Addressing the Islamic State (ISIS): Policy Analysis and Alternatives Dealing With Militant Groups in Foreign Nations

Andrew GavinStudent, Department of Sociology and Political Science

Tennessee Technological University

May 3, 2015

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Since the dawn of man, humans have engaged with each other in violent conflict. Groups

have formed to achieve specific purposes and some of those groups have emerged as militant

groups. Militant is defined as “having or showing a desired or willingness to use strong, extreme,

and sometimes forceful methods to achieve something” (Merriam-Webster, Inc, n.p). Therefore,

militant groups use whatever means necessary in order to achieve their goals – most of which are

terroristic in nature. These groups may eventually rise in power, infamy, and in number which

makes their purposes and actions a threat to populations and the nations in which they act in

through acts of radicalism, genocide, kidnapping, and other crimes against humanity (Simonelli,

Jensen, Castro-Reina, Pate, Menner, & Miller, 2014; Laub & Masters, 2015).

A recent militant group1 has emerged and grown expansively in power since 2002 and the

world has focused its attention on the areas of the world which it is affecting. This group, the

Islamic State (located in the Middle-East) is very violent in nature and has done cruel, heinous

things in its conquest for land and power.

BACKGROUND

The Islamic State (ISIS)

The Islamic State, or better known as ISIS (standing for the Islamic State in Iraq and

Syria) or ISIL (standing for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant2) is a militant movement that

has taken land in western Iraq and eastern Syria, an area where it has tried to establish a state

where some six and a half million residents are located (Laub & Masters, 2015). After forcefully

1 For the purpose of this paper, we will refer to ISIS as a militant group because their main focus is not just terroristic in nature regardless of how they are described in media. They seek land and to expand the borders of their “State,” not just to invoke fear.2 The Levant is an approximate geographical location referring to a large area in southwest Asia bounded by the Taurus Mountains of Anatolia in the North and the Mediterranean Sea in the West, with the Arabian Desert and Mesopotamia in the East

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taking territories in Iraq’s Sunni heartland, including two populated cities (Mosul and Tikrit),

ISIS declared its group a caliphate. This means that they believe they have absolute political and

theological authority over each and every Muslim (Laub & Masters, 2015).

When establishing its claim over the land that it currently resides in, ISIS has been

characterized by extreme acts of violence rather than building political institutions. They have

beheaded Western hostages, executed Muslims and Christians – women, men, children alike –

who disagree with their agenda, and they have attacked Iraqi and Syrian government supported

towns (Laub & Masters, 2015). ISIS has a huge foothold on the internet, being able to promote

and recruit through videos and social media. All of their acts of violence are claimed to be

“justified by references to the Prophet Mohammed’s early followers and [have] been a tool for

cementing territorial control” (Laub & Masters, 2015, n.p.). They have even been able to attract

thousands of foreign recruits, some even from the United States, which has become a huge

concern for Western nations.

The origins of ISIS can be traced back to the post-US invasion of Iraq in 2003. A

Jordanian militant commander aligned his Jihadi group with al-Qaeda, calling it al-Qaeda in Iraq

(AQI) (Laub & Masters, 2015). His plan was to draw the United States into a civil war by

attacking Shia Muslims and their holy sites in order to provoke them to retaliate against Sunni

Muslims. Later, during the US campaign in Iraq, US-backed coalitions emerged and political

tensions between the Shias and the Sunnis calmed down. This caused the AQI to weaken greatly.

They did not go away, though, and with the recent 2011 uprising in Syria it gave AQI a

chance to expand and its leaders rebranded the organization as “the Islamic State of Iraq and al-

Sham3” (ISIS) (Laub & Masters, 2015). After the United States pulled out of Iraq in 2010, ISIS

was able to find more tools for expansion because the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki,

3 al-Sham refers to the Levant, which reflects the great ambitions of ISIS

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had a Shia-led government and used divisive politics against Sunni political rivals to give Shias

advantages (Laub & Masters, 2015). al-Maliki even went as far as to “reject” the inclusion of

many of the US-backed Awakening coalition members into security forces and he “purged”

potential rivals from security forces (Laub & Masters, 2015). This caused Iraq’s military to

collapse, with many deserters joining ISIS and giving ISIS the opportunity to attack important

locations.

