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`LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS (Romero1,199!

FACTS

The residents of Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City raised a complaint

with the Laguna Lake Development Authority LLDA!, seeking to stop the operation

of the City "overnment of Caloocan of an #$% hectare open gar&age dumpsite inTala Estate, due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the pollutionof the surrounding water$

LLDA discovered that the City "overnment of Caloocan has &een maintaining the

open dumpsite at the Camarin Area without a re'uisi te Environmental ComplianceCertificate from the Environmental (anagement Bureau of the DE)*$ They alsofound the water to have &een directly contaminated &y the operation of thedumpsite$

LLDA issued a Ce"se "#$ Des%s& Or$eragainst the City "overnment and other

entities to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of

gar&age and other waste matter on the Camarin dumpsite$

The City "overnment went to the *egional Trial Court of Caloocan City to file an

action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order and sought to &edeclared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety andenhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a &alanced ecology within itsterritorial +urisdiction$

LLDA sought to dismiss the complaint, invoking the ollution Control Law that the

review of cease and desist orders of that nature falls under the Court of Appeals andnot the *TC$

*TC denied LLDA-s motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of preliminary in+unction

en+oining LLDA from enforcing the cease and desist order during the pendency ofthe case$

The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision that ruled that the LLDA '"s #o

o)er "#$ "*&'or%&+ &o %ss*e " e"se "#$ $es%s& or$er e#-o%#%#. &'e $*m%#.o/ ."r0".e$

The residents seek a review of the decision$

ISSUE

1

I love Justice Romero. Her decisions are so organised.


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9hile LLDA was not e=pressly conferred the power @to issue an ex-parte

cease and desist order in that language, the provision granting authorityto @make (!orders re'uiring the discontinuance of pollution, has thesame effect$

&$ )ecessarily implied powers$

Assuming ar"uendothat the cease and desist order was not e=pressly

conferred &y law, there is +urisprudence enough to the effect$

9hile it is a fundamental rule that "# "$m%#%s&r"&%ve ".e#+ '"s o#+

s*' o)er "s e2ress+ .r"#&e$ &o %& 0+ "),it is likewise a settledrule that "# "$m%#%s&r"&%ve ".e#+ '"s "so s*' o)ers "s "re#eess"r%+ %m%e$ %# &'e e2er%se o/ %&s e2ress o)ers32therwise,it will &e reduced to a @toothless paper agency$

:n #o$$ution Adjudication %oard vs &ourt of Appea$s,the Court ruled that

the AB has the power to issue an ex-partecease and desist order onprima facieevidence of an esta&lishment e=ceeding the allowa&lestandards set &y the antipollution laws of the country$

LLDA has &een vested with sufficiently &road powers in the regulation of

the pro+ects within the Laguna Lake region, and this includes theimplementation of relevant antipollution laws in the area$

UNION 4ANK v HLUR4 5 Gr%6o7A8*%#o 5 199

FACTS:

:n 835?, (artha David purchased from ereit *ealty Development *DC! acondominium unit for 485 paya&le in %1 e'ual monthly installments

:n 835#, *DC, without David-s knowledge and without prior approval from )A,mortgaged the condominium pro+ect to Bancom predecessor of Fnion Bank!

*DC failed to pay its o&ligation$ Conse'uently, Bancom foreclosed the mortgagedo& /0 condominium units, including the unit of David

The 7heriff issued a certificate of sale in favor ar East Bank since it was the

highest &idder

:n 83#3, David and Gua


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E2 %/# transferred the regulatory and 'uasi+udicial functions of )A to 7*Cuman 7ettlements *egulatory Commission! and in 83#%, E2 31 changed thename of 7*C to LF*B

:) T:7 CA7E, *DC-s act of mortgaging the condominium pro+ect to Bancomwithout the knowledge and consent of David and without the approval of )A nowLF*B! was not only an unsound real estate &usiness practice &ut also highly

pre+udicial to the &uyer

TF7, the case clearly falls under the +urisdiction of LF*B

The +urisdiction of the LF*B to regulate the real estate trade is &road enough toinclude +urisdiction over complaints for specific performance of the sale, orannulment of the mortgage, of a condominium unit with damages

AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE VS3 FACTORAN

Ose" v3 Am0ros%o

Carpio(orales, J$ K April 5, 411%

FACTS

:n June 8338, etitioner Edmundo 2sea and respondent Antonio Am&rosio

Am&rosio! entered into a Contract to 7ell a @ouse and Lot Fnit in asu&division$

:n )ovem&er 8338, Edmundo and Am&orsio forged a Deed of 7ale, where

Edmundo agreed to &uy the same house and lot su&+ect of the Contract to 7ell$

:n accordance with the @package deal provided in the Contract to 7ell, co

respondent *odolfo ere< was contracted &y Am&rosio to construct the houseof petitioner spouses with the specifications in the Contract to 7ell, Bill of(aterials and Approved Building lan &y the Building 2fficial of Gue


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or empowering such agency$

D )o$ 8?// grants to the LF*B +urisdiction in cases of. a! Fnsound real

estate &usiness practices &! Claims filed &y su&division lot or condominiumunit &uyer against the developer and c! Cases involving specific performanceof contractual and statutory o&ligations filed &y &uyers of su&division lotsagainst the developer$

D )o$ 305 provides that the LF*B shall have e=clusive +urisdiction to

regulate the real estate trade and &usiness$ E2 )o$ 31 names LF*B as the sole and regulatory &oard for housing$

The &usiness of developing su&divisions &eing im&ued with pu&lic interest and

welfare, any 'uestion arising from the e=ercise of that prerogative should &e&rought to the LF*B, which has the technical knowhow on the matter$ :n thee=ercise of its powers, the LF*B must commonly interpret and applycontracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts$ Thisancillary power is no longer a uni'uely +udicial function, e=ercisa&le only &y theregular courts$

:n &.. orres v. )i'ionada, 7C affirmed the competence of LF*B to award

damages although this is an essentially +udicial power e=ercisa&le only &ycourts of +ustice$

Fnder the $o&r%#e o/ r%m"r+ "$m%#%s&r"&%ve -*r%s$%&%o#, courts cannot or

will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand thee=ercise of sound administrative discretion re'uiring the special knowledge,e=perience, and services of the administrative tri&unal to determine technicaland intricate matters of fact$

LF*B has the e=pertise to determine the &asic technical issue of whether the

alleged deviations from the &uilding plans and the technical specificationsaffect the soundness and structural strength of the house$

etitioners attempt to separate their rights to the lot, which they admit is within

LF*B +urisdiction, and their rights to the house &uilt on the lot, which theyallege is enforcea&le in regular courts$

Both the Contract to 7ell and Deed of 7ale involve the sale and purchase ofthe @house and lot unit$ There is a clear intent &y the parties that the house"#$ lot &e treated as the single o&+ect of their contracts$

Allowing the splitting of a single cause of action would result in duplicity of

suits and possi&le conflicting findings &y 4 tri&unals on the same claim$

MATEO V3 CAAugust 8/, 8330 K J$ uno

F"&s

Fpon complaint of some (orong 9ater District (29AD! employees,

petitioners, all Board (em&ers of (29AD, conducted an investigation on

private respondent Edgar 7ta$ (aria, then "eneral (anager$

7ta$ (aria was then placed under preventive suspension and 7an Diego was

designated in his place$ 7ta$ (aria was later dismissed on January 5, 833?$

January 8#, 833? M private respondent filed a 7pecial Civil Action for Guo

9arranto and (andamus with preliminary in+unction &efore the *TC$

etitioner moved to dismiss the case on 4 grounds.

o Court had no +urisdiction over disciplinary actions of government

employees which is vested e=clusively in the Civil 7ervice Comissiono Guo warranto was not the proper remedy

(otion to dismiss and (* dismissed$

CA likewise dismissed petition and denied petitioner-s (*$

Iss*e


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rivate *espondent "randair applied for a Certificate of u&lic Convenience

and )ecessity with the Board$

Accordingly, the Chief earing 2fficer of the CAB issued a )otice of earing

setting the application for initial hearing and directing "randAir to serve a copyof the application and notice to all scheduled hilippine Domestic operators$

"randAir filed its Compliance, and re'uested for the issuance of a Temporary

2perating ermit

etitioner AL filed an 2pposition to the application for a Certificate of u&licConvenience and )ecessity with one of the grounds as. 8! CAB has no

