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DoD Controlling Organization: Departmentof the Army, Office of the AdjutantGeneral, Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY14 Nov 1978 per DoDD 5200.10 documentmarking; Adjutant General's Office ltr dtd29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

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AD NUMBER

AD394094

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

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FROM

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14 Nov 1969 per DoDD 5200.10 documentmarking

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET( )DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN RrPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (W) (25 Apr 67) FOR OT V 5 May 1967

SSUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 504th Military Police

Battalion (Arny)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

I. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned,Headquarters, 504th Military Police Battalion (Army) for quarterly periodending 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should hereviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19

-L• and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evalu-C-• ations and cor qttive actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90-• " days of receiptf covering letter.1L.J

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Com-mandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in thefuture from lessons learned during current operations, aud may be adaptedfor use in developing training material.

'd BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

• 'I C3 • I

SC, 4ý- I• I ncl;'.• ' • 1 KENNETH G. WICKHAM

Major General, USAThe Adjutant General

: .,. DISTRIBUTION:.• .,ommanding General

US Army Combat Development Command I

'0• US Continental Army CommandCommandants

US Army Command and General Staff CollegeUS Army War CollegeUS Army Air Defense School

" 0 US Army Artillery and Missile School RF•ADD L•CIASIF WIIUS Army Armor School SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED

"" US Army Chemical Corps School ICII£}RE'IS Army Engineer School

0 US Army Military Police School"US Army Infantry SchoolUS Arm Intelligence School

4, US Anny Medical Field Service School

0.. , 0 (Continued on page 2)P4 SECRET

SECRET

67? SIIBUTION (Cont'd)

is Army Ordnance School1t A rm y Q u a r t e r m a s t e r S c h o o l

US Army Security Agency School

US Army Transportation School

US Army Signal School

US Army Special Warfare School

US Army Civil Affairs School

Copies furnished:Assiatent Chief oT Staff for

Force Deelopment

2

SECRET

SECRET/ .... PADQUARTS) 504TH I.LIT-- RY POLICE - _ TTALTQN (.... - -2

AVBGF-K 9/ 4 qw 6

SUBJECT: prational *i-t for ,Xuarterlyr/er5.od ,~ig31 Octves*66,.i

THRU: Commanding Officer ____-

16th Military Police GroupATTN: AVEGF-B 'frA C 25 FcrýRiePO 96240

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force DevelopmentDepartment of the Army (ACSFORR, DA)Washington, D.C. 20310

SCTTON I

SIGN•IFICANT OGANIZATION-ACTIVITIES

A. CoamaMd 6ction.

1. (U) u'rfg the past quarter the Battalion continued to IprCr-i.de m1:.itary police support th,.-ou& out the II Cczps area of Sou,. TRVie- nar."

(*0 t.

2. (U) On 26 Septemeiq 1966 the 18th Nil1ta&W Po~tee Diigard i6th Military Police Group beams operational. The Battalion c4unri-x control of the 16th Military Police Group.

3. (U)' The 66,th Military. Police Company and the 40th CIDwer- -!1ie~ased frc-, at':zchwnt to t'ce Battalion dwu-3xj4 the quarter.

Reproduced From 1 -

Best Available Copy l)iMN (EGLAIFID AIT Er 3 F I AL;

DECLAN'IFIED AF~TER~ 12 YEAHASDOD DIR 5200.10

j; 11 SECRET

lo

4. (U) Key 'personn&l assignments ard siZn-Lficant changeswithin the unit wore as follows:

a. Lt Col Gotz Battalion CO 27 Sept 66

b. Major Hewitt Interim BN CO 24-27 Sept 66

c. Major Hewitt Bn XO 27 Sept 66

4. Captain Hallihan Bn Adj 1 Nov 66

e. Captain: Jmson A Co, CO I Nov 66

f. CWO Syth Bn Pers Off 4 Aug 66

g. SGM Rowe Bn SGH 7 Aug 66

h. MSG Giroux Bn Opno Sgt 7 Aug 66

5. (U) Tha military police detachments in Hue ardi Danangwcre withdra•wn on order of P. USARV. This returned a total of I officand 55,men to "B" Company rxntrol in Pleiku. Detaehrents closed in by12 P,1..mber 1966.t

6. (U) A TO&E squad of 11 military polico wao attacked to4at Brigade, 101st ALrborme Divisionin Tiq Hoa for Operation "SEWARD".Upon temirnnation of "SEWAAR", 24 October 1966, the squad, augonted bytwo more squads for a tetal of 33 milit.ry policemen# remained in TuyHoa as a prvanent military police detachment in direct support of theTuy Hoa Sub-Area CrEmand.

7. (U) The Annuml General Inspection of the Battalmi wya hWAduring the period 19-214 August 1966. The following comment was re-ceived from the USARV IG Inspection Team:

"The assigned missions of the 504th Mfl.itary PolicaBattaliOn were being aceomplished with a high degree of efficiency.EspirJt and morale wer. considered exceptional.. All personnel appearedto be pro-rossionally c 'r•petcnt and wert enthusiastic in their desireto perfoua usigned dul.cs in an outstanding manner. The overall ap..pear-,rce nir conrditior n fa,?A.cs and cquipnen5 a1& the positive at-titude oxiiited by all. peraoiuvel was indiative of a high degree ofproflusionaiixm and devotion to duty".

