adl deregulation final full version
TRANSCRIPT
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Deregulation of the Telecom Sectorand its Impact on the Overall Economy
November, 2005
www.adlittle.com
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Executive Summary
In many countries deregulation of the telecoms sector is being discussed as a meansto stimulate investment into new infrastructure
The continuation of a regulatory policy that was designed to support the liberalizationof telecoms markets favors competition on existing technology platforms and makes
investment into new infrastructure less attractive By analyzing regulatory policy changes in the US over the last years it becomes
evident that deregulation has led to significant investment announcements of theleading fixed operators in the country
Several studies suggest a positive impact of deregulation on the amount of in-vestments in the telecoms sector and on the overall economy; a positive relationship
between investments into the ICT sector and economic growth is common sense
To realize welfare gains, regulatory policy must pay attention to market andtechnology changes and consider deregulation to stimulate investments into newinfrastructure platforms
0Executive Summary
Deregulation stimulates infrastructure investment and has a positive impacton the overall economic growth and consumer welfare
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Introduction1
(De-)Regulation Perspectives2
Market Perspectives3
Agenda
Conclusions4
AnnexA
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In many telecom markets, deregulation is currently discussed; this discus-sion paper examines the impact of deregulation on the overall economy
Key Questions In which countries is deregulation currently disscussed and what are the most
relevant issues? What would be the impact of deregulation on investment, innovation and overall
welfare? Is there evidence of successful deregulation and what are the lessons learned?
Having achieved significant welfare gains after liberalization of thetelecom industry, many markets are considering deregulation
Explain the life cycle from liberalization and regulation towards deregulation and give an overview of countries
where deregulation is currently discussed Describe the relationship between (de-)regulation, market dynamics and telecom operator's investment decisions
Provide evidence of the positive relationship between deregulation and investment decisions based on a countrycase study
Draw conclusions on how deregulation can create incentives for more innovation and investment
In this paper we will:
Introduction Key Questions 1
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Market liberalization encourages the entry of new players
Liberalized markets are often regulated to prevent abuses by de facto orlegal monopolies and to protect consumers' and new entrants' rights
While achieving a lasting competitive market environment, deregulation isa logical step to sustain the further development of the industry
The rationale for deregulation is that less regulation will lead to highercompetitive intensity, an increase in related investments, more innovationand higher customer benefits
Regulation
Liberalization
Deregulation
Liberalized telecom markets have been regulated to achieve public-interest objectives (such as widespread service availability) and to avoidabuse of market power by incumbents through price discrimination, cross
subsidization and remonopolization Network owners viewed as having considerable market power are obliged
to provide access to other market players (non-discriminating and basedon regulated prices)
1
Regulation supports the liberalization process from a monopoly to acompetitive market
Introduction Definitions
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Introduction Milestones
Deregulation is the process of lowering the level of imposed regulation andshould be introduced as competition develops
1
Regulatory Milestones in Establishing Efficient Markets
Main targets
Preconditions
Consequencesof failure
Liberalization Regulation Deregulation
Achieve public interestobjectives
Avoid sub-optimal marketstructures
Stimulate investment in newinfrastructure
Establish technologycompetition
Existing public interests- information society- broadband diffusion- avoidance of digital divide
Efficient market andcompeting technologies
Players that are willing toinvest in (additional) networks
Technology alternatives
available Public interests not achieved
Discrimination(service & price)
Low investment level
Lack of innovation
Limited investments andtherefore limited techno-logical innovation
Stagnating price / perfor-mance levels due to limitedtechnology competition
Encourage competition toincrease efficiency andlower prices
Established basicinfrastructure
Additional players that areinterested in entering themarket
No sustainable competitionwill develop
High prices due toinefficiencies
Lack of innovation due tolow level of competition
not exhaustive
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Introduction1
(De-)Regulation Perspectives2
Market Perspectives3
Agenda
Conclusions4
AnnexA
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Policy makers face a choice between protecting competition in staticmarkets by regulation or accelerating dynamic market effects byderegulation
2(De-)Regulation Perspectives Regulatory policy crossroad
RegulatoryPolicy
Provide equal terms of access Universal service obligation Price regulation Local Loop Unbundling (LLU)
Wholesale obligation Regulatory certainty constricted in favor ofconsumer interests
Prioritization of regulatory certainty
Regulation limited to bottlenecks
Focus on provisioning of high investmentincentives (i.e. regulatory holidays)
No regulation of new infrastructure and markets(regulatory forbearance)
RegulatoryImpact
Competition is mainly based on existingtechnology platforms (infrastructure)
Limited possibilities to differentiate due toenforced infrastructure sharing obligations atregulated prices