Even more so, ISIS’s current leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (self-proclaimed caliph),

spent periods in US-run prisons in Iraq. al-Baghdadi was able to organize terrorist and militant

cells within these prisons including former members of Saddam Hussein’s secular-nationalist

Ba’ath party. These cells, after being let out or escaping, have joined the ranks of the Islamic

State (Laub & Masters, 2015).

ISIS is funded through many means. On black markets, ISIS sells oil from Syrian and

Iraqi reserves at below market prices. In the cities that ISIS controls, it is rumored that they have

a levied tax placed on religious minorities that have not fled the towns and they extort

businesses. One of the largest means of financing this group comes from ransom payments

(mostly for kidnapped European journalists and other captives). It is also stated that the Islamic

State pays its fighters monthly wages more than any rival group and even more than the Iraqi or

Syrian government offers (reportedly over five times what the Syrian government can offer in

ISIS controlled territories) (Laub & Masters, 2015).

CURRENT UNITED STATES POLICY ADDRESSING ISIS

Under the Obama Administration, the United States is leading a multilateral coalition that

“seeks to ‘degrade and ultimately destroy’ the Islamic State organization by progressively

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reducing the geographic and political space, manpower, and financial resources available to it”

(Obama, 2014; Katzman, Blanchard, Humud, Margesson, & Weed, 2015). In this coalition, the

US and other various members are taking many measures “including direct military action,

support for Iraqi and Syrian partner ground forces, intelligence gathering and sharing, and efforts

to restrict flows of foreign fighters and disrupt the Islamic State’s finances” (Katzman et al.,

2015). The United States currently wishes to isolate and restrict where ISIS can operate inside of

Syria but the Obama Administration refuses to work or coordinate with Syrian President Bashar

al-Asaad because the al-Asaad regime “terrorizes its own people” and “will never regain the

legitimacy it has lost” (Obama, 2014).

Military Operations

United States anti-ISIS military operations have been named “Operation Inherent

Resolve.” They have used aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and sea-launched cruise missiles to

“conduct more than two thousand strikes” in Iraq and Syria since late 2014 (Katzman et al.,

2015, p12). Our first stated objectives in the region were to stop the advance of ISIS and reduce

threats to Americans and religious minorities in the region. Now, we are shifted to supporting

defensive and offensive military operations by Iraqi and Kurdish forces while attempting to

disrupt the ability of ISIS to support their operations in Iraq from within their Syrian bases.

President Obama does not believe that introducing large-scale U.S. ground forces is necessary to

complete U.S. objectives. The President would rather pair airstrikes with efforts to bolster Iraqi

and Syrian security forces (Katzman et al., 2015).

Training and Equipping Assistance

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One of the premier policies that we are using to combat ISIS is providing “training and

equipping assistance” to Iraqi, Kurdish, and vetted Syrian4 forces. President Obama has approved

a deployment of “approximately 3,100 U.S. military personnel to Iraq for the purpose of advising

Iraqi forces, gathering intelligence on the Islamic State, and securing U.S. personnel and

facilities” (Katzman et al., p13). Two-thirds of these personnel are trainers and advisers for Iraqi

and native anti-ISIS forces, while the other third provide protection and support for these forces.

Training of Iraqi forces was planned to being in February 2015 and should last 8 to 10 months

(Katzman et al., 2015). The overall plan expects to train at least 25,000 soldiers. The United

States is also selling arms, weaponry, and armored vehicles to the anti-ISIS Iraqi forces

(Katzman et al., 2015).

