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Page 1: AFRICA FACES LITMUS TEST AT MC11 ON DEVELOPMENT ISSUEStwnafrica.org/wp/2017/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/African-Agenda-… · 23 Africa faces litmus test at MC11 on development issues

ISSUE Vol. 20 No. 4 2017 US$5.00 GB₤3.00 €5.00

• AFRICA FACES LITMUS TEST AT MC11 ON DEVELOPMENT ISSUES

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Find out what’s on the African Agenda

The African continent is mostly reported as a land of poverty, civil strife and endless lines of begging hands. Problems facing the continent are portrayed and communicated mostly by foreign eyes through the monop-oly-controlled news media.

By publishing African Agenda, Third World Network Africa aims to provide a different, more complex and nuanced perspective. Open your eyes and ears to an African perspective on critical issues such as trade, the environment, gender and sustainable development.

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CONTENTS COVER05 Rethinking Africa-EU relations after the Cotonou Agreements

11 Europe and Africa can the misunderstandings be resolved?

14 Africa- EU relations, a snapshot of the EPA negotiations

17 Can the post-Cotonou negotiations provide the context for a rethink of the EU’s EPA Policy?

19 79 ACP countries keen to remove imbalances in ties with EU

DEVELOPMENT21 Coping with Foreign Direct Investment

23 Africa faces litmus test at MC11 on development issues

26 The Sustainable Development Goals won’t happen without a radical economic rethink

CLIMATE CHANGE28 A cop out at COP 23?

31 Nigerianfarmerscan’tfightdesertificationalone

33 Food sovereignty and peasant agroecology real solutions to climate crisis

POLITICS35 Pentagon explanations for Niger operations can’t conceal strategic interest

SCIENCE38 Infantformulacompaniesputprofitbefore science

Editor-in-Chief: Yao Graham

Editor: Cornelius Adedze

Design: David Roy Quashie

EDITORIAL, SUBSCRIPTION AND ADVERTISING:

TWN-AfricaP. O. Box 19452Accra-NorthGhana, West AfricaTel: (233) 302 511189/503669/500419Fax: (233) 302 511188Email: [email protected]: www.twnafrica.org

Published by TWN AfricaAfrican Agenda

African Agenda is published by Third World Network (TWN) Africa.

The material in this magazine may be reproduced and distributed without prior permission, provided that the source of the material is attributed to African Agenda ISSN 0855-3378.

page 11 photo: Delegates at EU-ACP meeting

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African Agenda Vol. 20 No. 44

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African AgendaVol. 20 No. 4 5

COVER

Rethinking Africa-Europe Relations after the Cotonou

Partnership AgreementIn 2020 the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) will expire. Discussions are already under

way as to what would replace the CPA. It is an opportunity for Africans to rethink the long-standing relationship with Europe which has in recent time been subject of so much

acrimony, writes *Tetteh Homeku.

A significant part of Africa’s global economic fortune has been tied to the trade and aid regime of

the Cotonou agreement, itself essentially a continuation of the predecessor Lomé Convention first concluded between the two sides in 1975 and renewed until 1999. As many have already acknowl-edged, the world of a possible post-Coto-

nou framework is radically different from the one in which the CPA came into being. Among the major developments have been the 2008 global financial and economic crises that reached out from the advanced industrial economies of US and Europe to wreak havoc across Africa and much of the developing world. It is probably no exaggeration to say that the reverberations of the crises paved the way

for Brexit, with enormous implications for post-Cotonou. For Brexit means not only that the UK, a key architect of the ACP-EU framework since 1975 will no longer be part of a possible post-Coto-nou deal. More importantly the UK will now seek to construct its own trade re-lationship with, at least, the Common-wealth countries which it took along when it joined the EU.

Four lessons from 40 years of heartache

Lome Convention : 1975

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African Agenda Vol. 20 No.46

COVER

The reverberations of the global crisis also did serve as a wake-up call for many an African government in their attitude to, and the subsequent stagna-tion of, the negotiations of the Econom-ic Partnership Agreements (EPA) which were being conducted under the terms of the CPA. Indeed, it is arguable that the EPA negotiations, both in terms of substance and process, did a lot to under-mine whatever optimistic claims formed the premise of the CPA. The substan-tive subject matter of the negotiations brought into sharp relief the conflicting economic imperatives between the two parties. Europe’s agenda stood in much clearer relief: to open up African (and Caribbean and Pacific) economies to its producers and investors. Africa was looking to move away from its primary commodity dependent status. The two agenda turned out to have more in con-flict than in common. In addition, the course of the EPA negotiations exposed the shaky, shallow roots of the mutual good-will that was taken to exist in the dealings between Africa and Europe. Many saw emerge, a predatory European trade and econom-ic agenda, which some have argued had been characteristic of Europe all along. On their side, African governments came across too often as unable or unwilling to define, pursue and meet the costs of their own interest and agenda, to the point of even expecting Europe to pay for the ne-gotiations. In short, if the developments

over the decades since Cotonou came into being are to be taken seriously, Afri-ca and Europe have to be talking a differ-ent language than they are officially used to. And yet, however much things may have changed since the Cotonou agree-ment, the essential challenges that Africa has to overcome in its ability to benefit fundamentally from its dealings with Europe remain the same. They are es-sentially what they have been throughout the 40 odd years that Africa’s post-colo-nial economic relationship with Europe began to be defined through the Lomé Convention. In those years, African countries (and their Caribbean and Pacif-ic siblings) lost many an opportunity to chart a path more in keeping with their fundamental developmental needs. If that is not to happen again, these coun-tries may do no worse than bear in mind a number of key lessons of that history.

Lesson one: partnership in name or aspiration only

The first of these lessons concerns the essence of the relationship between Africa and the European Union. It has become almost axiomatic for European and African politicians as well as others in the development and aid industry to describe this relationship as a partner-ship. This description has been taken so much to heart as to appear in the title of otherwise severely imbalanced instru-ments such as the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, or the Economic Partnership Agreement – imbalances which have constantly weighed heavily in favour of only one side, the EU. For some, the ref-erence to partnership is aspirational. But however heart-warming or as-pirational, the ‘partner’ label has been misleading, and at key moments danger-ously so. For much of the EPA negotia-tions, many an African official could be heard berating civil society organisations who criticised the EPAs as free trade agreements (FTAs) between two unequal parties, with Europe standing to benefit at the expense of Africa’s development. For such officials, rather than being FTAs, these were development partner-ship agreements, with the EU providing aid to support Africa’s adjustment to the

new demands of an unkind international trade regime. An example of a more bizarre kind of this official thinking is the moment in May 2004 when Francophone West Af-rican countries broke ranks with pretty much everyone else in the ACP world and declared themselves ready to move to a second phase of the EPA negotiations, claiming they were ready and pointing to the fact that the EU, their negotiat-ing counterpart, promised to build their capacity for negotiation. Bizarre as it is, the mind-set behind this example was the typical attitude adopted by many African countries in the EPA negotiations, even to the extent that the European Union provided funding to pay for the cost of Africa’s own negotiators. The result, as can be seen in the EPAs so far concluded, has been agreements even more imbal-anced than when they started, with the EU inserting provisions on issues like export taxes that were never part of the agenda of negotiations adopted at the be-ginning. Such thinking cannot continue. In place of nebulous notions of partnership with the simultaneously deceptive, naïve and often patronising undertones, Afri-can countries must open their eyes to the reality of what they are in relation to Eu-rope, and on that basis, define their im-peratives, develop strategies to meet those imperatives and use whatever leverage they can to this end. They must recognise that, just like the countries of European Union, they are defined by their specific place in the international political econ-omy. In line with this they and Europe have economic developmental challeng-es that are fundamentally different and inherently conflictual, most often tak-ing the form of a zero sum-game, with Europe consistently seeking to promote its economic interests, at the expense of Africa.

Lesson two: it is raw materials, mar-kets and industrialisation, stupid

The defining question in Africa’s post-colonial arrangements with Europe, from the Lomé Conventions through to the CPA remains who does what with Africa’s natural resources as industri-al raw materials as well as with Africa’s

“Indeed, it is arguable that the EPA negotiations, both in terms of substance and process, did a lot to under-mine whatever optimistic

claims formed the premise of the CPA. The substantive subject matter of the nego-tiations brought into sharp relief the conflicting eco-

nomic imperatives between the two parties.”

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African AgendaVol. 20 No. 4 7

COVER

In the run-up to the Treaty of Rome (1957) which estab-lished the European Economic Community (EEC) -- pre-cursor of the EU -- France, which among the then treaty partners held the bulk of colonial possessions, made its partners an offer they could not refuse. It proposed to “share the exclusiveness of her colonial markets if the other members would agree to help meet the market and capital needs (of the colonies) that France could no longer handle”. The alternative was that France would not join the community. To retain France’s membership, provision was made, by means of an implementing con-vention attached to the Treaty of Rome, for the existing, i.e. colonial, trade and aid links to be maintained.

In 1958, the first European Development Fund (EDF)was set up, totalling 58 million monetary units of ac-count (the forerunner of the ECU, the European Curren-cy Unit), all of which was in the form of grants and mostly to be spent on (economic and social) infrastructure proj-ects.ThebulkofthefirstEDFaswascommittedwentto France’s overseas territories.

Many of these colonies became independent in the 1960s. Nevertheless, they found it impossible and/or undesirable to break their ties with the community. It then became necessary to put their continuing inter-re-lationship with Community on a different basis. Thus, eighteen countries, almost all Francophone, formed the Association of African States and Madagascar (AASM) with the aim of preserving and extending their ties with the Community. This new form of interrelationship was formalised in 1963 with the conclusion of the Yaoundé Convention between the AASM and the EEC. It was con-cludedforfiveyears,renewedforafurtherfiveyearsin1969, with provisions for preferential trade agreements, accesstorawmaterialsforEurope,financialandtech-nical assistance provided for by the European Develop-ment Fund.

When, together with Ireland and Denmark, Britain joined the EEC in 1973, her existing trade preferences with her own former colonies -- some 20 Commonwealth countriesinAfrica,theCaribbeanandthePacific--werecontinued within the EEC. At the same time, the same possibility was offered to those independent States in Africa which were neither members of the Common-wealth nor of the AASM grouping which had negotiated the Yaoundé Conventions.

Out of the AASM, the Commonwealth countries and independent states emerged one group: the African, CaribbeanandPacific (ACP) group,brought intobeingin Georgetown, in 1975. In January 1975, the second Yaoundé convention expired. In its place emerged, in February1975,thefirstLoméConvention.

Despite appearances to the contrary, very little has changed about the (neo-) colonial essence of these ar-rangements. The so-called partnership institutions that emergedwiththefirstLoméconvention–suchasjointassemblies, jointministerial councils, etc – have longbeen hollowed out as Europe intervened to impose dra-matic economic policy reforms in African countries with the on-set of structural adjustment.

This is not to deny that, during the forty long years of such interaction, the two sides may have built some commonality of interest and traditions. Or that the insti-tutions developed in the process may have gained some dynamics and purpose of their own that could usefully be deployed elsewhere. However, if these relations and institutions are to deepen into something more than outgrowths of a colonial past, African countries must in-vest them with a purpose and relevance in keeping with their fundamental challenges in the modern times. So far, alas, there is scant evidence of this happening.

The Beginning

vast market, both real and potential. Af-ter all these years, one would be forgiv-en for thinking that this is self-evident. And judging from their positions and demands throughout various trade ne-gotiations with Africa, Europe can, cer-tainly, be seen as aware that sustaining their industrialised economies requires continued, uninterrupted and favour-able access to Africa’s raw materials and markets. African countries, however, cannot be said to operate with similar understanding of the conditions within

which their raw materials and markets would be of use for their own develop-ment. Except for a brief moment in the immediate post-independence period, the positions taken by African countries did not seem to appreciate that, in or-der to industrialise and transform their economies from the primary commodity export-dependent outposts in the global order, they have to re-organise the terms of Europe’s access to their raw materials and their markets. The result is that in all the past

agreements Europe took steps to secure its access to Africa’s economies and raw materials. Africa on its part seemed con-tent to get more aid and preferential market for its exports, and continued to sell its resources to Europe in the same unprocessed form and on virtually the same terms of unequal exchange since colonial times. At the time of the first Lomé Con-vention in 1975, Europe was mortified by the prospect of losing its ready sources of raw material supply. The years prior

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African Agenda Vol. 20 No. 48

COVER

to the signing of the agreement were the years of the Arab-Israeli war, the use of oil as an economic weapon, the rise of OPEC as a major commodity cartel, the fear in the industrialised world of many replica OPECs for other primary com-modities, such as cocoa, coffee, gold, copper, and so on. In addition, many commodity prices were high, and de-veloping countries seemed to be on the brink of wielding some economic pow-er. Partially in response to this, Europe offered to stabilise the export prices of African (and Caribbean and Pacific) ag-ricultural (and later mineral) prices to its market, and to pay compensation in case the prices fell. Aid, and preferential ac-cess to Europe’s markets completed what was then toasted as a great win-win deal for all. But the export price stabilisation mechanism failed to address (nor was it meant to address) the roots of commod-ity price fluctuations which continued to dog African exports and to create havoc for their economies and development prospects. The industrial development arrangements in the agreement were in-effective. Thus, with Lomé I, Europe met its need; but Africa continued to harvest its problems. Soon, the prospects of commodity cartels receded, while commodity prices tumbled. Africa’s primary commodity dependence that was skirted in agree-ments plunged the continent into the long period of economic crises of the late 1970s culminating in the structural adjustment period of the 1980s. Hence-forth, Europe abandoned any pretence of helping Africa industrialise. In the subsequent Lomé Conven-tions, it embarked on structural adjust-ment conditionality, through macro-eco-nomic reforms in African countries. This made African countries give up all their industrialisation prospects in order to concentrate on their so-called compara-tive advantage in commodity export. By the time of Lomé IV, Europe was boldly telling the African state to get out of the way, being a corrupt part of the problem, and cede part of its functions to so-called decentralised operators, that is to say, NGOs from Europe and their African partners involved in the delivery of ser-

vices targeted at poverty alleviation. Having lost their way in the de-in-dustrialisation trauma of neo-liberal structural adjustment, African countries remained re-active throughout most of the Lomé Convention days. When they were not struggling simply to hold on to their European aid, and the preferential access to European markets for their ex-ports, they were doing whatever it took (that is what their “development part-ners” demanded) to attract the foreign investor that they had now come to be-lieve as the salvation to their economic woes. In the mid-1990s, as Lomé IV run its first course, the World Trade Organi-sation became the prime means for pro-moting the policies of economic deregu-lation and liberalisation that were touted

as necessary to attract the foreign inves-tor. Europe’s policy was to help Africa to gradually and smoothly integrate in to multilateral trade regime, that is become active in adopting WTO rules. There was even a questioning of the continued rel-evance of the ACP, and even more im-portantly, of the use of trade preferences enjoyed by these countries in Europe. Bill Clinton’s adoption of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the extension of enhanced trade prefer-ences to Africa, and with that, the Amer-ican declaration of intent to compete with Europe over African markets and investment opportunities put paid to such “loose talk”. Against the background of US pre-paring to enter into trade and investment agreements with selected African coun-

Africa-EU summit

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tries and regions, the Cotonou Partner-ship Agreement was agreed, whose lynch-pin was a series of free trade agreements with groupings of African countries, either grouped as their existing regional economic blocs or in new formations that suited Europe. This became the ba-sis of the EPA negotiations. What was meant to be negotiations of good-will among partners soon turned aggressive, not least because another group of coun-tries emerged on the scene to compete for Africa —- China, India, Brazil. Eu-rope’s aggressive response expressed itself in a number of novel demands like those on export taxes and MFN clauses which appeared mid-stream in the EPA negoti-ations to the shock of many an African negotiator and government. Throughout all of this, the need

for their own agenda of industrialisation hardly figured as a determining factor in the positions African governments took in relation to Europe. Only with the global financial and economic crises of 2008 did they wake up to the realisa-tion that their economies could not de-velop simply on the back of commodity export, however high their prices rose. Even then, they took a while to follow the logic of this realisation in their deal-ing with Europe. On the one hand they adopted programmes like the African Mining Vision, in which they commit-ted to adopt policies to promote local value addition to the mineral resources rather than export them raw. But then they moved straight from that to sign on to EPA agreements with Europe which took away the policies and policy space needed to achieve the goals of the AMV. Now that the same African countries have adopted Agenda 2063, an agenda of structural economic transformation that echoes and expands the United Nations Agenda 2030 of SDGs, surely it is not too much to hope that African govern-ments will learn that their own agenda of industrialisation must be the basis of what access they grant Europe and other countries to their market and resources. Or is it?

Lesson three: negotiating positions do not drop from the skies …

When Mao Ze Dong said that cor-rect ideas did not drop from the skies but rather came from practical and conscious engagement with one’s reality, he may have had a sneak preview of African offi-cials and negotiators in relation with Eu-rope. Except that in their negotiations with Europe, the Africans tended to look not so much to the skies as to Europe. It may have something to do with the long years of structural adjustment pol-icy imposition in which African agency over and responsibility for policy formu-lation and decision-making was usurped by multilateral and bilateral donors, with Africans simply implementing those pol-icies. By the time the EPAs negotiations were in full flow, African negotiators and officials simply abandoned any at-tempt to arrive at the negotiating table

with their own positions independently worked out from their strategic options, derived from their development strate-gy and policy objectives. The tendency has been to wait for what the European Union put on the table and then re-spond. For instance, even though they de-clared themselves ready to negotiate, the West Africans did not have a negotiating mandate of their own based on and struc-tured around their own priorities – they simply took a copy of the EC negotiating mandate, and made reactions to it. So the West African mandate, contained the same subject matters as that of Europe, even though it could not possibly be clear what they sought to gain by them. Thus, the EC had a subject on investment, by which they meant to develop rules which would give EU investors access to West African economies. The West Africans also had a paragraph on investment, although it was not clear even to them-selves whether they were talking about access of West African investors to the EU (a rather fanciful dream) or to West Africa (in which case what was the point of making it part of their EPA negotiat-ing mandate?). And this was not unique to West Africa. When it came to the actual posi-tions on these issues, a similar reactive mode operated. Europe put forward its position and Africa responded. In many instances, especially in the EPA negoti-ations, the response had been to assert that Africa needed capacity building to undertake the obligations contained in the demand, even in situations where the demands were palpably inapplicable to the conditions of African countries. This reactive mode was part of the mind-set that extended to depending upon Europe even to finance the meet-ings of Africa’s own negotiators or even studies that would form the basis of their negotiating positions. A number of the effects ensued from of this mode of dealing with Eu-rope. First, it allowed them to set the terms and parameters of the discussion. This went beyond subject matter of dis-cussions to include the institutional ar-rangements. In the EPA negotiations, Europe went as far as determining the

African AgendaVol. 20 No. 4 9

COVER

Africa-EU summit

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African Agenda Vol. 20 No. 410

COVER

kind of regional groupings for Africa with which to negotiate. Thus, a new group called Eastern and Southern Afri-ca (ESA) was created which bore no rela-tionship with any regional arrangement then existing in that region of Africa. This persisted far into the negotiations until, fed up, a group of countries decid-ed to set up their own Eastern African Community. The rump of the ESA still remains. In West Africa, two regional group-ings UEMOA and ECOWAS equally participate in the negotiations, even though UEMOA is meant to fold into ECOWAS as the pre-eminent regional body. Secondly, it allowed Europe to dic-tate and change the process of the nego-tiations at will, even mid-stream. The EPA negotiations were to start as an all ACP affair, where the rules for subsequent stages of the negotiations would be adopted. As the EU found it more difficult to impose its rules on this bigger group, it abrogated that process, and plunged into second phase involving regional grouping, helped along by Fran-cophone West Africa. Finally, it allowed Europe to get away with unfounded (some times patently absurd) positions. For a long part of the EPA nego-tiations, European negotiators insisted that WTO rules dictated that African countries had to open up their market to a minimum of 80% for European ex-ports. In spite of all the evidence to the contrary, this European preference was re-echoed by many African officials as an article of faith. That was until in the case of West Africa, a group of civil so-ciety organisations got fed up and com-missioned their own expert to confront EC negotiators with contrary arguments. Then they changed their tune to the ef-fect that it was in the interest of Africans to open up to 80%. It goes without saying that African countries cannot continue with this at-titude in future negotiations with Eu-rope. For a start, they must begin with their commonly adopted visions and goals—e.g. Agenda 2063, African Min-ing Vision, and ask themselves what the best strategy is to realise these. Then, on the basis of that, they can develop the policies and demands that can form their

negotiating agenda.

Lesson four: African citizens are not the enemy of African governments in

international negotiations… Effectively, the default position of African governments in their dealing with Europe has been to treat their citi-zens as “opponents”, to keep them as far away as possible from whatever they are negotiating with Europe. Even docu-ments outlining their views and expecta-tion which they have shared with Europe, their actual negotiating counterpart, are treated as confidential when it comes to African citizens. As regards prior consul-tation with citizens so as to inform their negotiating agenda, this might as well be an alien concept from an alien plan-et. The effect is that citizens and citizens groups who ultimately bear the brunt of agreements have usually been in the dark about the agreements. Unless they bad-ger their way into the process. Paradoxically, Europe has done more to facilitate African civil society ac-cess to the negotiations, partly as response to pressures from European citizens. But the dark side of this is that it has enabled Europe to pick and promote its own civil society groups among Africans. Thus at critical stages in the EPA negotiations in Ghana for instance, think-tanks that ac-knowledged they had never heard of the EPAs emerged commissioned by the EC for them to help government sort out its views; NGOs which had kept away from EPAs for all the while, emerged bran-dishing EU data to call for conclusion of the EPA negotiations, only for them to disappear into their previous silence thereafter; and subsidiaries of European companies based in Ghana, and export-ing to Europe emerged all of sudden as champions of a private sector urgency to conclude the deal. And yet notwithstanding, their treatment by their own governments Af-rican civil society have proven themselves a resource into which African negotiators have tapped to formulate technically sound negotiating positions in counter to EU. They have organised and brought to the table the views and concerns of a diverse range of socio-economic constit-uencies whose interests and livelihoods

have been implicated in the very formu-las adopted in the EPAs – from domestic enterprises, to farmers, to traders. It’s probably not an exaggeration to say that had it not been for this work, a much more atrocious version of the EPAs would long ago have been conclud-ed across Africa. Thus, until they devel-op the confidence to treat their citizens as the very basis of their legitimacy and asset in their dealing with Europe and others, the coming negotiations would not change much. This calls upon African civil society organisations and individuals to raise their own game, to continue and upscale what they have already done time and again across a range of issues – i.e., claim the space to interact with governments and decision-makers through the force of their collective and deep knowledge of the issues, their networking skills and relationships, and their capacity for so-cial mobilisation. Through these means above all can they ensure that the lessons of the past 40 years are learnt and applied for the benefit of Africa’s future.

* Tetteh Homeku is head of Programmes, TWN-Africa.

“The EPA negotiations were to start with an all ACP

affair, where the rules for subsequent stages of the negotiations would be ad-opted. As the EU found it

more difficult to impose its rules on this bigger group, it abrogated that process, and plunged into second phase involving regional grouping,

helped along by Franco-phone West Africa.”

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African AgendaVol. 20 No. 4 11

COVER

Europe and Africa: can the misunderstandings be resolved?

Some say Europe and Africa are bound to live together. This may be true. In both Europe and Af-rica, it is now acknowledged that this partnership built on the ruins of colonial domination and asymmetrical post-colonial interdependence relations has failed. So far, the two parties have notexhibitedanysenseofgreatimaginationinfindinganappropriatereplacementsolution.ThedifficultnegotiationoftheEconomicPartnershipAgreementdidnotimprovematters.It

rather worsened misunderstandings between Europe and Africa, argues *Cheikh Tidiane Dieye.

Economic relations between Europe and Africa, which have evolved over the last fifty years with some

level of stability and predictability, have now entered a turbulent zone that is making their pattern blurred and growth uncertain. The partnership between the two continents is at the crossroads. Its fu-ture trends and forms depend on the will of the two entities to rebuild together a common future. This partnership also

depends on strategies and efforts of each of them to shape a destiny without the other and sometimes against the other in a world that imposes constraints and offers opportunities. In this new configuration, it seems that it is Africa that has shown more clearly the will to free itself from the Eu-ropean tutelage in order to rebalance the relationship in its favour. Africa has tak-en the necessary measure imposed by the

need to create conditions for a readjust-ment of its trade, economic and politi-cal relations with Europe. This process is irreversible and is being driven by trends across the world and it is becoming in-creasingly clear that the African conti-nent would benefit by accelerating its efforts at diversifying its economic and trade partners to derive benefits from op-portunities emerging on world markets, especially in countries of the South.

Delegates at EU-ACP meeting

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But let us be clear. The need to di-versify Africa’s trade partners should not in any case imply, as some are suggesting, a complete reconsideration of Africa-Eu-rope relations in the interest of emerging relations, especially with China, which may appear as an alternative to Europe. Reasoning in terms of alternatives will be tantamount to promoting a model in which emerging countries would re-place Europe. This is neither possible nor productive for Africa. The continent’s approach should rather be perceived as a commitment to put ahead its well un-derstood strategic interests and deal with any partner that is likely to be an asset for the continent. China is not abandoning Europe for Africa or America. Europe is not doing so either. Why should Africa choose one or the other? Europe has for a long time been Af-rica’s major economic partner. It remains so to a large extent in many areas. Put-ting its own economic, political and geo-strategic interest first on the continent, together with other factors, have largely contributed in maintaining Africa in the current situation, that is, a trade profile based on commodity exports and manu-factured products imports, very little di-versification, inappropriate or non-exis-tent infrastructure, weak industrial base, a service sector in decline, etc. Europe cannot obviously be total-ly blamed for the economic difficulties plaguing Africa. In many cases, the in-ternal responsibilities are as significant as those of Europe, if not more. Having said this, it must be recognized that it is Europe that benefitted mostly from the colonial and post-colonial structures of production and trade imposed on Afri-ca. These are the structures that need to be corrected, if not changed, with the effective support of Europe in order to address part of the misunderstandings between the two continents. Throughout their shared history, re-lations between Europe and Africa were sometimes stable and other times tense but always complex and full of hidden challenges and interests. Whichever pe-riod is considered, the logic seems the same and many European initiatives have yielded very mixed results. Europe has been more concerned

with African politics than the economy. It has always decided for Africa and hard-ly with Africa It has always talked more than listened to Africa. It has imposed more than advised. .

Europe for Africa The beginning of the millennium marked a major turning point in relations between Europe and Africa. Economic and political changes that occurred in the middle of the 90s and deeply marked international relations were accelerat-ed in the 2000s. The traditional trends began to shake and opened the way for new forms of co-operation and econom-ic opportunities. It is in this context that two events occurred and had long-lasting effects on Europe-Africa relations. The first event is the Europe-Africa Summit, the first of its kind, which was held in Cairo in April 2000. During this summit, Europe outlined its policy to-wards Africa. The Cairo summit set up a strategic framework for the Europe –Af-rica Dialogue through priority axes iden-tified by the two parties. These axes in-clude regional integration in Africa and the integration of Africa into the world economy, good governance, institutions and human rights, peace and conflict management and sustainable develop-ment. As can be seen, the broad nature of these axes already pointed to difficulties in implementation and their inability to produce concrete results. In their poli-cy statement, both Europe and Africa showed their convergence of views and commitment to build a fruitful and mu-tually beneficial partnership. In real-ity, deep divergences were setting them apart: Europe was more interested in is-sues of human rights, politics, peace and security whilst Africa wished to promote economic and infrastructure develop-ment issues. The second event is the signing of the Cotonou Agreement on 23rd June 2000. This agreement is the framework for the partnership between the Euro-pean Union and 79 ACP countries. It aims to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, support sustainable economic, cultural and social development in ACP countries and facilitate the gradual inte-

gration of their economies into the world economy. Open to non-state actors, es-pecially the private sector and civil so-ciety, the implementation was managed by joint institutions such as the Coun-cil of ACP Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors and joint ACP-EU parlia-mentary Assembly. The Agreement has a strong political component. This com-ponent is focused on political dialogue on national, regional and international issues, human rights, democracy, conflict prevention, migration issues and terror-ism, among others. Regarding the com-ponent on economic issues, the Cotonou Agreement introduces the negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), provides for modalities for their establishment as well as procedures that will guide these negotiations.

Europe with Africa In 2005, the European Union Council presented its “new strategy for Africa”. It is based on priorities identified in Cairo and lays greater emphasis on migration and security issues, especially terrorism. This new strategy was the basis of the European approach when the sec-ond EU-Africa Summit was held in Lis-bon in 2007, seven years after the Cairo Summit. For the first time, Europe was meeting with Africa without a predeter-mined plan. Europe, it said, was coming to draw up, together with Africa, the outlines of a new partnership. The words were well chosen. The European leaders were talking about a new beginning and a new strategy for the first time, a truly common strategy. Jose Barroso promised to move from a “policy for Africa “to “a policy with Africa”. Louis Michel went further. In his view, the Lisbon Summit marked the adoption of a new common vision enshrined in a joint strategy based on an equal and pragmatic political part-nership without constraints and com-plexes and mutual responsibility. The commitment expressed by the European and African Heads of States led to the adoption of the Europe-Afri-ca Joint Strategy (EAJS) and the Lisbon Plan of Action. To give this new part-nership the chance to succeed, Europe and Africa promised to address together

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major political challenges that they con-sider as the main source of understand-ing under previous initiatives. The declarations of intention were, however, soon caught up with by the reality of economic and trade interests. In December 2007 while policymakers were exchanging beautiful words, experts negotiating the EPAs were battling on technical issues. In fact, it was when the deadline of December 2007 was drawing nearer that the European Commission intensified pressure on the region to sign the regional EPA and later on the non LDCs to conclude interim EPAs.

Trade, the cornerstone of the Economic Partnership Agreement Even though trade is not the only is-sue addressed in the Europe –Africa joint strategy, it has inevitably become the cor-nerstone of the partnership between the two continents. Its success will facilitate dialogue between the two partners, but its failure will undermine it for a long time to come. Europe was not prepared to see a continent, which has never turned down its demands, evolve and show a vigorous resistance in the negotiation of this trade agreement. Europe has always given Af-rica what it wanted and received what it desired in return. Europe is finding it difficult to reassure, convince and retain a partner that is eluding it. After Lisbon, the Declaration from the third summit of African and EU Heads of States held in Tripoli in No-vember 2011 also captured the will of both parties to conclude an agreement that promotes socio-economic develop-ment, regional integration and the inte-gration of Africa into the world economy. However, it could not address the misun-derstandings as it did not lead Europe to amend its attitude towards Africa. By imposing the signing of interim agreements on many African countries outside their regional grouping and in-sisting that they implement them before 1st October 2014 or lose their access to the European market under preferential conditions, the EU created serious ten-sions within the African regions. In West Africa, for instance, the non-conclusion of a regional EPA split the region into

five different trade regimes with the EU. If this situation is not resolved, it may sound the death knell of the integra-tion achieved with great difficulty. This explains why in several African regions, large sections of the population, includ-ing elected officials, private sector and civil society stakeholders and even gov-ernment officials perceived the signing of EPA not as a voluntary and desired act in the interest of the region, but as the price to pay to safeguard integration in a region trapped by the EU. Dialogue between Europe and Afri-ca should not be an empty word. It must be based on mutual respect, the consid-eration of the needs and capacities of each other and solidarity. In dealing with Africa, Europe hardly shows this kind of wisdom. The image Europe has of Africa over the centuries is preventing it from having a serene and objective relations with the continent. There is a second reason behind this current misunderstanding. It is more po-

litical if not geostrategic. Europe is once again showing interest in Africa because it has become a geostrategic stake being coveted by other emerging powers com-peting with Europe. This stance appears as an opportunist or reactive approach. Europe’s renewed economic interest in Africa seems to be in reaction to the rise of China, India, Brazil, to name but a few. By taking measures not to lose Af-rican markets it has so far considered its exclusive property, Europe would com-mit errors that will only reinforce the misunderstanding with its African part-ners. One of these errors is the inclusion of the so called Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause in the Economic Part-nership Agreement. This clause is not a necessary condition for legal validity of the EPA under the World Trade Organi-zation (WTO). By imposing this on its African partners and hoping to maintain its long term trade interests against its Chinese, Indian, Brazilian competitors and other emerging countries, the EU is once again making an inappropriate choice. Europe and Africa can build a pos-itive, proactive and mutually beneficial partnership. The aim should not always be monetary gains. What is needed is co-herence, commitment and respect. The billions promised or to be promised, if they are fully disbursed, which is rarely the case due to the European condition-alities that hinder absorption of these resources, cannot correct the structural deficiencies that a bad free trade agree-ment or incoherent interventions could cause economies in Africa Europe must also understand that the increasing pres-ence of China in Africa under conditions framed and defined by Africans them-selves is not necessarily to the detriment of the continent. It is favourabe for Afri-ca. *Cheikh Tidiane DIEYE is Executive Di-rector of the African Centre for Trade, Inte-gration and Development (CACID), Enda Tiers Monde Network.

This is a translation from the French by Barbara Kpodo-Zida

“There is a second reason behind this current mis-

understanding. It is more political if not geostrate-gic. Europe is once again showing interest in Africa because it has become a geostrategic stake being

coveted by other emerging powers competing with

Europe. This stance appears as an opportunist or reac-

tive approach.”

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Africa-EU relations: a snapshot of the EPA negotiations

As 2020 approaches and with it the expiry of the Cotonou Partnership Agreements (CPA) between the European Union and Africa, *Sylvester Bagooro cautions Africa against the pitfalls that characterise the EPAs negotiations in particular and Africa-EU relations in general and calls for negotiations that not only take account of Africa’s equitable developmental needs but also thebiasedhistoryandnatureofAfrica-EUrelationsthathavetendedtobenefitEuropemore

than Africa.

Many pundits have raised issues such as migration, security, jobs, and trade among oth-

ers, that should be the focus of the next conversation between Africa and the EU. Whatever the focus might be eventual-ly, Africa must constantly be mindful of the following: i) what kind of relation-ship that should be established between Africa and Europe in the post-Cotonou era that will be meet the equitable de-

velopmental needs of Africa and ii) what lessons Africa can pick from the over 15 years engagement on the Economic Part-nership Agreement (EPA) with the Euro-pean Union. Africa goes into this engagement with Europe with a certain economic reality, a reality that has lingered over decades. African economies continue to perform sub-optimally in the global economy due to its primary commodity

dependent nature. In 2015, Africa’s share in global trade was only 3percent, with total exports comprising 80percent raw commodities and 20percent manufac-tured. This precarious and perverse eco-nomic reality has been associated with the continent predating the commence-ment of the Lomé conventions, the pre-decessor of the CPA. Hence it is impera-tive for this reality to be the overarching driver of any further engagement with

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Europe. Currently, the need to struc-turally transform African economies has come to dominate policy discourses in Africa. In fact, Africa Agenda 2063, the guiding vision document of the Africa Union, has it as a key pillar for the next decades. The EPA negotiations emerged from the CPA which made provision for negotiating a trade agreement that is ‘compatible’ with the rules of the World Trade Organisation. That is by replac-ing the non-reciprocal preferential trade regime with a reciprocal trade agreement between Europe and African (Caribbean and Pacific) countries. The negotiations commenced in September 2002 and were scheduled to be concluded in five years. But that never happened. It took over 15 years of bumpy, bullying with deadlines and acrimonious negotiations. Hence African countries engaged in the conversations with the EU for post-Cotonou should pay critical atten-tion to the following lessons which are derived only from the content of the EPA texts in most of the Regions but with a special focus on West Africa and Ghana. First and foremost, EU does not care about Regional Integration in Afri-ca. Africa is more divided now than be-fore the onset of the EPA negotiations. In West Africa, there were only three trade regimes-ECOWAS Free Trade Area, UE-MOA for the French speaking countries and the trade arrangement under the CPA. Today, ECOWAS has six differ-ent trade regimes in relation to the EU alone. Cape Verde trades now with the EU under the Standard Generalised Sys-tem of Preference Plus (GSP+), Nigeria trades with the EU under the Standard GSP, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire are un-der different Interim EPAs and the rest of the countries, which are LDCs, under Everything But Arms (EBA). These exist in addition to the ECOWAS Trade Lib-eralisation Scheme. Also, all these trade regimes have different rules of origin and hence cumulation between countries will be impossible. The disintegration came about when the European Union with the threats of series of deadlines forced the developing countries in the Region such

as Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire to sign into interim EPAs. Even, when the Africa Union, based on its analysis appealed to the EU to consider ECOWAS, as an LDCs Region and be granted an LDCs preference, the European Commission opposed it and concentrated on dead-lines to get some members in the Region to succumb to its political pressure. Secondly, Market Access opening beyond a certain threshold is extremely detrimental to the local manufacturing sector but the EPA Negotiations have pushed West African countries to open more their economies and expose their local and dynamic manufacturing base to the threat of imports. In the lingering West Africa EPA, the liberalisation com-mitment is 75 percent. This was arrived at after sacrificing the light and most dy-namic manufacturing sector. In Ghana for instance, these include paper rolls, paper cartons, insecticides, fungicides, disinfectants, corrugated roofing sheets, paving stones, blocks, tiles, roofing tiles, corks, lids, bottle tops, baby walkers, prams and similar things, towels, sanitary towels, nappies, and similar products, garments and accessories for garments, among others. These constitute the light industrial sector and the heart of the re-gion’s manufacturing and are crucial for any meaningful industrial development. This explains why the ECOWAS Com-mission since 2007 maintained them as

critical for the development of the region and hence the deadlock in the negotia-tions between West Africa and the EU. More importantly, liberalisation of these products does not follow any sound economic logic because these products are made locally, and are not exported to Europe but satisfy national and regional markets. During the EPA negotiations the EU basically reduced the engagement to a much more mercantilist approach. This was evident in its demands for WTO-plus issues that became some of the con-troversial issues. Mention can be made of exports taxes and the most favoured nation clause provisions in the EPA. Ex-port taxes were never part of the EPA ne-gotiations (not even of the Doha Round in the WTO) until in about 2006, when the EU identified the undisturbed flow of raw materials to its manufactures as essential to its strategy for remaining globally competitive, leading it to adopt among others, its raw materials initiative. It thus identified export taxes as one of the means by which other countries “dis-rupt” the free availability of raw mate-rials. Since then it has attempted, with little success, to have this introduced into the WTO. The EU took the opportuni-ty through the pressures of the deadlines and introduced this late in 2007 into the EPA through the back door. With regards to the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause too, there is no legal basis for its inclusion in the EPA. Thus, its inclusion contravenes General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)/WTO rules that provide for South-South cooperation among developing coun-tries. The only reason was to gain pole position in Africa in terms of its raw ma-terials needs. In the proposed, West Afri-ca EPA the provision is that, subsequent to the adoption of the agreement, what-ever better trade terms West Africa grants to major developing countries, such as Brazil, China, or India would automat-ically be extended to the benefit of the European Union. However, as concerns whatever better terms West Africa may have got from those countries, it would be subject to consultation as to whether the European Union should grant these better terms to West Africa. Apart from

“The EPA Negotiations have pushed West African coun-

tries to open more their economies and expose their

local and dynamic manu-facturing base to the threat of imports. In the lingering West Africa EPA, the liber-

alisation commitment is 75 percent. This was arrived

at after sacrificing the light and most dynamic manu-

facturing sector.”

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the inequitable imbalance involved here, the main effect of this provision will be to undermine the future possibility of West Africa or any EPA party country constructing building mutually “South-South” relations with key developing countries.

Promised Aid from EU Bait and not for Real Trade Adjustment Cost

In the heat of the debate on the EPAs, the EU employed all available means including dangling of aid to get governments sign into the EPAs. But the EU did not provide any additional fund-ing other than repackaging existing Eu-ropean Development Fund (EDF). The Caribbean experience proves that EU did not provide any additional funding, con-trary to its commitment. In the case of West Africa, the Eu-ropean Union promised to give aid to countries to address adjustment cost. West Africa through its own analysis of the trade adjustment cost due to the EPA, initially demanded an amount of €9.54 billion from the EU. This was updated to 16 billion euros. After years of struggles between the negotiators the EU finally only promised West Africa an amount of 6.5 billion euros for the 16 West African countries spread over a 5-year period. This is to cover infrastructure develop-ment and capacity building of stakehold-ers including non-state actors. Dividing this among the 16 countries over the five years, the amount comes to 82 million Euros per country per year. This pales into insignificance when compared to the tariff revenue to be forgone in return for the promised aid, and there is no commitment on any additional aid.

The commitments in the current interim EPAs and the proposed West Africa EPA also show that the European Union is ever determined to strategical-ly take control of the entire economy of West African countries. The EU is look-ing ahead for government procurement, services, investment, intellectual proper-ty, capital accounts liberalisation among others. The implication of deregulation in all these sectors are enormous. A few will suffice:

a) Government Procurement:Government procurement serves as a tool by which government can create a stable market for local producers– from central to local level – purchases; including pens and pencils for public schools, furniture for government offices, taxi and local transport services for government hosted conferences, etc. Governments every-where, and especially in the developing world, from South Africa, Malaysia, Sin-gapore, Korea, to Brazil, have used this to encourage domestic businesses. In West Africa this is crucial for fulfilling local content policy whether in the oil and gas, mining, timber or any other sectors. What the European Union seeks is for West African governments to give to the better-endowed European contrac-tors and businesses equal or effectively better access as those given to West Afri-can businesses in the award of contracts for government procurement. This will simply drive the domestic sector out of business, and undermine the economic developmental objectives of procure-ment.

b) Deregulation of Capital accounts: Again, by deregulating capital accounts, the EU seeks to facilitate, for its inves-tors and financial dealers, the free flow of capital in and out of West Africa. The en-visaged negotiation on capital movement is a sad example of the EU’s aggressive agenda towards West Africa’s economies, with negative effects for all. This issue has never been part of the negotiating agenda, but the EU took advantage of the pressures of the situation to impose this, just as it did when it used the deadlines in 2007 to impose the effective prohibi-tion of export taxes in the Interim EPA,

thus depriving West Africa of a policy instrument that all governments had ap-plied to encourage domestic processing of and value-addition to raw produce. Ultimately, this would take away the very instruments used by the Central Banks in managing the ever-recurring crisis of currency problems in West Africa.

c) Investments: Developing countries have long resist-ed an agreement on investments at the WTO and they finally managed to re-move them from the Doha Agenda in 2004. An investment agreement with liberalisation commitments in the EPAs could severely restrict African govern-ments’ policy space to regulate foreign investment so that the investment can benefit the local economy and stimulate development. The investment rules that the EU, would seek just as in the Caribbean, would be to include ‘National treatment’ and ‘Investor protection’. National treat-ment means that foreign investors must be accorded the same rights as domestic investors or better, thereby curbing de-veloping countries’ ability to give pref-erential treatment to domestic investors, such as small or infant enterprises, or their ability to ban foreign investment in certain sectors or provide favourable treatment to regional investors to help foster regional integration. Moreover, giving ‘equal treatment’ to foreign investors often in practice means giving them greater influence and rights than domestic investors, giv-en their larger size and power. Investor protection, which establishes minimum standards of treatment of investors and the free flow of capital movements be-tween countries which secures the right of investors to repatriate profits, will re-strict the ability of West Africa to impose controls on capital movements These lessons, not exhaustive though, are inevitable, if the engagement with the EU in the post-Cotonou con-versations will meet the developmental needs of Africa. The EU must redeem its image by retreating in all the areas elabo-rated above.

* Sylvester Bagooro is programme officer, Political Economy, TWN-Africa.

“The commitments in the current interim EPAs and the

proposed West Africa EPA also show that the European Union is ever determined to strategically take control of the entire economy of West

African countries.”

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While the debate in East Africa on the EAC-EU EPA continues, with the UNECA warning of the dangers posed by the agreement to the structural economic transformation of East Africa, the Ger-man Chancellor Angela Merkel has described the EPAs as ‘not right’ and possible in need of re-negotiation.

A key issue will be laying the basis for EU trade agreements to contribute to the structural economic transformation of African agro-food sectors. This issue needs to be taken up in the post-Coto-nou negotiations in order to: a) enshrine an EU commitment to the flexible and responsible implementation of EPA commitments in legally binding agreements;b) address the systematic bias against smallholder producers and small scale exporters which exists in design and implementation EU food safety and SPS control systems;c) extend the current EU regulatory initiative son UTPs to ACP-EU supply chains;d) revise the design of loan and investment support instruments to effectively meet the needs of local agricultural producers and agro-processing companies.

According to press reports ‘Germany is calling for the rene-gotiation of some of the European Union’s trade agreements with Africa’, with the current agreements being seen as ‘un-fair’. Addressing development NGOs at a meeting in Ham-burg in June 2017 Chancellor Merkel reportedly argued some of the agreements negotiated between the EU and Africa were ‘not right’ (1), stating ‘We’ll speak again at the EU Africa summit in autumn about how we need to renegotiate them’ The EU-Africa Summit is scheduled for November 2017.

These remarks came in the face of calls by the government of Tanzania for a renegotiation of the EAC-EU EPA which it termed ‘skewed and exploitative’, while ‘Kenya’s Industri-alisation and Trade Principal Secretary Dr Chris Kiptoo said Chancellor Merkel’s comments were timely because some of the agreements that the continent has with the EU are not beneficial’.

This needs to be seen in the context of earlier warnings from the UN Economic Commission for Africa to EAC govern-ments ‘against entering into an Economic Partnership Agree-ment with the European Union arguing that it will neither spur economic growth nor bring wealth to the region’s citi-zens’. The UNECA maintains ‘if the EPA is signed, local in-dustries will struggle to withstand competitive pressures from EU firms, while the region will be stuck in its position as a low value-added commodity exporter’. According to the UNECA report ‘if the EAC-EU EPA is fully implemented, the region

risks losing trading opportunities with other partners, indus-trial output, welfare and GDP’.

The report claims ‘the bilateral deficit will increase given that the EPA does not represent improved market access for EAC countries to Europe over the short-to-midterm, as tariff elim-inations are implemented’. It was maintained ‘Intra-EAC im-ports could decline by $42 million – mainly in manufacturing – while tariff revenues from EU imports would decline by $169 million’ Overall ‘welfare in the EAC will likely reduce as a consequence of EPA. Most losses will be accrued by Kenya – $45 million – while the EU will register a huge welfare gain of $212 million’.

The UNECA analysis further claims ‘the deal with Europe will be calamitous unless EAC countries are able to clear-ly define what their infant industries are, as well as identify sub-sectors they intend to protect’. Furthermore it was argued provisions related to domestic support policies could under-mine existing industrial policy initiatives.

In terms of wider African integration efforts it was argued ‘while the EPA purportedly intends to respect regional inte-gration programmes, they are adding to the complexity of the task’. More specifically it is argued the EPAs could compro-mise efforts to promote a continental FTA.

However Rwanda’s Trade Minister referred to the UNECA report as a ‘political tool’ and a ‘step back in long term nego-tiations to secure a positive deal with the EU’.

However, EC officials continue to push African governments to sign on to EPAs in their current form. In June 2017 the outgoing EU Delegate to Nigeria called for ‘Nigeria to recon-sider its reluctance to sign the Economic Partnership Agree-ment’, arguing Nigeria need not figure the negative impact of the EPA. It was implied the Nigerian government’s policy was falling victim to the vested interests of ‘some Nigerians in positions of authority and businesses’ who are ‘just blocking the process to signing the EPA’.

Meanwhile EU representatives are talking up the prospects of the Gambia signing on to the West Africa-EU EPA following the change of government, with it being noted the new gov-ernment has ‘shown interest in joining the EPA’, which the only question being when the government would sign on to the EPA. Gambian officials however for their part have noted that while ‘the process has begun …the actual ratification of the deal is nowhere in sight’. Some parliamentarians while in opposition had previously come out firmly against the EPA.

Can the Post-Cotonou Negotiations provide the context for a rethink of the EU’s EPA Policy?

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Comment and Analysis

In responding to Chancellor Merkel’s remarks on the con-cluded EPAs Kenya’s Principal Secretary Kiptoo made specific reference to the forthcoming renegotiation of the Cotonou Agreement. It was the Cotonou Agreement which provid-ed the framework for the negotiation of the EU’s economic partnership agreements. It was always intended these trade arrangements would remain an integral part of the compre-hensive ACP-EU cooperation framework alongside arrange-ments for development financing and political dialogue.

The forthcoming Post-Cotonou negotiations could provide an opportunity for reviewing how the existing EPAs can be made more development friendly to address the concerns of the Tanzanian and other African governments over the long term structural economic development impacts of some of the contentious provisions of the EPAs. This could involve addressing four related areas.

Firstly enshrining in the new agreement legally binding com-mitments to the flexible and responsible implementation of EPA commitments, so that growing African demand for food products provides the market base for the structural trans-formation of African agro-food sectors. Currently expanding and evolving African food demand is sucking in imports from the EU on a massive scale, often in ways which undermine efforts to develop local agriculture and integrated agro-food sector supply chains (e.g. in the poultry and dairy sector).

There is a need to ensure EPA provisions on the use of non-tariff trade policy tools are not utilized in ways which systematically remove existing protections aimed at sustain-ing and fostering local agricultural production and locally integrated agro-food processing activities. This will require the interpretation and application of EPA provisions in these areas to be subordinated to structural economic development requirements of African agro-food sectors, through a formal recognition of what Joseph Stiglitz has described as the ‘right to development’.

Secondly, it will require the EU to put far more resources into

the design and application of effective SPS and food safety controls systems which take into account the conditions and constraints of smallholder producers and small scale export-ers. This should not involve any weakening of EU SPS and food safety control regimes; rather it should ensure that the existing bias against small scale producers and exporters un-der SPS and food safety control regimes is removed.

Thirdly it will require an extension of the EU’s current work on strengthening the functioning of agricultural supply chains and the elimination of unfair trading practices (UTPs) to ACP-EU supply chains, so current abuses do not continue to undermine farm level investment by reducing the returns to agricultural producers to levels which make further invest-ment in export orientated production non-viable (see com-panion article ‘Proposed EC Regulatory Initiative on UTPs Needs to be Extended to ACP-EU Supply Chains’, 8 Sep-tember 2017).

Fourthly it will require the redesign of investment facilities to create loan financing instruments suited to the needs of local producers and local agro-processors, so that strong local partners can be created who can effectively engage with EU agro-food sector enterprises in ensuring the structural trans-formation of ACP agro-food sectors, so that more value is being added and more jobs created in local agro-food sector supply chains on a financially sustainable basis.

If these four issues are substantively addressed in the post Cotonou negotiations then the basis could be strengthened for the EU’s new trade agreements to effectively support the structural transformation of ACP agro-food sectors.

This however will require African governments to take up the issue of the inclusion of EPA related issues in the post-Coto-nou negotiations in their discussions with the German gov-ernment in the run up to November Africa-EU summit. Some initiative in this regard from EU member states gov-ernments will be essential since the European Commission itself has little interest in addressing these issues as part of the Post-Cotonou negotiations, despite its obvious relevance to core EU migration concerns.

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79 ACP countries keen to remove ‘IMBALANCES’ in ties with EUThe ACP countries want a new partnership with the EU, reports *Jaya Ramachandran

Members of Parliament from 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries want a “radi-

cal departure” from the traditional rela-tionship with the European Union (EU), which in their view has been marked by an “imbalance” between the two blocs in terms of economic might and levels of technology and capacity. The ACP de-veloping countries wish to achieve a level of sustainable development that enables them to progress from being dependent exporters of raw materials to being able to add value to their own products. This was the distinctive message emerging from the ‘ACP Parliamentary Assembly’ and the first joint session of its kind with the Bureau of the ACP Com-mittee of Ambassadors October 9-11 in Brussels to discuss issues related to cru-cial negotiations for a new partnership framework agreement with the EU be-yond 2020, the year the ‘Cotonou Agree-ment’ ends. The Cotonou Agreement – a com-prehensive and legally binding treaty that governs trade, development cooperation and political dialogue between the two groups of countries – was signed in June 2000 in Cotonou, Benin’s largest city, by 78 ACP countries (Cuba was not includ-ed) and the then 15 EU Member States. It replaced the Lomé Convention, which had been the basis for ACP-EU development cooperation since 1975, and entered into force in 2003. It was subsequently revised in 2005 and 2010. Ibrahim Rassin Bundu of Sierra Le-one, President of the ACP Parliamentary Assembly, stressed at the gathering: “Al-though it will be ministers and ambas-sadors who will negotiate the post-Coto-nou Agreement, they need to do so on the basis of views that represent all the divergent needs and interests of the ACP Group. The ACP we want, must be peo-

ple-driven and not just the preserve of government representatives because the issues touch on the ordinary lives of all ACP citizens.” He pointed out that the ACP Parlia-mentary Assembly looks forward to hav-ing “a more substantive role in the new institutional framework of the reformed ACP Group.” he added. This was the 47th session of the Assembly. Ambassador Teshome Toga Chana-ka of Ethiopia, outgoing Chairman of the ACP Committee of Ambassadors, said in his opening statement: “While there is still a bit of time before formal consultations between our two parties begin sometime in 2018, I would like to urge us to be proactive in bringing out the positive results and acquis of the ACP-EU relationship over the past [42] years, and to develop a strategy for en-gaging institutions and individuals that will be influential in the decision-making process about the future of the relation-ship, such as Members of the European Parliament.” The ACP Secretary General Dr. Pat-rick Gomes made a presentation on the working policy document titled Towards the ACP we want, which outlines the vision, goals and rationale for the ACP Group as an international actor in the 21st century. He pointed to the three strategic pillars that would guide the work of the ACP for a “reinvented” fu-ture, and elements for consideration in a renegotiated relationship with the EU. The three pillars include: (i) Trade, Investments, Industrialisation and Ser-vices; (ii) Development Cooperation, Technology, Science and Innovation/Research and (iii) Political Dialogue and Advocacy. “Transforming economic structures and investment strategies is essential to achieve healthy and productive lives by

the great majority in our societies and not only for a few… This means productive resources must enable jobs, particularly for youth, women and girls; investments must give equitable returns to workers by living wages that improve the quality of life of families; and education and health care must become available, at reasonable or no costs,” the ACP Secretary General added. The underpinnings of the entire process for a post-Cotonou Agreement rests on the fundamental aim of achiev-ing the structural transformation of ACP economies, he added. “Transforming economic structures and investment strategies is essential to achieve healthy and productive lives by the great majority in our societies and not only for a few.” These ideas mirrored what several others said. Gambia was clear on this so was Cameroon; and Ethiopia spoke of the youth bombshells ready to explode. According to Dr. Gomes, the ne-gotiation process for the post-Cotonou Agreement has a road map guiding it – the Georgetown Agreement is to be re-vised; briefs prepared for the Technical Negotiating Teams on each of the three strategic pillars; studies done on the Po-litical Dialogue and Investment Facility in the Cotonou Agreement, etc. leading to an exchange of a Negotiating Brief with the European commission by Au-gust 2018. The ACP chief said he was “par-ticularly struck by the lady members of Parliament of Samoa and Gabon who gave us an impetus to place emphasis on charting a course to bring tangible bene-fits to the millions of peoples in our 79 Member States.” He told the Parliamentarian from Gabon: “I admire your searching ques-tion on how will the EU regard the di-

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versification of ACP partner-ships? I can only answer your question by saying that it is for us to determine the na-ture and kind of partnerships the ACP Group as a whole will pursue.” These need not be in-compatible with what we agree to as a legally binding Agreement – a Treaty – with the European Union. The nature and scope of mem-bership in the ACP Group will be determined on the provisions of our Constitu-tive Act, the GT Agreement of 1975 and amended in 2003. “The Council has de-cided that the Agreement be revised. That will be another milestone in our roadmap. The revision will require your critical inputs,” he add-ed. “The Committee of Ambassadors and the ACP Secretariat are committed to en-suring that the voices of our Parliamen-tary representatives are heard and their concerns taken account of in the negoti-ations.” The ACP chief also informed the gathering of the progress made on the-matic issues for structural economic transformation: In July 2017, for exam-ple, the ACP and UNCTAD approved guiding principles for investment policy-making. These principles are in support of existing ACP initiatives, such as the ACP Private Sector Development Strategy, the New Approach to ACP support for the development of Agriculture Value chains, and the ACP Investment Facility. These non-binding principles pro-vide a basis for investment policymaking with a view to: promoting inclusive eco-nomic growth and sustainable develop-ment; promoting coherence in national and international investment policymak-ing; fostering an open, transparent and conducive global policy environment for investment; and aligning investment promotion and facilitation policies with sustainable development goals. These Guiding Principles come at a

time of mounting economic, social and environmental challenges, which high-light the critical role of investment as a driver of equitable economic and social growth. Mobilizing investment and en-suring that it contributes to sustainable development remains a key objective of the ACP Group. Dr. Gomes also drew attention to the historic launch of a Gender initiative to fight against sexual and gender based violence against women and girls. This initiative was launched in the margins of the UN General Assembly and the ACP was represented by the Chairman of the Committee of Ambassadors, Ambassa-dor Amadou DIOP of Senegal. The ACP is a key partner alongside the EU and the UN, he said. This initiative will strategically focus on the most prevalent forms of Violence Against Women and Girls in different re-gions, including sexual and gender-based violence and harmful practices; specific forms of domestic and family violence; trafficking in human beings; and eco-nomic (labour) exploitation. For the ACP regions, the emphasis will be on sexual and gender-based vio-lence and harmful practices in Sub-Saha-ran Africa, domestic and family violence in the Caribbean, and domestic violence

in the Pacific. “Violence against women and girls is a global pandemic that holds back de-velopment. Today it is said that one out of three women experience violence in their lives, this is, about 30% of women in the world. Up until last year 19% of women between 15 and 49 years of age have experienced physical and sexual vio-lence by an intimate partner. These num-bers tell us that the issue can no longer be ignored and must be addressed,” the ACP Secretary General said. “Our mission at the ACP will not be a task for individuals but together with clarity of purpose and by those like you, who are here today, determined to dis-charge their duty with dignity, determi-nation and distinction,” he added. He said he was inspired by words from the late Nelson Mandela: “Thus shall we live, because we will have created a society which recognizes that all peo-ple are born equal, with each entitled in equal measure to life, liberty, prosperity, human rights and good governance.”

* JayaRamachandran wrote this report for the IDN from Brussels.

The article is reproduced from IDN-In-DepthNews.

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Coping with Foreign Direct Investment

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) can make important contributions to sustainable development, when projects are aligned with national and regional sustainable development strategies, write

*Anis Chowdhury and Jomo Kwame Sundaram.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is increasingly touted as the elixir for economic growth. While not

against FDI, the mid-2015 Addis Aba-ba Action Agenda (AAAA) for financing development also cautioned that it “is concentrated in a few sectors in many developing countries and often bypasses countries most in need, and internation-al capital flows are often short-term ori-ented”.

FDI flowsUNCTAD’s 2017 World Investment Re-port (WIR) shows that FDI flows have remained the largest and has provided less volatile of all external financial flows to developing economies, despite declin-ing by 14% in 2016. FDI flows to the least developed countries and ‘structur-ally weak’ economies remain low and volatile. FDI inflows add to funds for invest-

ment, while providing foreign exchange for importing machinery and other needed inputs. FDI can enhance growth and structural transformation through various channels, notably via technologi-cal spill-overs, linkages and competition. Transnational corporations (TNCs) may also provide access to export markets and specialized expertise. However, none of these beneficial growth-enhancing effects can be taken

FDI-funded oil rig

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for granted as much depends on type of FDI. For instance, mergers and acquisi-tions (M&As) do not add new capacities or capabilities while typically concentrat-ing market power, whereas green-field investments tend to be more beneficial. FDI in capital-intensive mining has lim-ited linkage or employment effects.

Technological capacities and capabilities

Technological spill-overs occur when host country firms learn superi-or technology or management practices from TNCs. But intellectual property rights and other restrictions may effec-tively impede technology transfer. Or the quality of human resources in the host country may be too poor to effectively use, let alone transfer technol-ogy introduced by foreign firms. Learn-ing effects can be constrained by limited linkages or interactions between local suppliers and foreign affiliates. Linkages between TNCs and local firms are also more likely in countries with strict local content requirements. But purely export oriented TNCs, espe-cially in export processing zones (EPZs), are likely to have fewer and weaker link-ages with local industry. Foreign entry may reduce firm con-centration in a national market, thereby increasing competition, which may force local firms to reduce organizational inef-ficiencies to stay competitive. But if host country firms are not yet international-ly competitive, FDI may decimate local firms, giving market power and lucrative rents to foreign firms.

Contrasting experiences The South Korean government has long been cautious towards FDI. The share of FDI in gross capital formation was less than 2% during 1965-1984. The government did not depend on FDI for technology transfer, and preferred to ‘purchase and unbundle’ technology, encouraging ‘reverse engineering’. It fa-voured strict local content requirements, licensing, technical cooperation and joint ventures over wholly-owned FDI. In contrast, post-colonial Malaysia has never been hostile to any kind of FDI. After FDI-led import-substituting

industrialization petered out by the mid-1960s, export-orientation from the early 1970s generated hundreds of thousands of jobs for women. Electronics in Malay-sia has been more than 80% FDI since the 1970s, with little scope for knowl-edge spill-overs and interactions with lo-cal firms. Although lacking many mature industries, Malaysia has been experienc-ing premature deindustrialization since the 1997-1998 Asian financial crises.

China and India From the 1980s, China has been pro-active in encouraging both im-port-substituting and export-oriented FDI. However, it soon imposed strict requirements regarding local content, foreign exchange earnings, technology transfer as well as research and develop-ment, besides favouring joint ventures and cooperatives. Solely foreign-owned enterprises were not permitted unless they brought advanced technology or exported most of their output. China only relaxed these re-strictions in 2001 to comply with WTO entrance requirements. Nevertheless, it still prefers TNCs that bring advanced technology and boost exports, and green-field FDI over M&As. Thus, more than 80% of FDI in China involves green-field investments, mostly in manufacturing, constituting 70% of total FDI in 2001. China has strictly controlled FDI inflows into ser-vices, only allowing FDI in real estate recently. Although long cautious of FDI, India has recently changed its policies,

seeking FDI to boost Indian manufac-turing and create jobs. Thus, the current government has promised to “put more and more FDI proposals on automatic route instead of government route”. Despite sharp rising FDI inflows, the share of FDI in manufacturing de-clined from 48% to 29% between Oc-tober 2014 and September 2016, with few green-field investments. Newly in-corporated companies’ share of inflows was 2.7% overall, and 1.6% for manu-facturing, with the bulk of FDI going to M&As.

Policy lessons FDI policies need to be well com-plemented by effective industrial policies including efforts to enhance human re-source development and technological capabilities through public investments in education, training and R&D. Thus, South Korea industrialized rapidly without much FDI thanks to its well-educated workforce and efforts to enhance technological capabilities from 1966. Korean manufacturing developed with protection and other official support (e.g., subsidized credit from state-owned banks and government-guaranteed pri-vate firm borrowings from abroad) sub-ject to strict performance criteria (e.g., export targets). Indeed, FDI can make important contributions “to sustainable develop-ment, particularly when projects are aligned with national and regional sus-tainable development strategies. Gov-ernment policies can strengthen positive spillovers …, such as know-how and technology, including through establish-ing linkages with domestic suppliers, as well as encouraging the integration of lo-cal enterprises… into regional and global value chains”.

* Anis Chowdhury, Adjunct Professor, West-ern Sydney University and the University of New South Wales (Australia). He held senior United Nations positions during 2008-2016 in Bangkok and New York.* Jomo Kwame Sundaram, a former eco-nomics professor, was United Nations As-sistant Secretary-General for Economic Development, and received the Wassily Le-ontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic Thought in 2007.

“Linkages between TNCs and local firms are also

more likely in countries with strict local content require-

ments. But purely export oriented TNCs, especially

in export processing zones (EPZs), are likely to have

fewer and weaker linkages with local industry.”

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Africa faces litmus test at MC11 on development issues

The African Group of countries faces a litmus test at the World Trade Organization’s eleventh ministerial conference (MC11), on their collective proposals on development and domestic

support for agriculture, and their opposition to domestic regulation in services and new issues, reports *D. Ravi Kanth.

On December 5, the African Group issued a proposal at the WTO on “Africa and De-

velopment,” in which they provided a historical account of what happened to development in their countries following decolonization because of the multilater-al trade rules. “A number of studies have shown that the main reason why developing countries, especially LDCs have not been able to participate effectively in the Multilateral Trading System is mainly because they are lagging behind in terms of industrialisation, in particular the pro-duction of value added and competitive

manufacturing products,” the African Group said. “It is therefore important to note that governments have a duty to make strategic and targeted interventions in key sectors of the economy without fear of infringing on their WTO commit-ments or being sued under the DSU [dispute settlement understanding],” the Group argued. Therefore, the African Group said, its members need “some accommodation in the WTO to take measures necessary for industrialisation and development.” After all, it is historically established that “developed countries benefited from

the absence of rules, and then created new rules that constrained developing countries, particularly in the early stages of development,” the African Group ar-gued. The group maintained that develop-ment, which was the central pillar in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), is being seriously undermined. The Group said its members are frustrated that “the commitment by all Members to fulfilling the object, spirit and intent of the Doha Development Agenda is being seriously undermined.” Instead of finalizing the develop-mental dividends of the DDA negotia-

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tions, “the discourse on new issues such as Electronic Commerce, Investment Fa-cilitation, and Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs)” is being pushed aggressively to “overshadow the develop-ment agenda since the Tenth Ministerial Conference in the current Doha Round negotiations.” More disturbingly, the developed countries joined forces to reject any ne-gotiations on “development with respect to the paragraph 44 mandates in the Doha ministerial declaration,” the Afri-can Group argued. “Several developed Members have also adopted a stiff rejectionist approach to any negotiations on development with respect to the paragraph 44 mandate in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, with the view to foster structural transforma-tion, diversification and industrialisation in line with the African Union’s Agenda 2063: the Africa We Want.” The African Group said “some Members hold that these proposals can-not obtain multilateral consensus in time for concrete deliverables at MC11.” “At the same time, however, many of these Members are pursuing a num-ber of deliverables, some without prior agreement or a (WTO) mandate, that we would qualify as anti-development, and which unacceptably narrow the space our Members use and need for policies and regulations that support our devel-opment objectives,” the African Group insisted. For example, the African Group said, in Domestic Regulation for services

“these Members are pushing for rules that would erode our right to regulate, intrude into our domestic policy-mak-ing processes, and hinder the regulatory capacity and policy space for develop-ment-driven regulations by Africa; pro-mote regulatory capture and control; and limit the sovereign function of our elected parliamentary representatives in discharging their sovereign function of legislating.” “The inherent contradiction by some of these Members are untenable, and point to the need for Members to have an honest appraisal that can deliver on the commitment to the DDA,” the African Group argued. It emphasized the centrality of “the concept of Special and Differential Treat-ment (S&DT), which was introduced in recognition of the development aspi-rations and socio-economic challenges faced by the broad constituency of de-veloping and least developed countries (LDCs) of the WTO.” The African Group said that mem-bers should recall that “Ministers sought, through the establishment of the WTO, to ensure that developing countries - and especially the least developed among them - secure a share in the growth of in-ternational trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.” It asked whether the developed countries want free trade for the sake of it or enable economic development by improving “inter alia market access con-ditions and the terms of trade in a man-ner that would steadily raise their living

standards and eradicate poverty.” But major developed countries not only refused to engage but continued “to undermine the relevance and legitimacy of our issues despite having benefited from a system that supported their de-velopment and industrial rite of passage,” the African Group pointed out. Little wonder that “there is a total disconnect between the clear commit-ment to development by Ministers; and the stiff rejection by some Members on delivering on it,” it pointed out. As a consequence, “increasingly, the WTO is being looked at as an organisa-tion that does not respond to the specific needs and concerns of its Members, in particular to effectively addressing the challenges to economic development in Africa, despite the most recent commit-ment by Ministers in Paragraph 5 of the Nairobi Ministerial Declaration.” There is no clarity on issues concern-ing Development and how the WTO in-tends to deliver “on its commitment to development.” “Who is the WTO intended to serve if it cannot address the specific de-velopment needs of the majority of its Members?”, the African Group asked. More important, “what does the WTO intend to promote, beyond sim-ply rule-making?”, the African Group sought to know. Without answering these issues, the developed countries want to embark on new issues for “multilateral rules on E-commerce, Investment Facilitation and MSMEs,” the African Group main-tained.

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Enough is enough, the African Group said, suggesting that “members had already undertaken enough rules so far.” As a consequence, “the multilateral rules as they are, are constraining our do-mestic policy space and ability to indus-trialise.” “Before the GATT came into being, industrialised Members benefited from the absence of rules, through the utili-sation of policy space, and now they are closing this space through GATT Agree-ments notably by prohibiting the use of local content requirements; industrial subsidies; infant industry protection, among others. In other words, the policy instruments they used during their devel-opment process were denied to late-com-ers through the GATT Agreements.” Citing Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang’s famous research work on “kicking away the development ladder”, the African Group said it raised the is-sues in the Committee on Trade and De-velopment in Special Session (CTD-SS) discussions. The Doha Development Agenda was launched with development out-comes and aspirations at the centre for the purpose of redressing the systemic and historic imbalances inherited from GATT/WTO Agreements. “Yet, the view that new e-commerce, investment facilitation and MSMEs rules will be good for developing countries has been highly contested [and] which is why, it is imperative to question the logic of these new rules,” the African Group maintained. “If developing countries cannot find relief in the current mandates and rules in a Multilateral Trading System that is intended to serve all its Members, then what would be the rationale for adopting new rules, especially if they are meant to further marginalise poor economies? Any new rules would simply entrench exist-ing imbalances and further constrain the ability of our governments to implement industrial policy and catch-up,” the Afri-can Group maintained. Shockingly, the “developed coun-tries are suggesting that the new approach to development is through the provision of time-limited transition periods,” it ar-

gued. “Africa’s experience in the Uruguay Round shows that the transition periods do not work or at best are not an end in, and of themselves,” the African Group pointed out. “It is therefore unacceptable for some developed country Members to treat the development aspects of the work of this Organisation to conceptual and theoretical discussions at the Ministeri-al Conference, while on the other hand seeking to extract multilateral disciplines, including on new issues in areas of specif-ic interest to them,” it maintained. Because of the recent developments in the WTO “on a so-called reform agen-da and potential withering away of the centrality of development in the work of the WTO,” the African Group proposed the following points:

• The WTO respond to the call by its founding fathers in the Marrakesh Agreement to continue to make positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially LDCs among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.

• The G-90 S&DT proposal will be accorded the same treatment as all other potential deliverables at the MC11. A meeting of the CTD-SS will be convened to consider the draft Ministerial text.

* To reaffirm that the provisions for S&DT remain an integral part of existing and future WTO Agreements.

• To instruct the CTD-SS to expeditiously complete the review of all the outstanding Agreement- specific proposals and report to the General Council, with clear recommendations for a decision, at the next Ministerial Conference.

Any “discussion or dedicated session,” convened to deliberate on the topic of “Development” at the MC11 [Buenos

Aires] meeting, must address all the issues. And they include how the African Group of countries “use trade policy in-struments to promote structural trans-formation, industrialisation and sustain-able economic growth for developing countries and LDCs.” Other related issues include: “how can we [members] ensure that S&DT in the WTO is applied in a manner that is effective in addressing the problems of those who need it? How have the current rules contributed to, or constrained de-velopment for developing countries and LDCs? How would the rules being proposed in all areas where there are di-ametrical divergences contribute towards the development, and integration of de-veloping countries and LDCs into the multilateral trading system? What is the nexus between domestic regulation and trade? What is the relationship between the right to regulate and the inter-linkag-es between regulations and broader do-mestic economic imperatives?” Developed countries remained alarmed at the growing assertion and unity among the African Group of more than 50 countries, except Nigeria and in some cases Kenya, who are seeking to bring development to the centre stage in the multilateral trading system and the World Trade Organization, said a senior trade official from a major developed country who asked not to be identified. “We don’t know what these African countries led by the African Group are going to do at Buenos Aires on develop-ment because their unity is a cause for worry,” the official told SUNS. “Why are they bringing develop-ment to Buenos Aires; what do they want to achieve on these issues that call for var-ious carve outs in all WTO agreements,” the official said. In conclusion, the Buenos Aires meeting will remain as a testing group for the African Group at a time when the industrialized countries seem determined to run away with new issues without re-solving the outstanding Doha issues.

*D. Ravi Kanth wrote this for the SUNS #8591.

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The Sustainable Development Goals won’t happen without a

radical economic rethink

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are ambitious objectives: business as usual will

not deliver them. Speaking on the recent International Day for the Eradication of Poverty, UN Secretary General António Guterres acknowledged the need for new thinking: “The pledge to leave no one be-hind will require innovative approaches,

partnerships and solutions,” he said. But this new model will only come about if we radically reshape the national, region-al and global economies which lie behind many of the obstacles to achieving the SDGs. We must rethink the way we gov-ern and manage the global financial and economic system. In part, that means rethinking the

current trend to treat private finance as the default option for development. Pri-vate finance is being heavily touted by the World Bank, G20 and others as the solution to the SDG financing gap - for example, through their enthusiastic pro-motion of public-private partnerships. Yet international private capital has prov-en volatile, and is often short-term. In

Theglobaleconomicandfinancialsystemisseverelyhinderingdevelopmentprogressandrad-ical changes are needed in order to meet the demands of the Sustainable Development Goals,

writes *Jesse Griffiths.

UN headquarters, New York

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fact, since 2015, international private finance has been net negative for devel-oping countries: more money has been flowing out than has been going in. This volatility has led some developing coun-tries to protect themselves from external shocks by building up massive reserves. This is a sensible strategy, given the lack of faith those countries have in the IMF or other global institutions to protect them in times of crises. However, in practice they build reserves by buying safe assets from developed countries: in other words, the poorer countries are lending trillions of dollars to the richest countries, particularly the United States at very low rates of interest. The issue is therefore not about how to get more global capital to flow south-wards, but how to make sure that this results in high quality investments, and that developing countries have the tools they need to manage the risks. Most im-portantly, developing countries also need to make best use of their own private fi-nancial resources which are almost always several magnitudes larger than foreign capital. Sadly, international rules and institutions too often restrict rather than enhance developing countries’ efforts to make best use of private finance. For ex-ample, the WTO does not allow compa-nies to apply subsidies linked to sourcing domestically or on export performance, and the proliferation of bilateral trade and investment agreements restrict the use of procurement and competition policy to promote domestic industries. The increasing power of investor-state dispute provisions in these treaties give multinationals the power to challenge governments’ efforts to promote domes-tic industry, as well as to protect basic human rights. The prevailing global financial end economic system also works against poorer countries’ efforts to fund their own development by raising domestic public finance, principally through tax-ation. Domestic public finance – princi-pally tax revenues – is by far the largest development finance resource for those developing countries, dwarfing inter-national private and public flows com-bined, and developing countries have significantly improved tax collection in

recent years. However, developing coun-tries naturally have a limited tax base be-cause of high levels of poverty, and this already-limited tax base has been hurt by a trend to reduce taxes on multinationals through offering generous tax incentives in a destructive ‘race to the bottom’ com-petition to woo foreign investors. Even worse, significant tax revenues are also lost through tax havens, intra-company operations within multinational corpora-tions, and the secret transfer of financial resources out of the global south. As a re-sult there are significant public resource shortfalls for basic services, social protec-tion and infrastructure – particularly in least developed countries. International public financial flows – the money sent from donor to recipi-ent countries – are supposed to help fill this gap. But the figures are confusing, as they include large amounts of money that never leave the donor country, such as administrative costs and the costs of accommodating refugees. What is clear is that these flows have been lower than stated, less than promised, and have

proven volatile and subject to changing priorities in developed countries. The architecture of global econom-ic governance has been slow to change. There are major gaps, including the ab-sence of any mechanism to prevent and resolve debt crises – which have sadly be-come a common occurrence. In addition, the majority of developing countries are either excluded from, or have a limited voice in, global rule setting – thereby seriously weakening the quality of those rules. Despite some notable achieve-ments, secrecy and opacity – as opposed to transparency and openness – remain the norm at international financial insti-tutions. It is clear that the global economic and financial system is severely hindering development progress, and that radical changes will be needed if we are to meet the higher level of ambition the SDGs demand. All too often the blockers of reform are the rich countries, who can be accused of ‘kicking away the ladder’ that could allow developing countries to chart their own paths to prosperity. The SDGs set a universal agenda which applies to all countries. If developed na-tions are to take the SDGs seriously they need to show they are willing to make the necessary fundamental reforms to the global and economic system. As a new report from Eurodad sets out, this would mean changes at home, such as cracking down on the tax havens that are conduits for the loss of resources from the global south. It would also mean a new model of international cooperation, where for example the countries with major finan-cial centres support, rather than oppose, sensible reforms such as the creation of a mechanism to rapidly and fairly resolve debt crises. The benefits of these reforms would be felt at home as well as abroad. The SDGs represent a step-change in global ambitions: if they are to be met, they require a step-change in efforts to reform the global financial and economic system.

* Jesse Griffiths is Director of Eurodad. The above article is reproduced from Eurodad, 1 November 2017.

“The prevailing global finan-cial end economic system also works against poorer countries’ efforts to fund their own development by

raising domestic public finance, principally through taxation. Domestic public finance – principally tax

revenues – is by far the larg-est development finance resource for those devel-oping countries, dwarfing international private and

public flows combined, and developing countries have significantly improved tax

collection in recent years.”

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CLIMATE CHANGE

A Cop Out at COP23?

Over 20,000 people from around the world descended on Bonn, Germany at the beginning of

November for the 23rd Conference of the Parties (COP23). Timoci Naulusala, a 12-year-old from Fiji, made a passionate call for ac-tion at the opening of the COP23, stat-ing: “The sea is swallowing villages, eat-ing away at shorelines, withering crops. Relocation of people…cries over lost loved ones, dying of hunger and thirst…you may think it will only affect small nations…you are wrong.” French President Emmanuel Ma-cron echoed similar sentiments, noting that the effects of climate change have multiplied and are becoming increasing-ly intense. “The point of no return has been crossed,” he said. The conference set out to develop

a rule book for implementing the land-mark Paris Agreement. Though the dead-line for its completion is next year’s COP in Poland, many noted that not enough was achieved this year.

Unwilling and unprepared Among the most contentious issues at COP23 was about finance. Of the 100 billion dollars that was promised each year in climate finance for developing countries by 2020, developed countries have so far only pledged a little over 10 billion. Clare Shakya from the International Institute for Environment and Develop-ment also expressed concern to IPS that climate finance often does not reach the frontline poorest countries and people. “They get a far lower share than is their fair share,” she said. Less than 10 percent of an already

limited amount of climate finance reach-es poor communities. This impacts coun-tries such as Ethiopia where drought is drastically affecting livelihoods. The East African nation, which needs approxi-mately 7.5 billion dollars a year to switch to clean energy and adapt to climate change, is so far receiving between 100 million and 200 million per year. As part of the Paris Agreement, do-nors must give a future estimate of how much and what kind of climate finance is going to be committed in order for countries to plan and prepare. Howev-er, developed countries pushed back on the demands, further delaying discussion and action on the issue. “You didn’t see the developed coun-tries coming here prepared to engage se-riously on ramping up finance…parties knew there weren’t major political deci-sions that were going to have to be made

Despite a few victories, the UN’s annual climate change conference ended without achieving its goals or injecting a sense of much needed urgency, writes *Tharanga Yakupitiyage.

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as they were facing when they went into Paris,” Union of Concerned Scientist’s Director of Strategy and Policy Alden Meyer told IPS. While over 150 heads of state at-tended COP21 when the Paris Agree-ment was negotiated, a little over 25 heads of state attended this year’s confer-ence.

Both Meyer and Shakya expressed frustration on the lack of urgency over the discussion and implementation of the climate accord. “It was pretty disappointing for vul-nerable countries…that want to see more urgency in terms of mobilizing resources to help them in the wake of devastating hurricanes and typhoons that we have seen this year,” Meyer told IPS. This can be seen through countries’ pledges made under the Paris Agree-ment which are only one-third of what is required to keep emissions under two degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial level by 2030. Though countries agreed to exam-ine ways to close that gap next year, the apathy at COP23 does not bode well for the next year of climate discussions. Shakya noted that the negotiations that did happen during the conference also lacked a holistic approach as the words ‘gender’ were blocked in discus-sions about technology transfer while ‘fi-nance’ was neglected in the gender action plan. “There’s some really frustrating ele-

ments within the negotiations now that are trying to derail the connections that need to be there,” she told IPS.

No clear leadership As the U.S. has stepped back, even hosting a side event on “cleaner and more efficient fossil fuels” which sparked inter-national outrage, many are now looking to both French President Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel to take on a leadership role on climate ac-tion. “They both really have personal commitment to the Paris Agreement and at the moment, we are kind of short on leaders—they are our hope,” said Shakya.In August, the U.S. announced that it will withdraw all funding to the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a UN body tasked with re-searching climate change science. Macron called on Europe and promised to fill in the gap. “I hope Europe can replace the US as a climate leader and I can tell you that France is ready for that,” he told dele-gates.

“As part of the Paris Agree-ment, donors must give a

future estimate of how much and what kind of climate fi-

nance is going to be commit-ted in order for countries to plan and prepare. However, developed countries pushed back on the demands, fur-

ther delaying discussion and action on the issue.”

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Merkel pledged to double climate finance to support developing countries by 2020 and made explicit pledges to help least developed countries finance adaptation in areas such as climate in-formation systems and catastrophe risk management. However, attendees were left disap-pointed when Merkel did not announce a plan to reduce Germany’s dependence on coal. Approximately 40 percent of the

German power sector is reliant on coal and if such dependence continues, the Western European nation will not meet its 2020 emissions reactions targets. In fact, the European Union (EU) will not be able to reach its goal of re-ducing emissions by at least 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2030 unless policies are changed and more pledges are made.Though countries made a political com-mitment to ramp up negotiations, Mey-er expressed concern that progress may continue to be slow, especially as Poland is hosting COP in 2018. Poland is a heavily coal-dependent economy, with approximately 80 percent of its electricity generation coming from coal. The Climate Change Performance Index gave the Eastern European coun-try a ranking of 40 and noted that it con-

tinues to fight climate legislation. In an effort to move away from coal as an energy source, the United Kingdom and Canada created an inter-national “powering past coal” alliance. Another 25 national and subnational governments joined the alliance includ-ing France, Ethiopia, Mexico, and the U.S. states of Washington and Oregon. However, the alliance does not com-mit signatories to a specific phase-out

date. Several big coal countries also did not join the alliance including Germany, Poland, Australia, China, and India.

Small steps but big wins Despite slow progress, COP23 did not end without small victories. Countries agreed to review prog-ress on reducing emissions in 2018 and 2019, as well as conduct assessments on climate finance in 2018 and 2020. The meeting also expanded its rep-resentation, formally including women and indigenous communities for the first time. Shakya noted that the inclusion of women and indigenous groups in the decision-making process will help bring more focus on frontline poorest commu-

nities. “It is a really significant first step, but it is a first step only. We need to see this being the building blocks for them to be included in the process of policy development and investment,” she told IPS. Shakya called for more transparen-cy in climate finance and proposed that donors form a leadership group outside of formal negotiations in order to iden-tify and collaborate on solutions to im-

prove the quality of finance and report-ing. Meyer expressed hope that there will be further progress in meetings to happen between now and the next COP, particularly pointing to the One Planet Summit hosted by France in December which aims to bring together political leaders as well as those working in pub-lic and private finance to discuss how they can support and accelerate global efforts to fight climate change. “There is a lot more work to do…if there is political will, there will be a pretty decent outcome. If not, we are not going to see much improvement,” he said.

*Tharanga Yakupitiyage wrote this for the IPS from Bonn.

Cracked earth

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Nigerian farmers can’t fight desertification alone

Without concerted government action, land degradation could destroy millions of livelihoods, writes *Linus Unah.

When Abbas Gandi lost a large portion of his crops to the combined ravages of deserti-

fication and drought a few years ago, he was so disillusioned he considered aban-doning his 10-hectare farmland. “It came as a shock; very terrible year. Instead of getting at least 200 bags of yield, I got between 25 to 30 bags,” the 68-year-old farmer said, beads of sweat running off his weathered forehead. “I would have stopped farming if I hadn’t

been used to winning and losing.” The father of 13 lives in the village of Gandi in northwestern Nigeria’s Soko-to State, close to the Sahara desert. The mean annual rainfall here is less than 600 millimetres compared to over 3,500 mil-limetres along the coast in the south.Eleven states in the north, including Sokoto, are threatened with desertifica-tion, the process by which dryland eco-systems are continually degraded by the removal of tree and plant cover, mostly

by human activity. In northern Nigeria, desertification threatens the livelihoods of some 40 million people. These 11 states account for about 35 percent of the country’s total land area and are key areas of livestock rearing and agricultural production, such as beans, soya beans, millet, sorghum, tomatoes, melons, peppers, and onions. Farmers are taking a range of piece-meal steps to combat desertification, but for the fight against this devastating pro-

Digging up a tired soil

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cess to be waged effectively, experts say the government has to develop a more integrated and comprehensive approach to the management of land and water. Professor Emmanuel Oladipo, who ad-vises Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of En-vironment on climate change issues, explained how desertification is being fuelled by poor land use, unsustainable grazing practices, deforestation, and the consumption pressures associated with a booming population. “The direct causes of desertification and arid land degradation stem mostly from drastic reduction or destruction of the perennial plant cover, particularly trees, and simplification of the vegetation structure,” Oladipo told IRIN. “Soil surface not protected by per-manent vegetation becomes subject to: erosion by water and wind; crusting by raindrop splash and trampling by ani-mals; salinisation by evaporation; and water logging in topographic depressions since water is no longer extracted by per-manent vegetation.” Farmers in the north are taking steps to adapt to desertification and more frequent droughts – planting trees to provide shade and windbreaks, using diesel-powered pumps for irrigation, and sowing hardier crops such as beans – but such measures aren’t nearly equivalent to the enormous scale of the crisis. Nigeria has an annual deforestation rate of about 3.5 percent, meaning an av-erage yearly loss of between 350,000 and 400,000 hectares of forest cover. Official figures say Africa’s largest nation loses over 10.5 billion naira ($34.3 million) every year to environmental challenges such as deforestation, drought, and de-sertification, but wider unofficial ones put the annual cost in the billions of dol-lars. Five years ago, Nigeria developed a National Strategic Action Plan for de-sertification and drought, but just like its Drought and Desertification Policy and its Drought Preparedness Plan, a lack of funding and political will has held back progress. The bulk of the government’s counter-desertification work is imple-mented through the National Agency for the Great Green Wall, an ambitious plan

launched in 2007 to plant a 15-kilometre wide swathe of trees along 8,000 kilome-tres of the southern edge of the Sahara. More than 20 countries in the Sahel are involved, and some $8 billion has been mobilised for the initiative. Since Nigeria started implementing the initiative in 2013, the agency claims a long list of successes, including the planting of five million assorted forest and fruit tree seedlings, as well as hun-dreds of hectares of shelterbelts and com-munity woods and orchards. However, reporting from the indi-vidual states involved gives an equally long list of problems and indicates a gen-eral lack of enthusiasm. And, according to local newspaper The Guardian, the agency received less than one fifth of the 1.05 billion naira ($3.4 million) ap-proved for operations this year. For Murtala Adogi Mohammed, a PhD researcher looking at the impact of climate change in northwestern Kastina State, the deeper problem is that farm-ers themselves aren’t being given enough say in the design, implementation, and monitoring of the work. “Government-designed tree plant-ing projects without the input of the local farmers and key rural stakeholders are not sustainable,” he said. “To ensure stewardship, ownership and sustainabili-ty – rural dwellers buy-in is very import-ant.” The result is that Nigeria has in-vested hundreds of millions of dollars in afforestation and reforestation pro-grammes over the last few decades with-out effectively tackling desertification. Ologun Freeman, an associate direc-tor at the Federal Ministry of Environ-ment, told IRIN that the 2012 Presiden-tial Initiative on Afforestation, in which millions of seedlings were planted, “was not really successful as the government could not really track down the seedlings [all the way] to the field where they are supposed to be planted”. Many of the government’s efforts to tackle desertification in northern Nige-ria are not “sustainable”, said Olagunju Temidayo Ebenezer, a climate change researcher at the University of Ibadan. Ebenezer blamed the lack of monitoring and continuity, inconsistent government

policies, and the diversion of money from environmental management funds.Experts say the government needs to ad-dress the underlying enablers of defor-estation such as a lack of policy support, weak regulations, and rural poverty. Most of all, the trend towards an increasingly unsustainable dependence on land resources for food production, medicine, fuel, fodder, building materi-als, and household items, must stop. The soaring demand for fuelwood overrides any concerns about advancing desertification in the north. Fuelwood and charcoal account for about 50 per-cent of national primary energy con-sumption, with rural communities burn-ing up over 32 million cubic metres of fuelwood yearly. Mohammed believes providing “economic incentives” such as social cap-ital loans, microcredit schemes, and sub-sidies for agricultural machinery would reduce poverty and thereby release this growing pressure on arid lands. “Government should also improve the state of social amenities such as rural electricity, which would serve as an alter-native to fuelwood as a source of local energy,” he said. Beyond planting trees, Nigeria has to develop more efficient ways to reverse desertification and drought, said Oladi-po, who participated in the drafting of the 2012 action plan. “It requires a comprehensive and integrated approach to the management of the land, biodiversity, and water re-sources of the affected areas in northern Nigeria for the sustainable livelihoods of the people in the region,” he explained. Perhaps the best clues for how to succeed in the future lie in the action plan itself. It conceded that Nigeria’s ap-proach to reversing desertification had been “generally inconsistent, uncoordi-nated, piecemeal, sectoral and consists of single set remedial and ad hoc mea-sures” without “serious attempts to have a comprehensive and integrated national framework.”

*Linus Unah is a freelance journalist based in Nigeria and this is a IRIN report.

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Food sovereignty and peasant agroecology real solutions to

climate crisisFoodsovereigntyandpeasantagroecology–whichshouldbeunderstoodinthecontextof

national sovereignty - are the true solutions to build resilience and resistance, say *Michaelin Sibanda and Boaventura Monjane.

The transnational corporations responsible for over 70% of the man-made emissions continue

to push forward new false solutions to address the climate crisis. Such solutions not only focus on growing their profits but create more conditions to commod-ify nature, while turning a blind eye to the increasing social and environmental crisis they have created. Today, millions of peasants, indigenous people and fish-erfolks are losing their source of live-

lihood to rising sea levels and adverse weather conditions. It is clear that capital survives and feeds on chaos and destruction of nature. Human dignity and life are not respected at all. Recent climate disasters in Puerto Rico expose this immoral behavior. After suffering two hurricanes (Irma and Ma-ria), the US administration blocked any form of assistance to rebuild the island, only allowing its corporations. For Jesús Vázquez Negrón from

Puerto Rico, who was attending the people’s mobilizations parallel to the 23rd edition of the Conference of Par-ties (COP23) in Bonn, climate change is real. “We are here to remind the world that the change must be systemic. That is why the proposal of systemic change proposed by La Via Campesina, a global grassroots movement and alliance, is cru-cial.” The peasant struggle is not just about climate resilience – which is an act

Drought-ravaged terrain

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of resistance in itself. It is also a global fight against the expansion of agribusi-ness, which relies on free trade agree-ments. There is an urgent need to crit-ically question the mass production of meat and reduce the import of feed from the global south to Europe. To make sure they keep growing

despite global climate change, transna-tional corporations have developed their own ways - false solutions such as blue carbon, REDD [1] mechanism and cli-mate smart agriculture. Another issue that is generally un-dermined in climate change debates is migration. There are today more than ever before a growing number of cli-mate-migrants. According to Massa Koné of the Global Convergence of Land and Water Struggles – West Africa, the climate and the migrantion crisis are the two sides of the same coin. “… It is those who try to contain migrations who have also provoked it! It is their false solutions that are taking over our land, disturb our rainfall, that create wars! This is why mi-gration increases everyday”, says Koné. The good news is that the debates have a strong youth movement that is leading the struggle in various places of the globe, as they are the future of hu-manity. “We are the present for a bet-ter future and we will not give up, but continue to defend the interests of the peasants, the whole society, for a social transformation. We, peasants across the world, firmly reject the industrial model

of agriculture which is at the very root of climate change”, says young French peas-ant Fanny Metrat of Confederation Pay-sanne. “We are the ones who can cool the planet and feed the world”, she added. There have been many COPs before and many more will follow, but their impact on public policies is minor. Sus-tainable development, green economy, REDD are the buzzwords of capitalism being hammered these days in Bonn. But social movements expect governments and multinationals around the negotiat-ing table to deliver real solutions. To change the system, grassroots and peasant movements have to keep grow-ing and establish more alliances. Our governments do not realize the urgency of the situation but the peasantry suffers from it on a daily basis. Food sovereignty and peasant agroecology – which should be understood in the context of nation-al sovereignty - are the true solutions to build their resilience and resistance.

* Michaelin Sibanda is a ZIMSOFF youth member and Boaventura Monjane is a Mozambican activist, journalist and PhD Candidate, University of Coimbra, Portu-gal.

The peasant struggle is not just about climate re-silience – which is an act of resistance in itself. It is also a global fight against the expansion of agribusi-ness, which relies on free

trade agreements. There is an urgent need to critically question the mass produc-

tion of meat and reduce the import of feed from the

global south to Europe.

CLIMATE CHANGE

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POLITICS

Pentagon explanations for Niger operations can’t conceal

strategic interests

Operations in Niger are part of a broader strategic plan to further dominate Africa military and economically. The Sahel is a treasure trove of valuable minerals and other natural resources. U.S. military occupations, although said to be based on cooperative efforts between the host governmentsandWashington,clearlyrepresenttheinterestsofinternationalfinancecapital

based on Wall Street, contends *Abayomi Azikiwe.

Almost on a daily basis the re-counting of circumstances in-volving the killing of four United

States Green Berets in the West African state of Niger has shifted. Even senior members of the Senate have stated that they had no idea that Pentagon troops were conducting offensive operations in the country. Niger, a former French colo-ny, is ranked as the world’s fourth largest

producer of uranium, a fact which has been interestingly omitted from the lim-ited discourse on the deaths of the troops deployed under the banner of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). A recent report published in the Washington Post claims that the only African American soldier in the group of dead troops, Sgt. La David Johnson, had been kidnapped and killed execution

style. Purportedly, people living in the area where Johnson’s body was discov-ered indicated that his hands were bound behind his back with a gaping wound in the rear of his head. (Nov. 10) Other reports say that the Nigerien troops, who were ostensibly on a patrol mission with the AFRICOM forces, fled while the Green Berets stood and fought the alleged assailants. Who these “hostile

Cover up underway to obscure why AFRICOM is escalating its presence on the continent

Africom soldiers with their African counterparts

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elements” were has still not been clear-ly defined. What has been mentioned is that they are somehow affiliated with ISIS. (Guardian, Nov. 4) AFRICOM in a statement issued on November 12 said it was investigating the incident in order to report its find-ing to the family of the slain soldiers. Nonetheless, the family of Johnson com-plained about what they described as the insensitive nature of a phone call received from President Donald Trump in the af-termath of the news reports of the Green Beret’s death. Family members of Johnson also noted that they were prohibited from viewing what was said to have been the remains of the African American soldier. They, along with Congresswoman Fred-rica S. Wilson of Florida, have expressed their dissatisfaction with the response of the White House, particularly the subse-quent utterances of administration chief of staff Gen. John Kelly, who came to the defense of Trump saying that the presi-dent’s actions were appropriate. A report published on the AF-RICOM website dated October 23 uti-lizes what many may consider to be racist terminology in regard to the character of Niger and other African states. This at-titude was echoed by members of Con-gress as well as the White House. This article by AFRICOM writer Jim Garamone said: “ISIS seeks to sur-vive in the dark corners of the world where local inhabitants lack the pow-er and expertise to control the violent group, Dunford (Pentagon chair) said. ISIS operates where it can exploit weak-

nesses in local government and local se-curity forces, he added. Libya, Somalia, West Africa, certain places in Central and Southeast Asia are places where ISIS and like groups choose to operate.” Later in this report Garamone quotes the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Marine Corps Gen. John Dunford as saying: “If you think of those enablers as connective tissue between groups across the globe, our strategy is to cut that tissue, while enabling local se-curity forces to deal with the challenges within their countries and region. Our soldiers are operating in Niger to build the capacity of local forces to defeat vi-olent extremism in West Africa. Their presence is part of a global strategy.” The same article goes on to make even more contradictory claims stressing: “The United States is working with na-tions around the world to improve their military capabilities and capacities, Dun-ford said. U.S. troops, he added, have been working with forces from Niger for 20 years, the general said, training more than 35,000 soldiers from the region to confront the threats of ISIS, al-Qaida and Boko Haram.” Yet the Boko Haram insurgency which originated in neighboring Nigeria only began in 2009 after the country’s military attacked the headquarters of the organization in Maiduguri city in Borno state in the northern region. Prior to this time Boko Haram had largely functioned as an above-ground group focused on its own notions of the Islamic religion. ISIS arose after the collapse of the Pentagon occupation strategy in Iraq over the last six years when Washington sought to curtail growing Iranian influ-ence in the region. Even al-Qaeda had not been cited as an existential threat in West Africa prior to recent years. This was clearly not the case in 1997 as Dun-ford asserted. Moreover, what is never addressed is the supposed strategic and security inter-ests of the U.S. in Niger, West Africa and the continent as a whole. The presence of Pentagon military forces in Africa has rapidly grown over the last decade. These policies have been consis-tently implemented through successive administrations both Republican and

Democratic. The destruction of Lib-ya, Ivory Coast and Sudan all occurred during the administration of President Barack Obama. Obama continued to prop up the western-oriented regime in the Horn of Africa state of Somalia where genu-ine stability and security remain elusive. Constructing drone stations in Niger is part and parcel of a broader strategic plan to further dominate Africa military and economically. The Sahel region of West Africa is a treasure trove of valuable minerals and other natural resources including oil, gold, uranium and natural gas. U.S. military occupations although said to be based on cooperative efforts between the host governments and Washington, clearly the Pentagon represents the in-terests of international finance capital based on Wall Street.

“Moreover, what is never addressed is the supposed

strategic and security in-terests of the U.S. in Ni-ger, West Africa and the

continent as a whole. The presence of Pentagon mil-

itary forces in Africa has rapidly grown over the last

decade.”

Africom officers wit South African officers

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Much is made within the west-ern press that the intervention of AF-RICOM follows the request of regional states. These governments, however, are not in any position to refuse Pentagon interference in their internal affairs. If they dare to challenge the purported authority of the White House to send special units of the U.S. military into their countries they, of course, will face concerted efforts to remove their ad-ministrations from office. In fact in Mali during early 2012, a U.S.-trained lower-ranking military officer staged a coup against an elected government. There was no level of re-morse or contrition expressed by the-then Obama White House. Obviously, the White House along with Wall Street corporations view the African continent as a source of wealth

through the exploitation of natural re-sources including land and waterways. The question is what will the Niger people gain from this Pentagon military intervention which appears to have no end in sight? Since its independence from France in 1960, the country has been subjected to draconian debt imposi-tions of finance capital. Under the mil-itary occupation of the Pentagon such problems will not be overcome. Military and economic “support” from the U.S. comes inevitably at a heavy price. There is the entire history post-colonial Africa to attest to this analysis. Just three weeks after the killing of the four AFRICOM soldiers, demon-strations erupted in Niamey, the capital, against the economic policies of Presi-dent Mahamadou Issoufou. The unrest

was prompted by an austerity budget which is the stock and trade of neo-co-lonialism led by the U.S. According to a report on the pro-test actions: “Twenty-three police were hurt and a police station was set on fire in demonstrations against financial reforms late Sunday (Oct. 30) in the Niger capital of Niamey, the interior minister and private TV stations report-ed. The police commissariat at the Ha-bou Bene market, the country’s biggest trading spot, was torched and the front of the building housing the Indepen-dent National Electoral Commission (CENI), Niger’s voting watchdog, was vandalized, private television reported.” (Citizen, Oct. 30) The report goes on to report that: “Local civil society organizations have for weeks been denouncing the 2018 budget for imposing austerity on one of the poorest countries on the planet…. More than 80 percent of Niger is cov-ered by the Sahara desert. Its economy has been affected by falls in both oil prices, which it officially began export-ing in 2011, and uranium, of which it is a major exporter…. The country also has to spend resources to combat attacks by Boko Haram, whose Islamist insur-gency has spilled over from Nigeria, as well as from jihadists, including the Is-lamic State group, near the border with Mali.” These developments portend much for the future political situation in Ni-ger. Regional African states should take notice of the parallel between U.S. mili-tary presence and social instability. In the long term African Union (AU) member-states and their affiliates such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) must eventually move towards independent economic and security policies. Oth-erwise the dependency upon the West will undermine efforts aimed at genuine growth and prosperity.

* Abayomi Azikiwe is Editor, Pan-African News Wire.

Africom officers wit South African officers

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SCIENCE

Infant formula companies put profit before science

A new report from UK-based Changing Markets Foundation reveals how formula milk manufac-turersaddunnecessaryingredientswithnoprovenbenefits–alltorampuptheprices,

writes *Pat Thomas.

A new international investigation has revealed a shocking lack of science behind the infant formula

ranges sold by baby milk companies – and some questionable marketing prac-tices as well. Exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months of life – a practice recom-mended by every health organisation in the world – provides a baby with every-thing it needs to grow and thrive. Not just nutrition, but hundreds of non-nutrient factors which cannot be synthesised in the lab and which help protect against illness and promote optimal growth. For those women who don’t or can’t breastfeed, being able to trust that infant formula is providing the best possible nutrition is very important. But a new report, Milking It, from the non-profit, UK-based Changing Markets Foundation notes that while there is a single global standard for what ingredients should be in infant formula, the top four manufacturers, Nestlé, Da-none, Mead Johnson Nutrition (recently acquired by Reckitt Benckiser), and Ab-bott sell a mind-boggling number - more than 400 individual products - between them globally. Too often, according to the report, manufacturers add unnecessary ingredi-ents with no proven benefits – so that they can charge a premium price for their products. This isn’t illegal but it is uneth-ical and in breach of a voluntary World Health Organization (WHO) code on the marketing of breastmilk substitutes. Added fats, pre- and pro-biotics and certain nutrients, may make more plausable manufacturers’ claims to make formula which is closer to breastmilk, represents the latest developments in nutritional science, or satisfies hungrier babies, to promote better digestion, or to aid sleep. But, says the report: “There is little nutritional science and few beneficial health considerations behind their exten-

sive product ranges.” These premium products do not cater to mothers’ or babies’ needs but instead exist to create a market that cap-italises on mother’s anxiety around feed-ing their children, and their willingness to pay a premium for what they think is scientific certainty. In analysing the retail prices that companies around the world charge for infant formula, the report found that manufacturers charge whatever they can get away in individual markets – a fact underscored by the wildly different pric-es that the same brands sell for in differ-ent parts of the world. The most expensive products, for instance, were found in China and Hong Kong, where families can spend US$286 and US $304 per month to feed a 2-3-month old baby, respectively, based on using the most expensive product in those markets. In 2008 infant formula made in China was found to be contaminated with toxic melamine, deliberately added to some formulas to make them appear as if they contained more protein than they did. Many infants were made ill and some died from drinking the adulterated formula. Today Chinese mothers still seek big Western brands believing that they are better, or purer, than Chinese brands. The big brands capitalise on this fear by charging exorbitant prices for their prod-ucts. As a result, parents in China can spend up to 40% of their average sala-ry on infant formula. In comparison, the most expensive formula in European countries will only cost 1-3% of an aver-age salary. The report also highlighted the ex-tent to which formula companies listen in on mothers’ social media posts in or-der to learn about their hopes, fears and desires – and then tailor their marketing outreach around that.

Manufacturers use internet plat-forms such as Facebook, as well as online mother and baby clubs (often financed by formula manufacturers themselves), to collect vital information on moth-ers, and to portray themselves as trusted ‘friends’ on the ‘mother’s journey’ in or-der to sell their products. “Our report found that instead of nutritional science, companies are basing their selling strategies on market research and consumer preferences,” said Nusa Urbancic from Changing Markets Foun-dation. “Product differentials are carefully and deliberately designed to appeal to the tastes and lifestyle preferences of par-ents, or their natural desire to give their babies the best possible start in life. As such, manufacturers can package these products in ‘premium’ ranges and charge high prices accordingly.” The report calls for a comprehensive overhaul of global infant milk products and the introduction of stricter regula-tion, so that only those products based on unequivocal scientific advice, and with the highest quality of nutritional ingredients, are sold. It also calls on governments to in-troduce and enforce national legislation that fully implements the WHO market-ing Code and to ensure that the safety and nutritional quality and completeness of products are regularly verified. To coincide with the report Sum of Us, the global online campaigning platform, launched a petition on No-vember 1 calling for Nestlé to make sure their infant milks are safe, nutritionally complete and based on science. It gained nearly 60,000 signature son its first day.

*Pat Thomas is a journalist, author and campaigner and former editor of the Ecol-ogist. This article is reproduced fromThird World Network Features

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