against the current the survival of authoritarianism in burma

8/10/2019 Against the Current the Survival of Authoritarianism in Burma

1/19

Against the Current: The Survival of Authoritarianism in BurmaAuthor(s): Jalal AlamgirSource: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 3 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 333-350Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British ColumbiaStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2761026.

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2/19

Against

the

Current:

The SurvivalofAuthoritarianism

in

Burna*

Jalal

Alamgir

I.

INTRODUCTION

THE LAST

TWO DECADES have witnessed an

unprecedented growth

of

democracy

around the world.

Freedom House estimates that the

numberof free

ountries, hat s, democracieswithout eriousviolations

of human

rights,

as

gone up

from

hirty

o

seventy-six

etween

1973 and

the

beginning

of 1996.1

Burma, however,has

gone against

the current.

n

the Pacific

Rim,

South

Korea

and Taiwanhave

recently emocratized,

nd so

have

Burma's

neighbors,

angladesh

and Thailand. ndia is a

democracy,

nd theworld's

largest ne forthatmatter. urma seems the odd country ut in Southern

Asia. It

has been

under continuous authoritarianrule since

1962.

The

regime

has been isolatedfrommostof the

world,

artly y

hoice and

partly

by the

unwillingness f

many

countries

to

support

the

repressive

unta.

Burmese

authoritarianism

oes

not even have the

high

economic

perfor-

mance

thathas somewhat

legitimized

few

ther

non-democracies,

uch

as

the

big power adjacent

to

it

China.

How, then,

has authoritarianism

in

Burma been able

to survive or o

long?

This is

the

question

the

paper

athand seeks to answer.

The

global wave of democratization

has inspired

a

spate of studies

n

the social sciences.

Most,however,

while

underscoring

movement oward

democracy,usually omit

from

their

nquiry

the survival

of

monolithic

repressive

regimes.2

A more

complete

understanding

of

recent

*

For their helpful comments on previous

drafts,

thank Vikram

Chand,

Clark

Neher,

Ansil

Ramsay,Nagesh Rao, Rachel Boynton, and two

anonymous reviewers or PacificAffairs.

1

Freedomn theWorld:

The

Annual Survey fPolitical

Rights

nd Civil Liberties

995-96 (New

York:

Freedom House, 1996), p. 4.

2

The literature is vast and expanding.

Examples are Guillermo

O'Donnell and

Philippe

C.

Schmitter, Transitions romAuthorztarianRule:

Tentative Conclusions about UncertainDemocracies

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Alfred Stepan, RethinkingMilitaryPolitics

(Princeton: Princeton University ress, 1988);

Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern New York:

Random House, 1990); Samuel P. Huntington, The

ThirdWave:Democratization

n the

ate Twentieth

CenturyNorman: University f Oklahoma

Press, 1991);

Adam

Przeworski,Democracy nd

the

Market

(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,

1991); Merle Goldman, Sowing

the

eeds ofDemocracyn

China (Cambridge:

Harvard

University ress,

1994); Stephan Haggard

and

Stephen

B.

Webb, eds.,

Voting or Reform: emocracy, olitical

Liberalization,

and Economic

Adjustment New

York: Oxford

UniversityPress, 1994); and Stephan Haggard and

Robert

R.

Kaufman,

The

Political Economy f

Democratic ransitionsPrinceton: PrincetonUniversity ress, 1995).

333

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3/19

PacificAffairs

democratization

must

incorporate findings

from countries that

have

not

democratized. Cuba, North Korea, Libya, Vietnam

or Burma

can provide

more variability or studies that use democratization as the dependent vari-

able. Other

analyses

that treat democratization

as an

independent

variable

can

use these countries as control

cases. This

paper

aims to

contribute to

the overall literature

on democratization

by exploring

the Burma

story.

I

intend to do that

in

two stages.

The

first tage,

elaborated in section

II

of the paper, is theoretical. By looking

at

germane theories

I

identify he

structural bases that

support

authoritarianism.

I also make an

inventory

of

strategies

an authoritarian

regime

can

adopt

to maintain itself.

My

defini-

tion of authoritarianism is simple: It is a system hat does not allow regular,

institutionalized changes

in

government through

free elections.

The second stage, contained in section IV, is an examination of Burma

as

a case study. Here,

based on the

theoretical inventory,

I

review

the

actual

survival strategiespursued by

the Burmese state. The overall

method,

thus,

s to first xamine

what

different heories

propose

as to

how

an author-

itarian regime survives,

and

then to compare the Burmese experience

against

theoretical

expectations

or

hypotheses.

The

concluding

section of

the essay

summarizes

the findings

and offers ome

theoretically

informed

speculations on the futureofBurmese politics.

II.

FRAMEWORK

OF ANALYSIS:

THESES ABOUT

MAINTENANCE OF AUTHORITARIANISM

The

central

theoretical

argument

of

this essay

is that

authoritarianism

has both structural

nd

strategicources.

The

long-term basis

of

the survival

of

authoritarianism

may

be found

in

structural

characteristics,

such as tra-

dition and social order, classes, ethnic

and

religious divisions, ideology

(nationalism, socialism/communism), economic institutions and condi-

tions,

and

long-term

economic

performance.

These

are

structural

because

they represent

not human actors

per se,

but

the social, cultural, or

economic

arrangement, ordering,

or

situation

in which

actors find them-

selves.

I

emphasize

here

social, cultural,

and

economic,

but not

political

structure,

because

I

treat the

political

structure

-

authoritarianism

-

as

given.

I

will

argue

that

the

structural base

of

support

for authoritarianism

was

put

in

place

in Burma between

1962

and

1988, during

Ne

Win's

rule.

The structuralbase gradually eroded or changed and became more dif-

ficult to hold on to

by

the

late

eighties.

Domestic and

international

pro-democracy

forces

posed strategichallenges

to

the

regime.

These

forces,

which

represent

actors within he

tructure,

nclude

students

and

the intelli-

gentsia,

the

clergy,foreign powers,

and

the media.

Our

objective

will be to

examine

how the

State

Law

and Order Restoration

-

SLORC

-

regime

responded strategically

o

these

forces in the

post-1988 period.

334



4/19

Burma

-

Against theCurrent

Structural ources fAuthoritarianism

Modernization

theorists, starting with

Emile

Durkheim,

Max

Weber,

and Talcott Parsons, posit that authoritarianism generally exists

in

soci-

eties that have pre-modern structures, nd that t s eventually replaced with

democracy, which is automatic if the societal variables, such as value-system,

mode of production, and above all, rationality, ave

sufficiently

rogressed.

This implies the following theses on the survival of authoritarianism:

Thesis 1: Authoritarianism arises in a pre-modern setting. It will main-

tain itselfby thwartingmodernization, and by appealing to traditional

values, culture,

and

religion.