Limited investment incentives for incumbents
due to expected low / negative ROI
Market is driven by technology innovation
Investment into new infrastructure could be usedas a means to differentiate
Increase of infrastructure based competition
Acceptance of short term market inefficiencies
Continued regulation supportsdevelopment of static markets
Deregulation supportsdevelopment of dynamic markets
Deregulate if the expected overall welfare gains outweigh short term market inefficiencies
Ongoing Regulation Deregulation
Regulatory Policy
Crossroad
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To stimulate additional investments in the telecom sector, deregulation isbeing discussed in many countries
(De-)Regulation Perspectives Deregulation Discussions 2
Country Intention of Deregulation StatusBackground / Reasoning
US
Hong Kong
Australia
Canada
Germany
Fade out of unbundling, line sharing andcollocation obligations for broadbandconnections
No unbundling obligations for futureFTTx infrastructure
Implemented
Fade out of unbundling obligations for
FTTx Ending of compulsory provision of LLU
Implemented;LLU phase-out 2008
Enable potential investors to set outaccess terms and conditions beforeinvestment
Subject to approval
Framework for forbearance of highspeed intra-exchange digital services
Partial deregulation of local telecommarket
Ongoing hearing,decision Jan. 2006
"Regulatory holiday" i.e. forbearance ofunbundling obligation for FTTx/VDSLinfrastructure investment
Deregulation of international calls
Need for EU approval;Affiliation in Germantelecom act
Enable investments in network infra-
structure to earn returns adequate to theassociated risk
Investment certainty for additionalnetworks
Bell Canada's application to react onpricing and fierce competition
Investment incentives Regulatory certainty Incumbent lost significant market power
in the international voice business
Decline in investment Imparity between cable and telco
regulation
Source: Country regulators 2005
Current Deregulation Discussions not exhaustive
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Introduction1
(De-)Regulation Perspectives2
Market Perspectives3
Agenda
Conclusions4
AnnexA
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3Market Perspectives - Chapter Summary
Deregulation encourages operators to innovate by investing in new accesstechnologies
Summary
Increased infrastructure competition raises consumer welfare and operators would bewilling to invest in case of an adequate ROI
Market convergence may result in the entrance of neighbouring players in eachothers core business, increasing the pressure for innovation and related investment
Market convergence and related infrastructure competition is more likely to takeplace in dynamic markets
Deregulation is expected to positively influence the infrastructure investmentdecisions of incumbents and to unlock dynamic market effects
Based on market studies in the US, we expect deregulation of the telecom sector tostimulate investment in new infrastructure
There is a common understanding in the US that regulation resulted in a decline ofinfrastructure investment
Recent studies suggest that deregulation of the telecom sector has a considerablepositive impact on employment, tax receipts, consumption and GDP
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Introduction1
(De-)Regulation Perspectives2
Market Perspectives3
Agenda
Conclusions4
Market Drivers3.1
Case Study3.2
AnnexA
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Market convergence may result in the entrance of neighboring players ineach others core business, increasing the pressure for innovation andrelated investment
Market Perspectives Market convergence 3.1
Fixed Operators Mobile Operators
Cable / TV Other Platforms & Players
DVB-T andsatellite attack
cable TV
Mobile entersfixed voice &broadband
market
Fixed entersTV market(TVoDSL)
Fixed entersmobile voice
market
Convergence increases thechoice for consumers
Players are increasingly underpressure to differentiate throughinvestments into new
infrastructure and technology Incumbents find it hard to
defend themselves becausethey are the only marketparticipants restrained byregulation policy. Differentiationthrough capital expenditure is
not possible if regulatory policywill grant access to newinfrastructure to competitors
Cable entersfixed voice &broadband
market
observed convergence trends
Comments
Platformsenter fixed &mobile voicemarket (VoIP)
Mobileenters TV
market
(DVB-H)
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Deregulation
Regulation
Market convergence and related infrastructure competition is more likely totake place in dynamic markets
Market Perspectives Market dynamics 3.1
Dynamic Market Static Market
Revenuedecline
Lowerconsumer
prices
Investment tostabilize returns
only
Short termwelfare gains
Investment toinnovate
Investmentmultipliereffects
Long termwelfare gains
Generation ofnew revenue
sources
Company related results Welfare related resultsMarket development & company (re-)actions
Competitionon existing
infrastructure
1
Capitalexpenditure
4Differentiation(service,
brand, etc)
3
Competitionbetween multiple
technologies
6
Servicecommoditisation
2
Serviceinnovation based
on newinfrastructure
5
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Deregulation is expected to positively influence the infrastructure investmentdecisions of incumbents and to unlock dynamic market effects
Market Perspectives Operators Options 3.1
Options
Description
Implications
Incumbents Investment Options illustrative
Attractiveness
Impact on Economy
Invest(after deregulation)
Invest(based on current regulation)
"Business as usual"
No investment in new infrastructure Differentiation is focused on
marketing, brand, service applicationand packaging issues
Investment in new infrastructure butregulation behaviour potentiallydestroys business case, creatingfinancial uncertainty
Investment in new infrastructure Market development and competitors
behaviour during investment phasestill unclear
1 2a 2b
