afghan hearts, afghan minds -...

Afghan Hearts, Afghan MindsExploring Afghan perceptions of civil-military relations

Research conducted for the EuropeanNetwork of NGOs in Afghanistan(ENNA) and the British and IrishAgencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG)

Sippi Azarbaijani-MoghaddamMirwais WardakIdrees ZamanAnnabel Taylor 2008

Copyright: © British & Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group

June 2008

Cover photo: Philip Poupin www.philip-photos.com

This report can be downloaded from www.baag.org.uk

Contact: [email protected]

Responsibility for the content and presentation of findings and

recommendations rests with the authors

The views and opinions expressed in the report do not necessarily correspond

to the views of the European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan, the British and

Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group, their members, agencies that have

sponsored the research or other NGOs, Afghan or international’.

This report has been sponsored by Care International UK, the Canadian Council

for International Cooperation, Christian Aid, Cordaid (the Netherlands),

ICCO&Kerkinactie (the Netherlands), Oxfam Novib (the Netherlands) and the

Swedish Committee for Afghanistan

Afghan Hearts, Afghan MindsExploring Afghan perceptions of civil-military relations

Research conducted for the European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan(ENNA) and the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG)

Sippi Azarbaijani-MoghaddamMirwais WardakIdrees ZamanAnnabel Taylor

2008

ENNAEuropean Network

of NGOs in Afghanistan

2 | Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds

ContentsAbbreviations 3

Executive summary 4

Introduction 12

Research methodology 14

Chapter 1: Afghans in the Civmil debate 18

1.1 Afghan NGOs 191.2 Government 211.3 Civil society, communities and

the media 22

Chapter 2: Imported and local principles 24

2.1 Civilian casualties 252.2 Principles of Afghaniyat and Islamiyat 26

Chapter 3: Security for NGOs 28

3.1 NGO perceptions of insecurity 293.2 Perception and Identity management 303.3 Military and civilian approaches to

NGO security 323.4 Military impact on civilian identity 363.5 Provenance of assistance 383.6 Afghan NGO staff 40

Chapter 4: Expectations, effectiveness and impact 43

4.1 Sustainability 434.2 Charity versus development 454.3 Accountability and transparency 454.4 Contacts and consultations 464.5 Management of actors 484.6 Landscape of conflicts 484.7 Contractors – ‘the face of greed’ 49

Chapter 5: Governance and security 51

5.1 Civilianising PRTs 535.2 Coordination 535.3 Governance 555.4 Security 595.5 Private security companies 63

Chapter 6: Social transformation, intelligencegathering and cultural sensitivity 65

6.1 Social transformation 656.2 Information and intelligence 686.3 Cultural sensitivity 71

Chapter 7: Conclusion and recommendations 73

7.1 Summary of recommendations 76

Annex 1:Interviewees 81

Annex 2:Ministry of Interior Directive Related to PRTs 82

Annex 3:Bibliography 83

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AbbreviationsACBAR Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan ReliefAIHRC Afghanistan Independent Human Rights CommissionANA Afghan National ArmyANAP Afghan National Auxiliary PoliceANDS Afghan National Development StrategyANGO Afghan non-government organisationANSO Afghanistan NGO Safety OfficeANP Afghan National PoliceAOG armed opposition groupsCDC community development councilCF coalition forcesCIMIC civil-military cooperationCIVMIL civil-militaryDIAG disbandment of illegal armed groupsGoA government of AfghanistanHIG Hizb-I Islami GulbuddinICRC International Committee of the Red CrossIDLG independent directorate for local governanceIHL international humanitarian lawINGO international non-governmental organisationIO international organisationISAF International Security Assistance Force (NATO)ISAF X tenth command of ISAFMoI Ministry of the InteriorNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNGO non-governmental organisationNSP National Solidarity ProgrammeOCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsOEF Operation Enduring FreedomPDC provincial development committeePRT provincial reconstruction teampsyops psychological operations QIP quick impact projectSSR security sector reformUNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in AfghanistanWHAM winning hearts and minds


Throughout Afghanistan, there are silent but chillingreminders of the constant loss of innocent lives in aconflict which has spanned three decades, and onethat continues to claim innocent lives today:crowded graveyards; a gravelike structure in aprovincial capital to remind passers-by of thechildren killed in a roadside bomb. The identities ofthe killers and the victims may change but the resultfor the majority Afghans remains the same – a lack ofsecurity against a stark backdrop of continuingpoverty and underdevelopment.

Within donor-countries, politicians, media and thepublic are beginning to question the achievability ofstability and reconstruction in Afghanistan. At thesame time, donor governments have sought tointegrate their aid, foreign policy and militaryagendas in an effort to find a ‘comprehensiveapproach’. Pressure from donor governments andmilitary actors to deliver ‘instant’ development anddemocracy is pushing NGOs into unexploredterritory and promoting an uneasy marriagebetween ‘the three Ds’ – development, diplomacyand defence. Efforts by the international communityand national actors to put appropriate and effectivecoordination mechanisms in place, design andimpement joint strategies have proven difficult.

While significant efforts have been made toovercome the most obvious and avoidable clashes ofinterest and inconsistencies between military andcivilian actors, fundamental challenges remain. Someinternational military contingents have sought toimprove their coordination with governmentstructures. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)have also worked with some cash-strapped NGOson short-term and project-level activities, butdifficulties inevitably arise because of very differentobjectives. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs)are under pressure from all sides: from communitiesto deliver without jeopardising security; fromgovernment to implement national programmes;from criminal groups and armed opposition groups(AOGs) who threaten their safety; from politician-

donors and NATO representatives pressuring themto align with ‘hearts and minds’ strategies.

Civilian actors in the civil military (civmil) debate,including NGOs, have also primarily engaged withspecific elements of the military responsible formonitoring and interacting with civilian actors,framed as CIMIC in military jargon. Howeverinfringements into ‘humanitarian space’ have beencarried out by other elements of the military, whichare currently not engaged in the CIVMIL debate.There is also a vast range of NGO positions on civmilrelations, reflecting a complex history of NGOdevelopment, a complicated operational contextand A CERTAIN LEVEL OF incoherence in thepositions and approaches of individual PRTs.

In light of this, civil-military relations (CIVMIL) retainsits importance for those individuals, whether militaryor civilian, working to bring sustainable peace anddevelopment to Afghanistan.

This research has tried primarily to address Afghanconcerns and unpack some of the commonly heldassumptions about Afghan engagement with andwithin the main areas of the civmil debate. Inparticluar, it aimed to: • provide an evidence base for advocating to

donors, policymakers and the military forassistance that can be appropriately, safely andeffectively implemented in Afghanistan

• present NGOs with an analysis of thecharacteristics of insecurity and conflict inAfghanistan

• assess concerns regarding ‘blurring the lines’ orother impacts on the future of programmes andthe safety of staff and beneficiaries

• explore and convey the perspectives of localpopulations on security and development issues.

A total of 140 people were interviewed in twoprovinces,1 including aid agency staff, governmentemployees, religious and local leaders,policymakers, military personnel, diplomats, donor

1 Paktia and Uruzgan – sponsoring NGOs are operational in one, while the other has only a skeletal Afghan NGO(ANGO) presence. Both provinces represent different levels of security and civil-military relations experience.

Executive Summary

Executive Summary | 5

agency staff and academics. The range of views, attimes contradictory, demonstrates the complexity ofthe context and the need for regular, in-depthresearch of this kind which can help NGOs andothers gain a better understanding of theenvironment within which they operate. Anonymityof interviewees was stressed at all times.

1. Afghans in the Civmil debateDespite the number of Afghan individuals andorganisations who deal with civmil relations on adaily basis, there is little or no Afghan voice indebates on civmil. Discourse amongst policy-makerson ‘stabilisation’ through ‘winning hearts and minds’,‘civilianisation’ of military operations or‘humanitarian space’ can at times be disconnectedfrom the realities and concerns of practitioners atfield level and completely disconnected from thoseof ordinary Afghan people. There is a need for an‘Afghanisation’ of civil-military relations processes,institutions and principles. At present a variety ofpolitical, practical and cultural obstacles militateagainst the participation of Afghan NGOs,government or community representatives in policy-making or debate on CIVMIL. The responsibility toaddress this gap lies at all levels with thegovernment, NGOs, the military, and donors. Theresponsibility also lies with Afghan agenciesthemselves and Afghan civil society, both too oftenover-stretched, under-resourced and, in the case ofsome, driven by short-term financial considerations.

NGOs

Humanitarian agencies need to invest more intranslating concepts like humanitarian principles and‘humanitarian space’ into terms that create a deeperunderstanding, acceptance and ownership of suchconcepts among Afghan staff, local populations,powerholders and parties to the conflict. There hasbeen work at international level with Muslim scholarsto interpret humanitarian principles within an Islamicframework, but results have not been widelydisseminated in Afghanistan. It is important to

disseminate such information using the Afghanmedia in order to familiarize people and generatediscussion which may lead to a demystification of thejargon as well as a sense of ownership. AfghanNGOs need to be provided with sustained supportto build their capacity to engage with some policyprocesses on an equal footing, and to implementprogrammes on the basis of a principled andeffective approach to assistance, rather than short-term projectised and instrumentalised approach.

GoA

Although civmil interaction should includerepresentatives of the Afghan security and defenceforces, it rarely does. In fact, some individuals andgroups within these sectors have no accurate notionof what PRTs do and, at times, no clearunderstanding of, or interest in, the civmil debate.Furthermore, they have little in-depth knowledge ofinternational humanitarian law and how governmentactivities or positions on issues related tohumanitarian principles (eg. neutrality ofhumanitarian agencies) can impact on the ability ofagencies to provide neutral, impartial andindependent assistance to communities affected byconflict or humanitarian crisis. There is a need forwider understanding of the debate, its rationale andimpact at policy and implementation levels withinstate and government structures. Relevant ministriesand departments also need to increase theirunderstanding of how government policy on militaryactors impacts on humanitarian and NGOoperational space.

Civil society, communities and the media

Civil society and communities have very little inputto the discussion on civmil relations. The media isnot engaged either, and even if they had theopportunity to do so, journalists fear the reprisalsthey fear they may face if they took a perceived anti-military stance. In the current climate, it may bedifficult to provide a secure, enabling and neutralenvironment in which Afghan people can engage in


the CIVMIL debate. NGOs and civil society must tryto find ways to create such a safe space.

2. Imported and local principlesMilitary concepts, such as ‘winning hearts andminds’, or aid agency concerns regardinghumanitarian principles are not the only ones at playin the arena where NGOs and the military currentlyoperate. Afghaniyat and Islamiyat2 may alsounderpin many interactions in certain areas, whilerespect for cultural forms and the ability to practiceIslam are both fundamental parts of human securityfor some in Afghanistan. Aggressive house-to-housesearches and forced entry by the internationalmilitary can easily undermine the Afghaniyatprinciple of namus,3 and seem to create more ill-willthan civilian casualties. All stakeholders must learn tolook at human security in Afghanistan through amore culturally appropriate lens.

3. Security for NGOsThe Afghan context is increasingly characterised bynew trends in the nexus between the insurgency,economic criminality and weak, corrupt or absentrule of law. Distinctions between criminal elements,insurgents and ‘government’-associated factionshave become increasingly hard to discern anddelineate. In some areas, state security forces havebecome increasingly predatory. Increasing militaryinvolvement in the delivery of assistance poses newchallenges for NGOs’ own assistance strategies andapproaches to security management.

All interviewees seemed to have slightly differentperspectives on what it means to be secure anddifferent ways of providing security. NGOs tend tofocus on acceptance and protection-based securitymanagement strategies, while using deterrence as alast resort. However, as the security situationdeteriorates and impacts on social, political andconflict dynamics at the local level, the old methodsof operating, which allowed NGOS to manoeuvre ininsecure parts of Afghanistan in the past, are no

longer entirely effective. No longer able to rely oncommunities to provide them with security in aconsistent fashion, a pull-back in some areas hasbeen inevitable. Yet in doing so, NGOs have losttouch with communities. As a consequence, NGOsface a number of challenges and dilemmas,including: Managing and juggling differing perceptions of theirNGO’s identity amongst key stakeholders andpower-holders, including insurgent factions, localpopulations, local leaderships, and the governmentof Afghanistan Differences between military concepts of stabilisingand securing an area, versus NGO approaches to aidagency security management based on ‘acceptance’and negotiated access to communities in insecureareas Increasing challenges in negotiating access tobeneficiaries with local power-holders as newgenerations of insurgent forces assume control ofareas (without the same historic ties to NGOsoperating in those locales)Negative consequences for NGO safety and securityassociated with real or perceived associations withthe international military, which can result in the‘civilian’ identity of the wider NGO sector, and notjust individual agencies working with the military,being tainted by association NGO implementation of Government programmesconstitutes a security risk, and has compromised theability of agencies to claim ‘humanitarian space’.Through shifts in donor funding, NGOs have beenforced into an implicit alignment with a contestedcentral government.

This research suggests that ‘blurring’ of identitiesbetween military and civilians appears less of aproblem than the extent to which civilians areperceived to be engaging in activities or other formsof collaboration with the military. The ‘blurring thelines’ concept does not adequately capture thecharacter of local populations’ perceptions ofexternal assistance, whether provided by NGOs, themilitary or other international actors. Such aid

2 Afghaniyat is an unwritten code of conduct and honor that Afghans live by. The simplest translation would be asense of Afghan-ness. Islamiyat refers to Islamic studies in school curricula, but was used by some interviewees toexpress a broad sense of being a devout Muslim.

3 Broadly, honour or ‘face’.


relations with external actors are mediated bycomplex social and political dynamics; some ofwhich can appear contradictory. These findingspresent challenges for those NGOs engaged withthe military to re-assess implications for their ownsecurity management, but also for donors who arechannelling resources through military and civil-military operations.

4. Expectations, effectiveness andimpactMany of the Afghans interviewed expressed cleardistinctions and preferences between small andlarge-scale projects; developmental versus short-term approaches to programming; and methods ofproject design and implementation. There is nohomogenous picture of Afghan perceptions of aidchannelled through the military or civilian actors,such as NGOs. Some informants emphasised thatassistance is welcome regardless of its provenance,whilst others underlined that aid from the militarybrought serious risks with it. Despite efforts toimprove their coordination with civilian actors, suchas the Afghan Government, the international militaryremains continuously challenged in deliveringassistance. It persists in implementing aid largely onthe basis of a ‘charity’ paradigm, which can beperceived as patronising, instrumentalist andunsustainable by local populations. Key issues raisedincluded the following:

Sustainability

There is a preference for multi-year programmeswith a long-term, sustainable impact, which oftenrules out PRTs as implementers or indeed fundproviders. Interviewees indicated that NGO effortsto ensure that the impact of their work is sustainableare welcomed by communities.

Charity versus development paradigm

Military involvement in aid is driven in part by the

‘winning hearts and minds’ (WHAM) theory. Thisoperates on the basis of a charity paradigm, whichsees beneficiaries as the deserving poor, andprovides handouts and services while ignoring thecomplexity of the local context, and the unintendedconsequences of injecting resources into conflict-affected communities. NGOs have been working formany years to erase the handout mentality,emphasising the importance of ‘ownership’,involvement and empowerment of beneficiaries.This research does not advocate the military movingto a more developmental mindset, but they shouldbe aware of how charitable acts can undermineNGO activities.

Accountability and transparency

While many NGOs try to be accountable tobeneficiaries, PRTs are often secretive. Cost-effectiveness and transparent spending are some ofthe most important considerations for local Afghanpopulations. Any indication that donor funding isgoing astray or being wasted is likely to lead tofurther cynicism and hostility. Transparentcommunity-based monitoring and auditingstructures help communities and their leaderscontrol resource transfers, ensure that there is agood impact and that assistance does not becomedivisive.

Contacts and consultations

For a project to be effective, local consultation andinvolvement in the design, implementation andmaintenance are vital. As military and civil-militaryoperations, such as PRTs, are primarily directedaccording to military needs, their interaction and/orfollow-up with communities varies considerably.Communities feel that most NGOs mostly take theiropinions into consideration, with extensiveconsultations and follow-ups to projects. PRTs, onthe other hand, may consult with people but are notperceived to be listening or taking lessons learnt onboard.


Landscape of conflicts

All actors, including both international military andNGOs (local and international), must invest moreseriously into greater contextual understanding, andconflict sensitivity (Do No Harm). As NGO securitymanagement strategies become overly preoccupiedby overt trends in insecurity, they may become lessattuned to the local-level conflicts in whichassistance programmes can become implicated. In adifferent, although similar, trend, the internationalmilitary tends to focus on high-level conflictdynamics and is inadequately attuned to local-levelpolitical, social and conflict dynamics which canultimately feed the wider insecurity in a region.

Contractors: ‘the face of greed’

PRT procurement, tenders and related activities candrive up local prices and wages, while their lack oftransparency and perceived ineptitude in awardingcontracts is eroding communities’ goodwill. Afghansfrom all walks of life have set up contracting firmsand compete for contracts and funding. Becausemany contractors are seen as siphoning off fundsand providing low-quality work, their use oftencreates tense relations and can even lead to conflict.NGOs must find ways to differentiate and distancethemselves from contractors, as well as advocate tothe government, donors and military for greateraccountability of such actors in future.

5. Governance and securityEmphasis by international policy-makers and themilitary on a simplistic ‘security-development’linkage is misplaced and even counter-productive inthe Afghan context. Afghan populations aresceptical about military intentions, and are notfooled by simplistic material incentives designed to‘win hearts and minds’. Crude and unsophisticatedmethods, such as badly designed and implementedprojects to combat Taliban efforts on the non-kineticfront, to ensure force protection or to win supportfor the Afghan government are not currently helpingbuild credibility or trust. There is considerable

scepticism among civilians that an internationalmilitary force can promote the outreach of the GoA,rather than marginalise it or make it seemsubordinate to military imperatives.

While some analysts equate government ‘presence’with infrastructure, projects and services, mostinterviewees disagreed, linking security to improvedgovernance instead. Most Afghans see theinternational military presence almost as a ‘necessaryevil’, due to ANA and ANP inadequacy in tacklinginsurgency, terrorism, crime and outsideinterference. They see a clear role for PRTs in securitysector reform, as long as it is thought through andexecuted correctly. However, the image of theinternational military may have suffered as a result ofclose contact with the GoA, which is increasinglyseen as discredited.

Coordination C

oordinating humanitarian and developmentassistance has been a thorn in the side of the GoA,donors and others since the fall of the Taliban andbefore, with wastage and replication at variouslevels. Despite the creation of a number ofmechanisms to help coordinate and monitordevelopment assistance and projects, duplication isstill taking place in some areas.

Governance

Establishing the government’s legitimacy is essentialto successful stabilisation, but while there isevidence of NGOs helping to extend the GoAoutreach by implementing national health andeducation programmes, there is little clarity on howthe PRT presence can help. Interviewees felt that theGoA lacks the human resources necessary to tacklethe challenge of handling development, governanceand security. GOA representatives are not alwaysconsistent in the recognition of humanitarianprinciples or provide political support for NGOoperations, despite their importance for the deliveryof national programmes in many areas.


Security

Security is a priority for ordinary Afghans who cannoteven perform the basic functions of life in someareas due to current levels of insecurity, wherecriminality is rife and it is increasingly more difficultfor locals to distinguish between the Taliban andcriminal elements. The government has an importantrole in not only providing security, but in protectingpeople’s ‘namus’ or honour, an important part ofhuman security for Afghans and a critical aspect ofPashtun customary law. However it has so far failedto protect ordinary Afghans from corruptgovernment elements, criminals, the Taliban and theinternational military in different scenarios. Mostinterviewees felt that in these circumstances theclosure of PRTs would symbolise overall militarywithdrawal and lead to a rapidly deterioratingsecurity situation. However, Afghans interviewedoften do not trust ISAF and CF to protect them, andfeel the security they provide is fallout from militaryactivities in pursuit of international aims. In someareas, where tribal leaderships are contributing tosecurity, PRT and GOA security roles need to bemodified to ensure that they do not jeopardise suchfragile efforts.

Private security companies

While impromptu checkpoints, banditry and a rangeof criminal activities have always taken place onvarious routes, road security has deteriorated sincethe fall of the Taliban. The actors that straddle themilitary and private sectors in relation to roadbuilding and security are perceived to benefit fromlucrative deals and at times the protection ofelements within the international military presence.Financial support for such organisations can erodetransparency and accountability, and may evenreverse the impact of disarmament, demobilisationand reintegration. Their impact on NGO and PRTactivities and the potential dissonance which theyrepresent needs more attention and analysis.

6. Social transformation,intelligence gathering and culturalsensitivityVarious groups operating in Afghanistan wish toeffect social change: the GoA in its pursuit ofdemocracy; the military, through its WHAM efforts,psychological operations and counterinsurgencycampaigns. Since every group’s attempts at socialtransformation (including the Taliban’s) aim fordifferent and at times conflicting outcomes, it is anarea which impacts on operational space andsecurity and cannot be overlooked in the civmildebate.

Thirty years of sustained contact with communitieshas allowed NGOs, as well as members of theTaliban and other groups, to establish a unique set ofrelations and build up vast amounts of experienceand information. The international military presence,in comparison, tries to apply positive pressure,partially through short-term handouts andinfrastructure projects, to render communities moremalleable. Military efforts in this arena, using whatare at times crude and unsophisticated methods towin hearts and minds, to ensure force protection orto win support for the GoA, have led to clashes withhumanitarians and development workers.

The military’s insistence on working with NGOs orpreparing the ground for them does not help NGOsin their struggle to project an independent andimpartial identity and has led to the perceived andactual militarisation and instrumentalisation ofassistance. NGOs should not be pressured to getinvolved with the military for their socialtransformation and related activities at any stageprimarily because of implications related tointelligence gathering. At the same time, theactivities of the military, the GoA and others arechanging the operating environment for NGOs, whoneed to develop a heightened state of awareness ofthe shifting socio-political contexts within which theywork.


7. Conclusion

‘There is a common misperception that the issues inAfghanistan, and indeed elsewhere around theworld, can be dealt with by military means[alone]....The military is a key, an essential element indealing with those problems, but by and large theseproblems can only be resolved politically4.’

UK’s Chief of Defence Staff , 2007

CIVMIL relations, institutions and decision-making inAfghanistan need to be more inclusive and informedby Afghan perspectives. This responsibility falls toall actors, the GoA, the militiary, NGOs, Afghan civilsociety groups, and the media.

Based on the findings of this research in Uruzganand Paktia, the following key recommendations aremade: (A full list of the report’s detailedrecommendations is included on page 77)

Afghanisation:

Afghanisation implies both greater contextualunderstanding by international actors, andgreater participation of and accountability to andfrom Afghan actors themselves. Civil-militaryrelations processes, institutions and decision-making need to be more inclusive and informedof Afghan perspectives. This responsibility falls toall actors, including NGOs, military, government,UN, and Afghan agencies themselves. Suchefforts need to embedded in wider strategies tobuild the capacity and ownership of local actorsin processes that affect them. Drawing on theinternational efforts of Muslim scholars andhumanitarian agencies, donors and NGOs shouldalso invest in cross-cultural translation andsensitisation to ensure that humanitarianprinciples are understood as relevant to theAfghan social, cultural and religious context.

Governance:

The current emphasis by the internationalcommunity and military forces on ‘winning heartsand minds’ through a rather simplistic‘development-security’ sequence is misplaced.Greater emphasis should be placed onaddressing the essentially political challengesrelated to good governance and sustainableconflict resolution at both national and locallevels in Afghanistan. Afghan power-holdersand communities are well-versed in the powerdynamics implicated in short-term projectsimplemented to ‘win hearts and minds’.

‘Civilianisation’:

Military engagement with civilian agenciesthrough forums for civil-military relationsdialogue continues to be pro-forma, withdisappointing outcomes for some andinadequate follow-up based on concerns raisedby NGOs and Afghan stakeholders.

Conflict Sensitivity:

All actors need to invest more in the unintendedimpacts of their interventions for local-levelpolitical and conflict dynamics, which can havewider ramifications at regional and even nationallevel. Both combat operations and CIMIC-typeinterventions by military forces have manifoldimplications for the security environment for bothAfghan people and NGOs. NGOs are alsochallenged to increase investment in ensuring the‘conflict sensitivity’ of their programmes.

Aid Effectiveness:

Donors should recognise the intrinsic challengesof channelling aid through contested militaryoperations, which are also engaged in combatoperations. Both donors and the governmentshould recognise the security risks inherent ingovernment-aligned aid programmes in asituation of on-going insurgency, and make

4 Air Chief Marshall Jock Stirrup, the UK Chief of Defence Staff, interview with Sky News television, October 2007.


provisions for implementing partners accordingly.This research indicates that Afghan people arenot always convinced by short-term projectsdesigned to meet tactical military objectives, butprefer long-term sustainable programming.Issues of effective transparency to andconsultation of Afghan communities are alsocritical, and point to some intrinsic limitations tomilitary-led assistance strategies.

Humanitarian Access and SecurityManagement:

The situation for humanitarian and developmentpractitioners is continuously changing. Theiroperational space is shrinking as AOGs spreadfear and expand their influence. In such contexts,NGOs face a number of challenges in relation totheir security management and theimplementation of acceptance and protectionbased approaches to humanitarian access.Operational learning, and inter-agency sharingare required to maintain contextualunderstanding. NGOs may need to invest in theconflict mitigation and resolution skills, so thatfrontline staff are adequately equipped to dealwith the some of the social, political and conflictdynamics implicated in the implementation ofprogrammes. A particular challenge resides inproviding adequate funding and capacity-building for the Afghan NGO sector to enableeffective safety management, and sustainableorganisational and human resourcesdevelopment. NGOs also need to invest in theconflict mitigation and resolution skills, so thatfrontline staff are adequately equipped to dealwith the some of the social, political and conflictdynamics implicated in the implementation ofprogrammes.


As one flies into Tarinkot a graveyard comes intoview – a grave of martyrs. Tall poplar poles bearinggreen flags stand out against the rugged landscapeas a reminder that innocent blood was shed. Hererests an unfortunate group of Afghan men, womenand children who were massacred in the early daysof the jihad: civil servants and their families sent by acommunist government to serve the people ofremote Uruzgan. It was decided that these civilservants should be killed as a hostile act against thegovernment they represented. The decision wasmade to kill their families in cold blood as well. InTarinkot, the provincial capital, a pitifully small grave-like structure decked out in shiny scraps of clothstands on a street corner to remind passers-by of thechildren killed when, decades later, a suicidebomber tried to attack a stationary US convoy.

These are both silent but chilling reminders of theconstant loss of innocent lives in a conflict that hasspanned three decades and mutates from one lethalform to another, always with the loss of innocentlives. The identities of the killers and the victims maychange, but the result is the same – death,destruction and delayed development. In the light ofthis, the civil-military (civmil) debate retains itsimportance for those Afghans and internationals,both military and civilian, who work to bringsustainable peace and development to Afghanistanin the face of increasingly depressing odds and agovernment that is beset by problems.

Donor-country politicians, media and the public arecurrently questioning the achievability of bothstability and reconstruction in Afghanistan.Influential voices are calling for an expedited exitstrategy for international forces if visible progress isnot achieved and high levels of violence persist.5 TheNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is notseen as being in control of the situation. Theshocking attack on Kabul’s Serena Hotel in January2008 and the devastating bomb blast in Baghlan inNovember 2007 are further evidence to many thatthe security situation is out of control, political

violence is rampant and civilians are unsafe.Furthermore, there are signs that counter-narcoticsand counter-insurgency are increasingly being seenas two sides of the same coin.

In the midst of this, non-government organisations(NGOs) are under pressure from all sides: fromcommunities to deliver without jeopardising theirsecurity; from government to implement theirnational programmes; from criminal groups whothreaten their safety; from armed opposition groups(AOGs) who put them into the same basket as theiropponents; from politician-donors and NATOrepresentatives who pressure them to operate instrategically prioritised provinces in order to alignwith ‘hearts and minds’ (WHAM) strategies.

