, and Stanton (2008) emphasize the agency problem between outside shareholders and
managers and insiders as the source of CEF discounts. Studies by Lee, Shleifer and Thaler
(1991), Pontiff (1996), and Gemmill and Thomas (2002) emphasize the limits to (pure-trading)
arbitrage in explaining CEF discounts. 4 Our study speaks to both strands of the literature. On
the one hand, the fact that open-ending attempts are affected by a fund’s governance structure
suggests that agency problems play at least some role in the existence of CEF discounts. Further
evidence of agency problems in CEFs is our finding that discounts shrink after corrective actions
(such as an increase in dividends, the initiation of a share buyback program, or a reduction in
fees) taken by fund management in response to activist arbitrageurs’ activities. On the other
hand, our work also shows that costly shareholder communication due to ownership structure or
legal constraints are additional limits to arbitrage that prevent the convergence of CEF share
prices to NAVs.
As mentioned above, prior research on closed-end funds (conducted mostly before the
1992 reform) largely ignores the possibility of activist arbitrage, arguing that such a strategy is
very costly and difficult to execute (Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991)) and is likely to fail due to
resistance of managers and blockholders (Barclay, Holderness, and Pontiff (1993)). Two studies
from that period—Brauer (1984) and Brickley and Schallheim (1985)—analyze the return
realized by shareholders upon actual open-ending CEFs. Unlike our analysis, however, they do
not look at the full array of open-ending attempts to analyze their determinants and
consequences. Moreover, since their analysis is conducted in a period where open-ending
attempts were quite rare, they study a much smaller sample than we do in this study. Our paper 4 Attempts to explain the discounts by arguing that the methods used to calculate NAVs overstate the value of the assets due to tax liabilities or illiquidity have been shown long ago to be unpersuasive (see Malkiel (1977)).
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is also related to the literature on shareholder activism in public corporations in general, which
was recently surveyed by Gillan and Starks (2007), although the focus of the analysis in our
paper is very different from that literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the history
of the SEC regulations of the proxy process and especially the legal reform of 1992. We also
describe key institutional details of activist arbitrage in closed-end funds. Section 3 describes the
unique dataset used for our empirical analysis. In Section 4, we develop the methodology used
in our empirical analysis and present our empirical results on the determinants and consequences
of activist arbitrage and its relation with CEF discounts. Section 5 offers some concluding
remarks.
2. Background
2.1. SEC Regulation of the Proxy Process and the 1992 Reform
Dissident shareholders have two main avenues by which they can impose changes in a
corporation (including a closed-end fund). They can initiate a proxy contest and put forward an
alternative slate of directors to replace the firm’s current board and achieve ultimate control over
the corporation, or they can put forth a shareholder proposal to improve the firm’s governance
structure, its investment strategy, or its overall operations.5 The issues raised by dissidents in
proxy contests and shareholder proposals are resolved by shareholders’ voting. In the voting
process, also called the proxy process, the dissident shareholders try to get the proxies of other
shareholders to cast their votes in support of the changes they wish to make.6
The rules governing the proxy process were first established by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1935 under the authority granted by Section 14(a) of the
5 Activism can also be pursued via takeovers. In such a case, the arbitrageur acquires control over the firm, and makes restructuring decisions without being dependent on the votes of other shareholders. The profit from such a strategy is the capital gain realized by the activist once the improved operating strategy is reflected in the share price. Interestingly, takeovers are virtually non-existent in the closed-end fund industry. A possible reason is the anti-pyramiding provision of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Section 12(d)(1)), which prevents investment companies from holding more than 3% of the shares of other investment companies. This restriction prevents obvious potential activist arbitrageurs from attempting takeovers of closed-end funds. 6 There is a fundamental difference between the voting on a proxy contest and the voting on a shareholder proposal, in that the outcome of the latter does not bind the management. In addition, proxy contests are more expensive.
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934. One of the first rules enacted by the SEC required any party
soliciting proxies (requesting votes) from other shareholders to register and disclose certain
information prior to contacting shareholders. The proxy solicitation documents were reviewed
by the SEC. This often led to significant negotiations between the SEC and the soliciting party
before approval was granted to the activists to communicate with shareholders.
The proxy rules have evolved significantly since 1935. The most significant amendments
were enacted in 1956. These amendments created major deterrents to communication among
shareholders throughout a proxy process. The central feature of the 1956 amendments was a
change in the definition of a proxy solicitation. Under the new definition, a solicitation consisted
of any communication under circumstances reasonably calculated to influence voting decisions.
This liberal interpretation of solicitation dramatically expanded the power of the SEC to require
registration and review all proxy materials before they were communicated to shareholders. In
addition, public statements, analyses of voting issues, and any impromptu communications made
through television, speeches or on the radio were severely restricted. Finally, the new proxy
rules placed restrictions on communications containing complex, sophisticated, or forward-
looking language (such as predictions regarding future sales, earnings, etc.) and any criticisms
regarding the competency of the firm’s current management.
Clearly, these rules had a stifling effect on stockholder communication. Moreover, the
impact of the regulations fell mostly on dissidents, who face significantly greater costs than the
incumbent management in a proxy contest. These limitations on shareholder communication
have been subject to wide criticism for their negative impact on the efficiency of the voting
process. Pound (1991) provides an excellent summary of these criticisms.
In 1992, the SEC enacted major revisions in proxy rules. The new rules relaxed the
prevailing definition of a proxy solicitation to exclude any communication by shareholders when
not directly seeking the power to vote as proxy for other shareholders, as long as the
shareholders’ motive was only to gain pro rata with other shareholders. The 1992 amendments
also specifically excluded shareholders’ public statements of their voting intentions and/or voting
rationale (including public speeches, press releases, newspaper advertisements, and internet
communications) from the definition of a solicitation. These changes allowed independent
shareholders to freely engage in communication without being monitored by the SEC.
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2.2. Activism in the Closed-End Fund Industry
There are only a handful of arbitrageurs who actively engage in attempts to liquidate or
open-end CEFs. Consider, for example the following quotation from a Business Week article:
“Some institutions are more aggressive than others. A few groups are known for
their activism: Newgate Management Associates, based in Greenwich Conn.,
Harvard College, City of London Investment Management, Lazard Freres & Co.,
and Phillip Goldstein, who runs Opportunity Partners, a $40 million hedge fund
that specializes in closed-end funds in Pleasantville, N.Y. Their stake in a closed-
end fund does not guarantee an open-ending, but the odds are higher.”7
Our review indicates that the arbitrageurs mentioned in the previous quote are, with minor
exceptions, those that tend to dominate the activism in the CEFs market.8
Since some of the activists’ activities on which we focus are relatively unexplored in the
literature, we discuss in some detail the attempt by Phillip Goldstein to open-end the Emerging
Germany Fund. This example reflects some commonalities in the behavior of dissident
shareholders and the managements of CEFs. These include: (1) activists target deeply
discounted funds; (2) the attacks are conducted by more than one arbitrageur, and
communication plays a key role in the success of the attack; (3) the managements of CEFs often
object to open-ending attempts and fight them over an extended period of time; and (4) the
arbitrageurs use various tools to intervene in the operations of a CEF, including shareholder
proposals and proxy contests. Figure 1 provides an illustration of the evolution of this dissident
attack and the resultant effect on the fund’s discount.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
In mid-March 1997 the Emerging Germany Fund submitted its proxy filing, which
included a shareholder proposal filed by Phillip Goldstein “recommending that the board of
directors expedite the process to ensure the Fund's shares can be purchased and/or sold at net
7 Source: Toddi Gutner, When the lead comes off closed-end funds, BUSINESS WEEK, Sep.29, 1997. 8 Other key players include Ron Olin, Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG, and Laxey Partners Limited.
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asset value.” (See Form DEF 14A filed March 18th 19979) The fund advised shareholders to
oppose this proposal in the upcoming shareholder meeting in April. At that meeting the proposal
was defeated (2.7 million for, 3.6 million against, and 1 million abstained). By the end of 1997
both Phillip Goldstein and another prominent dissident, Ron Olin, jointly held 14 percent of the
fund’s outstanding shares (see DFRN14A filed January 11th 1999 10 ). In addition,
Bankgesellschaft Berlin, FMR Corp. and Lazard Freres & Co. were beneficial owners of 14
percent, 10 percent, and 10 percent, respectively, of the fund's outstanding shares. (DEF 14A
filed March 6th 1998).
In early 1998 the fund embarked on a program to distribute to its shareholders on a
quarterly basis approximately 2.5 percent of NAV, for a total of at least 10 percent annually. The
managed distribution policy was intended “to enhance shareholder value” (N-30D filed March
2nd 199811).