Competition is carried out onexisting technology platformswhich leads to commoditisationand limited differentiation potential
High risk results in lower expectedROI
No competitive edge and limiteddifferentiation possibilities due toaccess and wholesalerequirements
Possible first mover advantages Investment payoff is unproven
Risk of aging infrastructure Innovation might be limited to
existing technology platforms
Ongoing arbitrage businessmodels
Positive impact on welfaredue to additional investmentsand service innovation
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Introduction1
(De-)Regulation Perspectives2
Market Perspectives3
Agenda
Conclusions4
Market Drivers3.1
Case Study3.2
AnnexA
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3.2
There is a common understanding in the US that regulation resulted in adecline of infrastructure investment
Market Perspectives Case Study
Telecom Act of 1996
Federal CommunicationsCommission (FCC)Principles & Policy Goals:
Overview of US Regulation Approach
0
10
20
30
40
50
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Annual ILEC & CLEC CapitalExpenditures (bn USD)
Market development
Sources: FCC and court documents, T. Rowe Price, Arthur D. Little analysis
Encourage the ubiquitousavailability of broadbandaccess to the Internet forall Americans
Ensure that broadbandservices exist in a minimalregulatory environment thatpromotes investment andinnovation
Develop an analyticalframework that is asconsistent as possible,across multiple platforms
Mandatory items:
Interconnection
Resale
Unbundled access tonetwork elements
Number Portability
Universal service contributions
911 rules Definition of details in the following years
Extensive unbundling and resaleobligations on RBOCs to encouragecompetitive entry of competitors intolocal markets
No significant development ofinfrastructure based competitionfor local telecom services
Market exit of numerous resellers
Asymmetric regulation betweencable and telecom operators
Significant decline in long distance
market revenues Significant decline of investment in
the public telecom market sinceY2000
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3.2Market Perspectives Case Study
In the US unbundling obligations for new infrastructure investments byRBOCs have been abolished
CommentsObligation TelecomAct 1996 New RuleExplanation
UNE-L RemainsIn force, "cost-
based" pricing
CLECs will not be able to service customers unlessthey combine UNE-L and installation of their owninfrastructure
Unbundled networkelements-loop. Local
copper loop (does notinclude switching)
Note: Please refer to glossary in appendix Sources: FCC and court documents, Arthur D. Little analysis
Obligations to Regional Bell Operating Companies in US
Effective dates of UNE-P elimination are not uniformlydefinedUNE-P
In force, "cost-based" pricing
Eliminated
Unbundled networkelements-platform. Allowsend to end service withoutowning infrastructure
Line Sharing EliminatedIn force, "cost-based" pricing
Line sharing is no longer available as an unbundledelement. A 3 year transition period is established, withnew orders only being accepted during the first year
Access to the higherfrequency portions of thelocal copper loop to provideDSL services
WholesaleDSL Services Eliminated
In force, "cost-based" pricing
No future obligation to provide access to wholesalewireline broadband Internet services. One yeartransition period. ISPs may still negotiate commercialwholesale agreements with an RBOC
Allowed ISPs to buy DSLservices at wholesale pricesand resell them to endcustomers
Fibre andHybrid LoopUnbundling
Not requiredNo rule
No unbundling requirement in greenfield situations.Where fibre replaces copper or is installed alongside,limited unbundling requirements (either provideaccess to narrowband fibre or to a spare copper loop)
Refers to both FTTH andFTTC with a final copperconnection
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Source: FCC Policy highlights of Michael K. Powell's FCC Tenure (2005); FCC Press Releases and Web Site; Arthur D. Little analysis
FCC deregulation decisions have been directly followed by investmentannouncements of telco operators
3.2Market Perspectives Case Study
2003 2004 2005
FCCDecisions
Timeline of Deregulation and Market Reactions
Reactions
Investment
June: BellSouthInvestment
Announcement
2002
August:Verizon
Statement
June:BellSouthStatement
October: VerizonInvestment
Announcement
October: SBCInvestment
Announcement
October:SBC
Statement1 2 3
45 6
August: FCCderegulates wirelinebroadband Internet
access services(copperline DSL)
December: FCCintroduces
amended regulationconcerningunbundlingobligations
October: FCCconfirms the
deregulation ofFTTC
connections
August: FCCderegulates fiber
to apartmentbuidings
February: FCCderegulates new FTTx
connections, linesharing and collocation
obligations
March: Cable modemdeclared as
"information service"by FCC*
*In June 2005 the Supreme Court asserted the FCC's cable ruling (Brand X Case)
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The FCC's deregulation decisions have been highly welcomed by the largestlocal incumbents
3.2Market Perspectives Case Study
Statements to Deregulation by RBOCs
Source: Press clippings, Arthur D. Little analysis
This is an important step This decision will help accelerate deployment of broadbandnetworks, enabling greater choice and increased access for consumers.
Susanne A. Guyer, Verizon senior vice president for federal regulatory affairs, August 5,2004
"with this positive policy movementThe path forward is much clearer. This is the
latest in a series of broadband rulings that demonstrate this Administration and the FCCunderstand that keeping outdated regulation off of tomorrow's technology will boost jobs,investment and innovation.."
SBC Chairman and CEO Edward E. Whitacre Jr., 14 October 2004
"By rejecting the CLEC petitions and moving quickly to bring regulatory parity for high-speed broadband providers, the FCC can spark even more investment and fasterdelivery of innovative services to customers..."
