T'1]L.,

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FO R L 1.5 JUNE 1980

A~r~~:ssT!!E

"UYN 'T)N ST A T 1: 11, 0OF TE 7 L IP E -AL P 10T Y

e meet at a vital timie, not only tLor our Party, bDutP lso for- our nation. The. hazards conf ronting the freedomof -peoor and! nations ha ve increased smnce the year bhegan.The hilstoric~illy invaluanle- influence of countries in

*tic lpest- to thi'e cause of- iman hryi e gi nechiallen.ge. It- J.s a chlallenge wnoc-,-f not fced now~and. succesfully surmi.ounted., hnas thei potential to* 'J-nvus at so-ne tim in the future, tevi.ctorie's Ln values

A- aw freo hat we seek! for all future g'enecrations of*-Australlians. It is a bout the nat-i. ure and extent of t!-.at

challense ane the .di-mension of ou r response that I want to*Snea:t to you today.

s thie !-ari knows, on C'ristm~as Eve-last year, Soviettrcoop carr -r ailrcraftr star -ted landin-,t~au arpotT o eay s later, 5,000 Soviet troops had ta'e= over '.{aiul.

?rsc~tAmin of Afgh-anL-,tar, wa-s ki ,lled the rext- daiy.Dy New Yer' s Ev,40,.00 trooo-s -ere fanni.ng out acrossA~chan*Lstan to seize control of iiia-lor to-ns. The newS o v ie installed presicent of Afghanist-an, -ir Babrak'aralj,'i cle hi.s-" first appearance on :a-Falbtl television

.screens.,.o.n 'New Year's Tay. To y fiv ant-hl flnlater S~5,000 Sovie t troops are locke d in conflict acainst

a 'alant national res',s!-nc canan thiat seems tonavuntc6sgifcn elements of Aga oit.T

s say lha.-t- te S ov. e t Un-,io n is Inc t 2 a rd i ;s ac t In b ru tallo. nt to e -,ya r, in ractor-,c. IL Ls merely describet.e acs.Thninthe Seco -TTorld. !par, the na"-zis ie

out t-ho :le male po-nula-t -on oil a Czechoslov-akiLan vil1lage',-s so e ~0 52C)0 m en I te 10'ol C I i7se d w-!or d r 2 co ile d

in horrocL. Yet n o w it iSr-otdo vd e rovidb; h- '.y~~nand. ch. Ir!ra e z- o survivcd, hat *.lOvertwi.ce iat nL!.--ber werQ iurCdi"cold"-bl)ooC, and' un'erRussian s-upervision, in the .A-fghlan vi lag-ie of- !erala.

1.icrc a -f already over ahlf :lion refu-ees in ais.nocole-2. hve f ouncl con t ions ini:olcrable Lin th-elr

own cr.-1S'ry. !t iLs feare that thle couldV~cz.r! se to one :i.llion.

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The-se cra!matic eVe-cits Mada fun laTmnntal :eassessmentoE idl accente-d Th.estcrn and Third .!orld ),rcpti onIS

an assumrt ons conzcern lng securit and deat;perc,-pt on~srn (a -ssessmcnts -hc zve been co -,fortin, an(. lulti1*n-

in t-1e- r e ffcct, but tko some extent have rc~lected -*J-shicultih£ rathler th an hadanalysis..

in a re~taddress to t'ie Ai--er~can Society of New!-spaper~Ytors -ashLns-on, thie former Aimer;_can Secretary

of StLate T'r 1{er ss in-.er, when arnirg- that a dangerigo ed s a de. '1 nvi ted, argued that:

T happen to a-ree wi.th President Carter,that the danger to A-merica is the gravestof the modern period".

Events in Afghanistan have given us a new example ofthe *Soviet Union's commitment to achieving great militarypower, pursuit of is ambitions. 1-istory since 1945conf-r-Ms that, where the Soviet Union perceives the

ot~otuniy fo an dvane, te concern for peace is*inst-ani-tly out aside. Rem,-emb-_er thne invasion of H'ungary:*n 1.95: thep Berlin IWall in 1961; the Cuban miss Ie crisi.sin 1952 and the invas'.on of CzechoslovakiLa in 1963.

It was the invasion of Czechoslovak;,ia that?.res'c'en_ T-rezh,-nev sou,-h-t to justify t-hrough- whatC is no,,,n ccen as tEhe PBrezhInev doct-rine. W,7hat is pernicious aboutthe '.rcz'anev doctrine -1s the imnos iti.on* of.. Soviet: dominilance,

*In thie guise of rcndc1er~ing ass i. stance.. The, fact is tiat~t ;s thie Soviet itself 1Yhi rlci~des when "assistance"s toe iven.