On March 27th, 1998, Phillip Goldstein again submitted a letter to the fund’s management
advising them of his intention to attend the fund’s annual shareholder meeting on April 27 and to
nominate himself and three others for election as directors of the fund. He also revealed his
intention to submit four proposals for consideration by the shareholders, including proposals that
essentially would require open-ending the fund and firing the fund’s investment advisers. During
the course of this increasingly hostile battle, Mr. Goldstein was an active participant in electronic
“discussions” on an Internet discussion board and a number of the messages that he posted
addressed the proposals that he wanted shareholders to consider at the annual shareholders’
meeting. On April 8, 1998 the fund withdrew its notice of the April 27, 1998 meeting and
commenced a lawsuit against both Mr. Goldstein and Mr. Olin, alleging violation of the proxy
solicitation rules and beneficial ownership disclosure provisions of U.S. federal securities laws
(PRE 14A filed April 8th 1998 and PRE 14A filed April 27th 199812).
Throughout 1998 Deep Discount Advisors, Inc. and Ron Olin Investment Management
Company continued to increase their holdings of the fund’s shares. As of November 6, 1998 the 9 A Form DEF 14A is a document sent by publicly listed corporations to their shareholders providing material information on corporate matters subject to vote at the annual meeting. 10 A Form DFRN 14A contains the definitive non-management proxy solicitation material. 11 A Form N-30D is a semi-annual report that contains information on fund performance and other important information. 12 A form PRE 14A is a preliminary proxy statement providing official notification to designated classes of shareholders of matters to be brought to a vote at a shareholders meeting.
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combined beneficial holdings of the two entities represented approximately 14.5% of the fund’s
outstanding shares. In a letter to the fund’s management dated November 6, 1998, Deep
Discount advisors Inc. requested that the board nominate Mr. Olin and three of his associates as
Directors of the fund for the next annual stockholders’ meeting, which was scheduled for
January 26, 1999. The letter made clear that if elected, this dissident slate of directors would
take the necessary steps to open-end the fund.
Seeing the writing on the wall, in late 1998 the management of the fund made a package
of proposals designed to open-end the fund (DEF 14A filed January 4th 1999). The package was
accepted at the shareholder meeting held on January 26, 1999, and the fund announced that it
would convert to an open-end, no-load mutual fund at the close of business on Monday, May 3,
1999. With the announcement, the fund’s discount from its NAV virtually disappeared.
Following the announced plan, the fund was later open-ended.
3. Data
From the Center for Research in Security Prices (“CRSP”) database, we gathered
information on all closed-end funds that were in existence at any time over the period 1988
through 2002.13 We also collected information on these funds through 2005 to allow for post-
event analyses. Based on information contained in various issues of Barron’s and Morningstar’s
Principia publications, as well as data obtained from Lipper, we then reduced this sample to
funds managing either domestic or international equity, including specialized equity
funds. Eliminated from the sample were closed-end funds investing in convertible bonds,
preferred stocks, taxable bonds, real estate, private equity, and municipal bonds. We also
excluded exchange-traded funds and funds incorporated outside the United States. Our selection
criteria reflect the need to obtain accurate NAV information so that the key variable in our
analysis, fund discounts, could be measured without error. The resulting sample includes 142
closed-end funds that were traded sometime over the period 1988-2002.
For each fund in our sample, we collected information on all events that might potentially
be related to activist arbitrage during 1988-2003. These events include any attempt of open-
13 In order to identify closed end funds in the CRSP database, we used the 'share code' variable. We included all shares for which the code is 14 (ordinary common share of a closed-end fund).
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ending, merger, or liquidation, as well as funds’ decisions to repurchase shares, make managed
distributions, and conduct rights offerings. This information was collected from various sources.
First, we hand-collected all reports filed with the SEC through SEC’s website Edgar during
1988-2003. Since the Edgar database is incomplete prior to the mid-90s, we examined Lexis-
Nexis for filings in earlier years. We retrieved registration statements, proxy related materials,
and annual reports from the SEC database. Second, we collected news stories using databases
such as Factiva (formerly Dow Jones Interactive), Proquest, Lexis-Nexis, as well as articles
published on the Internet. Third, we acquired various monthly publications from Thomas
Herzfeld Advisors. These publications provide a thorough description of the full universe of
closed-end funds’ corporate activities ranging from liquidations and mergers that have already
been consummated to outstanding and unresolved activities.
Based on these data, we constructed two fund activity indicators, one denoted “Open-
Ending Attempts” and the other “Open-Endings.” For “Open-Endings” the indicator variable is
assigned the value ‘1’ if an open-ending, merger, or liquidation occurred in a given year and ‘0’
otherwise. The variable “Open-Ending Attempts” is given the value ‘1’ if an attempt had been
made to open-end or liquidate the fund in a given year and ‘0’ otherwise.
Three technical points on the construction of these variables should be noted. First,
attempts include both shareholder proposals and proxy contests. While almost all the attempts
involve shareholder proposals, proxy contests are used in 56.5% of the cases. Second, our main
analysis includes 8 open-ending cases that were initiated by managers after a condition of a
lifeboat provision—a commitment contained in the fund’s Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation to
take actions to reduce the discount under certain specified circumstances—had been met.
Managers can always (and often do) object to open-ending when a lifeboat provision is being
met. Thus, we interpret a “voluntary” open-ending as an equilibrium decision that managers
make after assessing the pressure from outside investors. Third, some funds were the targets of
open-ending attempts over multiple years. Attempts in later years are counted as new events
only if they represent a distinctly new round of attacks.
Figure 2 plots the time trends of open-ending attempts and actual open-endings,
liquidations and mergers into open-end funds from 1988 to 2003. As can be seen from the
graphs, there is a clear upward trend in open-ending attempts after the 1992 Reform, especially
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after 1994. In early 1990s, only 3- 4% of the funds were subject to activists’ attacks. In the peak
years of 1999 and 2002, the percentage rose to around 30% of the sample funds. The number of
actual open-endings, however, did not change significantly following the legal reform.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Table 1 Panel A reports the summary statistics of the major fund characteristics that we
employ in our analysis. We acquired monthly NAV and price data from Securities Data
Corporation (SDC). In a few cases, we obtained the NAV and price data from Herzfeld
Advisors. Following the literature, fund discounts are calculated as (NAV-Price)/NAV. In most
years, about 80%-90% of the CEFs traded at a discount, similar to the numbers documented in
prior research. Institutional holdings are taken from Thomson Financial’s Spectrum Data, and
insider holdings are taken from Thomson Financial’s Lancer Analytics. 14 We obtained
information on price, volume, return, dividend, market capitalization, and turnover rate from
CRSP. Fund age is the number of years since the fund was first listed on CRSP. The annual
dividend yield is calculated as the difference between the funds’ annual buy-and-hold return with
dividends and the buy-and-hold return without dividends.
Table 1 Panel B lists the summary statistics of the fund policy variables for the full
sample period and sub-periods. We collected information on the existence of a staggered board,
supermajority, special meeting, and confidential voting by examining the funds’ filings with the
SEC.15 Information on lifeboat provisions were obtained from the SEC filings and from a
special Herzfeld publication dedicated to a survey of lifeboat provisions among closed-end
funds. A fund is coded as having a lifeboat if it states explicitly that open-ending is a possible
outcome to be considered by the management, or if it indicates commitment to making a tender
offer or share repurchase in cases of a persistent discount. Finally, information on management
fees was obtained from SDC. To disentangle time trends from composition effects, we
separately report the summary statistics in each period for old and new funds, depending on
whether the fund is in our sample for more than three years.
[Insert Table 1 here]
14 The Thomson Financial’s Lancer Analytics database reports the updated number of shares held for all the insiders reported to the SEC. The measure of total insider holdings, used in our analysis, is then calculated as the sum over all insiders of their most recent reported holdings before the fiscal year-end. 15 We do not present statistics on confidential voting since there is little cross-sectional variation in this variable.
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4. Empirical Results
4.1. Determinants of CEF Discounts
CEF discounts provide the motivation for activist arbitrage. The core of our analysis,
presented in Section 4.2.2, consists of estimating a system of equations where the discount and
activist arbitrage activities are simultaneously determined. An important first step is to
understand the determinants of CEF discounts. We now provide a brief overview of the key
cross-sectional determinants of CEF discounts that have been documented in the literature.
Table 2 presents regression results in which the dependent variable is DISCOUNT, defined as
(NAV-Price) / NAV. The first column presents results based on a pooled regression with year
fixed effects, and the second column presents results based on Fama-MacBeth type regressions.
[Insert Table 2 here]
CEF discounts are often attributed to mispricing. Pontiff (1996) and Gemmill and
Thomas (2002) studied the relation between deviations of CEF share prices from NAVs and
variables that proxy for the costs of pure-trading arbitrage and thus proxy for the difficulty of
eliminating mispricing. We adopt his suggested variables in our regressions. First, we use the
market capitalization (MV) of CEFs and the market price (P) of CEF shares to proxy for
transaction costs, which make arbitrage more costly. The rationale for the inclusion of market
price is that bid-ask spreads tend to be relatively fixed at low prices. Second, we use the residual
standard deviation of a fund’s NAV return (STDNAV) as a proxy for the difficulty in replicating
the fund’s underlying portfolio.16 On the one hand, the more difficult it is to replicate the fund’s
underlying portfolio, the more costly are arbitrage activities, and the more likely it is that price
will deviate from NAV. This can lead to a higher discount. On the other hand, a CEF might be
created precisely because investors are willing to pay a premium for the hard-to-replicate fund’s
assets, which could lead to a higher premium or a lower discount. Third, we include the
dividend yield (DIV). Pontiff (1996, 2006) argues that it should be easier to execute a pure-
16 The residual is calculated from a regression of a fund’s NAV return, in excess of the risk-free rate, on the Fama-French three-factor model plus an additional momentum factor. To these factors we add two MSCI international indices, representing the European and the Far East markets.
