admin law cases chap 6

7/28/2019 Admin Law Cases Chap 6

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remedy; (8) when strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of controversy is private land;and (10) in quo-warranto proceeding (citation omitted).

In the courts opinion, however, the instant petition does not fall within any of the exceptions above -mentioned.

Gonzales v. CA (GR No. 106028; May 9, 2001) - Dulnuan

FACTS :

Petitioner Lilia Y. Gonzales received two Orders from the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued pursuant to the operation land transfer program of the government underPresidential Decree (PD) No. 27. Petitioner was directed to surrender the titles to her land and tosubmit the other requirements of the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines, while the said bank wasordered to pay the petitioner compensation for the two parcels of land.

The petitioner filed a Petition forCertiorari

and Prohibition with Temporary Restraining Order withthe Court of Appeals to restrain the enforcement and to annul the said two Orders of the DAR RegionalDirector on the ground of lack or excess of jurisdiction, alleging that the petitioner never filed a landtransfer claim and was not notified of nor heard in the execution of the final survey plans and thevaluation of her land.

The CA rendered a decision denying due course to, and dismissing the petition for failure of thepetitioners to exhaust administrative remedies.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE : W/N the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals comes withinthe exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies

HELD : NO. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts mustallow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities withinthe specialized areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previouserror committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courtsfrom entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resortto the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner.

After a careful perusal of the records, we find the doctrine of exhaustion of administrativeremedies to be applicable in this case.

The assailed orders involving parcels of land situated in Naga, Pototan, Iloilo were issued by theRegional Director of DAR Region VI Office in Iloilo City. A Regional Director is the head of a DAR RegionalOffice which, under the Administrative Code of 1987, is responsible for "supporting the field units andsupervising program implementation of the Department within the region" .[11] The function of the DARRegional Office includes "[implementing] laws, policies, plans, rules and regulations of the Departmentin the regional area" .[12] A similar function is delegated to the DAR Regional Offices under ExecutiveOrder No. 129- A[13] . With such a broad function and responsibility, it may be reasonably concluded thatthe issuance of the assailed orders pursuant to the operation land transfer and tenant emancipationprogram of the government is within the authority and jurisdiction of the DAR Regional
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Director. However, questions as to the propriety of the issuance could have still been raised before theproper administrative forum. Instead of going directly to the Court of Appeals on certiorari , thepetitioner should have sought redress in the DARAB, and the latter's officials should have beengiven an opportunity to review the matter and resolve the controversy.

Doctrine of Prior ResortIndustrial Enterprises Inc. v. CA (184 SCRA 462) - Dulnuan

FACTS :

Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Governmentthrough the Bureau of Energy Development (BED) for the exploration of two coal blocks in EasternSamar. Subsequently, IEI also applied with the then Ministry of Energy for another coal operatingcontract for the exploration of three additional coal blocks which, together with the original two blocks,comprised the so-called "Giporlos Area."

IEI was later on advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal supply-demand balance . . . the logical coal operator in the area should be the Marinduque Mining andIndustrial Corporation (MMIC), which was already developing the coal deposit in another area (BagacayArea) and that the Bagacay and Giporlos Areas should be awarded to MMIC. Thus, IEI and MMICexecuted a Memorandum of Agreement whereby IEI assigned and transferred to MMIC all its rights andinterests in the two coal blocks which are the subject of IEI's coal operating contract.

Subsequently, however, IEI filed an action for rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement withdamages against MMIC and the then Minister of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the Regional TrialCourt of Makati.

In a summary judgment, the Trial Court ordered the rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement. Inreversing the Trial Court, the Court of Appeals held that the rendition of the summary judgment was notproper since there were genuine issues in controversy between the parties, and more importantly, thatthe Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that, under Presidential Decree No. 1206,it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation anddevelopment of coal blocks.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE : Whether or not the civil court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for rescission of the

Memorandum of Agreement concerning a coal operating contract over coal blocks

HELD : While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil contractcognizable by a civil court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be rescinded isderived from a coal-operating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-bearinglands and the determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal operating contract over thesubject coal blocks to IEI would be in line with the integrated national program for coal-development


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and with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal-supply-demand balance, IEI's cause of action was not merely the rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. These are matters properly falling within the domain of the BED.

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in

many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It mayoccur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that thematter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requiresthe expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technicalmatters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in anadministrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter iswithin the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where aclaim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claimrequires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the specialcompetence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of

such issues to the administrative body for its view" (United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352U.S. 59, Emphasis supplied).

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coalareas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contractsover said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possessionof the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence todecide matters concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development andextraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. Itbehooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently they have statutory power to proceed in

recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.

One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and thedetermination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only byour regular courts (Antipolo Realty Corp. vs. National Housing Authority, 153 SCRA 399, at 407).

Doctrine of Finality of Administrative ActionSta. Rosa Mining v. Liedo (156 SCRA 1) - Dulnuan FACTS: Petitioner Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc. (petitioner, for short) is a mining corporation duly

organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It alleges that it is the holder of fifty (50) validmining claims situated in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, acquired under the provisions of the Act of the U.S. Congress dated 1 July 1902 (Philippine Bill of 1902, for short).

On 14 October 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1214 was issued, requiring holders of subsisting and validpatentable mining claims located under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a mining leaseapplication within one (1) year from the approval of the Decree. Petitioner accordingly filed a mininglease application, but "under protest," on 13 October 1978, with a reservation annotated on the back of


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its application that it is not waiving its rights over its mining claims until the validity of PresidentialDecree No. 1214 shall have been passed upon by this Court. 1

On 10 October 1978, or three (3) days before filing the disputed mining lease application, petitioner filedthis special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that it has no other plain, speedy and

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to protect its rights (except by said petition). Petitionerassails Presidential Decree No. 1214 as unconstitutional in that it amounts to a deprivation of propertywithout due process of law.