P. Porsonnel. Morale and Discipline,

1. (U) DirLr-g this period the Battalion did not have anycascs of malari"r. Coen 'nuer, emphar.•,• on use of malal-4., pills, mosquitenoL. ,'!d insect. spray *..s se-rved to 'd.ce the hac*w& One co:u-irmed

2

UNCLASiUIE

CONFIDENTIALtaleof ejk~iti w,,s c-cr" JjdJJGAl' prsonniel in -the

"• HHD Campany "C" and 66ti Military Police COmWp1Y ",.ro immunizedimmediately with gamma globulin shots,

2. (U) There Were 16 cases of YD reporto.. Cm~and wiphaj.i atall echelons has been affected to reduce the rate, Purticular mphauishas been placed on the responbibility of the individual NCO to guideocounsel, and set the example for his men.

3. (U) Approximately 65% of alloted MR spaces were uasdj In-structions have been published to insure maximum participation in pro-gram. The s-a31 amount of literature ava:lable on the subject has !eenprocured and distributed-.

4. (U) There were ten traffic accidents during the quarter.During this period a tctUl of 758,289 miles was driven. Continued emphasiaon cafe driving has aoststed in reducing the number of traffic accidentse.",:.Lh.%. personal injurics were sustained.

5. (U) One r.+:n was killed in Nha Trang whvi a terrorist threwan explosive into the vab of the 3/4 ton truck he was driving. One manw--i kilJ.ed in a traffic, accident in Danang while on nilitary policeduty,

'6. (C) B*ttalion strength ad of 31 October 1966 MA 635officers wa nmen. Ihis is 34 above authorizec strength. Projected90 day losses of 178 opposed to projected ga4s of 60 will result ktunit understrength.

7. (U) One M Wegzssoml Inqdi'y was received ecuceraing thestatus of radios within the unit.

8. (U) All of Company "C" and 80% of HED moved into woodenbarracks constructed urder th-, "se'f help" program during this period.

C. Intellgience ard Comuterintell&Mce.

1. (U) Int-..1 ience:

a. Daily intel 'ierne reports c.r r xe '."ed f re rV

Intflgs~ce Advisor &AM O Dt*vls:in G--2,

b. Freqnent co.tacts are made with ?,ACV S-2 Advisorsfor inteJ]igence info.nation pertaining to areas where mility pxli.e ' I:,

are c-crat.-.g and to f.-nish t-ne to them.

c,? MiJ.Itary nide -trnl.5 are instructed to reportany hostile or "."sc a .ctivi..ies wI.th! th,'fir a.-ra cf "t p':+bi.2it

2. (U) Coui.ýr,-rintrx:td-g a- There vrre 67 sceurity actionstakun durng the pericd Thii included 62 security cler.ran:o validatiMsand 5 clearance requested. Nn revocation or denial actions were re-quested.

3

CONFIDENTIALipc4

SECRETD. Plans, Operat..ions and TrainiA.

1. (S) Major Operations Supported:

a, Military police provided support for the followingmajor operations during the period.

(1) Operation iAMR/IRVI/N3" involving support ofIst Cavalry Division search ard destroy operations from 13 September1966 to a time to be announced. Supported by elements of B and CCompanies.

(2) Operation ",ROAD RUNNER! involving traffic con-trol and convoy escort support in operations to open up main supplyroutes in II CTZ at -. i.i. These operations are on a continuing basis andL.o date "A" and "B" C,-,'anies have provided support,

(3) Operation "SEWARD" involving support of letBria,•e. ',01st Airlnrnp Division during protection of rice harvestingfr-, 1 September to 2r October, 1966. "A"l Company el:tle.nts supportedtlhiý. operattion.

(L.) Operation "ROBIN" involving t, c novement incov'n';Iy of the 4th Infantry Division from 26, July to .0 October 1966.Elements of "A"l "B" al "C" Comnr•-.is furnished tra;7fia supportduring troop !ornment.

(5) Operation "STABLE", involving the movement inccu-try of the 9th Infantry Division (White Horse) RCKA. Elements of"All Compear furnished traffic support during troop movement.

b. Support fo'. thnse operations consisted of:

(1) Convoy escorts and convoy security

(2) Traffic control and regulation points

(2) VIP security

(.) Traffic and law and order patrols

(5) Evacuvation of P.W. to ARVN P.W. Camp

c. Units of the Battalion supported major combat op-erations for a total of 103 days during the quarter. "THAYER/IRVING"j48, "mSIWM"; 55o

2. (U) Effr-tive 6 October 1966 the Battalion was assignedthe mission of P.W. m"acuation froa diviti6n or sepirate brigade P.W.collecting points to tho kRVN Combat Captive (PW) Camp II CTZ in PleikU.

