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TRANSCRIPT
AFGHANISTAN
COUNTRY PROCUREMENT ASSESSMENT:
CONSULTING SERVICES
June 2007
Procurement Services Unit
South Asia Region
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the
performance of their official duties. Its contents may not be otherwise disclosed
without World Bank authorization.
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ABA Afghan Builders Association
ADB Asian Development Bank
AICC Afghanistan International Chamber of
Commerce
AISA Afghanistan Investment Support
Agency
ARDS Afghanistan Reconstruction and
Development Services
ARDS PU Afghanistan Reconstruction and
Development Services Procurement
Unit
ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers
Bank The World Bank
CEU Contract Evaluation Unit
CMO Contract Management Office
CPIA Country Policy and Institutional
Performance Assessment
CQS Selection Based on the Consultants’
Qualification
CSC Civil Service Commission
DFID UK Department for International
Development
EC Evaluation Committee
EoI Expression of Interest
EPAP Emergency Public Administration
Project I and II (World Bank)
FBS Fixed Budget Selection
FTP Full Technical Proposal
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GoA Government of Afghanistan
GTZ Gesellschaft fuer Technische
Zusammenarbeit (German Development
Agency)
IDA International Development Association
IRS Internationally Recruited Staff
LCS Least Cost Selection
LICUS Low-Income Countries Under Stress
LM Line Ministry
LRS Locally Recruited Staff
MoE Ministry of Economy
MoEW Ministry of Energy and Water
MoF Ministry of Finance
MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoLSA Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
MQS Minimum Qualifying Score
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NO No Objection
NSP National Solidarity Program
ODA Official Development Assistance
PA Public Administration
PACBP Public Administration Capacity
Building Project
PC Procurement Consultant
PDT Peace Dividend Trust (NGO)
PLO Procurement Liaison Officer
PMU Project Management Unit
PPL Public Procurement Law
PPU Procurement Policy Unit (within the
MoF)
PR Rules of Procedure for Public
Procurement in Afghanistan
PRR Priority Reform & Restructuring
Framework
PRP Procurement Reform Program
PU Procurement Unit (within ARDS)
QBS Quality-Based Selection
QCBS Quality- and Cost-Based Selection
RFP Request for Proposals
SPC Special Procurement Commission
SRFP Standard Request for Proposal
SSS Single-Source Selection
STP Simplified Technical Proposal
ToR Terms of Reference
TSU Technical Support Unit
TTL Bank Task Team Leader
UNDP UN Development Programme
Guidelines 2004 Bank Guidelines on the Selection
and Employment of Consultants by
World Bank Borrowers
Vice President : Praful C. Patel
Country Director : Alastair J. Mckechnie
Sector Director : Barbara Kafka
Sector Manager : Els Hinderdael-Forger
Task Team Leader : Shawkat M.Quamrul Hasan
PREFACE ...................................................................................................................................................................II
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................................... III
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................................... 1
COUNTRY ECONOMIC BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................ 1 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT .......................................................................................................... 1 SECURITY SITUATION ................................................................................................................................................ 1 CONSULTING SERVICES IN AFGHANISTAN ................................................................................................................. 2 PAST DEVELOPMENTS AND TA IN THE AREA OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT .................................................................. 2 OBJECTIVES AND EXECUTION OF ASSESSMENT ......................................................................................................... 3
FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................................... 4
BANK POLICY ON SELECTION OF CONSULTANTS ....................................................................................................... 4 The Bank’s Response to Crises, Emergencies and Fragile States ....................................................................... 4 Weighing QBS against QCBS .............................................................................................................................. 5
GOA POLICY ON CONSULTANTS ................................................................................................................................ 5 LEGAL AND REGULATORY PROCUREMENT FRAMEWORK .......................................................................................... 6
The New Public Procurement Law ...................................................................................................................... 6 Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement ........................................................................................................ 6 Recommendations to Improve the Legal and Regulatory Framework ................................................................. 8
AFGHAN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK & ORGANIZATION OF PROCUREMENT .......................................................... 8 ARDS Procurement Unit ...................................................................................................................................... 8 Line Ministries ..................................................................................................................................................... 9 Procurement Policy Unit ................................................................................................................................... 10 Special Procurement Commission ..................................................................................................................... 10 Contract Management Office ............................................................................................................................. 10 Appeal and Complaint Mechanisms ................................................................................................................... 11 Professional Consulting Associations ................................................................................................................ 11 Recommendations to Improve the Institutional Framework .............................................................................. 11
AFGHAN PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES .......................................................................................... 11 Available Procurement Manuals or Guidelines ................................................................................................. 11 Availability of Standard Request for Proposals ................................................................................................. 11 Recommendations to Improve Procedures & Practices ..................................................................................... 11
BANK PROCUREMENT CAPACITY ............................................................................................................................. 11 PA PROCUREMENT CAPACITY ................................................................................................................................. 12
Procurement Capacity of PC within ARDS ........................................................................................................ 12 Previous and Ongoing Capacity Building and Training .................................................................................... 12 Capacity within Line Ministries - Key Constraints and Challenges .................................................................. 13 Procurement Capacity in Provinces and Districts ............................................................................................. 13
CAPACITY-BUILDING APPROACH BY PACBP AND PRP .......................................................................................... 13 RISKS WITHIN CAPACITY-BUILDING APPROACH BY PACBP AND PRP .................................................................... 14
Efficient Selection of Consultants ...................................................................................................................... 14 Development of National Consultants................................................................................................................ 14 Capacity Building of the PA ............................................................................................................................... 15 Recommendations .............................................................................................................................................. 15
CORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY IN PROCUREMENT OF CONSULTANTS ........................................................................ 16 Steps to be taken by Government ....................................................................................................................... 17 Steps to be taken by the Donor Community ....................................................................................................... 17
PUBLIC SECTOR DEMAND FOR CONSULTING SERVICES ........................................................................................... 17
Domestically Funded Demand ........................................................................................................................... 17 Consulting Services Funded by the Bank ........................................................................................................... 18
INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY OF CONSULTING SERVICES .............................................................................................. 19 International Participation ................................................................................................................................ 19 Performance on Consulting Service Contracts .................................................................................................. 20 Remuneration Levels .......................................................................................................................................... 20 Recommendations .............................................................................................................................................. 20
DOMESTIC SUPPLY OF CONSULTING SERVICES ........................................................................................................ 21 The Local Consulting Sector .............................................................................................................................. 21 Main Areas of Expertise ..................................................................................................................................... 21 Performance on Public Contracts and Remuneration Levels ............................................................................ 22 Capacity Assessment of Afghan Consultancies .................................................................................................. 22 Developing Capacity of the Domestic Consulting Sector .................................................................................. 23 Overcoming the Information Gap on Consultants ............................................................................................. 24 Recommendations .............................................................................................................................................. 24
RISK ASSESSMENT ................................................................................................................................................... 25
ANNEX 1: LIST OF PERSONS MET ............................................................................................................................ 26 ANNEX 2: DETAILS OF GOA-FUNDED CONSULTING CONTRACTS SINCE DECEMBER 2004 ....................................... 29 ANNEX 3: BANK-FUNDED CONSULTING ASSIGNMENTS, 2003-2006 ........................................................................ 30 ANNEX 4: ASSESSMENT OF 10 BANK-FUNDED CONSULTING ASSIGNMENTS ON EOI & SUBMISSION RATES ............ 36 ANNEX 5: ASSESSMENT OF 12 BANK-FUNDED CONSULTING ASSIGNMENTS ON BILLING RATES ............................. 37
PREFACE
This report was prepared by Martin Ehrenberg (Consultant, SARPS), who visited Kabul,
Afghanistan from November 21 to December 3, 2006. It builds on the findings and
recommendations arising from the 2005 World Bank assessment, Public Procurement for
Development Effectiveness, prepared by Quamrul Hasan (SARPS) and Peter Trepte (Consultant
SARPS), part of a larger Bank review of public finance in Afghanistan.1
During the mission, meetings were held with government agencies’ staff, international
consultancies currently implementing donor-financed projects in Afghanistan, academic
institutions, private sector firms (in particular Afghan consultancies), non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), associations, and with the resident missions of the European Commission,
GTZ, ADB, and DFID.
The assessment involved extensive interactions with Government agencies, whose valuable
cooperation was indispensable and also greatly beneficial. Deepal Fernando, Senior Procurement
Specialist, and Nargis Hakimy, Program Assistant (Procurement) in the Bank’s Country Office,
provided very valuable support, advice and background information. Mariam Sherman, Acting
Country Manager in Afghanistan, offered advice and guidance in the country throughout the
mission. The list of persons met may be found in Annex 1.
This work was carried out with guidance and supervision from Gian Casartelli (OPCPR), who
extensively reviewed the report and provided many recommendations, and Quamrul Hasan
(SARPS). Overall leadership was provided by Els Hinderdael (Regional Procurement Manager,
SARPS).
Ludmilla Butenko (SAC01), Nancy Zhao (SAROQ), Paul Sisk (SARFM), Devesh Mishra
(ECSPS), Joel A. Turkewitz (SARPS), and Nagaraju Duthaluri (SARPS) reviewed the report and
provided insightful comments.
1 “Afghanistan – Managing Public Finances for Development”, Volume II: Improving Public Financial Management
and Procurement, December 22, 2005, World Bank Report No. 34582-AF.
AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY PROCUREMENT ASSESSMENT:
CONSULTING SERVICES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Afghanistan is striving to emerge from a prolonged period of military occupation, wars
and the Taliban rule. The country’s security situation remains critical, especially outside of
Kabul, yet the economy is stable and continues to grow. In the reconstruction process the country
is receiving extensive donor support.
2. Taking into consideration the World Bank’s country assistance strategy, this report
examines whether Afghanistan’s Public Administration (PA) has access to the services it needs
from international and national consultants under Bank and Afghan procurement rules. Both, the
Bank’s selection procedures and the Government’s (GoA) policy, laws, rules of procedure, and
practices are examined to determine whether they (1) lead to efficient consulting contract awards
and (2) support the development of local consulting firms. The demand and supply of
international and domestic consulting services are assessed. In addition, this assessment
identifies the key constraints that hamper the evolution of the domestic consulting sector.
3. Suggestions are provided on what the GoA and the Bank could do to create an
environment suitable for (1) qualified international consultants; and (2) the development of
sustainable local consulting capacity necessary to help Afghanistan to implement its reform
programs.
SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS
4. Apart from the security situation, the capacity to enforce legislative reforms and the
effectiveness of the PA remain critical at all levels of government and also affect the selection
and use of consulting services. The key challenges to an efficient selection of consultants are:
5. Limited access to qualified consultants: Based on an assessment of Bank-funded
assignments from the years 2005 – 2007 the average number of proposals submitted per
assignment by international consultants is only about 2.5, of which just 2.1 are awarded a score
above the Minimum Qualifying Score (MQS). According to interviews conducted by the
mission, international consultants do not have sufficient incentives for seeking assignments in
the country. Many firms refrain from participating due to security concerns for their personnel.
Lack of trust in the capacity of the PA also discourages their participation. The entry costs
required to set up and conduct business in Afghanistan are very high. At present, those firms
willing to work in Afghanistan are reluctant to send qualified and experienced staff to
Afghanistan. As a consequence, the quality of the services obtained is often questionable.
6. A local consulting sector barely exists yet. Only a few local firms have evolved over the
past five years. Their main constraints are lack of qualifications and experience and limited
familiarity with procurement processes. As a result domestic firms, if they participate at all,
frequently fail to meet qualification criteria set by the Bank or the GoA. Lack of trust in the
fairness and the transparency of procurement handled by the PA also discourages their
participation.
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Executive Summary page iv
7. Weak procurement capacity: Procurement staff has limited familiarity with basic
principles of procurement and with the stages of the procurement process. In particular, the
executing agencies have difficulty in (1) drafting ToR; (2) organizing and conducting
evaluations; and (3) evaluating the quality of Expressions of Interest (EoIs) and proposals. Once
the consulting firms are selected, supervision and management of the consultants are weak.
8. Weak English and IT skills: The low level or absence of English and IT skills is
hindering capacity-building efforts. International and national procurement personnel are facing
serious problems in interacting with local staff. The work of local translators sometimes creates
confusion instead of facilitating communication.
9. GoA legal and regulatory framework: While the new Public Procurement Law (PPL)
adopted in October 2005 has considerably improved the legal basis of public procurement, it
lacks (1) the necessary foundation of a clearly stated policy on consultants; and (2) a chapter
devoted solely to consultants’ selection. In addition, the Procurement Policy Unit drafted Rules
of Procedure for Public Procurement in Afghanistan which became effective on April 12, 2007.
While these procurement rules provide sound guidance through the process of consultants’
selection and contain appropriate provisions on enforcing transparency, fair competition and the
administrative review of procurement proceedings, they still have several shortcomings
concerning the procurement of consultants. For example, the rules lack (1) simplified procedures
such as the use of Simplified Technical Proposals (STP); (2) provisions on the continuation of
assignments subject to satisfactory performance of the incumbent; and (3) necessary details on
the selection process such as the weight allocated to price under Quality- And Cost-Based
Selection (QCBS) or indicative weights for evaluation criteria. In addition, their complex
structure will make it difficult for PA staff to understand and apply the rules of procedure on
procurement. Supporting documents such as the Standard RFP and procurement manuals are not
yet available.
