[G.R. No. 153176. March 29, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN, In her capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 19, of the City of Naga and SERAFIN SABALLEGUE, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, J:

For determination in this petition is a question in procedural law - - - whether an information filed by a state prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor should be dismissed after the accused has entered his plea under the information.

Petitioner comes before us with a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking to declare as null and void the Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19 dated February 26, 2002[1] and April 3, 2002[2] which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the case of People vs. Serafin Saballegue, Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597, and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are undisputed.

On June 22, 2001, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of Republic Act No. 8282, otherwise known as the Social Security Act, in an information which reads:

The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Legazpi City, accuses SERAFIN SABALLEGUE, as proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press with business address at 16 San Mateo St., Peafrancia Ave., Naga City for Violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of R.A. 8282 otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997, committed as follows:

That on or about February 1990 and up to the present, in the City of Naga, Philippines, within the functional jurisdiction of SSS Naga Branch and the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, while being the proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally refuse and fail and continuously refuse and fail to remit the premiums due for his employee to the SSS in the amount of SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE PESOS (P6,533.00), Philippine Currency, representing SSS and EC premiums for the period from January 1990 to December 1999 (n.i.), and the 3% penalty per month for late remittance in the amount of ELEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-THREE PESOS and 28/100 (P11,143.28) computed as of 15 March 2000, despite lawful demands by letter in violation of the above-cited provisions of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the SSS and the public in general.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Legazpi City for Naga City. 22 June 2001.

(sgd.) ROMULO SJ. TOLENTINOState ProsecutorSpecial Prosecutor on SSS Casesin Region V[3]

The information contains a certification signed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino which states:

I hereby certify that the required investigation in this case has been conducted by the undersigned Special Prosecutor in accordance with law and under oath as officer of the court, that there is reasonable ground to believe that the offense has been committed, that the accused is probably guilty thereof and that the filing of the information is with the prior authority and approval of the Regional State Prosecutor.[4]

The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City presided by respondent judge Hon. Zeida Aurora B. Garfin. On September 24, 2001, accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for pre-trial.[5] Three days thereafter, the accused filed a motion to dismiss[6] on the ground that the information was filed without the prior written authority or approval of the city prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court.[7]

The People, through State Prosecutor Tolentino, filed an opposition,[8] against which the accused filed a rejoinder.[9] The People filed a reply to the rejoinder[10] on December 21, 2001. A rejoinder to the reply[11] was filed by the accused on January 21, 2002.

After considering the arguments raised, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss in its first questioned Order dated February 26, 2002, to wit:

After considering the respective arguments raised by the parties, the Court believes and so resolves that the Information has not been filed in accordance with Section 4, par. 3 of Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, thus:

Rule 112, Section 4 x x x x x x

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.

Expresio unius est exclusio alterius.

The Information will readily show that it has not complied with this rule as it has not been approved by the City Prosecutor.

This Court holds that the defendants plea to the Information is not a waiver to file a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. By express provision of the rules and by a long line of decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings (People vs. Eduarte, 182 SCRA 750).

The Supreme Court in Villa vs. Ibaez (88 Phil 402) dwelt on lack of authority of the officer who filed the information and on jurisdiction at the same time, pertinent portions run as follows:

The defendant had pleaded to the information before he filed a motion to quash, and it is contended that by his plea he waived all objections to the information. The contention is correct as far as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express provision of section 10 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Now, the objection to the respondents actuations goes to the very foundations of jurisdiction. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity of the nature noted in the information cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.

Prosecutor Tolentino also contends that having been duly designated to assist the City Prosecutor in the investigation and prosecution of all SSS cases by the Regional State prosecutor as alter ego of the Secretary of Justice in Region V, then that authority may be given to other than the City Prosecutor. The Court finds this contention to be devoid of merit. The Regional State Prosecutor is not the alter ego of the Secretary of Justice but a mere subordinate official and if ever the former files cases, it is by virtue of a delegated authority by the Secretary of Justice. Potestas delegada non potesta delegare (sic) what has been delegated cannot be redelegated.

In his opposition, the state prosecutor also attached a memorandum dated June 22, 2001 by Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan addressed to Provincial Prosecutor and City Prosecutors of Region V directing them to inhibit and to append the following NOTATION after the certification in the Information for filing.

NOTATION: The herein City/Provincial Prosecutor is inhibiting from this case and the Special Prosecution Team on SSS Cases in Region V is authorized to dispose of the case without my approval in view of the request for inhibition of the SSS Regional Manager as granted by the Regional State Prosecutor.

A perusal of the Information, however, would readily show that nowhere in the Information has the City Prosecutor of Naga City appended the above-quoted notation/inhibition. At most, the authority of the special prosecutor is only for the conduct of preliminary investigations and the prosecution of cases after they are filed. The Court, however, believes that the filing of this Information must be in conformity with the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 4 of Rule 112.

WHEREFORE, premises considered and for lack of jurisdiction, the Court hereby resolves to DISMISS this case without pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.[12]

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the People contending that as a special prosecutor designated by the regional state prosecutor to handle SSS cases within Region V, State Prosecutor Tolentino is authorized to file the information involving violations of the SSS law without need of prior approval from the city prosecutor. [13] Letters of commendation from Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo[14] and Secretary Hernando Perez[15] were offered as proof to show that State Prosecutor Tolentinos authority to file the information was recognized. In response, the defense pointed out in its opposition that the motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing, hence it is pro forma or a mere scrap of paper. [16]

On April 3, 2002, respondent judge issued the second questioned Order which reads:

Acting upon the Motion for Reconsideration filed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino, Special Prosecutor on SSS cases in Region V, and it appearing that the same has failed to comply with the requirement of notice prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, the same is hereby DENIED for being a mere scrap of paper.

SO ORDERED.[17]

Hence, this petition by the People through Regional State Prosecutor Santiago Turingan and State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino. Petitioner attributes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondent judge, viz:[18]

1. RESPONDENT JUDGE DISMISSED THE INFORMATION WITHOUT THE REQUIRED SUPPORTING FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES;

2. RESPONDENT JUDGE DELIBERATELY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IGNORED THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN FAVOR OF THE PROSECUTION WITHOUT THE REQUIRED SUFFICIENCY OF REBUTTAL EVIDENCE. THE WORD MAY IN SEC. 4, RULE 112 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS NOT MANDATORY;

3. RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN DELIBERATELY IGNORING THE JUDICIALLY KNOWN INHIBITION OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR AND THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER;

4. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN INTERFERING WITH THE PURELY EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF FILING AN INFORMATION BY RULING ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE FILING OFFICER TO FILE THE INFORMATION.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its comment[19] in compliance with this Courts Resolution dated September 23, 2002.[20] It opines that the dismissal of the information is mandated under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Private respondent contends that:[21] 1) the instant petition was filed out of time; 2) the special State Prosecutor is only authorized to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecution of SSS cases and not to sign the information; and 3) the City Prosecutor did not expressly inhibit himself from handling SSS cases nor signing the information.