I n deed th rezhnev doctrline-vitrtually assertsta,C onee.cutry hoas becomie Socialist,- assistance will

gi o* -ae sure Iiat it. remains so. But' the i nvi t-ati-onsto..I Ttc6rVene, alleaedly to provide assistance, are issued

Liy p pet eaders. Notwithstanding, the ntblt ntens'on created by Soviet behaviour, attemnts at detenteHere C:ee trougkhout the 70s. But it so eaeparent-ha In ci~ Ef detente by the West was not- shared by

*.the cvi.et Union.'..

It Is :.ortant to n pa c' *the parcel of ittcm- -labelled"tnt"n*telast (cade,' and to dist i~n<uL sh wha t

;as be, neFicial and SOLund from what was illusory. Whia ti,1;ny -'eo!nle failed! to rcalise w.as that the Sovie-t Union.

(I no t accept.that deteonte precluded tChem ro any acti5on-i tat -*ol avnag thn in thie Th1-i rd -!orld, or in theworl at arg-e.

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st 'o mtCem, ctl rr'Ia tn a r IL n c F, La

;turo) nn,.'a UniteC cti~ n- rhc eh vat oL

s 'rL1.,s.ce1 ne, niavc h- ~~v2 Uni.ori

pur)'(e .cy of un1.r.(!c co t oni can c' O C) t 111 S,,3c? 1 ~opCenly seh o Fiurther .tr. 1 wipluj~ r yr, b.subers i.oT, C' th ovi s. i.on of rthe 1.,se? oL surrogyat-s J.n .An-gola,Etoia o> 1 en

Of. cours:?, the most recent and m.-ost brazen eximn,1e hasbeon ij.n A.fS~iani.stan, whiere -he Soviet army th2 largest

*and1 most po'w.erlul land army thlc w-orld -has been used*to invadle a dlefenceless ThirdLc \'orlcd cou~ntry. This Indicates

m ost cl-:harly 'how lon-h!eld Soviet *ambitions can be suddenly*real2.seewhe an opportun*: Ly pre sent s itself.

For in 14,whIen Hitler macle overtures to Stalin, oneof7 the )riccs set by Stalin for Russ-an friecndship, wasa recog-n I- Lon by the -;err.1vns that Sovi-et- "national aspirat Lons

*centre sout~h or the nat-onalterorofteSvt*Uni~on the direction of the Indi-an-Ocean".

In the 1li:;ht of suha sttonthe Sln-aoorc Foreign*li sl-tr s per~iaps very. i;iuch on tar:-7t when arr'ued

*rcently thant there vas -no!thLng- sur;-ras Ln,- about theiL \'Let Sora y into Afgh'anistan.. Rather, he said, w ha t

Was surp)ri's ng: tw.as the "gull.ibillty of non-Communists".

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Thereo~v tonof the -rue i iurc of th sta1 itaioot i ou b y t11c 1. nv as i or-Q AEC ;,hnni,;.s nC S nan 10 ~rim t :!ull I Iv As a resl, x

nfva 3 1- on, A-.1:;ctU~ o S1 JCC?CL Lf ovvn',

Z, t0 C rea ti n of- a1 C'n stte

*acloser prox--*r,*-aiv t: .Th n Indian Ocean. resa

access to a It 0r )at.v3 ba se s for strate7c, ,:ircraj-tshould the USSR. dlesire

an ability to deploy troops+ across the Pa'kistanibord.1er

*an inherent abltdpniguo h pye of**airrat that may be deployed, to provicee tactical*air support over the Persiann Gulf, the

Arabian Sea, and thIne Eastern h,,alf. of Saud'i Arabia*

*thie inherent ab~lit--y tEo po v ie a IL m.it e d ai-rsupport to the Soviet Inc.,'an OCcean squadron.

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tab;- yI, -Vnot only ~n Sct!") s Aslia, "hut also i--n tlewri -cnecra-lly, has becen uind!erminc,'. It iLs now~ Up to-

all np.i-ons, and all people Ocdi.cntedl to freedor:., tod-c 1 -'ithey can, silngly or coll ectvLy to e' the

.,ov t U.n .on any furca--er o-proartunity, w'ehrin *-herTbird !world. or in t-ho world! at lr

~erettably, the worldi is no lon-er a s i.anv t hocu -hit i tto ras many wantec' to see- it. Thie Soviet invasLTon0 of. Af Thistan has s!-ock ed the "est and mnovel r- to reassesits a g+ mp t:i o s ab1)out,1 s ecu rit in(Id det ente. As a resul!-of thiis, in t11he court of world" o-)in*,on, the Sov:.et invasi.onof A.fgh-nis tan stands eeci*si.velvw coricle;7ned. by v~rcountries and by the TLhi-rd "2orld countries.

