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Adversarial VNet Embeddings: A Threat for ISPs? Yvonne-Anne Pignolet, Gilles Tredan, Stefan Schmid April, 2013

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Page 2: Adversarial VNet Embeddings: A Threat for ISPs? · Motif Define an order on motif sequences: Constraints on which sequence to ask first in order not to overlook a part of the topology

2 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

CloudNets = Virtual Networking Cloud Resources

Success of Node Virtualization

a.k.a. end-host virtualization VMWare revamped server business OpenStack VM = flexible allocation, migration.. «Elastic computing»

Trend of Link Virtualization

MPLS, VPN networks, VLANs Software Defined Networks

(SDN), OpenFlow, ... «The VMWare of the net» «Elastic networking»

Unified, fully virtualized networks: CloudNets „Combine networking with heterougeneous cloud resources (e.g., storage, CPU, ...)!“

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3 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

The Vision: Sharing Resources.

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4 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

The Vision: Flexible CloudNets.

Physical infrastructure

(e.g., accessed by mobile clients)

Specification:

1. close to mobile clients

2. >100 kbit/s bandwidth for synchronization

Provider 1

Provider 2

CloudNet requests

CloudNet 2: Mobile service w/ QoS CloudNet 1: Computation

Specification:

1. > 1 GFLOPS per node

2. Monday 3pm-5pm

3. multi provider ok

Page 5: Adversarial VNet Embeddings: A Threat for ISPs? · Motif Define an order on motif sequences: Constraints on which sequence to ask first in order not to overlook a part of the topology

5 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

The Vision: Flexible CloudNets.

Physical infrastructure

(e.g., accessed by mobile clients)

Specification:

1. close to mobile clients

2. >100 kbit/s bandwidth for synchronization

Provider 1

Provider 2

CloudNet requests

CloudNet 2: Mobile service w/ QoS CloudNet 1: Computation

Specification:

1. > 1 GFLOPS per node

2. Monday 3pm-5pm

3. multi provider ok

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6 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Embedding: From Service Provider via Broker to Infrastructure Provider.

API

API

API

Roles in CloudNet Arch.

Service Provider (SP)

(offers services over the top)

Virtual Network Operator (VNO)

(operates CloudNet, Layer 3+, triggers migration)

Physical Infrastructure Provider (PIP)

(resource and bit pipe provider)

Virtual Network Provider (VNP)

(resource broker, compiles resources)

Embed!

Embed!

Embed!

Page 7: Adversarial VNet Embeddings: A Threat for ISPs? · Motif Define an order on motif sequences: Constraints on which sequence to ask first in order not to overlook a part of the topology

7 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Security Issues.

Are CloudNet embeddings a threat for ISPs?

Do embeddings leak information about infrastructure?

?

Page 8: Adversarial VNet Embeddings: A Threat for ISPs? · Motif Define an order on motif sequences: Constraints on which sequence to ask first in order not to overlook a part of the topology

8 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Request Complexity.

Are CloudNet embeddings a threat for ISPs?

How many embeddings needed to fully reveal topology?

Request Complexity

?

?

?

Yes

Yes

No

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9 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Embedding Model.

unit capacity

unit capacity

arbitrary node demand arbitrary link

demand

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10 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Embedding Model.

unit capacity

unit capacity

arbitrary node demand arbitrary link

demand

relay cost ε>0 (e.g., packet rate)

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11 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Embedding Model.

unit capacity

unit capacity

arbitrary node demand arbitrary link

demand

relay cost ε>0 (e.g., packet rate) We will ask for unit capacities on

nodes and links! Essentially a graph immersion problem: disjoint paths for virtual links...

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12 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Some Properties Simple...

«Is the network 2-connected?»

?

No

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13 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Example: Tree

How to discover a tree? (Too) naive idea: 1. Test whether triangle fits? (loop-free) 2. Try to add neighbors to node until it works

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14 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Example: Tree

How to discover a tree? Naive idea: 1. Test whether triangle fits? (loop-free) 2. Try to add neighbors to node as long as possible, then continue with other node (degree strategy)

Problem: virtual links may be embedded over multiple physical links! Can still extend v, but will miss nodes along the way!

v

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15 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Solution: Tree

TREE ALGORITHM: line strategy 1. Binary search on longest path («anchor»):

...

2. Last and first node explored, explore «branches» at pending nodes

Analysis: Amortized analysis on links.

Then:

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16 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Be Careful with Embedding Relation!

Example: - A cannot be embedded into B - B cannot be embedded into A - But A can be embedded into BB!

A B BB

1

2

5

3

4 6 7 1

2

5

3

4

6

7

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17 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Overview of Results.

PIP 3 Tree Can be explored in O(n)

requests. This is optimal!

PIP 3 General Graph Can be explored in O(n2)

requests. This is optimal!

Cactus Graph Can be explored in O(n)

requests. This is optimal!

Lower bound: via number of possible trees and binary information.

Idea: Make spanning tree and then try all edges. (Edges directly does not work!)

Via «graph motifs»! A general framework exploiting poset relation.

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18 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Overview of Results.

PIP 3 Tree Can be explored in O(n)

requests. This is optimal!

PIP 3 General Graph Can be explored in O(n2)

requests. This is optimal!

Cactus Graph Can be explored in O(n)

requests. This is optimal!

Lower bound: via number of possible trees and binary information.

Idea: Make spanning tree and then try all edges. (Edges directly does not work!)

Via «graph motifs»! A general framework exploiting poset relation.

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19 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Overview of Results.

PIP 3 Tree Can be explored in O(n)

requests. This is optimal!

PIP 3 General Graph Can be explored in O(n^2)

requests. This is optimal!

Cactus Graph Can be explored in O(n)

requests. This is optimal!

Lower bound: via number of possible trees and binary information.

Idea: Make spanning tree and then try all edges. (Edges directly does not work!)

Via «graph motifs»! A general framework exploiting poset relation.

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20 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

General Recipe: Expand Request! 1. Find «knitting»: - increasing connectivity too late comes at high cost! - so first find graph structure of connected «motifs» - motif = 2-connected components

2. Expand knitting - add nodes along virtual edges

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21 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

General Recipe. 1. Find «knitting»: - increasing connectivity too late comes at high cost! - so first find graph structure of connected «motifs» - motif = 2-connected components

2. Expand knitting - add nodes along virtual edges

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22 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

General Recipe. 1. Find «knitting»: - increasing connectivity too late comes at high cost! - so first find graph structure of connected «motifs» - motif = 2-connected components

2. Expand knitting - greedily add nodes along virtual edges

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23 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Dictionary Attack: Expansion Framework.

Examples Tree motifs: Cactus motifs:

Basic “knittings” of the graph.

Motif Define an order on motif sequences: Constraints on which sequence to ask first in order not to overlook a part of the topology. (E.g., by embedding links across multiple hops.)

Dictionary

Partially ordered set: embedding relation fulfills reflexivity, anti-symmetry, transitivity.

Poset

Framework

Explore branches according

to dictionary order,

exploiting poset property.

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24 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Dictionary Attacks: Expand Framework.

Examples Tree motifs: Cactus motifs:

Basic “knittings” of the graph.

Motif Define an order on motif sequences: Constraints on which sequence to ask first in order not to overlook a part of the topology. (E.g., by embedding links across multiple hops.)

Dictionary

Partially ordered set: embedding relation fulfills reflexivity, anti-symmetry, transitivity.

Poset

Framework

Explore branches according

to dictionary order,

exploiting poset property.

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25 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Example: Dictionary as a DAG.

Dictionary is a directed acyclic graph: defines which motifs to ask first! (Ensure: no important part overlooked!) Graph b) can be derived from dictionary a)!

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26 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Example: Dictionary as a DAG.

Dictionary is a directed acyclic graph: defines which motifs to ask first! (Ensure: no important part overlooked!) Graph b) can be derived from dictionary a)!

Request complexity depends on depth! (E.g., number of motifs?)

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27 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Evaluation: Request Complexity in Real Graphs.

A small set of motifs is often sufficient to discover all or most of a topology! (Size of dictionary influences request complexity…) E.g., motifs for autonomous system AS 1239 (Sprint) from Rocketfuel:

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28 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Conclusion.

- CloudNets:

- Elastic computing and networking

- Federated architecture: embeddings

- New security challenges

- With binary replies, graphs can not be exploited very efficiently (at least linear time)

- A first look at topology!

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29 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

The Project Website.

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30 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Collaborators and Publications. People

T-Labs / TU Berlin: Anja Feldmann, Carlo Fürst, Johannes Grassler, Arne Ludwig, Matthias Rost, Gregor Schaffrath, Stefan Schmid

Uni Wroclaw: Marcin Bienkowski Uni Tel Aviv: Guy Even, Moti Medina NTT DoCoMo Eurolabs: Group around Wolfgang Kellerer LAAS: Gilles Tredan ABB: Yvonne Anne Pignolet IBM Research: Johannes Schneider Arizona State Uni: Xinhui Hu, Andrea Richa

Publications

Prototype: J. Information Technology 2013, ICCCN 2012, ERCIM News 2012, SIGCOMM VISA 2009

Migration: ToN 2013, INFOCOM 2013, ICDCN 2013 + Elsevier TCS Journal, Hot-ICE 2011, IPTComm 2011, SIGCOMM VISA 2010

Embedding: INFOCOM 2013 (Mini-Conference), CLOUDNETS 2012, 2 x ACM UCC 2012, DISC 2012, ICDCN 2012 (Best Paper Distributed Computing Track)

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31 Telekom Innovation Laboratories Stefan Schmid

Dr. Stefan Schmid

Telekom Innovation Laboratories Ernst-Reuter-Platz 7, D-10587 Berlin E-mail: [email protected]

Project website: http://www.net.t-labs.tu-

berlin.de/~stefan/virtu.shtml

Contact.