adorno on technology and the work of art

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Adorno on Technology

and the Work of Art Martin J.C. Dixon

The work of art still has something in common with enchantment: it posits its own,

self-enclosed area, which is withdrawn from the context of profane existence, and in

which special laws apply. Just as in the ceremony the magician first of all marked

out the limits of the area where the sacred powers were to come into play, so every

work of art describes its own circumference which closes it off from actuality.1

The substantive element of artistic modernism draws its power from the fact that the

most advanced procedures of material production and organisation are not limited to

the sphere in which they originate. In manner scarcely analysed yet by sociology,

they radiate out into areas of life far removed from them, deep into the zones of

subjective experience, which does not notice this and guards the sanctity of its

reserves. Art is modern when, by its mode of experience and as the expression of

crisis of experience, it absorbs what industrialisation has developed under the given

relations of production.2

Combining these two formulations, in its current state of development the artwork has a

double character; on the one hand it is closed to ÔactualityÕ, is governed by interior lawsand sides with enchantment and the mythic, while on the other it Ôabsorbs what

industrialisation has developedÕ and marks itself as the equal of the highest stage of

technological sophistication and rational organisation. Put in these terms, the artwork

entwines formal enchantment and technical disenchantment and it is these two processes

that together constitute the Ôinner communication of the modern and mythÕ.3 Such

ÔcommunicationÕ contributes to an historical antagonism within the concept of art itself;

in the process of gaining command of its own materials it disenchants itself, and with this

it renounces its own powers of illusion and appearance. Arguably, the development of

the modern work of art since Baudelaire has been towards its own de-aestheticisation.4

1Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment , p. 19.2Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 34.

3Ibid., p. 22-23.4See ibid., p. 79.



The artwork implies an artistic subject, and this subject is defenceless against the

technological world: what the subject experiences and the manner in which these

experiences come about cannot be shielded from the social totality. This means that what

passes for a domain of subjective artistic production - the realm of ÔcreationÕ, inspiration,

even ÔGeniusÕ - cannot be simply be dissociated from the conditions and experiences of

material production that predominate in a given society.

Regarding technology in general, AdornoÕs views follow from the classical

Marxian analysis. Advanced industrial technology is deployed within a specific social

situation termed the Ôrelations of productionÕ. Relations of production include everything

that passes between the worker and the factory owner, manager or, more generally, the

ÔcapitalistÕ for whom the ÔworkerÕ works. In MarxÕs analysis it is the difference of

interests of the capitalist and worker which produce the irrational and distorting phenomena such as the division of labour, the commodification of labour, time and

objects, the alienation of the worker from the objects that are produced, and even

alienation from him or herself. For Marx, the connection of labour and the object

produced by labour is fundamental: the Ôproduct of labour is labour embodied and made

material in an object, it is the objectification of labour. The realisation of labour is its

objectificationÕ.5 It is assumed that the object of labour is the embodiment of the subject,

that it should belong to the Ôessential beingÕ of the worker.6 Under capitalism, the

overbearing externality of the object with respect to the worker, and the fact that the

worker possesses neither the object nor the materials from which it is made nor the

capital that is generated through its market exchange, the labourer loses not only the

object but also him or herself in the process of manufacture. The capacities and time of

the worker are the property of the capitalist and consequently the worker suffers a Ôloss of

realityÕ.7 The physical and mental resources of the worker which might otherwise be put

to realising immediate needs and the development of self are disposed entirely to produce

an alien and meaningless object. This Marx describes as a Ôlabour of self-sacrifice, of

mortificationÕ.8 It is this alienation which produces the schism between work and

ÔleisureÕ as the attempt is made to restore outside working hours that which the worker expended during the day, a space to which aesthetic activity - both production and

reception - is constantly in danger of being relegated.

5Karl Marx, Early Writings, p. 324.6Ibid., p. 326.

7Ibid., p. 324.8Ibid., p. 326.