Work on the UN integration of missions has beenconcurrent with the growth of interest in civmilrelations, mixing political mandates withhumanitarian relief and development. The UnitedNations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA)is the first attempt at such integration and hasreceived a mixed response from different quarters.At the same time, national governments have beengrappling with the need to unite their aid, foreignpolicy and security agencies in an effort to find asound comprehensive approach.

The history and main points of the civmil relationshipin Afghanistan has been amply covered elsewhere,with good analysis and recommendations for NGOsand others.6 There are currently approximately41,000 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)troops in Afghanistan and 11,000 American troopsunder the Coalition. It is clear, however, that thecivmil debate is overwhelmingly focused on a smallpercentage of the overall force capability – namelythe provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). In brief,PRTs were a US-Coalition attempt at adressing amulti-agency requirement at provincial level,introduced by the US ambassador as a means towinning hearts and minds in the context ofOperation Enduring Freedom (OEF). According to

5 See, for example, ‘Afghanistan death toll rising’ Al-Jazeera.net (October 2007); or Annabella Bulacan, ‘Death tollin Afghan clashes reaches 5,600 in first 10 months of 2007’ (November 2007) AHN News.

6 See, for example, Humanitarian Policy Group (March 2006); Donini et al (2006); Uesugi (2006); Save the ChildrenUK (2004); Sedra (2004); Gordon (2005); Stapleton (2007); World Bank (2007).

Introduction

Introduction | 13

Mark Sedra, ‘It was a response to growingresentment toward the Coalition among the majorityPashtun community in the south and east of thecountry, where the bulk of military operations havebeen undertaken, and to international criticism ofthe apparent disconnect between OEF and thewider reconstruction and stabilisation process.’7

Some NATO spokespeople argue that thecoexistence of pragmatic NGO involvement in civmildialogues at country level and NGO advocacy onpolicy at international levels represent aninconsistency in NGO positions. In the Afghancontext, there is a vast range of NGO positions,reflecting a complex history of NGO developmentand a complicated operational context.

At the same time, there is increasingacknowledgement within ISAF of the incoherence inpositions and approaches of individual PRTs. Afurther cause of difference and inconsistencybetween military forces is ‘the presence of twoseparate military operations and commands inAfghanistan, and different approaches to civil-military activities.’8 It is admitted that even thepersonalities of PRT commanders change the wayCIVMIL relations are handled – for example, whileone commander may support the civiliancomponent, the next could see only militarysolutions to problems. PRTs also have very differentresource levels: the Lithuanian PRT in Ghor isunderresourced in one of the poorest and mostmarginalised provinces, while American and BritishPRTs in Helmand are well-funded.

This research, in critically interrogating both themilitary concepts of ‘hearts and minds’ and aidagency concepts of ‘aid effectiveness’, has triedprimarily to address Afghan concerns and to unpacksome of the commonly held assumptions aboutAfghan engagement with and within the main areasof the debate. Many of these assumptions areinherent in the argument that integrated CIVMILoperations – particularly quick impact projects (QIPs)

– facilitate reconstruction. Such projects are seen asessential and effective strategies to winning heartsand minds among local populations, that buildconsent for the government of Afghanistan (GoA)international military operations and the process oftransition associated with reconstruction andpolitical reform at provincial and national levels. Theimpact of opium production and drug trafficking, aswell as counterinsurgency efforts are not covered inthis research.

Both NGOs and the military are at times being askedto perform roles for which they are inexperiencedand ill-equipped. Both are in many ways sufferingfrom the unwillingness to find diplomatic solutionsto the crises in the Middle East and South andCentral Asia. During this research, interviewees onall sides commented on the lack of real political willor leadership to make the challenging decisionsabout political issues in Afghanistan and to takeresponsibility to see them through.

SynopsisChapter 1 considers Afghan involvement in thecivmil debate, a subject that has been neglectedthus far, but has long-term implications for NGOoperations in the country. It discusses why Afghanshave been reluctant to engage in the debate, andthe overall implications of this reluctance. It alsotouches briefly on the understanding andengagement of the Afghan government, media andcivil society in the debate. Chapter 2 examines someof the principles at play in the humanitarian space inthe light of occidental and oriental approaches.Chapter 3 details some of the threats facing NGOsand their response to these. Chapter 4 exploressome of the issues surrounding the quality of militaryassistance, including the negative impact ofcontractors used as implementing partners by PRTs.Chapter 5 considers the impact of PRT activities ongovernance and security, and how much thepresence of the international military is helping GoAoutreach. Chapter 6 examines the problems social

7 Sedra (2006).

8 World Bank (2007). The Americans are the exception in that General Rodriguez, based in Bagram, has directcommand and authority.


engineering and intelligence gathering pose forPRTs, which are not best designed to access and usesuch information, and how the current set-ups andlack of cultural sensitivity risk putting perceivedintelligence providers in danger.

Research methodology

Research

A total of 140 people were interviewed for thisresearch: 90 aid agency staff, policymakers, militarypersonnel, diplomats, donor agency staff andacademics in Europe, North America andAfghanistan; and 50 Afghan NGO staff, governmentpersonnel, local leaders, and individuals in a range ofsectors, from media to private construction.

The research team consisted of two Afghan9 and twonon-Aghan individuals; two male and two female.Three team members conducted fieldwork inAfghanistan.The research team has: • in-depth knowledge of Afghan provincial/local-

level politics and development processes• expertise in aid effectiveness (development and

humanitarian) – specifically the design,implementation, monitoring and evaluation of aidprogrammes in contexts of chronic insecurity andconflict

• expertise in CIVMIL relations in the context ofinternational military operations.

• Afghan language skills (both Dari and Pashto)and knowledge of relevant cultural, ethnic andhistorical factors in the geographic areasprioritised for research

• experience in field-based data collection,interviewing and report-writing

This research further benefited from the findings ofresearch interviews conducted by the team leaderon similar issues in other parts of Afghanistan priorto the field research for this report.

The purpose of the research was threefold:

to provide an evidence base for advocating todonors, policymakers and the military for assistancethat can be appropriately, safely and effectivelyimplemented in Afghanistan in view of policydebates on aid effectiveness, civmil and WHAM to present NGOs with an analysis of thecharacteristics of insecurity and conflict in

9 Afghan colleagues from the Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU).

Box 1: Notes on language and terminology

• ‘Taliban’ is used as an umbrella term for all thevarious groups which currently compose theTaliban movement in the different regions ofAfghanistan.

• The term ‘military’ is used generically, unlessthere is deliberate specification – in manycases, it was evident that interviewees werenot discussing PRT personnel when theyreferred to the military, and they could rarelydifferentiate between Coalition and NATO-ISAF personnel.

• NGO is also used as a broad umbrella termcovering a vast range of international andAfghan organisations of varying sizes, somewith a long history of service in Afghanistan,others newly arrived or established.

• It is sometimes difficult to differentiatebetween humanitarian and developmentorganisations, as many tend to multi-task,especially smaller Afghan organisations. TheRed Cross is one of the few agencies strictlyadhering to humanitarian activities inAfghanistan at present. In the report, theterms NGO or agency refer to these multi-mandating organisations. By and large,Afghans did not differentiate betweenorganisations.

• PRTs generally consist of a manoeuvreelement, special forces, civil-miltarycooperation (CIMIC) teams, multiple donorpossibilities and other elements. Thus PRT isoften used as a generic term covering someor all of these elements.

Introduction | 15

Afghanistan that impact on programmes and assessconcerns regarding ‘blurring the lines’ or othertrends with relevance to the future of programmesand the safety of staff and beneficiaries to explore and convey the perspectives of localpopulations on security and development issueswhich are frequently assumed, but rarely researchedin a rigorous fashion or given voice.

Although it was initially envisaged that the researchmethodology would consist of both a quantitativeand qualitative approach, time, budget and securityissues related to travelling with paperwork such asquestionnaires, which could be linked to NGOs insome areas, restricted us to a qualitative approach.

The views of local populations – policymakers, civilservants, NGO staff, aid agency beneficiaries, mediaand civil society actors – were placed centre-stage.Our contextual understanding arising from a long-term operational presence and fluency in locallanguages also meant that communications weredirect and interviewees less anxious aboutmisinterpretation. We tried as far as possible toarticulate the perspectives of local populations on anumber of issues: similar views and phrasesrepeated by different subjects indicated thatinterviewees are communicating what is regualrlybeing expressed in their community and society. Wetried to unpack issues and triangulate data, toensure that the comments reported representedtrends and issues rather than being one-offstatements. The range of views, at timescontradictory, represented in this reportdemonstrates the complexity of the context and theneed for regular in-depth research of this kind whichcan help NGOs and others gain a betterunderstanding of the environment in which theyoperate. The inconsistencies and contradictions thatbecome evident during such research highlight thedifficulty of agreeing on common positions.

Geography

The research focused on two provinces whichrepresent different levels of NGO activity, securityand CIVMIL relations:• Paktia: some of the NGOs sponsoring the

research are operational here and the province,which has a US PRT, is largely secure except fortwo districts. Being close to Kabul, the provincehas an educated elite which has taken animportant role in Afghan political life, such asPresident Najibullah.

• Uruzgan: remote and mountainous, this is avolatile province which at one stage producedone cadre of the Taliban leadership. The PRT isDutch, and there is just a skeletal Afghan NGO(ANGO) presence.

Box 2: Sample research questions:

• What are the different factors of insecurityand conflict that impact on NGOprogrammes, staff, beneficiary communitiesand development/humanitarian objectives?What are their consequences?

• How significant are international militaryoperations, including combat, peacekeepingand civmil activities (especially QIPs), in thiscontext?

• Can evidence be found to substantiate, refuteor nuance the ‘blurring the lines’ argumentregarding the consequences of militaryinvolvement in aid?

• On what basis can NGOs work effectively,safely and appropriately at the local level?

• What policies, strategies and behavioursshould the host government, donors and themilitary implement in order to support, ratherthan constrain or erode the NGO ability toprogramme safely, effectively andappropriately?


Although it would have been interesting to include aNorth-South and/or a Pashtun-non-Pashtunperspective, time constraints meant that this was notpossible.

Interviewees

Interviews with Afghans were conducted on anindividual basis or in groups of three to avoid thetendency of some people to ‘perform’ for anaudience of peers. It also meant that less peoplewould have to spend time and effort coming to aninterview in which they may have chosen not toparticipate. We stressed anonymity for intervieweesin both provinces at all times. In Uruzgan, our hostANGO facilitated interviewee selection based onour criteria, which included tribe and communitydevelopment council (CDC) membership, position ingovernment, etc. In Paktia, we sought outinterviewees oursleves, selecting on a more sectoralbasis – such as media or tribal groups.

In cases where people complained of low-qualityprojects or particular incidents, we recorded thosethat were mentioned by more than one interviewee,since this indicated that what was being describedwas an established part of local gossip or thatreports were being collected from a number ofeyewitnesses. We started off with a table of pointsfor semi-structured interview which would allowtriangulation. After a first set of interviews inUruzgan, the table had to be modified due tointerviewees’ hesitation to answer certain questions.The table focused primarily on eliciting views relatedto the roles of the GoA, NGOs and PRTs ingovernance, development and assistance projects,and security provision.

Interviews with internationals were also conductedon an individual or small group basis. Primaryinterviewees – such as foreign affairs, developmentand defence ministry officials; representatives fromacademic and other research institutes; NGO staff;and other relevant stakeholders both in donor

countries and in Afghanistan –were selectedaccording to their perceived involvement and orinterest in the civmil debate. Secondary intervieweeswere recommended by primary interviewees. Weinterviewed both civilian and military staff in UruzganPRT; whereas in Paktia only civilian staff wereavailable for interviewing. Interviews were based onbroad checklists related to development andassistance projects, governance and security, whichwere altered according to the person beinginterviewed.

It was almost impossible to interview women inUruzgan due to their restricted mobility and the factthey rarely interact with strangers. In Paktia, thewomen we wanted to interview – staff from NGOsand the Ministry of Women’s Affairs – wereconsistently unavailable. In Kabul, there was a mix ofmale and female interviewees, but the Afghans werepredominantly male. While it is evidently importantto have a mixed perspective, certain categories ofwomen do tend to withhold opinion on issues whichare considered ‘public’ and therefore beyond theirsphere of influence or concern. In this sense, eventhough it would have been possible to find ways tointerview more women, it would have proved time-consuming without necessarily yielding results.10

Security issues

Security in the provinces selected meant that projectsites could not be visited, as even local NGO staffcurrently restrict their movements to essential visitsonly. Time and budget limitations, together with atense security environment, meant that in-depthanalysis of the causes of specific acts of violenceagainst NGOs – as well as wider surveys of publicperceptions – could not be carried out. In bothprovinces, our host ANGOs did not want us to drawattention to ourselves by moving around. The visit toUruzgan was hampered by unrest in Chora district,close to Tarinkot.

10 The team leader has spent over a decade in Afghanistan, is an expert on gender issues in Afghanistan and hasexplored a range of issues with Afghan women. As a result of this experience, she was aware of Pashtun women’shesitation to express opinion on anything to do with the military.

Introduction | 17

The Afghan male team members changed theirappearance, growing beards and wearing moretraditional clothing. The female team leaderobserved hejab11 and covered her face whentravelling in public. In Uruzgan, we presentedourselves as all-Afghan, doing research for KabulUniversity. This was to ensure security and to putinterviewee minds at ease in a pervasive atmosphereof suspicion and the tangible feeling that ‘walls haveears’.

Transport also created problems – we were strandedfor some days in Uruzgan due to the lack of flightsand insecure roads. We used an old local vehicle forour trip to Paktia to avoid drawing the attention ofAOGs. Not using a vehicle that clearly indicated‘international organisation’ or ‘commander’ made uslook like ordinary Afghans. We discussed what weshould say to police at checkpoints to ensure theywould not ‘alert’ their ‘friends’ down the road to robor kidnap team members. The police seem to poseas much if not more of a tangible threat than theTaliban in some areas – for example, we werestrongly advised to avoid revealing our presence tothe local police in Uruzgan, who it was reported tous “create security problems if they are not bribed.

11 Attire which includes head cover and is appropriately modest in an Islamic context.


From the outset of the research, it was clearlyevident that Afghans are not vocal in the civmildebate at a national or international level. This is instark contrast with the number of individuals andorganisations that are heavily engaged in civmilrelations in their day-to-day work in the field.

Interviews with Afghan policymakers and NGO staffbrought up a wide and contradictory range ofperspectives regarding issues raised in the civmildebate. For example, one interviewee from a KabulANGO hoped to ‘be able to convince the militaryand PRT to use NGOs as a bridge to work with’,while another saw the military as wilfully creatingproblems wherever they went.

Interviewees offered a number of reasons orobstacles for the noticeable lack of Afghans in thecivmil debate. These fall broadly into two categories:

1. Political reasons, such as:

• ANGO fear of losing funding from PRTs anddonors pushing for collaboration with PRTs

• frequent disappointment in trying to influencethe military, leading to dismay

• the perception that policy engagement on civmilhas less practical application compared tothematic debates on health or agriculture

• perceived weakness of the GoA to tackle andinfluence international military strategy andoperations

• perceived NGO failure to come up with commonstance or position

• the lack of effective influencers within the GoA • rigid doctrine and modus operandi of ISAF troop-

contributing nations• the lack of direct communication links with

coalition forces (CF)• the lack of a common strategy between different

PRTs, which makes influencing a labour-intensiveand repetitive task

• the perception of military interaction with civiliansas motivated by unidirectional intelligence-gathering imperatives

• a lack of clarity on the desired outcomes of thecivmil debate.

2. Practical and cultural obstacles, such as:

• ANGOs being understaffed and overstretched• the lack of a real Afghan culture of advocacy in

general, and of dedicated advocacy units in mostANGOs, unless they are donor driven

• language barriers: Meetings are conducted inEnglish, which means that some Afghans can notparticipate effectively; there is also a lack ofagreed vocabulary for common terms of debatein Dari or Pashto

• the perceived low level of Afghan expertise onthe issue

• a perceived patronising attitude towardsAfghans, with meetings often dominated byexpatriate staff

• a lack of trusted, professional and politically orethnically ‘impartial’ interpreters

• low-level staff attending meetings, partlyreflecting the low priority ANGOs give to theCIVMIL debate, and partly the fact that ANGOdirectors are often tied up chasing funding andmeeting reporting requirements

• low participation of Afghans in the debate,leading to a low invitation rate

• the perception that Civmil meetings are a wasteof time, with no direct result of impact and theNGO community slow to react to stimuli

• an overall perception that the civmil workinggroup is suffering from apathy and a lack ofparticipation.

The above challenges raise an interesting set ofquestions about Afghan voice and empowerment,which have clear parallels with the wider challengesin promoting local ownership of aid, security and

Chapter 1: Afghans in the CIVMIL debate

Afghans in the CIVMIL debate | 19

political processes in Afghanistan. Such efforts inrelation to civmil are rendered more complex byANGO attitudes to security, which is discussed inmore detail in Chapter 3.

Most fundamentally, however, Afghans observingthe ebb and flow of the civmil debate have beenfrustrated by their experience that, although themilitary frequently appear to listen intently, there israrely a corresponding change in policy or practice.This signals insincerity to some and indicates tointerviewees that ISAF and the PRTs are anunresponsive alien force on the Afghan socio-political landscape.

1.1 Afghan NGOsJust as it is among international non-governmentalorganisation (INGOs), civmil is a contested territoryfor ANGOs. Many ANGOs do currently work withPRTs. The current research highlights a number ofissues in relation to ANGO engagement with PRTsand the wider CIVMIL debate:

1.1.1 Capacity and funding constraints

The obstacles to Afghan participation in the civmildebate listed in the previous section point to seriousweaknesses in organisational capacity and politicalstrategy within the ANGO sector. Morefundamentally, these weaknesses point to theresponsibility of donors to foster more effective andsustainable civil society development and NGOcapacity building in Afghanistan. Donors currentlyoffload increasing amounts of project funding onANGOs simply because they appear willing andable. This stretches many organisations to theirlimits, and pays little heed to considerations oforganisational safety and security, capacity buildingor human resource development. In some cases,local management models are either non-existent orinappropriate, with a tendency to concentrateauthority in one or two people who are frequentlyoverstretched. ANGOs rarely get core funding thatwould enable them to survive between projects and

develop strategic visions or policy issues.

Human resources too are an important part of thisdilemma for all stakeholders and not solely NGOs.The relatively small pool of qualified andexperienced Afghans with the prerequisite level ofEnglish or European language skills in Afghanistan iscurrently being pulled between donors, diplomaticcommunity, aid agencies, the military and the privatesector. This has naturally had a profound impact onstaffing and capacity for INGOs and ANGOs.

1.1.2 Cultural gaps and challenges

‘Afghan NGOs know very little about humanitarianprinciples. They are money-driven. They have blindlystarted working with PRTs and don’t even know whatthe main objectives of the military-implementingdevelopment projects are.’

Afghan analyst, Kabul

This quote is one of several demonstrating aperceived lack of knowledge about humanitarianismamong ANGOs. Many ANGO interviewees andAfghan INGO interviewees could not listhumanitarian principles or were unclear as to whatthey meant in an applied sense: some confusedhumanitarian principles with human rightsconventions. They were also unclear on the statedobjectives of PRTs in implementing assistance anddevelopment projects and how this could affectNGO operational space and humanitarian space.

In general, the research suggested that there is nospecific humanitarian terminology in Dari or Pashto,which might facilitate discussion of civmil issues.Those Afghan NGO staff with an awareness of civmildebates explained that most of the discussionfocuses on two issues: the military’s objectives inpursuing development activities, and technicaldebates on aid effectiveness which contrast NGOexpertise with the weaknesses in PRT approaches toassistance. There is also extensive discussion of


civilian casualties, but the relevance of civmilprocesses to such issues is not understood or actedupon. In other words, the political and principledunderpinning of the civmil debate is missing formany Afghans.

1.1.3 Limitations in impact of engagement

Some Afghans mentioned the fact that theoccupation of Afghanaid’s office in Nuristan by theUS forces and the unsatisfactory outcome of thatcase has led to disillusionment for a number ofmembers of the Agency Coordinating Body forAfghan Relief (ACBAR).12 Interviewees viewed theincident as a failure of NGOs and civil society toinfluence the military that epitomises a wider senseof inevitability and powerlessness in the face of theinternational military presence. A number of NGOinterviewees in Kabul felt a sense of unavoidabilityaround military encroachment on humanitarianspace.

1.1.4 Pragmatism and following the money

One key outcome of the above trends is thatAfghans generally display pragmatism and a numberof different approaches to civmil relations.Pragmatism has led a number of smaller and/or localNGOs to follow the money – one rationale for themturning to PRTs for projects was the lack of fundsdirectly available for NGOs as donor money isincreasingly channelled through nationalprogrammes and trust funds. Evidently, PRT fundingis easier to handle than standard donor fundingbecause their reporting and monitoring proceduresare lighter.

With NGOs facing increasing security threats andmany INGOs implementing more stringent safetyand security management approaches, ANGOs havealso found that their funding opportunities haveincreased. As a consequence, ANGOs (as is the caseamong INGOs) pursue a wide spectrum of positionsfrom cooperation to all-out opposition. Such trendshave dangerous implications in terms of the

perceived instrumentalisation of humanitarianassistance, with NGOs generally being seen asaligning themselves with ISAF, CF and the GoA. Inturn this has a divisive knock-on effect as NGOsbecome more suspicious of each other, claimingthere is little or no openness among NGOs receivingPRT funding.

The consequences of direct funding from militaryand integrated CIVMIL operations has also been feltin ANGOs with severely limited staff capacity. ANGOdirectors have to juggle and prioritise a number ofconcerns in deploying staff, which directly impactson the range of issues with which they choose todeal. Because they have to balance the decision tojeopardise staff security against survival of the NGOand their livelihoods, unilateral decisions to acceptPRT funding can create resentment. Such decisionsare rarely based on an informed analysis of theimplications of working with PRTs or on NGOpositions in the civmil debate.

Some of the ANGOs receiving or looking to receivefunding from PRTs feel that no organisation – noteven NGO coordination bodies – have the right todecide for the entire NGO community on a positionvis-a-vis PRTs. Other ANGOs use the humanitarianimperative to argue that community vulnerability inthe face of urgent needs has forced them tocollaborate with PRTs in some areas. ANGOs alsofeel that INGOs come from a more secure fundingposition and can afford to be more critical of PRTs ingeneral.

In such a climate, it is difficult for ACBAR and otherbodies to do more than communicate on salientissues and share best practice. ACBAR, a keynetwork of national and international NGOs inAfghanistan, has tried to brief and train Dari- andPashto-speaking NGO staff on different componentsof the civmil debate, such as humanitarian principles.However, ACBAR itself is severely overstretched andunderfunded at times, so its efforts to build localcapacity are constrained. With such a broad

12 On 20 February 2007, US troops forced entry into Afghanaid’s offices with blindfolded captives, whom theyproceeded to interrogate there. Afghanaid staff were forced to vacate the premises. There has been nosatisfactory resolution of the incident


membership and corresponding range of positions,it is also difficult for networks to come up with acommon stance. INGOs are challenged to work withANGO partners to feed information and policyrecommendations to international-level policyprocesses which may help address these obstacles.

1.2 GovernmentRecommendations have been made that the GoA begiven a key role in coordinating the civmilrelationship, for the following reasons:

• the GoA’s request for US$20 billion of externalassistance over the next five years obliges it todemonstrate its leadership credentials

• the need for an enforcement mechanism toensure NGO-military coordination is systematicand rigorous – the GoA could submit legislationto Parliament covering NGO-militarycoordination as a condition for operating inAfghanistan; penalties for failing to coordinatecould include official censure and deregistration.

• GoA coordination of the NGO CIVMILrelationship could help build governmentcapacity to implement state building.13

However, against the backdrop of general low levelsof information and/or interest in the civmil debate orcommitment to humanitarian principles, the aboveprospect seems unworkable.

civmil interaction should include representatives ofthe Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan NationalPolice (ANP) and Afghan National Auxiliary Police(ANAP), but rarely does. In fact, one draft version ofAfghanistan Civil Military Working Group’s civmilguidelines left the Afghan armed forces outaltogether.

The ANA is divided roughly between the mostly US-trained officers left from the Zahir Shah era andCommunist-era personnel trained and mentored bythe Soviets. There are also groups from the

Mujahideen and post-Taliban eras – mostlyrepresenting scattered Northern Alliance interests –who are focused on defeating the Taliban andstruggle against perceived attempts to re-establishPashtun domination. These groups are furtherfragmented between those who favour NGOs overPRTs for providing humanitarian assistance andimplementing development, and those who see allNGOs as corrupt. Each group has its own narrow setof interests and pursues different strategies in itsinteraction with the various parts of the internationalmilitary presence. Some of them have no accuratenotion of what PRTs do and, at times, no clearunderstanding of, or interest in, the civmil debate.Furthermore, none of the groups have in-depthknowledge of international humanitarian law (IHL)and how their activities can impact on humanitarianspace. For example, although the Ministry of theInterior’s (MoI) executive steering committee is incharge of coordination between the MoI and ISAF,interviewees tended to conflate the concept of acivmil debate and relations with one-on-onecontacts, liaison, coordination and interaction withPRTs.

Many interviewees from government and policy-making levels felt that PRTs were undermining theGoA (see Chapter 5 for in-depth discussion ofgovernance issues). There was little or no concernabout how PRT activities were impacting onhumanitarian space or NGO operations, as shown inthe examples below:

• The head of the newly formed IndependentDirectorate for Local Governance (IDLG) initiallyseemed unclear on the role of PRTs and unawareof the civmil debate, although the IDLG hassubsequently called for PRTs to build the capacityof provincial development committees (PDCs)and phase out their own presence in theprovinces.

13 Karp (2005).


• Since some Community Development Councilswhich are part of the National SolidarityProgramme (NSP) already seem to receive PRTfunding or are apparently encouraged by NSPfacilitating partners to apply for it,14 the Ministryof Rural Rehabilitation and Development shouldalso be taking an interest in and positioning itselfin the civmil debate. However, the ministry has noclear, official position on the matter.

• There has been some bilateral development ofgovernment-PRT relations – for example, theMinistry of Education has entered intodiscussions with PRTs over PRT school-buildingprojects, while individual parliamentarians arelobbying PRTs to provide assistance for theirpersonal NGOs and causes. However, there hasstill been no major debate on the issue inParliament.

There is a general need within state and governmentstructures for wider understanding of andengagement in the CIVMIL debate, its rationale andimpact at policy and implementation levels. There isalso a need to increase understanding of how formaland informal government policies on PRTs and othermilitary actors impact on humanitarian and NGOoperational space.

1.3 Civil society, communities andthe media

‘We have not covered the civil-military debate in themedia mainly for two reasons. First we think it willnot be an interesting subject for the readers andsecond we cannot write things that can irritate thegovernment and the PRTs. Freedom of speech issomething on paper. Here in Paktia if I write thatthree districts are practically under Taliban control Ibelieve I will be in jail the next day. In some districtsnot only the elders but the district administratorshave made their alliances with the Taliban.’

Journalist, Paktia

Civil society groups and communities are almostcompletely left out of the discussion on civmilrelations. While these groups often have veryspecific or narrow interests, they are most often atthe civmil interface. As a result, they are affectedmost profoundly by it and often develop creativemeans of handling both sets of actors. The Afghanmedia is not directly engaged in the debate either:they are not currently included in meetings orinformed of the technicalities and details. Even ifthey were, journalists and media groups may avoidgetting close to the issues, in fear of reprisals fromthe international military if they take a perceivedanti-military stance. Some interviewees stated thisclearly while others indicated it indirectly. TheAfghan Independent Human Rights Commission’s(AIHRC) interaction with ISAF and CF is mostfrequently tied to monitoring human rights violationsrelated to prisoner transfer and increasingly tocivilian casualties, not the CIVMIL debate. It could bethat they fear that involvement in the CIVMIL debatemay lead to loss of access to prisoners.

