administrative law cases - chapter 4

CASE DIGEST: CHAPTER IV ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ELECTION LAW

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Power of Adjudication

1) SANTIAGO JR. vs. BAUTISTA

32 SCRA 188, GR No. L-25024, March 30, 1970

2) ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. CA

169 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 76761, January 9, 1989

3) BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS & MORTGAGE BANK vs.

MONETARY BOARD

204 SCRA 767, G.R. No. 70054 December 11, 1991

4) CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. LUCAS

301 SCRA 560, Gr. No. 127838, January 21, 1999

5) DESIERTO vs. SILVESTRE

Gr. No. 145389, July 31, 2001

6) MABUHAY TEXTILE MILLS CORP. vs. ONGPIN

141 SCRA 437, G.R. No. L-67784 February 28, 1986

7) REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORP. vs. SENDINO

233 SCRA 665, G.R. No. 109703 July 5, 1994

8) REPUBLIC vs MIGRINO

189 SCRA 289, G.R. No. 89483, August 30, 1990


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SANTIAGO JR. vs. BAUTISTA

32 SCRA 188, GR No. L-25024, March 30, 1970

Facts:

Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd

honor. 2 days before his graduation, Ted and his parents sought the

invalidation of the ranking of the honor students. They filed a

Certiorari case against the principal and teachers who composed the

committee on rating honors.. Respondents filed a MTD claiming that

the action was improper, and even assuming it was proper, the

question has become academic (bc the graduation already

proceeded. They also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part

of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor

board, exercising judicial functions, under Rule 65, certiorari is a

remedy against judicial function

Issue:

Whether or not the a committees act of determining who

among the batch of graduating pupils should be ranked first, second

and third honors involves the exercise of a quasi-judicial power.

Or Whether or not the committees decision is subject to

judicial review by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court.

Held:

No. The court ruled that there could be no doubt that he

miserably failed to comply with the requirement of Rule 65. The

stubborn fact remains, however, that appellant had known of such

decision of the said committee of teachers much earlier, as shown

by the circumstance that according to him, even before the filing of

his petition with the lower court on the 19th of May, 1965, he had

personally appealed the said committee's decision with various

higher authorities of the above-named school, who merely passed

the buck to each other. Moreover, appellant mentions in his petition

various other documents or papers as the Service Manual for

Teachers allegedly violated by appellees in the constitution of their

committee; altered grading sheets; and erasures in his Grade I

certificate which appellant never bothered to attach to his

petition.

A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial

powers. The exercise of judicial function is the doing of something in

the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for

certiorari to exist,

Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises

judicial functions: 1) there must be specific controversy involving

rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and

determination. 2) that the tribunal must have the power and

authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision. 3) the

tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs

to the judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the executive)

It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to

determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are,

with respect to a matter in controversy.

Judicial power is defined: as authority to determine the

rights of persons or property; authority vested in some court, officer

or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or

property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of

adjudication.

The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining

cases before them. The construction of laws and the adjudication of

legal rights.

The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are

neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the performance of its

assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to

some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse

claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring there

from is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with

power and authority to determine.

As pointed out by appellees, however, there is nothing on

record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit

down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of

rating them for honors, such function involves the determination of

what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested

with judicial or quasi judicial functions.

WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is

difficult, if not impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or

quasi judicial acts, and there is considerable conflict in the decisions

in regard thereto, in connection with the law as to the right to the

writ of certiorari. It is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act

to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which

performs it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a

judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the

proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in

which that word is used when applied to the courts of justice, but it

is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act

judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public

character. ...' "In State ex rel. Board of Commrs. vs. Dunn (86 Minn.

301, 304), the following statements were made:

'The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial

and what are administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult

to determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the

performance of legislative or administrative duties, and the

performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a

measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said

generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what

the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a

matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that

authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts

judicially.


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ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. CA

169 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 76761, January 9, 1989

Facts:

Larrabaster applied with the National Land Settlement

Administration (NLSA) for a home lot at the Marbel Settlement

District, Cotabato and was granted. He leased the lot to private

respondent, Basilio MENDOZA, and tolerated Jorge Geller to squat

on the portion thereof. Land Settlement and Development

Corporation (LASEDECO) took over the functions of the NLSA.