It is also reported that the U.S., through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “has

begun supplying light weaponry and ammunition directly to the security forces (peshmurga) of

the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)” (Katzman et al., 2015, p15). Some of our European

allies are also supplying weaponry to the peshmurga. Generally the peshmurga and the Iraqi

security forces have contrasting views on territory and resource control but have come together

in support for the common cause of fighting ISIS, therefore the Iraqi forces are allowing the

United States to funnel Iraqi weapons to the KRG forces. The personnel that the United States

has in Iraq are also responsible for the training and support for the peshmurga.

Disrupting Finances

4 One should assume that these would be anti-ISIS tribal forces and not Syrian state forces due to the President’s opposition to working with al-Asaad.

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A policy that the United States is currently pursuing is disrupting the financial resources

of the Islamic States and is comprised of “disrupting [ISIS] revenue streams, limiting the group’s

access to formal financial systems, and imposing sanctions on the group’s senior leaderships and

financial facilitators” (Katzman et al, 2015, p17). In order to disrupt ISIS’s revenue streams, the

U.S. is “targeting those who refine, transport, handle, or sell [ISIS] oil’ (Katzman et al., 2015,

p17). There is also partnering with the United Nations to disrupt finances. Precise military strikes

by coalition members are being conducted on oil refineries and collection points. The United

States is working directly with “Iraqi authorities, banks’ headquarters, and the international

financial community” to prevent local access to banks for ISIS. It is reported that ISIS has

established its own bank in their controlled town of Mosul in Iraq (Katzmanel al., 2015). The

United States also has placed sanctions on ISIS officials and any external financial backers

which we are aware of.

DEFINING THE PROBLEM

The United States and other world powers must figure out how to effectively address

potential emerging militant groups, especially those who are able to quickly grow in power just

like ISIS has. A group like ISIS, claiming to be the caliphate, brings up concerns that their

conquest has no geographic limits. United States President Barack Obama’s current policy plan

of “degrad[ing] and ultimately defeat[ing]” the Islamic State using limited airstrikes and using

small amounts of support for local groups, may simply not work when looking at long-term

policy (seeing as that’s what we tried to do with the Taliban and al-Qaeda) (Katzman, Blanchard,

Humud, Margesson, & Weed, 2015). The United States and other world powers must fully

commit to and implement some sort of active and working strategy before ISIS becomes too

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powerful, because Iraq’s military is still in chaos and Syria is not yet recovered from their recent

civil war. As stated by Max Boot in the Council of Foreign Relation’s Policy Innovation

Memorandum No. 51 titled “Defeating ISIS”:

“A reasonable goal for the United States would be neither to ‘degrade’ ISIS (vague and

insufficient) nor to “destroy” it (too ambitious for the present), but rather to “defeat” or

“neutralize” it, ending its ability to control significant territory and reducing it to, at

worst, a small terrorist group with limited reach” (Boot, 2014).

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

This paper is being written with the intent of exploring and analyzing public policies and

policy alternatives that can be used to address the threat of militant groups in foreign nations,

using ISIS as a specific example because they are two of the most recent threats. After analyzing

these public policies, I will identify certain evaluative criteria that I believe should be the most

important when evaluating such policies. Then, those evaluative criteria will be applied to each

policy to see how they hold up in relation to the criteria presented. Finally, I will conclude with a

statement about what I believe to be the best policy alternative for addressing the threat of

militant groups in foreign nations.

POLICY ALTERNATIVES

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I. Lift the Prohibition of Boots on the Ground

President Obama currently has a prohibition on allowing U.S. forces on the ground. As

stated in the section about current U.S. policy dealing with ISIS, training the Iraqi forces is

predicted to take 8 to 10 months. United States personnel are not currently tasked for combat

scenarios other than protective purposes; therefore we cannot currently assist with ground

operations and training local security forces will take a very long time. According to U.S.

Director of National Intelligence James Clapper: “in February 2015 more than thirteen thousand

foreign fighters joined Sunni Arab antigovernment extremist groups, including the Islamic States

in Syria” (Laub & Masters, 2015, p2).