The phenomena that Marx declares the consequence of capitalist relations of

production are, in theory at least, separable from the question of the means or Ôforces of

productionÕ, which can equated with technological means in general. And the argument

often runs that providing the existing relations of production can be dismantled and the

proletariat gain ownership and control of the means of production, there is no reason why

the Marxist should not have cause for optimism regarding the post-revolutionary status of

technology. The current relations of production are such that they have totally distorted

the notion of productivity and have diverted technology away from its supposed capacity

to liberate the worker from work, towards the debasement of labour and ever greater

degrees of specialisation and dependency. Furthermore, in enabling mass production,

technology makes it possible to produce in quantities far in excess of what a society

actually requires resulting in production for its own sake. The exponential acceleration of

techno-scientific development has lead to the discovery of all manner new devices, products and consumer gadgets. This in turn necessitates the requirement to stimulate

desire for these commodities and increase consumption leading to the contemporary

experience of material and semiotic inundation. The consuming individual, apparently

empowered by ÔchoiceÕ, is crowded out by the superabundance of purchasable goods and

services and the frenetic attempts to force the existence and desirability of a given

commodity into his or her consciousness. If the relations of production could be

transformed, not only would these excesses come to an end, the whole techno-scientific

infrastructure could be placed at the disposal of all in such a way as to allow it to be

oriented and apportioned according to genuine material needs and to benefit the entirety

of society. Until recently, socialist movements espoused the principle that the means of

production should therefore come under the ownership of the state.

Such an argument rests on the assumption that technology is of itself socially and

politically neutral . As Andrew Feenberg relates in his essay on Herbert MarcuseÕs

critique of technology, this assumption takes it that the Ôneutrality of technology consists

first of all in its indifference, as pure instrumentality, to the variety of ends it can be made

to serveÕ, and secondly, that Ôit also appears to be indifferent with respect to culture, at

least among the modern nations, and especially with respect to the political distinction between capitalist and socialist societyÕ.9 Unlike many social institutions (Feenberg

mentions legal, religious institutions) the assumption is that the entirety of technology

9See Feenberg, Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia , p. 229. The issue of the Frankfurt

SchoolÕs attitude to technology is also discussed in Larrain, The Concept of Ideology, pp.172-210.



developed under capitalism could be transferred to a socialist context without any

fundamental changes. He continues:

The socio-political neutrality of technology is usually attributed to its ÒrationalÓ

character and is related to the universality of the truth embodied in the technology, a

truth which can be formulated in verifiable causal propositions. Insofar as such

propositions are true, they are not socially and politically relative but, like scientific

ideas, maintain their cognitive status in every conceivable social context.10

There are, however, many reasons for supposing that this is not the case and that the

transferral of technology from the hands of the capitalist and into the hands of the

proletariat is entirely insufficient for the recovery of a truly efficacious and non-

alienating form of material production. MarcuseÕs own critique claims that Ôtechnology

is fundamentally biased towards dominationÕ11 in that technical machinery - because it

has been developed to serve the interests of the capitalist and these interests are always to

extend the control and exploitation of the work force - has a design and manner of

operation that consolidates the power of the capitalist. In line with MarxÕs theory of

alienation, technology in and of itself is alienating. Its manner of operation isolates and

disempowers the worker; it obliges the worker to perform systematic and repetitive

operations; the operator regulates and structures his or her activity in conformity with the

requirements of the technology which that activity then begins to resemble. Technology

is both a powerful means of increasing production and profit for the capitalist and also a

solution to the problem of labour discipline.12

And in direct contradiction to currentideology, the development of technology under capitalist relations of production is

continually constrained by the narrow interests of profit, market competition and labour

control. Accordingly, Marx could insist on a normative critique of capitalist economies

in that they failed to demonstrate sufficient productive competence. The rhetoric that

10Ibid., p. 229.11Ibid., p. 230.

12In the twentieth century, the ideology of technology has advanced considerably into the very functioningof the political and communicative spheres. As Jorge Larrain relates: Ò...the evolution of capitalism in the

twentieth century brought about two new factors, the increase in state intervention on the one hand, and the

interdependence of research and technology on the other hand. The change from liberalism to a welfarestate destroyed in practice the ideology of just exchange, and the need for a new legitimating ideology

arose. It is found in technology and science which have become fused and increasingly manipulative.

They provide the ideological basis to justify decisions as if they were merely ÔtechnicalÕ, not ÔpoliticalÕ.