Larrabaster and his wife assigned their rights and interests over the

Disputed Property to Jose B. PEA. Notwithstanding the transfer,

PEA allowed Mendoza and Geller to stay on the lot.

Republic Act No. 1160 transferred the custody and

administration of the Marbel Townsite to the National Resettlement

and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). PEA requested NARRA

to approve the transfer of rights but the latter did not act thereon in

view of Proclamation No. 336, series of 1956, returning to the

Bureau of Lands the disposition of the lots which remained

unallocated by the LASEDECO at the time of its abolition.

The Bureau of Lands did not act on PEA's request either,

prompting him to bring up the matter to the Board of Liquidators

(BOL).The BOL denied the request. PEA moved for reconsideration

but the BOL again denied the same under its Resolution No. 439,

series of 1967. PEA appealed to the Office of the President.

Upon PEA's motion for reconsideration, it was granted

and BOL approved his request.

Private respondent MENDOZA addressed a letter-protest

to the BOL and responded by advising MENDOZA to direct its protest

to the Office of the President. He did and while his protest with the

Office of the President was still pending, MENDOZA resorted to Civil

Case for certiorari before the then Court of First Instance of

Cotabato against the petitioners-public officials and PEA.

MENDOZA followed up with a Supplemental Petition to annul the

administrative Decision denying his protest. TC dismissed his

petition. CA reversed.

Issue:

Whether or not the CAgravely erred in holding that private

respondent basilio mendoza has been denied due process of law.

Held:

No. In ruling that the Decisions of the Office of the

President were vitiated by failure to accord due process of law to

MENDOZA, respondent Appellate Court relied on its observations

that MENDOZA was: (1) not made a party to the administrative case;

(2) not served with a copy of the 10 February 1969 Decision; and (3)

not notified of proceedings before the 13 May 1969 Decision nor

served a copy thereof.

The foregoing observations do not justify the conclusion

arrived at. After the Office of the President had rendered its

Decision dated 13 May 1969, MENDOZA filed a letter-protest on 1

August 1969 with the BOL. The latter office directed him to file his

protest with the Office of the President, which he did. On 28

September 1971, MENDOZA's request for reconsideration was

denied by said Office. So that, even assuming that there was

absence of notice and opportunity to be present in the

administrative proceedings prior to the rendition of the 10 February

1969 and 13 May 1969 Decisions by the Office of the President, such

procedural defect was cured when MENDOZA elevated his letter

protest to the Office of the President, which subjected the

controversy to appellate review but eventually denied

reconsideration.

Having thus been given a chance to be heard with respect

to his protest there is sufficient compliance with the requirements of

due process.

Substantial factual evidence support the questioned

administrative rulings. The Office of the President relied on the fact-

finding report of the BOL made sometime in 1969 with respect to

the Disputed Property to the effect that although the area of Lot No.

355 awarded to Larrabaster was 1,500 sq. ms., it was found situated

along a creek and that "it had increased in area to 3,616.93 square

meters by accretion."

Finally, invariable is the rule that in reviewing

administrative decisions of the Executive Branch of the government,

"the findings of fact made therein must be respected, as long as they

are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or

preponderant (Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil.

635 [1940]); that it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the

conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses, or

otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative

agency on the sufficiency of the evidence (Lao Tang Bun, et al. vs.

Fabre, 81 Phil. 682 [1948]); that the administrative decision in

matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on

proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law (Lovina vs.

Moreno L-17821, November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 557; Timbancaya vs.

Vicente, L-19100, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 852), which we find

absent herein.

BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS & MORTGAGE BANK vs. MONETARY

BOARD

204 SCRA 767, G.R. No. 70054 December 11, 1991

Facts:

On different occasions, Top Management

Program Corporatio n, Pilar Development Corpor ation, El

Grande Development Corporation obtained a loan from Banco

Filipino and Savings and Mortgage Bank secured by Real Estate

Mortgages.

When the bank suffered serious financial

problems, the Monetary Board issued resolution finding

the bank insolvent and placed it under receivership.-Banco Filipino filed a

complaint to set aside the said action of MB.-Subsequently, MB issued another

resolution placing the bank under liquidation and designating a liquidator.

Banco Filipino filed another petition questioning the validity of the said

resolution. A temporary restraining order was issued,


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however, acts pertaining to normal operations of a bank

are not enjoined.