!C jIj cS*on A IWn~L is O -1"iA

J;Vn. 1:ic.wz cv' idr cd>: )r Le U ~.it O1ron'Defence on 2 .\irg.1thsy:.{.wne ht: Tvt

o n c C' nLl c L to !'7ac o; or. tie to S usp 'In fs h' 2 1 Z Ln fu r th e r crnuat r i. es an." Dilh r c! Y

-i a.nt o s L s F orce.

i L a r uecd tw t'v oh i of i2 s -!rliv f or 'Sov .n HL lec-TceS s to 0iv 1 a n r e uce r ist the. luence and cl se2curx.t\ oF teres.Thie Ikiodof this I~s rar

aa resu)L o f c t ac tht r) s w er e hei.mad e at deet w the Sov' c: Union, the balance o_1

*strateg.;c -iitr -aaiiy shi f ted steadily to Thei rult-imat-e ad.vanz.tage.

T'hr oug-h the 70s, Soviet mli'taqry spenlinog averagecd between11 and 13 percent of CGAP, wh-i.le th-Ie. coe.oarable f igurein the USA has been 5 percent_. Asa result, trained military

manpower, available to Soviet Union, exceeeds that

a -,a1le to the Unted cStates b over 6 milI4on

*SovLet. rudfrcsotnihrtoeo the LISA by nine*o one: t-hese diiin r uprted by tankcs, m issiles

anO. nrti.llery whi.ch collecti..ely owtnme teUAba factor of two t.0 one.

TV- tl'i. s coi,oar.;-son on to he NATOP/'Thrsaw Pact milt taryoa Iance e Fi*.ne thatim the !-arsa.~ Paict 'has a marked superiorityver "-XTO alli.es. IT hms over 200" d4vi sions. that

*could. P, o:pl d-n-ried, MA TO has about 100. The Wa-Irsaw.Pact ar-,-ar, en:t includecs 3,000)% tankrs compared with Z"ATOw C-6 a 1 teover 12,000 Tae !-arsaw Pact f~orces have5,000 .com!at planes at tlheirdso4 >AOjs over

I he. 1or A tl-nti c. Treat- Organisation has over thieyes*repeat2l -w..Arned of t'he dangers of the unceasing exp

ane p r ove:n n of1 S ov;. ii. 1 i t ary ca )nailI ti.e's a ncG ur ge d.the-'%:est to enhzmncc its own ec>ence efforts in res-eonse.

i v. 1975 te.\0MntralCouncll expressed concernat the hLhlevel of m-.litary expendliture by the'- Sv e t

~union an('th cont-inued hc ru.eiL' expansit.on of h.ii Ltary oe of theC rarsaw- ?n.,ct on land, air and! sea,whih theCrunc.I l noted, '.Vf'Icltoreoc

t."th theI avot-.--d dlesire of ~'So'V.et Union to i.inoroveFast-'West relati.ons.

V hase sentiee-.nts were expressed aaain at the Londlon NIATOn 1.977 and at the- 1. 19.79 and 98 councl

CAI r.ATnn, sters hive clea-rl,; foreseen th po sp2c I" o FSoviet ni ita',rr~i~ht hreten.n3tnh sta5i.lity of' jhe

m' I-;tnry h-alance .,tr all'leveis conventional, nuclear,A.e fcus, 'r oss com a ri s o ns of' t his:,

:{fCdo no' cons .de(rat ion ELI~ar fctorsand r.lttti.ve dij-fFlerences hecenforces on both sides.

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WC21S0j. extent of Cl- arin-s bnu .le-uro: becausfe

of S ovi. c s in I le.'anc o r, c zne A f -anw n 'insu und er I c2 T.ost ermohrC.:ca I T" Ji r2a I~ ty oft2Or!

to bDe Co::plA'cCrnt. Ov re. nations o'Ierespnc~ th chal Y' C)f Xfthmstan cris is i i

.2 a c rutic al( et.e r 11 1n Ilt 0 1,o'.G C seur t' 0or (i C C 2sto c .e.