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trading arbitrage on a fund with a higher dividend yield since the higher payout reduces the
expected holding cost.
We find that a lower share price is indeed associated with a higher discount. Market
capitalization, however, does not impact the magnitude of the discounts when other
characteristics are included. We complement these measures of transaction costs with another
common measure of liquidity: share turnover (TO). This variable is calculated as the yearly
share volume scaled by the number of shares outstanding. As expected, this measure is
negatively related to the discount.17 We also find that the relation between STDNAV and the
discount is negative and significant. This result, which reflects the sum of two opposite effects,
is consistent with the result in Table II of Pontiff (1996). Finally, we find that dividend yields
are negatively related to discounts.
Other important variables that we employ reflect the potential agency costs between fund
managers and shareholders, which are often cited as a cause for CEF discounts. Based on the
literature, our proxies for agency costs are the expense ratio (FEES) and the proportion of a
fund’s shares held by insiders (INSIDER). We find that FEES does not explain discounts.18 This
finding has also been documented by Malkiel (1977), Barclay, Holderness and Pontiff (1993),
Gemmill and Thomas (2002) and Del Guercio, Dann, and Partch (2003). On the other hand,
higher insider ownership is overall significantly associated with higher discounts, consistent with
Barclay, Holderness and Pontiff (1993).
Lastly, we include fund age (AGE) and the presence of a lifeboat provision (LIFEBOAT).
The literature has documented that CEFs tend to trade at a premium after their initial public
offering, and over time start trading at a discount. The regression results confirm this pattern,
although with low statistical significance. As expected, the existence of a LIFEBOAT appears to
reduce discounts.
Our regressions also include year fixed effects. As a robustness check, Column 3 of
Table 2 considers a more parsimonious alternative to year dummies. Following Lee, Shleifer
17 We consider alternative measures of liquidity based on Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). For both measures, higher illiquidity is indeed associated with higher fund discounts although only the second measure is marginally significant. 18 The result does not change significantly if FEES is replaced with the residual from a regression of FEES on fund characteristics that could affect expenses for non-agency related reasons.
14
and Thaler (1991), we use the difference between the return on small stocks and large stocks as a
proxy for investor sentiment. The results show that the proxy for sentiment is significantly
related to the discount in the predicted negative direction.
Overall, a handful of covariates are able to explain a reasonable portion of the cross-
sectional variation in fund discounts: they jointly explain 18.2% of the total variation in
DISCOUNT at the fund-year level with the inclusion of year dummies. We include these
covariates as we proceed to analyze the relation between discounts and activist arbitrage.
4.2. Analysis of Open-Ending Attempts
4.2.1. Closed-End Fund Discounts around Open-Ending Attempts: Overview
We begin our analysis of open-ending attempts and their relation to CEF discounts by
exploring the behavior of fund discounts around an open-ending attempt. The left panel of Table
3 considers all funds that were attacked. Here, funds that are actually open-ended are treated as
having a zero discount after the open-ending. Column 1 shows the average path of raw fund
discounts around an open-ending attempt. It demonstrates the decline in discount following
attempt. On average, a closed-end fund’s discount is greater than 20% of its NAV two years
before an attack. The discount drops to about 5.6% of NAV three years after the attack.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
In order to provide a more meaningful interpretation of the effects of an attack, we adjust
for time trends in the CEF industry and for the histories of the attacked funds. Columns 2 and 3
present the changes in the discount of attacked funds in excess of the mean discount of all funds
in the same year and in excess of a fund’s own historical average, respectively. Historical
averages are calculated as a fund’s average discount from all years up to four years before the
current attack (an observation would drop out of the calculation for columns (3) and (7) if the
historical discount is not available). The results indicate that funds that are subsequently attacked
by activists tend to have high discounts. The discount drops substantially after the attack, and
drops further in the subsequent three years.
It is possible that the results discussed above are due to mean reversion. Indeed, previous
literature has documented that CEF discounts exhibit a tendency for mean reversion. If
15
arbitrageurs target deeply discounted funds, the above pattern could be obtained independently
of the attacks themselves. Column 4 addresses this issue. For each fund i under attack in year t,
we find all the funds that did not experience attacks between t-3 and t+3 and that had t-2
discounts that are between 90% and 110% of fund i’s discount in t-2.19 We then report the
discount of event funds in excess of the matched funds in column 4.20 We find that, on average,
funds that are attacked in year t have a discount at t+3 that is more than 8 percentage points
lower than that of funds that had similar discount at t-2 and were not attacked. Hence, discount
patterns of attacked funds cannot be explained solely by mean reversion.
Finally, the right panel of Table 3 (columns 5-8) repeats the analysis of columns 1-4 only
for the surviving sample. That is, here, funds drop out of the sample after they are open-ended.
The purpose of this analysis is to show that open-ending attempts affect the discounts of attacked
funds even if they end up not being open-ended. This happens because fund managements
typically adopt remedial actions to fight discounts after the fund is attacked. Hence, Greenwood
and Schor’s (2008) result that the value-added from activism is associated only with firms that
disappear from the public market does not seem to apply in our sample of closed-end funds.
In detail, looking at the right panel, we can see a similar, albeit more moderate behavior,
of the discounts of attacked funds that survived as we saw for the whole sample of attacked
funds. Column 8 addresses the issue of whether this pattern can be attributed to mean reversion.
The short answer is no: during the first two years of the attack, funds that survive realize a
greater reduction in their discounts than funds that started with a similar discount and were not
attacked. However, unlike the case for the whole sample (column 4), the result disappears two
years after the attack. (The results for t+2 and t+3 in column 8 are statistically insignificant).
4.2.2. Determinants of Open-Ending Attempts: Dual Relation between Attempts and Discounts
We now turn to a rigorous econometric analysis of the determinants of open-ending
attempts. The most important determinant is of course the discount. Estimating the effect of
19 For nine cases, this range is widened to 80% to 120% due to data availability. 20 Note that the excess discount in t-2 is very close to zero by construction. Our choice of t-2 as the matching year reflects a balance between being close enough to the event, but still far enough to be roughly free from the anticipation effect that causes a decrease in the discount of the attacked fund before the attack started.
16
discounts on open-ending attempts is a complicated task. While deeply discounted CEFs are
expected to attract more attacks since they offer greater potential profit to arbitrageurs, a CEF
discount should decrease if the market expects that the fund is susceptible to an attack. Thus, a
simple reduced-form regression of observed attacks on observed discounts could underestimate
the sensitivity of attacks to discounts and understate the rational-expectation’s component in
discounts. The structural model underlying our analysis reflects these effects:
( )
*, , 1 , 1 ,
*, ,
, 1 , 2 , ,
, , 1
,
( 0),, ,
, 0.
i t i t i t i t
i t i t
i t i t i t i t
i t i t
ATTEMPT DISCOUNT X
ATTEMPT I ATTEMPTDISCOUNT X Z Z
corr
− −
−
= β + γ + ε
= >
= μ +μ +ω ≠ Θ
ρ = ε ω ≤
(1)
In (1), subscripts i and t index for fund and year, respectively. *,i tATTEMPT is a latent
variable for the propensity of fund i to be the target of an open-ending attempt in year t, and
,i tATTEMPT is the observed binary outcome summarizing whether an open-ending attempt
occurred or not. (The construction of this variable was described in Section 3.) ,i tDISCOUNT is
defined as in Section 4.1. ,i tX is a vector of variables that affect both the discount and the
probability of an open-ending attack. ,i tZ is a vector of instrumental variables that only affect
discounts directly. The ways in which variables ,i tX and ,i tZ affect the discount were reviewed
in Section 4.1. Residual errors, ,i tε and , 1i t−ω , in (1) are jointly normally distributed.21
A key feature of the model is that the first and the third equations in (1) may be linked
because the unobserved shock in ATTEMPT may negatively affect the residual discount (i.e.,
( ), , 1, 0−ρ = ε ω ≤i t i tcorr ). The point is that shocks to the likelihood of an open-ending attempt
may be observed by market participants and be priced so as to affect the discount. An example
21 Note that we include in the estimation observations where the fund’s discount is negative even though such funds must be immune to attacks. The reason we do not automatically exclude those observations is that there is no theoretical cutoff discount level above which attacks become likely. For example, a discount level of 0% is not a natural cutoff since funds with a 0.1% discount are probably as much immune to attacks as funds with a 0% discount. As a result, our empirical strategy is to rely on the maximum likelihood function to trace out the predicted probability at each level of discount. Fortunately, the parametric specification of the probit, which we use here, does not impose a linear relationship between the predicted probability and the covariates. Hence, if funds with a low discount (including negative discounts) are empirically not subject to attacks, then the probit likelihood function will fit the data such that the predicted probabilities of attacks on such funds are arbitrarily close to zero.