A resolution was also issued ordering the conduct of hearings. In the

meantime, Top Management Program Corporation, Pilar Development Corporation,

El Grande Development Corporation failed to pay their obligations. The liquidator

extra judicially foreclosed the Real Estate Mortgages.

Each filed separately a petition for injunction and prohibition seeking to

enjoin the sheriff from proceeding with the foreclosure sale.

Petitions were dismissed. Hence, petitions were filed by Top

Management Program Corporation, Pilar Development Corporation, El Grande

Development Corporation alleging that the liquidator has no

authority to proceed with the foreclosure sale pending the resolution of the

issue on the validity of the closure and liquidation of Banco Filipino.

The petitioner also filed with the SC the instant petition for certiorari and

mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the resolution of the

Board as made without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, to

order respondents to furnish petitioner with the reports of examination which led to

its closure and to afford petitioner BF a hearing prior to any resolution that may be

used under Section 29 of RA 265 (Central Bank Act).

Issue:

Whether or not the closure and receivership of petitioner bank which

was ordered by respondent MB is valid.

Held:

No. It is null and void. The Central bank is vested with the authority to take

charge and administer the monetary and banking systems of the country and this

authority includes the power to examine and determine the financial condition of

banks for the purpose of closure ion the ground of insolvency.

Even if the bank is questioning the validity of its closure,

during the pendency of the case, the liquidator can continue prosecution

suits for collection and foreclosure of mortgages, as they are acts done In the usual

course of administration of the banks.

While the high tribunal recognized the actual closure of

Banco Filipino and the consequent legal effects thereof on its

operations, We cannot uphold the legality of its closure and thus

ruled that the closure and receivership of petitioner bank, which was

ordered by respondent Monetary Board on January 25, 1985, is null

and void.

Despite the existence of the partial list of findings in the

examination of the bank, there were still highly significant items to

be weighed and determined such as the matter of valuation

reserves, before these can be considered in the financial condition

of the bank. It would be a drastic move to conclude prematurely

that a bank is insolvent if the basis for such conclusion is lacking and

insufficient, especially if doubt exists as to whether such bases or

findings faithfully represent the real financial status of the bank.

The actuation of the Monetary Board in closing petitioner

bank on January 25, 1985 barely four days after a conference with

the latter on the examiners' partial findings on its financial position

is also violative of what was provided in the CB Manual of

Examination Procedures.

The basic standards of substantial due process were not

observed. However, as to the requirement of notice and hearing,

Sec. 29 of RA 265 does not require a previous hearing before the

Monetary Board implements the closure of a bank, since its action is

subject to judicial scrutiny as provided for under the same law (Rural

Bank of Bato v. IAC, G.R. No. 65642, October 15, 1984, Rural Bank v.

Court of Appeals, G.R. 61689, June 20, 1988,162 SCRA 288).

Notwithstanding the foregoing, administrative due process

does not mean that the other important principles may be

dispensed with, namely: the decision of the administrative body

must have something to support itself and the evidence must be

substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It

means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, supra). Hence,

where the decision is merely based upon pieces of documentary

evidence that are not sufficiently substantial and probative for the

purpose and conclusion they are presented, the standard of fairness

mandated in the due process clause is not met. In the case at bar,

the conclusion arrived at by the respondent Board that the

petitioner bank is in an illiquid financial position on January 23,

1985, as to justify its closure on January 25, 1985 cannot be given

weight and finality as the report itself admits the inadequacy of its

basis to support its conclusion.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. LUCAS

301 SCRA 560, Gr. No. 127838, January 21, 1999

Facts:

Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant information officer at the

Agricultural Information Division, Department of Agriculture (DA for

brevity), filed with the office of the Secretary, DA, an affidavit-

complaint against respondent Jose J. Lucas, a photographer of the

same agency, for misconduct, consisting of touching her thigh with

lascivious thought. Respondent denied the charges, he alleged that

he did not touch the thigh of complainant Linatok, that what

transpired was that he accidentally brushed Linatok's leg when he

reached for his shoes and that the same was merely accidental and

he did not intend nor was there malice when his hand got in contact

with Linatok's leg.