THE BANK’S CURRENT STRATEGY
10. The ongoing four-year Bank-funded Public Administration Capacity Building Project
(PACBP) that started in 2005 is addressing these key challenges through three main procurement
subcomponents:
Subcomponent 1: Technical Assistance on procurement facilitation;
Subcomponent 2: Capacity building of Borrower’s procurement staff; and
Subcomponent 3: Legal and institutional framework development.
Under subcomponent 1 the Afghan PA currently draws on advisory services of an international
Procurement Consultant (PC) to facilitate and assist international and domestic procurement
processes. Further support for capacity building (subcomponent 2) and for the completion of the
legal and regulatory framework for procurement (subcomponent 3) is included in the Bank-
funded Procurement Reform Program: Procurement Capacity Building and Legal & Institutional
Framework Development (PRP) that started on 17 March 2007.
KEY RISKS
11. This report finds three risks that might affect the strategy defined by PACBP and its
related PRP, in the areas of consultant selection, development of national consultants, and
capacity building for the PA.
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Executive Summary page v
Efficient Selection of Consultants
12. Since it is a priority for reconstruction that the Afghan PA be reestablished, the Bank
projects focus on building basic procurement capacity. The PACBP provides training to a limited
number of key staff while the PRP includes a broad program for hundreds of trainees from all
levels of government. However, due to PACBP’s limited outreach and PRP’s broad focus,
training will only concentrate on basic subjects. In particular, PA staff will not receive training
on consultant selection tasks, such as preparing ToR and assessing the quality of proposals.
While specialized capacity building may be too much to expect at this stage, many parties
interviewed expressed concerns about the credibility of the selection process given current
deficiencies in the performance of these tasks. The same PA officials who have trouble drafting
ToR then later are responsible for evaluating the proposals. Given this critical gap and the
reluctance of consultants to seek assignments in Afghanistan, it is reasonable to conclude that the
PA needs further support in evaluating proposals.
Development of National Consultants
13. The PRP includes basic training courses for local firms which will focus on (1) creating
awareness about the new Public Procurement Law; and (2) procurement procedures for goods,
works and consulting services. However, the following issues also need to be addressed:
(1) The GoA and Bank’s procurement procedures do not sufficiently take into account the
technical and administrative weakness of the PA and the local consulting firms and apply
complex standard procurement methods where simplified ones are needed.
(2) Neither PA nor donors have adequate information on locally available expertise and are
facing difficulty identifying the few available local resources.
Capacity Building of the PA
14. While the PRP provides for a comprehensive capacity-building approach, its
effectiveness may face serious challenges since interaction between international and national
procurement staff is hindered by language barriers, unfamiliarity of nationals with IT systems
and the lack of qualified translators. In addition, the training program could be compromised by
the small number of local staff trainable in the complex procurement processes required by Bank
or GoA regulations. Experienced PA staff is often poached by donor agencies and NGOs and the
lack of qualified counterpart personnel in the Afghan PA often renders on the job training
impossible. When counterpart staff is available low motivation due to low pay and limited
opportunity for merit based promotion undermine the knowledge transfer.
SUMMARY OF MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS
Key Recommendations to the Government of Afghanistan
R1: The GoA may consider developing a comprehensive policy paper on professional and
expert consultants to meet the specific needs of the PA and to encourage the creation of local
consulting firms. The 2005 Public Procurement Law only reflects basic policy principles for
selection of consultants while the new ‘Rules of Procedures’ provide the principles and
procedures of consulting services in details. The GoA should explore the possibility of
improving the pertinent rules of procedures depending on the changes in the country
circumstances. Once ministries have clearly defined their mandates and their respective
functions, a review of the range of services that local consulting firms could provide to the PA
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Executive Summary page vi
should be performed to decide which functions could be outsourced to local consultants.
Drawing on experience with present Bank-funded public administration reform programs and its
recommendations on HR planning and management, the policy should also address capacity
building of PA staff through training and incentives.
R2: The GoA should consider reviewing the procurement rules of procedure’s provisions on
consultants’ selection in light of the special situation in Afghanistan. Since both the PA and local
consulting sector are weak, the use of Simplified Technical Proposals (STP) should be
considered for routine assignments designed to attract local attention. The regulation should also
provide for the continuation of assignments subject to satisfactory performance and necessary
details on the selection process such as the weight allocated to price under Quality- And Cost-
Based Selection (QCBS) or indicative weights for evaluation criteria. The consultants
implementing the PRP could provide advice on the revision of the procurement rules of
procedure.
R3: The PA is still a long way away from being able to efficiently select consultants. The
GoA (with support from the Bank) should therefore consider assigning reputable consulting
firms with strong procurement expertise in the field of the specific projects to the task of
conducting proposal evaluations under major Bank-funded projects in close cooperation with the
PA. The same consultants could also be entrusted with the quality and administrative control of
the contracts and with building capacity. In particular, Bank-funded projects that cannot rely on
the support of internationally staffed Project Management Units (PMUs) or Technical Support
Units (TSUs) should benefit from this approach. For smaller Bank-funded projects, specialized
individual consultants should be assigned to Evaluation Committees.
R4: Since Afghan consultancies can best develop their capacity through associations with
international firms, the Requests for Proposals (RFP) and the Terms of Reference (ToR) for
internationally competed assignments funded by the GoA should clearly identify, whenever
possible and feasible, those components that can be executed by local consultants. In case no
competent Afghan consultancies exist, the tender documents should clearly require from
international firms to transfer skills and know-how to local individual advisors. Once these
individual consultants were involved in internationally executed projects and developed their
capacity under the supervision of experienced international consultants, they would be in a
position to establish their own consulting companies.
R5: Since international consultants and PA staff are having difficulty interacting effectively,
the GoA (with Bank support) may consider conducting a study on local translator training
centers and implementing a training program for translators. It is also recommended to raise the
level of English and IT skills of national procurement staff. Therefore, the GoA may consider
developing and implementing training modules for procurement staff in the area of English, IT
and computer skills.
Key Recommendations to the Bank
R6: For Bank-funded projects that are too small to justify the use of international consulting
firms as under Recommendation 3 (R3), the Bank should encourage Bank staff to more actively
support the weakest counterpart agencies. Bank specialists in the required areas should
extensively review and also provide input to draft ToR regarding objectives, components,
activities, milestones, and evaluation indicators. Common weaknesses in TA projects such as the
fragmentation into small assignments of short duration, inadequate monitoring or the disregard
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Executive Summary page vii
of local circumstances should be avoided by better procurement planning, and effective
supervision.
R7: Since continuity is essential for successful capacity building, but international
participation is low and entry costs for international firms are very high in Afghanistan, the Bank
should consider including a provision for continuation of work by the same consultant under
Single-Source Selection (SSS) in the initial RFPs whenever justified by the characteristics and
the circumstances of the projects.
R8: Mirroring Recommendation 4 to the GoA (R4), the Bank should (1) provide incentives
for local participation by encouraging international and local firms to form partnerships and
associations whenever feasible; and (2) require from international firms to transfer skills and
know-how to local individual advisors.
R9: When drafting ToR, the security situation should be taken into account. Especially when
the services are not related to capacity-building activities that need to take place locally, the ToR
should provide for international consultants to perform services from outside the country to the
greatest extent possible.
R10: For consultants’ selections under Bank rules and conducted by the PA, the following
precautions are recommended: (1) Quality-Based Selection (QBS) and Fixed Budget Selection
(FBS) should be applied to standard assignments; (2) QCBS should only apply when clearly
justified by the nature of the ToR; and (3) Simplified Technical Proposals (STPs) should be used
as much as possible. Information on local consulting firms already made available by other
stakeholders such as the NGO Peace Dividend Trust should be disseminated to the Bank’s staff
and TTLs. Whenever possible and feasible local firms should be considered for small
assignments generally procured under SSS.
R11: To facilitate the preparation of projects and procurement plans, the Bank should consider
requesting the Procurement Consultant to improve the quality of its monthly progress report by
including data on the participation of international and national consulting firms such as (1)
average number of EoI, size of shortlists, proposals submitted; (2) countries of origin of short-
listed, responsive and winning firms and their categories (NGOs, consultancies, government
agencies, etc.); (3) average billing rates; (4) number and nature of assignments for which the
ToR require the participation of national firms; (5) nature of assignments limited to national
participation; and (6) number and nature of assignments in which local firms are associated with
international firms. Alternatively, the Procurement Consultant could be requested to prepare an
annual report focusing on the points described above and complementing the monthly progress
reports.
R12: Finally, the Bank could also consider cooperating with two stakeholders already
providing support and training to local consulting firms. The Bank’s PRP could (1) draw on the
experience of the NGO Peace Dividend Trust on training courses in procurement for local
companies; and (2) collaborate with the Engineering Capacity Building Project for local
consulting engineering companies implemented by the American Society of Civil Engineers
(ASCE).
AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY PROCUREMENT ASSESSMENT:
CONSULTING SERVICES
Introduction
Country Economic Background
1. Afghanistan is striving to emerge from a prolonged period of military occupation, wars
and the Taliban rule and remains one of the world’s poorest countries with an estimated per
capita GDP of only US$355 in 2006/07.2 The country’s security situation remains critical,
especially outside of Kabul, yet in recent years the economy has continued to grow in this
volatile political, economic and security environment. Real GDP for 2006/07 is estimated at
US$8.88 billion and projected to grow by 11% in 2007/08 (excluding opium production). The
macroeconomic environment has been stable and inflation returned to a moderate level in
2005/06 (approx. 5%).
Public and Private Sector Development
2. Starting in 2002, the GoA has introduced a number of structural reforms. A new Income
Tax Law, a revised Customs Code, a modern Public Finance and Expenditure Management Law,
a strengthened Procurement Law, Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement, a new Civil
Service Law, and a revised Law on Foreign and Domestic Investment are in place. Fiduciary
standards have been strengthened and administrative reforms have been undertaken. The GoA is
committed to fiscal discipline but fiscal sustainability remains a challenge. In 2004/05, total
public expenditures amounted to US$3.4 billion, of which only US$0.9 billion was implemented
by the GoA. Revenue mobilization remains low at 5.5 percent of GDP in 2005/06, one of the
lowest ratios in the world, and domestic revenues cover only half of total operating expenditures
in the Government’s core budget. Almost all public sector consulting services contracts are
externally funded. Continued progress in reform of Afghanistan’s Public Administration (PA)
and the rule of law are critical for progress, but PA capacity is still very limited.
3. Achievements in private sector development include the establishment of the Afghanistan
Investment Support Agency (AISA) as a one-stop shop to register firms,3 approval of a Banking
law, licensing of more than a dozen commercial banks, and creation of an Industrial Park
Authority.
Security Situation
4. Apart from challenges of education, health, and infrastructure, the lack of security is the
main obstacle to Afghanistan's reconstruction program. The country has not yet fully emerged
from its state of conflict and the security situation in the country has deteriorated since April
2004. Even major NGOs are reluctant to send their national staff to the provinces where conflict
is ongoing. International experts avoid travel within the country, and when they do, they either
keep a low profile or hire extensive and costly security support. As a result, studies and reports
2 See Bank document “Interim Strategy Note Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for the Period FY07-FY08” (February
2007), p. 6, Table 1: Macroeconomic Indicators. 3 Afghanistan is ranked 17 out of 175 countries for ease in starting a business according to the Bank’s Doing
Business Report 2007.
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 2 of 37
are frequently based on old data since visiting missions in dangerous provinces are rarely
feasible. Compared to the provinces where the conflict is ongoing the security situation in Kabul
is relatively stable. However, attacks on international staff, threat warnings, and seizure of
explosives are common. Risks related to security lead to a low level of interest from potential
bidders, higher costs and/or delays in assignment execution. The security situation is not likely to
change in the medium term and will limit operational activities while requiring substantial
security expenses.
Consulting Services in Afghanistan
5. Traditionally, most technical departments of the PA covered in-house their limited needs
for planning, research, studies, designs, and supervision services. However, nearly 30 years of
unrest reduced Afghanistan to political and economic ruin. The process of political
reconstruction following the end of the Taliban regime in 2001 has had barely any significant
impact on the creation of a domestic consulting service sector as yet.
6. One of the most dramatic consequences of decades of turmoil was the loss of knowledge
capital as the majority of skilled labor left the country. Young and qualified professionals,
mainly educated in Pakistan, prefer to pursue careers outside Afghanistan. The risky operating
environment in Afghanistan is also reducing the incentive for qualified foreign consultants to
undertake assignments in the country.
7. While extensive donor support could encourage local consultancies to emerge, the
exodus of local capacity is still seriously hampering their development. The lack of basic
professional management, English language and IT skills prevents domestic firms from emerging
and participating in development projects. At present the local consultancy market is very small.
The domestic supply of consulting services is discussed in detail below (paras. 69 ff).
Past Developments and TA in the Area of Public Procurement
8. Steps to improve the Afghan procurement environment were initiated under the First and
Second Emergency Public Administration Projects (EPAP I and II) funded by the Bank starting
in 2002. Under the Procurement Strengthening Component of the EPAP I, the Government
appointed a consulting firm as the PA’s central Procurement Consultant (PC) responsible for
handling procurement operations under IDA and other donor-funded aid within the Procurement
Unit (PU) of the Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development Services (ARDS).4 The purpose
was to put in place emergency procurement capacity and to facilitate rapid and transparent
utilization of donor resources for reconstruction.