We shall first resolve the procedural issues. Respondent contends that the motion for reconsideration filed on April 1, 2002 is late because it was filed eighteen days after March 14, 2002, the date when petitioner received the first questioned order. Respondent has overlooked that the 15th day after March 14 is a Good Friday. Hence, petitioners last day to file the motion for reconsideration was on the next working day after Good Friday, April 1.[22]

Next, respondent argues that having been considered as a mere scrap of paper, the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner did not toll the running of the reglementary period. Respondent, however, erroneously assumes that the present case is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. As stated at the outset, this is an original petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65.

Sec. 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court is clear. It provides that (a) pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of appeal. (emphases supplied) Hence, the same provision has no application in the case at bar.

The reckoning date is the receipt of the second questioned Order and not the receipt of the first. Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by En Banc Resolution A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, September 1, 2000, provides, viz:

Sec. 4. When and where petition filed.-- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60)- day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

x x x x x x x x x

As shown by the records, petitioner received the first questioned order dated February 26, 2002 on March 14, 2002.[23] A motion for reconsideration was timely filed on April 1, 2002[24] which was dismissed for lack of notice of hearing in an Order dated April 3, 2002.[25] This second questioned order was received by petitioner on April 11, 2002.[26] A motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari was filed on April 18, 2002.[27] A motion for leave to file and admit the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed on May 29, 2002.[28] Having been filed within the reglementary period, petitioners motion for leave to file the instant petition was granted in this Courts Resolution dated July 15, 2002.[29]

We now come to the other issue: whether the prior written authority and approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor is necessary in filing the information at bar.

Petitioner takes the unbending view that the approval of the city or provincial prosecutor is no longer required. It is contended that the Regional State Prosecutor has already directed the city or provincial prosecutor to inhibit from handling SSS cases.[30] Petitioner cites the letter of Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan to SSS Regional Director in Naga City dated June 6, 1997[31] and copies of Regional Orders No. 97-024-A[32] and 2001-033[33] dated July 14, 1997 and September 28, 2001, respectively, showing the designation of State Prosecutor Tolentino as special prosecutor for SSS cases in Region V. Petitioner relies on Galvez, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.[34] and Sanchez v. Demetriou, et al.[35] to prop up its contention that given the designation of State Prosecutor Tolentino, the city prosecutor need not participate in the filing and prosecution of the information in the case at bar.

We disagree. Under Presidential Decree No. 1275, the powers of a Regional State Prosecutor are as follows:

Sec. 8. The Regional State Prosecution Office: Functions of Regional State Prosecutor. - The Regional State Prosecutor shall, under the control of the Secretary of Justice, have the following functions:

a) Implement policies, plans, programs, memoranda, orders, circulars and rules and regulations of the Department of Justice relative to the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases in his region.

b) Exercise immediate administrative supervision over all provincial and city fiscals and other prosecuting officers of provinces and cities comprised within his region.

c) Prosecute any case arising within the region.

d) With respect to his regional office and the offices of the provincial and city fiscals within his region, he shall:

1) Appoint such member of subordinate officers and employees as may be necessary; and approve transfers of subordinate personnel within the jurisdiction of the regional office.

2) Investigate administrative complaints against fiscals and other prosecuting officers within his region and submit his recommendation thereon to the Secretary of Justice who shall, after review thereof, submit the appropriate recommendation to the Office of the President: Provided, that where the Secretary of Justice finds insufficient grounds for the filing of charges, he may render a decision of dismissal thereof.

3) Investigate administrative complaints against subordinate personnel of the region and submit his recommendations thereon to the Secretary of Justice who shall have the authority to render decision thereon. (emphases supplied)

The power of administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the department or its equivalent to generally oversee the operations of such agencies and to insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day activities; or require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit, performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the department; to take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of maladministration; and to review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them.[36] This is distinguished from the power of supervision and control which includes the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs.[37]

The Regional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only with the power of administrative supervision. As administrative supervisor, he has no power to direct the city and provincial prosecutors to inhibit from handling certain cases. At most, he can request for their inhibition. Hence, the said directive of the regional state prosecutor to the city and provincial prosecutors is questionable to say the least.

Petitioner cannot lean on the cases of Galvez and Sanchez. In those cases, the special prosecutors were acting under the directive of the Secretary of Justice. They were appointed in accordance with law. Nowhere in P.D. No. 1275 is the regional state prosecutor granted the power to appoint a special prosecutor armed with the authority to file an information without the prior written authority or approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. P.D. No. 1275 provides the manner by which special prosecutors are appointed, to wit:

Sec. 15. Special Counsels. - Whenever the exigencies of the service require the creation of positions of additional counsel to assist provincial and city fiscals in the discharge of their duties, positions of Special Counsels may be created by any province or city, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, and with salaries chargeable against provincial or city funds. The Secretary of Justice shall appoint said Special Counsels, upon recommendation of the provincial or city fiscal and regional state prosecutors concerned, either on permanent or temporary basis.

Special Counsel shall be appointed from members of the bar and shall be allowed not more than the salary rate provided in this Decree for the lowest rank or grade of assistant fiscal in the province or city where assigned. (emphases supplied)

Under Department Order No. 318,[38] Defining the authority, duties and responsibilities of regional state prosecutors, then Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III ordered the appointed regional state prosecutors (which included Regional State Prosecutor Turingan for Region V) to, among others, (i)nvestigate and/or prosecute, upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice, specific criminal cases filed within the region. (emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, there is no pretense that a directive was issued by the Secretary of Justice to Regional State Prosecutor Turingan to investigate and/or prosecute SSS cases filed within his territorial jurisdiction. A bare reading of the alleged letter of commendation by then Secretary Hernando Perez would show that it does not amount to a directive or even a recognition of this authority. In fact, while the letter of Secretary Perez commends the efforts of Regional State Prosecutor Turingan in successfully prosecuting SSS cases, it also negates his authority to prosecute them. Secretary Perez called the Regional State Prosecutors attention to DOJ Circular No. 27, series of 2001, which states that all important cases of the SSS should be referred to the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel.[39] Thus, Regional State Prosecutor Turingan cannot be considered a special prosecutor within the meaning of the law.