Herschel Abbott, BellSouth vice president governmental affairs, June 30, 2005
1
2
3
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The deregulation decision was followed by large scale investment announce-ments by the RBOCs
3.2Market Perspectives Case Study
Capex in new infrastructure is about 1
bn$ in 2004 and 1.3 bn$ in 2005 Installations of fiber-to-the-curb in 2004
were 126,000 and 200,000 areestimated in 2005
BellSouth Boosts Fiber Deployment Following FCCOrderBellSouth told the FCC today that it plans to deploy fiber to almost60 percent more locations in 2005 than it did in 2004AlthoughBellSouth had installed fiber in many branches of its network, therate of deployment rapidly increased once the commission's actionremoved the disincentive Press, June 30, 2005
Project Lightspeed: Target is to reach18 million homes by 2007 / 2008 (17mio FTTN + 1 mio FTTH)
Cumulative capex over 3 years isexpected to be about $4 billion + $1billion for investment in customeractivations
SBC Communications Will Deploy Advanced BroadbandServices To Reach 18 Million Homes In 2-3 YearsSBC Communications Inc. said today it will dramatically accelerateits plan to build a new fiber-optics network into neighborhoodsintwo to three years rather than five years as previouslyannounced Press Release, Oct. 14, 2004
Target is for about half of the homesin the covered areas to have FTTH orFTTN by end-2008, i.e. 15 million
Total investment of $15-20 billion Intention to hire between 3,000 and
5,000 new employees by the end of2005
Fast as light, Verizon is moving to roll out advancedfiber-based broadband technology to customers in sixmore states.At a news conference here today, the company announced newfiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) deployment to homes andbusinesses News Release, Oct. 25, 2004
Investment Announcements by RBOCs*
Company Announcement Details
4
5
6
Source: Press clippings, Arthur D. Little analysis *) Qwest has not made an investment announcement related to the FCC rulings
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There will be significant increase of new infrastructure investment andadditional FTTx homes passed until 2007
3.2Market Perspectives Case Study
RBOCs Communicated FTTx Investment
Company Annual Capex in New Infrastructure ($ bn) RBOC Coverage
0,9
2,02,9
3,8
0
1
2
3
4
2003 2004 2005e 2006e 2007e
1,6
3,4
0
1
2
3
4
2003 2004 2005e 2006e 2007e
1,0 1,3
0
1
2
3
4
2003 2004 2005e 2006e 2007e
BellsouthVerizonVerizon+SBCSBC Qwest
Verizon+ Qwest
Verizon+ BS
Annual add. FTTx homes passed (m)
0
5
10
15
2003 2004 2005e 2006e 2007e
n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a.
n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Press clippings, Arthur D. Little analysis
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In addition to RBOCs, cable operators and competitors have announced toinvest into broadband technology
3.2Market Perspectives Case Study
Installation of additional broadbandequipment in approximately 200 centraloffices across the nation, increasingCovad's nationwide broadband networkto more than 2,000 central offices
broadening the access network enablesCovad to more efficiently utilize its coreATM network
Covad Announces 2004 Network Expansion InitiativeCovad today announced plans to expand its nationwidecoverage area and customer reach for digital subscriber line(DSL), frame access, and T1 broadband services.Company press release, January 7, 2004
Agreement with Level 3Communications to expand fiberfootprint
Network expansion including fibercapacity, routing and opticalequipment
Comcast Extends National Fiber Infrastructureto provide inter-city and metro dark fiber as part of Comcast'sextension of its fiber footprint. This backbone ensures thatComcast has a technically advanced and fully upgradeablenationwide broadband networkCompany press release, December 7, 2004
OEN plans to offer integrated IPTVservice, 10 to 100 Mbps Internet, Voice,Video-on-Demand (VOD) and otherbroadband applications
OEN said it has acquired programmingagreements for IPTV distribution of over400 television channels
OEN Plans Large-Scale FTTH Deployment in Houston announced plans to deploy FTTH to 1,600,000 households inHouston, the 10th largest television market in the U.S. Thecompany plans to launch its United States service offering inDecember 2005Press release, October 2005
Investment Announcments by Other Market Players
Company Announcement Details
OEN
examples
Source: Press clipings, Arthur D. Little analysis
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Comment
Consumer surplus isdefined as the valueconsumers place on agood or service abovewhat they actually pay
A report to the USchamber of commercepredicts that consumersurplus from broadbandalone will increasebetween 46% and 76%per year due toderegulation compared tothe baseline case
Cumulative additionalconsumer surplus in theyears from 2005 to 2009could be up to 42.7 billionUS Dollars
Household broadbandpenetration (%)
Consumer surplus($ bn)
5,9
12,1
17,722
26,4
4,5
6,6
8,1
10,6
12,9
34%
41%
57%
47%
52%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
2005 2006 2007 2008 20090%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Baseline growthin surplus
Incremental surplusdue to deregulation
Broadband penetration
Source: Hazlett et al.: Sending the right signals (2004)
Expected Broadband Penetration & Consumer Surplus
3.2Market Perspectives Case Study
Deregulation is expected to trigger substantial growth of consumer surplusdue to increased broadband penetration
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Comment
A study prepared by Allen Sinaiet al. for the ACCF (AmericanCouncil for Capital Formation)expects that deregulation willcontribute up to 0.2% ofadditional GDP growth over thenext years
On average, 91,000 new jobswill be generated annuallythrough 2008
Cumulative additional federal taxreceipts will be up to $14.4billion
Personal consumptionexpenditure will increase froman additional $8.6 billion in 2005
to an additional $20.3 billion in2007
Recent studies suggest that deregulation of the telecom sector has a consi-derable positive impact on employment, tax receipts, consumption and GDP
GDPFederal TaxReceipts
Source: Sinai et al.: Macroeconomic Effects of Telecommunication Deregulation (2004)
1,12,3
3,4 3,9 3,7
2
8,6
16,4
20,318,8
6,6
12,9
18,319,7
16,6
30
69
130
114110
0
10
20
30
2004 2005 2006 2007 20080
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Difference in Level($ bn)
Additional jobs per annum('000)
PersonalConsumptionExpenditures
Employment
Expected Economic Impact of Deregulation in the US
3.2Market Perspectives Case Study
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3.2Market Perspectives Case Study
There are several studies supporting the conclusions that deregulation ofthe telecom sector triggers investments and overall growth of the economy
Unbundling decreases ILECs cashflowscash flows are used to financeILEC investments unbundlinggenerally lowers ILEC investment in a
