Key Points

ThewaveofArabrevolt,whichstartedinTunisiaandthenEgyptandLibya,isspreadingatanunprecedentedspeed.Thisistheresultofnotonlymoderninternet-basedtechnolo-giesofcommunication,butalso thedeepsocio-economiccrisisof the regioncoupledwithautocraticregimesthatarenotqualifiedtoaddresstheneedsofthenewgeneration.

Thesocio-economicmalaiseintheregionisdeep.Youthunemployment,degradationofnaturalresources,anddemographicexplosionareamongthedrivingforces.Corruptionandeconomicautocracywenthandinhand.Thereisaneedforacompletesocio-eco-nomicoverhaul.Topplingautocraciesisanecessaryfirststep,butthesuccessofthecur-rentwillalsodependonthepossiblecreationofnewpoliticalinstitutions,andareformistagenda.

ItiscurioustoseethedifferentreactionoftheWestcomparedtothewaveoftheColorRevolutionsadecadeearlier.Western leaders,whocloselycollaboratedwiththeauto-craticregimesfordecades,anddidnotcometothesupportofpro-democracymilitants,needtorevisetheirapproach.Theyshouldalsorevisetheirpoliciestowardsthenationalquestionsoftheregion,includingthesituationsinPalestineandIraq.Lastly,forastableMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,theWest,andespeciallyEurope,needstorevisetheposi-tionoftheregionontheglobaleconomicmap,asoil-basedeconomiesoftheregionhavefailedtocreatethenecessaryjobsandsustainabledevelopment.

GCSP Policy Paper n11February 2011

The Arab Revolt: Roots and Perspectives

by Vicken Cheterian

TheGenevaCentreforSecurityPolicy(GCSP)isaninternationaltrainingcentreforsecuritypolicybasedinGeneva.Aninternationalfoundationwithover40memberstates,itofferscoursesforcivilservants,diplomatsandmilitaryofficersfromallovertheworld.Throughresearch,workshopsandconferencesitprovidesaninternationallyrecognizedforumfordialogueonissuesoftopicalinterestrelatingtosecurityandpeacepolicy.

TheArabrevoltthatstartedinTunisiaandover-threw the reignof Zein El-AbedeenBenAli istakingtheformofahugewave.TheregimeofHosniMubarakofEgypt,thecentralstateoftheArabWorld,followedsuit.UprisinginLibyacontinues,inspiteofattemptsbytheKaddhafiregimetokillitinbloodandfire.AliAbdallahSalehofYemendeclaredthathewillnotseekanewmandate,aconcessionwhichonlyemboldenedbothoppositionandyouthrevolt.KingAbdallahofJordansackedtheunpopulargovernmentofSamirRifai,andnamedMarufBakhitas thenewprimeminister andaskedhim tobringtruepolitical reforms. Inaword, theentireArabWorldisfacinganunprecedentedwaveofrevolt.

Thecontestationhasalreadyscoredanumberofvic-tories: the23year-oldautocratofTunisiapromptlyleft the country to exile in Saudi Arabia; in Egypt,Hosni Mubarak abandoned long brewing plans toinstall his son Jamal inhis seat, andwas forced toabdicate, handingpowerover to themilitary, aftertryingtobringhisloyalchiefofthemukhabarat,orthe secret services, Omar Suleiman, to the post ofvicepresident.

In case there is doubt about the importance ofthe on-goingArab revolt, an animated debate hasemergedaboutitsnature,andgrowing,sometimesanxiousprognosticsaboutitspossibleoutcome.Ontheonehandwehaveardentembraceofyetanoth-erTwitterorFacebookrevolution,whileothersunderlinethepoweroftheinternetandthesatellitetelevisions inunderminingautocratic regimes.Suchcomparisons,consciouslyornot,createanemotion-al fieldwhere the demonstrators or rebels are likeus,ourWestern,modern,middle-class,globalisedyouth.ComparisonsofthefalloftheBerlinWallandtheliberationofEasternEuropewiththecurrentwaveofArabrevoltareabundant.IsthisTheArabworlds1989Revolution?asksal-Jazeera,whiletheDeutche-Welle finds similarities with the events inEastGermanyovertwodecadesback?1Lesserenthu-siastsfearthecurrentpopularmobilizationwilltop-plepro-Western regimes,break the regionalpowerbalanceinawayunfavorabletoIsrael,andeventu-ally open up the political space for Islamist forces,beittheMuslimBrotherhoodormoreradicaljihadigroups.