Modernization theory, however, can lead to opposing theses. Neil

Smelser

argued that social disturbances accompany modernization, espe-

cially

in

countries that undergo rapid industrialization.

In

such instances,

there is a functional necessity for a strong, centralized government. 3

Accordingly,

Thesis

2:

The

structural source of authoritarianism is instability and

dislocation

in

the context of modernization.

An

authoritarian regime

claims to maintain order.

Within the Marxist literature, there are two general perspectives on

authoritarianism. First, here is bourgeois authoritarianism, encapsulated as

follows:

Thesis

3:

An

authoritarian regime under capitalism arises to serve the

interests of capital

and

to confrontorganized labor.

The other way authoritarianism can arise is through a socialist revolu-

tion, during which,

as Marx

put it,

the state

can be

nothing

but the

revolutionaryictatorshipfthe roletariat.

4

Thesis

4: Authoritarianism arises

from/during

a

revolution

in

order to

successfully omplete the transitionto a postrevolutionaryera.

Neo-Marxist

analysis

of

underdevelopment, especially dependency

theory,proposed the following general hypothesis:5

'Neil Smelser, Mechanisms

of

and Adjustments

to

Change,

in T.

Burns, ed., IndustrialMan

(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969).

4

Karl Marx, Critique ftheGothaProgram, eprinted

n

Robert C. Tucker,

The

Marx-Engels

eader,

2d

ed.

(New

York:

W.

W.

Norton, 1978), p. 630, original

talics.And as

Engels put it,

though

a bitsar-

castically, A revolution is certainlythe most authoritarian thing there is, in Friedrich Engels, On

Authority,eprinted n Tucker, TheMarx-Engels eader, . 733.

5A

recent

application

of such

a

thesis

s

Dietrich

Rueschemeyer,

E. H.

Stephens,

and

John

D.

Stephens, CapitalistDevelopment Democracy Chicago: University f Chicago Press,

1992), which

finds the working class as the most consistent pro-democratic force, and that their

weakness per-

petuated authoritarian coalitions between the middle

class

and the landed aristocracy.

Barrington

Moore also highlights he antidemocratic nature of the landed gentry.Barrington

Moore,Jr., Social

Origins fDictatorshipnd DemocracyBoston: Beacon Press, 1966). See,

in

addition, Hamza

Alavi,

The

State

in

Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh, NewLeftReview, o. 74 (1972),

pp. 59-81;

and Alavi, India and the Colonial Mode of Production, The SocialistRegister 975 (London:

Merlin,

1975).

335



5/19

Pacific

ffairs

Thesis : The main structural

oot of authoritarianismn developing

countries

s a transnationallass-based lliance

against

he

working lass.

Accordingto Clive Thomas,there are additional roots of authoritari-

anism n

developing

ountries: the

highly ragmented..

social

formations

[of peripheralcountries],

ombined

with heir

multiracial r

multiethnic

populations, ncourage

the

vigorous romotion

f the state

s the principal

unifying

orce nd

unifying

ymbol

f the

society. 6

Thesis6:

A

heterogeneous and

underdeveloped setting ncourages

authoritarianism.epression

s utilized

o

promote

nd coerce national

unification.

Specialists tudying he developmental tate r bureaucratic uthor-

itarianism point out that when the state embarks on a

rapid (usually

export-led) rowth oute, strong uthoritarian

egime

dominated

by

ech-

nocrats

and

the military s likely to

arise,

so it can

direct capital into

profitable ectors, epresswages,

nd

provide tability.7

Thesis : Authoritarianism

bureaucratic-military)

s

required

for

fast

(export-led) growth.

he

continuity

f such

regimesrestsupon high

economic

performance.

Some

of

the

hypothesis

uggested

above are

mutually

onflictive

and some

akin.

To minimize

edundancy, hey

an be consolidated nto

fourmain strands f

arguments,

s

presented

below:

The

tructural

ases

of

Authoritarianism:

Modernizationhesis: uthoritarianismrises

n

a

pre-modern etting,

continues

through

he

instability

f

ndustrialization,

nd

appeals

to

tradition, ulture,

nd

religion.

Capitalism

hesis:

uthoritarianism

s

based on

a

transnationalapital-

ist

alliance,

and is

necessary

to

repress

labor and

promote fast

export-led rowth.

Socialism

hesis: uthoritarianisms

necessary

o maintain

evolutionary

ideology

nd

to complete ocialist

ransformation.

Nationalism hesis:

Authoritarianism rises

n

a

heterogenous society

and seeks to

promote

national

unity

nd the

strictmaintenance of

order.

6

CliveY.

Thomas,

The

Rise

of

he

Authoritariantate n

Peripheral

ocieties

NewYork:

Monthly

Review

Press,

1984),

p.

119;

also Basil

Davidson, The Black Man's Burden NewYork: Times

Books, 1992).

7 Guillermo

O'Donnell, Modernization nd BureaucraticAuthoritarianism

Berkeley:

Institute of

International

Studies, 1973); Peter Evans,

DependentDevelopment:heAlliance fMultinational,tate nd

Local

Capital in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1979); Stephan

Haggard, Pathways

from he

eriphery: he Politicsof

Growth

n

Newly ndustrializing

ountries

Ithaca:

Cornell

University

Press, 1990).

336



6/19

Burma - Against the

Current

Strategies fAuthoritarianism gainst

Pro-Democracy hallenges.According

to Samuel

Huntington, there

were five

general

threats

to

authoritarianism

in the seventies and the eighties.8 Firstdictatorships,mostlyautarkic ones,

faced an economic performance

challenge, marked by economic decline

brought on by oil shocks, a decrease in

primary commodity prices

and

the

debt crisis. An authoritarian government might confront these crises in

the following way:

The Economic Reform trategy:

ntroduce market-oriented changes

in

economic

policy, pursue multilateral

aid,

and

promote

economic

pluralism.

Second, the postwar economic growth had increased literacy, social

development,

and

overall income,

leading to an empowerment of actors

especially middle-class actors

-

within the

civil society who

started

to

demand a more open political system.Hence,

ThePoliticalReform trategy:iberalize the

polity, hat s, open up

limited

space

for

people

to

vent

their

grievances.

Huntington

also notes

changes

in

the

doctrine

and

activities

of

the

Catholic

Church,

in

response to

which the state

usually

undertook

repression of the clergy and the dissemination their ideas.

The Secularism Strategy: ncrease repression and emphasize secular

values.

(The

reverse

of

this

may

also

be true: Authoritarian

regimes

con-

front challenges

from

pro-secular institutions

by emphasizing

religious-fundamentalistvalues.)