If ISIS continues to grow at this rate, they will eventually out number Iraqi security

forces and peshmurga forces. I would suggest lifting the prohibition on boots on the ground in

Iraq. This could increase the reliability and accuracy of airstrikes by having eyes on the ground

and this could give combat advisers a more active role. According to the Council on Foreign

Relations’ Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 51, “experience shows that ‘combat advisors’

fighting alongside indigenous troops are far more effective than trainers confined to large bases”

(Boot, 2014, p2). If we lift our prohibition of boots on the ground and increase support in the

region, ISIS can possibly be contained. Some analysts even suggest that in order to defeat ISIS,

we will need in between 10,000 and 25,000 troops active – not our mere 3,100.

If we lift our prohibition of boots on the ground in this region, we can also make use of

our common tactic of using special military task forces when accomplishing goals in combat

zones. Defined on the United States Special Operation Command’s website:

“The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is a sub-unified command of the US

Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). It is charged to study special operations

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requirements and techniques, ensure interoperability and equipment standardization, plan and

conduct special operations exercises and training, and develop joint special operations tactics”

(United States Special Operations Command).

This special force proved extremely useful between 2003 and 2010. It was able to take out high-

value targets within al-Qaeda by gaining intelligence by ways of which bombing cannot do alone

(Boot, 2014). This Command has Special Forces like Delta Force and SEAL Team Six in it and

could be used for precise, low-key ground operations and strikes against ISIS. If they were able

to greatly assist in the neutralization of al-Qaeda, then they will be able to help with the issue of

ISIS, too.

II. Increase Support in Arming and Training Forces Fighting Militant Groups

In addition to the above policy on removing the prohibition on boots on the ground, we

must also make efforts to better or improve on supporting the arming and training of forces

fighting a militant group like ISIS. President Obama’s Administration’s announced plans to train

and equip a vetted Syrian force of a mere 5,400 soldiers are simply insufficient in size and the

plan spans 3-years (ISIS could grow to an immense number by then). Concerning tribal forces in

the region, we have currently only trained and equipped a small unit of 250 soldiers (Boot,

2014). If we are to maintain our current policy on keeping boots off the ground in the region, we

at least need to bolster our programs of training and equipping in both a timely manner and we

must ensure that the number of anti-ISIS forces are comparable in size to ISIS itself.5 A new

program must be implemented to quickly train or establish a force than can handle the sheer

numbers and skill of ISIS.

5 Which, if ISIS currently has ~32,000 soldiers and continues to grow, the force of ~31,000 we expect to have in 8 to 10 months is already not enough.

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III. Drawing Nations of Interest in to the Conflict

Though already invested slightly in the conflict due to the nature of ISIS’s claim to be a

caliphate, nations like Turkey should be voluntarily drawn in to the fight to defeat ISIS. This

could be a very risky policy to adopt. It is needed, though, to ensure that the world does not see

the United States increasing policy building in the area and/or increasing our presence in the

region as an attempt to Americanize, globalize, or extort the natural resources of the area.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan states that he will not commit any troops to the cause

unless the United States commits itself to overthrowing Syrian President al-Asaad (Boot, 2014).

The United States is already in opposition with al-Asaad and we are already making airstrikes in

the region. We could commit to extending airstrikes to al-Asaad regime locations and establish a

no-fly zone in Syria, and that should suffice to bring Turkey into the conflict (Boot, 2014).

Having a nation like Turkey on our side would give a regional advantage and locations to

provide safe-havens to anti-ISIS forces and groups near the Turkey/Syria border.

IV. Starting Pretexts for Nation Building

Part of what fuels the current conflict is the constant political, ideological, and cultural

differences between the Kurds and political leaders in Iraq and Syria. Even more so, the

governments of both Syria and Iraq are currently very fragmented and unstable. Before the ISIS

conflict gets settled, the United States (along with the United Nations) should establish

framework for nation-building that would not require these political entities (Syria and Iraq) to

remain intact. Therefore, the pretexts and groundwork for new nations could be established. The

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Kurds already have their own regional government established in the Kurdistan region of

Northern Iraq and there are prominent Sunni and Shiite political leaders.

