ageing and the challenge to finance health care in europe ... · public health spending: exp....
TRANSCRIPT
Reinhard Busse, Prof. Dr. med. MPH FFPHFG Management im Gesundheitswesen, Technische Universität Berlin
(WHO Collaborating Centre for Health Systems Research and Management)&
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies
Ageing and the Challenge to Finance Health Care in Europe:
An Overview and Innovations
$1,227 – savings calculated to Czech government each time a smoker dies
Report from Philip Morris
An ageing crisis?
• Compression of morbidity– Longer and healthier life expectancy– "Living longer and dying faster“
• Reduced cost of dying at older ages• Lower life time health costs by the healthier • Drawing less from health services • Contributing for longer: late retirement
The ageing of the population: an exampleThe price of success?
The good news: We get older, because we are healthier (even though some still have doubts)
Separating the (high) costs of dying from overall health-care costs shows a more modest picture
Public health spending: exp. growth rates/ year 1971-2002 [* from 1981]
Age effect Income effect Other factors Total spending
Australia (to 2001 only) 0.5 1.7 1.7 (1.4)* 4.0 (3.6)*
Austria 0.2 2.5 1.5 (0.0)* 4.2 (2.2)*
Belgium (from 1995 only) 0.4 2.2 0.6 2.9
Canada 0.6 2.1 0.4 (0.6)* 3.1 (2.6)*
Denmark 0.2 1.6 0.1 (-0.5)* 1.9 (1.3)*
Finland 0.6 2.4 0.5 (0.2)* 3.4 (2.6)*
France 0.3 1.9 1.6 (1.0)* 3.9 (2.8)*
Germany 0.3 1.6 1.9 (1.0)* 3.7 (2.2)*
Greece (from 1987 only) 0.4 2.1 0.8 3.4
Ireland 0.0 4.4 0.9 (-1.0)* 5.3 (3.9)*
Italy (from 1988 only) 0.7 2.2 -0.1 2.1
Japan (to 2001 only) 0.6 2.6 1.8 (1.1)* 4.9 (3.8)*
Luxembourg (from1975 only) 0.0 3.3 0.7 (-0.1)* 4.2 (3.8)*
Netherlands (from 1972 only) 0.4 2.0 0.9 (0.3)* 3.3 (2.6)*
New Zealand 0.2 1.2 1.4 (1.0)* 2.9 (2.7)*
Norway 0.1 3.0 2.2 (1.5)* 5.4 (4.0)*
Portugal 0.5 2.9 4.4 (2.8)* 8.0 (5.9)*
Spain 0.4 2.4 2.5 (0.8)* 5.4 (3.4)*
Sweden 0.3 1.6 0.7 (-0.4)* 2.5 (1.5)*
Switzerland (from 1985 only) 0.2 0.9 2.9 3.8
United Kingdom 0.1 2.1 1.5 (1.0)* 3.8 (3.4)*
United States 0.3 2.1 2.7 (2.6)* 5.1 (4.7)*
Average 0.4 (0.3)* 2.5 (2.3)* 1.5 (1.0)* 4.3 (3.6)*
Only 1/10th
1/3rd and modifiable
Third-party Payer
Population Providers: hospitals,
primary care etc.
Third-party payer: Local Health Authorities; Health insurance funds
Population Providers: hospitals,
primary care etc.
Collector of resources
Steward/regulator
Third-party payer
Population Providers
Collector of resources
Steward/regulator
Functions
Regulation
Coverage:Who? What?How much?