In

face of

the

promotion of

democracy by

external

actors,

such as

the

United States, the USSR, the Vatican,

NGOs

or

multilateral agencies,

a

regime may adopt

The International Alliance

Strategy:

Align with

other authoritarian

countries, and emphasize nationalism.

Finally, to

counter

snowballing,

or demonstration effects from one

democratizing country

to

another,

authoritarian

regimes

tend

to

restrict

independent communication.

The Censorship trategy: ensor media, and

suppress

communication

with the outside world.

Scope

and Limitations

f

the

Study.

As

intimated,

I

plan

to look at

Burma

by breaking its political history into

the

1962-88

and 1988-93

periods,

corresponding respectively

o Ne Win's

and SLORC's

rule,

and to the struc-

tural and

strategic

sources.

I

evaluate

the theses

above

by

first

liminating

those which

clearly

do not

apply

to

Burma,

and

then

assessing

the

extent

to which

the others fit

he

Burmese

case.

8

Huntington, The ThirdWave.

337



7/19

Pacific

Affairs

The reader may suspect that

I

have overlooked two quite obvious the-

ses. First, uthoritarian regimes surviveby using

sheer brute force

against

all

opposition. This argument, while factual, is tautological, for authoritarian

regimes by definition have to relyon repression.

Force

by itself does not

explain much; rather, t is used as

an

essential part

of all

the survival strate-

gies listed above. No doubt the

Burmese

regime

has been

severely

repressive, and the purpose of this essay

is

to go beyond examining just

repression.

The second obvious thesis s that authoritarian regimes cope with oppo-

sition by democratizing.

Democratization is

one

step

further

than

liberalization; it involves conducting free elections and transferring ower.

But the

undertaking

of democratization

implies

the

end

of authoritarian

rule. Analytically, s such, it

is not a

survival strategy;

t s

surrender,which

is

what we

hope

to see

in Burma

some

day

soon.

III. A BRIEF

CHRONOLOGY

OF EVENTS

Burma

emerged

as

a

sovereign

nation-state

in

1948,

and

until 1958 it

was

a

parliamentary democracy,

crafted

along

the Indian model of federal-

ism. In 1958, at the request of Prime Minister U Nu, the military chief

General Ne Win temporarily

took

over power

to

suppress minority

nsur-

gency

and

restore

order so that national elections could be held

in

1960.

In

1962,

U

Nu resigned as prime minister

because of divisions

within his

party,

AFPFL

(Anti-Fascist People's

Freedom

League).

In the

leadership

vacuum Ne

Win

seized

power

and

established

a

Revolutionary

Council

to govern the state

under the

military,known

in Burma as the tatmadaw.

He

subsequently

banned all

political parties

and

dissent,

and

organized

Burma as

a

one-party tate

under

the BSPP,

the Burma Socialist

Programme

party.To thisend, a new constitution was passed in 1974.

Ne Win

ruled until 1988. In

April Aung

San Suu

Kyi,

the

expatriate

daughter ofAung San, came back to Burma amid growingstudent demands

for democratization. As a token of liberalization Ne

Win

resigned

in

July,

as

thousands of students were killed

in

military firings

on

demonstrations

between March and September. General Saw Maung took over as

the

new

ruler of

Burma.

One-party

authoritarianism under the

1974

constitution

was

abrogated,

and

military

authoritarianism

was

established

under the

SLORC junta. The next year, Suu Kyi, who became embroiled in the

struggle

for

democracy,

was

put

under house arrest. SLORC

organized

national

elections in

1990,

in

which

Suu

Kyi's coalition,

the National

League

for

Democracy (NLD)

secured

overwhelming victory. LORC, however,

has

refused to transfer

power,

and

is still

ruling

Burma

(they changed

the coun-

try's

name from

Burma

to

Myanmar). Only very recently,

in

July, 1994,

have

they

released Suu

Kyi (now

a Nobel

laureate)

from

house

arrest,

but

they

continue to limit

her

actions.

338



8/19

Burma

-

Against

the

Current

IV.

THE

SURVIVAL

OF

BURMESE

AUTHORITARIANISM

Structuralources. e Win ustifiedhis ascension to powerby stressing

threeexigencies.First, military

akeover,

e

argued,was the

onlywayto

preventBurma fromdisintegrating.

ational unitywas posed as the fore-

mostproblemfacingmultiethnic urma.And it was not ust sheer

rhetoric

-

it did have a plausible ring of truth o it.9The dominant ethnic

group

in Burma is the Burmans, concentrated n the centralvalley

of the river

Irrawaddy. arens, Shans,

Mons, Chins,Arakanese, and numerous other

ethnicminorities re scattered round

the

peripheralregion. Considering

this

multicultural etting,

he original constitutionwas based

on federal-

ism; t even allowed theopportunityorKarensand Shans to secede from

the

union

after

en

years.

Burmese authoritarianism ose

amid

various

small-scale

thnic nsurgencies,

hich he regimeup to thepresent

imehas

been

trying

o crush.The brutalwar gainst thnicities

as

helped

Burmese

regimes o divert ttention way

from heir conomic failures.

A new con-

stitution

assed by

Ne Win

in 1974

rejected federalism

nd

emphasized

national dentity verethnicity.

Nationalism was emphasized not only to suppress

minoritiesbut to

breedxenophobia as well.Priorto the military akeover, he nascentcapi-

talist class

in Burma

was

composed mostly

of

Chinese and Indian

merchants, entered around

Rangoon and otherports.The authoritarian

government oupled anticapitalist

deologywith iercely

ationalist hetoric

in order

to wipe out thisexpatriate

merchant

lass.

Anti-Chinese

iots

n

1967 were tacitly sometimes xplicitly) ncouraged,following

ood short-

ages.

As

it

destroyed

entrepreneurship

in

society,

it

also reduced

significantly

he

potential

for

economic

challenges against

authoritarian-

ism.Up to 300,000 ettled ndians and Pakistanis ere

estimated o

have

eft

the countryby1965. In addition,the regime passed citizenship aws,

restricting

arious

privileges such

as

medical school

admission)

for itizens

who

cannot prove

their Burmese

ancestry

back

to

1823.10

English

was

banned as a medium of nstruction. ontinuing

n the

same

vein,

SLORC

has repeatedly ortrayed ung

San

Suu Kyi

s soiled

blood,

because

she

is

married to a British

itizen.

The Burma case seems

to confirm he thesis

that

vigorouspromotion

of nationalism

has been

a

major deological

base

for

uthoritarian

egimes

n

peripheral

ocieties.