A ga n st L- s o f crucial s i nfic nc e a nd i s vitLtht it"s lesssons bo learnt ancd apied. I suggestL1 te re

*are six b,-asi;c lessons:

First, )greater uni.ty and cohesion among' the alliesof the Unlted States JAs essential; and a muchrearier degree of consensus'needs to be developed

among, all those who value national independence.

.Second, we must maintain absolute clarity andcertainty in our 's:i.nals to the Soviet* Union,in order that our interests and- the l~mits of

.our toleran-e are not. mi.sreaci by MNoscow.

.Th .rcl, new levels -of dfence preparedness. mustb latevec! an a ntine in order t-o

th-a t mnajor Western c ountr e s dIo not see th-eir*interests as be-C:Ln. confi.,ned to Eurooe and its

u~~ediateenvitronmient.

Courth, chainnels of communication miust: be keptopnt0. W

4 F..ifth, W..estern countries must continue to -striveto~r arms control agreements wi-th the Sovi.et Union,but they must so reco,-,nsin-g that th ey can

.only.succeed if thle necesssary political pre-conditions

*They cinnot succeed as long- as the Soviet UJInionvrs~sts wi~th a concer,!t ofL (Iet entI-e whtcch- alloWsfor the relentless qc-vuao of eaons indthe: r uin%-.nh!.ted deplo-c: ent in Thnird WJorld'(1 dsputes.

t, !'cten countr s nust attend to srnteinthei lik it iz-rIlcd countr.,e-s tter

*parts of the world, WhiLle recog-nis ing, the piartcularprolei-s and needs o[ SuIch countrit-s.

*Such an annoroach miiust be pursuedI with resolution andsteadIrfastness, over what maIy 62 quilt a Ion,-, period! oftmre. Elut 'th*!s approachi offers tiao best prospect of aroa1.Ls't-c a-cccmmo'ati-*on 'q1,h oscow.,. It offer-s the bestp oportun!ty of con'il.nul"igpece The Australian Govcrn;:!enth o IC!s C;irMly to thle. view that, tths time,* it is vital

Qto st !n d V)t ou LI r 0 ar all.ies.

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The Covern;;,imtn faced in J.ainulv a clhallenge -t'hrit: involved

*n our bt-lateral. p.l >s wihthe Th.v.,i Union:

.i area of ou wtnor a or, C rien1s

r t~area of our c' aEcnce spenrii*.-n;, J'n zenc e

W~t ren~c toour -t-tw~ elations, on Januar 9,*the Governu'.ent annou-nced. a nvirof cdecisions Lnr-'-,edC

to b r ing.h to the Soviet Ujnion and its people anexoresstion of the strongest rpossi4 le opposition to the

-Sovi-et action in Afghani stan.

In th'e area of trade, Australia has acted in concertwi-th other grain exporting nations in support of theUS action tolii grain sales to the Sovet Union. '-Je

*are a so supportin- the lI.*st of h5.gh% technologyv items*which N,'orth Ami-,erica, Japan and'2eter Europe arree s Ii-ouldi

h su~ecto export control.. ave curta ilecd s cientfc

cultural and hi.gh level official exchiang'es wihthe Sovie-t-Uni:on. "Je have curta,led t -he operation of Sovi. fishingprojects and cruise snI--s in Australian waters.

In seu to act Ln. concert w.,2th our maj-or allies, t e-sovern~:ekil had hoped to secure !Ais-ralia's sunnort foran Olymp.c Cames boycott. It its a matter oE great regretthatr thec Execut,ve of tlie AutainOlyrnp-c 17'dceraltton saw

i!th over 60 nations staying. away from the Ca-mes, reprcsenti.ngaor thn half th e w:orld s-oultote world' s re jection

o f S t -behavi.our has been formally re-Lstereed w iththe S6viet leadership.

P ut u,;hatever. h nature of the s.i~nal being sent- to tleSoviet Union, the Austra-li.an La' 'or Pryhsdsu Lfcitself from-any' cred-I.t-- for the c-ollecti.ve drive bei-ng exerted'by indepenrviently minded count-ries in the edefence ofLfreeedom.Indecd, the ALP fi-ts l:well the critLicisn -nade bySolzhecni.tsyn that:.

"TeU-s4 smplydeoes not wa,-nt to believe t-'iat-thle t-ie for sacri-fi.ces arr Lved..