proportionate manner "Capex increase resulting from the
elimination of UNE-P regulationswould have had a multiplicative effecton the economy"
Regulation caused decrease ofCapex leads to lower ROI and inconsequence to the elimination of
jobs "to address the profit squeeze"
Mandatory unbundling and irreversibleinvestment in telecom networks
(Pindyck 2004):
"[The Telecom Act of 1996] leads to an
asymmetric allocation of r isk and return whichcreates a significant investmentdisincentive[and] reduce incentives to buildnew networks or upgrade existing ones"
"Regulations that impede telecommunicationsinvestment harm the economy
ICT investments fuel growth of productivity andare worth approximately $56bn in output for
GDP (CA) Intense regulations harm investments and
reduce the economic output meaning fewerjobs and lower wages
Deregulation significantly fuelsfurther Capex "Cascading effecton overall economic growth" mightlead to $13bn additional Capex in
3 years Major impact on GDP: Reform of
UNE rules (-> deregulation) couldincrease GDP up to $102bn in 3years
Reform of UNE rules(deregulation) and resultinginvestments in the ICT market
could create up to 669k jobs in 3years
An accurate scorecard of theTelecommunications Act 1996:Rejoinder to the Phoenix CentreStudy No.7 (Crandall et al. 2003):
Extracts from Studies about Deregulation
How telecom regulationsharm California consumers
(Pociask 2003):
1 2 3
4
Telecom deregulation and theeconomy The impact of UNE-Pon jobs, investment and growth
(Eisenach et al. 2003):
All studies came to the conclusion that deregulation would triggeradditional investments and boost the overall welfare of the economy
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Introduction1
(De-)Regulation perspectives2
Market Perspectives3
Agenda
Conclusions4
AnnexA
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Deregulation stimulates additional investments in new infrastructureenabling overall welfare gains
Conclusions Economic Impact of Deregulation 4
Status Quo Deregulation
Expected
Effect
Conclusions: Effects of Deregulation
InfrastructureInvestments
Investments primarily in existing infrastructure(stable to decreasing)
Limited incentive to invest into newinfrastructure
Additional potential investments by incumbentsdue to positive business cases
Potential competitor related bandwagoninvestment effect
Price Decline Competition ensures decreasing prices
due to commoditization More competition on access networks and
services leads to decreasing prices
ServiceInnovation
Service innovation limited to existingtechnologies and hence focused on e.g.service applications, product bundlesand pricing only
Service innovation based on new infrastructureand technology competition
Additional service innovation
BroadbandPenetration
Stable growth until maturity stage Increased infrastructure competition acceleratesbroadband penetration
GDP Positive impact through additional investments
and multiplier effects Contribution to GDP by fixed telecom
sector will slowly decline
OverallEmploymentLevel
Declining due to high cost pressure The employment level in the telco industry will bestabilized due to the roll out of new infrastructureand services
Potential positive impact on employment in otherindustries due to spillover effects
Competition Competition is carried out on existing platform
(static market view)
Focus on arbitrage business models
Competition is carried out between platforms(dynamic market view)
Business model focus on innovation
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Studies point out the positive relationship of ICT investments and GDPgrowth
4
ICT investments contribute to an overall increase incapital and an increase in labor productivity
ICT capital investment contributed on average 0.5%
to GDP growth in OECD countries from 1995 to 2001 The contribution of ICT capital to GDP growth has
strongly increased since the first half of the 1990s
Conclusions Economic Impact of Deregulation
Effects of increased investment in current generationbroadband technologies- 61,000 new jobs could be created on average per year
until 2021- Wide adoption of broadband (DSL, cable) could lead to
an increase in GDP of $179.9bn until 2021
Investments into more advanced technologies (FTTH)could be up to $82.8bn until 2021
The combined investments into existing and advancedbroadband technologies- will be up to $146.4bn until 2021
- will lead to a cumulative additional GDP of $414bn until2021
- Generate on average 140,000 new jobs per year
The economic impact of ICT Measurement,Evidence and Implications
(OECD 2004):
The effects of ubiquitous broadband adoption oninvestment, jobs and the US economy
(Criterion Economics 2003):
Studies suggest that there is a considerable relation between ICT investments andGDP growth
Extracts from Studies on ICT Investment and GDP Growth
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If the regulatory approach does not match current market conditions, regulation
leads to market distortions, i.e. the risk of absent or delayed investments
The regulatory approach must be reviewed on a regular basis to identifyderegulation possibilities in order to keep up with market and technologicaldevelopments; subsequently remaining regulation has to transfer to generalcompetition law
If market participants believe that the regulator changes the rules during thegame, investments and innovation may be held back due to the uncertainregulatory environment
Once the regulator has committed to a certain regulatory approach, it must alsodefine a planning horizon during which regulation conditions are not changed
No Regulation of
NewInfrastructure
Timing of RegulatoryEasing
Avoid Uncertainty
If regulation of new infrastructure investments reduces the expected ROI farbelow market returns of the same investment in an unregulated environment,potential investors are likely to refrain from taking the risk associated withinvestments
To overcome this problem, regulatory policy must provide investmentincentives, i.e. allow investors to benefit from first mover advantages by notregulating (or deregulating) new investments or granting regulatory holidays
To realize welfare gains, regulators must pay attention to possible pitfallsand behave accordingly
Conclusions Key Success Factors of Regulators 4
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Putting it All Together
Increased infrastructurecompetition raises consumerwelfare and operators would bewilling to invest if ROI isadequate
Deregulation is expected topositively influence theinfrastructure investmentdecisions of incumbents and tounlock dynamic market effects
As indicated by several studies, deregulation stimulates additional investments innetwork infrastructure and results in a positive economic impact
To stimulate economic growth, regulatory policy must consider market andtechnology changes
Conclusion: Deregulation Results in Higher Welfare Gains!
