ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Poli Review 092015)Administrative offense; exoneration. The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a government employee to back salaries if he was not exonerated of the charge against him. If the exoneration of the employee is relative (as distinguished from complete exoneration), an inquiry into the factual premise of the offense charged and of the offense committed must be made. If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the same.The Civil Service Commission vs. Richard G. Cruz,G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011.Administrative proceedings; substantial evidence. Self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are insufficient to establish a case before quasi-judicial bodies where the quantum of evidence required establishing a fact is substantial evidence. Often described as more than a mere scintilla, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. In this case, there is no dispute regarding the fact that Esguerra had altogether failed to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement under the POEA-SEC. Beyond his bare assertion that CSMSI (employer) never gave him referrals to continue his medications as recommended by the foreign doctor despite his call on 8 July 2003 to inform them that he will report the next day in order to submit his medical evaluation abroad, Esguerra did not present any evidence to prove justification for his inability to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician. Thus, he was not awarded disability benefits and sickness allowance.Coastal Safeway Marine Services vs. Esguerra,G.R. No. 185352, August 10, 2011.Public officers; No work-no pay principle; Exception. The general rule is that public officials are only entitled to compensation if they render service. This is otherwise known as the no work-no pay principle. However, back salaries may be awarded even for unworked days to illegally dismissed or unjustly suspended employees based on the constitutional provision that no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. In order, however, to fall under this exception, two conditions must be complied with: (a) the employee must be found innocent of the charges; and (b) his suspension must be unjustified. In this case, the two conditions were present. The first condition was met since the offense which the respondent was found guilty of (violation of reasonable rules and regulations) stemmed from an act (failure to log in and log out) different from the act of dishonesty (claimingovertime pay despite his failure to render overtime work) that he was charged with. The second condition was met as the respondents committed offense merits neither dismissal from the service nor suspension (for more than one month), but only reprimand. In sum, the respondent is entitled to back salaries from the time he was dismissed until his reinstatement to his former position i.e., for the period of his preventive suspension pending appeal. For the period of his preventive suspension pending investigation, the respondent is not entitled to any back salaries.The Civil Service Commission vs. Richard G. Cruz,G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011.@jmjduremdes.polirev/092015Public officers; kinds of preventive suspension. There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (i) preventive suspension pending investigation and (ii) preventive suspension pending appeal. Compensation is due only for the period of preventive suspensionpending appeal should the employee be ultimately exonerated.The Civil Service Commission vs. Richard G. Cruz,G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011.

CSC VS. CRUZ [G.R. NO. 187858; AUGUST 9, 2011] (Exoneration)Doctrine: If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesserpenalty remains the same.Facts: The respondent,StorekeeperAof theCity ofMalolos Water District(CMWD),was chargedwith grave misconduct and dishonesty by CMWD General Manager (GM) Nicasio Reyes.He allegedly uttered a false, malicious and damaging statement against GM Reyes and the rest of the CMWD Board of Directors which stemmedfromthe respondents actof claimingovertimepay despitehis failure tolog inand out inthe computerized daily time record for three working days. GM Reyes preventively suspended the respondent for15 days. Before the expiration of his preventive suspension, however, GM Reyes, with the approval of the CMWD Board, found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty, and dismissed him from the service. The CSC however reversed the ruling and stated that respondent should not be held liable for grave misconduct.Issue: Whether the respondent is entitled to back salaries after the CSC ordered his reinstatement to his formerposition.Held: The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a government employee to back salaries if he was not exonerated of thecharge against him.If the exoneration of theemployee is relative (as distinguished from complete exoneration), an inquiry into the factual premise of the offense charged and of the offense committed must be made.If the administrative offense found to have beenactually committed is of lessergravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the same.

@jmjduremdes.polirev/092015MARTINEZ VS. VILLANUEVA[G.R. NO. 169196. JULY 6, 2011] (Prohibited Loans)Doctrine: Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 which prohibits public officials and employees to solicit or accept, directly orindirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office is malum prohibitum.Facts: PetitionerMartinezistheGeneralManagerofClaveriaAgri-BasedMulti -PurposeCooperative,Inc.(CABMPCI) while respondent Villanueva is the Assistant Regional Director of the Cooperative DevelopmentAuthority (CDA),Regional Office No.02, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. Respondent solicited several loans from CABMPCI. The Ombudsman later found thatRespondent abused her position when she solicited a loan fromCABMPCIdespitethefactthatsheisdisqualifiedbyitsby-laws.Therelevantprovisionunderwhichrespondent was charged is Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 which reads: SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts Public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept directly orindirectly,any gift, gratuity,favor, entertainment, loan or anything ofmonetary value from any personin thecourse oftheirofficialduties orinconnectionwith any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office.On appeal, Respondent argued thatthe Office ofthe Deputy Ombudsmanfor Luzon erredin treating theloans he obtained from CABMPCI as a prohibited loan under Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 because she was an official of the CDA.Respondent argued that althoughSection 7(d) of R.A.No. 6713 prohibits all public officials and employees from soliciting or accepting loans in connection with any operation being regulated by heroffice, the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 6938 or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines allows qualified officials and employees to become members ofcooperatives and naturally, toavail of theattendant privileges and benefits of membership. She contended that it would be absurd if CDA officials and employees who are eligible to apply for membership in a cooperative would be prohibited from availing loans. On appeal, the CA that respondent should not have been held liable for grave misconduct because of the supposed failure ofMartinez to show undue influenceIssues:1.Whether the Cooperative Code impliedly repealed Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713.2.Whether the prohibition under Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 requires undue influence.