The desireto establish socialism s the second excuse which he rulers

in Burma

have

used in

their

stablishment f authoritarianism.

t

takeover,

9

SeeJosef Silverstein, urma: Military ule and the olitics f tagnation Ithaca: Cornell University

Press, 1977); and David I. Steinberg, Burma's Road TowardDevelopment:

Growth nd

Ideology

nder

Military ule (Boulder: WestviewPress, 1981), chapters

1

and 2.

10

Mya Maung, Totalitarianism n Burma: Prospects orEconomicDevelopment New York: Paragon

Press, 1992), p. 19.

339



9/19

Pacific

Affairs

Ne Win argued that the Revolutionary Council intended to return to

socialism,

which he claimed was the

original

dream

of AFPFL

(Anti-Fascist

Peoples Freedom League) and Aung San. Until 1988, Burmese authoritar-

ianism directed itselfby an ideology called the Burmese Way to Socialism.

What

made this socialism the

Burmese

Way

was

its

compatibility

with

what the

regime identified as traditional values. Its pronouncements were suffi-

ciently vague..

.but

sufficiently

motive

to

appeal

to

public

sentiment.

The Revolutionary Council

also

published

an

ideological proclamation enti-

fled

The System f

Correlation

f

Man and His

Environment,

hich

tried

to blend

the Marxist notion

of

dialectics with

Buddhist

theological concepts

about

change.12

In spite ofsuch appeals, the regime, to date, has frequentlyfound

itself challenged by the organized Buddhist clergy, he sangha, which I will

examine later. Suffice

to say

now that the

ideological grounding

for

author-

itarian regimes

in Burma

was found

in a blend

of the modernization thesis

(appeals

to

tradition),

the

socialism

thesis,

and

the nationalism thesis.

The

capitalism thesis, however,

does not hold

in

Burma,

in

stark contrast

to

its

neighbors

of

Southeast Asia,

such as

Thailand, Malaysia,

and

Singapore.

The regime's socialist

and

nationalist ideology justified

an

antimarket

economic structure based

on

total

state command and control. All sectors

of the economy, except agriculture, were nationalized. Industrial

production was vested upon twelve corporations headed by military

appointees. Price, production,

and distribution were

largely

decided cen-

trally. Only

in

very

recent

years

has

the

Burmese

junta

allowed

private

investment. n 1988, there were

in

the entire country only four private firms

with

more than 100

employees, compared

to

426

state-owned

enterprises

of the same size. There were 150 state-owned firms that

employed

51-100

workers, compared

to

ust

nine

private

firms.13

The

economy

is still

highly

regulated.

Historically, only

one

foreign

firmwas

allowed to

operate

in

Burma;

it

was

a German

company,

a

purveyor

of arms and

ammunition. All

others

were nationalized

between

1962

and

1965. In

the late

seventies,

some for-

eign investmentwas allowed

in

the natural resources sector,but only as oint

ventures with

the

state. Some of the

regulations

have

been

withdrawn

recently (I will look at this later), but as a structural factor, multinational

capital

has not been

present

in Burma

between

1962

and

1988,

so as

to

become

a

long-term support base for authoritarianism. A useful contrast

can be drawn with the Banana

Republics

ofCentral America.

11

Robert Taylor, The State n Burma Honolulu: University f Hawaii Press, 1987), p. 296.

12

Silverstein,Burma: Military ule, pp. 80-87.

1 Wilfried Lfitkenhorst, Industrial Development and Industrial Policy in Myanmar: Turning

Challenges into Changes, in Mya Than andJoseph L. H. Tan, eds., MyanmarDilemmas nd Options

(Singapore: Instituteof Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), p. 175; data from table 6.

340



10/19

Burma

-

Against theCurrent

Furthermore, Burma has not had a high-trade,

high-performance econ-

omy. By adopting autarkic

socialism, Ne Win's regime stifled foreign

trade. In the fifties, rade (especially the rice trade) accounted for close to

40 percent

of

GDP.

Between 1970-77, it

had come down to 13 percent.14

Burma was one of the

world's leading rice exporters in the early twentieth

century,

but it

is

now

dependent

on food aid. In 1941, Burma's annual

exports

of

rice amounted to

more

than 3

million tons; the figure

for

1993-

94 was 263,000 tons, a considerable

increase from a

trough

in

1989 at

merely 49,000

tons.15

The Burmese command economy has not experienced

sustained high

growth; quite the contrary, t has stagnated substantially.

At independence

Burmese leaders boasted about it being one of

the richest countries

in

Southeast

Asia.

While its neighbors grew

and socially developed rapidly,

data indicate that the Burmese standard of living

declined. In 1961, the

average urban Burmese spent 48 percent of his/her

income on food;

in

1976, they had to spend 79 percent, indicative of

a large decrease in living

standards.16

In

1993 dollars,

Burmese

per capita

GDP was $1060

in

1980 at

the

official

rate

of

exchange (which

translates

nto a

meager $43

at the

black

market rate

-

the real value

lies

somewhere

in

between);

it declined to

$906 by 1993, and is projected to be $833 by the year 2000, ifthe current

economic

and

demographic

trends continue. Between 1980-93,

the

aver-

age

annual real

growth

rate of

GDP/capita

has been

-1.2 percent,

and the

annual

growth rate

of total real GDP has been 0.9 percent.17

In

view

of

the

the consistent

decline,

the United Nations

in

1987

declared Burma one of

the least

developed

countries

in

the world.

The

appeal

to

socialism,

the

bedrock of Ne

Win's

economic

planning,

was

accompanied by

the

setting up

of

councils

for

workers

and

peasants

in

order to lend formal credence to the notion that the stateis acting fortheir

benefit.

Ne

Win's government

established a nationwide Workers'

council,

though

the

council does not

have

much

decision-making power.

Ne Win

himself attended council meetings to impress upon

urban

workers

that he

represented their

cause.

Stagnation

and

scarcity,

however,

led to

growing

labor

unrest, strikes,

nd

demonstrations, which were put down brutally.

A

critical,

and

prudent

(from

the

viewpoint

of

the regime)

decision was

to not nationalize

agriculture.

Some token

land reforms

were

undertaken to

rid

the agrarian structure

of some

large

landlords. By

and

far, hough,

the

regime kept the peasantry relativelyfree from collectivization. Whereas

the state

effectively

controlled

all industrial

production,

94

percent

of

agricultural production

was

still in

private

hands

in

1985.18

This

was

criti-

14

Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 344.

15

Far East and Australasia 1996 (London: Europa Publications,

1996), p. 644.

16

These

statistics re from Steinberg, Burma's Road,

p. 78 and table 5.1.

17

UNCTAD, Least Developed Countries 1995 Report

(NewYork:

United

Nations, 1995), p.

A-3.