Therefore ideology in advanced capitalism means technocratic consciousness and depolitization, the

concealing of communicative interaction and its replacement by a scientific manipulative system.Ó Larrain,

The Concept of Ideology, p.206.



claims that technology saves time and money, is more reliable, or ÔliberatesÕ, is

continually contradicted by ordinary experience.

But Marcuse believed that such a critique was less tenable in the context of late-

capitalism since the migration of advanced technology into every sector of life has led to

the situation where technology and technological rationality now monopolises not only

praxis but also theory, the very means by which critique can proceed:

Not only is technical progress distorted by the requirements of capitalist control, but

the Òuniverse of discourseÓ, public and eventually even private speech and thought,

limit themselves to the posing and resolving of technical problems with the double

constraints of the simultaneous interest in technical advance and domination that

characterizes capitalist rationality. . . The universalization of technical modes of

thought changes the cultural conditions presupposed by the Marxian theory of

emancipatory struggle. There is no place for critical consciousness in this world: it is

Òone-dimensionalÓ.13

Technology has become ideological in as much as it has becomes increasingly difficult to

think or act in a non-technical manner, our activities are reduced to the Ôposing and

resolving of technical problemsÕ. The relentless debilitation of the very agency that could

bring about revolution Ð a working class that is brought to critical consciousness by

Marxist theory Ð leaves the dynamic of the Ôemancipatory struggleÕ in tatters. The issue

of how to counter the ideological force of technology while acknowledging that

technology is essential to our material existence is the dilemma that the Critical Theory of

technology under late-capitalism must solve.

*

The preceding discussion can help situate AdornoÕs attempt to accommodate technology

within his aesthetic theory. On the basis of the text that begins this paper, Adorno seems

to share something of MarcuseÕs point of view when he writes that the influence of the

sphere of material production extends to, and penetrates, the subject: technology and,

therefore, technical attitudes can and should reproduce themselves in theoretical

undertakings and artistic practices. Adorno makes two claims here: firstly that art, if it is

to be truly modern, must incorporate and reckon with the subjectÕs experience of

technology in the contemporary world; but secondly and further to this, rather than

attempting to banish technology from its own sphere or suppress its negative influence,

13Ibid., p. 237.



ÔautonomousÕ and ÔpurposelessÕ, the essentially heteronomous and telic forces of

production find themselves transfigured when they are incorporated by and in the

artwork. The peculiar structure of the artwork in a sense permits Adorno to maintain

both a neutral and critical stance with respect to technology. The artwork can

simultaneously employ and tell the ÔtruthÕ about the negativity of current technological

forces - it mimetically adapts itself to technology and shows it at work for non-coercive,

aesthetic purposes; and insofar as that technology alienates the subject and stifles the

mediation of the object, the success and truth of the artwork is dependent on the extent to

which the ensuing crisis becomes materialised in the immanent structure of the work.

The legacy of the ÔproductionÕ issue in Marxist theory has been resituated by

Adorno - largely intact - in the context of the aesthetic domain. In doing so he has, in

many respects, transferred the question of what technical productive forces are, or, in atransformed society, might be, out of political economy and into a concern for the

immanent critique of modern art. By incorporating both technological means and the

subjectÕs experience of technology within its own productive procedures - acknowledging

respectively a ÔneutralÕ stance regarding technology and its ideological hegemony - art

becomes a means of diverting the remorseless momentum of modern technology for the

purposes of its own inner-aesthetic organisation. By internalising technology, the

artwork provides an intimation of what technology might be without the distorting and

corrupting influence of the capitalist relations of production.

AdornoÕs understanding of aesthetic production hinges on establishing and

defending a concept of production as realisation, and this entails, in one sense, the task of

re-implicating the subject in the requirement to realise the needs of the object and not to

mistake the fashioning and instantiation of objective procedures - and the assumed

abdication of the subject - as a binding guarantee of objectivity. Also within the concept

of realisation is the idea that the artwork must mediate something that is other to it,

something which Adorno names as Ôthe moreÕ [das Mehr ]: ÔFor the more is not simply

the nexus of elements, but an other, mediated through this nexus but divided from it. The

artistic elements suggest through their nexus what escapes itÕ.17

The artwork is alwaysmore than what it is, and this lifts the artwork out of the empirical domain:

[A]rt is an entity that is not identical with its empiria. What is essential to art is that

which is not the case, that which is incommensurable with the empirical measure of

17Ibid.. p. 79.



in-itselfÕ. This impetus drives the organisation towards a goal or a purpose; it is

considered as something objective, that is as residing in, or as an aspect of, the objectivity

of the material, an objectivity that is understood as facing the subject who experiences

this impetus as something with which the subject must contend. In this process the

organisation is sublimated - raised up, transformed - and thus becomes more than

organisation for its own sake. The organisation of the work is, therefore, sublimated by

an internal purposive necessity. Nothing in the work can appear there without reference

to this lawfulness, without reference to technical necessity. Everything in the artwork

looks to Technik for its justification; Technik governs the interior of the work and is the

arbiter of correctness of organisation, what within the bounds of the work, and only there,

can be considered as necessary. But here the logic takes on a new complication:

Gehalt und Technik sind identisch and nicht-identisch. Nicht-identisch, weil das

Kunstwerk sein Leben hat an der Spannung von Innen und Au§en; weil es Kunstwerk wird einzig, indem seine Erscheinung Ÿber sich hinausweist. . . Die unvermittelte

IdentitŠt von Gehalt und Erscheinung hšbe die Idee von Kunst selber auf. Dennoch

sind beide auch identisch. Denn in der Komposition zŠhlt nur das Realisierte.21

(Content and Technik are identical and non-identical. Non-identical because the

artwork itself lives in the tension between the interior and exterior; because it

becomes an artwork solely in that its manifestation points beyond itself. . .The

unmediated identity of content and manifestation would cancel the idea of art itself.

Nonetheless, both are also identical. For in the composition only that which is

realised counts.)

The conclusion that one can draw from this singular relation of Technik and content is

surprising - Ôthe concept of Technik encompasses its own dialecticÕ.22 That is, Technik

both realises and determines content; it includes within it what it is designed to serve.

Technik and Gehalt cannot, in the final assessment, be separated. This is not simply a

logical curiosity or peculiarity; what Adorno indicates here is that this feature of Technik

is in fact indicated by the historical emergence of a particular notion of Ôcompositional

techniqueÕ during the nineteenth century and coincides with the advent of the

autonomous work of art and the concomitant gaining of volitional freedom for the

composer. This freedom was the readiness to exert self-conscious and rational

domination of means over the compositional material itself. Advancement in

compositional technique entails a Ôprogressive domination over tonal material by the

21Gesamellte Schriften. 16, p. 229. See also Adorno, Music and Technique, p. 80. (Translation altered.)22ÔDa§ in der Musik Gehalt und Technik identisch and nicht-identisch seien, sagt nicht weniger, als da§der Begriff der Technik seine eigene Dialektik einschlie§t.Õ (G.S. 16, p. 230.)



In the light of the dialectical property of Technik that Adorno outlines above, though such

techniques begin as external to the musical composition itself, they are also capable of

penetrating into the interior form of the music; the exterior no longer exists in a state of

dialectical tension with the interior, but has become implicated with the interior, and

transforms it: ÔThis externalized aspect of music - in a certain sense its communicative

aspect - then penetrates into the interior of the formal law of musicÕ.25 Previously,

realisation was exteriorisation; the realisation that was part of the process of discovering

meaning in the work is now included in the domain of compositional intention. The

content of the work is profoundly affected by such a transformation.

The second form of technification is that of the appropriation of non-musical

ÔtechnologiesÕ in order to expand compositional resources, the Ôinclusion in music of

techniques which had developed extraterritorially within the total course of technical and

technological advancementÕ.26

Adorno suggests as examples of developments ininstrumentation the valve horn and the saxophone. Each appeared as a discrete invention

in its own right before its Ôcompositional hour tolledÕ, before, in other words, the

potential of these new instruments is ever explored within an aesthetic context - he even

goes so far as to say that the valve horn was a Ôdecisive precondition of WagnerÕs art of

instrumental compositionÕ. But more significantly:

Means which are in no way primarily a product of the composition are admitted to

the composition for the sake of its expansion; in doing so, however, these means raise

demands of their own. This results in the establishment of an extra-aesthetic factor

normatively - as it were - within the aesthetic realm. The unity of an epoch, which isactually the unity of its total social tendency - asserts itself above and beyond works

of art through its presence in these very works themselves.27

In the attempt to capitalise on extra-aesthetic advancement, the artwork incorporates new

means into itself and thus society can be said to appear within and assert itself through

the artwork. But in addition, these new techniques raise demands of their own, aesthetic

demands, and the purpose which the artwork is intended to serve. Here we arrive at what

Adorno calls the Ôdialectical law of motion regarding the technification of the work of

artÕ which is the Ôlaw of its increasing integration and its self-alienationÕ.28 Integrationcomes about because, as we have already seen, the composer is able to exercise greater

25Ibid.26Ibid.

27Ibid.28Ibid.



discrimination over a greater range of forces and these have become included in the

aesthetic configuration. Self-alienation results because new compositional means are

procured through specialisation and objectification, which are themselves Ôcut-off from

contentÕ and subjectivity. These new means bring with them ideology and what

transpires is a dialectic of domination: the aesthetic goal of the artwork relies more

heavily on the means, the means therefore come to ÔthreatenÕ the ends by dominating

them, Ôit is the aesthetic dialectic of master and slave [ Herr und Knecht ]Õ.29

In making reference to HegelÕs analysis of Lord and Bondsman in the

Phenomenology of Spirit Adorno deepens the underlying theme concerning subjectivity.

HegelÕs argument is that for self-consciousness to develop, an individual must encounter

another self-consciousness, the reciprocal interaction of which results in a mutual

development of consciousness. Self-consciousness can only exist in and for itself

through being acknowledged by an other. This process breaks down in certain instances,such as in the relation of master to servant. Here the master does not encounter the

servant as a self-consciousness but as a thing, and it is the servant that encounters the

material world on the masterÕs behalf, also depriving the master of a potential

engagement with the world and of possible self-development. The consciousness of the

ÔmasterÕ suffers as a consequence. AdornoÕs implication is that in the process of

domination of means over ends not only do the means become tyrannical but the

development of consciousness is at stake. The gathering together of ever more powerful

means by the composing subject results in a deformation of the consciousness of the

composer; the composer loses touch with the materials which are not encountered

directly, but with techniques as intermediaries.

With integral serialism, which at this time had Ôbecome transparent as the telos of

compositionÕ30, the processes of technification achieve new levels of material control and

the relation between Technik and content enters a crisis. Integral serialism is the latest

stage in the Ôrational commandÕ of content and material. To begin with, Adorno

addresses the issue of the realisation in performance of the serially composed work and

the fact that specific interpretation becomes superfluous if everything in the score has

become predetermined and the performers role can only be one of Ômute readingÕ.31

Blind accuracy might be the only significant performance criterion; no additional insight

into the music is in fact necessary since the integral serialist work which has satisfied

29Ibid.

30Ibid.31Ibid.



itself in its notation and is concerned only with its own structural articulation, has already

Ôdeveloped into its own realisationÕ.32 This Adorno sees as a threat to the idea of the

work. With the integral serial work, nothing can be perceived in the material beyond its

abstractions; what stands for the work is nothing but the execution of certain formal

procedures. For Adorno, this is a travesty of what it is to compose. The coherence that

such a logical and systematic approach would seem to guarantee in fact yields its

opposite: the musical material, reduced to logical primitives, cannot be re-integrated into

a continuity. In isolating compositional components, and in rationalising their

relationships, all effective spontaneous interrelation between individual moments, and

participation in and contribution to a sense of the wholeness of the work is blocked.