*The AL? SC2!7:S to bongT-~c to ,ha,,roupT, of people ;hio inv ent-reasons Eor 'oelicvino tlhaU the Soviets do not ;mean whatthev' say: p-coleI w,,ho inv tc2 o thers to ignore wh;at t-he

SoitUin osTeALP F, p rt o f th at b o dy c, people

lhinch, C wI ;'Ile .voiciLn- codmaio W the invasion of'Af-hanistan, opposes virtually eve~ry move deidt~omah e that condlecna!: [on efc .e neople who ciaL iC-1that, int thie i-ntI-ceest s oi Fd ct ente c, must turn a blindI eve. to 'ovi(-t

*.ad-vances is somr~e alLe geVdly remote or strategically.S C-'s enF ca n a r 0n of the rld.1

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Tn~.edsenor Sokei.~n in Lthe Lal >or Party have sa .ur I~ Cht In Crur C, the r' C. oF t s r u*

tat t'.ere ,,as no threat to AuIr2l*,i~ Iro!-n event-s -*n

A. .A s t a n 5s1. 5,(i)G h .nc tres from t~C~tntr."~'~~ul~y smis a l Cl ov er

G,00c h~ L recs fr o A Crl.1a

A.ndc !-Cl '1inc -lnntae&~sf ure t:o r as p th-ehienby a ed sms eort n Ja nuila ry t'isyer

.'(Afgh,-an i s tan) far away from our area of*nterest and Aust[ rallia is not threatened..

*afterall who would want' Afqhanis tan?"

his s re nsct of N'eville Char.'ierlain's stateren

in Seotember 133 Hlis response to the naonfCzechoslovakia w.as that itwas simply:

quarel ina far-away country betenpol

whof whom w e n ow n oh r is a littleover 1,000 kidoimetres froma London).

_Rut wha-it tis worse, the Labor Par-y 'has sought to undermine.s sup P0rt for- tie IJnited' States of Ameri.ca in a calculatedI

-nul o t'he- priority we mnust- ,i;ve to frcedom defence.2rKayen has accuse' President Carcter of electi.on yearDoIi:tics, as if ZMr Cart-cr hiimiself had engineered the

Sovet nvasion.. Presum~ably, 'he would have an equallysu~erficLal but different_ 1'ana-tlon for [~rs Thatchner's

*rcsnonse, since her <-ove-rn.cnt has only recently been,elected.

An--Cnaa hre he Tru-_eau -overnment- has been

Outsoh i:.e.n its sunport of the boycott, that, decisionwe as not ce unti.l after the Canadian election.

In contrnst- to.. M!r llaycien' s Nositilon, as recently asa31, r Ja.m es -C a1. 1a 'a n the Leaer of the British LaborParty ancl for;:er Pri-ie i:inistc-, slaid:

".(71e Sove.t UnIon) ha ve raised, by theirown act, ons, grave doubts-.c aso 'how far the-yw..ant

IwoulrI f i.ne. hnard to nam2 o Ilea er of any other d:IcocratLcparty w .ci hns been so outs-oZE.-n in his oppositi;on to

an lypi hocot s he eair2rof the Austrailia-n L.-)hor0-jipc'-oro, sLcLalr t

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17 NTa Z~e aland as recr-1x ji 5 o'oc Ln'hoijr ?Pa r'v ar:,wt< tlt !-,)e~3shu

c onpir; p a3t C- nc ~S

r in spi. t- of: e 'Z c a ].an rr! andComln.'?C-wus .\soc iton t'?.VOL;.n 'o o ol

tour !ealifl! a;io 2LIa:.~ tnc!ng. frcr,o~ teseare cnnoeists).

Thiis bri-.ngs m-ie to a scerious poi-nt. Australia is ntowI isol a t ednf our re-ion. China, japan, Soutlh Hiong, Ton-,

*the Phili.opines, Thaiand, \Ialays-ta, Sinr-,apore, Inclonesia,Panua ew Guinea, 1iji and de f acto New Z ealIand w;Illnot be attending.

In -decidij*ng to attend the Noscow G-ames. Australia isv~~.rtuially alone in the region in company wtih onlyC~us

Laos, Cmmnunis'c Vietna-, and! Comr.up.. St 1ort-h :orea. 1l ave Lo say that I fi-nd- that a shameful and! repugnantpositlon to De. in.

Auistralla, as an i~ndenendent nation, v?,th an unqualifi'edrecord .n d"efence ofI lbe r I-Y and' th1e righ1-t to be free,)hais n neced and "houndlen tlutv to s upport o the-r f ree andine.eppnclent nat ons. T o to Cio so is to deny ourhiustorv. Moreover, as an ally *oF the USA, Australia has

*a sneChIfic ac! urg-ent necd Zo su~port the world' s greatestfree -)ow.cr. ofc of these -rouncis stancinn, alo-ne is suiffi__c~nt_f~or a boycott. 1"oth tog-etheQr represent an overzihenmingar~ument to '.i1.'h1ch .it Ls not- too late orteAForeso.