4

SECRE

A IleCONFIDENTIAL-" In the absence of spe- '_.•.- Ioa.t' level, the Battalion

published a Letter of Inotructions on P.W. Evacu-ti,(-n 1v.scO c.. cx-periencgained in the first two evacwttions. Th• l,,- prcblem U i-countered throughout was the difficulity of arrangin% truck -ad d r-craft transportation of the P.W. A total of 222 P.W. were evacuatedduring the quarter. Elements of 1A", "B" and "C" Ccnpanies ýmre in-volved.

3. (U) A "Traffic Control in Tactical Operations" SOP wasScstaUl'hed to preclude issui.- complete operi.½ons orders for lessthan company size support missions. Items inct.ided in it were:

a. Establishment of anzror plated 4 ton vehicles armedwith M60 machine guns for highway patrols and convoy escorts.

b. Es4Ablishient of three man, radio equipped TCPs to,'ro+ide instant con'nunmiations and individual protection.

c. reovisions for daily briefing and CcT( riofing of do-tails by the OIC/NCOIý' to include road and emev intcJ.JA4rcnce, tacticalsupport and reporting procedures.

d. Reco-mended minimum uniform ,vehiclc and equipment

4. (U) On direction of Commnding Officer, 16th MilitaryPolice G'oup, on 14 October 1966 a study was made of the militarypolice support being furnished to area Provost Marshals. A "Min-Uram essential" and "mianxim effective" strength figure was eeta&b2.Isdfor each area, to determine how many personnel could be relieved frloroutine military police duties for tactical`support. If the Battalionfilled the "ltnimum essential" figures it would have the equivalentof three full platoons, three additional platoon headquarters and threeadditional squads to support tactical operations. Approval of thestudy is pending.

5. (U) Preventive maintenance has been stressed especiallon ¼ tons and radios. This has been necessary due to the wear and tearevidenced by he.vily armored ;n.nd sandbagged vehicles traveling un-improved roads in tact ".cal arn.as.

E. CUmunication: Activj.t7.r.

1. (C) A radio teln.type net has been established by 10thMilitary Police Brigad'. to include stations at Headquartrs., 18thIfilitary Po'lice Brigadr: in Saigon, Headquarters, 16th M.1ilitary PoliceGroup in Nha Trang and Headquarters, 5Q 4th Military Police Battalionin Qui Nhon. The AN/7.:: 46 nonfiguraticn is used and -'4.ransmissions

5

Ur CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 6Averagb nine hours dai ,AU UMIW &M11 MgiB xpedited transmin.ssionsof information and queri.:is which formerly had to 17 ... !.•yed biy courieror on the overloaded telephone system.

2. (U) The new AN/VRC 46 and 47 type radios started toarrive during the quarter. "A" Company completed mooa ting of au-thorized radios mn 6 October 1966. The remainder of the Battalion'sradios were available in the depot in Qui Nhon, but could not be in-stalled due to the nonava•l.,ahility of installation kits at the and ofthe quarter.

3, (U) Instructions mere isauv_5 to the unit ecomankers toreduce the anovt of radio traffic being broadcast on tactical op-erations. This resulted in less tramisimes more clarity md morev observance of security requirements.

4. (U) Al/M 25 radios, on loan fro units oquipped with-chem, have been used as radio relays on operatilons "THAYER and "MOADVJNNP., as the AN/ARC los were not capahle of the desired rang$.

5. (U) A planned Rystam of radio relays to establish cor-tact betwenI "B" Company in Ploilc amd Bttalion Hoadquartoro in QsdNhon was recommended during thin period. It is felt with tbe AN/R r46, the plan vii]. work with a ninimum of two relay ctations, one ofmbich is already establiutred at the An Khe IWitary Po-ice Station,

I'

S(U) S-ly Wanngont. DwbW tis npmtii periad,thm suppIy managemit technical inspections (pre IG) vve con-ducted b- the 8-4 on units assigned to the Battzlion.. The in-spectius incdicated that all -- its'were perfonming their supply mis-sion in a satisfactory manner, Dr..2Lng the period 22-26 Av$at 1966,the 'JSAW' Inspector Ge7wral conducted the annual 6eneirl Irnpection andindicated all uw ts were conducting Tupply management in a camiendablemanner. Due to rotation of &11 but one experienced supply sergeant, acritical shortage of trained supply personnel continues to exist. Withno anticipated gains, amn OJT progeam is being initiated at least threemonths prior to the DW of NW porsonnel.

2, (U) Maiike~aec )nagement. During this reporting period,the Battalion S-4 and "otor O'ffi.cer conducted a pre-F.nnual GeneralInspection on ali. unit- in t.,- Battalion. The results of these in-spections indicated thr.t all ,',its were in a satisfactory condition.Duri•ng the week of 22 Amust 1$6, the USAW Inspctop Gener4 conductedthe annual General Insrection and foimd a13. unit• pezforming their• : ms sl~m ktiefactorily,.

3. (U) Org•'izational Clathir• and Equipn.t.

CON FDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALSa. (U) Durf '.Th w F9 T pttYp 'iod a critical shortage

bf k4-ton trucks con'minue to hanmpr the mission of thV, inlit, "s a31 Oatober 1966 the Battalicn was short 11 - ton ",r1cks. With theincrease in operational missions and administrative requirements,it is imperative that thie unit be kept up to TO&E strength in vehicles.

b. Tie AN/VRC 46 and 47 typo r•dios were issued to Company"it" throu'i USkSC CRB during October and have been installed. Theradios for HHD, "B" Ccopany and "C" Company were in the depot atUSASC Q.ui Ndhon at the and of the quarter. Insufficent installationkits were available at this time.