Mobilizingfinancial
resources
Resource pooling & allocation
Purchasing(via contracts)/
payment
Access toand provision of services
Creating human & technical resources
Third-party Payer
Population Providers
Taxes
Social HealthInsurance
contributions
Voluntary insurance
Out-of-pocket
prepaid
sickness fundshealth
authorities
private insurers
Issue 1: Finding the “right“ funding mix …
public
Third-party Payer
Population Providers
Taxes
Social HealthInsurance
contributions
Voluntary insurance
Out-of-pocket
India 2006
24%
1%
1%
69%
25% public
Third-party Payer
Population Providers
Taxes
Social HealthInsurance
contributions
Voluntary insurance
Out-of-pocket
USA 2006
33%
13%
36%
13%
46% public
Third-party Payer
Population Providers
Taxes
Social HealthInsurance
contributions
Voluntary insurance
Out-of-pocket
High income (excl. US) 2006
39%
38%
5%
14%
77% public
The more public (less private) – the better? Yes, for equity
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
10 20 30 40 50 60
Private expenditure on health as % of total expenditure on health (2002)
% o
f hou
seho
lds
with
cat
astr
ophi
c (>
40%
of i
ncom
e)
tota
l hea
lth e
xpen
ditu
re
SHI
TAX
MIXED
USAGR
ROK
CH
CDN
P
ED
B
FIN
FDK
UK
NIS
S
inequitable
% private
% households bankrupt due to health expenditure
58.7
20.1
35.7
11.4
16.5 16 15.3 14.4
10.6
14.6
5.5
16.614.9
11.1
14.5
18.7
15.513.4
15.4
9
35.9
12.8
30.3
6.7
12.414.3
7.8
15.1 14.4
11
15.6
6.5
18.216.5
13
17.2
21.5
18.717.5
20.4
15
-22.8
-7.3-5.4 -4.7 -4.1 -1.7 -0.6
0 0.4 1.6 2.8 3.2 4.1 5
8.4
-0.2
1 1 1.6
1.9 2.7
6
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Korea UnitedStates
Switzerlandb)
France Ireland Denmark Netherlandsb),c)
Japan Canada d) UnitedKingdom e)
Norway Luxembourgb)
Australia Austria f) Germany New Zealandc)
Spain Finland Iceland d) Italy d) Sweden g)
% of total expenditure on health in 1990
% of total expenditure on health, lates tavailable year (2006, unless otherwise noted)
Difference between 1990 and 2002
Out-of-pocket 1990-2006: a mixed picture
decreasing
increasing
Italy
Third-party payer
Population Providers
Collector of resources
Steward/regulator
Issue 2: Making payers and providersaccountable for need, costs, quality …
Purchasing(via contracts)/
payment
Reform trends purchasers
• NHS: development of purchasers through purchaser/provider split
purchasers = regions, health authorities, primary care trusts …providers = autonomous institutions (responsible for their own staff)
• SHI: transformation of sickness funds from payers to active purchasers
Reform trends changing the way hospitals (and other providers) are paidFee-for-service
* Ill patientsusually attractive* Over-provisionof Services* Under-referral* No incentivefor high quality
Budget
* (ill) Patientsnot attractive* Under-provisionof services* Over-referral* Quality: bad results-> more work
DRGs (per case)
* Very ill patients(within DRG) notattractive* Tendency toaverage provision* Contradictoryweak incentives
USA Europe
Reform trends changing the way hospitals (and other providers) are paidFee-for-service
* Ill patientsusually attractive* Over-provisionof Services* Under-referral* No incentivefor high quality
Budget
* (ill) Patientsnot attractive* Under-provisionof services* Over-referral* Quality: bad re-sults -> more work
DRGs (per case)
* Very ill patients(within DRG) notattractive* Tendency toaverage provision* Contradictoryweak incentives
No incentives for appropriate continuity of care across providers
Quality indicators, transparency & pay-for-performanceManaged care
So then, why DRGs?