+urisdiction to hear his application until the latter has first o&tained a franchiseto operate from Congress &ut the CAB Chief 2perating 2fficer denied theopposition

etitioner AL then opposed private respondentNs application for a temporary

permit since applicant didnNt possess the re'uired fitness and capa&ility andapplicant has failed to prove that thereNs a clear and urgent pu&lic need for theservices applied for

The Board approved the issuance of a Temporary 2perating ermit for a

period of ? months and it +ustified its assumption of +urisdiction over "randAirNsapplication

upon motion &y private respondent "randAir, the temporary permit was

e=tended for % months

Thus, this petition where petitioner AL argues that respondent %oard acted

'eyond its powers and jurisdiction in takin" co"ni*ance of +randAirsapp$ication for the issuance of a &ertificate of #u'$ic &onvenience andNecessity and in issuin" a temporary permit since +randAir didnt have a$e"is$ative franchise to en"a"e in schedu$ed domestic air transportation a$e"is$ative franchise may on$y 'e "ranted 'y &on"ress as espoused in ec. //,Art. /0 and ec. /, Art. 1 of &onsti0.

*espondent "randAi r re$ies on its interpretation of 2A 331 which fo$$ows the

pronouncements of the &A in Avia 4i$ipinas v &A% and i$an"an Airways v

+rand 5nt$ Airways where &A uphe$d the authority of the %oard to issue suchauthority in the a'sence of a $e"is$ative franchise which authority is derivedfrom ec /6 2A 331

:77FE7.

/. WoN &A% has jurisdiction over +randAirs App$ication for a emporary7peratin" #ermit8 9:

0. WoN a $e"is$ative franchise is an a'so$ute re;uirement for the %oard to haveauthority to issue &ertificates of #u'$ic &onvenience and Necessity8 N7

2See page 546 footnote of case

*AT:2.

8$ CAB has +urisdiction over "randAirNs Application for a Temporary 2peratingermit$ :n #AL v. &A% (/


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0+ se%/+%#. &'e re8*%reme#&s &o $e&erm%#e &'e ome&e#+ o/ "rose&%ve oer"&or &o e#.".e %# &'e *0% serv%e o/ "%r &r"#sor&"&%o#"#$ &'e roe$*re /or &'e roess%#. o/ "%"&%o# o/ " Cer&%/%"&e o/P*0% Co#ve#%e#e "#$ Neess%&+3

2. ThereNs nothing in the law nor in the Constitution that indicates that a legislativefranchise is an indispensa&le re'uirement for an entity to operate as adomestic air transport operator$ Although 7ec$ 88 of Art$ 84 recogni&ertificate of #u'$ic &onvenience? which is anauthori*ation issued for the operation of pu'$ic services for which no franchiseis re;uired 'y $aw.

The Court said that the terms @convenience and necessity, if used together in astatute, are usually construed together$ u&lic convenience and necessitye=ists when the proposed facility will meet a reasona&le want of the pu&lic andsupply a need which the e=isting facilities do not ade'uately afford$ :t doesnNtmean or re'uire an actual physical necessity or an indispensa&le thing$ :t is thelaw which determines the re'uisites for the issuance of the certification and notthe title indicating the certificate$

ER4 vs3 Co*r& o/ Ae"sangani&an, J$ K (arch 40, 8333

ACT7.- The mem&ers of the Association of (indanao :ndustries A(:! are enterprises

which were among those granted direct connection facility &y the )ational owerCorporation )apocor! although operating within the franchise area of :ligan Lightand ower, :nc$ :ligan!$

- :ligan filed with the Energy *egulatory Board E*B! a petition for the

3

See page 551 for the provision

implementation of the 83#5 Ca&inet olicy *eforms in the ower 7ector, prayingspecificaly that the direct supply of power to industries within its franchise areai$e$ A(:! &e discontinued &y )apocor$

- The Ca&inet olicy *eforms provides, in part.o @Continue direct connectionsOuntil such time as the appropriate

regulatory &oard determines that direct connetion of industry to )apocoris no longer necessary in the franchise areaO$with satisfactory

guarantees of nonpre+udice to industries$$- :n its petition, :ligan alleged that it can meet, even surpass the set of financial

standards adopted &y the E*B pursuant to the policy guidelines set &y theCa&inet$

