agiou konstantinou bypass

March 2011 | Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS 1

Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in

Greece


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5.1 Introduction

Project overview

This chapter presents the results of the ex post evaluation and review of the ex

ante CBA for the Agios Konstantinos Bypass project in Greece. This project is

covered by the following EU application for assistance from the Cohesion Fund:

2000 GR/16/C/PT/007 PATHE section: AGIOS KONSTANTINOS by-

pass - KAMENA VOURLA by-pass.

The Agios Konstantinos Bypass project forms part of a wider package of

improvements (most of which have already been implemented) to modernise the

route on the PATHE (Patras, Athens, Thessaloniki, Evzoni) transport axis.

Location

The Agios Konstantinos Bypass is located between the two largest cities in

Greece: Athens and Thessaloniki, on what is known locally as the PATHE

highway (or Highway 1). This also forms the European E75 route, part of the

TEN-T Priority Motorway Axis 7 (Igoumenista – Patras – Athens – Sofia –

Budapest). The location of the Agios Konstantinos Bypass in relation to the

major settlements in Greece is shown in Figure 1.

2 Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS | March 2011


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Figure 1. Location of the Agios Konstantinos Bypass in its National Context

Source: Openstreetmap.org

Description

The Agios Konstantinos Bypass project involved the construction of a dual 2-

lane highway bypassing the towns of Agios Konstantinos and Kamena Vourla,

which are located on the former main route. It should be noted, however, that

Kamena Vourla already had a single carriageway bypass which opened in the

1980’s. The Agios Konstantinos Bypass project also upgraded the existing

Kamena Vourla Bypass to a dual two lane highway. The key timescales for this

project are summarised as follows:

construction start – 2001;

open for traffic – October 2008;

completion of ancillary works – May 2009; and,

transfer of operator from PATHE to Ionia Odos (concessionaire) –

October 2009.

The old road through Agios Konstantinos is contained within a narrow corridor

between the sea and the town (with many properties and businesses facing onto

the route in places). Therefore there was little scope to undertake any significant

improvements of the existing road. The narrow cross section of the road did not



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allow safe overtaking. Severe congestion events were commonplace particularly

in the summer months when traffic volumes were at their highest. Agios

Konstantinos is also one of the main ferry gateways from the Greek mainland to

the island of the Skiathos. The ferry pier is located adjacent to the road (to the

east of the town) and exacerbated the congestion during loading and unloading

periods (at least once per day).

The route through the Agios Konstantinos area is one of the last sections of the

E75 between Athens and Thessaloniki to be upgraded to highway standard due

to the challenging topographical conditions in the area. In order to overcome the

difficulties posed by the mountainous terrain, the following complex structures

were required:

3 tunnels (total length 3.2km);

3 cut and cover tunnels (total length 0.85km); and,

1 single cut and cover tunnel (length 0.4km)

Figure 2 shows a comparison between the Agios Konstantinos bypass, and the

former main route through Agios Konstantinos..

Figure 2. National Road 1 and ferry pier (left) and Agios Konstantinos Bypass (right)

Source: Site visit photos by evaluation team (July 2010)

The speed limit on the newly constructed section is lower than the Greek

national speed limit for highways (120km/h) and ranges from 100km/h to

80km/h through the tunnels. This is because the route still has a number of

sharp bends and changes in elevation despite the use of tunnels. The speed limits

are enforced through the use of electronic variable message signs located at

regular intervals along the entire length of the project.

The E75 is in part a toll motorway (the nearest toll station is located at Tragana

which is 25km to the south-east of the project). However, the project section

itself is currently not tolled. The location of the project in its local context is

shown in Figure 3.



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Figure 3. Location of the Agios Konstantinos Bypass in its Local Context

Source: Openstreetmap.org

The total cost of the project was €317.8m (2000 prices, including VAT). 37% of

the funding was from the Cohesion Fund, and the remainder was financed by

national funding. The high cost of the project for such a short section of highway

is clearly due to the complex structures required to overcome the difficulties of

the mountainous terrain.

5.1.1 Context

Socio-economic context

The location of Greece, at the south-eastern point of the European Union,

means that good transport connections to the rest of the EU are essential to

ensure economic development is promoted and maintained, and that it is not

constrained by Greece’s relatively peripheral location. High quality transport links

between neighbouring Member States (including Italy, Central Europe and the

Balkans) are therefore vital for Greece’s economic and social wellbeing.