It is important for civil society, communities and themedia to be more informed and involved to ensurethat the Afghan voice is heard in the civmil debate.However, it may be difficult to provide a secure,

14 This observation is based on the team leader’s field research in various provinces of Afghanistan in 2006.


enabling and neutral environment to elicit acontribution from Afghan nationals in the currenthuman rights climate. It is therefore crucial thatNGOs and civil society groups try to find ways tocreate such a safe space.

1.3.1 Media relations and freedom ofspeech

‘The Americans are polite and respect journalists.The government is very rude. But we think that thePRT is using the government to intimidate journalistsand control the media. There is an Afghan employedby the PRT who constantly monitors the media. Thegovernor is very biased and only supports andpraises the journalists that are in his favour.’

Journalist, Paktia

The establishment of an independent Afghan mediasector is one of the achievements of the 2001 BonnAgreement, but its progress is being scaled back inthe face of attacks from radical elements and thoseopposed to freedom of speech. Like the ANGOsector, the Afghan media is facing a funding crisis,which could see the international military andopposition groups funded by Afghanistan’sneighbours battling for influence in the sector,threatening the independence of the media.

PRTs are already entering this sector in a variety ofways which could damage nascent mediaindependence. Some Afghan journalists interviewedin the current research said that PRTs wereestablishing local radio stations and broadcastingprogrammes which they felt were for propagandapurposes rather than providing useful information.This approach to radio programming is damagingthe credibility of independent media. A smallnumber of PRT-run programmes to train journalistsare also causing concern.

The Afghan media or civil society groups have madeno coordinated effort to approach those PRTs thatare active in the media sector to voice suchconcerns. This is due to three reasons: • a belief that lobbying would have no impact• the fact that they may need to apply for PRT

funding at some point • the dearth of open criticism from Afghans

because they either feel co-opted or intimidatedin different ways – those who feel able to voicedissent in a ‘safe’ interview context such as thatprovided by the current research would notnecessarily feel able to complain in other fora.

Comments indicated that the military, in its variousforms, was not trusted as genuinely supportive ofdemocratic principles such as freedom of speech.The NGO sector needs to pay greater attention tohow this situation is impacting on the space forbroader human rights and civil society work inAfghanistan as it frames the wider political and socialclimate for NGO activism.


‘These defenceless people burn to nothing silently.All we can do is to deeply regret this loss of life.’

Government employee, Uruzgan

Military and humanitarian actors alike use principlesand concepts that are informed by widerinternational experience – such as ‘humanitarianspace’ and ‘stabilisation’ – to describe theirmandate, objectives and experience in Afghanistan.However, ensuring that such terms are understoodand translated in the context of prevailing Afghansocial, cultural or religious norms remains achallenge.

While the principles of humanitarian space may haveequivalents in Islamic social history, the type ofdebates which bring such concepts to the fore havenot yet taken place in the Afghan context. There hasbeen work at international level with Muslim scholarsto interpret humanitarian principles within an Islamicframework, but the results have not been widelydisseminated in Afghanistan. It is important,therefore, that civil society (Afghan andInternational) and Afghan media disseminate suchinformation to familiarise people with the concepts,generate discussion around them, demystify thejargon and allow them to develop a deeperunderstanding and sense of ownership of the issues.

Unfamiliar conceptsThe research team could not, for example, find anadequate phrase in Dari or Pashto which covered thefull meaning of ‘humanitarian space’15, instead usingthe term, ‘NGO operational space’, which is quitedifferent. The very fact that the rights of those inneed and the vulnerable are regularly disregardedby elites shows that humanitarianism does not siteasily in Afghan society, with its recent history ofviolence, bloodshed and social upheaval. Otheroccidental concepts – such as ‘blurring the lines’,

‘hearts and minds’, force protection, – are rarelyunpacked for local interlocutors. These are notissues that the GoA, Afghan leaderships and peopleseem to fully grasp and/or necessarily care about.They have their own theories regarding whatactivities related to these concepts actually mean –for example, in the Afghan worldview, WHAMactivities would not be one-off events but a constantnegotiation and renegotiation of a subtle balance ofpower in a relationship which matures as a result ofgoing through the trials and tribulations ofalternating conflict and cooperation.

‘Those who are neutral can live in areas where theTaliban are in control. Those who work with thegovernment and NGOs cannot live there.’

Journalist, Paktia

Interviewees found it difficult to imagine the conceptof neutrality – where elders or community membersdeal with both the Taliban and the GoA whilemaintaining their distance, or refuse to cooperatewith either. Nobody knew of any cases where agroup or individual had maintained ‘neutrality’.Discussions with interviewees indicated thatneutrality was considered as not getting involved inpolitical or military skirmishing. Neutral wassomehow interpreted as ‘harmless’ and implied asense of ‘not knowing’ or innocence. They found theconcept of impartiality – not taking sides – easier tounderstand: with a history of making and breakingalliances, Afghans were more comfortable withconcepts involving decisions on whether to take oneside or another.

Some organisations attempt to negotiatehumanitarian access by getting combatants tounderstand the principles which guide theiroperations. Most recently UNICEF and theInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)have been able to negotiate ceasefires with theTaliban to conduct vaccination days – which have

15 Linguistic and semantic obstacles work in both directions – for example, English does not have all the specificterms which Pashto has for different orders of conflict and rivalry.

Chapter 2: Imported and localprinciples

Imported and local principles | 25

been reportedly disrupted on two occasions by theactivities of the international military rather than theTaliban. Vaccination days were not unusual before2001 – they were seen by warring parties as anopportunity to boost local popularity and legitimacy;fulfil part of their moral obligation as Muslims toassist vulnerable children; and most importantly totake the moral high ground against the other side.Nowadays, some of the motivation remains thesame, and in areas with local Taliban fighters, suchmoves probably keep fighters motivated. The WorldFood Programme, on the other hand, cannot alwaysnegotiate safe passage for convoys – partly becausethey will not negotiate with all parties, but alsobecause the food aid being transported could besold or diverted to feed troops.

It is, of course, difficult to comment on levels ofunderstanding and respect for humanitarianprinciples and space without interviewingrepresentatives from the Taliban and AOGs. Forexample, it is difficult to ascertain how often theTaliban respect IHL in their dealings with prisoners(especially ANA) and how much they respect therights of wounded war enemies to medical attention.Yet if reports of beheadings and summaryexecutions of captives are correct, this wouldindicates a lack of adherence to IHL, and captiveskept alive may be solely of strategic value in prisonerexchanges.

2.1 Civilian casualties

‘Initially we supposed [the foreign forces] to be ourguests, but they turned out to be very short-sighted.They opened fire on everyone indiscriminately andmade most of us think otherwise. Only a few daysback they opened fire on a young newly wed guy inthe nearby bazaar. The poor victim was putting fuelin his car by the roadside. At the same time a PRTconvoy was passing and they thought he was tryingto detonate something. So they showered him withbullets. He died on the spot. He has brothers, andcousins and a tribe. Can they all forget whathappened to their young relative?”

Shura member, Uruzgan

‘We report the civilian deaths of the civilians inattacks because it is our moral responsibility and atthe same time there is pressure from communitiesand relatives of victims. They call and threaten us,saying that if we do not report them then it meanswe are part of the coalition forces. We try to confirmthe casualties from independent sources.’

Journalist, Paktia

‘We received a number of complaints from people inJalalabad and Kandahar. Last year there were alsocomplaints from Khost, but not this year. Wetherefore asked for a conference where UNAMA,civil society representatives, religious leaders, elders,ISAF, coalition forces and the GoA all participated.The aim was to examine ways to reduce civiliancasualties. It is not just we who are concerned aboutit, but also the government and NATO forces thatwant to do something because it has badly damagedthe image of international forces. The number ofcivilian casualties unexpectedly went up and hasoverwhelmed the international community and theAfghan government.’

Civil society representative, Kabul

‘People are generally afraid of expressing theirviews. They are deeply influenced by thepropaganda of anti-government elements. Thosewho at one point considered [CF] as guests…havechanged their opinion due to the heavy-handednessof the foreigners.’

Religious leader, Uruzgan

The Dutch have pressed UNAMA to recruit a humanrights officer to monitor the transfer of detaineesfrom Uruzgan. Yet despite such moves, there is noreal attempt to engage with Afghan audiences onHuman Rights, who need a different type ofresponse and reassurance to Western publics. Manypeople mentioned the death of the young mechanic,described in the comments above, but they did sowith regret and resignation rather than overthostility. The general feeling was that people haveno choice but to put up with such deaths. On theother hand, in Tarinkot, every time the research teamheard machine gun fire in the bazaar, staff from the


NGO the team were staying with would rush out tofind out whether American special forces had killedor injured anyone while passing through. It is unclearhow such deaths are viewed in Afghan culturalframeworks, whether further nuanced byPashtunwali16 or other customary law codes. It is alsouncertain whether people view communityinfrastructure as a suitable way of compensating’blood crimes’ committed in this way . What is clearis that trust between internationals and locals isconstantly eroded by such deaths.

There is a broad neglect of a history of militarisationin Afghanistan and the brutality of the past threedecades which has left people exhausted andtraumatised. This is a society which sees violence,corporal punishment and humiliation as a part offamily and to a certain extent community life.17 Theconcept that anyone would care about protectingcivilians, which the AIHRC is beginning to tackle, isalien to Afghans. Warlords such as Abdul RashidDostum, for instance, frequently used human shieldsin the 1990s without any outcry from either locals orinternationals. Today, like many other warlords whocommitted human rights abuses, he still constitutesa force to be reckoned with in Afghan politics. In theyears prior to 9/11, people were tortured andexecuted with impunity while the internationalcommunity effectively stood by. The brutalisedpopulation now mistrusts the internationalcommunity’s motives and fears the warlords whohave been rehabilitated into government: they feelthat any outcry will result in reprisals or inaction. It istherefore vital for civil society and others to feelsupported in creating a safe space and strongpresence where ordinary people feel they can safelyvoice complaints on issues such as civilian casualties.

2.2 Principles of Afghaniyat andIslamiyat18

‘Foreign forces always employ bullying tactics. Theyhumiliate elders in front of their relatives; put a bagon their heads and body-search their female familymembers. It obviously benefits the Taliban [who]have photographs of such incidents and now sendthem via mobile to each and everyone.’


‘We prefer NGOs as they know our cultural values.Americans only bully their way and insult our elders.’


‘We live in a remote and inaccessible area. Peopleare very conservative and ideological. Whateverwork is within the frameworks of Islam is acceptableto them.’


‘It would be a bit difficult for the PRT or the militaryto achieve winning hearts and minds becausepeople still look at them suspiciously as foreigners. Itwould be good if Islamic countries replaced themand started talking to the Taliban.’

Tribal leader, Paktia

Humanitarian principles are not the only ones at playin the arena where NGOs and the military currentlyoperate – there is also Afghaniyat and Islamiyat,which underpin many interactions and reactions tospecific stimuli for most Afghans. These may lead toacts of violence and contribute to insecurity. ForAfghans, respect for certain cultural forms and theability to practice Islam are fundamental parts ofhuman security. Actions which disrespect the

16 The Pashtun code of conduct.

17 See, for example, Smith (2008).

18 It is difficult to define Afghaniyat. It is an unwritten code of conduct and honour that Afghans live by. The simplesttranslation would be a sense of Afghan-ness. Islamiyat is a term used to refer to Islamic studies in school curricula,but some interviewees used it to express a broad sense of being a devout Muslim.

Imported and local principles | 27

principles of Afghaniyat upset them – for example,house-to-house searches and special forces kickingdoors down can undermine the principle of namus19

and Afghaniyat. Because such acts put the integrityof a man’s honour and manliness at stake, he has toretaliate, and such incidents are easily manipulatedby opposition groups to force people to act. ManyAfghans – including NGO staff – are fundamentallyopposed to house-to-house searches, because theyare familiar with and understand that the principlesinvolved are so strongly socialised in somecommunities that they become second nature andcan only be expressed in culturally appropriateforms. In some cases, namus incidents seem tocreate more ill-will than civilian casualties.

It may be possible to use Afghaniyat or Islamiyatprinciples – such as melmastia (hospitality); zakat(alms); or invoking protection for women, childrenand the sick – to draw parallels with aspects ofhumanitarianism. The difficulty is where to draw theline in terms of what to accept and respect – forexample, Afghaniyat accepts blood feuds, whichinclude the exchange of women in lieu of bloodmoney, and Islamic practice in some countriesaccepts the stoning of adulterous women.

The Taliban are keen to interpret the actions of theinternational military presence in a light which willmobilise people to support them and join theirranks. The advent of better communications hasgreatly assisted them in this. In communitiesunderpinned by Islamiyat, the Taliban often try tomobilise people through invoking the need for jihad.

NGOs have also used aspects of Islam to argue forchange – for example, by using the literacy of theProphet’s wives, Khadija and Ayesha, to push forgirls’ education. However, in the past few years,NGOs have tended to rely less on such tools. It maybe time they started revisiting such practices.Analysis of these various principles and initiativeswhich attempt cross-cultural interpretation ofhumanitarian and other principles into such

frameworks are currently lacking in the Afghancontext. However, they are crucial in order to elicitmeaningful engagement of ordinary Afghans in thecivmil debate.

19 Broadly, honour or ‘face’.


‘NGOs have suffered in the last five years. We areblamed for spying, which is worse than the earlieraccusations of corruption. And now people areconfusing NGOs and private contractors, so we haveto take the blame for what they are doing. PRTsshould be careful when selecting partners and gothrough NGO coordination bodies.’

ANGO representative, Kabul

‘Most of the people we have contact with know andwelcome our efforts. But there are also some whoconsider us as American spies. Some consider usmissionaries working to convert people toChristianity.’ ANGO representative, Paktia

Research indicates that shifts towards integratedcivmil relations along with the military’s increasingrole in assistance work are having manifoldimplications for the security management strategiesof humanitarian agencies.20 This was also borne outby the findings in the current research in Uruzganand Paktia, which highlighted how the implicationsof CIVMIL relations, policies and approaches forNGO security are framed by wider trends that affectNGO operations and the dynamics of conflict andsecurity. Thus the impact of CIVMIL relations iscompounded by wider trends in donor assistanceand government policy, which are forcing NGOs toalign themselves with government strategies.

Multiple factors shape the security risks and threatsconfronting NGOs, including criminality; randomviolence and disorder; and targeted violence againstinternational agencies, irrespective of theirassociation with the military. The Afghan context isincreasingly characterised by new trends in thecriminalisation of the formal and informal securitysector, which encompasses the national police,militias and bandits. Police and military checkpointscreate security issues for many Afghans, who can beasked for bribes, intimidated or even abducted.

Afghan NGO staff feel strongly that localgovernment can be predatory in some areas. Inmany cases, staying in touch is not so much toguarantee security but to ensure that staff are notmade insecure by suspicions or accusations ofhaving Taliban or anti-government sympathies.21

Although it is the GoA’s responsibility to prevent anddeal with incidents in an appropriate manner, insome areas with little rule of law and wheregovernment figures are connected to criminalnetworks, agencies just have to avoid giving themthe opportunity to intimidate, extort, rob or worse.This highlights issues around the GoA not meetingits security obligations while aid agencies in generaltake more responsibility.22 NGOs must lobby theAfghan government to take note of such incidentswith local security forces.

As the situation evolves, it becomes increasinglydifficult to distinguish criminals and AOGs, when thelines get blurred, at times deliberately, as part ofboth criminal and insurgent tactics. The recentincrease in the lucrative abduction of Afghans andinternationals is striking. The research suggests thatAfghan society is not necessarily more violent thanbefore; rather the increased numbers of newexpatriate and NGO staff has led to a higherprobability of encounters with criminal elements.

In the course of this research, military intervieweesoften implied that NGOs cannot operate in areasuntil such areas are militarily secured and‘completely safe’ as defined by the military. Thiscontrasts with the reality that some NGOs have beenmanoeuvring in insecure regions of Afghanistan formany years, operating on the basis of long-termrelationships and negotiated access with localcommunities and powerholders. It is important tonote that they were doing this on their own terms ina time and space largely uncomplicated by the overtpresence of a foreign military.

20 Humanitarian Policy Group (March 2006).

21 Similar accusations are sometimes levelled at peaceful protestors and groups of youth or students in southernAfghanistan.


Chapter 3: Security for NGOs

Security for NGOs | 29

3.1 NGO perceptions of insecurityMost NGOs cited the safety and security of theirstaff, programmes and beneficiaries as an overridingconcern. However, every stakeholder interviewedseemed to have a slightly different perspective onwhat it means to be secure, and different ways ofproviding security. For example, some perceivedISAF’s provision of patrols as increasing safety;others believed they attract suicide bombers androadside bombs.

NGO interviewees identified a wide range of sourcesof insecurity – both local and foreign – whichincluded ordinary people, Afghan armed forces,criminal elements, AOGs; and CF. For example: • Ordinary people can pose a security threat if

local or international staff become embroiled in alocal conflict which leads to violence or death –for adultery, revenge, losing face, unpaid debt,etc.

• Foreign fighters may look to drive out localTaliban in areas where the latter are willing towork out a modus vivendi with NGO staff.

• Criminal gangs are aware of the lucrative dealswhich NGO-sector hostages represent. In thiscontext, aid worker casualties do not necessarilyindicate a shrinking of humanitarian space, butthe overlay of humanitarian space with amultiplicity of other ‘spaces’ based on differentsets of principles and desired outcomes.

3.1.1 The nexus between governmentalignment, military strategy and NGOsecurity

As a result of donor emphasis on state building anddevelopment approaches which channel fundingthrough central government, NGOs have beengently coerced into joining national, government-aligned aid programmes. One example is the NSP,which provides small-scale project funding to localcommunities within a national framework. Just asNGOs were coerced into joining the NSP – and byextension, in the eyes of some, declaring solidarity

with the government – INGOs also feel underpressure from their respective governments andmilitaries to move into insecure areas where thedifferent national PRTs operate. Indeed, several PRTshave sought to align themselves with and supportthe NSP and other national developmentprogrammes. Such trends have manifoldimplications for NGO security, as it is not alwaysclear how local populations and parties to theconflict view NGOs working with the government.

However, the GoA still struggles to exert itsauthority over NGOs and other groups. NGOresistance to aligning with the government perhapsreflects a mix of legitimate concerns about agencyindependence and safety implications for staff,programme and beneficiaries with institutional foot-dragging over the issue of re-aligning withgovernment plans and budgets. The latter iscompounded by NGO nostalgia for earlier periodswhen they were not subject to the current levels ofstate bureaucracy, regulations and corruption andNGO staff dealt directly with local commanders.

Some of the national programmes are instrumentalin providing basic health and education services.While ordinary people appreciate the provision ofsuch services, they may also suspect all groups ofsiphoning off assistance meant for theircommunities, regardless of who is allied with whom.AOGs might take umbrage at alliances with thegovernment, but will appreciate that denying serviceprovision in areas under their control is unpopular.For multi-mandate organisations implementingdevelopment projects and providing humanitarianassistance, programmes such as NSP present aserious challenge in a context of on-goinginsurgency and violence. As one commentatorstated:

‘The fundamental issue is a definitional one. Onceyou have declared victory, legitimized Karzai andagreed to support his government, you cannot all ofa sudden decide that you want to work in


humanitarian mode. You have obviously taken sidesand are seen as such by the Taliban, etc… But thesystem does not learn. Basically, NGOs need todecide: do they want to be Wilsonians and part ofthe foreign policy of their governments orDunantists and go by established humanitarianprinciples. I would argue that trying to do both atthe same time is a recipe for being shot at.’ 23

3.1.3 Shift from acceptance to protectionand withdrawal

The seminal NGO security management typologydeveloped by Konrad Van Brabant describes threemain categories for NGO security management orposture:acceptance, negotiated on the basis of principlesand based on community acceptanceprotection, involving more emphasis on protectivemeasures, such as operating with low visibility, orvarying routes to avoid planned attacks, etcdeterrence, which involves suspension of operationsor withdrawal, the use of armed protection, etc.

As the security situation in Afghanistan hasdeteriorated, NGOs have increasingly shiftedtowards so-called ‘remote management’ models ofprogramme implementation, management andmonitoring and evaluation. This also reflects a shiftaway from acceptance-based strategies towardsprotection- and deterrence-based approaches, andeven withdrawal in areas that become too insecurefor operations. This shift represents a genuinedilemma for NGOs, as it has inevitably contributedto reduced contextual understanding and distancingfrom benefeciary communities.

Taken as a whole, this research uncovered a dynamicsituation in which using certain strategies andactivities can create insecurity in some situations butnot others – with no clear parameters or logic as towhy certain events unfold. This makes the task ofsituation analysis and strategic planning much morecomplicated. The following sections outline the

challenges and dilemmas confronting those INGOsand ANGOs that are still attempting to useacceptance and protection-based securitymanagement strategies in an increasingly insecurecontext.

3.2 Perception and Identitymanagement

‘We do not have anything written about securityrules and so on, but we are always careful. Whentraveling between different districts, we don’t eventrust our drivers and tell them one day before thatwe are going to location B while on the day we goto location C due to security concerns.’

ANGO representative, Paktia

In order to survive in any conflict or post-conflictenvironment, every organisation and individual hasto manage their own identities, either by presentingslightly different faces to different stakeholders or bytaking on one monolithic identity and onlyinteracting with groups that react appropriately to it.The accepted (and largely unarticulated) Afghanview is that the more skilled one becomes in jugglingidentities, the wider the range of contexts in whichone can operate. The complicated nature of thepicture in Afghanistan can be exemplified by thecase of NGOs who become involved in conflictresolution and/or local-level political and socialprocesses associated with developmentprogrammes while maintaining their identities asimpartial arbiters and facilitators. It would appearthat the clean theoretical concepts and mandatesthat characterise Western aid discourse are notconsistently relevant in the Afghan context. Thisissue is explored in more detail in sections on therelevance of Afghan cultural and social norms toconcepts of humanitarian space.

However, it would appear that Taliban intelligence isat a level where they generally know who is comingand going in an area and what strategies they use. It

23 Personal communication with ex-UN official with many years of Afghan experience.


has generally been the practice of Afghanintelligence services under any regime to plantpeople within foreign organisations, and manypolitical and other groups can have their peoplewithin an organisation at any one time. It is unclear,however, why the Taliban and AOGs choose totarget particular individuals and organisations atspecific times.

Key elements in NGO efforts to manage theperception of their identity by different stakeholdersinclude the following:

• Distancing from military forces in both a physicaland a political sense, and making publicstatements which underline this position, areobvious and important parts of identitymanagement for NGOs operating in a conflictsituation, signalling a non-combatant identity.

• Some INGOs ensure security by presenting aneutral, humanitarian face, distancing themselvesfrom their government’s foreign policies andmilitary presence in Afghanistan.

• Perception and identity management for someNGOs is importantly shaped by funding streamsand modalities. Those agencies which havesecured longer-term funding have the timeframeand organisational capacity to develop morethoughtful strategies on identify management.As a consequence, they are under less pressureto juggle identities in a less strategic fashion or toface possible security risks by, for example,approaching PRTs for funding.

• Acceptance is also determined by staff actionsand behaviour as well as the type and quality ofprojects and coverage. These are all importantdeterminants of goodwill and acceptance, and byextension of security, albeit with limitations.

• A long-term presence is important as the identity,motives, services and caliber of an organiszationare clear to communities. Some INGOs andANGOs have links with communities from theirtime in the refugee camps which makes theinteraction with the organisation, if not with

particular staff members, more than two decadesold. NGOs and staff with a long term presence iefrom the jihad or before the fall of the Taliban,command a great deal of respect, based onhaving shared the ‘years of suffering’. This bringswith it a certain level of security, although this haslimitations which must be recognised

• Part of identity management currently includescarrying no vestige of NGO, government or‘international’ paraphernalia while travellingcertain routes. One NGO, for example, facesproblems transferring documentation from thefield to head office, especially on GoA-ledprogrammes. There have been reports ofindividuals who were summarily executed formerely carrying documentation which links themto government and even international businessinterests.24

• Many NGOs keep a low profile by minimisingevidence of an international link. This ishampered by donor visibility dictates, since signsand logos often have to be removed from projectsites and NGO offices. Even media coverage of‘success stories’ abroad can threaten NGOsecurity: there is anecdotal evidence that someAOGs continuously monitor the internationalmedia and react to what they find. There are,however, a number of ways to reduce visibility.For example, when the Taliban started asking acommunity about Afghan engineers working for acertain INGO, the INGO immediately removedthe engineers and appointed a local person tosupervise the work. The engineers then visitedonly sporadically by taxi.

• Other ways of managing identity include alteringdress and appearance in different contexts.Blending in has become increasingly important oflate, so many INGOs are now working throughANGOs. However, this can create a situation inwhich access supersedes the capacity toimplement effective projects.25

• Staff identity and behaviour is of greatimportance. The reputation of some NGOs iscentred in the identity of specific staff members

24 Personal communication with an individual whose family member was executed for carrying a Disbandment ofIllegal Armed Groups (DIAG) identity card, but wishes to remain anonymous.



who have extensive relations or a high-profile in agiven community, and happen to work in theNGO. In the current research, the identity of oneANGO had become entirely associated with onestaff member, who had worked there for thirteenyears. Nobody referred to the NGO by its name,but rather as his organisation.

• During the jihad era for instance, organisationswould unwittingly be co-opted by one ethnicgroup and/or political party, giving them aspecific identity. They would then work in areascontrolled by that party or ethnicity, providinglimited security in specific areas. Some NGOsmobilise specific staff members to forge linkswith certain groups because of their background– for example, employing staff with Hizb-I IslamiGulbuddin (HIG) affiliations to work in HIG-controlled areas. If they are prevented fromdoing this – for example, when CF target theirstaff assuming they are combatants – the scopeof operations decreases.

• Local staff from the area can still becomecasualties of local blood feuds because beingpart of an NGO does not automatically give themimmunity from their identity within the clan‘honour’ system into which they were born.Conflicts within that system may override otherprerogatives, and in the worst cases, mayendanger the NGO as a whole.

• Unless an NGO has been around for many yearsand has a specific range of identity parameters,communities tend not to remember names orknow who is delivering the assistance. As aconsequence, NGOs may be judged by theactions of other NGOs, who are grouped under abroad umbrella; which further complicatesmanaging their identity. This has evident orfollow-on implications for their security.

3.3 Military and civilian approaches toNGO security

‘Sometimes the military make very grave mistakesthat put the life of others in danger. In Shamali somemilitary personnel had distributed blankets to thedisabled and on the blankets there were phonenumbers and a request asking them to call if theyhave any information about Al Qaeda. That reallyput those who had received the blankets in danger.We are still trying to find which particular PRT ormilitary unit did this, but we have failed to identifythem. A similar mistake was made when an airplanedropped footballs coloured with the flags of anumber of Islamic countries and that included SaudiArabia. Saudi has the kalima on its flag and thedisrespect really irritated the public.’

Civil society representative, Kabul.

‘We are not saying that PRTs should not help people,and sometimes they may need to do so for gettinginformation or winning hearts and minds but theyshould not have a negative impact on the personalsecurity of others. That is our main concern.’


‘We try to keep PRTs away from our offices and donot interact with them because it brings threats frominsurgents and suspicion from our targetcommunities.’


‘The military is shameless. They are pushing NGOsinto a corner.’



‘We know about the civil-military debate. We alsoknow that the PRT is trying to show that their role inreconstruction is important and that NGOs cannotwork where the PRT is able to go. They also claimthat they are more cost-effective than NGOs. Theyare sharing these views in private and informalmeetings.’

International NGO Staff, Paktia

Because military concepts of security-developmentlinkage take priority, the military can onlyunderstand NGO security constraints within theirown paradigms. INGOs, ANGOs, the ICRC, differentarms of the government and private sectorcompanies all have different systems for handlingsecurity procedures and incidents, based on theirindividual mandates, goals and operationalmethods. When these different systems overlap,problems can often appear. This section examinesexamples of some of these.