9. A progress review conducted in January 2004 identified key constraints in achieving
EPAP I and EPAP II’s objectives and recommended further actions to be addressed by the Bank-
funded Public Administration Capacity Building Project (PACBP), being implemented May
2005 – June 2009. Additional consulting services to be provided under the procurement
component of PACBP were approved in 2004 and can be grouped into three main categories:
Procurement services (subcomponent 1);
Technical assistance on capacity building (subcomponent 2); and
Legal and regulatory framework development (subcomponent 3).
4 The PC provided procurement services to the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA) until the AACA
was dissolved in September 2003 and the AACA unit responsible for procurement was renamed ARDS.
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 3 of 37
The procurement support services (subcomponent 1) are provided by the PC (currently RITES
Ltd. from India) within ARDS.5 This assignment includes capacity building of local procurement
counterpart staff to be trained as Procurement Liaison Officers (PLOs).
10. Based on recommendations of the 2005 Bank assessment, Public Procurement for
Development Effectiveness,6 the following tasks were accomplished:
A Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) within the Ministry of Finance (MoF) was
established in August 2006; and
Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement to implement the new Public
Procurement Law (PPL) were prepared by the PPU and became effective on April
12, 2007.
11. The international consulting firm responsible for implementing the most recent relevant
assignment, the Procurement Reform Program: Procurement Capacity Building and Legal &
Institutional Framework Development (PRP), commenced work on March 17, 2007.7 The
objectives of this assignment cover the subcomponents 2 (capacity building) and 3 (legal and
regulatory framework development) of PACBP and are:
To develop local procurement capacity within Line Ministries (LMs) and to
enable them to progressively carry out procurement;
To train the PA and as far as practicable the private sector in procurement
procedures and practices under the new Public Procurement Law (PPL); and
To develop procedures under the national law and to provide further support to
the PPU.
Objectives and Execution of Assessment
12. Taking into consideration the Bank’s country assistance strategy, this report examines
whether Afghanistan’s PA has access to the services it needs from international and national
consultants under Bank and Afghan procurement regulations. It is based on a mission that visited
Afghanistan from November 21 to December 3, 2006; due to the security situation in
Afghanistan and travel restrictions, the mission was limited to Kabul. The mission met with
government agencies’ staff, international consultancies currently implementing donor-financed
projects in Afghanistan, academic institutions, the private sector firms (in particular Afghan
consultancies), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), associations, and with the resident
missions of the European Commission, GTZ, ADB, and DFID (the list of persons met is attached
to the report as Annex 1).
13. The report investigates both the capacity and competence of the purchaser (PA) and also
the ability of suppliers (consulting firms) to provide the required services. The Bank’s selection
procedures and the Government’s (GoA) policy, laws, rules of procedure, and practices are
5 Crown Agents from UK performed the role of the Procurement Consultant (PC) from August 2002 until August
2004. The consulting service contract with their successor RITES from India was signed in September 2004. 6 Part II (p. 52 – 79, prepared by Quamrul Hasan, SARPS, and Peter Trepte, Consultant) of Volume II: “Improving
Public Financial Management and Procurement”, World Bank Report No. 34582-AF: “Afghanistan – Managing
Public Finances for Development (In Five Volumes)”, December 22, 2005. 7 Charles Kendell & Partners Ltd./UK in association with the International Development Law Organization/Italy
(IDLO) and the Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply/UK (CIPS).
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 4 of 37
examined to determine whether they (1) lead to efficient consulting contract awards8 and (2)
support the development of local consulting firms. The demand and the supply of international
and domestic consulting services are assessed. In addition, this assessment identifies the risks
concerning the current Bank capacity-building strategy and the key constraints that hamper the
evolution of the domestic consulting sector.
14. Suggestions are provided on what the GoA and the Bank could do to create an
environment suitable for (1) qualified international consultants and (2) the development of
sustainable local consulting capacity necessary to help Afghanistan to implement its reform
programs.
Findings & Recommendations
Bank Policy on Selection of Consultants
The Bank’s Response to Crises, Emergencies and Fragile States
15. Bank Task Team Leaders (TTLs) interviewed for this report stressed the need to flexibly
apply the 2004 Bank Guidelines on Selection and Employment of Consultants in Afghanistan due
to the weak national institutions and the high risk of conflict. However, neither the Bank’s
approach to Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS), of which Afghanistan is a severe
case, nor its response to crises or emergencies allow for disregarding the Guidelines. The Bank’s
approach to LICUS only suggests outsourcing procurement functions in post-conflict
environments.9 The Bank’s rapid response to crises and emergencies is designed to facilitate the
Bank’s rapid response to emergencies and is limited to the immediate aftermath until regular
procurement procedures can be used without comprising the timely delivery of assistance.10
16. Nonetheless, the Bank’s procurement tools to cope with crises and post-conflict countries
have been useful in assessing the main obstacles to efficient consultants’ selection in
Afghanistan and providing recommendations for this report. The Bank’s response to crises and
emergencies suggests the following procurement-related activities: (1) increased flexibility in the
use of simplified procurement methods; (2) outsourcing of procurement and the ability to draw
on pre-qualified procurement and project management agents through sole-source (SSS) or
qualification-based (CQS) selection; (3) sole sourcing of consulting firms already working in the
area and which have a proven track record for the provision of technical assistance; (4) extension
8 “Efficient contract awards” result from the consideration of the Bank’s main policy principles defined in Art 1.4 of
the 2004 Bank Guidelines when selecting consultants: (1) high-quality services; (2) economy and efficiency; (3)
equal opportunities for all qualified consultants; (4) the development and use of national consultants; and (5)
transparency. 9 Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) cover a spectrum of fragility, including countries with deteriorating
governance, those in prolonged political crisis, post-conflict transition countries and those in gradual but still fragile
reform processes. See “Low-Income Countries Under Stress Update”, OPCS, World Bank, December 19, 2005.
LICUS are identified by weak Country Policy and Institutional Performance Assessment (CPIA) ratings. “Severe”
LICUS, as Afghanistan, score lowest within this grouping. 10
The Bank policy on rapid response to crises and emergencies policy is not intended to address economic or social
impacts associated with prolonged poor performance by a country. It replaced the policy on emergency recovery
assistance in March 2007. See Bank document R2007-0010 of January 17, 2007 (revised March 2007), “Toward a
New Framework for Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies”, its Supplemental Note (R2007-0010/1), and its
Annex C (Draft OP/BP 8.00, “Rapid Response to Crisis and Emergencies” applicable to emergency operations
submitted for approval after March 1, 2007).
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 5 of 37
of contracts issued under existing projects for similar activities through increase in their
corresponding contract amounts; and (5) encouraging Bank teams working on emergency
operations to actively support counterpart agencies at various stages of the procurement process,
including preparation of ToR, RFP, and drafting of shortlists.
Weighing QBS against QCBS
17. The use of Quality- and Cost-Based Selection (QCBS) has recently been questioned by
many Bank TTLs in view of the high deviations in proposal prices observed in consultants’
selections. As a result, quality becomes less decisive since price turns out to be the overriding
selection factor in many cases. This may lead to poor proposals gaining the highest overall score
and thus to poor quality services. The prudent use of Quality-Based Selection (QBS) could
reduce this risk by placing the main focus on quality. The benefits of using QBS should
particularly be considered for major capacity-building or management/procurement agent
services, which generally have a strong impact on the development of the PA and the
implementation of projects.
GoA Policy on Consultants
18. The GoA has not yet developed a specific policy on consultants, which could form the
basis for a legal and regulatory framework that effectively addresses the needs of the PA and the
consulting firms. The 2005 Public Procurement Law only reflects basic policy principles for
selection of consultants while the new ‘Rules of Procedures’ (see paras. 22) provide the
procedures of consulting services in details. However, a review has not been conducted yet
covering
The range of services that domestic consulting firms could provide to the PA;
The domestic consulting sector, its characteristics, and its capacity to implement
assignments funded by the GoA; or
The quality of services that consultants have already provided to the public sector.
To date, no consultant association has been formed in Afghanistan that could participate in a
public sector dialogue on policy and contribute views on regulatory issues. Considering the
weakness of the few existing consulting companies, it is presently too early to establish a
consulting association in Afghanistan.
Recommendation:
19. Once ministries have clearly defined their mandates and their respective functions, a
review of the range of services that local consulting firms could provide to the PA should be
performed to decide which functions could be outsourced to local consultants. The GoA may
then wish to consider drafting a strategy/policy paper on professional and expert consultants in
the medium term to meet the specific needs of the PA and to encourage the creation of local
consulting firms. The policy on consultants could cover the following areas:
Outsourcing: Relying on present public sector reforms, the policy should
indicate areas and functions for which the GoA will require the support of
professional and expert consultants;
Management & Capacity Development: Drawing on experience with present
public administration reform programs and its recommendations on common
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 6 of 37
functions like HR planning and management, the policy should address capacity
building of the PA through training and incentives;
Enabling Environment & Policy Dialogue: The policy should foresee means for
an institutionalized public-private dialogue. This dialogue should explore
opportunities for developing a favorable fiscal and employment policy for
consulting firms.
Legal and Regulatory Procurement Framework
The New Public Procurement Law
20. The new Public Procurement Law (PPL) prepared by the Procurement Unit (PU) of
ARDS and enacted in October 2005 has considerably improved the legal basis for public
procurement. Considering the need for reforms, the new law is certainly to be considered a major
achievement. A proposed amendment to the PPL recently has been referred to Parliament after
approval by the Cabinet extending the timeframe where interim procurement arrangements shall
apply.11
21. However, it is recommended that the following shortcomings be addressed in future
amendments.
(1) The new PPL lacks the necessary foundation of a comprehensive policy on
consultants’ procurement (see previous section);
(2) The PPL lacks a well-defined and user-friendly chapter on consultants’ selection;
(3) The Dari language version PPL that was approved is reported to be inconsistent
with the original English version from which it was translated.
Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement
22. The PPL’s complexity and its lack of a chapter devoted to consultants’ procurement will
make it difficult to apply under the present situation in Afghanistan. Therefore, regulations or
rules of procedure on procurement compliant with international best practice and addressing the
needs of both the GoA and the domestic consulting sector are fundamental for effectively
implementing the PPL. In accordance with Art. 106(1) PPL the Procurement Policy Unit (PPU)
developed Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement in Afghanistan which became effective on
April 12, 2007.12
These procurement rules (PR) provide sound guidance through the process of
consultants’ selection and contain appropriate provisions on enforcing transparency, fair
competition and the administrative review of procurement proceedings.13
However, since the
11
The amendment concerns Art 104 (a) and (b) PPL. The extended timeframe for interim procurement arrangements
are “three” and “five” years instead of “one“ and “two” years respectively. 12
The PPU had originally drafted regulations on public procurement. However, the Afghan Ministry of Justice
decided that this document was mostly procedural in nature and did not have to be submitted to the GoA for
approval. Therefore, the regulation was renamed rules of procedure, approved by the Ministry of Finance and issued
by the PPU in accordance to Article 106(1) PPL. 13
See for example Articles 157 PR (Records) and 81 PR (Publication of Notices) on transparency, Article 162 PR
on declarations on conflicts of interest, Article 164 PR on post-employment restrictions on public officials, Article
165 PR on avoidance of conflict of interests in consulting services, or Articles 170 ff PR on the administrative
review.
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 7 of 37
consulting firm responsible for implementing the PRP will no longer provide support to the PPU
in improving the PR,14
some of the remaining shortcomings of the PR are summarized here.
(1) User-friendly Chapter on Consultants’ Selection: The PR lack user-friendly
provisions on the selection of consultants that will allow the PA to apply the
national law on procurement correctly. While the PR distinguish between non-
consultancy services and consultants’ services they do not provide clear guidance
on these two procedures. Several provisions concerning the selection of
consultants can be found only when referring to other chapters of the procurement
rules.15
(2) Definition of Consultants and Mixed Shortlists: The PR neither define the term
consultants16
nor do they mandate that the shortlist shall only comprise
consultants of the same category, similar capacity, and business objectives. Thus,
a management consulting firm might find itself in the position that it has to
compete against a non-profit organization. If a mixed shortlist is unavoidable
under the circumstances, QBS instead of QCBS should be applicable. In addition,
the PR should define the terms professional and expert consultants.
(3) Simplified Technical Proposals (STP): The PR provide for Quality- and Cost-
Based Selection (QCBS), Quality-Based Selection (QBS), Fixed-Budget
Selection (FBS), Least-Cost Selection (LCS)17
and Single-Source Selection
(SSS)18
but lack specific rules for small assignments designed to attract the
attention of local consultancies. Presently even for small assignments standard
procedures apply while simplified procedures could be a major incentive for
increased participation of evolving Afghan consultancies. Considering the
widespread corruption stakeholders do not advocate the use of Selection Based on
the Consultants’ Qualification (CQS). However, an alternative solution would be
the use of Simplified Technical Proposals (STP) for routine assignments with
insignificant downstream impacts.19
Considering the limited capacity of domestic
procurement staff and the local consulting sector discussed below,20
the use of
STPs could help to (1) improve the selection of consultants; and (2) encourage
participation of local consulting firms.