17
of such a shock is the emergence of arbitrageurs that target CEFs of a particular type. Hence,
identifying the system in (1) requires a set of instrumental variables.
We use three ,i tZ variables that enter the DISCOUNT equation but not the ATTEMPT
equation. First, we use DIV. High dividends are expected to reduce the discount as they lead to
partial liquidation of the fund. The effect can be quite significant given that dividends are
expected to be paid over the entire future horizon. For arbitrageurs who attack the fund,
however, taking the discount as given, the effect of the dividend is very small, given that they
only plan to hold the shares for a short period of time. Second, we use LIFEBOAT. As
explained previously, a lifeboat is a commitment by the fund to remedial actions designed at
narrowing the discount. Discounts should fully reflect the potential effect(s) of lifeboats.
Conditional on the discount, the existence of a lifeboat should not affect the probability of an
attempt. Third, we use the Fama-French small-minus-big factor (SMB), which empirically
commoves with the CEF discounts. This comovement has several explanations, both behavioral
(Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991)), and rational (Cherkes, Sagi, and Stanton (2008) or
Swaminathan (1996)). For our purpose, it only matters that activists care about the SMB factor
only for its effect on discounts.
The ,i tX variables include the other determinants of the discount reviewed in Section 4.1.
We add a governance variable that we expect affects the probability of an attack. GOV is an
index (0-3) aggregated over the existence of a staggered board, supermajority voting, and the
ability of the board to call a special meeting. The higher the index, the worse is the firm’s
governance structure (see Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)). 22 We also add a variable
NAVRET that captures the raw return on the NAV of the fund. This is because many activists
mention a poor return on the funds’ assets as a trigger for the attack.
The model in (1) falls within the general class of probit models with an endogenous
continuous variable. It differs from a linear simultaneous system in that *ATTEMPT is an
unobserved latent variable. As a result, the two endogenous observed variables—ATTEMPT and
DISCOUNT—cannot be solved as linear functions of the exogenous variables, and the
conventional instrumental variable method does not apply. Two methods that have been used
22 According to Pound (1988), special meetings are used by managers to shorten the time for collecting proxies.
18
extensively in the labor economics literature are well-tailored for our model specification: a two-
stage conditional maximum likelihood (2SCML) method introduced by Rivers and Vuong
(1988), and a full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) method applied in Evans, Oates, and
Schwab (1992). We have applied both methods and have obtained similar results. We report
those from the Rivers and Vuong (1988) method for its tractability and ease of interpretation.23
To begin the estimation procedure, we rewrite Equation (1) as:
*, , 1 , 1 , 1 ,i t i t i t i t i tATTEMPT DISCOUNT X− − −= β + γ + θω + η (2)
where i,t i,t 1 i,t−ε = θω +η is a linear projection of i,tε onto i,t 1−ω , and i,tη is orthogonal to all the
other variables. Equation (2) is estimated using a two-step procedure. First, we estimate the
DISCOUNT equation in Equation (1), as we did in Section 4.1, and retain the residuals i,t 1ˆ −ω .
Second, we estimate Equation (2) using the probit method, where i,t 1−ω is replaced with i,t 1ˆ −ω .24
Table 4 reports the results on the determinants of open-ending attempts. The dependent
variable is a dummy for the occurrence of an open-ending attempt at the fund-year level. The
mean of the dependent variable is 13.3% for all fund-year observations. Reported coefficients
are the un-scaled probit estimates from Equation (2) (and the associated t-statistics) and the
change in the probability of an open-ending attempt for a unit change in the covariates (as
derived in Equation (5) in the appendix). Separately reported are θ̂ (the coefficient on the
residual discount in Equation (2)) and ρ̂ (the implied correlation between the two error
disturbances in Equation (1)).
[Insert Table 4 Here]
A simple regression of ATTEMPT on DISCOUNT shows that a one percentage point
increase in the observed discount is associated with a 0.66 percentage point increase in the
probability of an open-ending attempt (column 1). When accounting for the endogeneity of
DISCOUNT—i.e., the effect of the possibility of future attempts on the residual discount—in
column 2, the sensitivity of the probability to the discount increases substantially to 1.07.
23 Also see Rivers and Vuong (1988) for a discussion of their test in comparison with Heckman’s (1978) generalized two-stage simultaneous probit (G2SP) method. Rivers and Vuong (1988) indicate that the two methods have similar asymptotic properties, but their method is easier to implement, and fares more favorably in limited samples. 24 Additional technical details regarding the estimation methods are discussed in the Appendix.
19
Columns 3 and 4 add other covariates as controls. These additional explanatory variables do not
significantly change the effect of the discount on open-ending activities. Columns 5 and 6 report
results for the subsamples before and after the legal reform of 1992. Note that the sensitivity of
open-ending activities to the discount is stronger before the legal reform. This is perhaps
because open-ending attempts were difficult to launch before the reform, so only deeply
discounted funds were targeted.
The negative sign of θ̂ reported at the bottom of Table 4 demonstrates that the discount
shrinks in anticipation of the higher probability of open-ending activities. This creates a
feedback loop between discounts and open-ending attempts. This negative feedback loop is
significant in columns 2 and 5. Before the legal reform of 1992, there were fewer open-ending
attempts, and hence conditional on an attempt taking place, the probability of success was
higher. This provides the rationale for why the feedback loop was strong enough to be
statistically significant mostly before the legal reform (column 5).25
Interestingly, after controlling for the discount, the fund’s past-year NAV return is only
marginally significant in explaining activists’ attempts. Hence, poor return seems to affect such
attempts only (or mostly) to the extent that it is reflected in the discount. In robustness analysis,
we constructed measures of NAV return that control for benchmark returns or market factors, but
it turns out that they have even lower power in explaining the attempts.
4.2.3. Determinants of Open-Ending Attempts: Communication and Governance
We now turn to analyze other determinants of open-ending attempts. As we discussed
before, the 1992 reform seems to have had a large effect on the volume of open-ending attempts.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 break the sample into two sub-periods (all regressors lag by one
year): 1989-1993 (pre reform) and 1994-2003 (post reform). Other things equal, there is an 8.48
(t-statistic = 3.58) percentage point increase in the probability of open-ending attempts during the
second period. Since the reform was designed to lift barriers on communication among
25The test of the feedback loop has low power because the residual discount also contains some exogenous components of DISCOUNT that are positively associated with ATTEMPT. Therefore, finding a significantly negative sign for θ̂ is strong evidence for a feedback loop.
20
shareholders, the time-series pattern suggests that one important determinant of attacks is the
ease of communication.
Clearly, the time-series pattern does not uniquely identify the effect of communication.
The observed pattern could also result from other changes that occurred around 1993. One
possibility is the increase in the number of hedge funds engaged in open-ending activities after
1993.26 To further investigate the role of communication, Table 5 presents results using cross
sectional measures of communication costs.
[Insert Table 5 here]
The first variable we consider is share turnover. High turnover makes communication
and coordination more difficult for two reasons (see Pound (1988)). First, given the time lag at
which account names become available to activists, the latter may not get up-to-date shareholder
contacts at high turnover funds. Second, there is a gap of 10 to 60 days between the record date
(which qualifies a shareholder to vote) and the actual vote date. Investors with short holding
periods (corresponding to high turnover) may cease to be shareholders by the voting date or
expect to exit the fund soon, and thus lack the incentive to cast a careful vote. Column 1 shows
that after 1993, a 100 percentage point increase in the annual turnover rate is associated with a 6
percentage point lower probability of an attack, significant at the 10% level. While this result
identifies high turnover as an impediment to activism, it is commonly believed that this variable
enhances market efficiency. This is because high turnover improves liquidity, and can contribute
to lower discount (see Table 2). This ambivalent effect of liquidity is consistent with the models
of Kahn and Winton (1998) and Bolton and von Thadden (1998).
The second variable we use proxies for the average shareholder account size. Holding
the market value of a fund constant, the smaller the average holding per account, the more
shareholders an arbitrageur needs to persuade to have enough support. Accessing many
shareholders and motivating them to act is logistically difficult. Direct information about
individual account size is not readily available. However, it is reasonable to assume that the size
26 The attempt to attribute the surge in open-ending activities solely to the increasing presence of hedge funds faces two main problems. First, both number of hedge funds and their assets saw smooth growth during our sample period, with no visible structural break at any point, including years around 1993. (Information is obtained from Hedge Fund Research, Chicago.) Second, open-ending activities are highly concentrated among a handful of players, even in the latter part of our sample.
21
of a typical trade by an investor in a fund is a good proxy for his total holdings in the fund (see
Battalio and Mendenhall (2005)). Using the TAQ and ISSM databases, we obtain the average
trade size (in 1,000 shares) of a fund-year, and the proportion of trades that are more than 2,000
and 5,000 shares. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 show the effect of trading size on open-ending
attempts. In the post-1993 period, every 1,000 share increase in the average trading size (the
mean and standard deviation are 1,260 and 710 shares, respectively) is associated with a 5.6
percentage point increase in the probability of an attack. Using the proportion of trades above
2,000 shares (or 5,000, not tabulated) yields similar results. These results are significant at less
than 5%.