I isV~rdto understand!, thien, h ow the Executi';e oftile A~id7 e:erci.Ln- their inclenendent ih to maadecis'*6-h3 have decided to plo-ce tl-iec.r oercci.ved cdutyto the tnternational Olynmpic m~ovement: above their duty

*to Australia, and to ?-usrlans.

Thie.Crovernr,-er2t-, has always accepted tlie hi-gh priority-'that r;:s bie ziven :In our national life to young people

and the r p urs ut of ecel Ien c cn all things, in c 1udsno:t. '7e il coninme to act unon this priority. 'Lr

advocacy ofE a boycottr repriesrents our support of a hi.-I eroit T or, -IS t' Svit uan ric'htis act-Ivist andi

Noel Prlizewi .nne r, Andlrei Szikharf has saiLd:

"The broade-st Possible boycott of: the Moscow OlY;. csnecessary.

"very spectator or a thl.etLe wo comes to the C Iy c swll b vjn' ndrect: SLl-nort Lo Soviet 1militarvpolici es"

auh- prospect. ~s utnh

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W-~icvcr hiold 'n L~i ;orld has on w.i.ll he rNICem~ iorc scc- ;iy s~n.2a stirviort, oE an C.miaco2.I dio no!- o e c, e ra i a wh i cot'n-rv lke s~rali -j can d. ~btIdo 110t mis

t£L~r. r re ie-.c thoe o watto A~ Aus t ra i.aas hav'jjr ngnoj Wec in thei r-orld. Th'e fact i S thla,-

'nve a voicc andi~' canra, a cnrbtontoward!s2h volution of a coa,,non sLratery.

klvcer tle past -rL*v? moontc-s, my Ministrirs arid. I have s o u h-o do :wh:-at could' to-( contributec to-.;areds a stron-er

-Wester-n allianca!, unde-r thc ).eadcrshi'.-n oi': t Unitetas;anc! w.e I1-ave diSCuIssed witlh courntries in our regilon,

andri in, Europ2, the consequences of Afghanilstan. have*argruedl the need for closer co-operation and consultation.

Our commron objectives req~uire that countries whi1ch valuetheir national independence speak wiLh strength supported

*by aequate defence capab-ili ties.

In thi s* 'ee t ~TA'.10 Is (Jeterrninti.on already e viJ.e nce dbe fore th-nvsono Afgh,'an;istan to modern~sc andstrength1-en -LLs theatre nuclear weapon systei-m and conventionalforces!-, is important.

For i.ts part, the Uni-ted; States. is p ropos..n.a real1 increases.in defence sne ov(er thenx ieyertlnit cummlat-ivelv -o more Ihan 2)0' a-)ove thle current level.

*The thaIrcl nspe ct o f ou r o n response concerns the d ef-_n.c er.ecl silons an-nounaced -n dIetail byv ';Illen on March

Thseinoveth aising of our ow..n level of nat1:ional.defe1nce rnP_.reoeiness; Zncreased efforts in decfenceco-operation with tfr;.endlv nations in our re a ndt)rac I mesues in support of the UniteStes

ly inthe Indian Ocean area.

Under tie five year defence programme announced -y th eCove rn;-en t, t!ere il be an average increase Ln defence

pe 1-uzre of -or annm., in real t-er-s. Total de fencee ex p cnr! tu r P i n 1934-3)S i'.s exeeactec! to reaich albout 37.

of ros Doesxc i'r'htt:anr' defenice *xpndliiure i.n.19PS s exopected' -o shiow. a real increas2 of 5/ above

the 19-79-30 level.

.m r~rmecalls forf an increase Ln expcnditure on*capitaL, Lte'n;-s. Siri ,ou ca--me to governimcnt, expenditure

on zvta oI ;Le ms Lias r isen f rom 3. 3 of totcal defenceexpnc.trei 1975-7r) t-o 91.most 1.6'1 in 1979-30; and

xtwilr'sc to ovter 2571 by 1.934-85.