341



11/19

Pacific

Affairs

agricultural production was

still n

private hands in 1985.18 This was critical

because it did not alienate the peasantry

in

an economic

setting

where

the

majority of the population was employed in agriculture. Even in 1990-92,

about

70

percent

of

the

labor force

was

agrarian.'9

Ne

Win's

regime,

in addi-

tion,

formed

a

Peasants'

Council,

based

on which the

state

could claim

that the peasantry, representing most

of the

population, played

a

greater,

and direct,

role in the

polity. However, the government was the only legal

buyer n the agricultural market,

and

itsiphoned

enormous amounts of sur-

plus value

off

the peasantry by setting prices

that

did

not reflect demand

conditions,

seasonal

characteristics,

and the

cost-structure

f

production.20

By involving both workersand farmers nto formal state organizations,

the regime's corporatist strategywas successful

in

securing crucial

allies

against

the

better-educated

urban-based

opposition.

Further,

in

the early

years the Revolutionary

Council did

not face

much opposition

from either

domestic groups or foreign observers,

as

people had

generally positive

memories

of

the two

years

of Ne

Win's

(authoritarian)

rule

(1958-60)

within a constitutional

government.21

The military nitially registered the

support

of

the

Burmese urban workers

by creating

animosity toward the

Chinese and Indian merchant class. Its Workers' Council

and

Peasants'

Council proved helpful in forging links with the majority of the popula-

tion

until the seventies.

In

1972,

Ne

Win

and other

top

brass

resigned

from

the

military,

o that

they began

to

appear

as

civilians,

heading

a

truly

ocial-

ist program under a comprehensive workers-peasants party.The party had

affiliate organizations

for the

youth,

so as to

contain

-

ultimately

a futile

effort ominous political inclinations

of

students.

These

organizations

were

not successful in

the urban

areas. The

BSPP,

(Burma

Socialist

Programme Party)

as in

many

East

European one-party

states, was not

a

channel throughwhich opposition could voice serious grievances, though

it was effective

for a while

in

keeping parts

of

the

rural

populace busy

in

various

organizational

activities.

The

constitution passed

in

1974, which

formally gave power to a

People's Assembly with Ne Win as the president, was

a good exercise in

public

relations

for the

regime.

For

three

years during

its

drafting,

fifteen

committees

toured the

countryside

to

garner people's

opinion

on

it,

and

about

17,000

local

task

groups

were formed

to

discuss it and

suggest

modifications.

Ne

Win

argued

that

this

was

the

onlyway

to

drafta

constitu-

tion,

and

that

the earlier one

was

made

by lawyers

nd

politicians

removed

from the people. 22 Thus,

in

addition to organizing workers'

and

peasants'

groups,

Ne Win's

populist

stance

sought

a

direct

alliance with

the people.

8


9

UNDP,

Human

Development Report

1994

(New

York: Oxford

University ress, 1994), p.

163.

20

See

Mya Maung,

The

Burma

Road to

Poverty

New York:Praeger, 1991), chapters6-7.

21


22

Ibid., p. 307-10.

342



12/19

Burma Against heCurrent

As economic stagnation

became deep rooted in the seventies, the

regimebegan to solicitnew allies. The government verlooked the

black

market,which allowed a good number ofpeople to trade and to earn a

livelihood outside of

regulated auspices.23When student-

nd

clergy-led

oppositionmounted n the

eighties, he regime ought he support fvari-

ous ethnicgroupswithwhom

they ad finallymanaged to come to ceasefire

agreements. t

is

important o note that

the regime's support

base

in

the

civil societyhas not been

constant,partly

because it could not

perform

economically,

nd

hence could not create a group of economic beneficia-

ries independent of the

military. oth Ne Win and SLORC have relied

mostlyn themilitarys itsmain base ofsupport. heyhave procuredhard-

ware

for

the soldiers and

pursued

ethnic

wars

to

keep

them

busy,while

installing military

commanders to oversee almost every

significant

economic and political

organization.

Strategic

ources. he Burmese

unta

has been

brutal

n

dealingwith ro-

democracy

demonstrations.

mmediately

after the

takeover,

the

army

occupied Rangoon University,

illed hundreds, nd blew up the

Students

Union

Building,whichwas

a

historic ymbol

f

resistance.Again,

n

1974,

the

army

massacred

university

tudents,

nd

in 1988

they

illed

bout three

thousand, ccording oan estimate yFreedomHouse.24Collegeswere hut

downfor hreeyears fterwards.acing severerepression, t least ten thou-

sand

students

led

the cities

to

the

Thai

border. Rangoon University

nd

affiliatedechnical nd medical schoolsremain losed.

Almost verydayhe

police,

on a

variety

f

pretexts,

round

up

and

detain

politicallyactive

students.

The

power

of

both students nd the

sangha the Buddhistclergy)was

augmented

fter uu

Kyibegan to

use the

regime'sown weapon against

t.

She argued thatdemocracy, hecks and balances, and human rights re

compatiblewith

Buddhism s

well

as with

Burmese

traditions;

n her

words,

it s

a

puzzlement o the Burmesehow conceptswhichrecognize he nher-

ent

dignity

nd the

equal and inalienable

rights

f

human

beings...can

be

inimical to

indigenous values. 25

The

sangha (i.e.,

the Buddhist

clergy),

has

played

a

central role

in

organizing pposition o the regime, ince

all

politicalpartieswere

banned

in

1964. The

strategy

f

bothNe

Win

and

SLORC has been

to

simply epress

23

Steinberg, Burma'sRoad, p. 169.

24

Freedom

n

theWorld, 993-1994, pp. 174-76;

see

also Amnestynternational eport

989

(London:

Amnesty nternational Publications, 1989), pp. 165-68. Amnesty stimates that over one thousand

were killed between

March

and September of

1988.

Bertil Lintner, Outrage: Burma's Strugglefor

DemocracyLondon and Bangkok:

White

Lotus, 1990), and Maung, Totalitarianism,hapter 2,

discuss

in detail the student revoltsof 1988.

25

Aung San Suu Kyi, In Quest of Democracy, in Freedom rom ear and OtherWritings

London:

Viking, 1991), p. 175. See alsoJosef Silverstein, The Idea of Freedom in Burma and the Political

Thought of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, PacificAffairs,ol. 69, no. 2 (1996), pp. 211-28.

343



13/19

Pacific ffairs

such organization. Immediately after seizing power, the Revolutionary

Council asked all monks to

register

with the

government,

which

they

refused to do.26 The Buddha Sasana Council, a large religious organization,

was

dissolved

in

1962.

On

numerous

occasions soldiers

have

fired

upon

demonstrations by

monks.

They

have invaded monasteries

and

pagodas to

cleanse the clergy

of

political elements.