Petitioner argues that the word may is permissive. Hence, there are cases when prior written approval is not required, and this is one such instance. This is too simplistic an interpretation. Whether the word may is mandatory or directory depends on the context of its use. We agree with the OSG that the use of the permissive word may should be read together with the other provisions in the same section of the Rule. The paragraph immediately preceding the quoted provision shows that the word may is mandatory. It states:

Sec. 4, Rule 112. x x x

Within five (5) days from his resolution, he (investigating prosecutor) shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action. (emphasis supplied)

Having settled that the prior authority and approval of the city, provincial or chief state prosecutor should have been obtained, we shall now resolve the more important issue: whether the lack of prior written approval of the city, provincial or chief state prosecutor in the filing of an information is a defect in the information that is waived if not raised as an objection before arraignment.

We hold that it is not.

The provisions in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that demand illumination are Sections 3 and 9 of Rule 117 in relation to paragraph 3, Section 4 of Rule 112, to wit:

Rule 117, Section 3. Grounds.The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule. (emphasis supplied)

Rule 112, Section 4, paragraph 3 provides, viz:

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. (emphasis supplied)

Private respondent and the OSG take the position that the lack of prior authority or approval by the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor is an infirmity in the information that prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. Since lack of jurisdiction is a defect that may be raised as an objection anytime even after arraignment, the respondent judge did not err in granting the motion to dismiss based on this ground. As basis, they cite the case of Villa v. Ibaez, et al.[40] where we held, viz:

The defendant had pleaded to an information before he filed a motion to quash, and it is contended that by his plea he waived all objections to the informations. The contention is correct as far as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express provision of section 10 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court (now Section 9 of Rule 117), and by a long line of uniform decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. Now, the objection to the respondents actuations goes to the very foundation of the jurisdiction. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.[41] (emphasis supplied)

The case of Villa is authority for the principle that lack of authority on the part of the filing officer prevents the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law while jurisdiction over the case is invested by the act of plaintiff and attaches upon the filing of the complaint or information.[42] Hence, while a court may have jurisdiction over the subject matter, like a violation of the SSS Law, it does not acquire jurisdiction over the case itself until its jurisdiction is invoked with the filing of the information.

In the United States, an information has been held as a jurisdictional requirement upon which a defendant stands trial. Thus, it has been ruled that in the absence of probable cause, the court lacks jurisdiction to try the criminal offense.[43] In our jurisdiction, we have similarly held that:

While the choice of the court where to bring an action, where there are two or more courts having concurrent jurisdiction thereon, is a matter of procedure and not jurisdiction, as suggested by appellant, the moment such choice has been exercised, the matter becomes jurisdictional. Such choice is deemed made when the proper complaint or information is filed with the court having jurisdiction over the crime, and said court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, from which time the right and power of the court to try the accused attaches. (citations omitted) It is not for the defendant to exercise that choice, which is lodged upon those who may validly file or subscribe to the complaint or information under sections 2 and 3 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. [44] (emphasis supplied)

A closer look at Villa would be useful in resolving the issue at hand. In that case, Atty. Abelardo Subido, Chief of the Division of Investigation in the Office of the Mayor of Manila, was appointed by the Secretary of Justice as special counsel to assist the City Fiscal of Manila in the cases involving city government officials or employees. Pursuant to his appointment, Atty. Subido filed an information against Pedro Villa for falsification of a payroll. Atty. Subidos authority to file the information was challenged on the ground that he was disqualified for appointment under Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144, to wit:

SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal. The Secretary of Justice may appoint any lawyer, being either a subordinate from his office or a competent person not in the public service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his duties, and with the same authority therein as might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General.[45]

We held, viz:

Appointments by the Secretary of Justice in virtue of the foregoing provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, were upheld in Lo Cham vs. Ocampo et al., 44 Official Gazette, 458, and Go Cam et al., vs. Gatmaitan et al., (47 Official Gazette, 5092). But in those cases, the appointees were officials or employees in one or another of the bureaus or offices under the Department of Justice, and were rightly considered subordinates in the office of the Secretary of Justice within the meaning of section 1686, ante.

The case at bar does not come within the rationale of the above decisions. Attorney Subido is a regular officer or employee in the Department of Interior, more particularly in the City Mayors office. For this reason, he belongs to the class of persons disqualified for appointment to the post of special counsel.

That to be eligible as special counsel to aid a fiscal the appointee must be either an employee or officer in the Department of Justice is so manifest from a bare reading of section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code as to preclude construction. And the limitation of the range of choice in the appointment or designation is not without reason.

The obvious reason is to have appointed only lawyers over whom the Secretary of Justice can exercise exclusive and absolute power of supervision. An appointee from a branch of the government outside the Department of Justice would owe obedience to, and be subject to orders by, mutually independent superiors having, possibly, antagonistic interests. Referring particularly to the case at hand for illustration, Attorney Subido could be recalled or his time and attention be required elsewhere by the Secretary of Interior or the City Mayor while he was discharging his duties as public prosecutor, and the Secretary of Justice would be helpless to stop such recall or interference. An eventuality or state of affairs so undesirable, not to say detrimental to the public service and specially the administration of justice, the Legislature wisely intended to avoid.

The application of the 1951 Villa ruling is not confined to instances where the person who filed the information is disqualified from being a special prosecutor under Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, but has been extended to various cases where the information was filed by an unauthorized officer as in the case at bar. In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[46] the Court held that it is a fundamental principle that when on its face the information is null and void for lack of authority to file the same, it cannot be cured nor resurrected by amendment. In that case, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) conducted an investigation and filed an information with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner Roman Cruz, Jr. charging him with graft and corruption. The petitioner sought to quash the information on the ground that the crime charged did not constitute a Marcos crony related crime over which the PCGG had authority to investigate and file an information. The Court found that the crime alleged in the information was not among those which PCGG was authorized to investigate under Executive Orders No. 1 and 14 of then President Corazon Aquino and ruled that the information was null and void. Of similar import is Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[47] where we ruled that the information having been filed by an unauthorized party (the PCGG), the information was fatally flawed. We noted that this defect is not a mere remediable defect of form, but a defect that could not be cured.