Therefore, I would suggest that we, at the minimum, allow the establishment of a

separate Kurdish nation that would be located in Northern Iraq and possibly some areas of the

Syrian land bordering Iraq. This would finally allow the Kurds the independence that they need.

This, or even something similar for the Sunnis, cannot happen without framework and pretexts

established. Leaders from the U.S. and the UN should have periodic meetings while this conflict

is still going on and they should deliberate on what nation-building options are available for the

region and what consequences such things could bring about.

EVALUATIVE CRITERIA

In the textbook Public Policy: Politics, Analysis, and Alternatives by Michael E. Kraft

and Scott R. Furlong, the authors outline specific evaluative criteria which can be used “to weigh

policy options or judge the merits of existing policies or programs” and “can also be regarded as

justifications or rationales for a policy or government action” (2015, p. 173). The main four

evaluative criteria are listed as followed: effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and political

feasibility. These are the four criteria that we will be using to judge the policy alternatives that

were listed in the prior section.

1. Effectiveness

Effectiveness is defined by Kraft & Furlong as “likelihood of achieving policy goals and

objectives or demonstrated achievement of them” (p. 175). This criterion is used to evaluate

virtually all policy proposals where there is question or concern on how well government

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programs work. It “refers to reaching a policy or program’s states goals and objectives” (Kraft &

Furlong, 2015). Since most of the policy alternatives suggested to address ISIS are not in place

yet, when this evaluative criterion is discussed, I will discuss it from the viewpoint on whether or

not it is likely that goals or objectives could be met in the future if the policy is put in place.

2. Efficiency

Efficiency is defined by Kraft & Furlong as “the achievement of program goals or

benefits in relationship to the costs” wherein the “least cost for a given benefit or the largest

benefit for a given cost” shows successes or failures (p. 175). There is always an interest in

containing and limiting the cost of government programs (especially with the fact that our

national debt is currently at $18.2 trillion and growing). This can be used as justification to

change or remove a program based on economic concepts. In reality, this means government

resources should be allocated to best meet the needs of society, especially when a program’s

costs are greater than the benefits (Kraft & Furlong, 2015).

3. Equity

Equity is defined by Kraft & Furlong as “fairness or justice in the distribution of the

policy’s costs, benefits, and risks across population subgroups” (p. 175). Equity is stated to have

two different meanings: “process equity and outcomes (end-result) equity” (p. 180). The first

refers to the decision-making process and whether or not the decision-making process is fair to

all participants. The second refers to whether or not the outcomes of suggested policy

alternatives are fair to all participants.

4. Political Feasibility

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Political Feasibility is defined by Kraft & Furlong as “the extent to which elected

officials will accept and support a policy proposal” (p. 175). This applies to any controversial

policy where political parties have differing views and opinions. This criterion is extremely

important because in order for a policy to get passed or accept by the government, it must be

feasible that those who will sign it in to law will accept it. Depending on which party is in

control of the legislative bodies, it may have to adhere to Republican, Democratic, Conservative,

or Liberal agendas, or a mix of ideologies.

ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVES

I. Lift the Prohibition of Boots on the Ground

1. Effectiveness: I believe that lifting the prohibition of boots on the ground for the sole

purpose of achieving U.S. objectives in Iraq and Syria would be very effective. Our current

policy of leaving the attainment of U.S. objectives up to airstrikes alone is not being very

effective. Therefore, it is time to step up to the next option. This would cut the timeline down

from having to wait 8 to 10 months to train indigenous soldiers to us being able to aggressively

attack ISIS on the ground, and it would allow for the use of special forces (those have already

proven to be effective).

2. Efficiency: Allowing troops on the ground would definitely cost us money, definitely

more money than what we are spending now. In the long run, though, it would be a short

timeline – quicker than what we are looking at currently. I believe that this would be a cost worth

spending because of how it would allow us to complete our objectives in a timely manner.