3.3.1 PRTs, NGO security anddevelopment

Interviewees reported that PRT personnel visited anNGO compound shortly after it was raided by armedpeople looking for evidence of contact with thenearby PRT. Visiting the compound to ask whathappened would seem normal to the military, whowere compiling an incident report, but it completelywent against the NGO’s security needs in thecontext – having survived the incident unscathed,they needed further distancing from the PRT.

The above incident shows that the military can be ill-informed in its approach to the security of non-military actors or can create unwelcome security fall-out in the resolute pursuit of their own aims. SomePRTs see an NGO presence as an indicator ofsecurity or ‘success’ and want to see NGOsoperating in their areas at any cost. They see NGOsas part of WHAM and believe that they benefit fromtheir work. They believe that offering protection and

security monitoring will encourage NGOs to work inareas with a PRT presence. Donors who accept thenotion that PRTs can provide security for NGOs arenot taking the complexity of ground realities intoconsideration. In some places, NGOs are beinggently coerced to take PRT money. At times this canbe seen to ‘legitimise’ the PRT role and foothold inhumanitarian and development space. There is alsoan attitude among some PRT personnel that NGOsare already at risk because of Taliban intelligencesystems and that PRT contact will not put them atany further risk. This is a dangerous assumption.

However, it is also clear that some (generally Britishand northern European) PRTs try to show sensitivityto the fact that NGO staff do not wish to beassociated with them for security reasons and tendto stay away from their projects even in thereasonably stable north. Most PRTs have alsorealised that they should not drop in on NGOsunannounced. In some provinces – including thevolatile southern ones – NGOs meet with PRTpersonnel through coordination meetings in publicvenues rather than private regular meetings, whichcan lead to accusations that they are providingintelligence.

There is also a big difference in how PRTs handleNGOs working in insurgency areas, where they areeffectively engaged in ‘guerrilla humanitarianism’ – asmall low-key presence opportunisticallyimplementing projects when the occasion presentsitself.

There are also cases where the military has bypassedconsultation altogether, drawing up plans, expectingNGOs to fit in with and implement them. In thecases described here, and others like them, themilitary did not consult with NGOs on what theimplications for NGO identities, mandates, modes ofoperation and security might be

• In Uruzgan, the Dutch PRT uses the concept ofcreating or supporting ‘permissive areas’, where


there is no continuous fighting. The idea is to fanout from these areas, rolling out blanket securityand development. Some ANGOs have acceptedthis concept, with a great deal of risk to theirstaff.

• The British and some others use the ‘Afghandevelopment zone’ concept – a mechanismwhich focuses kinetic, development andreconstruction resources and is designed tomaximise the use of constrained ISAF, GoA andinternational resources in insurgency-strickenareas. This concept built on what internationalforces were already doing within troubled areas,and was approved by the Policy Action Group inmid-2006. However, it was not supported bysufficient strategic consultation andcommunication activities. As a result, parts of theinternational community were unconvinced bythe concept and the GoA ignored it to a certainextent. Nevertheless, the British follow thisprinciple as appropriate in Helmand, throughQIPs and support for the GoA’s NationalProgrammes, as reflected in the Joint (UK) Planfor Helmand, which seeks to establish a secure‘lozenge’ around Lashkargah. The concept seemsto have been stretched to its very limits, duemainly to a lack of sufficient buy-in from theGoA.26

Not discussing such plans prior to implementation inthe relevant coordination fora, is a serious oversighton the part of the military. It has at best made lifedifficult for some NGOs and at worst put people’slives and projects at risk.

3.3.2 Negotiating with militants

Negotiating with commanders and militia leaders foraccess and safe conduct to enable NGOs toimplement assistance programmes is a long-standing tradition in Afghanistan, as in other conflictsettings. For such leaders, these negotiations arepart of a complex process of legitimisation, financialgain and coercion of the population.

Some organisations, including UN agencies and theICRC, can be open about their occasionalnegotiations with AOGs because they have therequisite political back-up and can protect their stafffrom the Afghan and international military. A numberof factors have helped the ICRC maintain asomewhat neutral and impartial identity, including:its mandate; its well-known emblem; an establishedpresence in the Afghan and cross-border context;and its ability to maintain its independence from thearmed forces and the GoA.

For other agencies, personal relations with theTaliban or HIG or having staff with current orprevious links with these groups may offeropportunities to negotiate access. In manyinstances, this is not organised or led at a centralagency level, but, in a very limited number of cases,delegated to or clandestinely attempted by fieldstaff and as such reflects relationships forged at thefrontline of implementation. Staff may be embeddedwithin the beneficiary communities, encouragingthem to make the necessary connections to enablethe continuation of much-needed livelihoodsassistance.

A range of approaches to negotiating accesscurrently exists within the NGO sector and beyond,each with different practical considerations andconsequences. The following are just a few of themany challenges NGOs face in pursuing suchstrategies.

• There is a lack of documentation of good andbad practice in negotiating access, of how toovercome challenges and the risks inherent insuch negotiations. This means that the lessonslearned tend to remain a part of the informalinstitutional memory of agencies, and are subjectto the vagaries of institutional change and staffturnover.

26 Personal communication with DFID staff member, 15 October 2007.


• These strategies face uncertain understanding orsupport from the GoA and international militarypresence, notwithstanding their obligationsunder IHL to facilitate the provision of neutral,independent and impartial humanitarianassistance. Some agencies interviewed duringthis research cited instances of accessnegotiations leading to targeting by and/orhostile behaviour from the CF.

• Opportunities to negotiate access are beingeroded and challenged by the rise of a newgeneration of Taliban and HIG figures, who donot have historical connections to aid agencies.As the conflict situation evolves, with its impacton community politics and social dynamics, so thescope for humanitarian access is also affected.

During the Taliban period, there was no honeymoonperiod of goodwill between Taliban and aid agenciesor the international community. There were raids onNGO offices and homes to seize material of an un-Islamic nature, alcohol and evidence of proselytising.Local and international staff were at timesimprisoned, beaten and/or deported. Frequentedicts and decrees attempted to exert control overagencies and their staff. In the eyes of many Taliban,events post-2001 have confirmed their suspicionsabout foreigners being opponents and/or spies.According to Donini et al (2006), a large number ofaid agencies arrived in numbers when the militarydid, in response to 9/11, leading the Taliban toconclude that aid agencies are a tool of the USgovernment. No agencies tried to approach theTaliban at that early stage. Discussions withinterviewees reaffirm Donini et al’s conclusion that ‘asocial contract of acceptability will be difficult to re-negotiate’.27

27 Donini et al (2006).

Box 3:

Security: one InternationalContractor’s story

Afghan and international staff from oneparticular international contractor working in anarea that is generally deemed insecure faceproblems getting to and from insecure districtsand travelling around within them. Theinternational contractor uses deterrence toensure staff security. The organisation used tohire security guards from the relative of a localgovernment figure whose very lucrative privatesecurity business (reportedly charging US$300per month per guard) caters for contractors andsuppliers dealing with the PRT. The contractornow has an informal arrangement with the localpolice. When hired privately, the police wear nouniform and come heavily armed. This does notseem to upset local people. The contractor alsogets guarantees of security from localcommunities and ensures that it has good,reliable local staff. The staff try to make sure thatall the various groups in the area benefit fromtheir work without getting too deep into local,tribal politics. As the organisation spends moretime on the ground (roughly three years)interactions are leading to better understanding,trust is growing and people are more open andless hesitant to be seen with staff.


3.4 Military impact on civilianidentity

‘In some ways the presence of PRTs and the militaryhas constrained the NGOs and created securityproblems. Before, people were suspicious of NGOsand thought that they share information with themilitary but now that suspicion is over and peoplehave slowly started to understand that NGOs arehere not to support the military but to bringassistance.’

Local leader, Paktia

‘People can tell the difference between NGOs,UNAMA, PRT and coalition forces. I would notaccept that the lines are still blurred. They even canname the NGOs that have worked for a long time inPaktia such as Care, ICRC and others. People aremore suspicious about the role of UNAMA.’

Journalist, Paktia

‘If any NGO wants to show that they are here fordevelopment and reconstruction, and are not part ofthe political game, they must work closely withcommunities. They should also be sensitive to localcustoms and culture. We are not saying that allforeigners are our enemies. We have Sikhs, and theyare certainly not Muslims and we know that they donot have hidden agendas. We live peacefully with

28 Traditional local leaders.

29 Religious leader.

One ANGO that works in many districts of oneprovince has its security policy and instructionsprovided by the government ministry that runs theparticular sector within which they are working.They mainly rely on community acceptance andasserting the right of communities to humanitarianassistance. With an 11-year presence in theprovince, the NGO is well-known to the Taliban andstresses its impartiality. Despite this, staff are undersuspicion and under threat from all sides – theTaliban, the GoA, ISAF and CF – none of whichseem to fully accept or respect the NGO’s impartialstatus. Their staff have been imprisoned, beatenand even killed. The main threats to their securitycome from the Taliban, who think they are spies.Getting embroiled in conflicts arising from tribalrifts has constituted another major source ofinsecurity.

The NGO staff use military air support to travel tosome districts and receive infrastructure supportfrom internationals. They try to remain anonymousand blend in as much as possible – by using local

transport, dressing like local people, and carryingnothing that would implicate them as NGO staff.However, their line ministry insists on signs or logosbeing displayed wherever activities are takingplace.

In their community health meetings with tribalelders, maleks28 and mullahs,29 the ANGO staff alsodiscuss security. During such meetings and in theirday-to-day work they try to demonstrate theirpolicy of impartial humanitarianism to everyone,and generally have confidence in the goodwill andacceptance of communities. However, this strategyis not always effective, particularly in communitiesthat cannot control the Taliban presence. Ingeneral, the Taliban can only establish a presence inareas with weak leadership and tribal disunity,though the NGO also finds it easier to work in areaswhere the Taliban have families in the communitywho benefit from the NGO’s services. In contrast, itis almost impossible to work in places where theTaliban originate from other provinces or includeforeign nationals.

Box 4:

Security: one ANGOs’s story


them. But in the case of Americans and their army,you cannot trust them.’


‘We can distinguish who is NGO and who is PRT andwe also know that there are civilians in the PRT. Theyseem to be dangerous and have hidden agendas.This makes us suspicious.’


Some Afghan interviewees obviously still see contactbetween PRTs, NGOs and civilians as a security risk,and indicated that the problem may be one of beingtainted by association rather than ‘blurring ofidentities’. One interviewee told us that his relativesin a distant village in Uruzgan have told him not tovisit them because he worked at the PRT. One INGOwas forced to leave the province, accused of spyingfor the CF after some Taliban positions they wereclose to were hit. ANGO interviewees, based inUruzgan, were worried that recent staff kidnappingshave been the result of their cooperation with thePRT, which they try to keep low-key. Although thehostages were recovered through the mediation ofelders, staff in the Kabul HQ felt they would not beso lucky next time when the Taliban got wind of theircontact with the PRT. In spite of this they still use PRTlogistical solutions to get around – for example, tovisit flood-stricken areas in mountainous terrain.

At the time of this research, the Afghanistan NGOSecurity Office (ANSO) reported a rise in recentmonths of NGO staff being abused by those(identified as ‘Taliban’) looking for proof to link themwith PRTs. There have been reports of raids onNGOs in the province of Ghazni, with intruderslooking for evidence of contact with PRTs. Similarlyin the east, HIG and Taliban elements are reportedlyraiding NGO offices in search of evidence of contactwith PRTs and the military, primarily Americans.

‘The risks have increased for our staff in the province.There are two reasons: one is that the local Talibanare not in control anymore and the second is that we

lost face because people know that we arecooperating with the PRT.’

ANGO representative, KabulHowever, notwithstanding the situations describedabove, it is difficult to identify any consistency in whyor when AOGs consider that individuals or agencieshave ‘crossed the line’ in their contact with theinternational military or CIVMIL operations. Forexample, some interviewees from Paktia assertedthat PRTs can travel anywhere and contact anyonewithout jeopardising the latter’s security. PRTs thathave been in place for a number of years alsoemploy community members to do menial, clerical,construction and other types of work. They and theirfamilies also get incomplete ideas about the life andpeople inside the PRT, which contributes to a certainnormalisation of relations with the PRT as a foreignpresence.30 Such families are not uniformlythreatened.

‘The government, PRT, NGOs, they all look exactlythe same – they are foreigners to us, even if there arelocal staff among them.’


‘We know that the PRT is being commanded by theNetherlands. But the Taliban term everyone involvedin aid circles as “Americans”. It is the Taliban’s policynot to make a distinction between NGOs andAmerican forces or PRTs.’


The current research also raises the question ofwhether certain troop-contributing nations are moreproblematic than others. In Uruzgan, ‘American’ wasa catch-all term used for all military, even the ANA.Even groups who knew that the Dutch had takenover in the province still referred to the military as‘Americans’ – in common parlance this now denotesa foreign or non-local (in the case of the ANA)military presence. This lack of distinction in speechwas unusual since locals tended to like the Dutch forbeing respectful, while they disliked the Americansfor being aggressive. In addition, the clean-shaven

30 Based on discussions with Afghan families in Lashkargah, with relatives working in the PRT.


ANA donning wrap-around sunglasses and dressedin uniforms which resemble those of the Americansare probably an alien sight for rural Afghans used toseeing Mujahideen and Taliban fighters in localclothes.

Although most interviewees said that they and theircommunities can distinguish between NGOs, PRTand other military personnel, some said that therewas no differentiation between ‘outsiders’, includinglocal staff of foreign institutions. Similarly, it has beenreported by a number of interlocutors that certainmembers of the Taliban refer to non-Muslims as kafiror infidels. As far as they are concerned, everyonewho is not wholeheartedly on their side is a kafir. Incontexts in which such elements of the insurgencyhold sway, principles of neutrality and impartialityhave limited efficacy.

3.5 Provenance of assistance

Research in Paktia and Uruzgan suggests that localpeople do identify differences in assistancechannelled through different providers, includingmilitary and civilian. Interviewees had a range ofviews on whether the provenance of aid is importantin terms of impact on security. It was clear that underthe current circumstances, low-key contact waspreferrable to visible engagement. The researchrevealed that communities are desparate forassistance from whichever quarter; however, they arealso sensitive to the political and consequentsecurity implications of accepting aid associatedwith contested military, international, or governmentagendas.

Following a long history of international assistance,many of the Afghans interviewed were aware whothe main aid actors are and what they can deliver.For the most part, those interviewed had clear ideasand perspectives on the different roles ofgovernment, NGOs and military. Intervieweesgenerally felt that NGOs should implementdevelopment projects and provide humanitarianassistance. In some cases, for example large-scaleinfrastructure projects beyond the capacity of theNGOs that they were familiar with, they would say

the PRTs should implement such projects. Whenasked whether they had experience of such projectsbeing implemented by PRTs, they would reply in thenegative but that they could not think of anyone elsewho implements projects apart from NGOs andPRTs. In fact, people are at a loss as to what sort oforganizations can implement projects of the typeand scale which they now want. Evidently, as part ofclarifying NGO identities and handling expectations,communities must be engaged in discussions onwhat the current range of actors in the Afghancontext can provide and what the limitations andimplications are for them.

3.5.1 Assistance from the military

‘We know that there are complaints about what thePRT is doing and we have received complaints aboutthe way they search houses, the lack of transparencyin the bidding processes and ultimately the lowquality of the reconstruction work.’

GoA representative, Kabul

‘I do not believe [PRTs] are very successful withwinning hearts and minds. People still see them asinvaders in the south and sometimes stop using theinfrastructure they build. Neither do I believe thatdoing development work or distributing gifts willhelp them gather intelligence. For example, the PRTbuilt a bridge in Mohammad Agha district, Logarprovince and people refrained from using it until agroup of religious elders were organised to go andpreach to the community that using the bridge builtby the PRT is not a sin.’

Journalist, Kabul

‘In the first days of the Karzai regime, people had abad taste in their mouths because of the coalitionforces’ bombardment. So when they came later onto distribute wheat, people threw that wheat on thefire after they left. But now it is not a problem wherethe aid comes from.’

Religious leader, Paktia


‘We know the PRT people from their uniforms. Ifthey come and visit a project it means that theproject is funded by the PRT. Now people can alsorecognize PRT people from the emblems on theiruniform. For example Australians have the sign of adog (kangaroo) on their uniforms.’


‘The PRT people come with uniforms and bigsecurity and people hate that.’


‘People hate the military and call them Americans.We have examples where people destroyed whatthe Americans built in Shawak district and let theNGOs work instead.’

Journalist, Paktia

Some interviewees stated a clear preference forassistance from people in civilian clothes rather thana military uniform because they know that theresponsibilities are different. The presence ofuniformed soldiers monitoring or visiting a projectindicates that the military are somehow involved;people are keen to distance themselves from themilitary and do not always wish to receive assistancethat can be linked to them. They also indicated thatconsultation with PRTs had been made difficultbecause people felt that their lives would be at riskif they were seen to become too familiar with PRTpersonnel – sustained contact with a PRT would leadto accusations of providing intelligence andtherefore decreased security.

Some interviewees indicated discomfort with PRTassistance: they felt that it had ‘strings attached’ andthat people’s dire need was being used to forcethem to provide intelligence. This is against ‘Do NoHarm’ principles: humanitarian assistance is nolonger neutral and becomes a part of the conflictcontext. Assistance linked to the military will oftenbe accepted. However, it is not always welcomed;and is viewed as provided with ulterior motiveswhich can lead to insecurity.

The comments highlight how the internationalmilitary is not able to draw a line between its militaryoperations and assistance-related activities designedto win consent. Perceptions of the internationalmilitary amongst local populations do not separateout the international forces ‘quasi-developmental’face as embodied by civil-military operations and itsaggressive combat operations. As a consequencethe assistance provided by PRTs is tainted by theimpact of the other activities of the military.

3.5.2 Assistance from international donors

‘It does not matter to the poor where the moneycomes from. It is only due to provocations and thefears of communities that they sometimes declineassistance from foreigners.’


‘It does not matter where money or aid comes from.Islam does not place any restrictions on this issue.’


‘Though we understand that international assistanceto Afghanistan also has a political dimension basedon the vested interests of some Western countries,in general, we don’t mind their assistance as long asit is not practically harmful to our Islamic beliefs.’


‘Where aid comes from matters. Under the presentcircumstances and with the mood that communitiesare in, even if Saudi sends money, people will look atit with mistrust and decline taking it.’


‘People do not know about the source of the money.Whoever does the assistance, they say it is from a“mowasesa” or organisation.’



‘For pro-government people, who have a certainlevel of education, it does not matter where fundingcomes from. They welcome the product and value it.Those who are against the government are lookingfor an excuse to condemn aid even if it comes fromSaudi Arabia.’


“The country has been badly destroyed. We needreconstruction, it does not matter who is doing it aslong as the aid doesn’t have strings attached.”

Paktia, tribal leader

Interviews surfaced a range of views on theprovenance of aid. In Paktia interviewees claimedthat people value assistance regardless of where itcomes from and that they will even end disputes orput tribal conflicts to one side, albeit temporarily, inorder to receive development assistance. Theystated that ‘smart’ people would consider it asinternational assistance to Afghans, while ‘idiots’would want to know exactly where it came from andreject assistance from some quarters. Suchassertions are laden with a complex web of interestin financial and material gain: tempered by implicitrecognition of political and security concernsassociated with aid aligned to different politicalinterests. For example, NGOs that engage inprogramming activities with a political character,such as peace-building, will be asked about theirfunding sources. This was explained in terms of thebelief amongst many Afghan communities that theycan discern which Afghan political interests arealigned with different international donor countriesand institutions. Rightly or wrongly, many ordinaryAfghans believe that specific donor nations backindividual Afghan powerholders, national politicalparties and factions.

Some groups also felt that communities had beenbullied into refusing assistance from certain quarters– for example, in areas which are effectively underTaliban control people are wary of receivingassistance from America and Europe. In one area,INGO staff explained that USAID signs weresmashed in the night while ECHO signs were left

untouched. The question of Muslim donors wasraised, but interviewees felt that there would still besuspicion in some quarters. These discussions madeclear that the visibility issue pushed by donors andgovernment – signs, stickers, logos, etc. – can createsecurity incidents for INGOs and ANGOs alike, butdo not always do so.

According to ANGO interviewees in Kabul, NGOoffices are being attacked for several reasons:general insecurity and growing criminalisation;collaboration with PRTs or the GoA; and receivingfunding from the international community which isalso supporting the GoA. However, explanationsabout security are much more nuanced at field level.

3.6 Afghan NGO staff There are major differences between the wayANGOs and INGOs handle security, and within thesetwo broad categories there are further variances.

A serious concern uncovered by the research inPaktia and Uruzgan was the role of ‘new-comer’NGOs in Afghanistan, who appear sometimesoblivious to the potential security risks which couldarise as a result of contact with PRTs (as highlightedin section 3.2.1). This is placing the safety of thoseagencies’ staff at risk, as well as affecting the securityof other NGOs.

Another serious concern is the apparent ‘inshallah’culture in ANGO security management. This iscompounded by a wider lack of support system forANGOs on safety and security matters. Forexample, ANSO does not have many ANGOmembers. This may be related to the costs ofsecurity provision and establishing related systems,such as buying equipment to set up acommunication system. There is also a general beliefamong Afghans that they know the situation betterby virtue of being local, that they have access tolocal networks and can negotiate their way out of adisturbance.

The gaps and weaknesses in Afghan NGO securitymanagement approaches appear even more acuteat field level. The research in Paktia and Uruzgan


suggests that there is a lack of an open or in-depthinteragency discussion on security issues andprecautions among Afghans at many levels. Informalone-on-one discussions may occur but these do notalways filter back up to Kabul or beyond to affectNGO operations. Mechanisms should be set up toimprove communication in this respect.

3.6.1 Understanding of risks by Afghanstaff

Some interviewees commented on the much highernumber of fatalities among Afghans, and wonderedwhether they were more at risk, being in the field, orwere taking more risks in order to access the fundingavailable for work in insecure areas. Afghansworking for INGOs appear to be most at risk31.

Afghans are on the frontline of NGO implementationand, although they adapt to situations as they haveto and tend to opt for a low-profile approach thataccommodates existing circumstances, theirconcept of security appears fraught with risk. This is,in part, the legacy of three decades of war, wherepeople’s approach to security has become reactiveand short-term rather than proactive and long-term.

It is difficult to say how the growing insecurity incertain areas is affecting the morale of NGO staff.While some international staff may see withdrawal asthe only option, for Afghan staff, a salary can meanthe survival of immediate and extended familymembers, and security risks are met with stoicism.All Afghans face many of the same risks in theireveryday lives, and thus Afghan NGO staff wouldnot see agency withdrawal as a logical move toreduce insecurity faced by Afghan staff.

It was also evident that taking precautions andplanning for certain eventualities among someAfghan staff was highly unusual. For example,ANGO interviewees were reluctant to discuss thesteps they would take if an expatriate team memberwere kidnapped, and often insisted: ’Don’t worry.Nothing will happen to you. You are safe here.’ Suchresponses came from risk-averse staff who were

visibly scared for their own safety in other situations,indicating that this may have been a standardresponse arising in a culture where hospitality ratherthan security planning is of enormous importance. Alongside many other observations over the pastdecade, this reaction strongly indicates thatforeseeing events and making contingency plans areseen as unnecessary: it is more normal to come upagainst a security incident and, in the absence ofother obvious options, panic. For example, ANGOinterviewees had no plans for staff evacuation or alockdown scenario in case full-scale warfare brokeout in their area. Afghans in INGOs often have toattend security meetings with UN agencies,international and Afghan security forces and tribalelders and also consult a great deal withcommunities. However, there does not appear to beopen and in-depth interagency discussion onsecurity issues and precautions among Afghans atprovincial level. Informal one-on-one discussionsmay occur but these do not filter back up to Kabul orbeyond to affect NGO implementation and securitypolicies.

3.6.2 Profile of Afghan NGO staffin terms of age and experienceMany of those Afghans who currently work forNGOs are young people with English and computerskills. Some of these did not grow up in Afghanistanduring the war; some often have little or no directimplementation or field experience; and they tendto have little sense of the institutional and securitychallenges NGOs have faced during the last threedecades – indeed, institutional memory is steadilybeing lost. They often lack the knowledge tosafeguard their own security and negotiate with ruraland/or conservative communities, and may display acertain amount of bravado, which is inadvisable. Thechallenges these ill-prepared younger staff face arealso very different from those faced by older staff inprevious decades, but there is no acknowledgementof this. An expatriate presence – particularly a highlyvisible one – generally constitutes a security risk forAfghan staff, while internationals may be put at riskby the lack of preparation and know-how, and the

31 Figures available from Afghan NGO Safety Office


overconfident attitude of younger, less experiencedstaff or older staff who have ‘seen it all’. There is aneed for regular security training and drills for localstaff to raise awareness of the risks to their own andtheir charges’ safety. Such training can and shouldincorporate useful indigenous knowledge andpractice.

Afghan staff can also be put at risk when there istribal and community rivalry to get projects.Humanitarian assistance and development is attimes linked to namus (already discussed in Section2.2). Those denied may feel they have to exact aprice for perceived ‘losses’ from local NGO staff.

One final point to consider is that throughout the1980s and 1990s many organisations operated on across-border basis, and both local and internationalstaff had a temporary existence in communitieswhich were not theirs. Afghan staff had much moreinvested in local acceptance and had to be vigilantabout the security environment. Their internationalcolleagues benefited from this, while the presenceof internationals provided safety for Afghans to acertain extent. Staff shared the sameaccommodation and office space, forging close linkswith each other and allowing internationals to getcloser to the Afghan way of thinking and the dailylife of a predominantly educated, urban and oftenPashtun minority. This is no longer the case: in mostoffices Afghan staff go home at night, whichdistances internationals from Afghan daily life. It alsoleads to a certain ‘them-and-us’ attitude amongAfghan staff, who prefer not to have the addedsecurity headache of international colleagues in fieldoffices. The growth of positions based in majorurban centres has also resulted in weaker linksbetween urban-based staff and their ruralcounterparts, as they spend less time in field officesand have less direct dealings with beneficiaries andlocal counterparts. This naturally impacts on theirassumptions about local knowledge,implementation and security.

Box 5:

The power of local elites: adouble-edged sword

Local elites have the power to provide orwithdraw security. Although neither communityconcepts of providing security, nor thelimitations of such indigenous systems have beenfully explored, many NGOs ask local elders for asecurity guarantee before starting work in theirdistricts. It is a point of pride for leaders to beable to guarantee safety for NGOs and othervisitors: it shows the extent of their power, whichis increasingly limited by AOGs. Leaders willwarn NGO staff of the presence of fighters andadvise them when to stay away.

However, this does not always work in NGOs’favour, as illustrated by the following example:

ANGO A explained that ANGO B was givenmaterials to distribute. ANGO B allowedgovernment employees, local leaders andsecurity personnel to ‘divert’ the materialbecause they were under pressure. As a result,only 5-10 per cent of the material reached itstarget group. When ANGO A was givenmaterials to distribute, the same elite groupsdemanded their share, threatening staff. ANGOA staff decided to ignore them and distributedto the target group. As a result ANGO A ‘lost therelationships’ with the people they turned awayand subsequently lost a certain amount ofgoodwill and security in those communities. Theydescribed the local elite as ‘addicted’ to bullyingtheir way into distributions and taking what theybelieve is their rightful due. Both kinds ofresource transfer produce negative impacts: onefor the beneficiaries; the other for theimplementers.

| 43

Afghanistan is still paying the price for the rathershort-sighted and almost wholesale disengagementwhich took place in the region at the end of the ColdWar. As a result, Afghans do not feel that theinternational community is there for the long hauland are anxious to see reconstruction anddevelopment take place while prospects are stillgood.