Because the material of the serial work is pre-formulated at the outset, nothing is actually

required of the ÔcomposerÕ other than the writing-out of the results. Nothing is required

of the performer other than the obedient rendering of these results as sound. In bothcases, the musical subject is no more than an executant. The arbitrary system of ordering

that is put in place is willed by the composer in order to exclude him or herself. This

cannot yield a pure objectivity; it approximates to, but is in reality only a surrogate for a

true sense of objectivity. The subjectivity that wields serial techniques is deluded by the

perfection of the material and the perfection of the material coincides with its

suppression. With the material subdued, the compositional subject experiences no

obligation with respect to the material since it has no ÔbeingÕ, and Ôno longer offers

resistance and, consequently, no longer existsÕ.33 Resistance is what places the composer

under obligation in the first instance; the demand of the material is experienced as

resistance to compositional intention, an obstacle to the compositional will. The abolition

of resistance in the material makes it absolutely commensurable with thought and nothing

obstructs the capriciousness of subjectivity. The compositional subject reduces material

to itself, material and construction being indistinguishable. Compositional activity falls

under AdornoÕs critique of idealism: composition consumes its object and makes the

material identical to itself. Resistance is history sedimented in the material, the history of

previous subjective activity on and with that material. Atomisation and systematisation,

heedless to the material, dispossess it of that history:

The continuity of meaning is undermined by the reduction of all musical elements

and dimensions to the same level; this is done in order to promote the complete

continuity of meaning and the liberation of it from anything alien or heteronomous

32Ibid., p. 83.33Ibid., p. 84.



which is unable to resolve within itself. The destiny of every musical phenomenon,

disrupted in this way, is that the disposition of material in a manner no way identical

with the material befalls the material itself, rather than paying heed to the direction

which the phenomenon would take of its own free will . . . [wohin das Erscheinende

von sich aus will ].34

What lies at the root of AdornoÕs critique of serialism is identity; the

technological work of art ÔdreamsÕ of an Ôabsolute identityÕ. The process of

technification has as its telos the total reduction of all and every aspect of the

composition to a single principle. Constructions based on identity expel what is

heteronomous to the system and establish a false, that is pre-given, consistency. Against

this, Adorno states that the phenomenon has a will of its own, the material has an

historical momentum which awaits release through the subject, a will which is effaced in

systematisation. The reduction of musical elements is achieved through the device of the

parameter, and it is the parameter that serves identity. Parameters permit the constructionof spurious identities between the separable, but non-identical elements of music, which

Adorno compares to Ômultiplying oranges by typewritersÕ [ Apfelsinen mit

Schreibmaschinen multipliziert ].35

Moreover, mechanical means of reproduction have made it possible to Ôdefine

music as independent from ephemeral performanceÕ and this can react in the content of

the artwork:

Technological development, understood at first as extra-musical, then guarded by

compositional intentions, converges with inner-musical development. If works of art become their own reproduction, it is then foreseeable that reproductions will become

works.36

In marked contrast to Walter BenjaminÕs views on this topic, the mechanical means of

reproduction such as tape and early electronic devices were seen by Adorno as

threatening to the work concept because it meant that the musical work would exist

ready-realised in a medium that formerly was given over to reproduction only. The

aesthetic potential of the non-identity of production and re-production is necessarily

forfeited. For Adorno, one of the ways by which this potential can be protected is in fact

the mediating capability of notation. What concerns him is that with electronic media

comes the possibility of making music as:

34Ibid. (G.S. 16, p. 235.)

35G.S. 16, p. 237.36Ibid.



directly as one paints a picture and the significative intermediate level, notation,

could be by-passed as though it were an ornamental formality. In this process, the

tension between Technik and content is necessarily reduced further. The less musical

portrayal continues to be the portrayal of something, the more the essence of the

means comes to agree with the essence of that which is portrayed.

37

The act of notating is the notating of something ; the notation is non-identical with that

which it attempts to capture as notation. Notation, as a musical means, as a specific

musical Technik , safeguards the work from becoming identical with its realisation and

therefore reified. One can aver that the same can be said of contemporary trends

concerning live electronics which re-implicate the performer/interpreter in specific acts of

ÔrealisationÕ, none of which can be considered identical with the ÔworkÕ.

*

It has become apparent in the preceding discussion that AdornoÕs concept of Technik is

bivalent; it both governs the internal constitution of the work - its logic - and, as

technification, it is the process by which that interior becomes expanded through the

importation of extra-aesthetic Technik . Both the development and the ÔageingÕ of the

work of art are by way of such intrusions. The most virulent intrusion into the aesthetic

context, and the extreme of technification, is that of the wrong logic, a logic of identity.