In Cudia v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[48] we also reiterated the Villa ruling. The accused in that case was apprehended in Mabalacat, Pampanga for illegal possession of firearms and was brought to Angeles City where the headquarters of the arresting officers was located. The City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information in the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. We invalidated the information filed by the City Prosecutor because he had no territorial jurisdiction, as the offense was committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga and his territorial jurisdiction was only in Angeles City. We held that an information, when required by law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another.[49] Otherwise, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.[50] It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused and the subject matter thereof. The accuseds plea to an information may be a waiver of all formal objections to the said information but not when there is want of jurisdiction. Questions relating to lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. An infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.[51]

Despite modifications of the provisions on unauthorized filing of information contained in the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure under which Villa was decided, the 1951 Villa ruling continues to be the prevailing case law on the matter.[52]

The 1940 Rules of Court provided in Rule 113, Section 10 that, if the defendant fails to move to quash the complaint or information before he pleads thereto, he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash except (1) when the complaint or information does not charge an offense or (2) the court is without jurisdiction of the same. (emphasis ours) Among the enumerated grounds for a motion to quash under Section 2 of the same Rule was (t)hat the fiscal has no authority to file the information. With only the above two exceptions provided by the 1940 Rules, the Court nevertheless made the Villa ruling that if the filing officer lacks authority to file the information, jurisdiction is not conferred on the court and this infirmity cannot be cured by silence or waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent.

The 1940 Rules of Court was amended in 1964. With only minimal changes introduced, the 1964 Rules of Court contained provisions on unauthorized filing of information similar to the above provisions of the 1940 Rules.[53]

Then came the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Lack of authority of the officer who filed the information was also a ground for a motion to quash under these rules. The 1985 Rules also provided for waiver of the grounds for a motion to quash under Rule 117, Section 8, but enumerated the following exceptions to the waiver: (a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused; (c) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (d) the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged. Apparently, the want of jurisdiction under the 1985 Rules refers to jurisdiction over the offense and the person, and not over the case as in Villa where the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for lack of authority of the officer who filed the information. Still, despite the enumeration, the Court continued to apply the Villa ruling as shown in the afore-cited Cruz and Cudia cases.

The 1985 Rules was amended in 2000. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure also provide for lack of authority of the filing officer as among the grounds for a motion to quash and the waiver of these grounds. Similar to the 1985 Rules, the Revised Rules enumerate the exceptions from the waiver, namely: (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (d) that the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Under the regime of the 2000 Revised Rules, we reiterated the Villa ruling in the above-cited Romualdez case. With the enumeration of the four exceptions, which was almost a replica of the enumeration in the 1985 Rules, the 2000 Rules did not intend to abandon Villa. The Villa ruling subsisted alongside the enumerated exceptions under the 1985 Rules, and it remains to do so under the enumerated exceptions under the 2000 Rules. Neither the Rationale of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court evinces any intent to abandon the doctrine enunciated in Villa.

In sum, we hold that, in the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written approval of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the information in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 was filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in the information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The respondent courts orders dated February 26, 2002 and April 3, 2002 are AFFIRMED. Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new information by an authorized officer.

SO ORDERED.