Our research found that the level of exposure todevelopment projects, NGOs and governanceprocesses determined the level of sophisticationinterviewees demonstrated in expressing theirexpectations and thoughts about the effectivenessof implementation. In general, Afghans are makingtrade-offs between small and large-scale projects;short-term and long-term inputs; and developmentand security needs. Some prefer to hold out forsustainable development and want high-qualityresults delivered on time, as promised by mostimplementers. Afghans are wary of beingabandoned after experiencing the anarchic forces ofcivil war which tore apart the lives of consecutivegenerations.

Following the fall of the Taliban, people had highexpectations of modernity and joining theinternational community after long years of isolation,often with unrealistic timeframes and desiredoutcomes. Although this has at times led todisappointment, it is generally acknowledged byinterviewees that both NGOs and PRTs haveimplemented some good projects acrossAfghanistan. Increasing calls for enquiries into theeffectiveness, quality and impact of military-fundedprojects, however, have led the UK’s StabilisationUnit (formerly known as the Post-ConflictReconstruction Unit), for instance, to commission areview of the effectiveness of PRT QIPS and NATOto carry out an Afghanistan-wide study into theissues.32

This chapter explores the quality of military-fundedassistance in Afghanistan. The research leads us toagree with the World Bank that, while PRTs still havea role to play in Afghanistan for the time being,‘definite measures should be taken both to managethe risks that they present and to move steadily ontoan institutional track which makes them increasinglyredundant.’33

4.1 Sustainability

‘Development projects are beyond their [PRT]capacity and do not help them in winning hearts andminds either. They have only succeeded in creatingpublicity for themselves. Now many people knowwho they are and how much resources they have.’


It was noted during interviews that older, moremature local leaders tended to opt for long-termsustainable development projects, whereas youngerinterviewees were happy with short-termhumanitarian interventions. There is definitely apreference among communities for multi-yearprogrammes with a long-term, sustainable impact,which often rules out PRTs as implementers or fund-providers, as ‘national and internationalactors…cannot predict from one PRT to the nextwhat to expect in terms of expertise, level orsustainability of engagement, or focus (with activitiesranging from building schools, wells and clinics,vaccinating children and goats, to handing outhumanitarian aid). The different interpretations ofthe initial PRT concept by PRT commanders has onlybeen magnified as more nations have establishedPRTs.’ 34

Interviewees showed a preference for skills trainingand livelihood projects, as well as education,electricity and large-scale infrastructure provision,

32 The results of this study were not available at the time of writing.

33 World Bank (2007).

34 Hendrickson et al (2005).

Chapter 4: Expectations, effectivenessand impact


such as bridges and extensive roads, which reflectspublished findings.35 The World Bank has alsorecommended that PRTs ‘move away from small-scale community-level projects and initiatives, wherethe conflicts between local prioritisation andgovernance and top-down PRT processes are likelyto be most pronounced… and focus instead on‘larger-scale, bulk and link infrastructure, where theneed is obvious and process-conflicts are likely to bemuch fewer.’36

Getting people to change agricultural techniquesand to use new crops varieties, for instance, cannotbe achieved in a matter of months or through simpledistributions. It is clearly impossible to have asignificant impact in some sectors, such asagriculture in a short timeframe without regularinteractions between professionals in the field andcommunities. However, this does not seem to detersome PRTs from getting involved..

‘We cannot say that we need one or another kind ofassistance. We need both long-term and short-termprojects. It depends on the needs of the people.’


‘Those who know something prefer long-termprojects over short ones. Those who are illiterateobviously prefer getting a few kilos of flour overlong-term projects. Take for example the NSP. Theydug deep wells for us but if instead they haddistributed money, we would have already spent itand we would still be drinking unhealthy water.’


‘Those working for the welfare of communitiesshould place their activities within the frameworks ofIslam and the Sharia… I would state that Islam valuesthose who have a skill or earn money through hardwork. The Prophet Mohammad, PBUH, says that hewho earns bread through hard work is a friend ofAllah. Those eating free bread will never feelsatisfied. So in accordance with the teachings of

Islam, we also support long-term projects whichcould provide a better livelihood for poor men.’


‘We have a common saying that “It is better to haveless from a sustainable source than having a greatdeal just once”… We really do not need somebodyto distribute biscuits to us and we do not needconstruction projects that fall down after a year.Most of the projects here in Paktia are of a very lowquality. We would really prefer our roads to be builtand electricity to be supplied.’


‘We know that the PRT might leave at any time, butNGOs are here to stay with us. They have alreadydemonstrated this.’


‘Though we prefer-longer term projects, in view ofwidespread poverty, we cannot deny theeffectiveness of short-term projects.’


These comments indicate that the sustainability ofprojects is an important consideration for the localcommunity interviewees in this research.

The issue of sustainability is complicated by the factthat some PRT personnel make promises which theycannot keep in the time they are on the ground andwhich the next rotation may not want to fulfil, ashappened with a hydro-electric power project inLogar; wherein a PRT took over the project after theimplementing INGO dropped it due to conflictswithin the community, however the next rotation tothe PRT did not follow the project through. Suchbroken promises without adequate explanations donot help build strong relations with communities andlead to reversals in assumed ‘heart and mind’ gains.PRTs also often use contractors who producesubstandard work. This impacts on a project’s

35 See, for example, Donini et al (2006) and World Bank (2007).


Expectations, Effectiveness and Impact | 45

sustainability, as the work needs to be redone withina short space of time (See section 4.7 )

In contrast, many NGOs work hard to ensure that theimpact of their work is sustainable and they putsystems in place to include local people – forexample, training maintenance personnel forinfrastructure and setting up community systems toensure they are paid. Communities welcome suchefforts, as it means they have organisations andindividuals to go to if things go wrong or when newproblems appear.

4.2 Charity versus development Some PRTs continue to promote the ‘handoutmentality’ which NGOs have been working for manyyears to erase among both beneficiaries and staff.Some INGOs are still struggling to bring some oftheir Afghan staff away from the charity paradigmand towards the development paradigm, whichfocuses on the poorest and most vulnerable groupswho have been marginalised by the elites that havebenefited from almost all assistance for decades.The developmental approach has to address manycomplexities and it has taken NGOs more than adecade to bring their staff up to speed.Development activities and processes are sociallyembedded and owned by beneficiaries whereverfeasible, and NGO staff are trained to plan forchange. The developmental approach involvesrelatively long periods of staff training andconsultations, forming relationships of trust withcommunities and dealing with conflict as it arisesand its attendant headaches.

The charity paradigm, on the other hand, seeseverybody as deserving and poor. Unlike theconcept of humanitarian assistance, of which rightsare an intrinsic part, a charity paradigm is based ona power differential: it is patronising and seesbeneficiaries as disempowered victims who shouldbe grateful and beholden for assistance. It makes it‘worthwhile’ to hand things out and provide services

while ignoring the complexity and consequences ofactions. This paradigm has been difficult to shift inthe Afghan context. The WHAM mindset is largelypremised on a charity approach, which ignores thecomplexity of any given situation and can createconflict. The PRT learning curve on these issues hasbeen relatively flat in spite of the money and effortsspent briefing personnel and consulting experts.

Some PRTs, with no commitment to the type ofinstitutional development involved in such a charity-to-development paradigm shift, believe they may bein a good place to rapidly move from relief todevelopment mode. This ignores the competenciesof assistance agencies – particularly in theempowerment of local communities – as well as theneed for seasoned professionals.37 While it is neithernecessary nor advisable for the military to move to amore developmental mindset, there is a need toraise awareness of how charitable acts canundermine NGO activities.

4.3 Accountability andtransparency

‘People can get their rights from NGOs and makethem listen to their grievances. We cannot evenreach the gates of the PRT, let alone demandsomething from them.’


Many NGOs, especially the more established ones,try to be accountable to their beneficiaries – as atribal elder from Paktia observed: ‘They cannotsimply leave after they mess up.’ As their relationswith local counterparts evolve over time, the NGOsare increasingly transparent about programming andcontracts. PRTs, on the other hand, have to besecretive about their military aims, and are alsoaccused of not coordinating or cooperating andkeeping the details of contracts to themselves.

37 DANIDA (2006).


‘It is difficult to say what kind of assistance will help.We had long-term projects but everything hasturned to be more like business and has not helpedthe poor very much. We do not care who is helpingus, but it should be without any conditions attached.We would like the government to take the lead indevelopment and reconstruction. The importantthing is that we save the funds from corruption andmisuse. It does not make any difference whether it islong-term or short-term. What we are concernedwith is corruption and the bad quality of work.’


‘The main problem with the PRT is that they keep thecost of the projects secret and we do not know howmuch money they allocate to their projects.’

Government employee, Paktia

‘PRT forces are here for a short time following theirown national policies.’


The Commanders’ Emergency ResponseProgramme in some PRTs involves resourcesimplemented by civil affairs units. These funds canbe substantial and it is difficult to say how muchordinary civilians can influence how they are spent.Decision making is likely to be heavily influenced byinterpreters and local interlocutors who also act asimpromptu analysts and cultural advisers. It isgenerally accepted that one has to give a‘percentage’ to some interpreters to accessresources and get contracts from the PRT. Researchhas uncovered frequent accusations of corruptionamong the foreigners in the PRTs, but these werebeyond the scope of this research.

ISAF and PRT funding is perceived as being easy toaccess for those with contacts on the inside,particularly by ANGOs and contractors, because it isthought to involve little or no monitoring, short ofticking a box once the final product is delivered. Thissort of money encourages the quick growth of low-quality local NGOs which rather like weeds thrive

while funds rain down and die off as soon as thefunding drought approaches. Such organisations donot necessarily have in-roads into the community,programme experience, analysis skills or innovation.Spending money on such organisations does notbuild local capacity, but tends to waste money andcreate resentment. Nevertheless, there can be anuneasy compromise if these ‘NGOs’ are truly localand if the money is indirectly going into the localeconomy. When some local NGOs and contractorsare seen to be ‘milking PRTs’ for all their worth, thiscan both tarnish a PRT’s reputation and hamper thesuccess of WHAM efforts.

Local populations are canny and have a good idea ofhow much funding PRTs have available: Afghanscurrently follow the funding very closely since cost-effectiveness and honest spending are some of themost important considerations for winning over thepopulation. Any indication that donor fundingearmarked for Afghanistan is going astray or beingwasted is likely to upset people and lead to furthercynicism and hostility. Afghans suspect that PRTs’transaction costs are high, so it is important that theyproduce some kind of acceptable result. Somecommunity leaders also consider transparent,community-based monitoring and auditingstructures to be critical, as they mostly want tocontrol resource transfers, ensure that there is goodimpact and that assistance does not becomedivisive.

4.4 Contacts and consultationsCommunities want direct face-to-face relations andlinks with outsiders claiming to work for theirbenefit. Interviewees stressed that consultation andlocal involvement were very important factors in aproject’s success. This is less easy in the case of PRTs,where the levels of interaction and follow-up with acommunity can vary wildly. People feel moreconfident working with NGOs because of theextensive consultations and follow-ups which usuallytake place, and because they usually provideevidence that their opinion has been taken intoconsideration. As a result, NGOs can negotiate


delays in projects and make promises which peopleknow they will keep. Interviewees frequently held upthe NSP as a good example of communityconsultation. Some have had no contact with PRTs,while they have been exposed to NGO work for anumber of years. It must be noted that people whohad not seen direct benefit from a PRT complainedvociferously about the lack of contact, especially if aneighbouring community had received benefits.

Even those PRTs that try to consult NGOs, localleaders and others regularly do not seem to be goodat listening or taking lessons learnt on board –possibly because of the formality and brevity ofinteractions, or because the interaction is just part ofthe WHAM strategy. Among interviewees who hadbeen consulted by a PRT, many complained ofhaving to provide the same information to anendless line of new people who often repeat thesame mistakes their predecessors made.Interviewees felt that new rotations repeat the samequestions due to a lack of follow-up on theirsuggestions, a lack of sincerity, or a ritualistic processwhich does not yield results. Handover procedures,ensuring that there is institutional memory andpassing on lessons learnt differ from PRT to PRT. Thebest practice seems to be to ensure that PRTcommanders and key staff have a decent overlapperiod and that they are properly briefed in theirhome country, in Kabul and in the field. Althoughthere are now a number of institutions briefingmilitary personnel before they are sent to the field,their material will need constant revision to keep up-to-date with realities on the ground.

‘The problem that we face with the PRT is that theydon’t consult us when selecting a project. They shunour priority projects – for example, they build a roadleading to a village while avoid building one whichjoins one part of a district to another or a roadconnecting the provincial centre with a district.’


PRTs were persistently criticised for having little orno consultation with people beyond short, formalmeetings. One shura leader from Uruzgan pointedout that PRT work is not well-known because they donot employ people from the local community forimportant roles. Even civilian PRT personnel oftenspend very short periods of time in any localebecause they tend to be accompanied by heavilyarmed escorts who get nervous about drawing fire.As a result PRTs try as much as possible to workthrough proxies who sometimes turn out to beinappropriate choices. Sedra suggested one way ofinvolving Afghan stakeholders is that a ‘governmentrepresentative should be embedded in all PRTs andthe government, along with local communityleaders, should participate in the process todetermine what projects the PRT undertakes.Providing the government with ownership over thePRT planning process, both during the pre-deployment and main phase, will ensure thelegitimacy of the structure.’38

Indeed, there was a plan for MoI officials to beembedded in PRTs – officers were recruited andtrained, but there was initial confusion over theirrole, authority over local police chiefs, reportingchains, security clearance, salary, travelarrangements, living conditions in the PRT andaccess to information. At the time of research therewas no evidence of such individuals in the PRTs wevisited. However, even if there had been,communities and their leaders have increasingly littletrust in the government at present and would nothave been satisfied with such an arrangement.

Evidently NGOs are often seen by the military assources of information on communities and asuitable bridging mechanism, but this can haveimplications for their security (i.e. being accused ofsupplying intelligence).

38 SEDRA (2004).


4.5 Management of actorsLocal Afghan leaders manage their community’srelations with the outside world in accordance with acomplex web of political, social and economicinterests. This is equally true in terms of theirrelations with NGOs, the military, the GoA, theTaliban and others. The more skilled they are atjuggling these relations, the better their own andtheir communities’ chances of survival. In pursuit ofthese aims, it would seem that Afghan leaders donot always express a general preference for NGOsover PRTs, or vice versa, they pragmatically welcomeall comers, observe the outcomes and decide how tomanage relations. Resources and risks forthemselves and their constituents are balanceddepending on a range of factors. Disappointmentand mistrust from ordinary people does notnecessarily lead to communities shifting wholesaleto the Taliban. However, if the leadership becomesdisenchanted, or if trust in the leadership is seriouslytaxed, this creates entry points for the Taliban andother factions.

4.6 Landscape of conflictsUnderstanding the implications of ongoing low- andmedium-level conflicts for NGO programmes; aswell as their linkages to broader conflict in thecountry remains a challenge in Afghanistan. Attimes, various power-holders, including subnationalGoA actors, sometimes manipulate these sameconflicts to their own ends. Given the importance ofstaff safety and security, the primary emphasis inNGO conflict analysis tends to be of high-levelarmed conflict. The lack of effective rule of law hasrendered this landscape of conflicts even morecomplex – in some cases creating a securityminefield for NGOs. The fact that a growing numberof conflict resolution organisations are registeringwith the Ministry of Justice39 shows that people areseeking out informal conflict resolution services.Those involved have to have acumen in the field, along-standing reputation, keen insight into theindividuals and communities involved and areputation for impartial judgement.

It is important that NGOs involve local people andinstitutions in a sensitive fashion to understand thesedynamics on the basis of which they can analysepower relations within communities and conductconflict mappings prior to implementation. NGOstaff are, sometimes, shy of stepping into such roles,but it is increasingly difficult to send staff into thefield and expect them to work effectively withouthaving some form of conflict resolution awareness,training and tools. However there are also seriousrisks for newcomers, whether military or civilian, andinexperienced agencies to get involved in conflictresolution without good analysis, skills and toolsappropriate to the context.

If the aid sector has spent the last ten yearsgrappling with concepts of ‘Do No Harm’ andconflict sensitivity, the military also deal with themost obvious armed conflicts and do not alwaysanalyse the low-level, long-term disputes that theirprojects may exacerbate. For example, one PRT builta dam in one district in Paktia following minimalconsultation with a limited number of families,resulting in exacerbated conflict between subtribes.

‘In some cases, [the PRTs] act as conflict resolutionbodies because they are thought to be more neutralthan the local government structures. These aremostly conflicts between tribes or rivalcommanders.’


In some cases PRTs are asked to arbitrate indisputes, but examining the conditions under whichthis occurs were beyond the scope of this research.

It would seem, however that engaging in conflictmitigation and conflict resolution is a protractedaffair, and not an easy task for a military or civil-military operation to engage in: For example, ifcommunities agree in a short time that the conflicthas been resolved, indications are that it is quitelikely that they have agreed on a ceasefire to receivewhatever they think the PRT may be offering.

39 The Norwegian Refugee Council is one of the few organisations that focus on resolving local conflicts, especiallyland disputes, in Afghanistan.


4.7 Contractors – ‘the face ofgreed’Some NGO and local community intervieweesclaimed that PRTs can distort the local economy,driving up prices and wages through procurement,tenders, salaries, creating a certain amount ofresentment within communities. Their use ofcontractors also has a negative impact, as the lack oftransparency in awarding contracts and theperceived ineptitude in hiring the right people iseroding communities’ goodwill towards PRTs.

Contractors come in many shapes and sizes, someinternational and many local. In our research, thefocus was on local contractors, as interviewees werenot aware of, or knowledgeable about, internationalcontractors, particularly those who deal exclusivelywith the military. Civil servants, warlords, triballeaders and Afghan NGO staff among others haveset up contracting firms and all compete forcontracts and funding. Since contractors producingsubstandard work continue to find projects, it is seenas an avenue for siphoning off funding, and thenumber of firms is mushrooming. NGO staff accusedGoA and UN staff of giving contracts to their own ortheir friends’ firms which, forewarned, are able toundercut other bids, get the contracts and produceinferior quality work. NGOs and ordinary people feltthat much funding was being wasted in this way.

‘It is easy to deal with NGOs. We can criticise themand persuade them to be accountable. Withcontractors we cannot do this because they are alllinked to government employees and are not evenready to talk to us.’


‘Contractors are identified by the low quality of theirwork.’


‘In Chamkani we built a girls’ school and it stoodthere for years. The PRT hired contractors who builta school next door and when a group was broughtby helicopter for the opening ceremony, the windfrom the blades blew the roof away.’

INGO staff Paktia

Contractors were unanimously disliked and despisedby the majority of interviewees, even though thereare some respectable firms trying to do good qualitywork. Interviewees complained that contractors:• misappropriate money and ‘skim’ funds• do low-quality work at high cost• can only work honestly if heavily supervised by

foreigners• are generally outsiders in the areas where they

work, and so invest and spend their wagesoutside the target area

• create conflict but are accountable to nobody• work on contracts that are drawn up in Kabul,

making it difficult to hold them to account• come from outside, do the work and leave, so

communities are often unaware of who has donethe work

• neither build relations with communities norwork for sustainable impact.

Rather than bringing people and governmenttogether and reducing tension, projectsimplemented by contractors seemed to create tenserelations or even generate conflict.

‘If the construction companies want to get a goodreputation then those who get projects through atransparent bidding process should not contractthem out to others. Sometimes the contracts aresold four or five times. It is then the fourth or fifthconstruction company who actually implement theproject and in that case all the others get their shareand that affects the quality of the project.’



‘Private companies are notoriously corrupt andpeople in the PRT seem to be corrupt because theyknow that the quality of their work is worse and stillthey continue to give contracts to those privatecompanies. We complained many times, but theycome with unreliable excuses or simply ignore us.’


Interviewees gave examples of low-quality of workcarried out by contractors at inflated cost, including: • government buildings in Uruzgan with large

cracks in the walls and doors that could not beopened or closed without the application of forceon the building’s inauguration day

• a number of schools in Paktia districts with badlycracked walls

Concerns were also expressed during interviewsabout the lack of accountability for poor qualitywork, including:

• PRTs ignoring complaints from the governor andcommunities about the quality of work andinaugurating the infrastructure anyway.

• VIP visitors at opening ceremonies who try tolaugh at or shrug off the low quality of the work

Community leaders explained that, although it iseasy to hold NGOs accountable, contractors –especially those with powerful owners or patrons –refuse to answer for their mistakes and crimes. Evengovernors do not have any power over contractors,and without government buy-in there is no way ofregulating this aspect of the construction industry inAfghanistan.

Local contractors often do not get as much work ascontractors from Kabul and other locations. Thelocal people interviewed in this research andparticipants in previous research conducted by theresearch team are incensed by what they see asdaylight robbery committed by contractors. This is

particularly the case when contracts, generallydrawn up in Kabul, change hands several times:wherein it is felt that funds are skimmed off at eachexchange, leading to a trickle-down effect untilreaching a low-quality contractor left with a smallamount of money to implement a substandardproject. A large part of people’s frustration is basedon not knowing the amount of funds being allocatedfor a project in the first place and feeling short-changed as a result. The general lack of consultationwith community leaders or community monitoringsystems to control contracted-out projectsgenerates a great deal of mistrust, resentment andeventually conflict.

‘People consider all of those involved in the aidsector as PRT people, and since the PRT implementsprojects through dubious and corrupt contractors,people consider all aid actors as corrupt spies.


Bad contractors spoil the reputation not only of thePRTs who employ them, but also of the NGO sectorin general because the two have been conflated.Many interviewees used the terms contractor andNGO interchangeably and had to be asked furtherquestions before they would differentiate betweenthe two. Blurring the lines between NGOs’ andcontractors’ identities has created as much ‘badblood’ as confusion between military andhumanitarian personnel did some years ago. The useof contractors is generally diminishing goodwill incommunities, firstly towards PRTs who are seen to bewasting money by contracting them and secondlytowards NGOs, whether they are contracted by PRTsor not. It is therefore important for NGOs to findways to differentiate and distance themselves fromcontractors as far as possible.

| 51

‘Without the government you cannot think ofdevelopment and a peaceful life but I do not meanthis government. We have to change it and make ittransparent.’

Tribal elder, Paktia

‘There are different views about the PRTs.Sometimes communities ask for PRTs to go to theirprovinces and believe that it will bring funding andprojects. This happens particularly in the provincesof the north while in the south people want them toleave.’


ISAF’s mission statement defines its tasks as‘assisting the Afghan government in extending itsauthority across the country, conducting stability andsecurity operations in co-ordination with the Afghannational security forces; mentoring and supportingthe Afghan national army; and supporting Afghangovernment programmes to disarm illegally armedgroups.’40 This is reinforced by the PRT missionstatement ‘to assist the Islamic Republic ofAfghanistan to extend its authority, in order tofacilitate the development of a stable and secureenvironment in the identified area of operations, andenable Security Sector Reform and reconstructionefforts.’41

There remains a considerable amount of scepticismon the part of non-military actors that aninternational military force can promote the outreachof the GoA, rather than marginalise or make it seemsubordinate to military wishes. There is also aquestion mark over the military’s ability to show truealignment with GoA objectives, which may competeor clash with the foreign policies of the nationsinvolved. This was echoed in interviews withAfghans, who seem to have less faith in the ability oftheir own government.

There is no doubt that the Afghan government is stillweak, especially at subnational level, where theeffectiveness of their provincial presence isdebatable. However, the perception that the Talibanfill the vacuum where government presence is weakor contested is a simplistic one that ignores thesophistication of Taliban social engineering andpsychological operations (psyops), as well as thelength of time it takes for cumulative factors, mostlythe misdemeanours of GOA personnel, to lead todistricts falling to the Taliban and other AOGs. Thefact that some analysts generally equate GOA‘presence’ with infrastructure, projects and services,signals a belief that a quick gesture can eliminatelong term resentment. This, in turn, leads to theargument that PRTs should urgently implementwhere NGOs cannot. This view also suggests thatNGOs benefit from the impact of the military’spresence, as they can roll out development in thewake of AOG clearance and/or WHAM activities.

It is evident that the government loses credibilityevery time a promise is not kept, but how much doPRT implementation and WHAM attempts help theGoA to establish a credible presence? In Uruzgan,where the security situation was dire, manyinterviewees felt that projects and developmentwork, although welcome, were pointless and wouldremain so until the security situation is previouslyestablished. According to most Afghan interviewees,the idea that development leads to stability andsecurity is contrived. In fact more interviewees linkedsecurity to improved governance and the removal ofunsavoury characters from positions of power ratherthan the roll-out of small infrastructure projects.

It has been argued that governance reform shouldpreferably be led by civilian actors, particularly thecentral government and UNAMA. The military haveargued that the ‘civilian-only’ position is difficult toapply in areas that are as insecure as Helmand,where UNAMA does not have an operationalpresence and civilian agencies are severely restrictedin their ability to operate openly and in support of

40 www.nato.int/issues/isaf/index.html

41 Statement by Mitchell Everett Shivers, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Central Asia: testimony to theHouse Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Provincial ReconstructionTeams in Afghanistan, 4 October 2007.

Chapter 5: Governance and security


central or provincial government. However, there arecases where PRTs have increased their civiliancapacity in order to facilitate provincial governmentreform and linkages to central governmentdevelopment strategies. Examples include:

• the Dutch PRT in Uruzgan province, wheregovernance issues are dealt with by civilians andCIMIC people accompany any civilian-leddelegations to visit GoA officials

• the Canadian PRT in Kandahar province, whichfacilitates outreach by central government tolocal communities under its ‘Confidence inGovernance’ programme – for example, byproviding secure escorts for visits

• cooperation with PDCs and other coordinationmechanisms at local level

• the PRT in Helmand province, where civiliangovernance advisors are deployed.

In all these cases, the ability of civilians to implementprogrammes has been hampered by access andsecurity issues. Activities and approaches are stillbasic and superficial, leading to critiques of windowdressing from a variety of commentators: ’PRTactivities enabled the promotion of an appearanceof progress, which distracted from the dire state ofgovernance in many provinces, but about whichthere was little if any political will, either nationally orinternationally, to take more effective action.’42

There seems to be a growing disenchantment withthe foreign military presence among Afghans. PRTsmay soon find themselves under similar scrutiny asNGOs, which suddenly found themselves put underthe microscope, and subject to constant harassmentin the press and which were eventually ‘regulated’under the NGO law. For the time being, theinternational military presence is seen as a‘necessary evil’ because of the inadequacy of theANA and ANP to tackle insurgency, terrorism andcrime as well as interference from Afghanistan’sneighbours. Afghans generally see a clear role forPRTs in security sector reform (SSR), so long as it isthought through and executed correctly.

Meanwhile, the international military is sufferingfrom close contact with a government that is viewedby many Afghans as discredited and corrupt –indeed, some ISAF advisors confided that PRTs feelthat getting rid of the most egregious cases ofgovernment dysfunctionality will improvegovernment credibility. Although the government-PRT relationship is outside the scope of this report,our research did raise questions about the logic ofimplementing projects to boost support for thepresent government when it is so unpopular in thesecommunities.

‘Actually it is the PRT and UNAMA who aregoverning. The government is very weak and looksto the PRT. That is really bad for the government. Itis against our constitution.’


In addition, PRTs are increasingly seen by somecommunities as vying for power with localgovernment, a development which has contributedto the MoI directive that prevents local governmentofficials and chiefs of police from visiting PRTs (seeAnnex 2). Local government officials also complainof difficult interactions in some provinces –particularly when it comes to coordination,discussed in Section 5.1.

According to the World Bank, the most recentedition of the PRT handbook emphasises that PRTsplay a crucial role in occupying the vacuum createdby a weak government presence, thus deterringagents of instability.43 The handbook stresses thatthe PRT is ‘neither a combat nor a developmentinstitution…[but] a civil-military institution that isable to penetrate the more unstable and insecureareas because of its military component and is ableto stabilize these areas because of the combinedcapabilities of its diplomacy, military and economiccomponents.’ The World Bank defines this asproviding ‘substantial latitude for the PRTs to pursuea wide range of activities in the areas in which theyoperate.’44 It is precisely this ambiguity created by

42 Stapleton (2007).



Governance and Security | 53

the definitions that leads to tensions,misunderstandings and, at times, superficialapproaches.