The last variable we entertain is the percentage of the fund’s shares that are owned by
institutional investors. It is easier to locate and coordinate with institutional shareholders since
they are bigger and are required to disclose their quarterly ownership. We construct a dummy
variable for institutional shares being greater than 15%.27 To ensure that we are not capturing
the holdings of the activists themselves with this variable, we exclude holdings by institutions
that ever attacked the fund during our sample period. Column 4 shows that the effect on the
probability of an open-ending attempt after 1993 is 7.5 percentage points, significant at the 5%
level. Using the level of total institutional ownership (not reported) yields similar results.
Overall, the evidence suggests that the ease of communication among shareholders is an
important factor in generating activist attacks against CEFs. An important aspect of our results is
that our measures explain open-ending attempts only after the 1992 reform. Table 5 shows that
the effect of the communication variables is insignificant in the pre-reform subsample. We
conjecture that before the 1992 reform, communication was so severely constrained by law that
characteristics of the shareholder base did not matter much for activist arbitrageurs. These
characteristics became significant only after the reform allowed various forms of
communication. The bottom of Table 5 reports the results of a test for whether the effect of
communication is different between the two subsamples. The results indicate that the effect of
27 In a private interview, Phillip Goldstein said that he targets funds with more than 15% institutional ownership.
22
communication is indeed greater after the reform than before the reform. The results, however,
are only significant in two out of the four columns.28
There is a robustness issue in interpreting the results regarding the effect of
communication costs because these variables are affected by the attacks. For example,
institutions may know that a fund is being targeted and react by buying its shares. To reduce this
concern, our analysis uses measures of communication that lag the attack by one year. We also
conducted a robustness check using a lag of two years. The results are similar.
Another class of variables likely to affect activist arbitrageurs’ attacks against closed-end
funds is governance variables. Del Guercio, Dann, and Partch (2003) show that governance
variables are important determinants for various decisions of CEF managements and boards.
Using the GOV variable defined in Section 4.2.2, we find (in Table 4) that after 1993, the
addition of one of the three provisions in GOV (which makes governance more pro-management)
is associated with an increase of about 5.1 percentage points in the probability of an attempt
(significant at the 5% level). Moreover, funds with higher insider ownership invite more
attempts after 1993 (significant at the 5% level). Such relations were non-existent beforehand.
Following Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian (2002) and Del Guercio, Dann, and Partch (2003),
we also use a dummy variable for staggered board in place of GOV. This specification (not
tabulated) yields even stronger results: the sample average incremental probability is 7.8%
(significant at the 5% level).29 This evidence echoes Choi’s (2000) finding that after the 1992
reform, firms with stronger management entrenchment and more pro-manager governance
became more frequent targets of shareholder proposals. Our explanation is that communication
among shareholders is particularly important when managers have more power in opposing
dissidents. Hence, activism against firms with pro-manager governance became more prominent
after the 1992 reform. Interestingly, although high fees may also point to bad governance, we
find that high-fee funds are overall less susceptible to attacks in the post-reform era (significant
28 The reason for the lower significance here is that the insignificance of the effect of communication on attacks in the pre-reform period is associated with high standard errors, which inflate the standard errors of the difference statistics. Hence, the significance of the difference statistics is lower than that of the post-reform coefficients. 29 There might be an endogeneity problem as funds that anticipate higher probability of activist attacks are more likely to add governance provisions. To alleviate this concern, we conducted a robustness test, in which we included only the funds that did not change their governance in the analysis. The results remained qualitatively the same.
23
at the 10% level). We do not have a good explanation for why this variable behaves differently
than the other governance variables.
4.2.4. Determinants of Successes of Open-Ending Attempts
We now turn to an analysis of the determinants of the success of open-ending attempts.
Table 6 Panel A repeats the same analysis conducted in Table 4, except we replace the dependent
variable with a dummy variable for actual open-endings. We find a strong dual relation between
actual open-endings and fund discounts prior to the attempts. While a higher discount level is
associated with higher likelihood that the fund will be open-ended, the prospects of open-ending
shrink the discount. In equilibrium, a one percentage point increase in the discount is associated
with a 0.11 percentage point increase in the probability of open-ending (column 1 of Panel A).
After incorporating the feedback loop, this sensitivity increases to 0.29 percentage points
(column 2 of Panel A). Compared to Table 4, the results in Panel A of Table 6 show a stronger
effect of actual open-endings on discounts. This is intuitive as ex-post successful attacks are
probably ex-ante more powerful and thus have a stronger effect on market prices.
[Insert Panel A of Table 6 here.]
An interesting observation reflected in Panel A is that successful open–ending attempts
are not easy to predict based on observables, especially during the post-reform period. Indeed,
the goodness-of-fit measures are modest. This is consistent with an equilibrium where activists
profit from their activities because the market cannot predict them (Maug (1998)).
Defining “success” as the eventual open-ending of a closed-end fund, while natural and
intuitive, does not accurately characterize the complicated outcomes of open-ending attempts.
First, while in some cases funds are open-ended within the same year of the attempt, in other
cases open-ending takes much longer. Such cases are not as successful because the arbitrageurs
need to commit more of their capital and time and hence realize lower profits. Second,
arbitrageurs can also profit from their open-ending attempts when the fund remains closed. This
happens when the discount shrinks as a result of the attack, for example, if the fund management
takes actions to suppress the discount. We address these features with a duration-to-success
model.
24
Using the language of a duration analysis, we say that a “spell” starts when an attack
occurs. The initial conditions are the funds’ characteristics just before the attack. If the attempt
does not succeed by the end of our sample period (that is, by 2003), the duration of the spell is
treated as being censored on the right end. Alternatively, if the attempt succeeds at a time within
our sample period, the attempt-to-success duration is recorded without censoring. Combining
both types of observations, we get the following log-likelihood function for duration:
ln( ) ( | ) ln ( | )uncensored spells all spells
L h t x S t x= +∑ ∑ (3)
In Equation (3), h is the baseline hazard function, where we adopt the most commonly
used Weibull distribution: [ ] 1exp( ) exp( )h x t x θ−= − β θ ⋅ − β ; t is the time from the start of an attempt;
S is the survival function: exp( )S h t= − ⋅ . All covariates x are measured at the time an attempt
starts (the discount is measured at the end of the previous period). The coefficients β̂ (vector)
and θ̂ (scalar) are estimable using the maximum likelihood estimation method. We are
interested in the effect of the x variables on the duration of attempts. A positive coefficient
means that a higher value of the covariate is associated with lower success rates for the activist
attempt (as it takes longer to achieve the goal).
Panel B of Table 6 provides the results from estimating Equation (3). The reported
coefficients are ˆ ˆ and θ β . In columns (1) and (2), the measure of success is narrowly defined as
actual open-endings. In columns (3) and (4), success is more broadly defined as either open-
ending or near disappearance of the discount (i.e., the discount dropped to below 5%).
[Insert Panel B of Table 6 here]
We find several results that demonstrate how entrenched management is better able to
defend against activists’ attacks. First, older, established funds take significantly longer to be
open-ended.30 Second, our GOV variable is a direct measure of managerial entrenchment.
Column (1) indicates that high GOV is indeed associated with longer duration (t-statistic = 1.94).
Among the components of GOV, staggered board has the most intuitive effect on duration: in
order to have absolute control of the board, activists need to win proxy fights in at least two
annual elections if the fund has a staggered board. In Column (2), we replace GOV with a 30 While it is true that a fund gets to an older age because it survived attacks, our results go further in that the “instantaneous hazard” conditional on the fund’s surviving to the current date is also negatively related to age.
25
dummy variable for staggered board alone (STAGBOARD). The coefficient is now strengthened
(t-statistic = 2.22). Our calculations of the economic effect show that the presence of a staggered
board increases the time to open-ending (starting from the occurrence of an attempt) by almost 3
years. Third, we see that INSIDER, which captures the management’s voting power, is
significantly positively related to duration.
Columns (3) and (4) broaden the definition of “successful attempt” to either open-ending,
or shrinkage of the discount to below 5%. The reported results are overall consistent with those
in the first two columns, but are noisier. This is not surprising given that a reduction in the
discount could be due to events unrelated to activism.
Finally, note that the discount is slightly positively related to the time to success. It might
seem paradoxical that a higher discount does not make it easier for arbitrageurs to succeed.
Given our earlier discussion on the feedback effect, however, the correct interpretation is that the
discount already reflects the prospect of a successful attempt.31
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we document strong and frequent attempts by activist arbitrageurs to open-
end closed-end funds in the wake of the SEC’s proxy reform in 1992. We find a dual
relationship between activist arbitrageurs’ activities and funds’ discounts. On the one hand,
activists tend to target deeply discounted funds. On the other hand, funds’ discounts reflect such
activity in a forward-looking way and shrink when an attack is expected. Following an attack,
the discount shrinks further or completely disappears (if the fund is open-ended), so that overall
activist arbitrage is found to have a substantial effect on CEF discounts. Aside from the
discount, the ability of shareholders to communicate and coordinate with each other and the
governance of the fund are found to be important factors in determining which funds are being
targeted. Our work shows that activist arbitrage is an important activity undertaken by market
participants to eliminate the difference between market prices and potential security values. In
the remainder of this section, we draw some broad implications from our work to several fields.