After a formal investigation by the Board of Personnel

Inquiry-BOPI, DA, the board issued a resolution finding respondent

guilty of simple misconduct

and recommending a penalty of

suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day. The Secretary of

Agriculture approved the recommendation.

Respondent appealed the decision to the Civil Service

Commission (CSC). CSC issued a resolution finding respondent guilty

of grave misconduct and imposing on him the penalty of dismissal

from the service. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the CSC

denied the motion.

Then, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. Court

of Appeals promulgated its decision setting aside the resolution of

the CSC and reinstating the resolution of the BOPI, DA.

The Court of Appeals further ruled that "a basic

requirement of due process on the other hand is that a person must


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be duly informed of the charges against him (Felicito Sajonas vs.

National Labor Relations Commission, 183 SCRA 182). In the instant

case however, Lucas came to know of the modification of the charge

against him only when he received notice of the resolution

dismissing him from the service.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Lucas was denied due process

when the CSC found him guilty of grave misconduct on a charge of

simple misconduct.

Held:

No. Petitioner anchors its position on the view that "the

formal charge against a respondent in an administrative case need

not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal

prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of

the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the

acts complained of, and not the designation of the offense. The

court denied the petition.

As well stated by the Court of Appeals, there is an existing

guideline of the CSC distinguishing simple and grave misconduct. In

the case of Landrito vs. Civil Service Commission, we held that "in

grave misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the

elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant

disregard of established rule, must be manifest, which is obviously

lacking in respondent's case. Respondent maintains that as he was

charged with simple misconduct, the CSC deprived him of his right to

due process by convicting him of grave misconduct.

The court sustained the ruling of the Court of Appeals

that: (a) a basic requirement of due process is that a person must be

duly informed of the charges against him and that (b) a person can

not be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged.

Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and

fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process

in investigations and hearings.

The right to substantive and

procedural due process is applicable in administrative proceedings.

DESIERTO vs. SILVESTRE

Gr. No. 145389, July 31, 2001

Facts:

On January 26, 2000, elements of Task Force "Aduana"

headed by petitioner Doctor conducted an entrapment operation in

a case of bribery involving Atty. Redempto C. Somera, Hearing

Officer, Law Division, Bureau of Customs, Manila, and Indian

nationals who had pending cases of seizure with the former.

After the pay-off materialized, petitioner Doctor

announced the entrapment and then arrested Atty. Somera and two

(2) Indian nationals, namely, Murli Tejoomal Mohrani and Kumar

Rupchand Khiatani, for violation of Article 210 of the Revised Penal

Code. As a consequence, the Task Force filed with the Regional Trial

Court, Manila, charges of bribery, violation of R. A. No. 3019, and

corruption of public officials against them.

Likewise, the Task Force filed with the Ombudsman

administrative charges for grave misconduct, dishonesty and

conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against

respondent Ronnie C. Silvestre and Atty. Somera.

Issue:

Whether or not the Ombudsman has authority to suspend

from office respondent Ronnie C. Silvestre indefinitely on the basis

of the administrative complaint filed with his office showing that

evidence of guilt is strong.

Held:

We need not resolve the issue presented. We dismiss the

petition. It has become moot.

On February 14, 2001, the Ombudsman dismissed the

administrative charges against respondent. In dismissing the

charges, the Ombudsman categorically ruled as follows: "It is

another story, however, as regards respondent SILVESTRE. In

implicating respondent SILVESTRE in the instant case, Atty. DOCTOR

stated in his AFFIDAVIT OF ARREST AND COMPLAINT, the following:

'6. That after the hearing of the case (S.I. No. 00-005) on

January 20, 2000, ATTY. SOMERA approached me and invited me to

the room of ATTY. RONNIE SILVESTRE (herein petitioner), Head of

the Law Department of the Port of Manila wherein the duo

convinced me to cooperate with them in the withdrawal of the

complaint and its eventual dismissal;

'7. That I did not commit myself to their proposition to

drop the case but I just continued talking with them with the plan in

mind to report the same to LT. GEN. JOSE T. CALIMLIM, Task Force

Commander of Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force ADUANA;'

"Except this bare allegation of the complainant, however,

practically no other evidence was ever presented to substantiate the

charge against respondent SILVESTRE. At this point, it may be noted

that well settled is the rule that within the field of administrative

law, while strict rules of evidence are not applicable to quasi-judicial

proceedings, nevertheless, in adducing evidence constitutive of

substantial evidence, the basic rule that mere allegation is not

evidence cannot be disregarded.