5.1 Civilianising PRTsThe debate on civilianising PRTs is on a backburner.There has been little conclusive research on theimpact of a civilian presence in PRTs. Although somePRTs are still civilian-run, it was felt by interviewees,some military and some NGO, that since the launchof ISAF X the policy has been one of progressivemilitarisation, with civilians increasingly excludedfrom ISAF processes, with the military showing lesscivilian points of reference and less interest in NGOcontribution. Candid exchanges in formal andinformal settings have been replaced by statementswhich are read out to NGOs and other non-militarygroups at public events while extolling the virtues ofcivilianisation. The NGO observer position on theExecutive Steering Committee, assistingcoordination between COM ISAF and the MoI, hasbeen removed. An ISAF interviewee admited thatthe civmil interface is currently a low priority for themilitary – there are even claims that the military isdeliberately pushing out civilian actors in some areasto get a monopoly on service provision and moredirect contact with those who may harbour armedopposition elements. Rigby (2006) describes thedanger of this creeping culture of militarism as a‘belief that reliance on military force and violence isa legitimate means of pursuing interests. This is oneof the paradoxes at the heart of military involvementin peace building. As such it is perhaps important tobe reminded that the threats to human security stemnot so much from conflict but from the violenceinvolved in the pursuance of conflict.’45

Yet there are signs that some PRTs are civilianising: inUruzgan, the PRT is putting policy, content andfunctional specialists under the civilianrepresentative, while reconstruction goals aredetermined by the Dutch Ministry of DevelopmentCooperation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs incollaboration with the GoA. Small funds are available

for CIMIC activities under the military. Despite suchchanges, all PRTs remain overwhelmingly manned bymilitary personnel.

5.2 Coordination

‘We have also noticed that the PRTs dominate in theprovinces, which undermines the legitimacy of thesubnational governance structures in provincialcapitals. The PRTs are not coordinating with lineministries and therefore the ANDS [Afghan NationalDevelopment Strategy] secretariat and someministries complain about duplication of projects.’


‘Previously we had coordination problems. Theywould build a school anywhere they liked based onthe request of a certain community. After a lot ofwork, we have finally convinced the PRT to buildschool buildings in accordance with our master plan.They have also accepted that they will build schoolsaccording to our technical plans and specificationsand that they will give us a role in monitoring theconstruction work… The 50 schools that the PRT isconstructing are rated as “low-cost” schools, whichmeans they will use wooden beams for the roofs.Since Paktia has metres of snow in winter, thoseschools will not last long.’


‘We have always raised the point that there shouldbe some coordination and that has still not beenachieved. The PRT says that is going to cooperate.[Their representatives] come to meetings and talkgenerally about their projects but do not want to gointo details. We do not know how much they spendand who is actually going to implement them. Insome cases they are giving contracts to privateconstruction firms at unbelievably high costs – forexample, they contracted out a tube-well forUS$8,000 while we can do it for US$2,000.’


45 Rigby (2006).


‘Now we hope that [the PRT] will gradually startspending their funds within the framework of theANDS. They seem inclined to do so and havepromised to but have not put it in practice. We haveasked them to work through the CDCs. In somecases they have started to help CDCs, but are notconsulting them on major projects.’


‘The main problem with the PRTs is that they keepthe cost of projects secret and we do not know howmuch funds are allocated to their projects. The [localcoordination] meetings have already started and wehope we will be able to tackle some problems. It isgoing well for the time being.’ Local leader, Paktia

Coordinating humanitarian and developmentassistance has been a thorn in the side of the GoA,donors and others since the fall of the Taliban. Thelack of a strong Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (OCHA) presence – specificallyfor civmil coordination – has not helped thesituation, while the endless parade of coordinationmechanisms and blueprint guidance documentshave not prevented wastage and replication atground level. One of the latest additions tocoordination mechanisms is the Policy Action Groupset up in July 2006. All line ministries, PRTs, NATO,National Security Council and donors participate inthe group’s weekly and monthly meetings. ZalmaiRasool, the head of the National Security Council,chairs the weekly meetings and President Karzaichairs the monthly ones. It works to improve thequality of reconstruction and procurementprocedures and to coordinate development andsecurity efforts. However, the research found thatthe impact of such bodies is not always felt beyondKabul.

Some ISAF interviewees suggested that theaccusations of lack of coordination by PRTs couldpartly be explained by the fact that some had not yet

learnt to say ‘no’. Regarding coordination with GoAprogrammes, the World Bank adds that: ‘Insofar asPRTs continue to provide resources outside thegovernment budget, they need to ensure maximumalignment with it. This involves producing accurateand timely information on project costs and detailsand ensuring that government inputs are accuratelycosted, particularly salary and operating costs oncethe project is completed.’ 46

PDCs have been created to facilitate the work ofprovincial-level government in coordinating andmonitoring development assistance and projects.Interviewees in Paktia complained that, in spite ofparticipation in PDC meetings and pressure from theMinistry of Economics to coordinate activities to fitwith national programmes such as ANDS, there arestill transparency and coordination issues on theground with PRTs. For example, the governor ofPaktia complained that there are no staff for fivePRT-built clinics because they were not in Ministry ofPublic Health plans. He is now under pressure fromthe PRTs to convince the ministry to send personneland from the communities to pay for guards for thebuildings.

It is clear that PRTs are not the only problem – someparticipating Afghans already regard the PDCs asvenues where people go, talk and posture, but thatdo not actually change anything. People also believethat some provincial governors and othergovernment figures only attend the meetings to getcontracts for their own firms and to get their handson the money.

Coordination processes consistently to suffer fromglitches and breakdowns, as PRTs, government andNGOs continue to duplicate work in some areas.There are also issues related to different interests inand approaches to coordination – for example, withPRTs gathering intelligence, NGOs aiming to reducereplication, GoA representatives wishing to followthe money and different groups pushing personalcontracting firms.



Internationally, UN OCHA has a natural andaccepted lead in facilitating the civmil relationship.In Afghanistan, INGOs look for UNAMAhumanitarian coordinators and civmil officers tocarry out that function, but this complicates issuesfurther, given UNAMA’s integrated mission forpolitical purposes and reconstruction. As a result,UNAMA is not always seen as a neutral and impartialplayer able to prioritise humanitarian principles, acton human rights violations, or be in a position tocriticise the international military or government ifcalled on to do so.

‘The military and UNAMA are apparently notshowing that they interfere in governance issues, butwe know that it is they who are governing. Theydecide what should happen. Some people contactthem, but it is normally the governor who representsus and is in direct contact with them. We have triedto contact them and no one can stop us but we knowthat they are just nodding and do not take usseriously.’


OCHA and UNAMA together are tasked withstrengthening the civmil capacity in Afghanistan,with the assistance of the Norwegians to fund morecoordination posts in the provinces. Nevertheless,OCHA is overstretched at the international level andtherefore unable to answer all calls to assist in civmiltraining, coordination, communication and doctrinedevelopment. Yet it remains the most natural homefor this function and should therefore bestrengthened rather than replicated within anotherbody. Donors would do well to fund additional civmilposts within NGOs to facilitate national debate, andwithin OCHA for international progression. Ironically,the UK’s Department for International Developmenthas recently decided to cease funding a dedicatedcivmil position.

5.3 Governance

‘People are like a mirror and reflect the activities andbehaviour of the PRT. If people are not happy withthe PRT, it means the PRT is not doing a good job.People from Gardez still bring up the example of aformer governor, Faiz Mohammad Khan. He servedthis province in an exemplary way… [solely fundedby] the duties collected on firewood taken to Kabul.Now people ask why today’s rulers can’t provide abetter service with all the money they get from theinternational community. That is something that PRTsshould think deeply about.’


In a research interview with the head of the newlyformed IDLG , Jelani Popal reiterated the messageof wanting to strengthen government at subnationallevel. He asked why, for instance, people do not stopthe Taliban from entering a village. He saw theproblem as a lack of credibility for (at times) corruptlocal administrations and as a perception amonglocal communities that the Taliban can stand by theirword and deliver. It is such logic – that sees simpledelivery of infrastructure and services as the solutionto win respect – that drives PRT incursions intohumanitarian space and assistance activities: if thegovernment and its proxies can deliver what theypromise, then communities would presumablysupport the former and reject hostile incomers.However, this view fails to take account of a range ofother dynamics at ground level: the complicatedinteractions which take place on the ground; thecynicism of communities after three decades ofviolence; the sophistication shown by ordinaryAfghans when articulating what accountable andtransparent government means; and the presence ofheavily armed foreign nationals. Instead it reducesthese elements to a simple matter of deliveringinputs and services, sometimes of dubious quality,arguing that someone has to implement suchprojects, and if it is not NGOs, then the task shouldpresumably be taken up by PRTs.


It is painfully clear that establishing the legitimacy ofthe government is essential to successfulstabilisation. While some NGOs have helpedimprove the image and extend the reach of the GoAin a number of ways – for example, through servicedelivery in health, education and the NSP, there islittle clarity and coherence on how the PRT presencehelps the GoA. The US military’s track record infilling state institutional and security vacuumsfollowing conflict – in Haiti, Somalia, Kosovo or Iraq,for example – is not good, and NATO nations underISAF are not faring much better. Overall, themilitary’s role in nation building and the patchyapproach to assisting state building is running intodifficulty in Afghanistan. ISAF is not in full commandof the PRTs, which also vary from one iteration toanother, making it difficult to pinpoint coherentstrategies on how they will assist the GoA.Additionally, each nation has a differentinterpretation of how they should support the GoA.It is unclear what the general PRT strategy forsupporting the GoA is, and the PRT’s role inextending GoA outreach is increasingly contested bylocals.

5.3.1 Consultation and transparency

‘We are very satisfied with the NSP project and thatis a real example of consultation.’


‘If we let the elders work and have full authority, theycan even talk to the Taliban and rehabilitate them,provided our decisions are binding and theinternational forces and the government respectthem. We see governors coming in and beingcorrupt. But when the elders want to reveal this,nobody listens.’


‘Corruption is rampant and government posts are upfor sale. When somebody pays for a government

post, he certainly tries to make the money back fromall these projects. Governance is all a business now.’


‘The government has failed miserably in maintainingrule of law...because government people are in ahurry to fill their pockets and go on to loot anotherprovince. They look at everything in the short term.’


‘The government should listen to the grievances ofpeople. It should control price hikes, corruption andvulgarity.’


‘As a matter of fact all [PRT-related] contracts arebeing awarded in the centre. We only know throughother sources that a contractor has come toimplement a project.’


Community consultation, transparency overbudgets, improving work quality and transparentbidding processes all improve relations with thepublic. Interviewees held up a transparent andaccountable government that consults closely withlocal leadership as the ideal model for governance,but felt that the current government falls far short ofthat ideal, lacking the necessary human resources totackle the challenge of handling development,governance and security, while the culture ofgovernance is marred by corruption. They also feltthat elements within the government continue toprey on the population. For example, a districtgovernor imprisoned all the maleks (local leaders) inKhass Uruzgan, asking them each to provide a sheepor 8,000 Afghanis (US$160) because he wanted topresent a gift to the provincial governor who hadrecently returned from the Hajj. In a similar tale thegovernor of Charchinu district jailed people forfighting, and extorted a bribe from each in additionto 1,500 Afghanis (US$30) per night for their stay injail. Such stories were common.


It is hard for ordinary people to report such cases tothe PRTs, whose incumbents are around for such ashort time, surrounded by high security, on patroland shielded by interpreters. Even if they do gainaccess, the PRT may not be able to react to end suchbehaviour. PRTs are better at winning the hearts andminds of Afghan elites and tend to deal with themore dominant tribal and social groupings whocontrol the local political and security apparatus,thus often reinforcing the status quo. Additionally,where PRTs pander to elite desires, NGOs are oftenunder pressure to follow suit. This plays into thehands of those opposition groups who are skilled atusing grievances as a way to destabilise the politicalstatus quo.

5.3.2 GoA-NGO relationship

Humanitarian relief and protection have beenhanded over to a government which often appearsunprepared or unwilling to deal with naturaldisasters and other emergencies. GoA staff seem tobarely understand humanitarian space and do notalways recognise humanitarian principles. At thesame time, however, they continue to keep NGOslargely out of that space and can even impede theiractivities. The former Minister of Planning, RamazanBashardost’s highly publicised campaign againstNGOs made an impression on the Afghan public,who started voicing concerns about NGO corruptionand costs. Bashardost became an advocate for agovernment which was hostile to NGOs and sawthem as rivals in credible service delivery and forinternational donor funding.

Although many high-level GoA staff come fromNGO backgrounds and the assistance sectorcontinues to act as a major capacity builder in theAfghan context, the GoA has issued no statementsor strategies either in support for NGOs andassistance organisations or recognising their pastand present contributions. If NGOs are going tocontinue rolling out national programmes, it is vitalthey lobby to elicit more substantive governmentsupport for NGO operations, and that the GoA ismore active in ensuring that a generally secureenvironment exists for their work.

5.3.3 GoA-PRT relationship

‘What kind of guests are these people? Guests arenot like these foreigners. They have all the authoritythat a host should have. They now perform theduties of the host and treat us, the people ofAfghanistan, like guests!’


‘We cannot criticise the PRT people because theyare the masters and hold the power. The governor issupporting them. The governor is doing thisbecause he sees his future in the existence of thePRT.’


‘We do not have capable people in the government.The PRT has more control while the governmentseems to be very weak and subordinate to the PRT.Sometimes the governor tries to be gatekeeper tothe PRT and does not seem happy if the elders goand meet PRT people.’


‘Whenever we need funding for doing somethinghere we ask the governor and he then asks the PRTto help instead of asking our central government orfinance ministry.’


‘The commander of the PRT is actually the governor.Most of the complaints go to the PRT and UNAMAand they interfere in governance. They even have astrong hand in hiring and firing directors of lineministries. The governor is quite scared of those whoare believed to have close relations with the UNAMAor the PRT.’

Journalist, Paktia

‘In a nutshell, PRTs create a provincial governmentpresence and increase popular support.’

ISAF personnel


‘On the surface it is the government who is showingoff, but in fact it is the PRT and UNAMA who areinvolved in the governance.’


Where PRTs are seen to have large amounts ofmoney, the provincial government often complainsthat they are having a destabilising effect bybecoming more influential than the governor and hisstaff. Where PRTs are not spending money,governors complain that they have been burdenedwith a poor PRT. In Paktia, the provincial governmentwas felt by interviewees to have no control overUNAMA and the PRT, but was still seen to jealouslyguard access to them because of the resources theycommanded. Seeing funding controlled by others isa sore point for many in subnational government,since it highlights their lack of power, influence andeffectiveness as leaders. Decentralising a certainamount of donor funds to PRTs has not improvedrelations, however: those holding the purse stringshave legitimacy and the inability of subnationalgovernance structures to command such fundsunderlines the lack of faith donors and centralgovernment have in them. GoA interviewees inKabul suggested that PRTs are approached bypeople to implement projects because they are seenas having much more resources at their disposal.

People do not see the relationship between the localgovernment and PRTs as one of equals. There havebeen rumours of some PRTs meddling ingovernance, removing or appointing governors andsupporting factions rather than acting in an advisoryrole. The ability to control projects funds (rather thanimplementation and final outcome) underlines agroup or individual’s status, power and influence.Some governors wield power by mobilising theirpatron-client networks, based on tribal or otherrelations, while those who are seen as too close toPRTs appear to wield no real influence. It isrumoured that even President Karzai has complainedthat some police chiefs are influenced and guided byPRTs, while their relations with governors arestrained. The government has been worried enough

about this to issue the directive preventing localgovernment officials and chiefs of police fromvisiting PRTs (see Annex 2). Interestingly, this imageof PRTs as the dispensers of funding and projects insome areas has also sidelined NGOs. However, it hasnot necessarily reduced government criticism andcompetitiveness with NGOs at subnational level.

Some interviewees complained that PRTs do notconsult the GoA when selecting or monitoringprojects – a fact that does not lend credence to thenotion that PRTs empower government and promoteits role or visibility. Interviewees also felt that PRTactivities had no impact on government popularityand did not address the real needs of the people. Itwas interesting to note that people are impressedwhen they see that PRTs do good works. However,they do not always make the connection that theyare there on behalf of the GoA, and when this isspelled out, the association seems artificial to them.

The general perception of an emasculated localgovernment which can only supplicate or makesuggestions to the PRT has profound consequencesin a country with a history of troubled relationsbetween subnational and central government. TheWorld Bank quite correctly recommends that ‘[e]achPRT commander should develop a condition-basedplan for phasing his/her PRT out..[with] their owndemise as their core objective’.47 These shouldinclude key indicators, concrete conditions and aplan for how they are to be achieved. It should alsobe noted, however, that the current crisis insubnational governance institutions in some areasand the growing security threats means that such aphasing out would probably take longer.

5.4 Security

‘May god forgives my sins; but there will be securitycomplications if the PRT leaves.’

Religious leader, Paktia,

As early as 2002, Kofi Annan stated that ‘the mostserious challenge today facing Afghanistan remains



the lack of security.’ In the same year PresidentKarzai asked the UN Security Council for assistanceto support the strategy ‘for the creation of a nationalarmy and a national system for security by translatinginternational pledges into concrete contributions.’48

By January 2003, CARE International was warning ofa ‘security vacuum in Afghanistan’, a situation thathas since that time steadily deteriorated: recentevents in particular tend to indicate that the GoA isnot in control of security issues.

Although it is widely agreed that Afghans shoulddecide the nature of military engagement in theirsovereign territory, interviewees indicated that thegeneral feeling is that they are on a very unevenplaying field with the international military presence.Some claimed that back in 2001/02, Afghan militaryinterlocutors – who were predominantly from thenorth and therefore preoccupied with the ethnicbalance of power and the return of the Taliban –agreed to everything that was proposed byincoming international counterparts. The GoA is nowtrying to renegotiate the terms of engagement, butit is difficult to claw back ground which they feel theylost during that period.

‘If children could go to school with freedom, andtraders move between places easily, that would bean indicator of good security.’


‘When I was a child we ate very ordinary food likeyogurt and corn bread, but had no worries about oursafety or whatever might happen the day after. Nowwe have a variety of good food, but never enjoy itand always worry about what will happen next. Iwant those times back. I want to move around freely.I want to sleep serenely without the anxiety thatcomes with hearing gunfire.’

Shura member, Uruzgan49

‘If I could move around freely and not be botheredby the Taliban anymore at night and by thegovernment during the day, that would be security.’


‘Leaders who care will provide security for theirpeople.’


‘If you build schools or clinics, it doesn’t bringsecurity. What’s the use of spending all this money?’


‘In my humble opinion, people prefer the PRT sinceits work is very positive and involves a lot of moneywhich NGOs don’t have. People therefore prefer thePRT over the government and NGOs. But still, thoseschools built by the PRT are being burnt by spoilersso people ask that instead of spending so muchfunding on schools which will be burnt later, whydoesn’t the PRT spend that money to improve thesecurity situation?’


‘Security will not come by force alone. Having theright people in government is the way forward.’


5.4.1 National police and army

The development of a strong army and a stable andcapable police force is an important part ofestablishing rule of law, which is key to statebuilding. A recent report on reforming the police inAfghanistan stated that ‘a trusted law enforcementinstitution would assist nearly everything that needsto be achieved in the country from security, throughgender rights and minority rights, to buildinginvestor confidence and development goals.’50

48 Statement by President Hamid Karzai at the 57th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 12September 2002, New York.

49 This interviewee was in his 60s or 70s.

50 International Crisis Group (August 2007).


Yet disarmament, demobilisation and reintegrationin post-Taliban Afghanistan have largely beenfraught with difficulties. The disbandment of illegalarmed groups (DIAG) is struggling and, though SSRis making ground, progress is not fast enough. Also,the ‘lead nation’ approach – with Germans andAmericans spearheading the training of armedforces – ‘has not served Afghanistan well, resultingin the absence of a comprehensive strategy toreform and rebuild the army, police and judiciary,within the framework of disarmament.’51 The GoAhas failed to protect people against internal threatsto their safety and the ANA, effectively a ‘nationalcontingent of the international effort’,52 is perceivedas being unable to protect them from externalthreats. Security is a priority for people and manyinterviewees felt that they and their families cannoteven perform the basic functions of life due tocurrent levels of insecurity in some parts of thecountry.

‘This province is a breeding ground for Talibanrecruits. It is the root of the problem. If thegovernment wants to address this issue, they shouldsupport our own armed forces. Right now we haveonly one district under our control (Dehrawod) andwe [have to send them] supplies via helicopters asthe roads are controlled by the Taliban. The problemis that our forces are armed only with light weaponswhile the enemies possess 82mm long-range guns.’


‘Frankly speaking, people hate the governmentpresence, in particular the ANP, more than theinternational forces.’

Journalist, Paktia

‘The police are a big headache. The ANA is quitegood and we do not have any cases where peoplehave complained about them. People in Paktiaprefer ‘arbakis’53 because they are our own peopleand the whole tribe is behind them. It is not the

arbaki but the whole tribe [who is] responsible formisconduct and any other crimes committed by theirarbakis.’


‘Generally, security is good. People do not have sucha bad perception of the ANA –they are much betterthan the police. Still, we are a bit worried about theway they use their resources. You can see pickupsgoing and coming to Kabul with one or two soldiers.That is a waste of resources and I think they shouldcontrol it.’


‘The ANP is an entirely corrupt force. They areinvolved in extortion, bribery, smuggling andkidnappings. The ANA is good, but the peopleprefer arbakis. They are from the same area as thepeople and will not dare to do anything wrong. Ifthey get involved in any crimes, then it becomes apersonal vendetta and none of them would takesuch risks.’

Journalist, Paktia

‘The ANP is a problem itself and people hate it. Thenational army can be trusted and have treated thepublic well. The ANP smuggle and are involved inrobberies and then they simply blame the Taliban.People are fed up with both the government and theTaliban. We dislike both of them. I believe that if weget honest people in government they will receive agreat deal of support from people.’


‘People like the arbakis but we lost a very goodopportunity. The central government did notsupport arbakis at the beginning and now it isdifficult to get them ready to fight against theTaliban.’



52 Interview with security sector organisation director, Kabul.

53 Local tribal militias mostly used in southeast Afghanistan.


‘The police are not doing their job. They loot housesand are involved in other criminal cases. The ANA isrelatively good but still you can not trust it as asustainable force because they are paid and if thegovernment is unable to pay them they maydisappear immediately. The arbaki is the mostreliable security force here in Paktia.’


In a 2007 study, the International Crisis Group foundthat ‘Afghanistan’s citizens more often view thepolice more as a source of fear than of security,’54

reflecting the sentiments expressed in the quotesabove. It is clear that local security forces still have along way to go in gaining popularity and that thegovernment is seen to be doing little to improvesecurity. People have much more interaction withthe ANP than the ANA, and yet the police, if presentand effective, are most often local, sometimes usingtheir power to settle old scores and predate on thelocal population. To further compound problems,police recruits are often uneducated, do not alwaysreceive their salaries and are given only light armsconsidering the task they have to perform and theopponents they face. The ANA have also beenknown to engage in taking advantage of their powerbut much less than the ANP. Some intervieweescomplained that the choice of tribes sent as policeand soldiers to Uruzgan was creating problems. Itwas also emphasized that the character of forces isdetermined by the choice of commander.

Overall, criminality is rife and it is increasinglydifficult for locals to distinguish between the Taliban,criminal elements and GoA security forces posing asthe Taliban. All seem to engage in the destruction ofstate property and attack members of the business,assistance and other communities, not only as softtargets in the struggle to destabilize governmentbut simply because they know they can.

‘Paktia is said to be a land of ‘jirgas’,55 and thissystem has helped us a great deal in maintaining thesecurity of schools. Tribes have deployed their ownarbakis to make sure schools buildings are safe. Theydo it voluntarily, though, [and] we do not make anyfinancial contribution to them. We have also formedcommunity-based committees to ensure the securityand safety of the schools in all areas where we work.’


‘We have 104,000 students in the province – bothgirls and boys. Paktia is the first province inAfghanistan to have an all-girls madrasa, with 250girl pupils in the Rahmat Khail area. Ironically, evenvery conservative people in the area encourage girls’schooling. Fortunately we have not had any school-burning cases so far.’


‘It is the people and tribes who have helped buildsecurity. I see very little role for the government andthe PRT… We need the government to help, but wealso know that this government is extremely weak.’


‘I think [that] if the PRT leaves, security will improve.Wherever they go, you see insurgency activity andbomb blasts.’


‘The PRT does not help promote security – I wouldsay it is doing the opposite. It is the tribes that havemaintained the security of the province.’


‘In some areas the Americans themselves createinsecurity and some would say they are alsosupporting the Taliban indirectly to maintain thestatus quo.’



55 Tribal gathering to resolve disputes or make decisions.


‘Generally, security is good in Paktia. We have justgot problems in two districts – Garda Serrai andZormat. Here in Gardez we are more scared ofsuicide bombers and the subsequent reaction of theAmericans.’


‘Instead of thinking about pulling out, foreign troopsshould think about improving their performance.They should fill the gaps, where due to their ownmistakes, insurgents are finding a place to breed.’


The government has an important role, not only inproviding security, but in protecting people’s namusor honour – an important part of human security forAfghans and a critical aspect of Pashtunwali orPashtun customary law. Part of the problem is thatthe government has been unable to protect Afghansfrom being preyed on not only by those within itsown ranks but by criminals and from the violence ofthe Taliban and the international military as well. Ithas also failed to preserve the integrity of people’snamus in a number of cases.

5.4.2 Tribal security

Interestingly, security in some areas of Paktia wasbeing taken care of to some extent by triballeaderships. When tribes have a coherent and strongleadership they can protect their territorial integrity.In communities, feeling strengthened and served bya strong sense of identity, leaders and peopleengage in processes which help them mutuallyreinforce each other’s power. The result is that everyindividual feels the responsibility to ask any strangerwhat their business is in their area and securityimproves. This stops Taliban and other types ofinfiltration while providing an enabling environmentfor others such as NGOs.

In areas where this is the case, the PRT’s security roleneeds to be modified to ensure that it does not

jeopardise such systems which can be fragile andunder threat. Where people have been taking aproactive role in maintaining security, claims that thePRT movements and actions are creating insecurityin their wake should be taken seriously.

5.4.3 Role of the PRT

‘I believe that the presence of international forces iscrucial in terms of providing security and buildingthe capacity of the ANA and ANP…………The ANAand ANP are still not trustworthy, however, and thepresence of international forces is a must for theoverall security and stability of the state.’


‘The GoA cannot guarantee the security of civilservants and needs PRT assistance to fly them tosome locations. Gisab district, for instance, has beenunder Taliban control for three years and they havetraining camps there.’


There is an overall recognition that there has notbeen enough investment in the Afghan securityforces, with perceptions that the GoA has no meansfor guaranteeing any type of security. As such, manyinterviewees – including GoA representatives inKabul – see a vital role for PRTs in improving securityand ensuring that the situation does not slide backinto one of the internecine war with which peopleare so familiar. Most people felt that the closure ofPRTs would symbolise overall military withdrawal andlead to a rapidly deteriorating security situation insome provinces, and that the ANA and ANP are farfrom ready to handle the Taliban without the supportof foreign forces. Even PRT detractors agreed thatthey have a role in supporting indigenous forces.Interviewees also thought that the government,bolstered by PRTs, should handle security andwelfare, while NGOs should be left to deal withprojects.


Where PRTs have dealt even-handedly withunsavoury armed elements, people take note andendorse their actions. This is more common in thenorth, which has had a slightly more colourful historyof warlordism and where community relations areless informed by a rigid culture of honour and similarconsiderations. In the south, however, people askwhy no Afghan forces are generally involved inhouse searches and why the authorities seem to beinformed about such raids only after the event. Suchactions undermine the legitimacy of the GoA andcast them in the role of powerless bystander.