Socio-Economic MalaiseThecurrentrevolt inArabcountries isdeep-rooted,and surpasses simply rebelling against political au-thoritarianismtoaimat theheartof thesocio-eco-nomic structure of the region.2 TheArab countriesaresomeofthemostexposedtorisingfoodprocess,since the region is one of the dryest in theworld,flanked by the two greatest deserts on the globe:theSaharaandRubal-Khali.AccordingtoaWorld

Bankstudy,theregionimportshalfofitsfood,andspendstheequivalentof30billionUSDonfoodim-ports.Withtheon-goingpopulationexplosiontheregionspopulationisgrowingatarhythmof2.3%ayearanddecreaseinwateravailabilityasaresultofclimatechangeandincreaseddammingofrivers,theregionwillincreasinglydependonfoodimports,and therefore be exposed to international marketfluctuations.Thesituationofthe industrialsector isnotbetter:theArabHumanDevelopmentReportin2009 notes that the domination of economies byoilhas ledtotheweakeningofothersectors:theArabcountrieswerelessindustrializedin2007thanin1970,almostfourdecadespreviously.3Lastly,theglobalcrisisof2008hadadeepimpactontheArabfinancial sector. According to one estimate, Arabcountrieslost2.5trilliondollarsasaresultoftheglo-balfinancialmeltdown.4

Thesocialconsequencesofthosestructuralproblemsaredeep:Theexistingpoliticalorderstodayaretoorigid,autocratic,corrupt,andmilitaristic,whichdoesnotqualifythemtoaddressmountingsocio-econom-icproblems.Oneofthemostexplosiveissuesisyouthunemployment:ArabDevelopmentReportestimatesthatwithinadecadeArabcountriesneedtocreate51 million new positions to accommodate youngpeopleseekingjobs.

The current socio-economic problems are notunique,butrepetitionsofperiodicfailingsofregionaleconomies.Theregionaleconomicmodel,highlyre-sembling colonial eramono-export and dependenteconomies, has failed. Today, not only the oil-richcountrieslikeAlgeriaorSaudiArabiaaredependentonpetrodollars,buttheentireregionisthroughlabormigration, remittancesanddirect investments fromoil-richeconomies.ThemostevidentfailuresareAl-geriaandLibya,whichareindeepsocialandpoliticalcrisisinspiteofrichoildeposits.

Whatisreallypeculiaristhatthecurrentrevoltistak-ingplacewhenoil prices are relativelyhigh,unlikethebreadriotsofthe1980s,aresultofacollapseofinternationaloilprices.Thisisaclearsignthattheoil-basedeconomicmodel isafailure,andasourceofregionalinstability.ThebestexampleofthisfailureisAlgeria,whereoil-richness,corruption,militarydic-tatorshipandsocialproblemscoexistunderoneroof.

TriggerThiswaveofrevoltstartedonabackgroundofde-terioratingsocialconditions:therisingpricesoffoodand basic services. This is not a surprise as globalfood prices are record high, and in Arab countriestwo-fifthofincomeisspentonfood(seeTable1).

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Widespreadunemploymentcrossedwiththeriseofbasicfoodpricesmadethesituationuntenable.Pro-testsagainstsocialconditionsclashedwiththerigidsystems of autocratic rule which do not allow notonlymassprotestbutpoliticalactioningeneral.Theotherimportantelementtothestartoftherebellionis complete hopelessness: the symbolic act of 26-yearoldMohamedBoazizi, theuniversityeducatedbut unemployed vegetable seller in Tunisia, whoseself-immolationignitedthefireoftheTunisianrevo-lution. It is incrediblethespeedatwhichthefireinTunisianprovincesspreadallaroundtheArabWorld.Attemptsatself-immolationwererepeatedinseveralcountries: Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Yemen, andevenSaudiArabia.

Anumberofanalystswhosee,especiallyinTunisia,aMiddleclassrevolutiononthebackgroundofeco-nomicdevelopment,wheredevelopingsocialforcesoverthrow an obsolete political system, are off themark.5Although Tunisia does better in comparisonwith neighboring countries, it was doing worse incomparisonwith itsownpast:socialandeconomicconditionswere indecline for the lastdecade,andinthelastthreetofouryearsalargenumberofpro-testswereindicatorsofthis.ThenewTunisianMinis-terofEconomicReformwasquotedsayingamongthe500,000orsounemployedwere130,000gradu-ates6inatotallaborforceof3.8million.Whenonelooks at the socio-economic conditions in Algeria,Egypt,JordanorYemen,thesituationisevenworsethaninTunisia.Onday16ofEgyptiananti-Mubarakprotest,laborunionsdeclaredstrikesandexpressedtheirsupporttothedemonstrations,fromemployeesofSuezCanaltopublictransportationworkersinthecapital.Andonday18Mubarakresigned,handingpowerovertothemilitary.Ifwelearnedsomethingfrom the Color Revolutions, especially from Kyr-gyzstanandUkraine,itisthatthesimplerotationofdifferentfractionsoftherulingelites isnot in itselfenoughtobringreformstothepoliticalsystem,ortocurbcorruption. InEgypt,wedidnotyethavethat

kindofrotation,butthesimpledisappearanceofanagingdictatorforthebenefitofthearmy,whichwasneverfarawayfromthecentreofpower.

What ishappening inEgypt, Tunisia andbeyond isnot simply a young,modernmiddle-class rebellionagainst authoritarian rule anachronisticwith recenteconomic developments and social stratification. Itis rather socialmalaise that goes beyond themid-dle classes to touchworkers, the unemployed andagriculturelaborers.Thisfarthepopularmovementshave not brought about new political institutions,orpushedhardenough to reformoldones.Yet, itisnotclearwhetherwewillbewitnessingaregimechange,orwhethertherulingcircleswillbebacktobusinessoncethewaveofmobilizationdiesdown.

LeadershipTheon-goingArabrevoltseemstobeleaderless.Thefirst reaction by the local regimes, dissidents, andWesternobservers alike is that of surprise.Noonesawthiscoming.Itwashopelessnessthatignitedthepopular revolt, not organized and concerted politi-calaction,symbolizedby theseriesofself immola-tionstartingwith thedesperateactofMohammadBouazizi in theTunisian townofSidiBouzid inDe-cember2010.TheArabyouthhaveinitiatedandledmanyofthepoliticalactionswithouttheleadershiporeventheinterventionofthetraditionaloppositionforces.7NearTahrirSquare inCairo, youngactivistsimprovised an operations center in an abandonedtouristic company, where they receive journalistsandgiveorderstotheyouthinthefield.8Whileitis the computer savvy youthwhogavenew life todissentthatwasbubblinginEgyptforseveralyears,itistheoldergenerationofpoliticalfigureswhoarenegotiatingwithmembers of theMubarak regimeaboutasolutionandtransitiontowardsdemocracy.In Libya,demonstrationsexploded twodaysear-lierthanthedayofangerannouncedbyopposi-tionparties.ThisspontaneousuprisingresemblesboththePalestinianIntifadaof1987whichwastheresultofhopelessnessaswellas thehunger riotsofthelate1980sinanumberofArabcountries.Itcanbecontrastedwith theColorRevolutionwhichwas ledbypartof theelite inpower;manyof theleadersoftheColorRevolutionsoccupiedhighfunc-tionsshortlybeforetherevolutions:SaakashviliwasaformerJusticeMinisterofGeorgia,YushenkoandBakiyevwereformerprimeministers respectivelyofUkraineandKyrgyzstan.

Theleadershipvacuumwillnottakelongtofillup.Itwill largelydependon thenatureof thepoliticalstruggle inside each country: will the aging rulersgiveuppowerandanewmechanismfordemocraticconsultationscreated?Or,willtherebemassiveuseofforceandviolence,leadingtobloodshedandradi-

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Table 1: Percentage of household expenditure on food from total budget

SaudiArabia23.8%Tunisia 35.8%Egypt38.8%Jordan40.9%Algeria43.9%Switzerland10.3%Greece14.5%Turkey24.8%

SeeEconomicResearchService,USDA,2007:http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/cpifoodandexpendi-tures/data/2007table97.htm

calizingoppositionforces?Itwillalsodependonthebalance of international forces, and whether theWestwill cometosupportArabdemocratic forces,orjustabandonthem.

WhatishappeningtodayissimilartothemassriotsthatshookanumberofArabcountriesinthe1980s:it started fromeconomicproblems causedby foodprice rises and transformed into political contesta-tion. In thissense, itdiffers fromtheColorRevolu-tions which were essentially political revolutionstriggeredbyelectoralfraud,anddidnotchangethecourseofliberal,pro-marketreformsthatwereiniti-atedby thepreviousgenerationof rulers, butonlyacceleratedthemaswasthecaseinGeorgia.

The National QuestionTheArabrevoltwillcastthenationalquestiononceagainontheagenda.Wehavealreadyseenwiththeprevious wave of Color Revolutions how unsolvednationalissuecanpresentanobstacleforpoliticalre-forms:Kosovohaspresenteda seriousobstacle forSerbianeffortsinrapprochementwiththeEuropeanUnion, while the unresolved conflicts of AbkhaziaandSouthOssetiatriggeredseveralarmedconfron-tations,culminatingwiththefive-dayswarbetweenGeorgiaandRussiainAugust2008.

Similarly, the central national question of theArabWorld is the unresolved issue of Palestine. Whilewatching the televised coverage of Tahrir Squareonal-JazeerainArabic,itwassurprisingtoseehowoften anti-governmental slogans reflected the na-tional question: Go away,Mubarak, the agent oftheAmericans, or Mubarak, the agent ofCampDavid, and how the slogan The peoplewant tochange the regime became the people want toliberatePalestine.MubarakslongcooperationwithIsraelandtheUS,againsthisownpublicopinion,bycooperatingonthesiegeofGazawasamajordraw-backonhislegitimacy.

Itisalsoremarkablehowregimescanacquiresymbol-iclegitimacybycastingthemselvesonthesideofre-sistance,asisthecasewiththeSyrianauthorities.InvariouschatsanddiscussiongroupstherearevoicesdefendingtheregimeofBasharal-Asad,sayingthathehas supportedanti-Israeli resistance (in LebanonwithHezballahforexample),oranti-Americanresist-anceinIraq.ForhowlongwillsuchsymboliccapitalhelptheBaathistregimeinSyriawhichinnatureisnotverydifferentfromthatinLibyawhilesocio-economicconditionsaredeteriorating,andwhiletheregimedoesnot tolerateeven the slightest expres-sionofdissentingperspective?

Repression and the ArmyBoth in Egypt and Tunisia, the primary instrumentofrepressionofpopularprotestwasthepolice.Yet,whenthepopularprotestsgotbiggerandthepolicewereoverwhelmed,theTunisianarmywasdeployedbutrefusedtoopenfireonthepeople.TheTunisianarmyspositionforcedprecipitouslyBenAlitoescapeandseeksafehavenabroad. InEgypt,too,thepri-mary instrumentof repressionwas thepolice,and,likeinTunisia,whentheprotestsbecametoobig,thepolicewereoverwhelmed, takenoutof the streetsandthearmywasdeployedintheirplace.Yet,theEgyptianarmyisofadifferentgistcomparedtotheTunisianone:inTunisiathestatereliedonthepoliceBenAlibeinghimselfaformerpoliceofficerwhileinEgyptthearmyisinpower.ThelastthreeEgyptianheadsofstateoriginatedfromthearmyandthefreeofficersmovement:GamalAbdelNasser,Anwar al-Sadat, and the most current ruler HosniMubarak.Highofficershaveimportantprivilegesandenjoy much influence in various economic sectors.WiththeemergenceoftheEgyptianrevolt,Mubarakhastriedtobringthearmyintotheforefrontofhisexercise of power. The newly appointed vice-presi-dentOmar Suleiman openly threatened a militarycoupincasetheoppositionpusheditsdemandsofregimechange,ratherthanbeingcontentwithcos-meticreforms.ButthearmyisoneoftheobstaclesinfrontofmodernizationinEgypt.Thearmyissuscep-tible to internaldivisionsagainstmountingpopulardiscontent,andespeciallydivisionsbetweenitslead-ershipandtherank-and-file,withtheirmodestsocialoriginsandsympathytothecauseofthedissentingpopularmovement.

Here,acomparisonwiththeeventsin1989ontheonehand,and theColorRevolutionson theother,isinteresting.ThebreadriotsofAlgeriain1989ledeventually to theopeningupof thepolitical spaceand the first free elections in 1992.When the au-thoritiessawthattheywerelosingtotheIslamicSal-vationFront,thearmyintervenedtocanceltheelec-tions,provokingabloodycivilwarthatstretchedovera decade and caused over one hundred thousandvictims.TheWestbyandlargesupportedthearmysintervention intopolitics,and its cancelationof theelections, fearing an Islamist victory. On the otherhand,Westernpowerswerefirmintheirrejectionoftheusageofarmedforcesinrepressingtheopposi-tion in the case of theColor Revolutions.Westernpowersdidnotneedtothreatenwithmilitaryrepris-al;itwasenoughtoinformthecorruptleadersandoligarchsofEastEuropeancountriesthatinthecaseofbloodshed,theirbankaccountsintheWestcouldbefrozen.

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The WestWestern political leaders have remained perplexed,to put itmildly, in front of the popular revolutionsinNorthAfrica,andthespreadofpopularmobiliza-tionelsewhereintheMiddleEast.ThefirstreactioninBrussels,ParisorWashingtonwasthefearoflosingalongstandingandreliablepartnerinBenAli,Mu-barak,andinsomecasesevenwiththeColonelKad-dhafi. The other preoccupation ofWestern leadershasbeentoavoidabloodbathasthepopularmove-mentspreadstoproportionsnotseenindecades,andwheretheoldrepressivepoliciesarenotenoughtocontaindissent.Butunlikeduringthepopular,pro-democratic revolutions inEasternEurope, theWestdidnotclearlyarticulatesupporttothelegitimacyofthepopularmovements.

Andforcause:theUSadministrationdevelopedoverthelastthreedecadesveryclosemilitary,politicalandeconomiccooperationwithregimeslikethatofHos-niMubarak.Inthewakeof9/11,theUSadministra-tiondevelopedclosesecuritycooperation,includingillegalkidnappingsandtorture,withtheEgyptianse-cretservicesthenheadedbyOmarSuleiman,thecur-rent acting president.9 If anything, European politi-cianswereinaworsepositiontosupportdemocraticmovements inNorthAfrica. Former French ForeignMinister Michle Alliot-Marie vacationed in Tunisiaand enjoyed the hospitality of a Tunisian business-manclosetotheBenAlisfamily,includingtheusageofhisprivatejetforpersonalreasons,weeksbeforehisdownfall;10duringthesamevacationperiodtheFrenchPrimeMinisterFranoisFilloninhisturnben-efited from the largesse of the Egyptian president,enjoyingfreeholidaysonTheNile.Theformercolo-nialpowerwhichexertsmuchinfluenceoverNorthAfricaandtheMiddleEastnotonlycouldnotsup-portthepopularmovements,norseethemcoming;itskeypolicymakerswerepersonallyindebtedtotheolddictatorsandarepassing theirenergy to justifytheirwrongacts.11

ButWesternresponsibilityisdeeperthansecurityco-operationwiththepolicestatesofBenAli,Mubarak,andtheothers intheregion.WehavelearnedthatMubarakhasanetworthof40to70billionUSD.12Thiscolossalamountwasaccumulatedillegally,andalthough it is goodnews that Switzerland and theEUaretryingtoblockMubarakfamilyaccounts,thequestionremainswhetherWestern leadersareseri-ousincombatingsuchmassivecorruption.Europeancountriesshoulddomoretoestablishmuchneededsocialjusticeamongitssouthernborders,helpthesecountries indeveloping theireconomiesandcreatethe much needed jobs for the youth. The EU im-posed liberal economic policies did not help in jobcreationinNorthAfrica;onthecontrary,itdestroyednumerous small and mid-sized enterprises unable

to competewith European counterparts.13 The oil-dependenteconomiesof the region failed tobringdevelopment,moderngovernance,orevenstability.Thecurrentwaveofprotest isaclearsignthattheregionneedstomovebeyonditsoildependencyifitwantstoprovideafuturetoitsyouth.HeretooEu-ropehasaroletoplayandaresponsibilitytoassume.

What Next?HowfarandhowdeepwilltheNorthAfricanrevoltspread isstill tobeseen.Yet,thefuturestabilityoftheregionwilldependonthekindofreformisten-ergypolicyandpoliticalinstitutionsthecurrentpopu-larmobilizationwillbringabout. If it fails, thenwewillonceagainhavethenecessaryconditionsfortheemergence of radical, nihilist political movements;whetherthesemovementshave Islamistoutercrestor not is not all that important. But today, at thedawnofanewandunprecedentedpopularmobiliza-tionallacrosstheArabWorld,thetimeshouldbeforoptimism,anditisthetaskofEuropenottodoubtthefinalresultofthepoliticalchangestakingplace,buttounderstandthedepthofchangesandtryandhelptheArabyouthtosucceedintheirtransitiontoachievedemocraticpoliticalinstitutionsnecessaryfordeepersocialandeconomicreforms.

NB: The views expressed in this paper are entirely and solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the GCSP.

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Endnotes

1SeeAl-JazeeraEnglishservice,February2,2011:http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2011/02/201121165427186924.htmlandDeut-sche Welle,February4,2011:http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,14817149,00.html2SeeVickenCheterian,TheArabcrisis:food,water,energy,justice,Open Democracy,January26,2011:www.opendemocracy.net/vicken-cheterian/arab-crisis-food-energy-water-justice3Arab Human Development Report,UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme,2009,p.10.4Al-Hayat,January11,2010:http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/964925EricGlodstein,AMiddleClassRevolution,Foreign Policy,January18,2011:www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/18/a_middle_class_revolution6EileenByrne,Tunisiaappealsforaidtoprotectdemocracy,Financial Times,February6,2011.7Al-Hayat,January17,2011:http://international.daralhayat.com/portalarticlendah/2293748Al-Sharq al-Awsat,February6,2011:http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=607014&issueno=117589 Jane Mayer, Who is Omar Suleiman?, The New Yorker, January 29, 2011: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/news-desk/2011/01/who-is-omar-suleiman.html10Le Monde,MichleAlliot-MarieetlaTunisie,retoursurunepolmique,February7,2011:http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/arti-cle/2011/02/07/michele-alliot-marie-et-la-tunisie-retour-sur-une-polemique_1476436_823448.html11Le Monde,VoyageenEgypte:FranoisFillonditavoirrespectlesrgles,February9,2011:http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2011/02/09/conflit-d-interets-fillon-annonce-un-projet-de-loi-dans-les-prochaines-semaines_1477334_823448.html12PhilippInman,Mubarakfamilyfortunecouldreach$70bn,sayexperts,The Guardian,February4,2011:www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/04/hosni-mubarak-family-fortune13SeetheinterviewofQantarawithWernerRuf:http://en.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr-1444/i.html

About the author

VickenCheterianisDirectorofCIMERA,aGeneva-basedinstitutionspecializedinpoliticalgovernance(www.cimera.org).HisresearchinterestsarecontemporarypoliticalevolutionsofArabWorldandpost-Sovietspace,includingarmedconflicts,environmentandsecurity,mediaanddemocratization.HislatestpublicationsareWar and Peace in the Caucasus, Russias Troubled Frontier,Hurst,London,2009;andFrom Perestroika to Rainbow Revolutions, Reform and Revolution after Social-ism,Hurst,London,forthcoming,2011(edited).

Contact

TheGenevaCentreforSecurityPolicyAvenuedelaPaix7bisP.O.Box1295CH-1211Geneva1T+41229061600F+41229061649www.gcsp.chinfo@gcsp.ch

GCSPPolicyPapersareavailableatwww.gcsp.ch

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