.For at'. island contlne-nt si..cn as Au st ral1i.-, looking- attwo oceanns, maritiJ.mc su~rve.U~lance. is of creflt _mportnnlce.norde;r to steghnour capab i.l'-ties i. 1L t:heC a J.r

wo w~L.l d.ouhk- ttb Orl.on surve;.llance 'hours flon,and increase t1he -num!iir of crews availahl--_ for

1'2)

aircraft so t'L.L li.e r theseair-'0.1.be eru'rpc Y arponr anl 2S 'L 7)1)Ln 2S .C~

Whien launche i c h horzon, range ofship, tie I.aroon _1 ss? as devastating

?zcuacy~.in~ ~~cev-2sse-zls.AW a rang-e o ZIO

lo-,e!-r cs.

w wil a c cure 735 ta7zCtcal11 L ~r s

-2 uj ol ug ra de o, r I aircraft to enable themto-carry preci~sion g.ided wear)o ns.

Yor the avv:

'je have decided to acqmire a Eourth F.71 guidedmissile fricgate Fromn the USA, and negotiationsave already been cormol,)etecd for this, and ord!ers

DlaCed.

'.have alread y orderedl one underway repleni;shmentsl-vip to-be built at' Vilc'krs "lock in. Syd'ney, and planto orcjter a secondic, also to be built In an Australiansh11p y ar

Iot tese will provide fuel, oil, stores ancl .:eaDponslrships at sea.

eplan to order a further ten Fromantle classoatrol boats, Ln aeddil-on Ito 15 already on order*wivich are 1)ein- bLilt- -n Cairns.

In. ordr. t o s treng th-en our capa'licies. on land:

U& have constituted1 th~ Third Army Task Force inTownsville as a ready renqtion force,.capable

of in uport on shortL notice.

Weare 'gigto up-trade the Army's fire-:po!-eryaccutrincg m ee Uu i 1551nr, calibre long-range weaponsadmore mobile anc 1li11-ier 105mm weapons.

in performanc.:, rrr. e anr1 rate OF fire, theseaethe very se .n teclinolocvy.

1.1 D*1.,ln tCo acqju:_-,c some~ 2,000 four- a-mr2 ei ght-t o Cn t r u cks order, we -irc sekin,.h.ghproorton local production.

Tn j:st-a-tnlent to t'i Parl* i-un in 7clbrua cy, one of fthe*Mae 2s,:r;!s Loresl-adotoed 'ur period ofl the fve year

(~efflo2 po-;rvm ~nsan ercans*-o from 22,O in the- str'~n-,h oV the Arm'y hr~servc.*

13

oJ ren.'lo'dn' n to Sr E- C) rs or( r, to r r; lY,.,jthe reserv, uLs up to fullSrfl~ by

4hc !1i11dc1-i- of0 1981. -ur Lid~~3t~ s tha-- jc t!'usi enlargethenu:~!,: rof A us L ra,1. an S Uri LnC0 for I.ta'sevc

So thtc:eis a bi.C cr nucleus, an. ayLne uclu(anc' T swis to st ress vcuo'-er round' l. fulrt~cre xrp a n s.on c o ul t1 k (12C t.r au.cl e. Lc evoltof s Lrategc p rose o SeCLS 1S, 0n rcg i n o Lutre pa n s -onofL t rrt fi ourc of 3Qfc would. rcs'r te re serveto thne levoLs at~~c cy s!tood at- t-e e-ry 71 7sb)e f ore they! 1-7re woun, 1y our Ditcloonns

The- reasons for embar!z ing on t his px-..ansion can be distilled*into one simple fact:; which 1-s that, at a time wheninternational uncertaintes are greater than for manyyears, lhe proportion of young Astlin trie Lomilitary service is at: Lts sm:allest for thirty years..The nation must. face th e implicai ons of this situation

*squarely.

It reflects a trendl, whi-7ch if 'allow"ec! to continue, would*weaken our security. Indeed, i f we di-*d not halt such

a trend, we would ri.ghti'v s ta n condenr..ned by generati-onsi~n the future.

A.art o' th-is s aIr ead"y undrlc, ay, i ln nto or-pnlse reception, trai~ncn5, ec;ipment, stores andsuror)ort, cabeo corrc.~~aninraei the reservestren-!-i. The Govern;'ent has stressed, that reserve traininq'requ:._res not only dcedicated off.i-cers and.. and. woi-men

ho rus -give of th-eir own. time; but also, it requiresan approor.ace cou.~etby the permann Lo.. e Limel

a Io ng tI adequate ec-Li-p oment. and support.

the Go~e-rnment is d.etcrilned that these provisilons shallbe Cae. lan or k4e r %t-o a thie yo u n r-2c r u. Ls a ma jo r