31 At this stage there is no powerful econometric method to identify the feedback or anticipation effect in duration models (see a recent discussion by Abbring and van den Berg (2003)).
26
Source of CEF Discounts: One of the biggest puzzles in the CEF literature (with broad
implications to financial economics) is the source of the discount. The two main hypotheses in
the literature link discounts to irrational mispricing (Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991)) or to
agency problems (Barclay, Holderness and Pontiff (1993), Ross (2002), Berk and Stanton
(2007), and Cherkes, Sagi and Stanton (2008)). Our study offers suggestive evidence that
agency problems play at least some role in the emergence of CEF discounts. First, we show that
activist arbitrageurs consider governance variables when selecting their targets. Second, in the
vast majority of events in our sample, discounts fall after managers take corrective actions such
as a share repurchase, dividend increase, or change in investment advisors.
Limits to Arbitrage: The persistence of CEF discounts is often used to demonstrate the
presence of the limits to arbitrage in financial markets (see Lee Shleifer and Thaler (1991),
Pontiff (1996), and Gemmill and Thomas (2002)). A large body of literature has pointed out
various market frictions that contribute to such limits. Our work shows that the costs of
communication and coordination—imposed by law, ownership structure, or the trading
environment of funds—can also be viewed as limits to arbitrage since they interfere with the
work of activist arbitrageurs. Importantly, our work also has indirect implications for pure-
trading arbitrage, given that without the work of activist arbitrageurs there is no guarantee that
CEF share prices will ever converge to the NAVs, and thus the profit from pure-trading arbitrage
becomes more uncertain.
The 1992 Proxy Reform: The evidence presented in this paper strongly suggests that
the proxy reform implemented by the SEC in 1992 had a major effect on closed-end funds.
Measuring the value created by open-ending attempts based on the decrease in discount
following attempts, we calculate that the reform created $124 million per year to CEF
shareholders. Adjusting for mean reversion in discounts (as we did in columns 4 and 8 of Table
3), the estimated value created by the reform to CEF shareholders amounts to $32 million per
year. The only other paper of which we are aware that tries to quantify the effects of the proxy
reform of 1992 is by Choi (2000). Using a much smaller sample of shareholder proposals in
regular corporations, he does not find any real effect of the 1992 reform.
Feedback Loops in Financial Markets: A basic feature of the interaction between
financial markets and corporate finance is that market prices affect and reflect corporate
27
activities simultaneously. As we argued above, CEF discounts attract activist arbitrageurs, but
these discounts shrink in anticipation of an activist arbitrageurs’ attack. This negative feedback
loop has many interesting implications; most of them have not yet been explored in the literature.
For example, the fact that market prices reflect anticipated activist attacks creates a disincentive
to engage in activist arbitrage. This is because the decrease in the discount that results from the
anticipation effect reduces the profit from open-ending the fund.32 The econometric methodology
that we use in this paper to disentangle the two effects is new in corporate finance, and could be
used in future research for settings that feature a similar feedback loop.
32 Some theoretical implications of the negative feedback loop between financial markets and corporate activities are explored in a recent paper by Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2008).
28
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31
Appendix:
Several comments regarding the execution of the estimation method (1)-(2) are in order.
First, as a feature of probit analysis, the estimation of Equation (2) identifies the coefficients
{ }/ , / , /η η ηβ σ γ σ θ σ up to scale. It has been a convention to report probit estimates by
normalizing the variance of the disturbance term ε to be unit. Given that ( )2 2 21η εσ = −ρ σ , we
need to rescale the coefficients from (2) by 21/ 1−ρ to obtain the coefficients in the original
system (1). Second, though i,t 1ˆ −ω enters equation (2) for estimation, it is not a conventional
covariate as the X variables in the same equation. More specially, i,t 1ˆ −ω is not a “determinant” of
an attempt, and the coefficient in front of i,t 1ˆ −ω should not be interpreted as the partial effect of a
unit change of the residual discount on the propensity of an attempt. In fact, i,t 1ˆ −ω should be
integrated out to obtain consistent estimates of { },β γ in the original system (1). Third, the probit
coefficients are not of direct interest to researchers. The interesting parameters are the average
partial effects (APE) of the covariates, that is, the average effect of a unit change in the
covariates on the incremental probability of an attempt.
As a result of these considerations, we compute the parameters { },β γ with ω̂ integrated
out, which are related to those from (2) by a scaling factor: 33
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1/2 1/22 2 2 2
2 22 2
ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ/ 1 1 ; / 1 1ˆ ˆ1 1ω ω
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞θ σ θ σ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟β = β −ρ + γ = γ −ρ +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟−ρ −ρ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
(4)
They serve to compute the sample analogue of the average partial effects of the covariates:
( ) ( )( ) ( )
/
/
E DISCOUNT X DISCOUNT E DISCOUNT X
E DISCOUNT X X E DISCOUNT X
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∂Φ β + γ ∂ = βφ β + γ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∂Φ β + γ ∂ = γφ β + γ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
(5)
33 The derivation is standard. See, for example, Wooldridge (2003), chapter 15 “Discrete Response Models”.
32
Table 1. Summary Statistics Panel A: Fund Characteristics over 1988-2002
This panel reports summary statistics for 142 closed-end funds over the sample period 1988-2002. The first two rows provide the number of funds in operation in each year and the percentage of funds that trade at a discount. Each of the next three-row blocks provides the sample mean, median, and standard deviation, respectively, of the indicated fund characteristic variable. Fund discount is defined as (NAV-P)/NAV. Market capitalization is the product of fund share price and number of shares outstanding. Annual turnover is the ratio of fund shares traded to total shares outstanding. Dividend yield is the ratio of dividend payout to fund share price. Insider ownership is the proportion of fund shares owned by insiders. Institutional ownership is the proportion of fund shares owned by institutions. Fund age is number of years since the first listing date on CRSP. Average trade size is the number of shares traded in a single transaction averaged over all trades in a given year. Standard deviations of monthly returns in a given year are calculated for both the underlying assets (NAV) and the fund shares. NAV return is defined as the percentage change in NAV values plus dividend paid, scaled by the beginning of period NAV. 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Number of funds 53 62 82 84 92 99 123 122 123 121 113 111 102 95 89 % trading at a discount 81 79 83 79 68 55 71 78 86 83 82 89 92 86 88 % of funds under attack 0.0 16.1 6.1 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.4 9.8 12.1 18.9 22.8 27.4 26.9 19.2 32.6 % market cap of funds under attack 0.0 7.2 3.5 2.4 7.5 5.6 2.2 16.2 11.6 25.6 26.0 13.0 15.1 13.1 17.7
Fund discount (%) 14.0 9.7 10.2 8.0 5.6 1.8 6.0 11.2 13.0 13.5 13.6 16.3 23.0 15.4 13.3 20.2 12.5 11.5 8.8 5.8 1.8 6.3 12.8 15.2 15.9 18.1 19.1 23.6 17.4 14.2
17.7 17.7 11.6 12.3 10.4 11.7 11.0 12.2 11.3 12.2 16.1 15.9 16.1 14.4 15.4 Market capitalization ($Million) 159 177 155 170 177 194 220 212 229 255 239 248 267 247 222
69 88 85 93 98 111 133 121 125 136 105 101 123 101 102 228 234 210 245 270 276 271 277 303 349 401 448 453 435 376 Annual turnover (%) 60 116 95 76 80 110 102 87 87 102 96 84 78 54 50
49 57 67 59 64 92 86 79 85 96 92 80 69 48 44 50 171 73 77 57 108 65 47 38 56 49 45 44 28 31 Dividend yield (%) 3.1 4.0 3.5 4.0 3.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 2.3 2.4 3.4 2.9 3.4 3.4 2.9
2.6 3.3 2.4 2.7 1.8 0.8 0.9 0.6 1.2 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.3 3.3 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.5 3.0 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.8 5.3 4.1 5.1 4.8 4.5
33
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Insider ownership (%) 1.0 1.7 1.7 4.5 2.3 2.6 1.6 3.9 2.5 2.9 1.6 6.8 4.3 7.6 7.6
0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.7 0.4 1.8 3.2 4.8 12.5 6.5 9.2 7.7 15.4 9.5 10.5 4.0 11.9 9.5 12.5 14.7 Institution ownership (%) (excluding activists’ stake)
12.1 13.4 11.0 13.3 12.8 12.8 10.8 12.2 13.1 12.1 12.5 13.6 14.3 16.1 18.3 6.6 8.0 6.5 8.6 9.1 9.9 8.7 10.5 10.5 10.5 11.1 10.9 12.4 14.3 16.0
12.3 13.1 11.3 14.7 12.6 10.8 9.7 8.9 9.7 12.3 13.9 12.8 14.3 14.8 14.8 Fund age (year) 7 7 6 6 6 7 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 15
2 2 3 3 3 4 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 12 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 11 11 11 Average trade size (1,000 shares) 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.7 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 Standard deviation of monthly fund NAV (in %)
4.3 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.7 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.3 4.4 5.0 5.8 6.2 5.7 4.8 3.1 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.8 3.6 4.4 5.2 5.7 5.3 4.3
2.6 2.3 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.4 3.1 2.6 Standard deviation of monthly fund return (in %)
4.9 5.4 6.4 6.2 6.2 5.9 6.5 5.9 5.8 5.8 6.2 6.2 6.7 6.6 6.4 4.2 4.5 4.7 4.8 5.0 5.4 5.9 5.2 5.4 5.3 5.9 6.0 6.3 6.1 6.0
2.7 2.8 3.7 3.4 3.1 3.0 3.1 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.0 3.1 2.9 NAV return (in %) 7.8 20.3 -14.2 18.6 -2.1 29.2 -9.1 4.7 8.4 -2.4 -5.4 38.2 -19.5 -12.4 -14.0
4.3 16.2 -11.2 11.3 -2.7 24.9 -7.3 3.4 9.9 2.4 -4.8 29.5 -19.8 -14.2 -14.3 10.3 20.3 14.7 26.6 17.1 31.1 18.3 23.6 18.3 28.7 32.7 49.8 21.7 17.3 19.8
34
Panel B: Fund Policies This panel reports the mean values of the policy variables over different sub-periods and separately for old and new funds. All of the variables except management fees are dummy variables equal to one if the provision exists. A staggered board is one in which directors are classified into difference classes and serve overlapping terms. Supermajority requires supermajority votes out of outstanding shares for open-ending. Special meeting means that the management has the right to call special meetings to discuss/vote on dissidents’ proposals. Lifeboat is a provision for remedial actions (including converting to an open-end fund) when discount persists beyond certain threshold for certain length of period. Management fees are calculated as fees over total net asset values. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. A fund is counted as an Old (New) fund if it has existed in our sample for more than (less than or equal to) three years in the year of calculation.