- A(: filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the following grounds.o L" o/ -*r%s$%&%o# o# &'e "r& o/ ER4 &o 'e"r &'e e&%&%o#

o ailure to state a cause of action

o )on+oinder of indispensa&le parties

- CA held that the core of the issue is related to the distri&ution and marketing ofenergy resources and is hence within the +urisdiction of the Department ofEnergy, pursuant to *A 5%?#$

:77FE.- 92) the E*B has +urisdiction to hear and decide cases involving direct

connection issues$o :ligan claims that *A 5%?# transferred to the D2E E*B-s nonprice

regulatory powers and functions relative to the petroleum industry$ Thisargument was founded on the definition of ener"y sourceunder the act$

ELD.- )2$ ursuant to *A 5%?#, it is now the Department of Energy D2E! that has

+urisdiction$

*AT:2.

-The court cited the consolidated cases 8! )A2C2* vs$ CA and CagayanElectric ower and 4! hividec :ndustrial Authority vs$ CA and Cagayan Electricower, where it was held that.o The determination of which of the two pu&lic utilities has the right to supply

electric power to an area which is within the coverage of &oth is certainlynot a ratefi=ing function which should remain with the E*B$ :t deals withthe regulation of the distri&ution of energy resources, which under E2 854is a function of E*B$ owever, with the enactment of *A 5%?#, the D2Etook over such functions$

- :t is now the D2E that has +urisdiction over the regulation of the marketing and thedistri&ution of energy resources$ Although formerly &elonging to the E*B, *A 5%?#transferred the nonratefi=ing +urisdiction power and functions of the E*B to the

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D2E$- The application for the )C-s direct supply or disconnection of power involve

essentially the distri&ution of energy resources, and not &y any incident, thedetermination of power rates$ ence, these applications must &e resolved &y theD2E$

- Also, the argument that electricity is not an energy resource is wrong$ E2 854provides that.

o Energy *esource is defined as any su&stance or phenomenn which &yitself or in com&ination with othersOemanates, or generatesOenergy$

o Electric power or electricity is defined as an impondera&le and invisi&le

agent producing light, hear, chemical decomposition, and other physicalphenomena$

- Fndou&tedly, therefore, electricity, which produces energy, is an energy resource$The regulation of its distri&ution is, therefore, among those functions formerly&elonging to the E*B, which have &een transferred to the D2E$

UNILONGO VS CAApril 5, 1999; Kapunan, J.

FACTS:7to$ )ino de Cul de 7ac )eigh&orhood Association :nc$ 7)7)A:! wasincorporated and registered with the 7ecurities P E=change Commission 7EC! &ypetitioners Fnilongo "roup, comprising them as the original Board of Trustees$ owever,since no elections for a new Board of Trustees and for a new set of officers were heldfrom the time of its incorporation, the petitioners su&se'uently amended the 7)7)ANs &ylaws &y changing the term of office of the Board of Trustees from 8yr to 4 yrs$ Despiteamendments, elections were held &y private respondents Dino "roup, from where theyemerged as the new officers$ Then again, the Fnilongo group esta&lished 7to$ )ino deCul de 7ac omeowners Association :nc$ C7A! and registered the same with theome :nsurance "uarantee Corporation :"C!$ rom this arise the controversy on who

should represent the homeowners and hold the offices and positions therefrom$ rivaterespondents, in their 'uo warranto complaints, sought to ouster the Fnilongo group fromthe Board of Trustees of the 7)7)A: and to dissolve the CD7A and declare itsregistration with the :"C null and void for &eing in contravention of law and illegallyformed$ :n response, two pleadings, an answer with counterclaim and a motion todismiss on grounds of lack of +urisdiction over the su&+ect matter, were filed &ypetitioners$ They contended that disputes involving homeowners association fall underthe e=clusive +urisdiction of the :"C$ The motion to dismiss was denied$ Dissatisfied,petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohi&ition with the Court of Appeals, which

was again denied for lack of merit$ 2n appeal, petitioners contended that the regularcourts have no +urisdiction over intracorporate controversies$

ISSUE:9hether or not the regular courts have +urisdiction over intracorporatecontroversies$