The Cohesion Fund has been instrumental in facilitating improvements to the

transport infrastructure in Greece, including the PATHE axis (considered in

more detail later in this section), and the Egnatia Odos highway running east-

west in the north of the country.



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Figure 4 shows that the change in GDP since 2000 for Greece as a whole, and

also for the Prefecture which contains the Agios Konstantinos bypass project.

Although there is no data available from 2007 onwards, the data shows that GDP

growth in the Agios Konstantinos area has consistently lagged behind the

National GDP.

Figure 4. National vs. Prefecture GDP growth since 2000

Source: Prepared from Eurostat data

Figure 5 shows the change in employment levels compared to the year 2000.

Again data is only available until 2007. However, it does show that in since 2005

in particular, the prefecture of Fthiotida has not experienced the same levels of

employment growth experienced in the rest of Greece.

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

% c

han

ge in

Eu

ro p

er

inh

abit

ant

bas

ed

on

20

00

leve

ls

Greece (National) Fthiotida (Prefecture)



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Figure 5. National vs. Prefecture change in employment since 2000

Source: prepared from Eurostat data

Although the bypass is a relatively localised development, it has provided a

significant improvement on the main road transport axis through the Prefecture.

Moreover, this complex project has kept a number of people employed during

the long construction period (and beyond), thereby facilitating employment and

economic growth in the area. The ex ante CBA forecast that 10,080 person years

would be required during construction and 115 employees would be required

once the project is open.

Strategic policy context

The PATHE highway is one of the most important road corridors in Greece. It

serves 6 regions, 11 prefectures, 16 cities, 9 ports and 6 airports. This axis has

been improved to highway standards in a number of locations over recent years.

The main objectives of the PATHE improvements (as specified in EU

Directorate-General Energy and Transport; 'TEN-T priority axes and projects 2005')

were the following:

reduced in journey times;

accelerated economic and regional development;

improved freight connections to central Europe and the rest of the EU;

increased tourism and trade; and,

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

% c

han

ge i

n e

mp

loym

en

t ra

te (

fro

m 2

00

0 le

vels

)

Greece (National) Fthiotida (Prefecture)



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fewer road accidents.

The specific objectives of the Agios Konstantinos Bypass project were listed in

the Application for Funding and are summarised below:

to increase average speeds on the motorway;

to improve safety on the motorway;

to improve road connections between Greece and the European Union;

to reduce load/capacity ratio;

to increase motorway capacity;

to reduce accidents; and,

to reduce journey times.

It can be seen that the project-specific objectives are clearly aligned with the

wider objectives of the whole PATHE axis.

5.1.2 Sources

We have used a number of different data sources for this review which can be

grouped into three categories, as follows:

stakeholder workshops/meetings;

project documentation; and,

primary and secondary data.

Stakeholder workshops

In July 2010 we organised a stakeholder workshop with representatives present

from the following institutions:

Ministry of National Economy;

Ministry of Public Works;

PATHE (Beneficiary); and,

TRADEMCO (the consultants responsible for preparing the ex ante

cost-benefit analysis document).

The stakeholder meetings were an opportunity to clarify our understanding of

the assumptions underpinning the ex ante CBA, and to obtain any additional

data. Additionally, the meetings provided a chance to discuss the overall

usefulness of the CBA in the decision-making process. We also made follow-up



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contact with each of the stakeholders where further support and advice was

necessary.

In addition to this workshop, we also met with the Mayor of Agios Konstantinos

and a representative from the Sterea Ellada region which covers the project area

to discuss the local and regional impacts of the project.

We have also had a regular dialogue with Ionia Odos, the current operator of the

route following handover from PATHE in 2009.

We are grateful to Ionia Odos and the other stakeholders listed in this section for

their valuable input to this study and timely provision of data.

Project Documentation

We have obtained a number of documents relating to the Agios Konstantinos

Bypass project which are listed in Table 1 together with their source.

Table 1. Summary of project related documentation

Document (Author) Obtained from

Technical & Financial Feasibility Study for the Project:

Upgrade of National Road 1 (PAThE) to Highway. Road

Section: Agios Konstantinos – Skarfeia. September 2001.