1988-2002 1988-1992 1993-1998 1999-2002
All Funds Old Funds New Funds Old Funds New Funds Old Funds New Funds
Staggered board 0.38 0.09 0.03 0.42 0.30 0.67 0.47
Supermajority 0.14 0.09 0.20 0.17 0.08 0.14 0.00
Special meeting 0.60 0.70 0.56 0.63 0.52 0.58 0.67
Lifeboat 0.53 0.44 0.57 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.60
Management fees 1.79 1.45 2.01 1.62 2.03 1.90 2.22
(0.90) (0.58) (0.61) (0.86) (0.71) (1.06) (0.49)
35
Table 2. Cross-Sectional Determinants of Closed-End Fund Discounts
The dependent variable is fund discount (DISCOUNT) in percentage points by firm-year observations. The first column reports estimates from a pooled regression with year fixed effects; the second column reports the results from a Fama-MacBeth regression, and the third column reports the results of a pooled regression without year fixed effects. MV is log market capitalization. P is log market price. STDNAV is the residual standard deviation from a regression of monthly NAV returns on the Fama-French three factors, the momentum factor, and two international indices factors. AGE is fund age in years. TO is the annual turnover rate (in percentage points) of a fund’s shares. DIV is the annualized dividend yield in percentage points. FEES is the management fees as percentage of net assets value. INSIDER is the ownership share of insiders in percentage points. LIFEBOAT is a dummy variable for the existence of a lifeboat provision (see definition in Table 1 Panel B). SMB is the Fama-French small-minus-big annual returns. Bold fonts represent statistical significance at less than the 5% level. In pooled regressions, standard errors adjust for autocorrelation using the Newey-West method with half-window width equal to 4 years. In Fama-MacBeth regressions, standard errors adjust for autocorrelation of all orders assuming an AR(1) process of the time-series coefficient estimates. The number of observations is 1,477. * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels.
(1) (2) (3) Year Fixed Effects Fama-MacBeth Pooled MV 0.828 0.404 0.814 (1.08) (0.49) (1.06) P -2.962** -3.561** -4.041** -(2.49) -(1.97) -(3.37) STDNAV -0.760** -0.637** 0.494 -(2.80) -(2.35) (0.39) AGE -0.094* -0.055 -0.011 -(1.74) -(0.45) -(0.23) TO -0.021** -0.005 -0.037** -(2.65) -(0.54) -(4.96) DIV -0.499** -0.422** -0.323** -(3.53) -(2.64) -(2.46) FEES 0.735 0.714 0.590 (0.52) (0.97) (0.40) INSIDER 0.101* 0.110** 0.092 (1.71) (4.61) (1.56) LIFEBOAT -1.843 -1.394** -1.702 -(1.59) -(2.96) -(1.36) SMB -- -- -0.107** -- -- -(2.85) CNST 17.515* 20.281* 14.749 (1.81) (1.88) (1.50)
Rsqr 0.182 -- 0.070
36
Table 3. Closed-End Fund Discounts around Open-Ending Attacks: Event Study This table reports the average discount of all funds subject to open-ending attempts in the seven event-time years from three years before
attempts (t-3) to three years afterwards (t+3), standard errors for the average are also reported. In the left four columns (1, 2, 5, and 6, “All Sample”), funds are counted as zero discount funds after they are open-ended. In the right four columns (3, 4, 7, and 8, “Surviving Sample”), funds drop out of the sample after being open-ended. In “Unadjusted” columns (1 and 5), discounts are expressed in their raw levels. In “Adj. for Year Fixed Effect” columns (2 and 4), discounts are demeaned from average discount of all funds in our sample (including funds not under attack) in the same year. In “Adj. for Fund Historical” columns (5 and 7), discounts are reported in excess of their own historical level measured as the in sample average through event year t-4. In “Adj. for Matched Funds” columns (6 and 8), discounts are subtracted from the average discounts of matched funds, where the latter are those that experience no open-ending attempts during the [t-3,t+3] window and have very similar levels of discounts in year t-2 (within 90% and 110% of the discounts of the event funds). The total number of events is 127. All Sample Surviving Sample
(1) Unadjusted (2) Adj. for Year Fixed Effect (5) Unadjusted (6) Adj. for Year Fixed Effect
Year Avg Std Err Avg Std Err Avg Std Err Avg Std Err
t-3 18.34 1.12 6.20 1.01 18.34 1.12 6.20 1.01 t-2 21.20 1.23 6.88 1.09 21.20 1.23 6.88 1.09 t-1 19.82 1.07 6.03 1.05 19.82 1.07 6.03 1.05 Attempt 14.46 1.15 0.27 1.14 14.46 1.15 0.27 1.14 t+1 8.42 1.00 -4.19 1.03 14.41 1.34 2.39 1.19 t+2 7.33 1.12 -3.30 0.99 12.58 1.69 2.18 1.37 t+3 5.61 0.92 -3.57 0.89 9.59 1.43 1.36 1.18
(3) Adj. for Fund Historical (4) Adj. for Matched Funds (7) Adj. Fund Historical (8) Adj. for Matched Funds
Year Avg Std Err Avg Std Err Avg Std Err Avg Std Err t-3 7.78 1.11 4.27 0.66 7.78 1.11 4.27 0.66 t-2 10.80 1.27 0.04 0.07 10.80 1.27 0.04 0.07 t-1 8.87 1.23 -0.49 0.70 8.87 1.23 -0.49 0.70 Attempt 3.81 1.44 -5.27 0.93 3.81 1.44 -5.27 0.93 t+1 -1.86 1.32 -10.78 1.38 3.70 1.57 -3.36 1.34 t+2 -2.92 1.50 -8.99 1.41 1.80 2.14 -0.21 1.59 t+3 -4.38 1.27 -8.41 1.65 -0.72 1.85 2.07 1.92
37
Table 4. Determinants of Open-Ending Attempts This table reports results from estimating the first equation of system (1). The dependent variable is the occurrence of open-ending attempts at the fund-year level. All regressors are lagged for one year. MV, STDNAV, AGE, TO, FEES, and INSIDER are defined in Table 2. DISCOUNT is the fund discount in percentage points. GOV is the sum of three indicator variables: staggered board, supermajority vote, and special meetings as defined in Table 1 Panel B. NAVRET is the fund’s NAV return as defined in Table 1 Panel A. Columns (1) and (3) report one-stage probit estimates without adjusting for the feedback effect. Columns (2), (4), (5), and (6) apply the two-stage estimation, with the additional exogeneity test reported below the regressions. Reported for each covariate are the un-scaled probit coefficient (in bold fonts), the t-statistics (in parenthesis), and the sample average incremental probability for a unit change in the covariate (in percentage points). In columns (2), (4), (5), and (6), the incremental probabilities also integrate out the variation of RESIDUALDISC (the residual from the second equation of (1)). In the exogeneity tests, reported are the θ estimate (the loading of RESIDUALDISC in the ATTEMPT equation), its t-statistics, and the implied ρ value (the correlation coefficient of the two error disturbances in (1). * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels.