"We are, therefore inclined to believe the defense of

respondent SILVESTRE, that what was discussed between him,

respondent SOMERA and Atty. DOCTOR on January 20, 2000, was

the legal issue on the continued detention of some kitchen wares

which were not covered by the Warrant of Seizure and Detention

(WSD). This, in light of subsequent Order of the District Collector of

the Port of Manila dated March 2, 2000, releasing the said kitchen

wares which were indeed, not covered by the Warrant of Seizure

and Detention (WSD) x x x

"Worthy of note also is the DECISION of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 58958 dated August 14, 2000 entitled

RONNIE C. SILVESTRE vs. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO,

(pages 253 to 254, Records) where in granting the petition for

certiorari and prohibition involving the preventive suspension order

on respondent SILVESTRE, the said appellate court stated, thus:


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"xxx xxx xxx

"While the above DECISION may not necessarily be

controlling in the resolution of the merits of the instant case insofar

as it pertains to respondent SILVESTRE, we cannot help but note its

relevancy inasmuch as practically no other evidence was presented

by the complainant, other than his AFFIDAVIT OF ARREST AND

COMPLAINT to support the charge against respondent SILVESTRE.

Needless to state, this is also the very same and only evidence

presented before the Court of Appeals which rendered the

aforequoted DECISION." WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSED

the petition for mootness.

MABUHAY TEXTILE MILLS CORP. vs. ONGPIN

141 SCRA 437, G.R. No. L-67784 February 28, 1986

Facts:

Petitioner Mabuhay Textile Mills Corporation (Mabuhay) is

a corporation engaged in the garments and textile import business

for the last twenty-seven years. Among the government

requirements for engaging in this type of business are the export

quota allocations issued by the respondent Garments and Textile

Export Board. The Board granted export quota allocations for 1983

to the petitioner.

The petitioner received a letter from the Board informing

it that its 1983 export quota allocations were revoked. Furthermore,

its major stockholders and officers were also distinguished from

engaging in business activities involving garment and textile exports.

The Bureau of Customs conducted an investigation

pursuant to the above initial findings. The petitioner moved to

reconsider the revocation of its export quota allocations and the

disqualification of its officers from the export business.

Commissioner of Customs responded through a letter-

comment addressed to the Board.

Petitioner filed an action for prohibition and injunction

with preliminary injunction and restraining order against the Board.

The trial court issued a restraining order directing the

Board and its officials to desist and to stop from implementing the

decision revoking the petitioner's export quota allocations and from

disqualifying its principal stockholder and officers from engaging in

the textile and garment export business. The Board moved to

reconsider but the same was denied.

The lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, and

among others directed the Board to issue to the petitioner within

two days from service of the writ.

The Board appealed the decision to the Intermediate

Appellate Court.

The appellate court modified the trial court's decision. It

affirmed all the findings of fact of the court and held that the

petitioner was denied due process by the Board when it cancelled

the export quota allocations.

However, the appellate court ordered the Board to give

the petitioner and its officers due hearing to determine whether or

not any of its rules and regulations had been violated as to warrant

the imposition of any penalty against them. Until such hearings were

held, the petitioner's export quota allocations were to remain

cancelled and its officers suspended. This modification is now the

subject of this petition.

The petitioner contended that the appellate court

committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered a new hearing

to be conducted unnecessarily since even without controverting

evidence, the evidence on record relied upon by the Board failed

miserably to measure up to the requisite of "substantial evidence."

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners contention is correct.

Held:

No. The court ruled that the contention has no merit.

Executive Order No. 823 provides, among others: The

GTEB shall have the following powers and functions: h. In case of

violations of its rules and regulations, cancel or suspend quota

allocations, export authorizations and licences for the operation of

bonded garment manufacturing warehouses. (Sec. 2[h] Exec. Order

No. 823 amended Sec. 3[h] of Exec. Order No. 537).