SECTION II

COMAMERS OBSMV.rTIO4S PJD ECOMMMIDkTIONS

Tart I, Observations (Lfssons Learned)

:. Personnel:

Item: Intra Thoather Rotation of Key Personnel

Discussion: 18th Mflitary Police Brigade has a plan torotatr key persomel wthin the Bri-ade to a different ,',t7 assio'.af tacr six kionths in the connand. This v41.1 provide the individuaiconcerned with a broader Imowledge of the military police role inVietnam and train him in two aspects of tJ at role.

Obewwatiou: The program as laid eit has not bee ir d -favorably by ccmanders mho wizh to remain with their !ýAtz% for ayear to galz and give their full experience. Misso, staff officersand NCOs Prefer to zuain in the same Batta.alion for a complete tourrather than being trancfered after -Ix months duty. Awother apparentshorz coriLr4, Toased on & one tije bicident, is the reassigwnit ofa key menber ot • .he statf withnot providing either a replacmsnt orthe time to orient one.

B. (C) opratiog

Item: Evacvution of ?.W.

Discussion: The mission of evacuating ? .W. from separatebri ae or division PA.. collfting points to the ARWN Combat Captive(R) Camp II CTZ in Pleiku was assumed by tho Battalion. The missionwas assigned effective 4 October 1966 and the f- :st cc-r.,itme* filledon 6 October 1966 with the evacuaticn of 30 P.W. from 1st Cav-.1ryDivision forward CP on Operation TWAYER to Pleiku. Implementinginstructions for the evacuatirg unit (s) have not been issued as ofthis date. Fragnenta.y raessages coc crning documentation required,reports to be reenders4 and suggested methods of obtaining trans-portation have been received.

7

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALThese messages plus cxperiefince" T rhanung tne-zrst shipmentsresulted in the Battalion publishing its own Letter of Instructionfor Evacuation of P.W.. Through 31 October 1966 222 2.tl. have beenevacuated to the AM PW Camp by the Battalion.

Obervatianr Although the evacuation mission had beendiscussed at higher headquarters level prior to actual assigmentto the Battalion no Implementir4 instzcUbons have been pmblishedwhich establish a positive authority and reference to use when tringto rebo3•2v ,nmnt tt"on' reqirimntv with capturing units, standardreporting procedures and whoeisresponsible to obtain and furnish airor land transportation. The publishing of a Battalion IDI wasaeccmplished as an interim measure.

Item: Securing P.W. for Air Transportation

Discussion: P.W.s can be transported in cargo aircraftwith or without the troop seats in position up to a maximum numberof 120 P.W. in a C-130 aircraft. Due to the possibility of anescape attempt or panic brought on by persons not used to flying,the P.W. should be strapped in securely during the flight.

Observation: When using troop seats each individual canbe seated with his forearms resting on his thighs and the seat beltsecurel* fastened over them. Any attempt to get loose and the resulting5truggle can be noticed by the P.W. escort. When using a cargo plane

with out seats the P.W. are seated on"'the floor, legs out infront, and acargo tie down strap is run front to rear over five to ten individuals.This is cinched into place immobilizing the P.W.s. Any such methodmust be discussed with and approved by the aircraft cornander priorto flight.

Item: Pedestal Mounts on L ton Vehicles

Discussion: Highway patrol and convoy esr-rZ missionsduring tactical operations demand a capability £cr trowarting andcentaining enemy ambushes and sniper fire. Ba- .. rlion SOP requiresdual vehicle patrols with the rear vehicle arm(:d with a pedestalmounted machine gun. TOUE 19-35F does not authorize pedestal mountsand authorizes only (3) M60 machihne guns per company.

Observation: Pedestal mounts have beern fabricated fromsteel pipe and mounted on ¼ ton vehicles. Sal':aged tripods withthe legs removed are used to mount the M60. Sharp edges are tapedto preclude injury to the machine gunncr. Each unit has (or hzs onrequisition) eight M60 machine guns drawn on the ratio of one perfifteen non for use in a ground defense role. When not being usedin that role they give an increased capability to the aotor patrols.

C

CON FIDENTIAL

di CONFIDENTIALA modified TME is six p:ostal mountsand cght machine guns 1 r military police conpan:,

Item: Extra Radios AN/PRC 25 per Military Police Squad

Discussion: TOUE 19-31F does not authorize the AN/PRC 25radio. Each military police comp~my is authiorized 6 iN/PRC 6rndios which are unreliable both fr'zx a porformance and serviceabi.l-ity standpoilnt. The use of ANIARC 25 radios cn loan has enabledunits of the Battalion to establish radio relVy-. defile control,TCPs and other caio needs whore a vehicle is not required. It hasrcleabed vehiclos for road patrols and traffic cQntrol and othermobile requirements. This is important when it is realizod that each52 mam platoon has only I 1 tons assigned to it although its' solereason for being is to control traffic. This itea is beinj& staffedfor submission as a modified TO&E to the current TOIE 19-35F.