Full Sample 1989-1993 1994-2003 1 2 3 4 5 6 DISCOUNT 0.034** 0.054** 0.041** 0.053** 0.184** 0.034** (9.53) (7.03) (9.15) (5.55) (3.53) (3.45) 0.66% 1.07% 0.77% 1.03% 2.43% 0.71% LN(MV) -- -- -0.033 -0.025 0.785** -0.075 -- -- -(0.62) -(0.48) (3.25) -(1.33) -- -- -0.61% -0.49% 10.39% -1.57% STDNAV -- -- -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -- -- -(0.06) -(0.02) -(0.03) -(0.13) -- -- -0.02% -0.01% -0.03% -0.06% AGE -- -- 0.027 0.020 -0.175 -0.042 -- -- (0.40) (0.30) -(1.00) -(0.50) -- -- 0.52% 0.39% -2.32% -0.89% TO -- -- -0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.003* -- -- -(1.44) -(1.08) (0.57) -(1.83) -0.03% -0.03% 0.03% -0.06% FEES -- -- -0.076 -0.085 0.169 -0.139* -- -- -(1.13) -(1.25) (0.60) -(1.74) -- -- -1.44% -1.65% 2.23% -2.91% GOV -- -- 0.209** 0.185** -0.831** 0.241** -- -- (3.71) (3.15) -(3.03) (3.90) 3.95% 3.58% -11.00% 5.06% INSIDER -- -- 0.006 0.005 -0.034 0.010** -- -- (1.32) (1.16) -(1.58) (2.09) -- -- 0.11% 0.10% -0.45% 0.21% NAVRET -0.002 -0.004* -0.016* -0.002 -(1.29) -(1.74) -(1.79) -(0.68) -0.05% -0.07% -0.21% -0.03% Exogeneity Test: θ̂ -- -0.025** -- -0.015 -0.120** 0.001 -- -(2.97) -- -(1.47) -(2.24) (0.09) Implied ρ̂ -- -0.312 -- -0.182 -0.689 0.012 NOB 1445 1445 1445 1445 367 1078 Goodness of Fit 0.096 0.104 0.132 0.134 0.206 0.141
38
Table 5: Effects of Shareholder Communication The dependent variable is the occurrence of an open-ending attempt at the fund-year level. All regressors are the same as in Table 4 columns (5) and (6) except that each column uses a different proxy for shareholder communication (COMMUNICATION). The default measure is turnover in Column 1 (repeated from Columns 5 and 6 in Table 4). Columns 2 and 3 use the average trade size (in 1,000 shares) and the proportion of trades that are more than 2,000 shares (in percentage points). Column 4 uses the dummy variable equal to one if the institutional ownership exceeds 15% for the fund-year. All regressors in Table 4 enter as controls but only coefficients on DISCOUNT and COMMUNICATION are reported (other coefficients are repetitively similar from those in Table 4 and are thus omitted). Reported for each covariate are the un-scaled probit coefficient (in bold fonts), the t-statistics (in parenthesis), and the sample average incremental probability for a unit change in the covariate (in percentage points). Reported below COMMUNICATION are the t-statistics for the difference between the coefficients from the two subsamples. * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels. Turnover Avg Trade Size (1,000) %(Trade > 2,000) (%Institution>15%)
1989-1993 1994-2003 1989-1993 1994-2003 1989-1993 1994-2003 1989-1993 1994-2003
1 2 3 4
DISCOUNT 0.184** 0.034** 0.146** 0.031** 0.139** 0.030** 0.155** 0.028** (3.53) (3.45) (3.45) (3.28) (3.37) (3.11) (3.57) (2.81) 2.43% 0.71% 1.96% 0.64% 1.86% 0.63% 2.07% 0.59% COMMUNICATION 0.002 -0.003* -0.126 0.269** -0.050 0.030** -0.595 0.361** (0.57) -(1.83) -(0.77) (3.47) -(1.56) (3.17) -(1.37) (2.53) 0.03% -0.06% -1.41% 5.56% -0.36% 0.61% -5.91% 7.50%
(t-statistics for two sample comparison) -(0.213) (2.07) ** (1.49) (3.49) ** NOB 367 1078 367 1078 367 1078 367 1078 Goodness of Fit 0.206 0.141 0.185 0.151 0.187 0.149 0.209 0.152
39
Table 6. Determinants of Open-Ending Successes
Panel A: Actual Open-Endings This table repeats the analysis of Table 4 except replacing the dependent variable with a dummy variable for the actual open-endings. * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels. Full Sample 1989-1993 1994-2003 1 2 3 4 5 6 DISCOUNT 0.019** 0.042** 0.023** 0.060** 0.214** 0.047** (3.09) (3.28) (3.25) (3.57) (2.32) (2.60) 0.11% 0.29% 0.12% 0.46% 1.92% 0.32% LN(MV) -- -- -0.059 -0.035 0.757** -0.099 -- -- -(0.73) -(0.43) (2.07) -(1.07) -- -- -0.32% -0.27% 6.78% -0.67% STDNAV -- -- -0.032 -0.030 -0.601** -0.003 -- -- -(0.88) -(0.79) -(2.01) -(0.07) -- -- -0.17% -0.23% -5.38% -0.02% AGE -- -- -0.129 -0.150 0.314 -0.265* -- -- -(1.23) -(1.41) (1.02) -(1.85) -- -- -0.69% -1.16% 2.81% -1.78% TO -- -- -0.003 -0.002 0.006 -0.003 -- -- -(1.52) -(1.06) (0.75) -(1.18) -- -- -0.02% -0.02% 0.05% -0.02% FEES -- -- -0.016 -0.028 0.611 -0.114 -- -- -(0.16) -(0.27) (1.40) -(0.82) -- -- -0.09% -0.22% 5.47% -0.77% GOV -- -- -0.109 -0.177* -1.419** -0.053 -- -- -(1.09) -(1.72) -(2.80) -(0.48) -- -- -0.59% -1.37% -12.70% -0.36% INSIDER -- -- -0.004 -0.006 -0.052 0.001 -- -- -(0.42) -(0.71) -(1.30) (0.12) -- -- -0.02% -0.05% -0.46% 0.01% NAVRET -- -- 0.000 -0.004 -0.029** -0.001 -- -- -(0.10) -(1.00) -(1.97) -(0.28) -- -- 0.00% -0.03% -0.26% -0.01% Exogeneity Test: θ̂ -- -0.030** -0.045** -0.209** -0.027 -- -(2.08) -(2.51) -(2.18) -(1.37) Implied ρ̂ -- -0.340 -0.479 -0.731 -0.312 NOB 1445 1445 1445 1445 367 1078 Goodness of Fit 0.031 0.043 0.064 0.083 0.307 0.078
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Panel B. Duration of Open-Ending Attempts
This table reports results from estimating the hazard model specified in (3) at the fund level using the maximum likelihood estimation method with a Weibull-distribution baseline hazard. The dependent variable is the length of time between the start of an open-ending attempt in a fund and its success (if no success avails the observation is treated as right-censored at the end of the sample period). In columns (1) and (2), success is narrowly defined as actual open-ending; in columns (3) and (4), it is broadly defined as either open-ending, or shrinkage of discount to below 5%. All covariates are the same as defined in Tables 2 and 4. Reported coefficients are the marginal effect of the covariates on the log expected duration. T-statistics (associated with β̂ in (3)) are reported below in parentheses. Also reported are the Weibull coefficient ( θ̂ ) for each specification, the corresponding t-statistics is for θ̂ -1, the measure of duration dependence (that is, if θ̂ -1>0 ( θ̂ -1<0), the instantaneous hazard rate is increasing (decreasing) with time). The number of observation is 106. * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels. Open-Ending Open-Ending & (Discount <5%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DISCOUNT 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.000 (0.76) (0.80) -(0.05) -(0.05) LN(MV) -0.017 -0.013 0.008 0.008 -(0.39) -(0.31) (0.19) (0.22) STDNAV -0.011 -0.026 -0.027 -0.033 -(0.21) -(0.51) -(0.63) -(0.77) AGE 0.497** 0.531** 0.454** 0.468** (2.53) (2.86) (2.55) (2.82) TO 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 (0.29) (0.17) (0.06) -(0.01) FEES 0.112 0.129 0.183 0.188 (0.89) (1.07) (1.54) (1.62) GOV 0.265* 0.104 (1.94) (0.93) STAGBOARD 0.513** 0.230 (2.22) (1.25) INSIDER 0.087** 0.087** 0.058** 0.059** (2.74) (2.77) (2.50) (2.55) NAVRET -0.004 -0.003 -0.006* -0.006 -(0.82) -(0.56) -(1.64) -(1.50) Weibull Coefficient ( θ̂ ) 0.838* 0.834* 0.820** 0.817** t-statistic for ( θ̂ -1) -(1.68) -(1.73) -(2.13) -(2.18)
Figure 1: Activist Example: The Emerging Germany Fund (1997-1999)g p g g y ( )
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Figure 2. Attempted and Successful Open-Endings of Close-End Funds (1988-2003)
This chart plots the following time series for the period 1988-2003: (1) Successful open-ending cases in each year; (2) Successful open-ending cases as a proportion of the total number of funds in each year; (3) Attempted (including successful) open-ending cases in each year; (4) Attempted (including successful) open-ending cases as a proportion of the total number of funds in each year.
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