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3. Equity: There is not much issue of equity here as long as we ensure that our influx of

soldiers would not disrupt the region (which, seeing as it is already fragmented, I doubt that it

would). In fact, allowing our soldiers into the region on foot would most likely increase equity

for the religious and ideological groups which are currently being persecuted by ISIS and their

allies. As long as we ensure that there are plans and fail safes to ensure stability in the region

when we remove troops, equity will not become an issue.

4. Political Feasibility: After creating a policy framework and effective plan or timeline

for our troops who would be on the ground, I can imagine that this could become very politically

feasible. There are those who would advocate that we don’t need people on the ground there, but

this is something that parties and sides will need to come to terms with because it will most

likely need to happen in order to 1) address the issues which the United States left the Iraqi

region with, and 2) to stop the massacre of minority groups in the region. I believe that most

politicians will accept such a policy when they realize it will achieve our goals in a quicker time

than we are currently looking at.

II. Increase Support in Arming and Training Forces Fighting Militant Groups

1. Effectiveness: Implementing stronger, more rigorous programs would increase the

effectiveness of our goal of having Iraqi and Kurdish forces trained to combat ISIS and other

militant groups in the region. A new plan also ensures that we can train soldiers quicker to

establish a more formidable force to combat ISIS’s large and growing force numbers to achieve

policy goals. The current program is not predicted to be effective; therefore a new, rigorous

policy will increase chances of being effective.

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2. Efficiency: A quicker, more effective program would ensure that the resources, time,

and money that the United States is investing in such training and equipping programs would be

spent better and have more returns on investments.

3. Equity: There is no issue of equity here, because we are still training and equipping all

anti-ISIS forces in the region and not just one specific subgroup. What they do with what we

give them, well, is their own choice.

4. Political Feasibility: There is not much question of political feasibility here because

such programs are already actively in place and politicians will always be on board with the

creation and implementation of more effective and efficient programs. The only real opposing

force would be those who recall what happened after we trained indigenous Afghani tribal forces

back during the Cold War and how these said forces ended up becoming local anti-US forces in

Afghanistan and Iraq. I’d just have to say they need to have faith in the program because we are

mainly training and equipping state and Kurdish security forces and not very many tribal forces.

III. Drawing Nations of Interest in to the Conflict

1. Effectiveness: In order for this policy to become effective, we must adopt other

policies along with it. Therefore, this may take a little more effort and work than a single policy

alternative. Yet, this is something that we should do because it is important to gain allies in the

region. Once we fulfill the parameters that Turkey’s President has for us, Turkey should gladly

join us in our efforts and we will be able to further increase the effectiveness and efficiency of

completing the goals which we have in the region.

2. Efficiency: This could cost us many resources because we would have to increase

military and other similar operations to include anti-al-Asaad measures. Yet, this could end up

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saving us money later or it may be something we end up spending money on anyways because

the United States is already entirely opposed to al-Asaad. If Turkey joins our initiatives, then

they will be able to spend their own resources and personnel, thus taking some burden off of the

U.S.

3. Equity: There is not much question of equity with this alternative because it does not

delineate between subgroups or minority groups because it is completely in-line with current

U.S. objectives. It could increase equity in the region with the use of Turkish-established safe-

zones for anti-ISIS and persecuted groups on the Syrian-Turkish border.

4. Political Feasibility: This could be a hard policy to get across to law-makers, but I

believe that once an effective plan has been established lawmakers can be convinced to follow

such a policy because it gets some of the burden of the conflict off of the United States and

allows it to be shared by another nation. I also believe that politicians will be more willing to get

on board with a policy like this because it means that a nation in the conflicted region is willing

to help us out. The hardest thing to get politicians on board with would be the fact that we would

have to commit to anti-al-Asaad operations. Yet, as I stated earlier, this is something that we

would most likely become involved in at a later time anyways.