In

October 1990,

for instance,

over three

hundred monks

were

arrested

during

a

violent crackdown on the

clergy;

most are still in

detention.27

After

coming

to

power,

SLORC dis-

solved all organizations

of

the sangha, except

nine that t considers

apolitical

legal

sects. 28The role of the Buddhist

clergy

s

parallel

to the role played

recently by the Catholic Church, and the response of the regime has also

been

parallel.

The

stated

ustification

withwhich the

regime

has cracked down

on

stu-

dents

and the

sangha

is

simple

and obvious: the need to

preserve

law and

order.

In

order to

do

that,

the

Revolutionary

Council

abrogated

the

consti-

tution,

as

has

been

customary

for most

coups

d'etat.

Meetings

of more than

five people were

banned and SLORC

derived

its

acronym

from a claimed

responsibility to restore law

and order.

It

is

this rationale that

also fed its

counterinsurgency

wars

against

various ethnic

groups,

and

against

students

and intellectuals. The armyis the mainstay of SLORC's strategic survival;

therefore,

massive

resources are channeled into the defense sector. The

mil-

itarybudget has increased dramatically since SLORC's takeover,rising from

less than $100

million in

1988 to close to $1

billion

in

1994. The

figure

puts

the

country, which

ranks

(1994-95)

one hundred and

thirtieth

in

human

development,

at

the

thirty-seventh lace

in

the world

in

defense

expenditure. Among

the

forty-seven

east

Developed

Countries

(LDC's

as

categorized by

the United

Nations),

Burma has the

largest

military,

the

highest military pending, and is the second-largest importerof arms (after

Yemen).

Its

military xpenditure

is

more than twice its combined spending

on education and

health,

the worst record

in

Asia.29 It is

patently

obvious

that the

primacy

of

the

military

t the

expense

of social

development

trans-

lates into severe repression.

To

complete

the strict

preservation

of

law

and order and

to

infuse the

societywith

ts

deologies,

the

state

suppressed

all

media. Communication is

further

inhibited because

of

the

country's fragile

infrastructure and

26

Silverstein, urma: Military ule,pp. 97-100.

27

For a description see Lintner,

Outrage.

he statistics re from

Freedomn theWorld 995-96, p.

165.

28

Maung, Totalitarianism,. 185.

29

The statistics re from UNDP, Human Development eport 994, p. 34; US

Arms

Control and

Disarmament Agency, World

Military xpenditures nd ArmsTransfers 995 (Washington, DC: US

Government Printing Office,

1996), pp. 42-43;

and Stockholm International Peace Research

Institute (SIPRI) webpage at the following URL: http://www.sipri.se/projects/Milex/-

expenditure/Myanmar.html, ctober

7, 1996.

344



14/19

Burma

-

Against theCurrent

facilities. Burma had

in

1990

only 0.2

TV

sets

on

average

for

every

100

peo-

ple. Compare that to

its

neighbors India (3.2)

or

Thailand (11.4). TV and

radio broadcast, needless to say, are under state control. International

phone charges are prohibitive at $5 a minute and higher. SLORC has

banned unauthorized possession of a computer with internet facilities. In

June 1996,James Nichols, honorary

consul for

Norway

and

diplomatic rep-

resentative for Denmark, Finland, and Switzerland, died in prison, serving

a

three-year sentence

for

the unauthorized use of a

fax

machine. 30 The

junta created a massive propaganda ring under the Ministry f Information.

There have been only two newspapers, one in Burmese and one in English,

both published by the state. Foreign reporters are routinely prohibited

from the country. Combined with these constrictive policies, the regime's

autarkic stance and superpower-neutrality ave helped keep many of its mis-

deeds in relative darkness. The overall situation validates my thesis that the

authoritarian response to pro-democracy influence from abroad is to curb

independent communication. Despite these efforts, owever, Burmese pro-

democracy activists

were

encouraged by the events

in

the Philippines,

China, Thailand, and elsewhere, as well

as

the international attention

fol-

lowing Suu Kyi's winning the Nobel Prize in 1991. Amnesty International

launched a global campaign fordemocracy in Burma in 1991, and the U.N.

Human

Rights

Commission also

started monitoring

human

rights

violations

of

the

SLORC

regime.

Faced with sustained economic stagnation and serious political chal-

lenges,

SLORC

had

to undertake some

political

liberalization measures

as a

strategic response, especially

after its

1988

massacres. National elections

were

held

in

1990, yet politicians

were not allowed to

speak

or

rally against

SLORC (Order 3/89).

In

spite

of

SLORC's efforts, he

National

League

forDemocracy (NLD), led by Suu Kyi, won a landslide victory, apturing

87.7

percent

of

the 485 seats.

SLORC, however,

refused to transfer

power;

instead, they reverted to terrorizing

the

political opposition.

SLORC

has

pursued

a dual

strategy: 1) to delay

as far as

possible the

transfer f

power,

and

(2)

to

crush

opposition political

leaders to the extent

that

they

either

give up

or are

subdued.

The

regime

has been

fairly

successful on

the first ount.

Its

pretext

has been to

argue

that

power

can be

transferred

nly

after

perfect

constitution s drafted.

To

this

end,

in 1993

SLORC selected 699

people

to

form

a national convention to draft

a

constitution.Out of the

delegates, only

90 were fromtheNLD. These mem-

bers

were handpicked,

so

that they

were

mostly sympathetic

to SLORC's

needs;

a

lot

of

them

from

ethnic

groups

that have

recently signed

cease-

fire

agreements with SLORC. Although opposition

MPs

were

a

minority

n

30

TV

statistics re fromUNDP, Human Development eport 994, p. 161. The

Nichols story s cov-

ered in

Financial Times,October 5, 1996, p. 1.

345



15/19

Pacific ffairs

thisbody,

they managed to

garner support

in the convention

so

as

to

delay

the

passing

of

the constitution.

The

constitution,which

is

now

in

the fourth

year ofdrafting, s basically another means of legitimizing authoritarianism.

It

reserves

a

quarter of

the seats in the

parliament for members of

the

armed forces. It stipulates

that the president

of

the

country must have had

military

experience,

must

not be married to a

foreigner,

and must

have

lived in Burma for

twenty ears

all

this obviously directed

against Suu Kyi.

However, Suu

Kyi's

NLD

withdrewfrom

the

convention

in

November

1995,

faced with

these unacceptable,

and

indeed

petty,

tipulations. SLORC took

advantage of this

withdrawal by

indicating

next

April that it considered

the

1990 legislature no longer valid because voterpreferences and composition

of

the electorate had

changed

in

the

six

years

since election. The

final

move

came in

June,

1996,

when the

unta

passed

a

law

prohibitingdisruptions

in

drafting

the constitution.

The

second

strategy

has

not worked as well.