HELD:NO3:"C has original and e=clusive +urisdiction over intracorporatecontroversies$ The +urisdiction of the 7EC over intracorporate matters concerninghomeowners association including their dissolution as found in $D 314A has &eentransferred to the ome :nsurance and "uarantee Corporation$ 9hatever am&iguities

that may arise regarding +urisdiction over 'uo warranto action against corporation orperson usurping corporate offices are classified and resolved &y the 8335 *ules of Civilrocedure, as amended$ Guo 9arranto actions against corporation or person usingcorporate offices fall under the +urisdiction of 7EC, unless otherwise provided for &y law,such as where the corporate entities involved are homeowners associations, in whichcase +urisdiction is lodged with the ome :nsurance and "uarantee Corporation :"C!$

De&"ve#&*res Reso*res, I#3 v3 C"0"&o K Guisum&ing,J$

FACTS

LA 2legario rendered a decision finding that the la&orers of "reen (ountainarms had &een illegally dismissed and that "reen (ountain arms, et al$

were guilty of Fnfair La&or ractice$

The la&orers filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of e=ecution &efore the

)L*C$

LA *ivera issued a writ of e=ecution, directing Deputy 7heriff Ientura to

e=ecute the +udgment against "reen (ountain arms, et al$o 7hreiff Ientura proceeded to garnish personal properties of "reen

(ountain arms, et al$, which were found to &e insufficient to satisfythe monetary award$

o 7heriff Ientura proceeded to levy upon a real property, registered in

the name of *o&erto 2ngpin, one of the respondents$

Deltaventures *esources, :nc$ filed a &'%r$7"r&+ "%m 0e/ore &'e NLRC,

asserting ownership over the property levied$o LA *ivera ordered the suspension of the auction sale until the merits

of petitionerNs claim has &een resolved$

owever, Deltaventures /%e$ " om"%#& /or %#-*#&%o# "#$ $"m".es with

prayer for the issuance of a temporary retraining order against the 7heriff onthe same grounds as the thirdparty claim! with the Re.%o#" Tr%" Co*r&$

o Deltaventures filed an amended complaint to implead LA *ivera and

the la&orers of "reen (ountain arms$

La&orers of "reen (ountain arms moved for the dismissal of the civil case on

the ground of the lack or +urisdiction of the *TCQ"*A)TED$

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ISSUE


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petitioner charged them with the full rate of electric consumption despite a&sence of anyincreases in the cost of energy$

The regional trial court is a court of general +urisdiction$ 2n the other hand, *epu&lic Act)o$ %85?, as amended &y residential Decree )o$ 841% empowered the E*B to regulateand fi= the power rates to &e charged &y electric companies$ The power to fi= rates ofelectric consumption does not carry with it the power to determine whether or not

petitioner is guilty of overcharging customers for consumption of electric power$ This fallswithin the +urisdiction of the regular courts$

9e have ruled that the 'uestion of determining the &reakdown and itemi? of *epu&lic Act )o$ %3?3 the ena&ling

charter of the CDA!$ owever, after e=amination of all the powers, functions, andresponsi&ilities enumerated in the section, there is no provision providing for such

ad+udicative powers$

o The language of *A )o$ %3?3 provides for purely administrative functions

which consist of policymaking, registration, fiscal and technicalassistance to cooperatives and implementation of cooperative laws$

o No)'ere %# &'e s"%$ ") "# %& 0e /o*#$ "#+ e2ress .r"#& &o &'e

CDA o/ "*&'or%&+ &o "$-*$%"&e ooer"&%ve $%s*&es3

At most, it could facilitate mediation and conciliation of disputes, and ># of the same

Act e=pressly states that if no mediation or conciliation succeeds within three ?!months, a certificate of nonresolution shall &e issued &y the commission prior to the

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filing of appropriate action &efore the proper courts$

Being an administrative agency, the CDA has only powers as are e=pressly granted

to it &y law and those which are necessarily implied in the e=ercise thereof$

Looking into the legislative records of deli&erations for the said act, it is clear that

the Congressmen intended the ordinary courts to resolve disputes &etween

cooperatives$

o This is in line with the policy of government granting autonomy to

cooperatives and minimising intervention in their own disputes that-s whythey encourage conciliation and mediation!$

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