G. R. No. 156982.September 8, 2004]NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION,petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT, JUANITO G. ESPINO, Director IV, NCR, Commission on Audit, and ERNESTO C. EULALIA, Resident Auditor, National Amnesty Commission.respondents.D E C I S I O NCORONA,J.:This petition for review[1]seeks to annul the two decisions of respondent Commission on Audit (COA)[2]dated July 26, 2001[3]and January 30, 2003,[4]affirming the September 21, 1998 ruling[5]of the National Government Audit Office (NGAO). The latter in turn upheld Auditor Ernesto C.Eulaliasorder disallowing the payment ofhonorariato the representatives of petitionersex officiomembers, per COA Memorandum No. 97-038.Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347.The NAC is tasked toreceive,process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government asex officiomembers.[6]It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the threeex officiomembers turned over said responsibility to their representatives whowere paidhonorariabeginning December 12, 1994.However, on October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditorEulaliadisallowed on audit the payment ofhonorariato these representatives amounting toP255,750for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038. On September 1, 1998, the NGAO upheld the auditors order and notices of disallowance were subsequently issued to the following:[7]REPRESENTATIVESAMOUNT1.CesarAverillaDepartment of National DefenseP2,500.002.Ramon MartinezDepartment of National Defense73,750.003.CielitoMindaro,Department of Justice18,750.004.PuritaDeynataDepartment of Justice62,000.005.Alberto BernardoDepartment of the InteriorAnd Local Government71,250.006.StephenVillaflorDepartment of the Interior andLocal Government26,250.007.ArtemioAspirasDepartment of Justice1,250.00P255,750.00Meanwhile, on April 28, 1999, the NAC passed Administrative Order No. 2 (the new Implementing Rules and Regulations of Proclamation No. 347), which was approved by then President Joseph Estrada on October 19, 1999.Section 1, Rule II thereof provides:Section 1, Composition The NAC shall be composed of seven (7) members:a) A Chairperson who shall beappointedby the President;b) Three (3) Commissioners who shall beappointedby the President;c) Three (3) Ex-officio Members1. Secretary of Justice2. Secretary of National Defense3. Secretary of the Interior and Local GovernmentTheex officiomembers maydesignatetheirrepresentativesto the Commission. Said Representatives shall beentitled toper diems,allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized by law.(Emphasis supplied)Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing before the COA the rulings of the resident auditor and the NGAO disallowing payment ofhonorariato theex officiomembers representatives, to no avail.Hence, on March 14, 2003, the NAC filed the present petition, contending that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in:(1) implementing COA Memorandum No. 97-038 without the required notice and publication under Article 2 of the Civil Code;(2) invoking paragraph 2, Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution to sustain the disallowance ofhonorariaunder said Memorandum; (3) applying the Memorandum to the NACex officiomembers representatives who were all appointive officials with ranks below that of an Assistant Secretary; (4) interpreting laws and rules outside of its mandate and declaring Section 1, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 2 null and void, and (5) disallowing the payment ofhonorariaon the ground of lack of authority of representatives to attend the NAC meetings in behalf of theex officiomembers.[8]We hold that the position of petitioner NAC is against the law and jurisprudence. The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grantper diem,honorariaor any allowance whatsoever to the NACex officiomembers official representatives.The Constitution mandates the Commission on Audit to ensure that the funds and properties of the government are validly, efficiently and conscientiously used. Thus, Article IX-D of the Constitution ordains the COA to exercise exclusive and broad auditing powers over all government entities or trustees, without any exception:Section 2.(1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty toexamine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government,or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution;(b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by law of the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.(2)The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, todefine the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods requiredtherefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, inexpensive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.Section 3.No lawshall be passedexempting any entityof the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds,from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.(Emphasis supplied).It is in accordance with this constitutional mandate that the COA issued Memorandum No. 97-038 on September 19, 1997:COMMISSION ON AUDIT MEMORANDUM NO.97-038SUBJECT:Implementation of Senate Committee Report No. 509, Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations and Committee on Civil Service and Government Reorganization.The Commission received a copy of Senate Committee Report No. 509 urging the Commission on Auditto immediately cause the disallowance of any payment of any form of additional compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple positions, and to effect the refund of any and all such additional compensation given to and received by the officials concerned, or their representatives, from the time of the finality of the Supreme Court ruling inCivil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretaryto the present.In the Civil Liberties Union case, theSupreme Court ruled that Cabinet Secretaries, their deputies and assistants may not hold any other office or employment. It declared Executive Order 284 unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants to hold other offices in addition to their primary office and to receive compensationtherefor.The said decisionbecame final andexecutoryon August 19, 1991.In view thereof, all unit heads/auditors/team leaders of the national government agencies and government owned or controlled corporations which have effected payment of subject allowances, are directed to implement the recommendation contained in the subject Senate Committee Report by undertaking the following audit action:1.On accounts that have not been audited and settled under certificate of settlements and balances on record from August 19, 1991 to present to immediately issue the Notices of disallowance and corresponding certificate of settlements and balances.2.On accounts that have been audited and settled under certificate of settlements and balances on record to review and re-open said accounts, issue the corresponding notices of disallowance, and certify a new balance thereon.It is understood that the re-opening of accounts shall be limited to those that were settled within the prescriptive period of three (3) years prescribed in Section 52 of P.D. 1445.3.On disallowances previously made on these accounts to submit a report on the status of the disallowances indicating whether those have been refunded/settled or have become final andexecutoryand the latest action taken by the Auditor thereon.All auditors concerned shall ensure that all documents evidencing the disallowed payments are kept intact on file in their respective offices.Any problem/issue arising from the implementation of this Memorandum shall be brought promptly to the attention of the Committee created under COA Officer Order No. 97-698 thru the Director concerned, for immediate resolution.An initial report on the implementation of this Memorandum shall be submitted to the Directors concerned not later than October 31, 1997. Thereafter, a quarterly progress report on the status of disallowances made shall be submitted, until all the disallowances shall have been enforced.The Committee created under COA Office Order No. 97-698, dated September 10, 1997, shall supervise the implementation of this Memorandum which shall take effect immediately and shall submit a consolidated report thereon in response to the recommendation of the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation and Committee on Civil Service and Government Reorganization.[9](Emphasis supplied)Contrary to petitioners claim, COA Memorandum No.97-038 does not need, for validity andeffectivity, the publication required by Article 2 of the Civil Code:Art. 2.Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in theOfficial Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.We clarified this publication requirement inTaadavs.Tuvera:[10][A]llstatutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for theireffectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a differenteffectivitydate is fixed by the legislature.Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.