Suu Kyi was under

house

arrest

from

1989 to

July 1995,

but this has

only

increased her

popularity.

Other opposition MPs

have been terrorized

since the elections.

In

May

of

1991,

forty-eight

LD

members were

imprisoned

on treason

charges,

and

the

military

has

recently ndicated that Suu

Kyi

s

also

verging

on

treason.

In May 1996, about 260 NLD demonstratorswere persecuted and arrested,

and

in

September,

the

unta cracked

down

on a

pro-democracy rally

and

arrested 583

people.

Apart

from

breaking up demonstrations, almost

every

day SLORC

picks

random

pretexts to detain and

incarcerate opposition

members with

charges

such

as

holding foreigncurrency,

making videos,

or

driving dangerously. Most often the

penalty

exceeds

a

year

in

prison.

Overall,

however,

the

opposition,

including many handpicked members

of

the

convention, has remained firm

against SLORC,

though divided

within tself.

Economic

policy

changes

came in

the seventies in the wake of

pro-

longed

stagnation.

The

junta,

in

response, opened

up trade, and,

in dire

need of

funds, agreed

in

1976 to the

establishment of the Burma

Aid

Group,

mobilized

by the World

Bank

to

provide

multilateral

economic assis-

tance.

In

1977,

the

regime passed

the

Right

to

Private

Enterprise Law,

which

allowed small-scale

private

economic

activity.

The

government

announced that

between

1988

andJuly 1994,

about

3,815 private

limited

companies,

311

foreign

companies,

and 974

partnerships

were

registered.31

The

regime

sought

foreign investment,

particularly

n

exploiting minerals,

oil,

and

gas

-

natural

resources that the state can claim and

control

easily.

The

policy

has

strengthened

since SLORC came to

power.

According

to

government

statistics

which

are

always suspect),

foreign

companies

have

31

Asia 1995

YearbookHong Kong: Review

Publishing Company, 1995), p. 97.

346



16/19

Burma

-

Against

theCurrent

invested 5.35 billion since SLORC's takeover hrough he end of 1996.32

The largestrecent nvestments by Unocal and Total, two

oil

companies

that plan to build a pipeline from an offshore ite throughBurma to

Thailand.

If

iberalization osters rivate

ompetition

nd creates

a

robust

group

of

entrepreneurs,t may

ultimately elp undermine

the

economic

base of SLORC.

However,

he

processof negotiations eem

to

indicatethat

liberalization has resulted

in

cartels

and

monopolies that would only

strengthen tate power. Many

of

the larger investments re made

in

collaborationwith ompanies that re

either

run

or owned by the military

top

brass.

It is for this

reason

that Suu

Kyi

has

repeatedly

asked

foreign

companies not to invest.

Some countries of the

West have

responded.

The

EC has an

arms

embargo

on

Burma,

and

partial

U.S.

trade sanctions

have

been in

place

since 1988. The White House is also contemplatingbanning new invest-

ment

in

Burma.

Some investors,

ncluding Macy's,

Eddie

Bauer,

Liz

Claiborne,

Levi

Strauss,Disney,Heineken, Carlsberg, nd, most compre-

hensively, epsico, have withdrawn rom

he

country.

U.S. cities such as

San

Francisco,Oakland, Berkeley,

nn

Arbor,

nd

Madison,

as

well

as

the

State

of

Massachusetts

ar

contracting ompanies

to have

business

ties to

Burma. Most donors, ncluding the World Bank and Asian Development

Bank,have suspended aid.

The

regime'srelationswith ts

neighbors, owever,

ave

been a

source

of

constant

upport, specially

ince its

foreign olicyrejected

both

domi-

nant

powers

of

the

cold war.Burmese eaders

have consistently

tirred

p

ideas against mperialism,

f

both theWestern

nd

the Soviet arieties. ntil

the

seventies,

Burma maintained a

foreignpolicy equidistant

from

both

poles.

Burmese

rulers even withdrew he

country

rom he

Non-Aligned

Movement n 1979, arguing hat he associationhad lost tsoriginalgoals.

Economically

nd

socially,

urma

became insulated rom he

outsideworld.

The

U.N.

operation

in Burma has been

quite small, compared

to other

developingnations,

nd since

1962,

no

significant

GOs have been

allowed

to

operate

there.33

The

relative bsence

of

European powers

n

Burma,however,

as

com-

pensated

for

by

ts

arge neighbor,China,

and the

space

left

by

Western

investors

s

taken up by those

from

he newly ndustrializing ountries

of

Asia. China and

Burma

became

closer

n

the

eighties,

when

both

began

to

be condemned nthe

West

or heirhuman

rights ransgressions,specially

in

the

wake of the

student

massacres n

Rangoon (1988)

and Tiananmen

Square (1989).

Further

ies

withChina

developed

because it was

a

cheap

32

AP Wire Service, BurmaGroups Call for

Talks, January16, 1997, 2:02

PM EST.

33

See Chi-shad Liang, Burma's ForeignRelations: Neutralism n

Theory

nd Practice

New

York:

Praeger, 1990); Clark D. Neher, SoutheastAsia in the

New nternational ra (Boulder, CO.: Westview

Press, 1991), chapter 9.

347



17/19

Pacific ffairs

and fairly ependable

source of armsneeded for

the Burmese

military:

n

1993 the two

countriesconcluded a

U.S.$1.2

billion arms deal

to be car-

ried out for hecomingfewyears.34 hinasuppliedarmsworth 300 million

out

of

the total $370

million that

Burma

spent

on arms

mportsduring

1992-94.35 dditionally, he border provinces of

China could utilize the

Burmeseblack

market o sell their

ommodities.36

ecently,

ith he official

opening

of

border

trade,

China has become one of

the

largest trading

partners

f

Burma. The

following

able

istsBurma's

three

argest rading

partners.

TABLE 1.

LARGESTTRADINGPARTNERS F BURMA,

1992

DATA

Imports

rom

US$

millions)

Exports

o

(US$ millions)

1.

Singapore 325.4

1.

China 119.1

2.

China 284.3 2.

Singapore

89.1

3.

Japan

106.1 3. India

51.2

Source:Far

East &Australasia 1996

(London:

Europa Publications, 996),

p. 649.

Burma has maintained cordial relations with other authoritarian

regimes

f Southeast

Asia. Thailand

(even

f

t's

a

democracy ow)

has been

a

large and long-timenvestor

n

Burma,

xtracting eak,minerals,

nd fish-

eries on concessional termswith he

Burmese

military

lite. Gun-runners

based

in

Singapore have

been central n

supplying

rms

to the tatmadaw.