14
Originally it was foreseen that the consulting firm implementing the PRP would have been responsible for
drafting (to the extent required) and modifying the existing rules on procurement and assisting the GoA towards its
finalization. However, amendments to the ToR for the PRP resulted in the deletion of this specific objective. 15
For example, Article 80(1) PR simply states that procuring entities shall ensure that they have complied with all
relevant requirements of Chapter II while this chapter also refers to the procurement of goods and (non-consultancy)
services. Furthermore, the provision listing all available methods for consultants’ selection (Article 84(2) PR) lacks
a clear reference to SSS regulated in Articles 27(1), 29 and 114ff PR. 16
Article 3(7) PR only defines consultants’ services as “activities of a professional, intellectual and advisory nature
that do not lead to a measurable physical output” but does not refer to different categories of consultants such as
consulting firms, NGOs, auditors, UN agencies, universities, or research institutions. 17
See Article 84(2) PR. 18
See Articles 27(1), 29 and 114ff PR. 19
For details see Section 2 (Instructions to Consultants) of the May 2004 edition of the Bank Standard RFP (SRFP).
According to best practice STP should be used when the following conditions are met: (a) the assignment is unlikely
to have significant downstream effects; (b) the assignment is of routine nature and the ToR already define in detail
the objectives, tasks, and required outputs; (c) the consultants’ previous work experience has been sufficiently
evaluated during shortlisting; and (d) capacity building is not a specific component of the assignment.
20 See PA Procurement Capacity, paras. 40 ff and The Local Consulting Sector, paras. 69 ff.
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 8 of 37
(4) Quality-Based Selection (QBS): QBS should be made mandatory for complex
and specialized assignments with high downstream effects, and assignments that
can be carried out in substantially different ways. Currently, Article 84 (4) PR
only states that QBS may be used for these types of assignments, thus leaving
room for the inappropriate use of QCBS.
(5) Continuation of Consulting Assignments: The PR lack a provision for awarding
a consultant an assignment that is a continuation of the initial contract subject to
its satisfactory performance in the previous assignment.
(6) Disclosure of Staff Months or Estimated Costs: According to best practice the
RFP should disclose either the estimated staff months or the cost estimate (not
both) whenever available to allow for comparable proposals.
(7) Weight Allocated to Price under QCBS: The weight allocated to price under
QCBS should be addressed within the PR.
(8) Indicative Weights for Evaluation Criteria: The PR should provide for
indicative weights to be used for the evaluation criteria. It is recommended to add
them to the evaluation criteria defined in Article 96(3) PR.
Recommendations to Improve the Legal and Regulatory Framework
23. While a revision of the PPL would depend on the policy on consultants to be elaborated
in the medium-term, the GoA should consider adjusting the PR by addressing the eight
shortcomings just listed. As originally foreseen, the consultants implementing the PRP could
provide advice on the revision of the PR.
Afghan Institutional Framework & Organization of Procurement
ARDS Procurement Unit
24. The assignment of the Procurement Consultant (PC) within the PU of ARDS has two
major objectives:
(1) Procurement facilitation for all goods, works & services under operations
financed directly by IDA, by the IDA-administered Afghanistan Reconstruction
Trust Fund (ARTF), by budgetary expenditures from domestic resources21
as well
as, to the extent feasible, by EU, ADB and other donors; and
(2) Capacity Building and training for ARDS key staff on procurement-related
matters.
Under supervision of ARDS the PC is assisting the Line Ministries (LMs) in procuring
consultancy services starting with the issuing of Expressions of Interest (EoI) and shortlisting of
consulting firms, through preparation of RFPs, receipt and opening of proposals, assistance in
evaluation of proposals, obtaining World Bank’s clearance, and issue of notification of awards.
25. Procurement for contracts using donor funds are usually subject to the rules of the
respective donor organizations. However, the PC is increasingly conducting procurement for
21
Excluding any procurement related to police, military or paramilitary.
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 9 of 37
projects financed by the GoA22
(either own resources or budget-support proceedings) subject to
domestic procurement rules.
26. The table below presents the procurement of consulting services contracts assisted by the
PC from 15 August 2002 until 31 March 07:23
Selection Method No. of Contracts Value US$M % Contracts % Value
QCBS 49 109.50 40.5% 44.6%
QBS 8 13.21 6.6% 5.4%
CQS 12 9.54 9.9% 3.9%
SSS 52 113.19 43.0% 46.1%
Total 121 245.44 100% 100%
Due to the need for emergency responses a high number of consulting contracts has been
awarded under SSS. However, 43 contracts were sole-sourced from August 2002 to November
2004. Only 9 contracts have been awarded under SSS since December 2004.
The Bank’s Department of Institutional Integrity (INT) has reviewed all cases facilitated by the
PC, but its report has not been finalized yet.
Line Ministries
27. One of the key constraints identified in former reviews was that there is no consistency in
the organizational structures of the Line Ministries (LMs) with regard to the procurement
functions and processes. Despite the procurement structure foreseen by the new PPL, the various
LM seem to have adopted different models of organizing procurement. Some ministries have
procurement departments, while in others procurement is conducted through service or planning
departments. According to the interviews procurement officers in LMs are sometimes not
involved in procurement processes. The reasons for disregarding available procurement
personnel seem to be:
(1) Lack of trust in the capacity of the procurement personnel;
(2) Lack of management, English and IT skills of procurement personnel and a
history of frequent delays and non-performance of procurement personnel;
(3) Lack of communication between trained procurement staff and senior officials
and consequently no awareness that qualified procurement personnel might be
available; and
(4) Desire to retain control over the procurement process without interference of
procurement personnel.
28. In some LMs (e.g. the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development) management
and procurement consultants are responsible for all matters regarding the procurement of
services and the implementation of Bank projects. Other LMs (e.g. the Ministry of Urban
Development), with Bank or donor support, have created Project Management Units (PMUs) and
Technical Support Units (TSUs) and are drawing on the services of international personnel
22
Procurement of goods, works or services of a value exceeding US$200,000 is to be handled exclusively by the PU
of ARDS. 23
Prior to appointment of the current PC (RITES Ltd.), Crown Agents from UK were providing similar services to
ARDS. The table presents all procured consultancy contracts facilitated by both RITES and Crown Agents.
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 10 of 37
specialized in budgeting, finance management and procurement. International procurement
advisors within PMUs are assigned to handle the procurement, to closely cooperate with local
staff and to build capacity within the respective LM by constant on-the-job training. Ministries
which currently have no PMU or TSU generally demand further support and expatriate staff
specialized in procurement for building capacity in their counterpart procurement teams.
29. The clarification and strengthening of procurement functions within the LM are to be
addressed by the PRP. The procurement processes will be reorganized to follow institutional
arrangements defined in the new PPL by
Identifying 9 key spending ministries to be integrated into the Priority Reform &
Restructuring (PRR) framework devised by the Civil Service Commission
(CSC);24
Assisting identified ministries to prepare applications for obtaining PRR status
that will result in increased equipment and higher salaries in those ministries and
will encourage adherence to the institutional structures foreseen by the new PPL;
Providing procurement training to staff in key ministries.
Procurement Policy Unit
30. The PRP will further support the Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) within the MoF by
drafting its rules of procedure, thus enabling the PPU to become a key player in the formulation
of future policies, legislation and procurement rules and to execute its functions according to
Article 94 of the PPL. These functions include monitoring procurement proceedings to ascertain
efficiency and compliance with the law, the collection of data or reports and the review of
procurement records and files, and proposing improvements in procurement practices. Currently,
one international advisor (since August 2006) and 4 national staff (since September 2006) are
running the PPU and consultancy support is expected to be phased out by PACBP credit closing
(June 30, 2009).
Special Procurement Commission
31. The Special Procurement Commission (SPC) within the Office of the President provided
for in Article 91 of the PPL grants approvals for all contract awards exceeding the levels of first
grade award authorities.25
Its rules for procedure (Transaction of Business Rules for SPC) were
drafted by the PPU and approved on March 31, 2007. The PRP will provide further assistance to
the SPC.
Contract Management Office
32. According to Article 69 of the PPL, a Contract Management Office (CMO) has been
established within the MoF. It serves as the Secretariat to the SPC. According to Article 183 PR
the CMO has the overall responsibility for planning and executing the work of SPC as well as
record keeping.
24
It was envisaged that the PRP would concentrate on the full capacity development of 6 Line Ministries and 6
Provincial Offices. However, required linkages with the provincial procurement entities are still missing. Therefore
the consultant implementing the PRP will undertake capacity development of 9 LMs. 25
See Annex A to the new PPL for details on thresholds for award authorities.
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 11 of 37
Appeal and Complaint Mechanisms
33. The PPU has finalized the design and implementation of an independent complaints
review mechanism and the respective rules of procedure in accordance to Article 86 of the PPL.
Articles 170 ff PR adequately provide for the administrative review of procurement proceedings
challenged by a bidding firm. The PRP consultants will be responsible for providing further
support and for conducting training for committee members.
Professional Consulting Associations
34. To date, there are no consulting associations in Afghanistan that could play a role in
monitoring professional standards, representing the sector in the public-policy dialogue with the
GoA, and in promoting the role of independent consultants in the Afghan economy. The capacity
of the few existing local firms is still too limited. Therefore, steps towards the establishment of a
consulting association in Afghanistan should be postponed until the local consulting sector has
developed more capacity.
Recommendations to Improve the Institutional Framework
35. It is recommended that results of the PRP and INT’s review of all procurement cases on
consulting services facilitated by the PC within ARDS be monitored.
Afghan Procurement Procedures and Practices
Available Procurement Manuals or Guidelines
36. There is an immediate need for an interpretative Manual on the Selection of Consultants.
While the rules of procedure on procurement cover the general steps of the selection process,
they lack clear guidance on specific points such as the definition of evaluation criteria, the
composition of the evaluation committee and the evaluation process. Currently, no
comprehensive manuals exist on the selection of consultants (such as a Good Procurement
Manual or Consultant Services Manual). While ARDS has prepared a Quality Manual, it focuses
only on Bank rules and lacks guidance on many specific issues such as shortlisting, defining
evaluation criteria, and the evaluation process. Comprehensive application manuals will be
developed under the PRP.
Availability of Standard Request for Proposals
37. The Standard Request for Proposals (RFP) will be developed under the PRP.
Recommendations to Improve Procedures & Practices
38. The consulting firm responsible for elaborating manuals and the Standard RFP should
rely to the extent possible on the recommendations and advice laid down in the Bank Consulting
Services Manual (2006). Since the PPL and the rules of procedure on procurement are inspired
by Bank rules, many practices suggested by the Consulting Services Manual will prove very
helpful in the Afghan context.
Bank Procurement Capacity
39. According to TTLs interviewed the procurement capacity of the Bank has considerably
improved since a senior procurement specialist joined the Bank office in Kabul in June 2006.26
26
The Bank’s organizational capacity in Afghanistan is considerably higher than in other fragile states (13 IRS and
59 LRS in Sept. 06 compared to an average of 3 IRS and 15 LRS in other fragile states). See Bank document
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 12 of 37
PA Procurement Capacity
40. There is a widespread recognition that lack of capacity is probably the greatest constraint
(apart from security concerns) to achieving results in Afghanistan.
Procurement Capacity of PC within ARDS
41. Many TTLs interviewed expressed concern about the capacity of the PC handling
procurement for the Bank and the GoA (see ARDS PU, paras. 24 ff). They concede that many
delays are caused by time-consuming Afghan decision-making processes. However, Bank TTLs
specifically feel that the PC lacks capacity to ensure the professional evaluation of proposals.
Therefore, TTLs stress the need to contract in additional capacity for major Bank-funded projects
and refer to successes gained by outsourcing the procurement services and the project oversight
to international consultants independent from the PC (as practiced, for example, under the Bank-
funded National Emergency Employment Program and the Emergency National Solidarity
Project).
Previous and Ongoing Capacity Building and Training
42. Under EPAP I and II the PC undertook training of between 110 and 150 procurement
staff from various LM. However, the training was based mostly on Bank procurement rules and
national legislation that was then superseded by the PPL. Not all stages of the training course
were completed as planned due to lack of resources and other pressing priorities. Training on the
provisions of the new PPL is foreseen under the PRP.
43. Ten Procurement Liaison Officers (PLO) were selected under EPAP II and PACBP for
intensive procurement training and attended a course at the Administrative Staff College of India
in Hyderabad. The training began in January 2004 and the PLOs were intended to provide core
procurement capacity and to assist the LMs in building their own capacity. The plan was to
retain the PLOs within ARDS first and to subsequently place them in the procurement units to be
set up in the LMs pursuant to the new PPL. However, according to the most recent information,
five of the ten PLOs left ARDS to pursue better paid careers. ARDS’s loss will have a negative
impact on the capacity-building programs within the LMs. Since the PLOs were intended to be
transferred into at least six to nine key spending LMs specifically supported under the upcoming
PRP, their loss might delay achievements under the new project.
44. Further training provided by the PC under PACBP included:
Staff of three LM (Ministry of Energy and Water, Ministry of Defense and
Ministry of Mines) received a one-month training program on the new PPL and
related procurement procedures;
Two procurement officers of Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation are currently
receiving on-the-job training; and
Training for other LM (4 staff members per ministry) commenced at end of
November 2006.
In addition, the GoA decided to transfer responsibility for consultant selection and administration
to the LMs so that they can develop further capacity through increased involvement in the
procurement processes.
SecM2007-0018, “Strengthening the World Bank Rapid Response and Long-Term Engagement in Fragile States”,
for details on the three-tiered approach for strengthening the Bank’s staffing and organizational support.