(TRADEMCO)

Ministry of Economy

EC Application for Assistance Ministry of Economy

EC Commission Decision DG REGIO

Annual Report, April 2009 DG REGIO

Final Report (Draft) Ministry of Economy

Expected Impact in the Agios Konstantinos and Kamena

Vourla wider area from the construction of the new ring

road in Maliakos Bay Area, June 2008

Municipality of Agios

Konstantinos

Primary and secondary data

In addition to the project related documentation, we have also undertaken a

comprehensive data collection exercise with a summary of the documents

obtained shown in Table 2. We are grateful to the Ministry of Economy,

Ministry of Public Works and Ionia Odos for their assistance.



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Table 2. Summary of Primary & Secondary Data Availability

Data Pre-project Opening Post-project Opening

Traffic flows through Agios Konstantinos.

No count data exists for the project section in the vicinity of Agios Konstantinos. However, data is available from Tragana toll station downstream of the project (see below).

The evaluation team commissioned traffic surveys on the old road east and west of Agios Konstantinos (2 x five day counts).

In addition, traffic flow data from the tunnel monitoring system (located on the new road between Agios Konstantinos and Kamena Vourla) was provided for 2009 and 2010.

Traffic flows upstream & downstream of the project

Traffic flow data from the Tragana Toll Station (southbound only) was provided by PATHE for the period 2001 to 2008.

Traffic flow data from the Tragana Toll Station was provided by Ionia Odos from 2008 to 2010 (southbound only until Sept 2009, then bidirectional).

Highway journey times

No observed journey times are available. However, before opening journey speeds are presented in the CBA which has enabled average journey times to be calculated.

Post opening journey time surveys were undertaken by the evaluation team in July 2010.

Accident data Accident statistics for the project area have been provided for the period 2001 to 2007 by PATHE.

Accident statistics for the project area have been provided for the period November 2008 to July 2010 by Ionia Odos

Project costs Forecast investment costs were obtained from the CBA.

Outturn costs were supplied by PATHE.

5.2 Ex post cost-benefit analysis

This section presents the results of the ex post cost benefit analysis for the Agios

Konstantinos Bypass project using observed data between 2000 and 2010 (that is

before and after project opening).

Headline results from the analysis:

This section offers some headline results from the analysis which will be explored

in more detail in the following section. Before presenting the ex post results, the

following table shows the traffic demand assumptions we have used in our low

and high case scenarios developed for this evaluation



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Economic analysis

The results of the ex post economic analysis for the high and low case over the

30 year appraisal period are presented in Table 3

Table 3. Summary of ex post economic analysis (2000 prices)

Low Case High Case

Net Present Value (€m) 233 283

Economic IRR (%) 12.6% 13.4%

Benefit-cost ratio 2.1 2.4

Source: Own calculation

A detailed breakdown of these results by year is shown in Annexe 1.

The headline results in Table 3 shows that the project represents good value for

money with a benefit-cost ratio ranging from 2.1 to 2.4 and an IRR ranging from

approximately 12% to 14%. The narrow range between the Low and High case

demonstrates the robustness of the project benefits and shows that despite

different traffic growth assumptions, the large journey time benefits provided by

this project are sufficient to generate considerable levels of economic benefit. It

should also be noted that, in the ex post analysis, we have not considered the

impacts of the removal of severe congestion events which often occurred at

weekends in the summer holiday season. The time savings provided by the

project on these occasions would offer considerable benefits to road users.

Therefore the ex post economic results presented here represent a conservative

estimate of actual impacts of the project.

We consider the details underlying this estimate in more detail later in this

chapter.

Financial analysis

The results of our ex post financial analysis for the high and low case are

presented in Table 4 which shows the return on the investment and the return

on capital (2008 prices, 5% discount rate, and 30 year appraisal period). The

financial analysis considers the investment costs, future maintenance costs, and

income from tolls. A detailed breakdown of the results is shown in Annexe 1 and

the detail underlying this estimate is considered in more detail later in this

chapter.



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Table 4. Summary of ex post financial analysis (2000 prices)

Low case High case

Net Present Value – Investment (€m) -173 -166

Financial IRR – Investment (%) -1.7% -1.3%

Net Present Value – Capital (€m) -85 -78

Financial IRR – Capital (%) 0.5% 1.0%


Table 4 shows that the project is not financially viable. This was also predicted

in the ex ante CBA. This is due to the high investment cost associated with to the

complex structures required to overcome for the difficult topographical

conditions in the Agios Konstantinos area. Moreover, lower traffic volumes than

expected have impacted the revenue from tolls.

The financial analysis differs from the economic analysis because the latter

includes time savings for road users which make up the vast majority of the

benefits attributable to this project.