Policy makers face a choicebetween protecting competitionin static markets by regulation oraccelerating dynamic marketeffects by deregulation
Deregulation is a logical step onthe way from a monopoly to anefficient market
(De-)RegulationPerspectives:
Challenge betweenOperators and Customers
Interests
Market Perspectives:Market Demand and
OperatorsWillingness to Invest
While establishing sustainablecompetition in the telecom industry,many markets are considering areduction in regulation
The debate is whether and to whatdegree deregulation will stimulateinvestment and growth
Key Questionsabout Deregulation
Conclusions Summary
Deregulation clearly stimulates investments and recent studies in the USsuggest a significant positive impact on the overall economy resulting inhigher welfare gains
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Introduction1
(De-)Regulation Perspectives2
Market Perspectives3
Agenda
Conclusions4
AnnexA
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Glossary of Abbreviations
Informations and Communications TechnologyICT
Incumbent Local Exchange CarrierILEC
Global System for Mobile CommunicationsGSM
IP TelevisionIPTV
Digital Subscriber LineDSL
DefinitionTerm
Gross Domestic ProductGDP
Superordinate term for the different levels ofFiber deployment
FTTx
Fiber To The PremisesFTTP
Fiber To The NodeFTTN
Fiber To The HomeFTTH
Fiber To The CurbFTTC
Federal Communications Commission. USnational regulation authority fortelecommunications and broadcast
FCC
Competitive Local Exchange CarrierCLEC
Capital ExpendituresCapexInternet ProtocolIPInternet Service ProviderISP
Local Loop UnbundlingLLU
Multiple Input Multiple OutputMIMO
Next Generation NetworkNGN
Regional Bell Operating Company (US)RBOC
Return on InvestmentROI
Unbundled Network ElementsUNE
Universal Mobile Telecommunications SystemUMTS
Unbundled Network Elements-Loop. Refers tothe local copper loop itself, but does not
include switching facilities (US)
UNE-L
Unbundled Network Elements-Platform. End-to-end service on third party infrastructure (US)
UNE-P
Voice over Internet ProtocolVoIP
DefinitionTerm
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Testimony (extracts) of Thomas Tauke, Senior Vice President Public Policy, Verizon before U.S.House Energy and Commerce Committee
Existing federal regulations handicap Verizons provision of DSL. The FCC has applied the section 251 unbundlingand resale requirements to Verizon and other incumbent local telephone companies. They require Verizon to allowcompetitors to put their DSL equipment not only in our central office equipment buildings but also in small "remoteterminal" boxes in local neighborhoods.
They require us to provide not only unbundled lines from our locations to customers, but also "subloop" pieces of thoselines. The FCC first required us to provide DSL-capable loops, then it required "line sharing" -- allowing a competitor touse only a portion of the capacity of the loop almost for free to provide DSL service while Verizon provided theunderlying basic telephone service. Now we are also required to "line split" -- to arrange for two different competitors toshare our lines, while we provide no service at all to the customer.The FCC is now considering requests from other carriers that we be required to provide our new DSL services to themat very low TELRIC prices -- that is prices that are below our costs. If we have to do this, what incentive will wehave to make the investments that make these services possible? And yet that investment is exactly what you
and the public expect from us.The other characteristic of the regulatory landscape is uncertainty -- participants and investors dont know for sure whatthe rules are. Whether Verizon must provide wholesale DSL services at discounts to their competitors and whether itmust unbundle its retail DSL service are now before the courts. Our investment decisions, and the investmentdecisions of our competitors, will be affected by the actions of these courts and by the Commissions actionsin response to them
A
RBOCs attributed the decline in infrastructure investment to the existingregulation framework not providing investment incentives
Deregulation Case Study United States
Comment on FCC Regulation by Verizon April 25, 2001
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Verizon
Verizon announced a significant increase in infrastructure investment afterthe deregulation decision of the FCC
Deregulation Case Study United States A
Verizon comment to FCC decision regarding theremoval of common carrier obligations and to createparity in the regulatory treatment between cable andphone company-provided broadband services.
Susanne A. Guyer, Verizon senior vice president
for federal regulatory affairs, August 5, 2004:
This is an important step This decision will helpaccelerate deployment of broadband networks,enabling greater choice and increased access forconsumers We commend Chairman Martin and thecommission for acting quickly to move us closer tothe presidents goal of broadband deployment to allAmericans by 2007.