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 13 of 37
Capacity within Line Ministries - Key Constraints and Challenges
45. Three key issues were identified by the mission consultations and by the PC in its March
07 Progress Report:
(1) Weak PA capacity:
Lack of procurement capacity of LM officials;
Weak capacity of LM procurement consultants;
Inefficient internal procedures (for example, a requirement to obtain a No
Objection (NO) from domestic higher award authorities after having
obtained NO from donor agency);
Lack of capacity to conduct evaluations and assess the quality of EoI and
proposals (see Efficient Selection of Consultants, para. 49).
(2) Lack of understanding of procurement principles and rules, lack of compliance
and accountability at decision-making level.
(3) Lack of adequate IT infrastructure within LMs.
The level of capacity varies, with higher capacity in the few LM that can draw on the assistance
of PMUs or TSUs, and lower capacity in LMs that do not have access to international advice.
Concerns about the capacity of local staff dealing with procurement were expressed by all TTLs
interviewed. Almost constant assistance by expatriate staff is deemed necessary for delegating
parts of the procurement processes to local counterparts.
46. In addition, TTLs and international consultants interviewed referred to lack of capacity in
the PA for managing and supervising consulting assignments. The PA and consultants often
seem to disagree on payment terms and on the interpretation of tasks defined in the Service
Contracts.
Procurement Capacity in Provinces and Districts
47. No data on procurement in the provinces and districts was obtained by the mission.
However, according to interviews with NGOs implementing the NSP, regional procurement
entities are facing the same problems as the national authorities.
Capacity-Building Approach by PACBP and PRP
48. In addition to training of key procurement staff provided by PACBP mentioned in the
previous section, the PRP will build capacity by:
Developing a nationwide procurement capacity-building strategy for central,
provincial and municipal governments;
Identifying key ministries and provinces to be supported under the new project;
Planning the transfer of procurement capacity and responsibility to LM according
to a set of milestones;
Organizing workshops for the dissemination of the new PPL;
Assessing the procurement training needs of the procuring entities (LMs,
provinces, districts);
Developing appropriate selection criteria for trainees;
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 14 of 37
Developing methodologies for implementation of a broad training program to
train hundreds of trainees of all levels of government;
Conducting a survey to identify a future procurement training centre for the
country.
Risks within Capacity-building Approach by PACBP and PRP
Efficient Selection of Consultants
49. Since it is a priority for reconstruction that the Afghan PA be reestablished, the Bank
projects focus on building basic procurement capacity. The PACBP provides training to a limited
number of key staff while the PRP includes a broad program for hundreds of trainees from all
levels of government. However, due to PACBP’s limited outreach and PRP’s broad focus
training will only concentrate on basic subjects. In particular, PA staff will not receive training
on consultant selection tasks such as preparing ToR and assessing the quality of proposals. While
specialized capacity building may be too much to expect at this stage, many parties interviewed
expressed concerns about the credibility of the selection process given current deficiencies in the
performance of these tasks. These concerns relate to three stages of consultant selection in
particular:
(1) Preparing the ToR and the RFP: According to TTLs interviewed LM staff lack
experience in designing projects along with the capacity to deliver and define the
technical inputs necessary for the preparation of ToRs. Most ToRs are drafted by
technical advisors funded by donors.
(2) Compiling shortlists: According to the interviews many Evaluation Committees
(EC) lack the capacity to adequately examine EoIs, assess the experience and
capacities of candidates and compile shortlists.
(3) Evaluating submitted proposals: International consultants and donor
representatives specifically question the capacity of local evaluators to adequately
evaluate the quality of complex proposals. The stakeholders interviewed also raise
doubts about the outcome of the evaluations of standard assignments since many
EC seem to lack specialists in the disciplines of these assignments. The same PA
officials who have trouble drafting ToR are then later responsible for evaluating
the proposals.
50. These concerns are a key challenge to attracting qualified international firms and
achieving value for money in the selection of consultants. Combined with concerns about a poor
command of English and corruption, the lack of trust in the qualifications of evaluators
discourages qualified consultants from seeking assignments in Afghanistan (see para. 65 for
participation rates).
Development of National Consultants
51. The PRP includes only basic training courses for local firms that which will focus on (1)
creating awareness about the new Public Procurement Law; and (2) training on procurement
procedures for goods, works and consulting services. The Bank program does not provide
assistance on revising the rules of procedure on procurement although a tailor-made solution is
needed to address the weakness of the local consulting firms (see paras. 22 no 3 and 83 for
details and recommendations).
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 15 of 37
52. Moreover, neither PA nor donors have adequate information on the available local
expertise and are facing difficulty to identify the few available local resources (see paras 82 ff).
Capacity Building of the PA
53. According to the interviews the collaboration between expatriates and local procurement
personnel often fails and training turns out to be fruitless because of insurmountable
communication barriers. International consultants frequently reported that international and
national procurement personnel have serious problems interacting effectively. The work of local
translators, generally domestic PA staff members who are not fully qualified translators,
sometimes creates more confusion and misunderstanding instead of facilitating communication.
In addition, expatriates reported that the level of IT skills of their local counterparts is very low
and that they are forced to allocate extensive periods of time to simple on-the-job IT training.
54. Based on the numerous interviews conducted in the course of the mission, four
constraints could hamper the current capacity-building strategy and the shift of responsibilities to
the local counterpart procurement personnel:
(1) Lack of effective interaction between international and national procurement staff
due to language barriers;
(2) Lack of qualified translators to facilitate effective communication between
expatriates and local counterparts;
(3) Lack of correct translations of procurement documents originally prepared in
English; and
(4) Very weak IT capacity of national procurement staff.
In addition, the training program could be compromised by the limited availability of local staff
trainable in complex procurement processes as required by the Bank or the GoA. Experienced
PA staff is often poached by donor agencies and NGOs and the lack of qualified counterpart
personnel in the Afghan PA often renders on the job training impossible. When counterpart staff
is available low motivation due to low pay and limited opportunity for merit based promotion
undermine the knowledge transfer.
Recommendations
55. While most issues are already addressed by the upcoming PRP, the GoA and the Bank
may consider the following approaches to address remaining risks within the capacity-building
approach of the PACBP and PRP.
(1) Professional evaluations of proposals are fundamental for achieving value for
money and attracting qualified international consultants. The GoA (with support
from the Bank) should therefore consider assigning reputable consulting firms
with strong procurement expertise in the field of the specific projects to the task
of conducting proposal evaluations under major Bank-funded projects in close
cooperation with the PA. The same consultants could also be entrusted with the
quality and administrative control of the contracts and building capacity. In
particular, Bank-funded projects that cannot rely on the support of internationally
staffed Project Management Units (PMUs) or Technical Support Units (TSUs)
should benefit from this approach.
(2) For Bank-funded projects that are too small to justify the use of international
consulting firms to handle proposal evaluation and contract management, the
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 16 of 37
Bank should encourage Bank staff to actively support counterpart agencies at
defining the technical input for ToR. Bank specialists in the required areas of
expertise should extensively review and also provide input to draft ToR regarding
objectives, components, activities, milestones, and evaluation indicators.
Common weaknesses in TA projects such as the fragmentation into small
assignments of short duration, inadequate monitoring or the disregard of local
circumstances should be avoided by better procurement planning and effective
supervision. Furthermore, consultants with expertise in the required fields should
be assigned to Evaluation Committees.
(3) The GoA (with support from the Bank) may wish to consider addressing the lack
of qualified translators by designing and implementing a training program at a
selected training institute for future translators.
(4) In addition, the GoA may consider developing and implementing training
modules for the procurement staff in the area of English, IT and computer skills.
Recommendations for the development of the local consulting sector are provided in para. 83.
Corruption and Integrity in Procurement of Consultants
56. All persons interviewed at international and domestic consulting firms complained about
nepotism and corruption. Most of the local consultants interviewed consider it useless to apply
for GoA-funded projects without having a special relationship with the government officials and
decision-makers involved. Corruption is especially threatening to international firms or Afghans
returning from overseas who do not have powerful patrons or fully understand how the local
system works.
57. According to the interviewees negative public perceptions of widespread corruption at all
levels of GoA have increased,27
threatening to undermine or even reverse the GoA’s and
international community’s efforts to build functioning institutions able to attract qualified
consultants. Allegations mainly concern the selection of individual consultants:
High-level officials interfere with selection processes;
Shortlists are manipulated or limited to pre-selected candidates with good relations to
powerful patrons;
Evaluation criteria are changed or disregarded after submission of CVs (requiring
doctoral degrees when originally a master’s would have been sufficient);
Information is leaked to preferred candidates; and
Job vacancies are not correctly advertised.
58. The new PPL addresses the need for transparency and accountability under a separate
special chapter (Chapter X). In addition, the rules of procedure for public procurement contain
appropriate provisions on enforcing transparency, fair competition and the administrative review
27
The 2005 Transparency International Corruption Index ranks Afghanistan 117th
placing it among the world’s most
corrupt countries.
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 17 of 37
of procurement proceedings.28
Article 108 of these recently enacted rules also effectively
regulates the selection of individual consultants.
59. The Bank’s Anti-Corruption Study (P101117) has recommended the following steps:
Steps to be taken by Government
Clarify administrative mandates and provide political support and resources
accordingly, with consideration of a small number of quick win or high profile
measures to demonstrate the GoA’s commitment to addressing the problem of
corruption in Afghanistan.
Accelerate efforts to reduce vulnerabilities to corruption in management of budget
funds and strengthen internal and external audit of public funds.
Improve transparency and effectiveness of merit-based recruitment processes and
monitor progress.
Initiate work toward developing and implementing an anti-corruption strategy, with
technical support from the international community.
Steps to be taken by the Donor Community
Provide technical assistance on anti-corruption policies and programs;
Renew the international community’s efforts on transparency (through regular public
disclosure of financial reports, audits, and contract awards).
In close collaboration with GoA, engage in rapid analysis of key Government sectors,
functions, processes and managerial responsibilities to identify points of vulnerability
to corruption and make recommendations for improvements.
Initiate analytical work on corruption to expand and strengthen the information base
for effective anti-corruption policies and programs.
Start incorporating an anti-corruption dimension into key development projects and
programs.
60. Considering the low level of capacity of PA officials and the lack of user-friendly rules
of procedure and manuals, it is not surprising that corruption remains a key issue. The GoA and
the Bank should ensure professional evaluations by outsourcing this task to international
consulting firms at least for major Bank-funded projects (see para. 55). In addition, the low
procurement capacity of the PA could be addressed by simplifying the tender process. The use of
Simplified Technical Proposals (STP) for routine assignments could help to increase
transparency in the evaluations of proposals (see para. 22 for details and recommendations).
Public Sector Demand for Consulting Services
Domestically Funded Demand
61. This section concentrates on the national budget available for procuring consulting
services. There are also local budgets available at the municipal level, and municipalities can
28
See for example Articles 157 PR (Records) and 81 PR (Publication of Notices) on transparency, Article 162 PR
on declarations on conflicts of interest, Article 164 PR on post-employment restrictions on public officials, Article
165 PR on avoidance of conflict of interests in consulting services, or Articles 170 ff PR on the administrative
review.
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 18 of 37
exercise some degree of fiscal autonomy. Revenues collected at the local level are mainly used to
fund municipal expenditures.
62. Since 2001 the focus has been on reconstruction, delivery of basic services and the
development of infrastructure. In addition, revenue mobilization in Afghanistan is still among the
lowest in the world and covers only 9% of total public expenditure. Therefore, only a small
percentage of national funds are spent on consulting services. The lack of trust in the capacity of
the domestic consulting sector further undermines efforts to successfully procure more
consulting services.
63. According to data provided by ARDS the GoA spent approx. US$130,900,000 for
contracts on goods, works and consulting services since 2004.29
Ten out of 49 contracts (8.6% of
total amount for goods, works and consulting services funded by GoA) concerned the provision
of consulting services. Seven consultancy contracts were awarded to international firms; 3 to
NGOs. No data is available on domestic consulting firms or subcontractors that may have been
associated with the implementation of the assignments. The data is summarized in the table
below, with details provided in Annex 2.
Consultancy Contracts Funded by GoA30
Selection Method Scope of Services Value US$ Winning Firm Origin
QBS Design of Building 500,000 Japan
QCBS Survey 450,000 Pakistan
QCBS Feasibility Study 751,239 Iran
QCBS Feasibility Study 2,321,560 India
QCBS Feasibility Study 2,132,010 India
QCBS Feasibility Study 2,210,000 India
QCBS National Skills Development 1,558,972 International NGO
QCBS National Skills Development 963,574 International NGO
QCBS National Skills Development 242,690 Local NGO
QCBS Design of Building 134,938 Pakistan
Total GoA Funding for Consulting Services: 11,264,983
Consulting Services Funded by the Bank
64. Since April 2002, the Bank has committed over US$1.28 billion for 25 development and
emergency reconstruction projects and two budget support operations in Afghanistan.31
This
support comprises US$849.8 million in grants and US$436.4 million in interest-free credits. Two
budget support operations, emergency public works, infrastructure reconstruction, and education
rehabilitation projects have so far been completed. Of the US$1.28 billion the World Bank has
29
The data provided by ARDS mainly concerns contracts above a value of US$200,000. 30
Awarded since December 2004 and facilitated through the PC within ARDS. 31
The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), administered by the World Bank on behalf of 25 donors and
managed in conjunction with ADB, Islamic Development Bank, United Nations Assistance Mission for
Afghanistan, and UNDP, remains the main mechanism for providing coordinated funding support to Afghanistan’s
recurrent budget and investments in line with agreed budget priorities of the GoA. As of October 22, 2006, 25
donors had pledged US$1.66 billion to ARTF, of which US$1.45 billion have been received.