(Emphasis supplied.)COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative regulation or letter of instruction which does not need publication to be effective and valid. It is not an implementing rule or regulation of a statute but a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and his official family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple offices and receiving double compensation.Six years prior to the issuance of COA Memorandum No. 97-038, the Court had the occasion to categorically explain this constitutional prohibition inCivil Liberties Union vs.TheExecutive Secretary:[11]Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides as follows:Sec. 13.The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.xxxxxxxxx[D]oesthe prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus:"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."We rule in the negative.xxxxxxxxxBut what is indeed significant is the fact thatalthough Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.xxxxxxxxxThus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. . . .xxxxxxxxxThe prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in anex-officiocapacity as provided by law and asrequiredby the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. xxxxxxxxx[T]he prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office."It refers to an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit Authority.xxxxxxxxxTheex-officioposition being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows thatthe official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position.The reason is that these services arealready paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.xxxxxxxxxxxx[E]x-officio posts held by the executive official concerned without additional compensation as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of his office do not fall under the definition of "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition...(Emphasissupplied).Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, such as theCivil Liberties Uniondoctrine, form part of our legal system.[12]Supreme Court decisions assume the same authority as valid statutes.[13]The Courts interpretation of the law is part of that law as of the date of enactment because its interpretation merely establishes the contemporary legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.[14]COA Memorandum No. 97-038 does not, in any manner or on its own, rule against or affect the right of any individual, except those provided for under the Constitution. Hence, publication of said Memorandum is not required for it to be valid, effective and enforceable.InCivil Liberties Union, we elucidated onthe two constitutional prohibitions against holding multiple positions in the government and receiving double compensation: (1) the blanket prohibition of paragraph 2, Section 7, Article IX-B on all government employees against holding multiple government offices, unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of their positions, and (2) the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII on the President and his official family from holding any other office, profession, business or financial interest, whether government or private, unless allowed by the Constitution.The NACex officiomembers representatives who were all appointive officials with ranks below Assistant Secretary are covered by the two constitutional prohibitions.First, the NACex officiomembers representatives are not exempt from the general prohibition because there is no law or administrative order creating a new office or position and authorizing additional compensationtherefor.Sections 54 and 56 of the Administrative Code of 1987 reiterate the constitutional prohibition against multiple positions in the government and receiving additional or double compensation:SEC. 54.Limitation on Appointment.(1) No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.xxxxxxxxx(3) Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.xxxxxxxxxSEC. 56.Additional or Double Compensation.--No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law nor accept without the consent of the President, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind form any foreign state.Pensions and gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation.RA 6758, the Salary Standardization Law, also bars the receipt of such additional emolument.The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere designation from theex officiomembers who were themselves also designated as such.There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. An appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office; a designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.[15]Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position.The legal basis of an employees right to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the position,[16]and not a mere designation.Second, theex officiomembers representatives are also covered by the strict constitutional prohibition imposed on the President and his official family.Again, inCivil Liberties Union,we held that cabinet secretaries, including their deputies and assistants, who hold positions inex officiocapacities, are proscribed from receiving additional compensation because their services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to their principal offices. Thus, in the attendance of the NAC meetings, theex officiomembers were not entitled to, and were in fact prohibited from, collecting extra compensation, whether it was calledper diem, honorarium,allowance or some other euphemism. Such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.Furthermore, inde la Cruz vs. COA[17]andBitoniovs. COA,[18]we upheldCOAsdisallowance of the payment ofhonorariaandper diemsto the officers concerned who sat asex officiomembers or alternates. The agent, alternate or representative cannot have a better right than his principal, theex officiomember. The laws, rules, prohibitions or restrictions that cover theex officiomember apply with equal force to his representative. In short, since theex officiomember is prohibited from receiving additional compensation for a position held in anex officiocapacity, so is his representative likewise restricted.The Court also finds that the re-opening of the NAC accounts within three years after its settlement is withinCOAsjurisdiction under Section 52 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, promulgated on June 11, 1978:SECTION 52.Opening and revision of settled accounts.(1) At any time before the expiration of three years after the settlement of any account by an auditor, the Commission maymotupropioreview and revise the account or settlement andcertifya new balance.More importantly, the Government is neverestoppedby the mistake or error on the part of its agents.[19]Erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not preclude subsequent corrective application of the statute.In declaring Section 1, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 2s. 1999 null and void, the COA ruled that:Petitioner further contends that with the new IRR issued by the NAC authorizing the ex-officio members to designate representatives to attend commission meetings and entitling them to receive per diems, honoraria and other allowances, there is now no legal impediment since it was approved by the President. This Commission begs to disagree. Said provision in the new IRR is null and void for having been promulgated in excess of its rule-making authority. Proclamation No. 347, the presidential issuance creating the NAC, makes no mention that representatives of ex-officio members can take the place of said ex-officio members during its meetings and can receive per diems and allowances. This being the case, the NAC, in the exercise of its quasi-legislative powers, cannot add, expand or enlarge the provisions of the issuance it seeks to implement without committing an ultraviresact.[20]We find that, on its face, Section 1, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 2 is valid, as it merely provides that:The ex officio members may designate their representatives to the Commission. Said Representatives shall be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized by law. (Emphasis supplied).The problem lies not in the administrative order but how the NAC and the COA interpreted it.First, the administrative order itself acknowledges that payment of allowances to the representatives must be authorized by the law, that is, the Constitution, statutes and judicial decisions. However, as already discussed, the payment of such allowances is not allowed, prohibited even.Second, the administrative order merely allows theex officiomembers to designate their representatives to NAC meetings but not to decide for them while attending such meetings. Section 4 of the administrative order categorically states:Decisions of the NAC shall be arrived at by a majority vote in a meeting where there is a quorum consisting of at least four members.Thus, although the administrative order does not preclude the representatives from attending the NAC meetings, they may do so only as guests or witnesses to the proceedings. They cannot substitute for theex officiomembers for purposes of determining quorum, participating in deliberations and making decisions.Lastly, we disagree withNACsposition that the representatives arede factoofficers and as such are entitled to allowances, pursuant to our pronouncement inCivil Liberties Union:where there is nodejureofficer, ade factoofficer, who in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensation attached to the office.Ade factoofficer derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. (He is) one who is in possession of an office and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent be not a mere volunteer.[21]The representatives cannot be consideredde factoofficers because they were not appointed but were merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not entitled to something their own principals are prohibited from receiving. Neither can they claim good faith, given the express prohibition of the Constitution and the finality of our decision inCivil Liberties Unionprior to their receipt of such allowances.WHEREFOREthe petition is herebyDISMISSEDfor lack of merit.SO ORDERED.