Ivan Seidenberg, CEO Verizon 09/05
"Verizon wants to pass an incremental 50% of homesin his territory in the next three years"
Verizons plans are the most ambitious of the RBOCs
Roll out target is for about half of the homes in the areas in which it hastraditional telephone franchises to have FTTH or FTTN by end-2008, i.e.15 million
Total investment of $15-20 billion
Intention to hire between 3,000 and 5,000 new employees by the end of2005 to help build the network
Video will initially be provided in traditional multichannel cable TVdistribution mode, with IPTV (only requested channels are sent to ahome) later
Source: Company documents, CIBC, Arthur D. Little analysis
Annual add. FTTxhomes passed (m)
0,9
2,0
2,9
3,8
1
4
23
0
1
2
3
4
2003 2004 2005e 2006e 2007e
0
5
10
15
Annual capex in newinfrastructure ($ bn)
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SBC (Rebranding to at&t)
The FCC deregulation decision paved the way for accelerated SBCinvestment and FTTN roll out
Deregulation Case Study United States A
SBC comment on the FCC decision to removecommon carrier obligations and to create parity in theregulatory treatment between cable and phonecompany-provided broadband services.
SBC Chairman and CEO Edward E. Whitacre Jr.,
14 October 2004
"with this positive policy movement, the delivery ofnext-generation broadband and video services is nolonger at some distant point in the future. The pathforward is much clearer. This is the latest in a seriesof broadband rulings that demonstrate thisAdministration and the FCC understand that keeping
outdated regulation off of tomorrow's technology willboost jobs, investment and innovation. It will beequally important at the state and local level that thepath remain clear of unnecessary regulatory orlegislative hurdles."
SBC Communications announced in Oct. 2004 that it will dramatically
accelerate its plan to build a new fiber-optics network into neighborhoods Project Lightspeed: Roll out target is to reach 18 million homes by 2007 /
2008 (17 mio FTTN + 1 mio FTTH)
Cumulative capital investment over 3 years is expected to be about $4billion + $1 billion for investment in customer activations
Provisioning of 25Mbps, four streams of HQ video per line, Internetaccess and VoIP service (U.S. expectation is to offer 4 different videochannels at any one time to different viewers in a household)
Source: Company documents, Press releases, Arthur D. Little analysis
0,0 0,0 0,0
1,6
3,4
10
0
6
0
1
2
3
4
2003 2004 2005e 2006e 2007e
0
5
10
15
Annual add. FTTxhomes passed (m)
Annual capex in newinfrastructure ($ bn)
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BellSouth
Although BellSouth had installed fiber in many branches of its network, therate of deployment rapidly increased once the FCC's ruling removed thedisincentive to invest
Deregulation Case Study United States A
Bellsouth comment on the FCC decision to removecommon carrier obligations and to create parity in theregulatory treatment between cable and phonecompany-provided broadband services.
Herschel Abbott, BellSouth vice presidentgovernmental affairs.
"By rejecting the CLEC petitions and moving quicklyto bring regulatory parity for high-speed broadbandproviders, the FCC can spark even more investmentand faster delivery of innovative services tocustomers The radical rewriting of the fiber-to-the-curb order proposed by [CLECs] runs the risk ofparalyzing the ability of incumbents to evolve theirnetworks and implement new, advanced
technologies."
Source: Company documents, Wachovia, Arthur D. Little analysis
Capex in new infrastructure is about 1 bn$ in 2004 and 1.3 bn$ in2005
Installations of fiber-to-the-curb were 126,000 in 2004 and200,000 are estimated for 2005
The increase is being attributed to the decision to have nounbundling obl igations on FTTC installations
1,01,3
0,10 0,13
0,20
0
1
2
3
4
2003 2004 2005e
0,0
0,5
1,0
Annual add. FTTxhomes passed (m)
Annual capex in newinfrastructure ($ bn)
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Optical Entertainment Network
OEN is an example for an alternative operator investing in new infrastructure
Deregulation Case Study United States A
OEN Plans Large-Scale FTTH Deployment in Houston (Oct. 2005)
Optical Entertainment Network (OEN), a private investor-backed company based in Texas,announced plans to deploy FTTH to 1,600,000 households in Houston, the 10th largesttelevision market in the U.S. The company, which has partnered with leading Europeanand North American vendors plans to launch its United States service offering in December2005 and begin European operations in Q2 of 2006.
The company plans to offer integrated IPTV service, 10 to 100 Mbps Internet, Voice,Video-on-Demand (VOD) and other broadband applications such as, Home Security,videoconferencing and telemedicine. OEN said it has acquired programming agreementsfor IPTV distribution from top programming television networks and will deliver over 400television channels, including 50 plus channels of HDTV.
OEN's first deployment partner is Phonoscope of Houston, Texas, owner of the largestprivately held metro fiber networks. Already the existing network reaches 200,000household easements and is within 100 to 500 yards of approximately 1.6 millionhouseholds in the 6 county areas around Houston.
Announced Services
10 to 100 Mbps InternetOEN's FISION willprovide Internet service atspeeds of 10 to 100 Mbpsand each FISIONsubscriber will receive aminimum of 10 Mbps of
symmetrical connectivity. Online gaming Digital video recorder
with time shiftingcapabilities
Tailored advertisingImagine seeingcommercials that aretailored to customer'slifestyle and interests
Personalized TV Unlimited local, national
and global televisionchannels
Source: Company website
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Alcatel
Infrastructure suppliers endorse the deregulation in the US in order tosustain the growth of the US broadband market
Deregulation Case Study United States A
November 9, 2005
The following statement should be attributed to Tim Krause, Chief Marketing Officer and Senior Vice President forGovernment Relations for Alcatel in North America, who testified today before the Telecommunications and InternetSubcommittee on the forthcoming BITS (Broadband Internet Transmission Services) Act:
"Alcatel endorses the BITS Act, and requests the Committee move it forward in the legislative process without delay.