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 19 of 37
committed to Afghanistan, approx. US$175.8 million (14%) were allocated to 63 consulting
service assignments which can be grouped by sector as shown in the table below, with details
provided in Annex 3.
World Bank Funded Consulting Assignments
(Signed Contracts from 29 May 2003 until 01 March 06)
Sector No of Contracts %
Agriculture 1 1.5 %
Education 3 4.8 %
Energy 3 4.8 %
Health 12 19.0 %
Public Administration and Law 8 12.7 %
SWAps (NSP) 27 42.9 %
Transport 4 6.3 %
Water & Sanitation 5 7.9 %
Total 63 100 %
The consulting contracts were awarded as follows:
World Bank Funded Consulting Assignments
(Signed Contracts from 29 May 2003 until 01 March 06)
Category of Consultant No of Contracts %
NGOs 38 60 %
International Consulting Firms 22 35 %
National Consulting Firms 1 2 %
Other 2 3 %
Total 63 100 %
International Supply of Consulting Services
International Participation
65. Participation rates of international consultants are low. Based on an assessment of 10
Bank-funded assignments from 2005 to 2007 the average number of international proposals
submitted per assignment was only 2.5. On average just 2.1 proposals scored above the
Minimum Qualifying Score (MQS). These outcomes are summarized in the table below, with
details in Annex 4.
Participation Rates EoI
Received
Size of
Shortlist
Proposals
Submitted
Proposals
Above MQS
Average 8.4 4.5 2.5 2.1
66. According to the international consultants interviewed the reasons for low participation
are:
(1) The security situation;
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 20 of 37
(2) Low PA capacity to evaluate consultants’ qualifications and lacking transparency
of selection processes; and
(3) Low PA capacity to adequately supervise and to pay international consultants
fairly and timely.
In addition, international consultants stressed the high costs required to set up and conduct
business in Afghanistan (security, electricity, safe housing for employees, identifying reliable
local partners or suppliers, etc.). The entry costs are considered to be extremely high. Once
established, firms tend to apply for other opportunities again. However, according to the
interviews the willingness of firms to operate in Afghanistan is mainly linked to the availability
of bilateral contracts and not to Bank-funded assignments which are merely seen as an addition
to the core business. International consultants interviewed point out that the incentives for
seeking Bank-funded assignments are missing. Excessive demands from the PA, its lacking
appreciation of consulting services, and delayed payments are among the many issues that
discourage qualified consultants.
Performance on Consulting Service Contracts
67. PA and donor officials generally consider the performance of international consulting
firms as merely satisfactory under the present circumstances and have observed that firms
generally refrain from sending experienced and qualified staff to Afghanistan. Assignments
focusing on capacity building implemented by international firms are generally rates as less than
satisfactory. However, officials admit that contract durations of 2 to 3 years make it difficult to
carry out comprehensive capacity-building contracts. In addition, the lack of trainable local staff
challenges any training program.
Remuneration Levels
68. Based on a sample of 12 Bank-funded contracts international firms from Part 1 countries
demand a median fee of $23,000 for key team members for operating in Afghanistan as outlined
in the following table, with details in Annex 5 on the 12 assessed contracts.
WB-funded Consulting Contracts (excluding NGOs): Monthly Billing Rates
Billing rates Team Leader Key Staff Nationals
Average $24,900 $18,750 $3,700
Median $23,550 $18,550 $2,900
Median (Part 1 country firms): $29,050 $23,000
Median (Part 2 country firms): $13,500 $10,500
Recommendations
(1) Since continuity is deemed essential for successful capacity building, but
international participation is low and entry costs for international firms are very
high, the Bank should consider including a provision for continuation of work by
the same consultant under SSS in the initial RFPs whenever feasible.
(2) When drafting ToR, the security situation should be taken into account.
Especially when the services are not related to capacity-building activities that
need to take place locally, the ToR should provide for international consultants to
perform services from outside the country to the greatest extent possible.
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 21 of 37
Domestic Supply of Consulting Services
The Local Consulting Sector
69. While contractors and suppliers of varying capacity seem to provide a sound local source
for implementing smaller contracts, the situation appears much less advanced in the area of
consulting firms. However, a full assessment is hindered by lack of information. While various
LMs have registered local firms, this information mainly serves to disseminate procurement
opportunities to potential local consulting service providers. It does not provide indications on
the actual expertise available or the previous performance of firms. The same problem applies to
the company registration scheme run by the Afghan Investment Support Agency (AISA).
70. ARDS is registering firms and requires them to provide information about their main
areas of interest. However, no information from ARDS could be obtained during the mission.
71. While it is far from being exhaustive, an immediately available source of information on
the local consulting sector is the Afghanistan Procurement Directory (www.
procurementdirectory.af) launched by the Canadian NGO Peace Dividend Trust (PDT) in
September 2006. This directory currently lists 14 local consulting firms, of which 6 have
previous experience with donors and 10 can rely on either permanent or temporary international
staff.
72. Based on site visits to a number of local companies’ offices and information provided by
PDT, the local consulting sector can be further divided into three categories:
(1) Kabul-based consulting firms owned and managed by foreigners with a proven
track record of professional experience in the country (mainly studies and
research), drawing on international and local staff and relying on a strong
clientele from the Afghan private sector (e.g. the national telecoms); approx. 2 out
of 14 companies listed under the Afghanistan Procurement Directory are in this
category.
(2) Domestic firms owned and run by local professionals mainly educated in Pakistan
and fluent in English with a limited number of international staff (mainly
temporary) on their payroll that occasionally have won small donor-funded
consulting contracts.
(3) Purely domestic consulting firms, with a limited number of local staff and no
international staff, that have no experience in providing consultancy services to
public sector clients.
Firms belonging to categories 2 and 3 are generally involved in many areas of business other
than consulting. According to interviews these types of firms are currently trying to win
consultancy contracts funded by the GoA or the international donor community, but mainly must
engage in construction and supply activities (e.g. the import of cars).
Main Areas of Expertise
73. According to the information gained during interviews at local companies and through
the assessment of firms’ webpages and data provided by the local consulting companies under
the Afghanistan Procurement Directory the main areas of local expertise are:
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 22 of 37
Areas of Expertise of Afghan Consulting Companies Listed under the
Afghanistan Procurement Directory
No of companies listed: 14 100 %
Capacity & institution building, training 2 14 %
Monitoring & evaluation 1 7 %
Community & social services 1 7 %
Research & surveys 4 29 %
Business support services 5 36 %
Public relations & advertising 7 50 %
IT services 3 21 %
Project support services 2 14 %
This table should be seen as mere indication of the range of services domestic consulting firms
could provide to the Afghan PA. It is not uncommon that webpages, company flyers or
brochures list vast areas of expertise while it turned out in interviews that the companies had yet
to provide consultancy services to a public client.
Performance on Public Contracts and Remuneration Levels
74. No data was available on the quality of local consultancy services provided to the Afghan
PA or donors.
75. According to the assessment of Bank-funded contracts for Afghan consultants nominated
by international firms, a median monthly billing rate of about US$2,900 applies (see
Remuneration Levels, para. 68). According to TTLs interviewed the fees of individual local
freelance consultants are generally higher (about $3,500 to 4,500) since the Bank has to compete
with other donors for the few experts available.
Capacity Assessment of Afghan Consultancies
76. The capacity of local consulting firms remains very weak. The few profitable domestic
firms operating from Kabul are developing skills by on-the-job training, in-house courses held by
international consultants and twinning (i.e. one international and one local staff are implementing
the same task). One of the biggest challenges is availability of qualified local professionals since
the private sector can rely neither on functioning advanced education systems nor on institutions
where experience can be gained.
77. NGOs implementing nationwide projects on behalf of the donor community are
contributing to the development of local capacity by in-house training courses in English
language and IT skills and by delegating project components to be implemented in the provinces
to local personnel.
78. According to the interviews conducted the major key constraints faced by the domestic
consulting firms are:
Lack of qualified local staff due to the new nature of assignments, higher quality
standards, and the weak and poorly funded Afghan tertiary education system;
Weak management, English and IT skills;
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 23 of 37
Competition for experts with donors and international consultants implementing
projects in Afghanistan;
Limited public demand and scarce financial resources;
Lack of developed banking system; many local consultants face serious difficulty to
obtain bank guarantees.
These problems are reflected in the poor track record of local consultants in winning contracts
from donors or the GoA. Other specific reasons for lack of success in public procurement
opportunities are:
Limited familiarity with public procurement, procurement procedures and
documents, partly due to lack of English skills;
Lack of experience in preparing compliant technical and financial proposals;
Failure to meet qualification requirements for proposed staff (for example, the post
requires a postgraduate degree despite the fact that there are no post-graduate
programs in Afghanistan, or qualified but young experts have too few years to meet
the requirement on minimum professional experience); and
Lack of trust in the fairness and transparency of procurement processes handled by
the GoA and therefore limited participation.
79. Once local firms were awarded contracts they face further problems since they lack
experience in project implementation under GoA or Bank rules (firms may switch key staff
without being aware that this requires a No Objection and have trouble preparing invoices
according to required standards).
Developing Capacity of the Domestic Consulting Sector
80. While most of the constraints faced by the consulting sector can only be addressed in the
long-term, the exclusion of domestic consultancies from the development process can be
addressed, at least in part for simple assignments, through training courses or workshops. The
upcoming PRP will include basic procurement training for local firms, conducting seminars (at
least twice a year) on the new PPL and structured training programs (four times a year) on
procurement procedures for contracts funded by the GoA and the donor community. However,
workshops and training courses do not focusing solely on consulting firms, but will also address
contractors and suppliers. In addition, the current lack of procurement manuals will hinder the
preparation and implementation of training materials and programs.
81. Therefore, the consultant responsible for the PRP could benefit from the experience of
two ongoing local training programs. The NGO Peace Dividend Trust (PDT) procurement
training courses focus on the major weaknesses of local firms in following procurement
procedures.32
While PDT has only offered a first training session for the construction sector in
May 2006, it plans to conduct a series of workshops on procurement for consulting services. The
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) is about to start the Engineering Capacity Building
Project for local consulting engineering companies.33
Training will cover a broad range of topics
32
Contact: Mrs Shirine Bakhat-Pont, Country Director Kabul Office, Peace Divident Trust Markeplace Project;
www.peacedividendmarketplace.org ; email: [email protected] 33
Contact: Mr Michael G. Goode, Director Grants & Contracts, American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE);
www.asce.org ; email: [email protected]
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 24 of 37
such as management, project management, and procurement. A collaboration between the PRP
and the ASCE project could achieve synergies.
Overcoming the Information Gap on Consultants
82. The monthly Progress Reports submitted by the Procurement Consultant to the Bank do
not enable a reviewer to extract information necessary to assess the quality of the selection
process. In particular, it lacks information on the nature of assignments and the extent of
international and national participation (average billing rates, participation rates from
international and national firms, and nature of assignments attracting national firms). Precise data
would enable TTLs and PA staff to better plan assignments and selection parameters.
83. Moreover, many representatives of the PA or the donor community interviewed are
unaware that at least some capable local firms exist in Afghanistan. Only a few persons
representing the public sector were able to name or recommend one local consultancy. As a
result, local firms are generally not taken into account when firms are selected under SSS for
special or urgent assignments.34
Information tools like the Afghanistan Procurement Directory
could help to minimize the information gap (see para. 71).
Recommendations
(1) Since Afghan consultancies can best develop their capacities through associations
with international firms, the Requests for Proposals (RFP) and the Terms of
Reference (ToR) for internationally competed assignments funded by the GoA
and the Bank should clearly identify, whenever possible and feasible, those
components that can be executed by local consultants. In case no competent
Afghan consultancies exist, the tender documents should clearly require from
international firms to transfer skills and know-how to local individual advisors.
Once these individual consultants were involved in internationally executed
projects and developed their capacity under the supervision of experienced
international consultants, they would be in a position to establish their own
consulting companies.
(2) For routine assignments limited to national consultants, the Bank and the GoA
should consider the use of Simplified Technical Proposals (STP). Quality-Based
Selection (QBS) and Fixed-Budget Selection (FBS) should apply to standard
assignments and Quality- and Cost-based Selection (QCBS) only when clearly
justified by the nature of the ToR. This should encourage local consultants to seek
participation. Information gained should be disseminated to the Bank’s TTLs (for
example, concerning the research tool Afghanistan Procurement Directory).
Whenever possible and feasible local firms should be considered for small
assignments generally procured under SSS.
(3) To facilitate the preparation of projects and procurement plans, the Bank should
consider requesting the PC to improve its monthly progress report. It should
include data on the participation of international and national consulting firms
such as (1) average number of EoI, size of shortlists, proposals submitted; (2)
countries of origin of shortlisted, responsive and winning firms and their
34
For example, under the Afghanistan Public Administration Reform Project (P100960) the selection of a US firm
for a survey on public opinion and expectations on the GoA was cleared although local capacity in the area of
surveys is good.