Observation: The AN/PRC 25 radio should be issued on thebasis of four per platoon, (12 per Company) to give each platoonthe capability for manning traffic points, radio relays and militarypolice stations without inraobilizinLu vehicles,

C. (U) Training and-Organization:

I'tem: Furnishing Personnel for"0M Detachments

Discussion: 'Although two TO&E 19-500 Provost MarshalDetachment teams have arrived in the Battaliod area of responsibilitythere is still a requirement to furnish vehicles and personnel toaugment these detachments. These augmentatiuns of personnel andequimnent are not TC&E and detract from the units capability toperform its mission.

Observation: !4M Detachment Ccmrnanders should review theirresources with the aim to better utilization of existing equipmentand personnel or additional TO&E 19-500 teams should be requested.

Item: Speciality Ulatoons

Discussion: Company "B" has ora,-mized speciality platoonstailored to fit specific cvntinuing missions. They have establisheda Combat support Platoon which handles convoy security on Highway#19, a Discipline, Law and Order Platoon which pirforns the townpatrol rissions in Pleiku and an Installation Security Platoon thatmans gateo posts on two installations.

Observation: This allows the Cram'nding Officer to tailorhis equipment and personnel to the mission. To provide variedexperience 25% of the personnel are rotated every 60 days.

9

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

the preferrtvi dutits.

D. (U) Into1Jjzenco%

Item: Clnarancq 6,f Indigenous PerIo lotmn4

Discuseion: Indigenous personnel hirod as KPs, laundre'see"tc. are requirod to hnvm a Mflitdry Socurity 4ervice Clearance issuedby Vietnamese authorities through Civilian Personnel Office.

Observation: klthough Battalion personnal have kept constantcheck an progress of clearances it takes up to five months to receiveone completely processed. It appears to be a case of understaffedoffices and govermnental bureaucracy.

E. (C) Logiatice:

Item: Motor Vehicle Maintenances

Discussion: Military police camitments are twenty four hoursdaily. D-ring this reporting periol "B" Company vehicles were totallycomitted every day. To allow for daily maintenance and repair the unitestablished a night motor pool shift from 1600-2400 to handle thevehicles being driven dut••g the day.

Observation: All vehicles hate received scheduled maintenanceon time and Immediate corrections of minor faults made vehicles availablefor the next duty shift.

Item: Armor Plating and Sa;Qdbagging of 1 Tons

Discussion: Twelve ¼ tons in each company are equipped withazmor plating (weight 600 lb.) and sandbagged flooring (weight 400 lb.).These vehicles are used in support of tactical operations and on high-,Ay patrol using lnimproved. roads,.' The crw-vnsists o from tw to threemilitary police and in some cases M60 machine guns.

Observation: The extra 1000 lbs of weight coupled with poorroads are having a detrimental effect on the life span of shocks,springs# and tires. When the ý tons so equipped are not being used inan area ihere hostile fire can be expected the armor plate and sand-bags are removed..

Item: Replacement Parts for Vehicles

Discussion: All units and detachments operate on a 24 hour-per-day basis with a requirement for continuous vehicle utilization;therefore many of the M151, j ton vehiclesare being driven inL excess

10

CONFIDENTIAL V

CONFIDENTIAL

of 4Z,OO0 ailes per no-tn0h. i •' ritf! conditions, the rate-t which parts must be repla.ced is frequent. This , was d' cusse4in the previous operational report and as of yet replacement partsare still not readily availablo. This problem continues to cause ex-cessive deadline tLme for vehicles and re duces the overall operatingefficiency of the unit. The Battalion Motor Section makes daily tripsto the direct exchange facility to ascertain the Povailability of "ariOsspare parts, but sufficient spare parts are not on hand.

Observation: There is a shortage of the following vehicle

parts

a. Hot patches

b. Spark plugs

c, Oil filters

d. Wheel bearings

e. Voltage regulators

f. lgaitAto system

g. Batteries

h. Fuel pumps

Cannibalization of deesElined vehicles is. not the solution to this pro-blem; however, detachments may be forced int•p this practice if they areto accmplish their mission. To avoid this practice, necessary partsreplacements must be made available at Ordnance direct support units.

Item: Shortage of J Ton Vehicles

Discussion: The 504th Military Police Battalion, sincearrival in Vietnam, had been given the responsibility of providingmilitary police support in tactical operations, POW escorts and lawand order in several built-up areas throughout II Corps area. TheBattalion, in accordance with its TO&E, is basically organized* andequipped to fully support tactical field operations assigne" Withthe ever increasing number of operations and conmitt•ents placed onthis Battalion, it is felt a shortage of (11 ) ý ton trucks is det-rimental to the successful accomplishment of the Battalion' s mission*Realizing this$ the unit should receive at least an 0 priority, if itis to successfully support cmbat operations. The unit has submitted.requisitions with appropriate follow-up action. In the last five months.the Battalion has received only (3) j ton vehicles a.% replacements.

11

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALObservation. l iu.*R|U of * ton vehicles arenot arriving in country for replacement purposes.