Asian multinationals

uch as

Nissan,Daewoo,

and

Mitsuihave recently et

up large investments.Most ofall,ASEAN (AssociationofSoutheastAsian

Nations)

has

provided deological support

to

Burmese

authoritarianism,

in

contrast o

the

European Community's

ole in

encouraging

democrati-

zation

in

Europe.

ASEAN has

rejected

American and

European

calls

to

impose sanctions

on

Burma,and has assured the

regime

that

t would not

meddle in

what

t considers the internal ffairs f

Myanmar,

nd

would

instead

constructivelyngage

the

unta

in

dealing

with omestic

olitics.37

In

1995,

Burma

oined

ASEAN's

Treaty

f

Amity

nd

Cooperation,

een as

the first

tep

toward ventual

full

membership.

The

organization ecently

indicated that Burma would soon be admitted, along with Laos and

Cambodia.

3'John Badgley, Myanmar

n

1993:

A

Watershed

Year,

Asian Survey, ol. 34, no. 2 (1994), pp.

153-59.

35

WorldMilitary xpenditures

nd Arms

Transfers 995, p.

155.

36

Chi-shad Liang,

Burma's

Foreign elations, hapter

5.

37Josef

ilverstein,

Burma in an International

Perspective,

Asian

Survey, ol. 32,

no. 10

(1992),

pp. 951-63.

348



18/19

Burma

-

Against theCurrent

Japan and Australia, he

two ountries n the region losest o European

and North

American

democratic

deals, have disappointedpro-democracy

activistsntheir olicy oward urma.Japanhas been supportingLORC. It

was the first ountry o recognize

SLORC

in

1989,

and

it has

also

resumed

its aid program, saying that aid would benefit the average

Burmese.

Australia's policy is to neither

discourage nor encourage

trade with

Burma. t has ruled out imposing conomic sanctions gainst

he regime.

V.

CONCLUSIONS:

THE

FUTURE

OF BURMESE AUTHORITARIANISM

The long-termtructural asisfor uthoritarianismn Burma

was put n

place duringNe Win'srule,roughly etween1962 and 1988. twas based on

severe

repression

ustified

n terms f

nationalism, ocialism,

nd

appeals

to

culture nd

tradition.

he economywas controlled ubstantially

y he state

and its

military

fficers. he

agrarian

tructurewas

kept

unchanged so

as

to not alienate

thepeasantry,

hich omprises he majority

f the

populace.

In response to pro-democracy hallenges

since

1988,

SLORC has acted

brutally gainst

he

students

nd the clergywhenever ossible,

nd at other

times

has

teased

with conomic

and

political iberalization,

whichusually

have been modest nscope. It continues o suppressmedia and finds nter-

national upport

n

other uthoritarian

owers, specially n the region.

Based on the theories nd

findings,what

can

thisessay

ay about the

future

f

authoritarianism

n Burma? Given

the nationwide

pposition, t

does

not

seem reasonable

to expect

that uthoritarianismn

Burma

will

ur-

vive

ndefinitely

nto thefuture.

here are two

possibilities.

he first

ption

is a

totalwithdrawal f the

army, nd the establishment f

a

Western-style

liberal

democracy.

The chances forthis eem

remote,

however, iven the

military's

lout

and

the

gargantuanproportion

of

resources that t com-

mands. The secondpossibilitys inferior, et ooks more ikely. urmamay

move

towardwhat

Clark Neher has dubbed

an

Asian-style

emocracy,

vi-

dent

n

theASEAN nations.38

his means

that herewould

be a strong tate

and

strongmilitary resence,

alongside

a

relatively eak egislature opu-

larly

and

fairly

lected.

There

is

ample regional support

for such an

outcome.

In

1993, delegates

from

forty-nine

sian countries met

in

Bangkok

and reviewed he UniversalDeclaration

of Human

Rights.They

reached the following onclusion,proclaimed

s the

Bangkok

Declaration:

F]undamental reedoms uchas speech, press, nd theright o democra-

tically hange

one's

government

re not

inalienable,

but must nstead

be

considered

in

the context

of...national and

regional particularities

nd

various

hierarchical, eligious

nd

cultural

ackgrounds. 39

38

Clark Neher, Asian StyleDemocracy,

Asian Survey, ol. 34, no.

11

(1994), pp. 949-61.

39 Quoted in Charles Grawbow, Asia: The Authoritarian Challenge,

in

Freedom

n the World

1993-94, pp. 41-49.

349



19/19

Pacific

ffairs

In either ase, the crafting f democracy

n

Burmawill

be

influenced y

Suu

Kyi's trategic

tance.

Her

options

have been constrained

y

the Peace

Prize,and the unta realizes, presumablywithrelief, hat he willrestrain

her

supporters

nd hot-blooded tudents rom

onfronting

he

regime

vio-

lently.

his

stance

of

NLD has

been beneficial

o

SLORC's

survival,

t least

to the extent that

Suu

Kyi's politics

are

predictable

to

the

junta.

Democratization

n Eastern

Europe,

or in

South

Asian

countries uch as

Bangladesh and Pakistan, y contrast, as accomplished

duringperiods of

considerable uncertainty.

n their last

days, the

Ershad

regime

in

Bangladesh,the

Marcos

government

n

the

Philippines

nd the Ceausescu

dictatorshipn Romaniahardly newwhattoexpect,were notprepared to

act

coherently,

nd could

not

muster

nough

forcesto counter

the

pro-

democracy

urmoil.The

politics

of

NLD,

on

the other

hand,

suggest

hat

the

change

toward

democracy

n Burma

would

probably

be

long

drawn

out and

is

likely

to be

accomplished through negotiations

rather than

through

direct

overthrow y

mass mobilization.And

very mportantly,

the demise of Burmese

authoritarianism

s

predicated

on at

least the neu-

trality,

f

not

the

support,

f

regional

actors

toward he movement

gainst

SLORC. Probably ensing his, LORC announced

n Declaration

1/90

that

its egitimacy id not come from he people butfrom the fact hat t was

accepted

as

the

government

f

Burma

by

the

UN and theworld t

large.40

SLORC's international conomic

position

willnot be

affected

more unless

ASEAN

imposes

an

embargo, which

s

unlikely.

Democratization

will

be

achieved

peacefully

fChina

holds back ts

militaryupport

o the

unta, ust

as the SovietUnion exercised estraint

n

face of democratic

mobilization

n

Eastern

Europe.

That

may

not be

forthcoming

illChina itself iberalizes

itspolity.

BrownUniversity,rovidence,I, U.S.A.February,997

40

Silverstein,

Burma

in

an International

Perspective, p. 952.

Suu

Kyi

has

recently asked the

United Nations to

vacate

the

Burmese

seat

in

the

organization,

so that SLORC

cannot claim inter-

national acceptance of its role.

350

against the current the survival of authoritarianism in burma

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