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Main Report page 25 of 37
categories (NGOs, consultancies, government agencies); (3) average billing rates;
(4) number and nature of assignments for which the ToRs require the participation
of national firms; (5) nature of assignments limited to national participation; and
(6) number and nature of assignments in which local firms are associated with
international firms. Alternatively, the Procurement Consultant could be requested
to prepare an annual report focusing on the points described above and
complementing the monthly progress reports.
(4) The Bank could also consider cooperating with two stakeholders currently
providing support and training to local consulting firms. The Bank’s PRP could
(1) draw on the experience of the NGO Peace Dividend Trust on training courses
on procurement for local companies; and (2) collaborate with the Engineering
Capacity Building Project for local consulting engineering companies
implemented by the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE).
Risk Assessment
84. A detailed risk analysis could not be carried out. However, the interviews with
stakeholders indicate the following key risks:
Security Risks – Lack of security is the number one challenge in Afghanistan's
development environment. The critical security situation will not change in the short
term and will limit operational activities. Only national firms and local staff will be
available to implement projects for reasonable fees in the remote provinces where
conflict is ongoing or likely to erupt again.
Technical and Economic Risks – The quality of consulting services has a direct
impact on the Afghan economy. Lack of quality services leads to questionable results,
increases project costs and causes delays. Considering the current weak capacity of
the local consulting sector and the increased fees for international consultants willing
to work in the daunting environment of Afghanistan, the costs to the Afghan economy
are likely to be alarmingly high.
Professional and Business Risks – The challenging operating environment, the
weak educational system, and lack of prospects for young professionals lead to a
constant drain of knowledgeable people. The loss of intellectual capital is one of the
most serious risks for the slowly evolving domestic consulting sector.
Regulatory Risks – The lack of provisions specifically tailored to support the weak
local consulting firms and the PA’s low capacity to efficiently award contracts have a
serious impact on the local consulting sector and make it costly and risky for
consultants to tender and to implement consultancy projects for the GoA.
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Annex 1: List of Persons Met page 26 of 37
Organization Name Position
Government of Afghanistan
Ministry of Finance, Office of
the Deputy Minister of Finance,
Procurement Policy Unit
Mr. Raj KAMAL Advisor to the Deputy Minister of
Finance,
Head of PPU
Independent Administrative
Reform & Civil Service
Commission
Mr. Mirza ABDULLAHI Director, Public Administrative Reform
Implementation – Civil Service
Management
Ministry of Urban Development Mr. Al-Haj Wahid Abdul AHAD Advisor to MoUD and PMU Team
Leader
Kabul Urban Development Project
(KURP)
Ministry of Public Works Mr. G.R. SINGAL Advisor to the MoPW
Donor Agencies
European Commission
Delegation to Afghanistan
Mr. Jens ENGELHARDT Deputy Head of Section Contracts &
Finance
European Commission
Delegation to Afghanistan
Mrs. Sandrine PETRONI Economic and Trade Advisor
ADB Mr. Brian FAWCETT Country Director
Afghanistan Resident Mission
ADB Mr. Robert Gordon RINKER Senior Project Management Specialist
DFID Mr. John GORDON Deputy Head
DFID Afghanistan
GTZ International Services Mrs. Marita DIEHLING Program Manager NSP
GTZ International Services Mr. Aziz Ahmad SARHADI Head of Administration
Consultants / NGOs
RITES Ltd. Mr. Virender Kumar GARG Team Leader & Program Manager,
Afghanistan Reconstruction and
Development Services (ARDS)
Peace Dividend Trust Mrs. Hedvig Christine
BOSERUP
Project Director -
Afghan Procurement Directory
Peace Dividend Trust Mrs. Sylvie M. GAROIA Trainer (Procurement courses for SME)
SMEC Intern. PTY. Ltd. Mr. David LORD Team Leader
World Bank –
Kabul Urban Development Project (KURP)
Bearing Point Mr. Kelvin POWER Chief of Party & Financial Management
Consultant -
Emergency Public Administration Project
Landell Mills Ltd. Mr. Jan van AGTHOVEN Institutional; Development Specialist –
Preparing the ADB Commercial Agriculture
Development Project
Rodeco Consulting GmbH Mr. Hans HUSSELMANN Team Leader
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Annex 1: List of Persons Met page 27 of 37
GTZ -Water Sector Reform Project
Ministry of Energy and Water
Rodeco Consulting GmbH Mr. Mike O’LEARY Team Leader
GTZ -Institutional Strengthening &
Organizational Development of Water
Utilities -
Ministry of Energy and Water
CIPE - Center for International
Private Enterprise
Mr. Tim BISPEE Deputy Chief of Party
Individual Mr. Gil M. SORIA Consultant (ADB) – Project Implementation
and Procurement Specialist,
Ministry of Energy and Water
Sheladia Inc. Mr. Mir HASHIMI Acting Team Leader (ADB Pul-e-Khumri-
Balkh Road Project)
Sheladia Inc. Mr. Paul J. GUNARATNAM Project Manager / Socioeconomist
Scanagri / Terrainstitute Dr. Stefan SCHUETTE Team Leader,
Capacity Building for Land Policy and
Administration Reform (ADB),
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation
ACTED – Agency for Technical
Cooperation and Development
Mrs. Ziggy GAREWAL Country Director Afghanistan
DED – Deutscher
Entwicklungsdienst
Mrs. Kerstin LEPPER Project Manager
Individual Mr. Malcolm TOLAND Advisor to the Ministry of Commerce,
Technical Assistance & Capacity Building
in the Ministry of Commerce Project
Hope Worldwide Mr. Daniel R. ALLISON Country Director
Hope Worldwide
CNFA (Citizens Network for
Foreign Affairs)
Mr. Gerald TURNBULL, PhD Country Director
CNFA Afghanistan
(Afghanistan Agriculture Development
Project, AADP, funded by USDA)
Individual Mr. Bradley DOLLIS Technical Advisor – Administration,
Ministry of Finance
ARD Inc. Dr. Lewis RASMUSSEN Senior Technical Advisor – USAID
Afghanistan Local Governance and
Community Development Project
Afghan Consulting Firms
AICB – Afghan Innovative
Consulting Bureau
Mr. Jan NAZARI Vice President
Afghan Bena Group Mr. Jamshid IBRAHIMI CEO
NBCC – Nawee Bakhter
Construction Co. Ltd.
Mr. Engineer Nazir AHMAD Director
Trust Project and Design Co. Mr. Abdul MUSA Director
Kabul Group Consulting Firm Mr. Sayed Javed ANDISH Managing Director
ALTAI Consulting Mr. Eric DAVIN Partner
Academic Institutions
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Annex 1: List of Persons Met page 28 of 37
Kabul University Prof. Abdul KABIR KARIMI Lecturer, Faculty of Economics
Kabul University Mr. Ahmad Jawed SHUAIBI Lecturer, Faculty of Economics
Other
Afghanistan International
Chamber of Commerce
Mr. Atiqullah M. NUSRAT Membership Director
ABA – Afghan Builders
Association
Mr. Naeem YASSIN President
ASCE – American Society of
Civil Engineers
Mr. Michael R. SANIO Director International Alliances
BRAC Afghanistan Bank Mr. Shawkat HOSSAIN COO & Senior Vice President
World Bank Task Team Leaders and Staff
Mrs. Nancy ZHAO Operations Advisor (SAROQ)
Mr. William BYRD Advisor (SASPR); TTL – Anti-Corruption Study
Mr. Paul Edwin SISK Senior Financial Management Specialist (SARFM); TTL – Public
Administration Capacity Building Project
Mrs. Susanne HOLSTE Senior Transport Specialist (SASEI); TTL – National Emergency Rural
Access Project, Emergency National Solidarity Program
Mr. Mitsuyoshi ASADA Senior Transport Specialist (SASEI); TTL – Emergency Transport
Rehabilitation Project
Mrs. Scherezad LATIF Education Specialist (SASHD); TTL – Strategic Higher Education TA
Project, Strengthening Higher Education Program
Mrs. Sorarya GOGA Senior Urban Development Specialist (SASEI); TTL – Kabul Urban
Reconstruction Project
Mrs. Julia M. FRASER Senior Financial Analyst (SASEI); TTL – Second Emergency Power
Rehabilitation Project
Mr. Nigel COULSON Senior Public Sector Specialist (SASPR)
Mr. Deepal FERNANDO Senior Procurement Specialist (SARPS)
Mrs. Sima KANAAN Senior Operations Officer (OPCFS)
Mrs. Patricia MACGOWAN Senior Procurement Specialist (LCSPT)
Mrs. Irina LUCA Lead Procurement Specialist (AFTPC)
Mr. Frederick KRANZ Consultant (MNAPR)
Mr. Nagaraju DUTHALURI Procurement Specialist (Consultant SARPS)
Mr. Habibullah WAJDI Education Specialist (SASHD)
Mr. Nargis HAKIMY Program Assistant – Procurement (SARPS)
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Annex 2: GoA Consulting Contracts page 29 of 37
(Facilitated through PC within ARDS)
No ARDS
Ref Mode Scope of Contract
Funding
Agency
Amount in
US$ Name of Winner
Year of
Award
1 MoFA/555 QBS Design of Japan Embassy Building GoA 500,000 PDS, Japan 12/2006
2 AISA/281 QCBS Survey of Industrial Parks GoA 450,000 NESPAK, Pakistan 03/2005
3 MoEW/279 QCBS Feasibility Study of Gambiri Irrigation
Project GoA 751,239
Toossab Consulting
Engineers, Iran 08/2006
4 MoEW/283 QCBS Feasibility Study of Farah Rud Irrigation
and Hydro Power GoA 2,321,560 CES, India et al. 08/2006
5 MoEW/354 QCBS Feasibility Study of Small & Medium
Dams GoA 2,132,010 CES, India et al. 11/2006
6 MoEW/305 QCBS Feasibility Study for Kelaghai Dam
Project GoA 2,210,000 CES, India et al. 12/2006
7 MoLSA/445
con1 QCBS
Consultancy Services for the National
Skills Development & Market Linkages
Program
GoA 1,558,972 International Rescue
Committee (Intern. NGO) 12/2006
8 MoLSA/445
con1 QCBS
Consultancy Services for the National
Skills Development & Market Linkages
Program
GoA 963,574 Solidarity Afghanistan
Belgium (Intern. NGO) 12/2006
9 MoLSA/445
con2 QCBS
Consultancy Services for the National
Skills Development & Market Linkages
Program
GoA 242,690 Sanayee Development
Foundation (Local NGO) 12/2006
10 MoFA/440 QCBS Design of Embassy Building GoA 134,938 Engineering Associate,
Pakistan 12/2006
(1) Consulting services contracts funded by GoA: US$11,264,983 8.6 %
(2) All contracts funded by GoA (goods, works, and consulting services): US$130,877,432 100 %
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Annex 3: Bank-funded Consulting Assignments page 30 of 37
(Signed Contracts from 29 May 2003 until 01 March 06)
No Project Name Contract Description
Contract
Amount in
US$
Signing
Date Company
Country of
Origin
1
Kabul Urban
Reconstruction Project
Consultants for Municipal Finance Support for
Kabul Municipality
$299,000 01-Mar-2006 Infrastructure
Professional
Enterprises (IPE)
India
2 Kabul Urban
Reconstruction Project
Technical Support Unit Assistance to MUDH
for KURP Implementation
$2,705,000 04-Feb-2006 SMEC Australia
3
Emergency Transport
Rehabilitation Project
Design and Construction Supervision for the
Rehabilitation of Taloqan-Faizabad Road -
PHASE 2
$750,000 01-Jan-2006 SMEC Australia
4 Emergency Irrigation
Rehabilitation Project
Feasibility Study for Lower Kokcha Irrigation
and Hydropower Project
$2,203,000 22-Dec-2005 Fichtner Germany
5 Emergency Power
Rehabilitation Project
Technical Assistance for Recruiting and
Commercialization of DABM
$10,677,000 25-Oct-2005 MVV Consulting Germany
6 Public Admin Capacity
Building Project
Government Financial Management Project -
System Study
$640,000 05-Sep-2005 ABU Consult Germany
7
Public Admin Capacity
Building Project
Consultancy Services to Support Treasury
Operations within the MoF, Line Ministries &
Provincial Administrations
$6,851,000 20-Jul-2005 Bearing Point US
8 Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Contract for the External Mid-Term
Evaluation of NSP
$459,000 20-Jul-2005 University of York UK
9 ARTF - Feasibility
Studies Facility
Rehabilitation of Baghdara Hydro Power Plant $4,100,000 07-Jun-2005 Fichtner Germany
10 Public Admin Capacity Consultancy Services to Support Audit $1,809,000 15-May-2005 Deloitte Touch India
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Annex 3: Bank-Funded Consulting Assignments page 31 of 37
Building Project Operations & Capacity Building of CAO Tohmatsu
11
Health Sector
Emergency
Reconstruction &
Development Project
Hiring of Consultant for CMW Training
Program in Panjshar and Kapisa
$357,000 02-May-2005 Health Net
International
International
NGO
12 Emergency Power
Rehabilitation Project
Design and Supervision of Rehab. &
Expansion of Urban Distribution Networks
$1,340,000 2-May-2005 SMEC Australia
13
ARTF - Afghanistan -
Short-Term Urban
Water Supply and
Sanitation Project
Continuation of Consulting Services for Re-
establishment & Operation of Water Supply &
Sanitation Services in Provincial Towns
$3,200,000 29-Apr-2005 Beller Kocks Consult Germany
14
Health Sector
Emergency
Reconstruction &
Development Project
Hiring of Consultant for CMW Training
Program in Parwan
$633,000 20-Apr-2005 International Medical
Corps.
International
NGO
15
Health Sector
Emergency
Reconstruction &
Development Project
Hiring of Consultant for CMW Training
Program in Parwan, Panjshar and Kapisa
$473,000 20-Apr-2005 BRAC Regional NGO
16 Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of NSP in 72 Villages in Laja
Mangal District of Paktia Province
$302,000 17-Apr-2005 People in Need (PIN) International
NGO
17 ARTF - Feasibility
Studies Facility
Amendment 2 for Consultancy Services $880,000 02-Oct-2004 Beller Kocks Consult Germany
18 Public Admin Capacity
Building Project
Procurement of Facilitation Services for
ARDS
$4,280,000 30-Sep-2004 Rites India
19 Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Assessment of Year 1 Performance of NSP
Facilitating Partners
$324,000 09-Aug-2004 Altai Consulting Afghanistan
20 ARTF - Feasibility
Studies Facility
Program Implementation Support Unit for
MWP
$2,315,000 15-Jul-2004 Decon Germany
21 Emergency Public
Administration Project
n.a. $1,700,000 08-Jul-2004 The British Council UK
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Annex 3: Bank-Funded Consulting Assignments page 32 of 37
II
22
ARTF - Civil Service
Capacity Building
Afghan Expatriate Services $5,000,000 08-Jul-2004 International
Organization for
Migration (IOM)
International
NGO
23
Emergency Public
Administration Project
II
Consultancy Services to Manage Public
Administrative Reform
$2,563,000 03-Jul-2004 The Services Group
(TSG)
US
24 Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in
the District of Balhkab in Sar-E-Pul Province
$1,076,000 27-May-2004 German Aggro
Action
International
NGO
25
Health Sector
Emergency
Reconstruction &
Development Project
Performance Based Partnership Agreement
between TISA and AMI for Delivering BPHS
in 3 Districts of Badghis Province
$3,748,000 13-May-2004 Aide Medicale
Internationale
International
NGO
26
Emergency
Infrastructure
Reconstruction Project
Hiring of Consultancy Services for Sanitation
Improvements in Kabul under EIRP
$1,300,000 27-Feb-2004 Gauff Ingenieure Germany
27
Health Sector
Emergency
Reconstruction &
Development Project
Performance Based Partnership Agreement
between TISA and BRAC/BDF for Delivering
BPHS in Balkh Province
$8,384,000 26-Feb-2004 BRAC Regional NGO
28
Health Sector
Emergency
Reconstruction &
Development Project
Performance Based Partnership Agreement
between TISA and SCA for Delivering BPHS
in 3 Districts of Badghis Province
$4,293,000 26-Feb-2004 Swedish Committee
for Afghanistan
Local NGO
29
Health Sector
Emergency
Reconstruction &
Development Project
Performance Based Partnership Agreement
with IBN Sina for Delivering BPHS in Sari
Pul Province
$4,129,000 26-Feb-2004 IBN Sina Regional NGO
30 Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of NSP in Jawand and AB-
Kameray Districts in Badghis Province
$1,673,000 24-Feb-2004 BRAC Regional NGO
31 Emergency National Facilitation of National Solidarity Program by $1,628,000 17-Feb-2004 MADERA International
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Annex 3: Bank-Funded Consulting Assignments page 33 of 37
Solidarity Project Madera in 4 Districts in Nuristan and
Laghman Provinces
NGO
32
Health Sector
Emergency
Reconstruction &
Development Project
Performance Based Partnership Agreement
between TISA and BRAC for Delivering
BPHS in 3 Districts of Badghis Province
$1,469,000 08-Feb-2004 BRAC Regional NGO
33
Health Sector
Emergency
Reconstruction &
Development Project
Consultancy Services for Third Party
Evaluation of MoH Programs
$3,859,000 03-Feb-2004 John Hopkins
University
US
34 Emergency National
Solidarity Project
NSP Facilitating Partner $1,297,000 21-Nov-2003 Oxfam International
NGO
35
Emergency Education
Rehabilitation and
Development Project
Facilitation Agency for Community Grant for
School development in Parwan and Kapisa
Provinces
$2,265,000 17-Nov-2003 BRAC Regional NGO
36
Health Sector
Emergency
Reconstruction &
Development Project
Consultancy Services under PPH in Nimroz
Province
$1,691,000 30-Oct-2003 COOPI International
NGO
37
Health Sector
Emergency
Reconstruction &
Development Project
Consultancy Services under PPH in Farah
Province
$5,381,000 28-Oct-2003 CHA Regional NGO
38
Health Sector
Emergency
Reconstruction &
Development Project
Consultancy Services under PPH in Hilmand
Province
$7,919,000 25-Oct-2003 IBN Sina Regional NGO
39 Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in
Selected Districts/Provinces
$902,000 27-Sep-2003 Ockenden
International
International
NGO
40 Emergency National
Solidarity Project
NSP - Oversight Consultant $24,322,000 08-Sep-2003 GTZ Germany
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Annex 3: Bank-Funded Consulting Assignments page 34 of 37
41 Emergency Transport
Rehabilitation Project
Design and Construction Supervision for the
Rehabilitation of Taloqan-Faizabad Road
$750,000 28-Aug-2003 SMEC Australia
42
Emergency Education
Rehabilitation and
Development Project
Bamiyan Province - Facilitation for
Community Grant for School Development
$2,420,000 24-Jul-2003 CARE International International
NGO
43
Emergency Education
Rehabilitation and
Development Project
Logar Province - Facilitation for Community
Grant for School Development
$2,286,000 24-Jul-2003 CARE International International
NGO
44
Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in
Samangan & Jawzjan Provinces - Darra-I Suf
et al.
$652,000 25-Jun-2003 ActionAid International
NGO
45
Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in
Samangan & Ghor Provinces - Hazrati Sultan
et.al
$2,807,000 25-Jun-2003 AfghanAid British NGO
46
Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in
Badakshan & Baghlan Provinces - Shignan et
al.
$4,912,000 25-Jun-2003 Aga Khan
Development
Network
International
NGO
47 Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in
Selected Provinces
$745,000 25-Jun-2003 AREA n.a.
48
Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in
Faryab, Baghlan, Kunduz & Takhar Provinces
- Almar et al.
$3,726,000 25-Jun-2003 ACTED International
NGO
49
Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in
Nangarhar, Partiak & Heland Provinces -
Rodat et al.
$4,845,000 25-Jun-2003 BRAC Regional NGO
50 Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in
Ghazni & Paktia Provinces - Malistan et al.
$2,982,000 25-Jun-2003 CARE International International
NGO
51 Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in
Alkh Province - Dawlatabad et al.
$933,000 25-Jun-2003 CHA Local NGO
52 Emergency National Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in $739,000 25-Jun-2003 CONCERN International
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Annex 3: Bank-Funded Consulting Assignments page 35 of 37
Solidarity Project Selected Districts/Provinces NGO
53 Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in
Laghman & Badghis Provinces - Alingar et al.
$2,396,000 25-Jun-2003 DACAAR International
NGO
54 Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in
Sar-I-Sul Province - Sayyad etal.
$1,194,000 25-Jun-2003 German Aggro
Action
International
NGO
55 Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in
Kunduz Province - Qalayi et al.
$1,539,000 25-Jun-2003 Ghazi Rural Support
Program (GRSP)
Local NGO
56
Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in
Logar & Khost Provinces - Mohammad Agha
et al.
$4,289,000 25-Jun-2003 International Rescue
Committee (IRC)
International
NGO
57 Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in
Kunar Province - Serkani et al.
$265,000 25-Jun-2003 Islamic Relief
Agency (ISRA)
International
NGO
58 Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in
Wardak Province - Markaz-I Behsud et al.
$984,000 25-Jun-2003 Swedish Committee
for Afghanistan
Local NGO
59
Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in
Kabul Province - Bagrami et al.
$1,848,000 25-Jun-2003 Sanayee
Development
Foundation (SDF)
Local NGO
60 Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of NSP in Kabul Provinces -
Shahjoy, Arghandab & Qalat Districts
$1,475,000 17-Jun-2003 Afghan Development
Association (ADA)
Afghanistan
61 Emergency National
Solidarity Project
Facilitation of National Solidarity Program in
Selected Districts/Provinces
$527,000 16-Jun-2003 GOAL International
NGO
62
Emergency Transport
Rehabilitation Project
Consultancy Services for the Supervision of
the Construction of the Doshi to Shrikhan
Bandar Road
$1,650,000 02-Jun-2003 Louis Berger Group US
63
Emergency
Infrastructure
Reconstruction Project
Re-establishment of Water Supply and
Sanitation services in Selected Provincial
Towns
$2,700,000 29-May-2003 Beller Kocks Consult Germany
Total (approx.): US$175,860,000
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Annex 4: Assessment of 10 Bank-funded Consulting Assignments page 36 of 37
Project Assignment No of EoI
Received
Size of
Shortlist
Proposals
Submitted
Proposals
above MQS
Health Sector Emergency
Reconstruction and
Development Project
Performance-based Partnership Agreements to Deliver Basic
Package of Health Services to Nimroz Province 5 5 3 2
Emergency Power
Rehabilitation Project
Supervisory Engineering Services for Rehabilitation of Naghlu
Hydropower Plant 6 6 1 1
Public Administration and
Capacity Building Project
Procurement Support Reform Project - Procurement Capacity
Building and Legal and Institutional Framework Development
for Procurement in Afghanistan
19 3 2 2
Emergency Power
Rehabilitation Project
Consultant Services for Legal Technical Assistance to the
MoEW to negotiate Power Purchase Agreements for Imports
from Neighboring Countries
5 5 2 2
Kabul Urban
Reconstruction Project
Preparation of Development Plan for Kabul 8 5 3 2
First Emergency Power
Rehabilitation Project
Consultant Services for Reactive Power Compensation for the
North-Eastern Transmission System 9 3 3 2
Public Administration and
Capacity Building Project
Consultancy Services to Support Treasury Operations within
MoF, Line Ministries and Provincial Administrations 12 6 3 3
Kabul Urban
Reconstruction Project
Preparation of Development Plans for Kandahar and Herat 4 3 2 2
Public Administration and
Capacity Building Project
Consulting Services to Support Audit Operations and Capacity
Building with the Control and Audit Office (CAO) 12 6 3 2
Kabul Urban
Reconstruction Project
Preparation of Development Plan for Mazar-i-Sharif and
Jalalabad 4 3 3 3
AVERAGE: 8.4 4.5 2.5 2.1
Afghanistan CPA: Consulting Services Annex 5: Assessment of 12 Bank-funded Consulting Assignments Billing Rates page 37 of 37
WB-funded Consulting Contracts (excluding NGOs): Monthly Billing Rates
Contract Selection
Method
Firm
from
Contract
Date
Team
Leader
Key
Staff National
(1) PRP - Procurement Reform Support Project: Procurement Capacity Building
and Legal & Institutional Framework Development (under PACBP) QCBS UK 02/07 $24,000 $23,000 $4,000
(2) Supervisory Engineering Services for Rehabilitation of Naghlu Hydro Power
Plant (under Emergency Power Rehabilitation Project) QCBS Germany 09/06 $31,000 $25,200 ./.
(3) Consultancy Services for Improving Air Traffic Management System of
Afghanistan Airspace (under Emergency Transport Rehabilitation Project) QBS France 04/06 $33,800 23,000 ./.
(4) Consultancy Services as Technical Support Unit to the PMU in the MoUDH
(under Kabul Urban Reconstruction Project) QCBS Australia 04/06 $23,100 $17,800 $2,500
(5) Government Financial Management and Administration Project – System
Study (under PACBP) QCBS Germany 09/05 $49,500 $31,000 $2,200
(6) Consultancy Services to Support Treasury Operations within the MoF, Line
Ministries & Provincial Administrations (under PACBP) QCBS US 07/05 $35,700 $26,600 $2,700
(7) Feasibility Study for Baghdara Hydropower Project (under ARTF Feasibility
Study Facility Project) QCBS Germany 06/05 $27,100 $18,100 $2,900
(8) Consultancy Contract for the Design and Construction Supervision for
Rehabilitation of Taloqan to Faizabad Road (under Emergency Transport
Rehabilitation Project)
QCBS Australia 08/03 $22,000 $19,000 ./.
(9) Consultancy Services to Support the Audit Operations and Capacity
Building of CAO (under PACBP) QCBS India 05/05 $18,000 $11,000 $7,000
(10) Procurement Strengthening and Support for ARDS (under EPAP II) QCBS India 09/04 $15,000 $13,000 $4,500
(11) Consultancy for Engineering Services for the Procurement and Installation
of OPGW and Associated Equipments for 220K Transmission Line from Kabul
to Pul-I-Khumri (under Emergency Transport Rehabilitation Project)
SSS India 06/06 $12,000 $10,000
(12) Consultant Services for Reactive Power Control for the North-Eastern
Transmission System (under Emergency Transport Rehabilitation Project) QCBS India 06/06 $7,500 $7,500
Average $24,900 $18,750 $3,700
Median $23,550 $18,550 $2,900
Median (Part 1 country firms): $29,050 $23,000
Median (Part 2 country firms): $13,500 $10,500