The BITS Act will ensure the continued growth of the U.S. broadband market by creating legal and regulatory certaintyfor the services that flow over powerful new broadband networks, such as the IPTV networks being built by Alcatel forU.S. telecommunications carriers, in several ways:
"First, it generally protects nascent broadband services from regulation at the Federal, State, and local level,and does so in a socially conscious manner by preserving important public policies, such as E911. (emphasisadded)"The bill creates a streamlined Federal video franchise process for broadband video services that will ensure they canbe a key driver of continued broadband deployment immediately. The BITS Act achieves this goal while protecting theability of municipalities to manage their local rights of way, as well as the video franchise fee revenue streams theyhave come to rely on.
"Alcatel also supports the inclusion into the BITS Act of Internet Neutrality principles, which promotes consumerbroadband demand, as well as protections for municipal entry into the broadband market when necessary."
Source: Verizon; Alcatel (system integrator for SBCs Project Lightspeed)
Example
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Since 1995, new entrants followed differentstrategies in the Hong Kong market
Hong Kong Broadband Network had no choicebut to build its own network infrastructure
Hutchison also started to invest into its owninfrastructure
New World Communications and Wharf T&Trelied mainly on Type II interconnection
In 2004, about 53% of households were connectedby at least two independent networks, including thatof the incumbent
The broadband market share of new entrants(including broadband offers from the Hong Kongcable operator) amounted to 45%
Narrowband market share for new competitors wasabout 28% of the total market
Regulation Background Results
ADeregulation Case Study Hong Kong (1/2)
The market liberalization has led to substantial competition and the regulatorstarted to review its policy in 2003
Type II interconnection policy was introduced in 1995
Type II interconnection is interconnection to afixed carrier's network at the customer accessnetwork level
The policy made unbundling for the incumbent(PCCW-HKT Telephone Ltd.) mandatory butrequired regulatory intervention only if commercialnegotiations failed
The policy mainly applied to three new entrants:
Wharf T&T Ltd.
New World Communications Ltd.
Hutchison Global Communications Ltd.
New competitors entering the market from 2003 were
not eligible for Type II interconnection as of right (i.e.Hong Kong Broadband Network)
Source: Hong Kong Legislative Council Brief (2004)
The Telecommunication Authority found that the continuation of mandatory access was justified only ifbenefits from facilitating competition and consumer choice would outweigh detriments arising fromdampening of incentives for investment in network infrastructure and began to review its policy in 2003
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The outcome of the policy review induced the Telecommunications Authorityto decide in favor of a regulation fade-out
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Implications
Source: Hong Kong Legislative Council Brief (2004)
End regulation immediatelyContinue regulation
Discourage furtherinvestments into advancedtelecommunications networks
High level of servicescompetition and enhancedcustomer choice
Total withdrawal would meanthat around 400 000 customerswould be forced to switch toanother telecommunicationsprovider
Competitors relying oninterconnection would be forcedto invest immediately
Regulation fade-out
A regulation fade-out wouldmean that customers could facea reduction of choices in theshort to mid-term
In the medium to long term, theaccelerated rollout of networksshould more than compensate75%-80% of consumers
Analysis
Options
Decision
The interconnection rules were only partially responsible for the development of the market The infrastructure on which interconnection is based has limitations concerning future services Additional investments into new infrastructure should be stimulated to keep Hong Kong's leading
edge
The Hong Kong Telecommunication Authority has chosen to fade-out interconnection until 2008 This fade out is limited to buildings which are connected by two alternative networks The Telecommunications Authority hopes that this policy will give both incumbents and competitors
incentives for further investments into advanced networks
Deregulation Case Study Hong Kong (2/2)
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In Canada deregulation is discussed with respect to local exchange anddigital broadband services
ADeregulation Case Study Canada
The regulatory body CRTC* opened a proceeding in April 2005 to determine the framework and the criteria for aframework for forbearance from the regulation of residential and business local exchange services.The proceeding covers the following issues:
1) the local exchange services that should be within the scope2) the relevant market(s) with respect to services and geographic areas3) the criteria to be applied to determine whether the relevant market(s) is/are sufficiently competitive for
forbearance4) the appropriate scope of the Commission's forbearance from its powers and duties5) post-forbearance criteria and conditions6) the process for future applications for forbearance from the regulation of local exchange services
In addition the CRTC intends to determine whether there should be a transitional regime that provides ILECs withmore regulatory flexibility prior to forbearance through:
1) lessening or removing competitive safeguards on promotions and the no-contact restriction under thewinback rules
2) permitting the ex parte filing of tariff applications for promotions3) the waiving of service charges for residential local winbacks
Forbearance ofregulation of localexchange services
Telecom Public NoticeCRTC 2005-2
Canada
Details
Source: CRTC, Arthur D. Little analysis
Intention of
Deregulation
Framework forforbearance of highspeed intra-exchangedigital services
Telecom Public NoticeCRTC 2005-8
The CRTC opened a proceeding in June 2005 to establish the framework and the criteria for forbearance from
regulation of intra-exchange high-speed digital services (HSDS). The proceeding covers the following issues:the definition of intra-exchange HSDS;
1. the relevant market(s) with respect to services and geographic areas2. the qualitative and quantitative criteria for determining market power3. the scope of the Commission's forbearance from its powers and duties4. the process to consider future applications for forbearance of intra-exchange HSDS5. post-forbearance criteria, conditions or safeguards
*Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission