U.S. AF-Pak Policy

By: M.Jawad Shigri

Ph.D (IR) 1094-315022

MJF110@GMAIL.COM

Preston University Islamabad

Pakistan

AF Pak Policy and War on Terror

1. The Bush Administration’s Policy

2. The Obama Administration’s Policy

3. Implication on South Asia

U.S. foreign assistance Brief History of U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan Pre-9/11 Clinton & Bush Administration Policy

Both held talks with Taliban to moderate its policies

Both withheld recognition of Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan

Both urged the end of discrimination against women

Clinton fires cruise misses at AQ training camps in eastern Afghanistan and gets UN to adopt sanctions after AQ bombings of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya

Bush steps up engagement with Pakistan; considers military assistance to Northern Alliance but refrains from doing so.

U.S. foreign assistance Brief History of U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan Post-9/11 Bush Administration Policy

the U.S. overthrows Taliban when it refuses to extradite Osama Bin Laden, completed by December 2001

Focus is on security assistance; U.S. has “lead country” role in building capacity of the Afghan National Army

Adds a Marine battalion in 2008

U.S. foreign assistance dObama Administration Policy

Three big reviews. . .

Launches strategic review upon taking office, but sends an additional 17,000 troops in February 2009 before review is complete, based on earlier request of ISAF Commander

March 2009 gives results of policy review and announces “comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan”

Narrows the mission to “core goal” . . .

“to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country in the

future”

U.S. foreign assistance Obama Administration Policy Increases focus on Pakistan (AfPak) and launches trilateral

commission b/w U.S., Afghanistan and Pakistan (March 2009 speech)

Places greater focus on training and increasing size of Afghan security forces so they can take the lead, including partnering U.S. with Afghan units (March 2009 speech)

Increases civilian effort for economic development and good governance: a “capable and accountable Afghan government” (March 2009 speech)

U.S. foreign assistance Obama Administration Policy May 2009 ISAF Assessment

GEN Mc Chrystal “the overalls situation is deteriorating” and says if turnaround doesn’t occur in next 12 months the U.S. “risks and outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible”

Prioritizes governance efforts equally with security efforts Advocates raising Afghan National Security Force to 400,000 Geographic prioritization of effort Need to change ISAF operational culture with greater unity of

effort and interaction with the population

U.S. foreign assistance Obama Administration Policy ISAF Assessment leads to another review . . .

Fall 2009 strategy review considers ISAF Assessment and classified set of “resource recommendations.”

Debate over: narrow focus on counter-terrorism, “a counter-terrorism plus” approach, and more multi-faceted campaign described in ISAF Assessment

Obama’s December 2009 West Point Speech Confirms core U.S. goal & focus on security Announces deployment of 30,000 more troops Launches civilian “surge” Sets deadline: condition-based withdraw of U.S. forces

beginning July 2011

U.S. foreign assistance Obama Administration Policy New policy change . . .

Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review, December 2010

President Obama says there is “significant progress” toward the core goal, but that “the gains we’ve made are still fragile and reversible”

Contains two new elements and a clarification . . .

1. States the transition to full Afghan lead will conclude by 20142. Stresses U.S. & Afghanistan will form a “new strategy

partnership,” but did not propose what that would look it like

What does he make clear?

U.S. foreign assistance Obama Administration Policy We are not nation-building . . .

“And that’s why, from the start, I’ve been very clear about our core goal. It’s not to defeat every last threat to the security of Afghanistan, because, ultimately, it is Afghans who must secure their country. And it’s not nation-building, because it is Afghans who must build their nation. Rather, we are focused on disrupting, dismantling and defeating al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and preventing its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.”

U.S. foreign assistance Obama Administration Policy Policy speech June 2011 . . .

Reaffirms commitment to 2014 and “core goal”

Says U.S. is continuing to make progress; outlines plan to withdraw 33,000 more troops

Announces U.S. is holding preliminary peace talks with the Taliban will work toward a political settlement b/w Afghan government and all opposition groups, including Taliban

Also . . . 10 year anniversary of start of war (October 7, 2001)Bonn Conference fails to achieve consensus on transition (Dec)Taliban opens office in Qatar, cancels talks in March 2012

Obama Administration Policy

• The US president said that he would strongly tackle the Al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership in Pakistan during both the presidential campaigns.

• He authorized the secret military operation that killed Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011. On the one hand, it was an achievement for the on-going War on Terror. But on the other, it has disappointed Pakistan as the country has insisted that the US share its intelligence, provide a strong case for any other unilateral action it intends to take, and that Islamabad is willing to cooperate.

Impact on South Asia

• the impact of the war on the South Asian region has been particularly at three levels.regional level, at the level of bilateral relations among regional

states at the domestic level.

1. Regional Impact

1. Resurgence of South Asia as the region of highest priority for America (as well as for the whole world)

2. Impact on the regional stability Attacks of terrorists

the Indian effort to manipulate the situation in its favor

2. Impact on the bilateral relations of the countries

Before WOT bilateral relations between India and Pakistan remained as tense as ever

For example

The nuclear tests in May 1998

the kargil crisis in 1999

2. Impact on the bilateral relations of the countries

After 9/11 the ice began to thawthe friendship offer by Vajpayee on April 18, 2003 CBMs to reduce trust deficitsResumption of road, rail and air links, exchange visits by the parliamentarians, media men,

and students,

3. Effects on the domestic political dynamics of the South Asian states

Pakistan had to take a U-turn on its Afghan policy

Pakistan lost much influence it had in Afghanistan

Pakistan banned many militant organisations

3. Effects on the domestic political dynamics of the South Asian states

The banned organizations re-surfaced under new names.

The frequency of terrorist activities multiplied. There was a sharp increase in the suicide

attacks on the government officials and assets The prevailing religious extremism and the

large chain of madrassas spread all over the area welcomed the fugitives Mujahedeen with open arms

3. Effects on the domestic political dynamics of the South Asian states

full-fledge military campaign to drive out the Taliban scraps

The adverse situation generated by the war has discouraged the foreign investors and impeded the domestic economic activity due to political uncertainty

Few Statistics

According to estimates, 98% of the deaths resulting from drone strikes are civilian

Few Statistics

Data Points

Data Points

Final ThoughtsPresident Obama, December 1, 2009

“If I did not think that the security of the United States and the safety of the American people were at stake in

Afghanistan, I would gladly order every single one of our troops home tomorrow.”

"Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and

Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future."

Thank You

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