Part II, Recommendations

A. (U3) Personnel: That intra theater transfer of key personnelbe mde only if the imlividual desires or a greater need for theindividuals skills exteb elsewhere.

B3. (U) Operation:

1. That implementing instructions which establish authcrityand references for P.W. evacuation be published.

2. That the modified TOkE for issue of six machine gunpedestal mounts and eight M60 machine guns per military policecompany be approved when submitted.

3. That tl:e modified TO&E for issue of twelve iiNARC 25radios per military police company be approved when submitted.

4. That additional PM detachments, TO&E 19-500, be assignedto II CdZ to man Provost Marshal Offices currently operating withBattalion personnel.

5. That USARV Civilian Personnel Office initiate a procedureto expedite MSS Clearances through Vietnamese government channels.

6. That heavy duty shock absorbers, springs and tires beissued for arnor plated * tons or increased replacement parts bestocked for estimated future demmnds,

7. That support cc.inaands review their equiw .. nt and partsreplacement procedure to insure a more responsive sup, -t to userunits.

Xk

W'ILBUR D. GETZLTC, WPCComnanding

12

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRETAVI'GF (lb novrembcr 1966) 17t Ind3UI'J',C'C: Onerational Hc•rort f'or ýuarterly l'er.icd !Fnding 31 October 1966

(Rtcs Os--P.-65) (C )

Headquarters, 16th Vrilih;,ry Police 'Group, A10 1:,2),O, 2h :iovcnber 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of' Staff for Force Dcvelc:nmcnrt, Denartnent of theArmy (ACS'iOR, DA), Washington, 1. C. 20310

1. (U) The Onerational Report for Quarterly Period -ndin,, 3] October1966 of the 5O4th klilitar-y Police Battalion is attached as Inclosure 1.

2. (U) I f"el that this report is F:encrally adequate and the recor;-mendations valid. A summarization and specific cormments recarding areasof nonconcurrence are contnined in the following narara'rhr. All comrrentsare keyed to specific sect-'1,ns, pararraphs and sUb-parar'raphs of the basicreport.

a. (Section 1, para Al) The 5041th Military Police Battalionwas assigned to the 16th Ifilitary Polic6 Group on 26 September 1966. Nocfficial relationship e;:isted between these two units prior to that date.

b. (Section I, para B6) If the command overseas replacementprogram continues as in the past, this battalion will not experience apersonnel shortage.

c. (Section I, para Fl) This unit is authorized five supplysergeants and presently has seven assigned, three of which are 90 daylosses. If replacements do not arrive as schedujed in FeLruary 1967, ashortfall will exist.

d. (Section I1, Part I, para A; Section 1i, Part II, para A)Nonconcur. The Intent of the Intra Theater Transfer Program is to adjustthe DEP.OS im.balances within the units to preclude rotational humps andthe loss of a majority of key personnel during the same month. Theentire headquarters of one brigade, one group, and two battalions arrivedin RIM within the shortr span of thirty days. This infusion rrogram is aneffort to maintain staff continuity Aý all times and at all levels ofcerorand.

e. (Section .1, Part I, para P; Section II, Part 1[, para Bl)Concur. Directive type T'¢WXs with iinlementing instructions regardinp theevacuation of Prisoners of War have been published by the 18th MilitaryPolice Bfigade. The implementing data which has leen urovided the bat-talion has teen based on guidance received from brigade durlnn the interinPeriod of development pending publication of a current revision of US.A2.VRoegulation 190-3, Yilitary PoLice Evaeuat~icn of Prisoners of War. Th'sheadouarters continues to coordinate with the Provost 'larshal, IFiV, inan attempt to require conformance with existing refguLations '-y the cap-turing units rc-ardonr• thn necessarv docturentation of PT's. The problem

Lu1 1:[[. A ,P , REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

SEC, r/ , 3 WHEN SEPARATED FROM-t AS.IFI'rn IN,.-, O5 URES

DICiLAL$SIIFIED

AVBGF (14 November 1966) 1st Ind 214 November 1966SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ?,nding 31 October 1966

(RCS CSFOR-65)(U)

of arranging air transportation for PW evacuation will not be resolveduntil definite priorities are established. Definite guidance is alsorequired in the handling of PWs in medical channels.

f. (Section II, Part I, para E, Item: Shortage of 14 ton Vehicles)Nonconcur. Based on the theater requisitioning procedure, which was notfully understood by the unit, follow-up action on requisitions of 02 prior-ity which had been passed to Okinawa was neither complete nor effective.Requisitions previously submitted have been reviewed by t/he S-4 of thisheadquarters and appropriate priorities have been established. Follow-upactions are now being directed to the supporting 2d Logistical CommandDepot as appropriate.

g. (Section II, Part II, para B2, 3) Concur. Requests forauthorization to procure additional M60 machine guns, machine gun pedestalmounts for h ton vehicles, and AN/PRC-25 radios will receive favorablecmsideration by this headquarters providing requests are consistent withthe mission requirements of the unit.

h. (Section II, Part II, para B4) Concur. This headquartershas directed the sulnission of Modified Tables of Organization and Equip-ment for all existing Provost Marshal detachments.

i. (Section II, Part II, para 5B) Concur. The current policyunder which Military Security Service Clearances are issued by Vietnameseauthorities to indigenous personnel through the Civilian Personnel Officeshould be studied in an attempt to expedite the process.