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:The instant consolidated petitions seek to annul and set aside the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court ofOlongapoCity, Branch 72, in Civil Case No. 20-0-04 and Civil Case No. 22-0-04, both dated May 24, 2004; and the February 14, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 83284, which declared Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156) unconstitutional.Said executive issuance prohibits the importation into the country, inclusive of the Special Economic and Freeport Zone or theSubicBay Freeport (SBF or Freeport), of used motor vehicles, subject to a few exceptions.The undisputed facts show that onDecember 12, 2002, President GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo, through Executive Secretary Alberto G.Romulo, issued EO 156, entitled PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE MOTOR VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES.The challenged provision states:3.1The importation into the country, inclusive of theFreeport, of all types of used motor vehicles is prohibited, except for the following:3.1.1A vehicle that is owned and for the personal use of a returning resident or immigrant and covered by an authority to import issued under the No-dollar Importation Program.Such vehicles cannot be resold for at least three (3) years;3.1.2A vehicle for the use of an official of the Diplomatic Corps and authorized to be imported by the Department of Foreign Affairs;3.1.3Trucks excluding pickup trucks;1.with GVW of 2.5-6.0 tons covered by an authority to import issued by the DTI.2.With GVW above 6.0 tons.3.1.4Buses:1.with GVW of 6-12 tons covered by an authority to import issued by DTI;2.with GVW above 12 tons.3.1.5Special purpose vehicles:1.fire trucks2.ambulances3.funeral hearse/coaches4.crane lorries5.tractor heads and truck tractors6.boom trucks7.tanker trucks8.tank lorries with high pressure spray gun9.reefers or refrigerated trucks10.mobile drilling derricks11.transit/concrete mixers12.mobile radiological units13.wreckers or tow trucks14.concrete pump trucks15.aerial/bucket flat-form trucks16.street sweepers17.vacuum trucks18.garbage compactors19.self loader trucks20.man lift trucks21.lighting trucks22.trucks mounted with special purpose equipment23.all other types of vehicle designed for a specific use.The issuance of EO 156 spawned three separate actions for declaratory relief before Branch 72 of theRegionalTrialCourtofOlongapoCity, all seeking the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Article 2, Section 3.1 of said executive order.The cases were filed by herein respondent entities, who or whose members, are classified asSubicBay Freeport Enterprises and engaged in the business of, among others, importing and/or trading used motor vehicles.G.R. No. 164171:On January 16, 2004, respondentsSouthwingHeavy Industries, Inc., (SOUTHWING) United Auctioneers, Inc. (UNITED AUCTIONEERS), andMicrovan, Inc. (MICROVAN), instituted a declaratory relief case docketed as Civil Case No. 20-0-04,[1]against the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Transportation and Communication, Commissioner of Customs, Assistant Secretary and Head of the Land Transportation Office,SubicBay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), Collector of Customs for the Port atSubicBay Freeport Zone, and the Chief of the Land Transportation Office atSubicBay Freeport Zone.SOUTHWING,UNITED AUCTIONEERSandMICROVANprayed that judgment be rendered (1) declaring Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 unconstitutional and illegal; (2) directing the Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs, Collector of Customs and the Chairman of the SBMA to allow the importation of used motor vehicles; (2) ordering the Land Transportation Office and its subordinates inside theSubicSpecial Economic Zone to process the registration of the imported used motor vehicles; and (3) in general, to allow the unimpeded entry and importation of used motor vehicles subject only to the payment of the required customs duties.Upon filing of petitioners answer/comment, respondentsSOUTHWINGandMICROVANfiled a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court.OnMay 24, 2004, a summary judgment was rendered declaring that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by the Constitution with Congress.The trial court further held that the proviso is contrary to the mandate of Republic Act No. 7227 (RA 7227) or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which allows the free flow of goods and capital within theFreeport.The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner declaring Executive Order 156 [Article 2, Section] 3.1 for being unconstitutional and illegal; directing respondents Collector of Customs based at SBMA to allow the importation and entry of used motor vehicles pursuant to the mandate of RA 7227; directing respondent Chiefof the Land Transportation Office and its subordinates inside theSubicSpecial Economic Zone or SBMA to process the registration of imported used motor vehicle; and in general, to allow unimpeded entry and importation of used motor vehicles to the Philippines subject only to the payment of the required customs duties.SO ORDERED.[2]From the foregoing decision, petitioners sought relief before this Courtviaa petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 164171.G.R. No. 164172:OnJanuary 20, 2004, respondentSubicIntegrated Macro Ventures Corporation (MACRO VENTURES) filed with the same trial court, a similar action for declaratory relief docketed as Civil Case No. 22-0-04,[3]with the same prayer and against the same parties[4]as those in Civil Case No. 20-0-04.In this case, the trial court likewise rendered a summary judgment onMay 24, 2004, holding that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, is repugnant to the constitution.[5]Elevated to this Courtviaa petition for review on certiorari, Civil Case No. 22-0-04 was docketed asG.R. No. 164172.G.R. No. 168741On January 22, 2003, respondent Motor Vehicle Importers Association ofSubicBay Freeport, Inc. (ASSOCIATION), filed another action for declaratory relief with essentially the same prayer as those in Civil Case No. 22-0-04 and Civil Case No. 20-0-04, against the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Chief of the Land Transportation Office, Commissioner of Customs, Collector of Customs at SBMA and the Chairman of SBMA.This was docketed as Civil Case No. 30-0-2003,[6]before the same trial court.In a decision datedMarch 10, 2004, the courta quogranted theASSOCIATIONsprayer and declared the assailed proviso as contrary to the Constitution, to wit:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner declaring Executive Order 156 [Article 2, Section] 3.1 for being unconstitutional and illegal; directing respondents Collector of Customs based at SBMA to allow the importation and entry of used motor vehicles pursuant to the mandate of RA 7227; directing respondent Chief of the Land Transportation Office and its subordinates inside theSubicSpecial Economic Zone or SBMA to process the registration of imported used motor vehicles; directing the respondent Chairman of the SBMA to allow the entry into theSubicSpecial Economic Zone or SBMA imported used motor vehicle; and in general, to allow unimpeded entry and importation of used motor vehicles to the Philippines subject only to the payment of the required customs duties.SO ORDERED.[7]Aggrieved, the petitioners in Civil Case No. 30-0-2003, filed a petition for certiorari[8]with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP. No. 83284) which denied the petition onFebruary 14, 2005and sustained the finding of the trial court that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, is void for being repugnant to the constitution.The dispositive portion thereof, reads:WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED.The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 72,OlongapoCity, in Civil Case No. 30-0-2003, accordingly, STANDS.SO ORDERED.[9]Theaforequoteddecision of the Court of Appeals was elevated to this Court and docketed as G.R. No. 168741.In a Resolution datedOctober 4, 2005,[10]said case was consolidated with G.R. No. 164171 and G.R. No. 164172.Petitioners are now before this Court contending that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is valid and applicable to the entire country, including theFreeeport.In support of their arguments, they raise procedural and substantive issues bearing on the constitutionality of the assailed proviso.Theprocedural issuesare: the lack of respondentslocusstandito question the validity of EO 156, the propriety of challenging EO 156 in a declaratory relief proceeding and the applicability of a judgment on the pleadings in this case.Petitioners argue that respondents will not be affected by the importation ban considering that their certificate of registration and tax exemption do not authorize them to engage in the importation and/or trading ofused cars.They also aver that the actions filed by respondents do not qualify as declaratory relief cases.Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for declaratory relief may be filed before there is a breach or violation of rights.Petitioners claim that there was already a breach of respondents supposed right because the cases were filed more than a year after the issuance of EO 156.In fact, in Civil Case No. 30-0-2003, numerous warrants of seizure and detention were issued against imported used motor vehicles belonging to respondentASSOCIATIONsmembers.Petitioners arguments lack merit.The established rule that the constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement[11]has been satisfied in the instant case.The broad subject of the prohibited importation is all types of used motor vehicles.Respondents would definitely suffer a direct injury from the implementation of EO 156 because their certificate of registration and tax exemption authorize them to trade and/or import newand usedmotor vehicles and spare parts, except used cars.[12]Other types of motor vehicles imported and/or traded by respondents and not falling within the category ofused carswould thus be subjected to the ban to the prejudice of their business. Undoubtedly, respondents have the legal standing to assail the validity of EO 156.As to the propriety of declaratory relief as a vehicle for assailing the executive issuance, suffice it to state that any breach of the rights of respondents will not affect the case.InCommission on Audit of the Province ofCebuv. Province ofCebu,[13]the Court entertained a suit for declaratory relief to finally settle the doubt as to the proper interpretation of the conflicting laws involved, notwithstanding a violation of the right of the party affected.We find no reason to deviate from said ruling mindful of the significance of the present case to the national economy.So also, summary judgments were properly rendered by the trial court because the issues involved in the instant case were pure questions of law.A motion forsummary judgment is premised on the assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either because these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact.It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the prompt disposition of a civil action in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact.[14]At any rate, even assuming the procedural flaws raised by petitioners truly exist, the Court is not precluded from brushing aside these technicalities and taking cognizance of the action filed by respondents considering its importance to the public and in keeping with the duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution.[15]We now come to thesubstantive issues, which are: (1) whether there is statutory basis for the issuance of EO 156; and (2) if the answer is in the affirmative, whether the application of Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, reasonable and within the scope provided by law.The main thrust of the petition is that EO 156 is constitutional because it was issued pursuant to EO226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines and that its application should be extended to the Freeport because the guarantee of RA 7227 on the free flow of goods into the said zone is merely an exemption from customs duties and taxes on items brought into the Freeport and not an open floodgate for all kinds of goods and materials without restriction.In G.R. No. 168741, the Court of Appeals invalidated Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, on the ground of lack of any statutory basis for the President to issue the same.It held that the prohibition on the importation of used motor vehicles is an exercise of police power vested on the legislature and absent any enabling law, the exercise thereof by the President through an executive issuance, is void.Police power isinherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society.It is lodged primarily with the legislature.By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including thebarangay.[16]Such delegation confers upon the Presidentquasi-legislative powerwhich may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy.[17]To be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the following requisites:(1)Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;(2)It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;(3)It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and(4)It must be reasonable.[18]Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, EO 156 actually satisfied thefirst requisiteof a valid administrative order.It has both constitutional and statutory bases.Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution.It provides:(2)The Congress may, bylaw, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage andwharfagedues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.[19](Emphasis supplied)The relevant statutes to execute this provision are:1)TheTariff and Customs Codewhich authorizes the President, in the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, to,interalia, prohibit the importation of any commodity.Section 401 thereof, reads:Sec. 401. Flexible Clause. a.In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, and subject to the limitations herein prescribed, the President, upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as NEDA), is hereby empowered:xxx(2)to establish import quota or to ban imports of any commodity, as may be necessary;xxxProvided, That upon periodic investigations by the Tariff Commission and recommendation of the NEDA, the President may cause a gradual reduction of protection levels granted in Section One hundred and four of this Code, including those subsequently granted pursuant to this section.(Emphasis supplied)2)Executive Order No. 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines which was issued on July 16, 1987, by then President Corazon C.Aquino, in the exercise of legislative power under the Provisional Freedom Constitution,[20]empowers the President to approve or reject the prohibition on the importation of any equipment or raw materials or finished products.Pertinent provisions thereof, read:ART. 4. Composition of the board.The Board of Investments shall be composed of seven (7) governors: The Secretary of Trade and Industry, three (3) Undersecretaries of Trade and Industry to be chosen by the President; and three (3) representatives from the government agencies and the private sector xxx.ART. 7.Powers and duties of the Board.xxxx(12)Formulate and implement rationalization programs for certain industries whose operation may result in dislocation, overcrowding or inefficient use of resources, thus impeding economic growth.For this purpose, the Board may formulate guidelines for progressive manufacturing programs, local content programs, mandatory sourcing requirements and dispersal of industries.In appropriate cases and upon approval of the President, the Board may restrict, either totally or partially, the importation of any equipment or raw materials or finished products involved in the rationalization program;(Emphasis supplied)3)Republic Act No. 8800, otherwise known as the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA), and entitled An Act Protecting Local Industries By Providing Safeguard Measures To Be Undertaken In Response To Increased Imports And Providing Penalties For Violation Thereof,[21]designated the Secretaries[22]of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Department of Agriculture, in their capacity asalter egosof the President, as the implementing authorities of the safeguard measures, which include,interalia, modification or imposition of any quantitative restriction on the importation of a product into the Philippines.The purpose of the SMA is stated in the declaration of policy, thus:SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote competitiveness of domestic industries and producers based on sound industrial and agricultural development policies, and efficient use of human, natural and technical resources. In pursuit of this goal and in the public interest, the State shall provide safeguard measures to protect domestic industries and producers from increased imports which cause or threaten to cause serious injury to those domestic industries and producers.There are thus explicit constitutional and statutory permission authorizing the President to ban or regulate importation of articles and commodities into the country.Anent thesecond requisite, that is, that the order must be issued or promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, it is necessary that the nature of the administrative issuance is properly determined.As in the enactment of laws, the general rule is that, the promulgation of administrative issuances requires previous notice and hearing, the only exception being where the legislature itself requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation.[23]This exception pertains to the issuance oflegislative rulesas distinguished frominterpretative ruleswhich give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed;[24]and are designed merely to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.[25]Alegislative rule, on the other hand, is in the nature of subordinate legislation, crafted to implement a primary legislation.InCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,[26]andCommissioner of Internal Revenuev. Michel J.LhuillierPawnshop, Inc.,[27]the Court enunciated the doctrinethat when an administrative rulegoes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render less cumbersome the implementation of the law and substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard and, thereafter, to be duly informed, before the issuance is given the force and effect of law.In the instant case, EO 156 is obviously a legislative rule as it seeks to implement or execute primary legislative enactments intended to protect the domestic industry by imposing a ban on the importation of a specified product not previously subject to such prohibition.The due process requirements in the issuance thereof are embodied in Section401[28]of the Tariff and Customs Code and Sections 5 and 9 of the SMA[29]which essentially mandate the conduct of investigation and public hearings before the regulatory measure or importation ban may be issued.In the present case, respondents neither questioned before this Court nor with the courts below the procedure that paved the way for the issuance of EO 156.What they challenged in their petitions before the trial court was the absence of substantive due process in the issuance of the EO.[30]Their main contention before the courta quois that the importation ban is illogical and unfair because it unreasonably drives them out of business to the prejudice of the national economy.Considering the settled principle that in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, acts of the other branches of the government are presumed to be valid,[31]and there being no objection from the respondents as to the procedure in the promulgation of EO 156, the presumption is that said executive issuance duly complied with the procedures and limitations imposed by law.To determine whether EO 156 has complied with the third and fourth requisites of a valid administrative issuance, to wit, that it was issued within the scope of authority given by the legislature and that it is reasonable, an examination of the nature of a Freeport under RA 7227 and the primordial purpose of the importation ban under the questioned EO is necessary.RA 7227 was enacted providing for, among other things, the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark andSubicmilitary reservations and their extensions into alternative productive uses in the form of Special Economic and Freeport Zone, or theSubicBay Freeport, in order to promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular and the country in general.The Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227 specifically defines the territory comprising theSubicBay Freeport, referred to as the Special Economic and Freeport Zone in Section 12 of RA 7227 as "a separate customs territory consisting of the City ofOlongapoand the Municipality ofSubic, Province ofZambales, the lands occupied by theSubicNaval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Philippine-U.S. Military Base Agreement as amended and within the territorial jurisdiction ofMorongandHermosa, Province ofBataan, the metes and bounds of which shall be delineated by the President of the Philippines; provided further that pending establishment of secure perimeters around the entire SBF, the SBF shall refer to the area demarcated by the SBMA pursuant to Section 13[32]hereof."Among the salient provisions of RA 7227 are as follows:SECTION 12. SubicSpecial Economic Zone. xxxxThe abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following policies:xxxx(a)Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code, theSubicSpecial Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign investments;(b)TheSubicSpecial Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and exported out of theSubicSpecial Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment. However, exp