Wider socio-economic impacts

The Agios Konstantinos bypass is only approximately two years into its expected

economic life. Generally, economic and social and environment impacts often

take many years to materialise. Clearly the effect of the recent economic

downturn in Greece must also be considered as this may be offsetting the initial

positive impact of the project. However, a number of immediate benefits are also

apparent. These are summarised below, with more details provided later in this

chapter:

noise and air quality improvements for Agios Konstantinos residents;

improved town centre and urban environment ambience following the

removal of through traffic and congestion; and

reduced (and more reliable) journey times between Athens and

Thessaloniki to support economic activity between Greece and other

EU states.

5.2.1 Costs

This section considers the one-off costs associated with the project construction,

and the ongoing annual costs associated with the maintenance of the new

infrastructure.



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One-off costs

Investment cost data has only recently been finalised. At the time of writing, the

Final Report for the project was still in draft form. PATHE have, however, been

able to provide some unit cost data at a partial level of disaggregation. The data

was provided in ‘as spent’ costs. However, PATHE also provided information on

the year in which each expenditure was made. This has enabled the conversion

into 2000 prices to match the forecast costs contained in the CBA document.

Table 5 provides a summary of the outturn costs broken down into unit costs at

the best level of detail possible from the information supplied. We have been

informed that ‘constructions’ refers to ‘bridges, crossings, retaining walls,

drainage canals and small tunnels’. The total cost of the entire project was

€317.863m (2000 prices including VAT) and the cost per kilometre was

€15.658m.

Table 5. Summary of ex post unit costs (2000) prices.

Description Unit cost

Level 1

'All in' unit cost (€m/km) € 15.658

Level 2

Unit cost of land (€m/ha) € 0.311

Unit 'build' cost roadworks (€m/km) € 2.706

Unit 'build' cost of tunnels (€m/km) € 19.276

Unit 'build' cost of constructions (€m/km) € 2.456

Source: PATHE

Unfortunately, forecast unit costs were not provided in the CBA document so

Table 6 shows the forecast project costs in as much detail as is available.



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Table 6. Summary of forecast project costs (2000) prices

Description Unit cost

Construction € 267.057

Design € 4.402

Land/Expropriation € 5.869

Project Management € 0.880

Other unknown costs € 0.587

Total Cost (including VAT) € 278.795

Total cost (excluding VAT @ 20%) € 223.000

Source: Ex ante CBA

A comparison of the forecast with outturn project investment costs shows that

the project was 14% over the original forecast contained in the CBA. PATHE

supplied a number of reasons for the cost overrun. These were:

compensation for expropriation is determined by the Greek courts and

therefore is almost impossible to forecast in advance;

activation of EU Directive EN 54/2004 for tunnel safety midway

through construction;

additional transported soil material was required as the excavated soil

had poor characteristics;

additional embankment stabilisation works were required; and

increased construction time due to archaeological findings.

Ongoing costs

A number of ongoing costs are incurred every year to maintain and operate the

new road. They include both the maintenance and operation of the road surface,

structures, drainage, electronic driver information systems and environmental

maintenance.

Annual maintenance costs were calculated and included in the ex ante CBA and

were forecast to be approximately €2.3m per annum (2000 prices), with

additional major works every 10 years costing €4.9m. These figures have been

taken to remain constant throughout the project’s life and are maintained for the



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ex post analysis because the majority of outturn maintenance costs have not yet

been incurred, limiting the potential to use observed figures.

5.2.2 Direct benefits

Time savings

The ex ante CBA provided forecasts of journey times without the project and

with the project (on both the new and old roads). We have collected post

opening journey times. Table 7 provides a comparison.

Table 7. Summary of Predicted vs. Observed Journey Time Savings (LGV)

Route

Without

project

(mm:ss)

With

project

(mm:ss)

Time saving

(mm:ss)

Predicted (2010)

Old Road 22:30 15:18 07:22

New Road N/A 11:00

11:30

(compared to old road

without project)

Observed (2010)

Old Road 22:30* 13:12 09:18

New Road N/A 9:06

13:24

(compared to old road

without project)

Source: Predicted: Ex Ante CBA. Observed: Data collected by evaluation team in July 2010.

(*) Pre implementation journey time data was not available for this project. The predicted ‘without’ project

journey times have therefore been used for the purposes of this evaluation.