Overall, Afghan interviewees stated that they do nottrust ISAF and CF to protect them, but rather fearthem, and feel that if they are perceived to say or dothe wrong things, they will be imprisoned or killed.They also regard the security provided by bothbodies as the beneficial fallout of military activities inpursuit of international aims which are not alwaysclear to them. As Stapleton (2007) states however:

“Though it was claimed that security in the PRT areaof operation would improve by virtue of the PRTs’presence, PRTs were never mandated, constructedor intended to afford direct protection to Afghancivilians or, for that matter, other developmentactors.”

5.5 Private security companiesAlthough there is no data which shows how manyNGO security incidents happen on roads56,anecdotal evidence would suggest that thepercentage out of all security incidents for this groupmay be significant. After the fall of the Taliban, roadsecurity in particular has deteriorated and thepresence of a number of different groups is creatingfurther complications. The governor of Paktiacomplained at length about the private securitycompany protecting construction on the road toKhost. He asked why construction companies werebeing allowed to approach non-government securitycontractors to provide security and blamed many

Box 6:

Training the Afghan police PRTs play a variety of roles in SSR, with many PRTtrainers from different countries forming part ofthe overall police training effort in many areas:• The Norwegians are undertaking some police

training in Faryab.• The Canadians are working with the ANA. • Canadian Gendarmerie staff are embedded

with the ANP.• Military personnel also monitor and assist the

ANP at checkpoints throughout the country. • The New Zealand PRT did some police

mentoring in Bamian, with a positive impact. • The Dutch provide military liaison teams to

mentor ANA on the ground in Uruzgan,actively engage with ANAP, and are lookinginto the construction of a police trainingcentre.

• The Americans are also involved in policementoring and training in a number oflocations, including Gardez, where the USPRT is helping to train the Afghan uniformedpolice.

Although civilian police should not technically betrained by the military, this distinction is blurredin areas where the police are fighting heavilyarmed, cross-border ‘insurgents’. Thegovernance dimensions of SSR, however, havelargely been overshadowed by concerns thatthere is enough reasonably trained andequipped manpower to deal withcounterinsurgency activities and the global waron terror. The governor of Paktia, however,stated that the PRTs play no role in training thepolice because they are too busy withdevelopment work. Like so many comments, thisindicated the perception that PRTs and themilitary pursue their own plans, irrespective ofperceived needs in the context context.

56 ANSO for example does not disaggregate data by incidents on and off road. Illegal checkpoints, for instance, haveover the past three decades resulted in many security incidents.


security incidents on the existence of suchcompanies.

Roads are still effectively a no-man’s land in someparts of Afghanistan. They are not controlled bylocal communities and where governance is weak ornon-existent, it is generally a case of appropriationof control by the ‘fittest’. Impromptu checkpoints,banditry and a range of criminal activities havealways taken place on various routes. The situationon the roads also determines the price of goods. Theroad from Uruzgan to Kandahar, for instance, is anarterial route with many checkpoints, police andother. When the road is blocked prices in Uruzgango up, giving those in control of the roadtremendous negotiating power.

It is interesting to look at the actors straddling themilitary and private sectors in relation to roadbuilding and security.These are Afghan privatesecurity firms – the militias of old commanders andwarlords in another guise, or as the Afghan sayinggoes, ‘the same donkeys disguised with differentsaddles’. They work independently or as partners ofinternational private security firms. With a history asmilitias, often owned by jihadi elements, these firmsare evidently used to playing one side off againstanother for profit, and are happy to alter the powerdynamics for whoever pays them. They are thereforeperceived as benefiting greatly from the effectiveprivatisation of road construction and security involatile areas. As road building currently relies onprivate company security, the commanders and theirex-militias effectively determine where roads go,how quickly they are built and how much of thebudget winds up in their own pockets. Thecommanders involved are very well-placed to act aspolitical and development gate-keepers, evenchanging local power dynamics and distorting thelocal context. Throughout the decades of war andinsecurity, many of the larger trucking interests inAfghanistan – often operated by powerful familieswith extensive political and military networks – havecontinued to operate without serious incident,

paying for safe passage. Interviewees also claimedthat when trucks linked directly or indirectly to theinternational military presence are involved insecurity incidents, there are insurance and a numberof other ‘scams’ involving the groups providing theirsecurity. In other words, private security firms are attimes perceived as holding development to ransomand impacting on the security of all stakeholders.Their impact on NGO and PRT activities and thepotential dissonance which they represent needs agreat deal more attention and analysis.

This may be an area where military and NGOinterests collide. Since road construction andsecurity are both of tremendous strategic interest,the private security firms benefit from lucrative dealsand at times from the protection of various elementswithin the international military presence. Providingsecurity for fuel and building material convoysserving military installations and contracting firmsoften working for the latter tie in to a neat nexuswhere all sorts of deals are being made.

Financial and other types of support for such firmserodes transparency and accountability, and mayeven reverse the impact of Disarmament,Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and DIAG.It also supports perceived state predation wherethose running such outfits are relatives of individualsin power. It also creates a conundrum for NGOs, whomay be asked for protection money by such groupsand left at the mercy of bandits and insurgents ifthey refuse to pay. Regulation of the private securityindustry has started on a modest scale, but thesecompanies will most certainly prove resilient as theycontinue to benefit from the patronage of powerfulnational and international backers.

| 65

The institutional memory of 30 years of sustainedcontact with communities all over Afghanistangenerates vast amounts of experience andinformation for some members of the Taliban, HIGand others. Some NGOs have also established aunique set of relations with their contacts from therefugee camps of the 1980s through to the present,and also have staff with individual and personal linksto local people and networks. Although such NGOshave developed a modus operandi with tribes in theareas where they work, most (with some notableexceptions) have not paid as much attention to tribalpolitics as they should, which is increasinglyinadvisable. Tribal elements are struggling to find asimilar modus operandi with PRTs too, which changeso quickly in command, nationality, and so on.

All development organisations are engaged in socialtransformation when they address gender issues,human rights, poverty, empowerment of specificgroups and other types of change. Similarly, thegovernment is transforming society in its pursuit ofdemocracy. In certain areas, programmes such as theNSP have ably demonstrated how socialtransformation can set in motion processes ofprofound change. PRT WHAM efforts, together withthe military’s psyops and counterinsurgency efforts,also aim to bring about change in community beliefsand behaviours.

Every group operating in Afghanistan – including theTaliban – wishes to effect change, accompanied bysocial transformation. Because the target outcomesof each group are different and at times conflicting,this is an area which impacts operational space andsecurity for many and cannot be overlooked in thecivmil debate.

57 Allied Joint Operations (2002).

58 Kamiya (2005).

Chapter 6: Social transformation,intelligence gathering and culturalsensitivity

Box 7:

A view from the military ‘Merely establishing good relations might beenough to deny the same advantages to hostileor potentially hostile forces. In many situations,commanders have a moral and legalresponsibility towards the civilian populations intheir area that can only be met by co-operatingwith the civil government and internationalbodies. The aim of CIMIC is to establish andmaintain the full co-operation of the civilianpopulation and institutions within a commander’sjoint operating agreement in order to createcivil-military conditions that offer him thegreatest possible moral, material, environmentaland tactical advantages. Implicit in this aim is thedenial of such advantages to an actual orpotential adversary. The long term purpose ofCIMIC is to create and sustain conditions that willsupport the achievement of a lasting solution tothe crisis.’ Allied Joint Operations 57

‘Insurgents are difficult to identify from the localpopulation. They are clever combatants skilled inthe art of information warfare. Victory againstinsurgency, while achievable at the militarytactical level, may never be truly decisive sincethe root causes of insurgency are typicallypolitical, social, and economic – not purelymilitary. Thus, success against an insurgencyrequires the synchronized application of allelements of national power: Diplomatic,Information, Military, and Economic (D-I-M-E).’ Brigadier General Jasan, Operation EnduringFreedom 58


6.1 Social transformation

Social transformation efforts to control communitiesmove the war from the frontlines deeper intocommunities, as every individual becomes apotential supporter or combatant of AOGs. In sucha situation, the imperatives of humanitarians,development workers and the military frequentlyoverlap and clash. The identity of any individual –fighter, victim, patient, source of intelligence –becomes contested territory, with varying outcomesand consequences depending on whom (s)he comesinto contact with.

6.1.1 Taliban and other opposition groups

In spite of claims that the Taliban and others aredisorganised bands of illiterate gunmen, they seemto work well on ideologies, belief systems andsuperstitions. For example, interviewees in Uruzgandescribed how, after the bodies of some Talibanwere dumped in the centre of Tarinkot as ahumiliation, young men kept sneaking up andcutting pieces off their clothes, in the belief that themen were martyrs and the pieces of cloth would bepowerful talismans. Such a reaction arises from theTaliban’s effective psyops campaigns, which lean onlocal belief systems to give the Taliban an almostotherworldly quality.

The Taliban, HIG and their allies have, for a numberof years formed, influenced, mutated and dissolvedpolitical, social, religious and other interconnectednetworks by creating, infiltrating, supporting ordecapitating them in order to consolidate theirpower and extend their reach. HIG in particularcounts on professionals in its ranks and hashistorically focused on organising service delivery tocommunities, whether in refugee camps or inAfghanistan. Reports indicate that these groups mayeven have infiltrated the GoA at every level andfreely operate within its frameworks.

Similarly, regional actors who support the Talibanand other AOGs are mobilising links forged withIslamist networks and other groups over threedecades of jihad, operating through networks basedon shared languages, cultures, religion and militaryas well as financial support and mentoring.

6.1.2 The international military

The international military presence, in comparison,tries to apply positive pressure, partly throughhandouts and infrastructure projects. This strategywill not work in isolation and needs to be followedup with long-term, intensive social transformationefforts. However, the processes of socialtransformation are far too delicate and complex forthe ‘can do’ logic of the military and many externalaid organisations.

Crude and unsophisticated methods, such as badlydesigned and implemented projects to combatTaliban efforts on the non-kinetic front, to win heartsand minds, to ensure force protection, or to winsupport for the Afghan government, are notcurrently helping build credibility or trust.Fundamentally, this is because underlying analysis issimplistic and based on ‘snapshot’ data collection,together with the need to get things done within ashort timeframe. Despite force protection being oneof the top priorities of commanders and a key factorinherent within the operational planning process, themilitary cannot establish relationships that put themin touch with the knowledge and experience thatcan yield in-depth insight into communities and theirworkings. Efforts such as patrols ‘engaging’ with thepopulation – by exchanging niceties with children,for example, although necessary and palliative forsoldiers on the ground, are manifestly not in thesame league. Meetings with tribal elders are oftenperformance events rather than fora for sincereinformation exchange. On the other hand,opposition groups benefit from relations that spanyears and even generations, absorbing information

Social Transformation, Intelligence Gathering and Cultural Sensitivity | 67

through social systems, then socialising andpresenting it in ways that are culturally assimilated

6.1.3 The Afghan reality

The chemistry of Afghan communities has in manyrespects irreversibly altered as a result of long yearsof war and displacement. Any old structures andprocesses that are still being used have undergonemodifications. Thus, it is not possible for the GoA,PRTs and others to return to a district after a longdisengagement and simply reinstate the malek orarbaki systems, or transplant systems from one placeto another without having a deep understanding ofcommunity sensibilities and the changes that havetaken place. Having traditional systems patronisedby foreign elements also mutates them – in someareas, for instance, people are becomingincreasingly resentful of PRTs meddling ingovernance issues, since they frequently make basicmistakes. There are cases where the PRTssuccessfully clear elements fostering insurgency orengaging in criminal acts, only to replace them withothers who upset the beneficial balance of power.For example, after one PRT removed hard-line, pro-Taliban, Islamist elements from one area, the localtribes were secure and happy; the PRT then built apolice station, which brought undesirable elementsinto the area and irritated the same tribes. Suchconsiderations colour perceptions of PRT andmilitary ‘good deeds’, and people’s subsequentinteractions with them.

‘People do not have any power or authority overtheir own lives.’


Many actors in the Afghan context including PRTs,insist on viewing Afghanistan as an egalitariansociety when designing WHAM or similarinterventions, assuming that a project implementedfor ordinary people will convince them to opposethe Taliban and other AOGs, or participate in effortsto change the balance of power in their

communities. What such analysis fails to appreciateis that ordinary people who fear for their lives or arelocked in a feudal system are often powerless to actor influence, and are afraid of repercussions fromlocal (often armed) elites, the GoA, the internationalmilitary, criminals and many others.

Programmes such as NSP have demonstrated thatthe transfer of power to ordinary people is a slowand at times painful process which requires a greatdeal of thought, trial and error and oversight. Ifpeople get power, they usually challenge local elitesfirst. It is not necessarily ‘ordinary people’ whosupport the Taliban, though they may sympathisewith their cause or turn a blind eye to their presence.Power plays between leaders at various levels areextremely complex, and the Taliban are often able totake advantage of weak spots and contestedleadership to find ways to enter and forge links withthe elites, who then invite them into a community forgood or for ill. Calculations on whether or not to dothis take in many more factors than theimplementation of QIPs and the provision of servicesin their areas. After all, the Taliban do not try toprovide any of these.

It should also be noted that, despite this insistenceon wooing ‘ordinary’ Afghans through projects andother means, there was a strong perception amonginterviewees that PRTs and the military only connectto warlords and corrupt officials. This kind ofdiscrepancy does not go unnoticed, andinterviewees also raised concerns about ISAF and CFinteracting with power-holders within and outsidethe GoA who have poor human rights recordsand/or involvement in corruption. This is seen ascontradicting the work of providing assistance andoften alienates and distances the very people theyare trying to win over. It also muddies the water forothers trying to provide assistance. The Taliban,though not necessarily popular, are opportunisticand can easily take advantage of such mistakes, inaddition to exploiting local power vacuums andfractures.


The head of the IDLG is concerned that peopleshould discuss government positively in village life.While providing development assistance andservices will help encourage this, demonstratingwholesome leadership and power and building long-term trust will do much more. If communities – ormore precisely, their leaders – have been able toreject the Taliban, they have done so throughparticular strengths and strategies. The focus shouldbe on ensuring that these are not jeopardised, eitherby government or by the international military. Suchcommunities protect themselves to a certain extent,but still need various types of assistance, sensitivelyprovided, to enable the leadership to continue toresist. For this to be successful, there must be in-depth knowledge of the workings of local powerstructures and how best to handle them, particularlyunderstanding that post-war, these will be fractured,disempowered, fundamentally altered orsupplanted. This sort of knowledge andunderstanding cannot easily be gleaned in a shorttime by heavily armed or escorted outsiders, nor canit be done through hastily executed developmentprojects.

6.1.4 NGOs

Insistence on the part of the military to control socialtransformation processes by working with NGOs orpreparing the ground for them with security inspecific areas does not help NGOs project anindependent and impartial identity, and in fact leadsto the militarisation and instrumentalisation ofassistance. NGOs have rarely been involved in thepolitical manoeuvrings which lead to leadershipchange or support for specific factions, nor havethey knowingly collected information to facilitate themilitary’s analysis of processes leading to suchchanges. There are, however, some ‘medial’organisations that call themselves NGOs whocovertly sell or provide the military and diplomaticcommunities with maps and in-depth information oncertain districts. Such organisations may alsofacilitate access to certain elements within

communities to help facilitate political or military aswell as social transformation. Such organizations arenot perceived as acting in a neutral and impartialmanner and should not be labelling themselves asNGOs.

NGOs should not be pressured to get involved withthe military’s social transformation and relatedactivities, primarily because of implications relatedto intelligence gathering. On the other hand, suchactivities – whether led by the military, the GoA orothers – are changing the operating environment forNGOs, at times with negative consequences. Assuch, NGOs need to develop a heightened state ofawareness of the shifting socio-political contextswithin which they work, particularly in areas ofgrowing insecurity.

6.2 Information and intelligence

‘We know that NGOs are civilians and PRTs aremilitary, and we also know that there are civiliansinside PRTs. People are a bit suspicious about theNGOs and believe that they are helping the militaryby providing intelligence and information.’


‘People are a bit suspicious about NGOs and thinkthat they are spying for the Americans. I think theymay do so, but still we have not found solid proof.They seem to be clever so they won’t leave behindsomething that can implicate them.’


‘We have been lucky with the presence of UNAMA.People go to UNAMA and UNAMA comes straightto us.’

International staff, Paktia

In any type of war, intelligence and information thatassists the military, either directly or indirectly, is at a


premium, and boundaries for accessing it areconstantly being redrawn as discussions on theethics of intelligence-gathering ebb and flow. Forthe GoA, ethical issues tied to intelligencegathering, interrogation and torture exist on paper,and the intelligence services have worked efficientlythroughout the decades of war. However, wheninformation gathering systems overlap, there is aclash for NGOs, the military and insurgents. Forexample, data collection – particularly mappingexercises to aid the design of development projects– can be seen as a suspicious activity by an AOG oreven the military.

Having disengaged with Afghanistan following theCold War, CF and ISAF have had to catch up sincethe fall of the Taliban in 2001. They are severelydisadvantaged in many ways and rely on any sourcesavailable to extract knowledge. The latest strategy –ostensibly to improve US military efficiency indelivering services and providing force protection –is the use of anthropologists or ‘human terrainteams’. This is a controversial move which can onlylead to impartiality and security problems for NGOdata collection and future social science research insome areas. It also alienates educated Afghans whofind this latest move by the military both patronisingand offensive.

Many interviewees felt that the Taliban and theirspies were suspicious of people who were in regularcontact with PRTs and that such informants developan ambiguous identity as a result. This notion wasstronger among people based further away fromPRTs in the provinces, and strongest in Kabul. In abid to understand local communities, the militaryconstantly collect information during all forms ofcontact with non-military groups. They are thereforeperceived as seeking ‘intelligence’ fromcommunities, NGOs and others – whether the datais on the number of projects in a village or sensitiveinformation about enemy tactics. Organisations thathave close contact with PRTs for ‘damage control’risk jeopardising their own reputations and security –

for example, UNAMA is currently being defamedthrough night letters in some districts where they areaccused of spying for the Gardez PRT.

The military appear to absorb all sorts of informationwhen there is any sustained contact, but it is arepetitive process as new PRT personnel often seekthe same information. Their means of retaining andtransferring institutional memory are not alwaysefficient: hence the need for regular informationdownloads, putting more informants at risk. Becauseopposition groups punish those who are perceivedas supplying intelligence, a pervasive militarypresence and regular efforts to gather data placemore people at risk of being punished for supplyingintelligence. This creates an uncomfortable nexuswhere the farther the military extends its influenceand outreach, the more it can endanger the activitiesof those who come into contact and need tocoordinate with them. It naturally has a profoundimpact on perceptions of neutrality and impartialitywhich NGOs may try to maintain, especially whereinformation gathering is required.

NGO criticism that PRTs do not take localsensitivities and ground reality into account is true toa certain extent, however, some PRTs use expertswho provide sophisticated information and analysison local political dynamics, tribal issues, at a levelthat is at times beyond NGO capacities. While theUS military is currently hiring anthropologists, theDutch PRT in Uruzgan has experts and holds regularmeetings with groups of mullahs as well as localleaders and tries to be informed on and sensitive totribal issues. It is clear that some sections of themilitary are aware that they constantly have toeducate themselves. However, there was also asense that this information collection can to a certainextent mean ticking boxes on categories of contactsrather than understanding the complex mosaicwithin which numerous actors are pursuing multiple,and at times conflicting, objectives. Military trainingdoes not prepare individuals to handle suchsituations – and certainly not in such a short time


period or when under duress to deliverdevelopment, state building and military ‘victories’.

6.2.1 Obstacles to intelligence gathering

Although some interviewees understood that PRTsare responsive to those they perceive as ‘supplyinggood information’, they also mentioned manyreasons why the military cannot access suchinformation easily. These included:

• security systems at PRTs and military bases actingas deterrents for would-be informants

• people feeling that it may be risky to approachheavily armed people

• ear of exposure – people may worry they will beseen if they have to wait for long periods at thePRT gate

• fears that it may be a one-sided exploitativerelationship where people take risks, provideinformation and do not necessarily get any resultsin return.

Such obstacles distort information provision to themilitary, and mean that any attempts by Afghans tofollow common cultural practice and establishnetworks of influence and information exchangewith PRTs are limited, except for those locals whohave armed influence in an area and come and gowithout fear of repercussions.

‘The PRT and ISAF mostly rely on local spies and getwrong and misleading information because of theinternal rivalries.’


‘They are the ones who conduct search operationsand give the wrong impression about individuals tothe PRT people and the Americans. They deny usaccess to the right people.’


Internationals in both NGOs and military institutionscan be prone to expert manipulation and being soldspecific information, which has facilitated the rise topower of gatekeepers – a major problem inAfghanistan today. Gate-keeping can involvedeliberate misinterpretation of speech, preventingaccess to a PRT or NGO. Gatekeepers holdtremendous power in relation to ordinary Afghans –they set up their own patron-client networks,altering the chemistry of communities and powerstructures in which such new networks becomeembedded and limiting the information channels.Getting rivals and enemies imprisoned,interrogated, or worse, by CF and ISAF has becomethe latest tool in the arsenal of Pashtun badal(revenge) power plays. It is well known that themilitary can unwittingly become embroiled in tribaland extended family conflicts in this way.

Knowing this, and with only a small pool of Englishspeakers available, it is also easy for elements withinthe GoA to ensure that only interpreters with aspecific ideology are allowed to interpret for themilitary. This allows specific information to be fed toPRTs and CF, except in the cases where personnelspeak local languages fluently. This is a constantsource of worry to people trying to present the‘ground reality’ to PRT personnel.

International NGO staff may face similar problems –less as a result of government interference, andmore because human resource departments havehistorically been co-opted by one ethnic group orextended family (especially in hiring and firing) whichoften tries to maintain its hold over the organisationor department by controlling the flow of staff.Selective use of information is also used for anumber of different reasons, providing internationalswith an incomplete and manipulated picture of whatis happening on the ground. The result is thatinformation is translated in a way that reflects theinterpreter’s worldview and can serve the intentionsof specific individuals. NGOs staff – especially the


more established ones – tend to have moreawareness of such practices and try to find ways tooffset the negative outcomes of such practiceswithin their own institutions.

During the reign of Zahir Shah (1933-73) experts ondifferent tribes would advise the government onhow to handle them. The past year has seen aresurgence of interest in tribes and tribal issues inmilitary and diplomatic circles, but not within mostNGOs. It is not so much anthropological knowledgeof tribes that is important for the purposes ofwinning the current struggle in Afghanistan, butknowledge of their vast, intricate and at times globalnetworks and the rifts within them which AOGscurrently manipulate and exploit. However, it isdifficult for PRTs or NGOs to access such knowledgein an integral manner, because it is often ‘lived’ orabsorbed via socialisation and cannot easily betransferred to people who did not grow up in asimilar environment or culture. To be able to createrelations with such networks that enable anindividual or group to exert anything other thansuperficial influence, it is vital to enter or attachoneself to such networks in an organic relationship,which is neither neutral nor impartial and is withinaccepted cultural norms of reciprocity. Implementingsmall infrastructure projects at a frenetic rate doesnot win respect or build the trust needed toinfluence such networks, while establishing moreinfluential relations can threaten impartiality.

6.3 Cultural sensitivity

‘If [foreigners] abide by our cultural values and codesthey will be considered as guests. People are happywith Dutch troops but extremely angry with theAmericans and Australians because of theirbehaviour.’


‘We are going to have a meeting in a couple of daysto discuss the PRT workshop for university students.The military have started to have meetings with thestudents and we do not know for what their purposeis. We believe it will have a very bad impact onstudents and [that they] might become targets intheir communities if they continue to interact withthe military.’


‘People will be happy if the PRT leaves. People arenot happy with some of the actions of the PRT evenif it continues building bridges and schools.’


Implicit within the PRT Manoeuvre Elements’ andother military units’ provision of a broad umbrella ofsecurity are various levels of interaction withcommunities. Projects, handouts and ‘favours’ areseen as a ‘carrot’ that counteracts the ‘stick’ of otheroperations. This demonstrates a certain lack ofsophisticated analysis of motivating factors and aslightly patronising attitude towards Afghans, asalready discussed in Section 4.2. In addition, beingembedded in and operating within the Afghancommunity for any purpose requires behaviour thatwill not harm relations or create future mistrust andhostility towards foreigners.

Some military contingents in Afghanistan still lackthe basics of cultural sensitivity despite attendingcourses and briefings. Interactions in some areas –usually intelligence-gathering raids – are leading tonamus incidents and resentment of the type that canintensify community hostility and improve Talibanrecruitment figures. At the same time, security issuesare increasingly keeping NGO staff out of the field,weakening relationships and networks built up overdecades to facilitate development work.Establishing new relationships will be far moredifficult if current circumstances prevail.


Afghans have always been slightly wary of outsiders,but at the same time emphatically hospitable as amatter of honour. Many NGOs, having suffered theconsequences of past mistakes, have learnt tonegotiate such contradictions by adopting a go-slowapproach. Afghans do not appreciate outsiderstouching on honour issues and trying to contactgroups perceived as vulnerable to outside influence,such as women or youth. This is a highly sensitiveissue. Afghanistan’s long history of invasion, theGreat Game and more recent history have left a fearof external interference, On many levels, whichcolours all interactions with outsiders. The insensitivemanner typical of some sections of the military intheir efforts to extract information from and win overmore vulnerable segments of the community willtherefore always be perceived negatively. Outsidersmust always be aware of the invisible boundariesthat exist in Afghanistan – crossing them is seen asdiscourteous and can change people’s perception ofoutsiders from guest to invader or spy.

Most of the anecdotes interviewees recounted asfailures within civmil relations – such as food airdrops that were the same colour as cluster bombs;raids on aid agency compounds; females beingsearched by men; leaflets linking aid to intelligence;and children being killed in bombing raids – are notcarried out by those same troops who areresponsible for establishing and maintainingrelations with civilians. The operational troops incharge of fighting, force protection, searches,intelligence gathering and bombing have the leaststructured civilian contact and least exposure to thecivmil dimension. However, their actions are mostlikely to be featured in international and nationalmedia and remembered by NGOs and civilians fornegative reasons. So, although the forcecommander may spend the majority of his meetingswith civilian leaders and have the support of civilianpolitical, development or stabilisation advisors, themain effort – or the most potentially damagingactivities –may well be kinetic. It is important thatNGO and civilian actors engaged in the civmildebate have access to and are able to influence all

elements of the military – not just the designatedCIMIC/civil affairs elements.

6.3.1 Radicalisation of communities,islamicisation of landscapes

‘We generally do not preach about worldly affairsduring Friday prayers. It may jeopardise our safety.’


Cultural sensitivity is a double-edged sword when itis not clear where the line should be drawn and whatthe consequences will be. At present, religiousleaders are increasingly worried for their ownsecurity – especially in the south – and prefer to keepa very low profile rather than give messages that canbe viewed as partisan in any way. Attempts by PRTsto woo them as allies in WHAM may not always beprofitable for either side. Outsiders meddling inareas of ordinary life of which they have no in-depthknowledge or real lived experience – such as theIslam practiced in Afghanistan – can lead tosuperficial interventions with potentially seriousunpredictable and unintended consequences.

For example, the enthusiastic construction ofmosques and madrasas to win over religiouscommunities and those thought to be religiousassumes that the rapid Islamicisation of the localterrain cannot be anything but positive. The logicbehind such projects seems to be that the Talibanare Muslim, so to combat them one needs Islamiccredentials. It assumes that building infrastructurefor ‘Islamic’ uses will keep local religious figureshappy; there is no question of transforming the locallandscape to symbolise the advent of goodgovernance, democracy and development within theframework of moderate Islam. This is an area whichneeds to be explored with local communities –especially where people are presenting a religiousfaçade to pre-empt the Taliban and other Islamistgroups out of fear rather than genuine religioussentiment.