In answer, the respondents allege that petitioner has no standing to file the instant petition as it failedto fully exhaust administrative remedies. They cite the pendency of petitioner's appeal, with the Officeof the President, of the ruling of the respondent Secretary of Natural Resources issued on 2 April 1977 inDNR Case No. 4140, which upheld the decision of the Director of Mines finding that forty four (44) out of petitioner's fifty (50) mining claims were void for lack of valid "tie points" as required under thePhilippine Bill of 1902, and that all the mining claims had already been abandoned and cancelled, forpetitioner's non-compliance with the legal requirements of the same Phil. Bill of 1902 and ExecutiveOrder No. 141. 3

ISSUE: W/N

HELD: It is premature for the Court to make a finding on the matter of whether petitioner hadabandoned its mining claims. Until petitioner's appeal shall have been decided by the Office of thePresident, where it is pending, petitioner's attempt to seek judicial recognition of the continuing validityof its mining claims, cannot be entertained by the Court. As stated by the Court, applying the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies: "By its own act of appealing from the decision of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, and

without waiting for the latter's decision, the defendant cannot complain if the courts do not take actionbe fore the President has decided its appeal."

The decisions of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte in applications for land registration filedby third persons covering the area over which petitioner had located and registered its mining claims, ascited by petitioner, are inapplicable. Said decisions merely denied the applications of such third personsfor land registration over areas already covered by petitioner's mining claims, for failure to show titlesthat were registrable under the Torrens system; that was all. While the CFI made a statement in onecase declaring that the petitioner's mining claims are its vested property and even patentable at thattime, there is nothing in said CFI decision that squarely passed upon the question of whether petitionerhad valid, patentable (but still unpatented) mining claims which it had continued to maintain, in

compliance with the requirements of applicable laws. This question, which involves a finding of facts, isprecisely the issue before the Office of the President in the petitioner's appeal from the decision of theSecretary of Natural Resources in DNR Case No. 4140 holding that petitioner's mining claims areconsidered abandoned cancelled for failure of petitioner to comply with the requirements of thePhilippine Bill of 1902 and Executive Order No. 141. In short, the decisions of the Court of First Instanceof Camarines Norte, relied upon by petitioner, do not foreclose a proceeding, such as DNR Case No.4140, to determine whether petitioner's unpatented mining claims have remained valid and subsisting.


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Effect of Non- Compliance

Landbank v. CA (G.R. no. 126332, Nov. 16, 1999) (pending)

Exception to the Doctrine

Espina v. CA (294 SCRA 525) (pending)

Appeal to the President Appeal to the PresidentSuyat, Jr., v. Hon. Ruben Torres (G.R. No. 133530, Oct. 25, 2004) Dulnuan

FACTS:

This case stemmed from a criminal case of robbery where herein Prosecutor Suyat Jr was the reviewingprosecutor.

Imelda Torres, mother of suspects Randy and Nelson Torres following up with the case talked toProsecutor Suyat, Jr. who, initially, demanded her the sum of P20,000.00 for the dismissal of the caseagainst the latters two (2) sons and nephew Marlon Bonson. But after bargaining, Prosecutor Suyat, Jr.finally agreed to the sum of P15,000.00 to be given in his office the following day.

Upon consultation with her lawyer Imelda Torres immediately sought the assistance Anti-OrganizedCrime Division of the National Bureau of Investigation who set out to entrap Prosecutor Suyat Jr.

After the entrapment, an administrative complaint was filed with the Department of Justice accusingProsecutor Suyat, Jr. of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal of grave misconduct and receivingfor personal use of a fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course of official duties.

Finding a prima facie case of grave misconduct and receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or anyvaluable thing in the course of official duties against Prosecutor Suyat, Jr., Secretary Franklin M. Drilon of the Department of Justice issued a formal charge against Prosecutor Suyat, Jr.

After several hearings, Secretary Drilon recommended to the then Executive Secretary Teofisto T.Guingona, Jr. of the Office of the President the immediate dismissal of Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. from thegovernment service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law.

In response, the Executive Secretary issued a memorandum stating his concurrence with therecommendation of Secretary Drilon, and recommended to President Fidel V. Ramos the approval of theproposed Administrative Order dismissing Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. The Office of the President of thePhilippines thru then Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. issued the first questioned orderdismissing Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. from the government service with forfeiture of all benefits under thelaw as earlier adverted to.

Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. filed his first motion for reconsideration which was denied, this time, by newExecutive Secretary Ruben D. Torres in his second questioned order dated February 16, 1996. His twosubsequent MRs were likewise denied.


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The CA dismissed his petition for certiorari for being an inappropriate remedy.

ISSUE: W/N the Courts may validly take cognizance of a petition for certiorari of a decision by the OPthat has become final and executory?

HELD: NO. Administrative Order No. 95 of the President Had Become Final and Executory When the

Petitioner Filed His Petition For Certiorari in the Court of Appeals hence beyond the jurisdiction of theCA to alter, modify or reverse.

Instead of filing an appeal, the petitioner opted to file a second MR which is a prohibited pleading hencethe reglementary period within which to file an appeal was not tolled. The petitioner filed a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the saidRules because he realized that the period within which to file the said petition for review had lapsed,and that AO No. 95 of the President had become final and executory. By filing a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner sought to nullify the said order via an independentaction, in lieu of his lost right of appeal. But case law is that the existence and the availability of theright to appeal are antithetical to the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari. These two remediesare mutually exclusive.

admin law cases chap 6

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