J. (Section II, Part II, para B6) Concur. Recommend heavyduty shock absorbers, springs and tires for ¼ ton vehicles which use armorplating and sandbagging be introduced into the logistical system in thistheater. Based on experience gained over the past sixty days in the useof armor plating and sandbagging of vehicles used for MP escort, recommendthat those units utilizing armor plating be authorized a 30 day PLL stock-age instead of the current 15 day authorization.

k. (Section IT, Part II, para B7) Concur. The shortages of1 ton vehicles and the accompanying lack of spare parts within this bat-talion have great impact on the unit's ability to successfully supportcombat operations.

giCLASSIFIED

1, 7" UNCLASSIFIEDAVBGF (ith Novwmber 1966) lst Ind. 2L Norv~nr 1966SUBJECT: Operational. Renort for Quartnriy Pe rtod ndinU I Octo:r 1966

(RCS CSFOR-65)(U)

3. (H) The Commanding Officer, '.-Oth Military Police Battalion,has been provided with a copy of this indorsement for his planning andguidance. A thorough explanation of' all nonc urrences has also beenprovided.

UISJ. KEKASColonel MPCCammanding

DECLASSIFIED

17 SECRET

AV'BGF-K-O ovember 1966) 2nd IndUBJE.CT: Opzcrational 2oport for q.uarterly Period ;nding 31 Octobcr

1966, leport Control 3--rbol CSC'0R-65

HAD4.'LaT MS, 13TH •iILIT\RY I'OICE B.tIGADi], A.0 96307 22 December 1966

TO: Deputy Coimaanding General, United States Arny, Vietnam ATTI: AVC-DHAPO 96307

1. (U) The Cverational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Periodending 31 October 1966, of the 504th Hilitary Police Bettnlion is for-warded herewith.

2. (U) This ht-douarters hr's reviewed the report end the first in-dorsement, considers them adequate, gener-'lly concurs with observationsand reco-mendations and adds the following comments:

a. (U) Reference Section i, paragraph B3, page 3. Concur. Thisheadquarters has forwarded a-recommrndation to Headquarters, USARV re-questing that R & R promotional material be made available in larger quan-tities. The Brigade newspaper prints a monthly colunn concerning R & Rsites.

b. (U) Reference Section I, paragraph B6, page 3 -md pvragraph2b, 1st Ind. Concur with comaents of 1st Ind.

c. (U) Reference Section I, paragraph 12, page 6. The new AN/VRC'46 :-rd 47 type radios have been installed as of 5 December 1966.

d. (U) Reference Section I, paragraph F1, poge 6 and p-ragraph2c, 1st Ind. Concur with comients of 1st Ind. This he-dquarters has sub-mitted required personnel requisitions to US.LRV.

e. (U) Reference Section I1, Part 1, paragraph A, Item: Intra-Theater Rotation of Key Personnel, page 7, Section II, Part II, paragraphA, page 12 and paragTaph 2d, ist Ind. Concur with comments of 1st Ind.

f. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, parograph B, Item: PedestalMounts on i-Ton Vehicles, page 8, Item: " tra Radios AN/PRC 25 perEilitary Police Squad, page 9. Concur with comments of 1st Ind. Unithas been advised to prepare and forwarl, concurrently, USRTIV Form 47and a revised Section III (Eeuipmen*) to the MITCM submitted by the 504th3'? Batta3lion on 17 ]'ay 1966.

g. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph B, page 7, SectionII, Part II, paragraph Bi, page 12 and paragraph 2e, 1st Ind. Concur withcoments of 1st Ind. US/aV 2,egulation 190-3, now under revision will

REMASE, Confidential HQ USARPACI S-67- -L3R

when soparaited from qa13,,-

SECRET

j* CONFIDENTIAL-'

id ýW U -U, . W.

AVDGCW-K-O ('11, November 1966) 2nd Ind

SUDJ C¶T U, orationn!. Report 'or 'uarterly Period .nding 31 October1966, Report Control Sý,mbol CS?0R-65

elabor'ite on documentation requirements for capturing units, stand-irdreporting procedures and the responsibility for land or sea transportof P1's. It will provide definite guil-nce for hnndling of ?W's inmedical channels. Altho ugh no )rioritiei for FW air evacuation have beenprovided, the regulation provides thet transport of 50 or more PW's by air-craft will be provided within 72 hours of the request.

h. (U) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph E, Item: Shor-tage of j-Ton Vehicles, page 11 and paragraph 2f, 1st Ind. Concur withccments of Ist Ind.

i. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph B2, 3, page 12and paragraph 2g, 1st Ind. Concur with comments of 1st Ind.

J. (U) Reference Section II, Part Ii, paragraph B4, page 12and paragraph 2h, 1st Ind. Concur with comnents of 1st Ind. The ob-jective is to release the maximun number of operational military policeperacel fro administrative duties.

k. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph B5, page 12and paragraph 21, lot ID. Coticur with cnmmets of 1st Ind.

1. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph B6, page 12d paragraph 2j, lot Ind. Concur with ccmsents of let Ind.

m. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph B7, page 12 andparagraph 2k, 1st Tnd. Concur with coments of let In. Spare pertsand critical shortages are reported weekly by this headquarters toUSARV on the Periodic Logisticti Report.

FOR THE C04AMDER:

CPT, MPGAdjutant

IDE" CONF N u iD uNTIALJudi GVW" n oftesoo Ull~l•l~ 0 no siftl Iul

SECRETAVHGC-DI (14 Nov 66) 3d IndSUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending

31 October 1966 (acS CcaOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 2 2F 2 F

TO: Comander in Chief, United States AruT, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OTAPO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-LessonsLearned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 504thMilitary Police Battalion (Army) as indorsed.

2. Pertinent commouts are as follows:

a. Reference Paragraph B, Part I, Section II, Item: Evacuationof Prisoners of War, Page 7; and Paragraph BI, Part II, Section TI, Page12: USARV Regulation 190-2, Evacuating, Processing and Accounting forPrisoners of War, dated 20 January 1967, has been distributed to companylevel. The above regulation established responsibilities and proceduresfor the evacuation, processing, and custodial accounting for prisonersof war captured by or delivered to US Military Forces.

b. Reference Paragraph D, Part I, Section II, Page 10; Pars-graph B5, Part II, Section II, Page 12; and Paragraph 21, lot Indorse-mist:

(1) The problm of obtaining security clearances fromMilitary Security Service (45S) has been studied on numerous occasionsand has bee presented to MACV and the Ambassador'a Civilian ManpowerCittee on at least three different occasions. The Government ofViet ha (G(N) is steadfast in its requirement for the two sponsorsfor clearances of direct-hire Vietnamese mployees of the US Forces.They claim their offices are understaffed and there are great diffi-culties involved in running the equivalent of National Agency checksdue to the great migration of people as a result of the war.

(2) The Office of the Civilian Personnel Director (OCPD)has added personnel to the staffe of most regional MSS offices in anattempt to expedite clearances. The time required to obtain clearanceshas improved considerably in the last 18 months. In most lnstanoes thedelay in obtaining clearances has been caueed by the individuals them-selves not taking their sponsors to the ISS offices. It is difficultto believe that it takes 5 months to reeeive a clearance if the indivi-dual is prot in taking his sponsors to the )MS office.

f11(;8AMIu I'N(,SSLFIEL) WIEN •SEPARATED

L iASSI"'D INCLOSUIb2S SECRET

SECRET

AVHGC-DH (14 Nov 66)SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending

31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

(3) Action to improve the 1SS clearance system is a con-tinuing priority item of OCPD.

c. Reference Paragraph B3, Section I, Page 3; and Paragraph2a, 2d Indorsement: It has been emphasized to all ccmrnds that 100%utilization of R&K allocations is essential. An aggressive programhas been initiated, through promotion and command emphasis, to improvethe utilization of all authorized RPR areas. Additional promotionalmaterial has been obtained from RHM areas and has been provided to allunits.

d. Reference Paragraph E, Part I, Section II, Item- Replace-ment Parts for Vehicles, Pages 10 and 11; Paragraph B6, Part II, Sec-tion II, Page 12; Paragraph 2J, let Indorement; and Paragraph 21, 2dIAdorrment:

(1) The overload spring kit is authorized only for truckSton Ml 5AIG. This headquarters has previously requested modification

of the truck 4 ton M151.

(2) The problem of obtaining adequate parts supply isappreciated. This is a continuing problem that requires time and ex-perience to rectify. Heavy dnimands eventually re oult in grvateratockage by supporting supply activities. Incre, e of the unit PLLto 30 days as proposed will not provide the desi' I results but onlyfurther spread already scarce assets. The apprc tate interim solu-tion to this problem is the Red Dall lxpr*-. Pr %..aa.

e. Reference Paragraph E, Part 5 ction 11, Item: Shortageof j Ton Vehicles, Pages II and 12; Paragia;- 97, Part II, Section II,Page 12; Paragraph 2K, lst Indorsement; and Paragraph 2a, 2d Indorse-ment: Theater receipts on -eplacement 4 ton trucks have not beenadequate to satisfy all requirements. However, recent receipts havealleviated most priority requirements for this vehicle. Follow-upactions noted appear appropriate to resolution of the problem experiencedby the 504th Military Police Battalion.

19

REGRAPOM r'crAS1F2rDI)CLO1U• fl

F~ROM CLASSd LD Jl[ NCLOSUI~JIý SECRET

4 SECRETAVHGC-,DH ( 14 Nov 66)SUBJECT, Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending

31 October 1966 (RCZ ?,SFOR-65)

f, Reference Paragraph 2f, 2d Indorsement: The action statedis the appropriate action to be taken. Reference'1 MTOE was forwardedto USARPAC on 8 June 1966.

FOR THE COMWNDI:

R. J. THORNTON

lot U, AGCAuo Aditant GCam

20

:0.1ikA. 1.1"SECRET