*advertising cpmpai,-n will be underta!ken. Rlecent Indicat-ionssuc-cst tliat maniy ycoun people are wL ,ilin- to coc-.e forward

toserve the -cou~ntry oy unclcrtalkirv traini-ng in C -he ArmyR~eserve. A h.-earten.Lng en.ml of this is trevi.1valof intrtinuvrs r;mnsh c reflec,- (groWing

creed.t'- on., and. an incr ?ased.! sense of respcnsi.- !-ty in,*Australi'a's youn- people.. ItL; re-dresents an encouragt.-ng

pe rc-pt ton a nd'2 a a- elcc-c srcnse of aw.,areness of thie dangersn the or.2sent- 4ntcrnat-onia. order.

Te nho:r n! cn t isdte<ne o su:)port ;Its ef encernr' 1 ~sWithI propecr *Ln119rstructure f'acjilJ.-_t.1s.

*Coe::Vurn Sound' naval b)ase faclitie will he imnorovec!nordler tZo supemci Opo'.nsand! beeort i ng,

indl later ho:.ic ot~; of- ship,; opera:In:; i.nthe Ind~lan Ocenn..

./14'

14

to C--rounoc f ac J.lte s furel s tor ag a n- 1einon

A o cn air fi.r l: ,q-1l be -1 flc o fillthe'.ap he tween Loeart-,oni-h and Dnrrw.ri-1

1P a ar o 1 boat faiiisat Dnrw,,in an-d Cairns arebigupgraded.

The Grden Islan dckar in jyne Lsbt~

n~OdrflS-r inore to support our Eleet andalwre-fit .,ork. to carried! out ono,. r vessels

Va Te ~IlI ia ms t o.4n dockyard, where new destroyerswill be built later in t~ie decade, will be upgradedand miodernised.

A* n widened and more secdire defence communicationssystem is being installed.

Of course, all of this is Tbut part of the %Government'spro-ratmme of init atives fLor upg-radi1ng Australian defencecapabklit'es. As the programme unfolds, additional dec"Is onsw~llobviously be made.

Curs is a total package-. It is supported by the Governmcht'sdeterminatLo-n to develop a stronger incdustri4l and econo-m*:.ecapac.t-v -i.n the dlecadle aheac!; andt our economic achieve~rents0o., th-e last 4'2 years have mnoved us signi-ficantly in th.-at

At .a timie of increasing international economic pressures,Australia compares .more than favourably wi; th many ofher mnaj;or trading Partners. This augurs wel o Asrl's

Inevitably, V t is a future of great significance forour young people, the quality -of whose lives in thl-e yearsahieae depend s so much on the response that we make, as

*a nation, to Lthe challenges confronti*ng us.* Part of oursucd6essful response involves understanding the challenge;

et Pd ntUi 'y 'ng, th e d ange-cr s an 111-.e th re-a ts. e n0-edl a clIe ar.*eye for our own obiecti-es a firim Inand in reachrri- our

oals T us- prolai th ri ples that gui de thie

values we defend.

c!-2c.en d c .,:ons appear hadaixl Complex, let us lookol toOur ~rTe.i5and our o~je vsin order to c. 2_ar the

*cours thatwe ust- pur,;ue. 1.ut ;In pursui-ng our prinrci piesan! values, we must re7-.e:r tha t the Soviet Ualion is

***also o I&s world; tnat:, ultimatnely, they an' w mustf.ind en of li-vin- to,,he i pac i to rzncure.

Ih2 s e pol L e es co;v' Co ~o c hr n 0 Cn i. S Lf r nr 1.'a ild 10- a, ,I coicerned !Or >i

Values; cfnceav e ChV -ct;r2-o Send a cle-Zar 1o A1 so. ,l whiose rrrh

'~eonstrate-_; t'e2 'noron LW*i he ju c1c:en 0.1: n:-oldcanno 1>2~

-i ci of us has a, ronle to play Inl s c n n c that siognal.2 ch oC us has a com~i tment to our ow..n fut-ure. iihot

tChia I c Wnt, our freedom cind, perhiaps, In the end,its ex.,'stence w 1ll not be sustained.

Th-at, -1s why e a chI -encrntion -utbe prepared to defendfor. -tsell the ri.,,ht to liberty, il- liberty 'and 'nhe pu r s ut

ofc happiness are ta b ra n e ed a nd secured.

14hat 'we. defene s an in' tanl-ce w chextends beyondthe span of a 1l.f et!-me Toc.;' s respors.Liltt isurslet us fulfill i. t wellI.

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S. VI...