To get a common “currency” of hospital activity for
• transparency performance measurement efficiency benchmarking,
• budget allocation (or division among purchasers),• planning of capacities,• payment ( efficiency)
For what types of activities?Scope of DRGs – the “DRG house”
DRGs for acute Inpatient care
Patients excluded from DRG system
Other activities
“Unbundled” activities for DRG patients
e.g. teaching, research
e.g. psychiatric or foreign patients
e.g. high-cost services or innovations
Possibly mixed with global budget or FFS Day cases
Outpatient clinics
Excluded costs, e.g. investments
Being aware of strategic behaviour of hospitals in times of DRGs
Options to avoid deficits under DRGs
LOS
RevenuesCosts/
Total costs
DRG-type payment
Reduce LOS
Increase revenues(right-/ up-coding;
negotiateextra payments)
Reduce costs(personnel,
cheaper technologies)
How DRG systems try to counter-act such behaviour:1. long- and short-stay adjustments
LOS
Revenues
Deductions(per day)
Surcharges(per day)
Short-stay outliers
Long-stay outliers
Inliers
Lower LOSthreshold
Upper LOSthreshold
How DRG systems try to counter-act such behaviour:2. Fee-for-service-type additional payments
England France Germany Nether-lands
Payments per hospital stay
One One One Several possible
Payments for specific high-cost services
Unbundled HRGs for e.g.:• Chemotherapy•Radiotherapy•Renal dialysis•Diagnostic imaging•High-cost drugs
Séances GHM for e.g.:• Chemotherapy•Radiotherapy•Renal dialysis
Additional payments:• ICU• Emergency care• High-cost drugs
Supplementary payments for e.g.:• Chemotherapy•Radiotherapy•Renal dialysis•Diagnostic imaging•High-cost drugs
No
Innovation-related add’lpayments
Yes Yes Yes Yes (for drugs)
How DRG systems try to counter-act such behaviour:
3. adjustments for quality
• England & Germany: no extra payment if patient readmitted within 30 days
• Germany: deduction for not submitting quality data
• England: up 1.5% reduction if quality standards are not met
• France: extra payments for quality improvement (e.g. regarding MRSA)
SHI: Capitation
Paying family doctors … the old wayTraditional forms of paying GPs (until early 2000s)
FFS
France Germany EnglandNetherlands Sweden
FFS (regionally
capped)Capitation Salary
PHI: FFS
Capitation
Payment components in GP care
Objective:appropriateness
& outcomes
Objective: productivity
& patient needs
Objective: admin. simplicity
& cost-containment
(& geogr. equity)
Basic
serv
ice
paym
ent
Extr
a se
rvic
epa
ymen
tQ
ualit
y pa
ymen
t
FFS
ADL payment
CAPIbonus
France Germany EnglandNetherlands Sweden
“RLV“ (capped
FFS)
FFS with capsper service type
FFSDMP payment
FFS (per visit & out-of-hours)
Capitation
Bonus and/orMalus
QOF bonus
Capitation
FFS (per visit)
FFS (“enhanced services“)
Paying family doctors … the new way
For GP payment, countries are moving toward a “European model” consisting of: (1) Capitation (inscription)/ capped FFS (visit-
triggered) to pay for providing basic services; (2) special lump sums for specific patient groups
(if capitation is not sufficiently risk-adjusted) + FFS for (potentially) underprovided services and/or requiring special expertise or technology;
(3) quality-related bonus (or malus) for (not) reaching certain targets.
Conclusions
60%
20-30%
10-20%
Examples of new payment measures• ‘year of care’ payment for the complete service
package required by individuals with chronic conditions (DK)
• Per patient bonus for physicians for acting as gatekeepers for chronic patients and for setting care protocols (F)
• bonus for DMP recruitment and documentation (D)• 1% of overall health budget available for integrated
care (D)• bonuses for reaching structural, process and outcome
targets (UK)• ‘pay-for-performance‘ bonuses (US)
Population ageing Strengthen the health systems response
• Improved management of chronic conditions• Coordination / integration of care• Focus on primary prevention (tobacco, alcohol,..)• Support healthy ageing, e.g. fall prevention
programmes
www.healthobservatory.eu
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