Likewise, under its Rules and Regulations, said Executive

Order provides: Rules and Regulations: Section III. Penalties.- Any act

or misrepresentation or violation of these Rules and Regulations

shall, after due hearing, constitute sufficient ground for the

imposition of a fine of not more than ten per cent (10%) of the gross

FOB value of the goods exported or for a total or partial forfeiture of

the offender's Export Quota, Export Authorization and Export

License and permit or temporary disqualification from enjoying the

privilege to export under all Agreements on textiles, without

prejudice to any liabilities under other applicable laws. (Sec. III, Part

111, Rules and Regulations).

It is clear from the above provisions that the respondent

Board is the body charged with the function of granting export

quota allocations, issuing licenses to operate bonded warehouses

and revoking or cancelling the same. Correspondingly, it is also

authorized to conduct hearings to determine whether or not

violations have been committed by the grantee .

The Board acted arbitrarily when, after acting solely upon

the initial findings of the Bureau of Customs, it issued the

questioned order but once the basis for its action proved non-

existent, it refused to lift its erroneous and unfounded order.

However, since the Board has reason to believe that the

petitioner might have violated its rules and regulations in

connection with the importation of materials for the petitioner's

garment industry then it has the discretion to conduct a proper

hearing to determine the petitioner's culpability or non-culpability. It

does not have to rely on the findings of other agencies to discharge

this function.


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In the case at bar, the petitioner was never given the

chance to present its side before its export quota allocations were

revoked and its officers suspended.

While it is true that such allocations as alleged by the

Board are mere privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it may

deem fit, these privileges have been accorded to petitioner for so

long that they have become impressed with property rights

especially since not only do these privileges determine the

continued existence of the petitioner with assets of over

P80,000,000.00 but also the livelihood of some 700 workers who are

employed by the petitioner and their families.

REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORP. vs. SENDINO

233 SCRA 665, G.R. No. 109703 July 5, 1994

Facts:

Private respondent Lucina C. Sendino entered into a

reservation agreement with Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for

a 120-square meter lot in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat,

Paranaque. He paid the full downpayment on the purchase price.

However, she was advised by REVI to change her co-maker, which

she agreed, asking for an extension of one month to do so.

For alleged non-compliance with the requirement of submission of

the appropriate documents under the terms of the original

agreement, REVI, informed respondent of the cancellation of the

contract.

Private respondent filed a complaint for Specific Performance

against REVI with the office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal

Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board

(HLURB)

The HLURB rendered its judgment in favor of private respondent and

ordered petitioners to continue with the sale of the house and lot

and to pay private respondent P5,000 as moral damages, P5,000 as

exemplary damages and P6,000 as attorney's fees and costs of the

suit. An appeal from this decision was taken to the HLURB OAALA

Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision. The decision of the

OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of the President (OP). The

OP rendered its decision dismissing the petitioners' appeal. The

Motion for reconsideration of the decision was likewise denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions.

Held:

Yes. The HLURB properly exercised its jurisdiction over the

case filed by the petitioners with its adjudicative body, the OAALA,

in ordering petitioners to comply with their obligations arising from

the Reservation Agreement.

In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial

powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in

the agency's enabling act. In view of the Court's pronouncement

in United Housing Corporation vs. Hon. Dayrit, supra, recognizing the

HLURB as the successor agency of the HSRC's powers and functions,

it therefore follows that the transfer of such functions from the NHA

to the HRSC effected by Section 8 of E.O. 648, series of 1981,

thereby resulted in the acquisition by the HLURB of adjudicatory

powers which included the power to "(h)ear and decide cases of

unsound real estate business practices . . . and cases of specific

performance."

Obviously, in the exercise of its powers and functions, the

HLURB must interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of

the parties under these contracts, and award damages whenever

appropriate.

Going to petitioners' contention that the decision of the

OAALA should have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners

sitting en banc, we find ample authority both in the statutes and

in jurisprudence-justifying the Board's act of dividing itself into

divisions of three. Under Section 5 of E.O. 648 which defines the

powers and duties of the Commission, the Board is specifically

mandated to "(a)dopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its

business" and perform such functions necessary for the effective

accomplishment of (its) above mentioned functions."

The practical necessity of establishing a procedure

whereby cases are decided by three (3) Commissioners furthermore

assumes greater significance when one notes that the HLURB, as

constituted, only has four (4) full time commissioners and five (5)

part time commissioners to deal with all the functions,

administrative, adjudicatory, or otherwise, entrusted to it.