The judgement as to the incorrectness of this logic is not brought to the artwork from theoutside; it is not a philosophical judgement, the artwork itself testifies to the damage done

and therein lies its truth content.

It can be said, therefore, that technification - and the history of technification is

the history of the modern artwork - is the process whereby the un- or under-defined limit

that encircles the artwork, that marks off the interior and its Ôspecial lawsÕ, is breached.

What comes in from the outside may well be placed under a new obligation, that of an

aesthetic context of unity, but it also distorts the interior of the work, dispersing and

exploding, its meaningfulness. But because of the singular logic of Technik , the fact that

it encompasses its own dialectic, ultimately it cannot be conveniently assigned to either

the inside or the outside of the artwork. Without the operation of some notion of a limit

between art and empirical world, AdornoÕs theory of technification would not be

possible. To reiterate the point made earlier, the artwork must mediate something which

37Ibid.



is other to it, something, that which in the sphere of the made is nevertheless non-made,

the Ônon-factual in their facticityÕ.38 The conclusions for the composer from AdornoÕs

theory of Technik are suggestive. While Adorno is sympathetic to the admittance of

Technik into the interior of the artwork, in the final analysis, what makes it an artwork

does not come under the jurisdiction of the composer and cannot itself be composed, but

arises out of that which is composed. It is so only to the extent that Technik is a means of

realisation and, as the realisation of the non-identical, performs what Adorno calls a

ÔMŸnchausean trickÕ.39

The binary logic of interior/exterior is intensified by the presence of the non-

identical, and ultimately the stability of the interior of the musical work is always

threatened by the non-identical. Because of the non-identical, the interior of artwork

becomes unstable and brings about a rupture of the limit between interior and exterior:

The strict immanence of the spirit of artworks is contradicted on the other hand by a

countertendency that is no less immanent: the tendency of artworks to wrest

themselves free of the internal unity of their own construction, to introduce within

themselves caesuras that no longer permit the totality of the appearance. Because the

spirit of the works is not identical with them, spirit breaks up the objective form

through which it is constituted; this rupture is the instant of apparition.40

This rupture precipitates the disintegration of the artwork, which is where AdornoÕs

theorisation of modernity culminates. Adorno encourages the integration of extra-

aesthetic Technik with the musical composition so as to heighten and intensify this

moment of rupture. The increased constructional unity that the rationalising tendencies

of Technik allows must, therefore, be answered by an ever greater disintegrating

tendency, a greater sensitivity to the blind spots and fissures in the technical constitution

of the resulting work.

The individual artist that reckons with these problems develops in terms of what

Adorno calls Ôhuman productive forcesÕ - that is, the ability on the part of the subject to

differentiate the materials under his or her command and to become aware of the history

that is stored in the material. Progress in the area of Technik must be matched by

progress in consciousness: ÔProgressive consciousness ascertains the condition of thematerial in which history is sedimented right up to the moment in which the work

answers to it; precisely by doing so, progressive consciousness is also the transforming

38Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 86.

39Ibid., p. 22-23.40Ibid., p. 88.



critique of technique [Technik ]; in this moment, consciousness reaches out into the open,

beyond the status quo.Õ41

41Ibid., p. 193.



References

Adorno, Theodor; Horkheimer, Max. The Dialectic of Enlightenment , trans. JohnCumming (London: Verso, 1997)

Adorno, Theodor. Aesthetic Theory, trans Robert Hullot-Kentor (London: The Atholone

Press, 1997)

Adorno, Theodor. ÔMusic and TechniqueÕ, trans. Wesley Blomster, Telos 32 (Summer 1977)

Adorno, Theodor. Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 16, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt:

Suhrkamp, 1978)

Feenberg, Andrew; Pippin, Robert; Webel, Charles P. (eds.). Marcuse: Critical Theoryand the Promise of Utopia (London: Macmillian Education Ltd, 1988)

Hegel, G.W.F. Phenomenology of Spirit , trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: OUP, 1977)

Larrain, Jorge. The Concept of Ideology (London: Hutchinson, 1979)

Marx, Karl. Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregory Benton

(Harmondsworth: Penguin Bools Limited, 1975)

adorno on technology and the work of art

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