During the jihad, when Islamic countries pouredmoney into Afghanistan for the construction ofmosques and madrasas, each group tried to push itsown doctrine via the infrastructure and preachersthey installed to incite people to certain acts – bothnegative and positive. How much this contributed tothe radicalisation of some communities in the longterm and irreversibly changed the dynamics withinthem – for example, giving more power to religiousfigures backed by radical groups abroad whiledecreasing the power of traditional leaders orsocialist or even democratic elements – is not knownbecause there have been no impact assessments.While conducting such assessments retrospectivelyis not easy, it is wrong to assume that building lots ofmosques and madrasas is automatically a good thing– in fact, the NSP has largely avoided requests forbuilding mosques by building community hallsinstead. Not everyone considers a mosque to be abenevolent community gathering place, and thedevelopment benefits are not always obvious – forexample, mosques are not necessarily suitable orrelevant for women or young people, while secularor moderate-minded community members may notregard a new mosque as a step towards progress.Both military and civilian actors should be aware ofthis.


‘There is a common misperception that the issues inAfghanistan, and indeed elsewhere around theworld, can be dealt with by military means[alone]....The military is a key, an essential element indealing with those problems, but by and large theseproblems can only be resolved politically.’

UK’s Chief of Defence Staff , 2007

As car bombs rip across quiet suburban streets andsuicide bombers cause carnage at public events andcelebrations, it becomes obvious that, although thewar may be over, unrest and violence continue tosmoulder and flare up unpredictably. This simplymarks a new phase in the insecurity faced by NGOsin Afghanistan. While the actors, situations andchallenges change, NGOs have to be more vigilantand juggle multiple identities and priorities just tosurvive in this ever-changing context. The vast andbewildering range of actors and personalitiesworking in NGOs and the military, struggling tounderstand one another’s dynamics, are engaged ina complex dance with shadowy partners whosemoves are increasingly unpredictable and deadly.

The complicated interactions taking place on theground; the cynicism of communities following threedecades of violence and escalating disappointmentand despair; the sophistication encountered – evenin remote villages – in articulating what anaccountable and transparent government means;and the presence of heavily armed foreign nationalsintimidating leaderless communities has all beencondensed into a simple matter of delivering oftenlow-quality inputs and services while avoiding thepainful introspection required to change the cultureof governance and overturn the legacy of animperfect past and protracted conflict.

Reducing the issue to this two-dimensional formulaallows PRTs and others to believe that rapid and

widespread aid delivery will lead to peace, stability,development and good governance. This faultyanalysis puts NGOs, who are involved in rolling outgovernment and other programmes, in a difficultposition. They are neither delivering fast enough norcovering enough ground, while the Taliban, HIG andtheir allies have very gradually consolidated theirpower and extended their reach over the last threedecades by forming, influencing, mutating anddissolving political, social, religious and otherinterconnected networks.

In this scenario, the imperatives of humanitarians,development workers and the military frequentlyoverlap and collide. Using small-scale and at timesbadly executed interventions as a ‘carrot’, theresponsibility of making moral decisions aboutsupporting good governance and rejecting terrorismis increasingly pressed on communities, who feelforced to tolerate an unpopular government and setof elites who have the support of a reluctantinternational community.

Afghans have been introduced to a great manyforeign concepts, and have adopted those that suitlocal pragmatism. The terminology of the civmildebate is largely alien to them: they struggle to seethe value of articulating their experiences, thoughthey are dealing with the reality of interactionsbetween civilians and military as best they can. TheCIVMIL debate has not surfaced in the Afghan policyenvironment; this means that the government ispursuing aims which may jeopardise not only NGOoperational space but humanitarian space, too. Thedebate has not been sufficiently ‘Afghanised’.Humanitarian principles are not the only ones at playin the Afghan context, where Afghaniyat andIslamiyat underpin interactions and reactions tospecific stimuli. Actions and attitudes whichdisrespect these principles and lead to unpleasantincidents may upset or even traumatisecommunities. Notions of namus underpin human

Chapter 7: Conclusion andrecommendations

Conclusion and Recommendations | 75

security for many people, and neither the GoA northe international military presence is paying themenough attention. This points to the need to look athuman security through a more culturallyappropriate lens.

The lack of Afghan perspective impacts on local andnational lobbying and advocacy efforts, mostcritically in relation to the GoA. NGOs and civilsociety can contribute to an analysis which providescomparisons between various groupings ofprinciples – such as Islamic/humanitarian andAfghan/Islamic – which will be essential to elicit themeaningful engagement of ordinary Afghans in thecivmil debate. Afghanising the debate may alsoultimately facilitate finding a common NGO positionand avoiding dangerous territory where assistancebecomes further instrumentalised and co-opted bythe military and the GoA.

The Afghan context has become a maze of pathwaysthat shift with alarming speed. The range of actorsand at times conflicting perspectives on how to keepand provide security means that every situation hasto be scrutinised through a multiplicity of lenses.Identity management increasingly becomes aconscious choice, while security and insecurity bothprovide lucrative business opportunities for a widerange of actors. It is clearly difficult for the military tokeep a distinction between its various functions, andthis has implications for organisations that choose tocome in contact with it. While the military may beable to provide assistance in insecure circumstances,this is often tainted by their other activities. NGOscannot soften or eliminate such perceptions byacting as conduits or proxies for assistancechanneled through the military.

In this situation, Afghans and internationalsapproach security from different perspectives –either broadly reactive and short-term, or proactiveand long-term. Changes in staffing, with younger,less experienced individuals, increase the level ofrisk, as does the constantly changing security terrain.

Relying on community acceptance and ‘local’security involves revisiting many assumptions andensuring that all stakeholders are working with thesame understanding and expectations.

Cost-effectiveness and honest spending are some ofthe most important considerations in the war to winover the population. Afghans are looking for long-term, sustainable interventions, of good quality anddelivered on time. They are well aware that thewindow of opportunity may be closing fast and thathandouts and charity, as opposed to a developmentapproach, will only lead to superficial change whichwill not serve them in the long run. Afghans areincreasingly eager to own the development processand look for ways to consolidate that ownership –becoming involved in design, monitoring, auditingand downward accountability. A number of NGOshave been working hard with communities to deliversuch interventions, so perceived PRT ineptitude inawarding contracts is an irritant for communities.

Most contractors – currently the major group ofimplementing partners for PRTs –create contestedterritory in a myriad of ways and generate conflict.Interactions with communities must involve a long-term and iterative process of building relationshipsand resolving conflict. The ability to controldevelopment and external networks is an importantpart of the leadership process and, provided thecontrol is for wholesome reasons, can be of greatbenefit to communities. Outsiders have to ensurethat they are not co-opted by the wrong networksand unwittingly have a negative impact on theexisting landscapes of conflict and powerdifferentials.

The underlying causes of the current situation inAfghanistan must be addressed. Whileunderdevelopment is a major contributor, it is notnecessarily a root cause of the lack of governmentcredibility at subnational level. Government‘presence’ is all too often simplistically equated withinfrastructure and projects.


Rather than thinking that the Afghan people have tochoose between the Taliban and the GoA, it may bewiser to understand that Afghans perceivethemselves as stuck between the frying pan and thefire. The international community, including PRTs, tryto make the frying pan look appealing. Afghanstolerate it as long as they can before jumping intothe proverbial fire. Neither choice is particularlytempting at the moment: the government is presentin communities but at times in a corrupt andaggressive manner which cannot be disguised byinfrastructure and service delivery. Decisivemeasures from the Karzai regime to demonstratewholesome leadership and power as well as aprofound process of trust building are the only waysout of this crisis. Such measures may only comeabout as a result of diplomatic pressure from theinternational community in the short-term and socialchange initiated from the grassroots in the long-term. Both NGOs and the military have distinct rolesto play in such a process.

Although there is little clarity and coherence on howthe PRT presence helps the GoA, the militaryeffectively face a choice in some areas: they caneither resource, submit to and coordinate with anunpopular and negligible government presence,often in the form of unpopular local elites, or theycan try to do their own thing and make the best of abad job. The result is: disenchantment; a perceptionthat they are winning hearts and minds on their ownbehalf; and accusations of undermining the GoA.The perception of local government that can onlysupplicate or make suggestions to the PRT hasprofound consequences in an area with a history oftroubled relations with central government. Astronger role in SSR is one of the easiest ways forPRTs to steer their way out of supportingdevelopment and governance – particularly sincegovernors, elites and their followers are at times onlyinterested in the funding rather than in finding waysto serve ordinary Afghans or bolster the state.

Stakeholders become increasingly opportunistic intaking advantage of insecurity and impunity. Securityis a daily preoccupation for most Afghans, who arefalling prey to both internal and external aggressors.The government has neither been able to protectAfghans from predation by criminals - even thosewithin government - nor from the violence inflictedon them by the Taliban, foreign insurgents and theinternational military. In a small number of casescommunities have taken matters into their ownhands, but they are often impeded by the GoA’s andPRTs’ lack of sensitivity to the fragility of such efforts.Afghans regard the security provided by ISAF andCF as fortuitous fallout from activities which haveobjectives far removed from the protection ofordinary Afghans.

Many Afghans see the development-security linkageas artificial and contrived and the governance-security linkage as a critical part of stabilisation. Thedevelopment of a strong army and stable andcapable police force is an important part of statebuilding and most agree that an internationalmilitary presence at provincial level is critical forsecurity and stability for the time being. In general,Afghans feel that they are on a very uneven playingfield in deciding the nature of military engagementin their sovereign territory.

The situation for humanitarians and developmentpractitioners is continuously changing. Theiroperational space is continually shrinking as AOGsspread fear and expand their influence. NGOs face anumber of challenges and are developing a range ofstrategies and practices to handle them. However,the question of whether humanitarian space can be‘mended’ under these circumstances is difficult toanswer. Success for a few organisations innegotiating access might raise hopes, but withoutthe possibility of conducting such research withAOGs – some of whom have tolerated but notwelcomed NGOs in the past – it would be unwise tosuggest that organisations should riskrapprochement in order to broaden their area ofoperations at present.


Finally, it may be wise for NGOs to take somepreparatory steps to learn how to handle anincreasingly complex situation with shrinking roomto manoeuvre. They need to find ways to strengthenrelations with communities despite a shrinking fieldpresence, particularly among internationals. Agrowing military presence will not compensate forthis. The most important step is for NGOs andothers to continuously challenge assumptions –particularly about their understanding of Afghanrealities, and Afghan understanding of the realitiesthe international community continuously imposeson them.

7.1 Summary of recommendationsCIVMIL relations, institutions and decision-makingneed to be more inclusive and informed of Afghanperspectives. This responsibility falls to all actors –the GoA, NGOs, the military, the UN and Afghanagencies. Such efforts need to be embedded inwider strategies to build the capacity and ownershipof local actors in processes that affect them. NGOs,civil society groups and the media all have asignificant role to play in promoting widerunderstanding of the debate and greater input fromcommunities.

7.1.1 Key recommendations

Afghanisation:

Afghanisation implies both greater contextualunderstanding by international actors, and greaterparticipation of and accountability to Afghan actorsthemselves. Civil-military relations processes,institutions and decision-making need to be moreinclusive and informed of Afghan perspectives. Thisresponsibility falls to all actors, including NGOs,military, government, UN, and Afghan agenciesthemselves. Such efforts need to be embedded inwider strategies to build the capacity and ownershipof local actors in processes that affect them. Drawingon the international efforts of Muslim scholars andhumanitarian agencies, donors and NGOs shouldalso invest in cross-cultural translation andsensitisation to ensure that humanitarian principles

are understood and made relevant to Afghan social,cultural and religious norms.

Governance:

The current emphasis by the internationalcommunity and military forces on ‘winning heartsand minds’ through a simplistic ‘development-security’ linkage is misplaced. Greater emphasisshould be placed on addressing the essentiallypolitical challenges related to governance andconflict resolution at both national and local levels inAfghanistan. Afghan power-holders andcommunities are well-versed in the power dynamicsimplicated in short-term projects implemented to‘win hearts and minds’.

‘Civilianisation’:

Despite the proclaimed efforts to ‘civilianise’ PRToperations, the research found little evidence thatcivilianisation is a priority or that changes on theground are keeping pace with what is discussions atpolicy level. Military engagement with civilianagencies through forums for civil-military relationsdialogue continues to be pro-forma, withdisappointing outcomes and inadequate follow-upbased on concerns raised by NGOs and Afghanstakeholders.

Conflict Sensitivity:

All actors need to invest more in the unintendedimpacts of their interventions for local-level politicaland conflict dynamics, which can have widerramifications at national level. Critical exampleswould include the importance of concepts of‘namus’ (honour) and religious practice in definingAfghan notions of human security. NGOs are alsochallenged to increase investment in ensuring the‘conflict sensitivity’ of their programmes.

Aid Effectiveness:

Donors should place greater emphasis on civilianchannels for assistance in Afghanistan. They shouldrecognise the intrinsic challenges of channelling aidthrough contested military operations, parts ofwhich are simultaneously engaged in combat


operations. Both donors and the government shouldrecognise the serious security risks inherent ingovernment-aligned aid programmes in a situationof on-going insurgency, and make provisions forimplementing partners accordingly. This researchraises serious challenges regarding the need forlonger-term programming and sustainability, basedon the finding that Afghan people are regularlyunimpressed by short-term projects designed tomeet tactical military objectives. Issues of effectivetransparency to and consultation of Afghancommunities are also critical, and point to intrinsiclimitations to military-led assistance strategies.CIMIC-type aid activities should be carefullycircumscribed so that their negative impacts onactivities of local authorities and civilian agencies aretaken into consideration.

Humanitarian Access and SecurityManagement:

NGOs should review their security management andwider programme management strategies to reflecton the implications of the increasing shift fromacceptance into protection- and deterrence-basedapproaches to humanitarian access. As security hasdeteriorated, NGOs have increasingly becomedistanced from beneficiary communities. Furtheroperational learning, and inter-agency informationsharing are required to identify means of sustainingand building relations with local communities andpower-holders, as well as maintaining contextualunderstanding. A particular challenge resides inproviding adequate funding and capacity-buildingfor some in the ANGO sector, to enable effectivesafety mechanisms to be set up, and to ensuresustainable organisational and human resourcesdevelopment. NGOs also need to invest in theconflict mitigation and resolution skills, so thatfrontline staff are adequately equipped to deal withthe social, political and conflict dynamics implicatedin the implementation of programmes.

7.1.2 Detailed Recommendations:

To ANGOs and INGOs:

• INGOs and ANGOs need to develop moresustained joint strategies to enable Afghanengagement in policy dialogue with relevantactors on CIVMIL relations. Such policyengagement needs to happen at local, national,international levels in a joined-up fashion toensure the sharing of up-to-date perspectives atoperational and policy levels.

• Drawing on the international efforts of Muslimscholars and humanitarian agencies, NGOsshould invest in initiatives that promote cross-cultural interpretation of humanitarian principles,which are critical to eliciting meaningfulengagement of Afghans in CIVMIL relations.

• NGOs need to constantly update and revise theirknowledge and understanding of the workings oflocal power structures, which may have becomefractured, disempowered, fundamentally alteredor supplanted by new informal structures in thepost-war era.

• NGOs should also review their securitymanagement strategies to reflect on theimplications of the shift from acceptance toprotection- and deterrence-based approaches.This includes providing regular security trainingand drills for local staff and raising awareness ofthe risks to the safety of all staff, particularlyyounger ones with less field experience. Theyshould also provide staff with conflict resolutionawareness, training and tools., being preparedwill help them work more effectively.

• Inter-agency approaches to such learninginitiatives need to place particular emphasis onthe skills, experience and local knowledge ofAfghan staff and partner ANGOs.

• In advocating for humanitarian space andreflecting on their own practice, the NGO sectorneeds to place greater emphasis on theresponsibilities of aid agencies to maintainappropriate interface with military actors. NGOs


that currently accept funding from militaryoperations should reflect in a serious fashion onthe risk of negative implications for the safety andsecurity of their own staff, programmes andbeneficiaries. They should also reflect on thenegative implications for the wider NGO sector inAfghanistan. NGOs should not be pressured toget involved with the military’s socialtransformation or intelligence gathering-relatedactivities at any stage. However, because suchactivities are changing the operatingenvironment for NGOs, they do need to developtheir awareness of the shifting socio-politicalcontexts within which they work, especially inareas of growing insecurity.

• NGO and civilian actors engaged in the civmildebate need to have access to engage andinfluence all elements of the military, not just thedesignated CIMIC or civilian affairs elements. Forboth INGOs and local Afghan stakeholders, themost damaging behaviour in terms of both CIMICand combat operations is pursued by elements ofthe international military which rarely engage inNGO-military civmil processes.

• We also strongly recommend that NGOs:- find ways to differentiate and distance

themselves from contractors, and advocatefor appropriate accountability of such actors,in order to safeguard the reputation of NGOsoperating on the basis of a principled andeffective approach

- fully explore community concepts of providingsecurity for NGOs and the limitations of suchindigenous systems

- lobby the GoA to elicit more substantivesupport for NGO operations, particularly inthe provision of security in view of incidents ofpredatory behaviour from local security forces

- encourage and support their Afghan partnerNGOs in shifting away from reactive andshort-term approaches to securitymanagement in favour of proactive and long-term safety and security strategies.

To the military and integrated civil-militaryoperations:

• The military needs to review and re-assess theefficacy of its emphasis on assistance and aid-type interventions to WHAM.

• Military and integrated civil-miliary operations,such as PRTs, should develop, expand and refinea stronger SSR role. Military and integrated civil-miliary operations need to develop moreeffective skills and procedures to improve theirability to consult with and listen to NGOs, localleaders and others and take any lessons learnt onboard. Such procedures need to be developed ina way that does not jeopardise the security ofthose interlocutors. The military should also beaware that, like all outsiders, they are prone toexpert manipulation and being sold specificinformation, which can facilitate the rise to powerof gatekeepers.

• Military and integrated civil-miliary operationsshould modify their security role to ensure that itdoes not jeopardise indigenous security systemswhich can be fragile and under threat. Themilitary also needs to assess the wider, long-termimplications of occasionally flirting with shadiermilitia elements in pursuit of its aims.

• Some military and integrated civil-miliaryoperations still promote the handout mentality,which NGOs have been working for many yearsto erase among both beneficiaries and staff.While it is not recommended that they move to adevelopmental mindset, they must increase theirawareness of how their CIMIC-related charitableacts can undermine NGO activities in their areasof operation.

• Military and integrated civil-miliary operationsshould be more vigilant when investing in localpartners. Spending money on low-quality localNGOs that flourish whenever funds are availabledoes not constitute building local capacity in asustainable fashion: instead it wastes money andcreates resentment, tarnishing the reputation ofthe military and hampering WHAM efforts.


• In order to reverse the diminishing of goodwill incommunities, military and integrated civil-miliaryoperations need to reassess their relationshipwith contractors in one of the following ways:stop using inappropriate contractors that deliverineffective projects, or have damagingconsequences for local political, social or conflictdynamics; find better ways of controlling themand promoting their accountability; resolve theconflicts they generate; or set up mechanisms forcommunity monitoring of contractors.

To the GoA:

• Relevant government ministries and departmentsneed to show a greater understanding of civmilrelations, its rationale and impact, at policy andimplementation levels.

• There also needs to be increased understandingin government of how its policies – both formaland informal – on relations with PRTs and othermilitary actors, impact on humanitarian accessand NGO operations. The government hasobligations under IHL to facilitate the provision ofhumanitarian assistance to populations in need.This responsibility is partly shaped throughgovernment engagement in civmil relations.

• The government must recognise, acknowledgeand support the role of NGOs in nationalprogrammes and service delivery. While this mayhave security implications where NGOs are seenas government partners, hostile remarks fromgovernment figures can also impact on NGOacceptance and security.

• Policymakers must also move away from modelswhich equate good governance with government‘presence’, and by extension with infrastructure,projects and services, and place greater emphasison addressing governance and political issuesrelated to conflict resolution at local and nationallevels.

To donors:

• Donors should limit the channelling of fundingthrough military operations, due to concernsregarding their implications for safety of

implementing agencies and beneficiaries and aideffectiveness, and emphasise civilian channels. Indoing so, donors should note Afghan preferencefor multi-year programmes with a long-term,sustainable impact.

• Donors should also review and carefully evaluatetheir use of private sector contractors, who oftenwork in consortia with local contractors andprivate security companies, to address concernsabout aid effectiveness and the perceptionamongst many Afghans that aid is diverted bycorrupt contractors.

• Donors should move away from policy models inwhich government ‘presence’ is equated withvery basic infrastructure, projects and services.Instead, greater attention needs to be focusedon addressing the political challenges related togovernance and conflict resolution at local andnational levels.

• International donors should take moreresponsibility in fostering the sustainabledevelopment of national and local NGOs. In thepush to implement ‘quick win’ developmentprojects in insecure areas, current short-termistfunding trends are instrumentalising local NGOs,without paying adequate attention to issues oforganisational development, policy engagement,safety and security management, AND humanresource development.

• Donors should invest in initiatives which promotecross-cultural interpretation of humanitarianprinciples, which are critical to elicitingmeaningful engagement of ordinary Afghans incivmil relations.

• Donor conditions regarding the visibility of thedonor’s nationality for a given programme (e.g.having signs, stickers and logos) should berevised in insecure. These visibility requirementscan create security incidents for INGOs andANGOs alike.

• Donor nations should be sensitive in their publicdiplomacy efforts regarding assistance ‘successstories’ in Afghanistan. There is anecdotalevidence that AOGs continuously monitor theinternational media and react to what they find.


Such stipulations should be reviewed based onthe local security context.

• Transparent spending is crucial to avoid furthercynicism and hostility from Afghans, who followfunding very closely. All actors should exploretransparent, community-based monitoring andauditing structures, to help communities andtheir leaders control resource transfers. This willalso help ensure good impact and preventassistance from becoming divisive.

To Afghan civil society:

• Afghan civil society should build on widerinternational efforts by humanitarian agencies towork with Muslim scholars and communityrepresentatives to interpret humanitarianprinciples within an Islamic framework.

• The Afghan media should disseminate suchinformation to engender greater understandingand ownership of these principles, which can thencontribute to improved humanitarian access.

• Civil society must work with others to create asafe space for ordinary people to voicecomplaints on issues such as civilian casualtiesand the misdemeanours of internaitonal militaryforces on the ground.


International Interviewees

• INGO staff, Kabul

• INGO staff, national offices and networks

• ISAF HQ civilian staff

• ISAF HQ military staff

• ISAF PRT military staff

• Members of diplomatic community, Kabuland UK

• International research institution staff

• British Red Cross staff

• ICRC staff

• UN staff, Afghanistan and HQ

• Interntaional donor agency staff, field-based

• International donor agency staff Kabul

• Staff, international research and academicinstitutions

• Ministry of Defence staff, various Europeancountries

• Staff, CIMIC Centre of Excellence

• Staff, UK Stabilisation Unit

• NATO staff

• Individuals encountered at variety of civmilcourses and workshops

Afghan Interviewees

• ANGO staff Gardez

• ANGO staff Uruzgan

• Afgan INGO staff Gardez

• ANGO directors Kabul

• GoA civil servants, Kabul

• GoA civil servants, Uruzgan

• GoA civil servants, Paktia

• ISAF PRT civilian staff

• Tribal leaders, Uruzgan

• Tribal leaders, Paktia

• Religious leaders, Uruzgan

• Religious leaders, Paktia

• Media groups, Paktia

• Media groups, Kabul

• IO staff, Uruzgan

• CDC heads, Uruzgan

• Contractors, Uruzgan

• AIHRC staff, Kabul

• Parliamentary staff, Kabul

Annex 1 – Interviewees

A full list of international interviewees is available from BAAG. A list of Afghan intervieweesis not available as for the most part they requested anonymity.

| 83

Ministry of Interior Affairs General Directorate of ( )

To all provinces governors, Regional commandersand provincial police chiefs:

Based on His Excellency the President of the Islamicrepublic of Afghanistan, all the governors, provincialpolice chiefs and regional commanders are orderedto prevent from going to the PRTs and otherinternational agencies. If it is a requirement, theyneed to schedule an appointment and invite them tothe governmental office and coordinate thesolutions of the interested issues.

Formal invitations and special occasions areconsidered as exceptions in this order.

Zarar Ahmad

Minister of Interior

Annex 2 - Ministry of Interior Directive Related to PRTs


• Aaronson, M. (2007) A Holistic Approach to theWar on Terror?www.sant.ox.ac.uk/areastudies/Aaronson_Paper_10_May_2007.pdf

• Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief(ACBAR) (July 2003) Provincial ReconstructionTeams and the Security Situation in AfghanistanPolicy Brief (Kabul)

• Allied Joint Operations (September 2002) CIMICin Joint Operations: Why Should the MilitaryBother Engaging with NGOs/IOs? AJP-3

• Amnesty International (March 2003) Afghanistan:Police Reconstruction Essential for theProtection of Human Rights

• Barker, Paul (November 2004) Why PRTs Aren’tthe Answer? Institute for War and PeaceReporting

• Barry, J. with A. Jefferys (2002) A Bridge TooFar: Aid Agencies and the Military inHumanitarian Response, Network Paper 37 ofthe Humanitarian Practice Network (London:ODI)

• Bessler, M. (2003) Civil-Military Relationship inComplex Emergencies Discussion Paper

• Bhatia, Michael, Jonathan Goodhand et al.(2003) Profits and Poverty: Aid, Livelihoods andConflict in Afghanistan HPG Background Paper(London: ODI)

• Bhatia, Michael, K. Lanigan and P. Wilkinson(June 2004) Minimal Investments, MinimalResults: The Failure of Security Policy inAfghanistan AREU Briefing Paper

• CARE (2003) A New Year’s Resolution to Keep:Secure a Lasting Peace in AfghanistanInternational Policy Brief, January 2003

• DANIDA (2006) Review of Civil-Military Activitiesin Afghanistan Financed by the Danish Ministryof Foreign Affairs, Final Report

• de Torrenté, N. (2002) The War on Terror’sChallenge to Humanitarian Action, A version ofthis article appears in Ethics and International

Affairs, Vol. 16, no. 2, Autumn 2002, CarnegieCouncil on Ethics and International Affairs

• Donini, A. (2004) An Elusive Quest: Integrationin the Response to the Afghan Crisis Ethics &International Affairs, 18, no. 2

• Donini, A., Larry Minnear et al. (June 2006),Humanitarian Agenda 2015: Principles, Powerand Perceptions, Afghanistan Country Study,Feinstein International Center

• Dziedzic M, and M. Seidl (September 2005),Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Militaryrelations with International and NonGovernmental Organisations in AfghanistanUSIP Special Report 147

• Eide, E.B. et al. (May 2005) Report onIntegrated Missions: Practical Perspectives andRecommendations, Independent Study for theExpanded UN ECHA Core Group

• Evaluation: Humanitarian and ReconstructionAssistance to Afghanistan 2001-2005 A jointEvaluation from Denmark, Ireland, TheNetherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom,Third World Quarterly, Vol 23, No 5, pp861–874, 2005

• Frerks, G. et al. (May 2006), Principles andPragmatism: Civil Military Action in Afghanistanand Liberia, Cordaidwww.cordaid.nl/Upload/publicatie/RAPPORT%20CMR.pdf

• Giustozzi, A. (October 2004) Good’ State vs.‘Bad’ Warlords? A Critique of State-BuildingStrategies in Afghanistan Working Paper No. 51,(LSE Crisis States Programme)

• Gordon, S. (June 2005) The Changing Role ofthe Military in Assistance Strategies, Papercommissioned by HPG, ODI

• Gostelow, L. and G. McHugh (2004) ProvincialReconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-MilitaryRelations in Afghanistan, Save the Children UK

• Gundel, J. (Sept 2006) Humanitarian Action inthe New Security Environment: Policy and

Annex 3 - Bibliography

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