It is settled that rules of procedure are as a matter of

course construed liberally in proceedings before administrative

bodies. In the instant case, the original suit for specific performance

and damages was filed by the private respondent with the HLURB-

OAALA, an administrative body not hamstrung by the strict

procedural technicalities of the Rules of Court. Under the

circumstances, it was certainly appropriate for the HLURB-OAALA to

have acted on the substantive questions relating to the validity of

petitioners' unilateral rescission of the contract without unduly

concerning itself with a mere procedural slip, the non-joinder of

private petitioner's husband in the original complaint before the

HLURB. Moreover, since petitioners participated in the

administrative proceedings without objecting to or raising the

procedural infirmity, they were certainly estopped from raising it on

appeal before the Office of the President and before this Court.


meikimouse

REPUBLIC vs MIGRINO

189 SCRA 289, G.R. No. 89483, August 30, 1990

Facts:

Acting on information received by the New AFP Anti-Graft

Board, which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful

income, private respondent Ret. Lt.Tecson was required by the

Board to submit his explanation/comment together with his

supporting evidence. Private respondent was unable to produce his

supporting evidence because they were allegedly in the custody of

his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. The Board proceeded with its

investigation and submitted its resolution, recommending that

private respondent be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act

No. 3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended.

The case was set for preliminary investigation by the

PCGG. Private respondent moved to dismiss the case on the

following grounds: (1) that the PCGG has no jurisdiction over his

person; (2) that the action against him under Rep. Act No. 1379 has

already prescribed; (3) that E.O. No. 14, insofar as it suspended the

provisions of Rep. Act No. 1379 on prescription of actions, was

inapplicable to his case; and (4) that having retired from the AFP, he

was now beyond the reach of Rep. Act No. 3019. The Board

opposed the motion to dismiss. The PCGG denied the motion to

dismiss for lack of merit. Private respondent moved for

reconsideration but was denied by the PCGG. Private respondent

was directed to submit his counter-affidavit and other controverting

evidence.

Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with

preliminary injunction with the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion to

dismiss and opposed the application for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction on the principal ground that the RTC had no

jurisdiction over the Board, citing the case of PCGG v. Pena. Private

respondent opposed the motion to dismiss. Petitioner replied to the

opposition.

The court judge denied petitioners motion to dismiss. The

respondent judge granted the application for the issuance of a writ

of preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioners from investigating or

prosecuting private respondent under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379

upon the filing of a bond in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos.

Petitioner strongly argues that the private respondents case falls

within the jurisdiction of the PCGG. Hence, this petition.

Issues:

Whether or not Presidential Commission on Good

Government- PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private

respondent

Held:

No. It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG Chairman,

creating the Board and authorizing it to investigate the unexplained

wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in

active service, to support the contention that PCGG has jurisdiction

over the case of private respondent

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as

ejusdem generis, the term subordinate as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2

would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with

former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family

member, relative, and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close

relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No.

2. Clearly, this alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth is not that

contemplated in E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or

was a government official or employee during the administration of

former Pres. Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the

respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close

association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.

This is so because otherwise the respondents case will fall under

existing general laws and procedures on the matter. Rep. Act No.

3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, penalizes the corrupt

practices of any public officer.

Under Rep. Act No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeited in

Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully

Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the

Procedure Therefor), whenever any public officer or employee has

acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is

manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or

employee and to his other lawful income and the income from

legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed

prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired [Sec. 2]. The Solicitor

General shall file the petition and prosecute the case in behalf of the

Republic, after preliminary investigation by the provincial or city

prosecutor.

The resolution alleges that private respondent unlawfully

accumulated wealth by taking advantage of his office as Finance

Officer of the Philippine Constabulary. No attempt is made in the

Boards resolution to link him or his accumulation of wealth to

former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.

It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG Chairman,

dated May 13, 1986, creating the Board and authorizing it to

investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP

personnel, both retired and in active service, to support the

contention that PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of

private Respondent. The PCGG cannot do more than what it was

empowered to do. Its powers are limited. Its task is limited to the

recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and

cronies. The PCGG cannot, through an order of its chairman, grant

itself additional powers powers not contemplated in its enabling

law.

But in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to

investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent for

violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be

enjoined from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any

action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule

of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to

exercise only the powers granted it.

administrative law cases - chapter 4

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