@jmjduremdes.polirev/092015Held:1.NO.True,theCooperativeCodeallowsCDAofficialsandemployeestobecomemembersofcooperatives and enjoy theprivileges and benefits attendant tomembership.However, it should not betaken as creating in favor of CDA officials and employees an exemption from the coverage of Section7(d),R.A.No.6713consideringthatthebenefitsandprivilegesattendanttomembershipinacooperative are not confined solely to availing of loans and not all cooperatives are established for the sole purpose of providing credit facilities to their members. Thus, the limitation on the benefits which respondent may enjoy in connection with her alleged membership in CABMPCI does not lead to absurd results and does not render naught membership in the cooperative or render R.A. No. 6938 ineffectual contrary to respondents assertions.We find that such limitation is but anecessary consequence of the privilege of holding a public office and is akin to the other limitations that, although interfering with a public servants private rights, are nonetheless deemed valid in light of the public trust nature of public employment.2.NO. Said prohibition in Section 7(d) is malum prohibitum.It is the commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated.Therefore, it is immaterial whether respondent has fully paid her loans since the law prohibits the mere act of soliciting a loan under the circumstances provided in Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713.Whether respondentusedher positionorauthorityas aCDA officialisof noconsequenceinthe determination of her administrative liability.

@jmjduremdes.polirev/092015DUMDUMA VS. CSC [GR NO. 182606, OCTOBER 4, 2011] (Defense of good faith)Doctrine: Only those who can live up to the constitutional exhortation that public office is a public trust deserve the honorof continuing in public service.Facts: Petitioner, a PNP Officer in Leyte, took the Career Service Professional Examination in 1998. In 1999, he filled out a Personal Data Sheet pursuant to his promotional appointment as Police Inspector and stated that he passed the Career Service Professional Examination Computer-Assisted Test in Quezon City with a rating of81%. His appointment was forwarded to the PNP-CSC for verification and approval where it was then discovered that he did not have the proper civil service eligibility, contrary to what he disclosed in his PDS. His appointment was disapproved on the ground of spurious eligibility and was charged with Dishonesty. Petitionerdenied the charged and alleged that a certain Dilodilo, who was allegedly a retired CSC director promised him total support in his examination and that he was in good faith when he wrote the information of his eligibility in his PDS. The CSC found him guilty of Dishonesty and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from service,forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. He reiterated his defense of good faith in his appeal to the CA, but the appellate court was unconvinced. Hence, this petition.Issue: Whether the petitioner may be dismissed from service for falsification of his eligibility for appointment purposes.Held: Yes.The Court agrees with the CSC and the CA that the undisputed facts, as revealed by theevidence, make out a clear case of dishonesty against Dumduma. When Dumdumas claim of eligibility was contradicted by the CSC Register of Eligibles and the List of Passing/Failing Examinees, it became incumbent upon Dumduma to explain why he made the incorrect entry in his PDS. Unlike his PDS entry, the CSC records are presumed correct and made in the regular course of official business. In explaining his action, however, Dumduma dug a deeper hole from which he could not extricate himself. Dumdumas contention is in start contrast to his admissions and does not merit belief. The concept of good faith in administrative cases such as this one is explained in a recent case in this wise: Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquire; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render a transaction unconscientious. In short, good faith is actually a question of intention. Although this is something internal, we can ascertain a persons intention not from his own protestation of good faith, which is self-serving, but from evidence of his conduct and outward acts.

@jmjduremdes.polirev/092015DANILO MORO V. GENEROSO REYES DEL CASTILLO (Restoration in Position after suspension)The Office of the Ombudsman charged Generoso, Chief Accountant of the AFP General Headquarters Accounting Center with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the service. By virtue of AFP Special Order 91 dated April 1, 2006, , the AFP reassigned Generoso to the PAF Accounting Center. His position was taken over by Danilo, then Chief Accountant of the Philippine Navy. On August 30, 2006, Generoso was place under preventive suspension. He was eventually dismissed from the service on February 5, 2007, which he appealed to the Court of Appeals. After the lapse of his six-month suspension (April 2, 2007), Generoso attempted to reassume his position at the AFP General Headquarters but was unable to do so, since Danilo declined to yield the position. Generoso then filed an action for quo warranto before the Regional Trial Court, alleging that Danilo was merely detailed at the GHQ Accounting Center when he placed under preventive suspension, hence after the lapse of his suspension, he is entitled to reassume the position being held by Danilo, who is a usurper. On his part, Danilo claimed that his assignment to the position was a permanent appointment, Generoso having been assigned to the PAF Accounting Center even before his suspension.The RTC dismissed Generosos petition, holding that Danilo is holding the position on a permanent appointment. Generosos reassignment to the PAF is valid up to one year, and since his suspension took only six months, he is still required to report to the PAF Accounting Center. Upon petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, the latter reversed the RTC decision, holding that SO 91 was void because it did not indicate the duration of the reassignment. Further, the order of dismissal of Generoso was appealed to the CA, hence, not yet final and executory. Danilo thus elevated the case to the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court: An action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court may be filed against one who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. It may be brought by the Republic of the Philippines or by the person claiming to be entitled to such office. In this case, it was Del Castillo who filed the action, claiming that he was entitled as a matter of right to reassume the position of GHQ Chief Accountant after his preventive suspension ended on March 11, 2007. He argues that, assuming his reassignment to the PAF Accounting Center was valid, the same could not exceed one year. Since his detail at the PAF took effect under SO 91 on April 1, 2006, it could last not later than March 31, 2007. By then, Moro should have allowed him to return to his previous posting as GHQ Chief Accountant.In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject public office. Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo warranto may be dismissed.Here, Del Castillo brought the action for quo warranto in his name on April 4, 2007, months after the Ombudsman ordered his dismissal from service on February 5, 2007. As explained above, that dismissal order was immediately executory even pending appeal. Consequently, he has no right to pursue the action for quo warranto or reassume the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center.@jmjduremdes.polirev/092015