IV. Starting Pretexts for Nation Building

1. Effectiveness: Out of every policy stated thus far, starting pretexts for nation building

will be the most involved and complicated policy. This is also a policy with much question

behind it because there is no way to really predict whether or not goals established will be

accomplished. This is why we must focus on starting the pretexts and groundwork before we

attempt to establish anything. Sitting down with other world powers and world leaders to figure

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out how we can do this means that this policy will already be effective. If anything comes out of

the pretexts, then hopefully we can start with international policymaking in the region.

2. Efficiency: Starting the pretexts for nation building will not cost much more than what

we already spend to send international policymakers and diplomats to organizations like the

United Nations to provide United States insights on world issues. If other policies come about

that require resources from the United States, efficiency will have to be addressed at that level.

3. Equity: Establishing pretexts for nation building should, out of every policy here, be

the most effective at addressing the issues of equity in the region. It must be noted, though, that

we must allow every substantial subgroup to have a voice in the process so that we can attempt

to establish fair policy for each group and not accidentally favor an entire group and cause more

turmoil in the region. The last thing we need is another constant battle of pieces of land because

it was forcibly taken without much fair negotiations or questioning.

4. Political Feasibility: This will be hard to get policymakers on board with because a lot

of politicians do not want to see another Israel-type situation established in the region because of

how much turmoil it has caused. Though, if nation-building can be shown to increase stability in

the region, then it will be easier to make such policy feasible for our policymakers here in the

United States.

CONCLUSION

After analysis of these four policy alternatives, I cannot say that one policy alone can

solve the issue of ISIS or other militant groups in foreign nations. This is not some simple issue;

we are talking about a force with a sizeable military and intentions to conquer a good portion of

the Middle-East. Therefore, I would say that several policies must be adopted, like the four

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policy alternatives which I presented in this paper. It will need a multi-lateral approach of direct

policy now to address and defeat the militant group with several available means that are

necessary while we must also figure out ways to maintain stability in the region once we are

close to achieving it. This will make sure that we have ways to prevent what happened last time

we dealt with a militant group in the region. We must make initiatives to prevent ISIS or

organizations like ISIS from emerging in unstable regions ever again. It will be soon enough and

we will be dealing with more and more of organizations, groups, and entities like this and if we

can establish working policy at this time, we will have something which we can refer to in order

to address problems when they arise again.

Works Cited

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Boot, M. (2014, November). Defeating ISIS: Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 51. Retrieved April 14, 2015, from Council on Foreign Relations Web site: http://www.cfr.org/iraq/defeating-isis/p33773

Boot, M., Cronin, A. K., Davidson, J., & Allen, M. (2015). What to Do About ISIS. Council on Foreign Relations.

Katzman, K., Blanchard, C. M., Humud, C. E., Margesson, R., & Weed, M. C. (2015). The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy . Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

Kraft, M. E., & Furlong, S. R. (2015). Evaluative Criteria for Judging Policy Proposals. In M. E. Kraft, & S. R. Furlong, Public Policy: Politics, Analysis, and Alternatives (pp. 173-182). Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Laub, Z., & Masters, J. (2015, April 1). Islamic State (ISIS). Retrieved April 15, 2015, from Council on Foreign Relations : http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/p14811

Merriam-Webster, Inc. (n.d.). Definition of Militant by Merriam-Webster. Retrieved April 17, 2015, from Merriam-Webster web site: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/militant

Obama, B. (2014, September 10). Statement by the President on ISIL. Retrieved April 16, 2015, from The White House Office of the Press Secretary: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1

Simonelli, C., Jensen, M., Castro-Reina, A., Pate, A., Menner, S., & Miller, E. (2014). Boko Haram Recent Attacks. College Park: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and the Responses to Terrorism.

United States Special Operations Command. (n.d.). Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Retrieved April 19, 2015, from United States Special Operations Command Web site: http://www.socom.mil/Pages/JointSpecialOperationsCommand.aspx