The table shows that the journey time savings resulting from the Agios

Konstantinos Bypass project are greater than forecast for both the old and new

roads. The reason for this difference is that it was observed on the site visit that

many of vehicles using the bypass travel in excess of the 80-100km/h speed limit

in place and the ex ante appraisal did not consider speed limit violations along

the extent of the project.

We have undertaken the calculation of the ex post monetary journey time benefit

using the following approach:

step 1: calculation the forecast annual vehicle hour saving in 2010 using

traffic flow and journey time data in the ex ante CBA;

step 2: calculate the actual vehicle hour saving in 2010 using observed

traffic flow and journey time data; and,



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step 3: relate the difference between the forecast and actual vehicle hour

saving in 2020 to the monetary saving in 2010.

We have used this approach for the remainder of the appraisal period (up to

2030). We were able to calculate the forecast annual vehicle hours in all years

using the journey speed/time and traffic forecasts presented in the ex ante CBA.

To calculate ‘actual’ annual vehicle hours, we deduced traffic growth assumptions

(High and Low case), and assumed the same decrease in vehicle speeds forecast

in the CBA.

Traffic Impacts and Congestion Reduction

The project has been successful in reducing congestion due to the provision of

extra highway capacity in the area. Figure 6 shows a comparison between the

before and after opening traffic flows in the Agios Konstantinos area. This

shows a considerable reduction in the number of vehicles using the route

through the town compared to the pre project situation, and these flows are also

lower than those forecast. Traffic flows using the new bypass are also lower than

expected, likely to be due to the recession affecting overall traffic growth in

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Figure 6. Predicted vs. observed traffic flows in the study area.

Source: Openstreemap.org

The CBA assumed that 36% of traffic would remain on the old road and 64%

would switch to the new bypass. Although the CBA does not state the location

of the traffic forecast on the old road (i.e. east or west of Agios Konstantinos),

surveys commissioned by the study team either side of the town shows that

traffic flows are almost the identical at the two locations. Figure 7 shows that

transfer of trips onto the new road is actually 84% with only 16% of vehicles

remaining on the old road. This transfer of trips, larger than expected, is

therefore likely to have enhanced the local air quality and noise impacts for local

residents in the area.

The traffic flows presented in Figure 7 show that traffic growth has been lower

than predicted between 2007 and 2010 across a ‘screenline’ encompassing the old

road through Agios Konstantinos and the bypass. This is most likely a direct

result of the recession causing a general decrease in traffic volumes throughout

Greece exacerbating the differences between predicted and observed flows rather

than a error in the traffic forecasting undertaken for this project.

To Athens

To

Thessaloniki

Highway 1 (E75)

National Road 1

N

-

17,200

17%

-

-

-

Legend

AADT Before Opening (2007)

AADT After Opening (2010)

%HGV

-

3,300

4%19,000

-

18%

-

10,900

20%

Observed Forecast

25,500

-

22%

ForecastObserved

-

19,000

20%

ForecastObserved



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Figure 7. Predicted vs. observed traffic flows in the study area

Note: The locations of the traffic flows shown on this map are for presentation purposes only.

The reliability of journey times would also have improved as a result of the

increased capacity of the route. The CBA did not quantify the reliability of

journey times, as it is very difficult to model and monetise. However, it is

reasonable to assume that journey time reliability (particularly in the busy summer

months) has improved considerably. The Mayor of Agios Konstantinos stated

anecdotally that delays in excess of 60 minutes were not uncommon in the

summer months before the project opened. This potential for delay has now

been removed following opening of the project.

Vehicle Operating Costs (VOC’s)

Vehicle operating costs savings were calculated in the ex ante CBA. However,

these benefits or dis-benefits cannot be isolated because they have been included

with the monetary journey time benefits and are not presented separately.

Therefore, for the ex post evaluation, we have had to consider journey time

savings and VOC savings together using the approach described earlier for the

evaluation of journey time benefits.

To Athens

To

Thessaloniki

Highway 1 (E75)

National Road 1

N

84%

-

-

-

Legend

AADT Before Opening (2007)

AADT After Opening (2010)

% Change

19,000

20,500

+8%

- % Of Corridor Traffic

25,500

30,000

+18%

Observed Forecast

Forecast

36%

Observed Forecast

64%

16%

Observed



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Toll Revenues

The ex ante CBA forecast an increase in toll revenues from the project. This was

based on a rate of €0.03 per PCU (Passenger Car Unit) per kilometre. The CBA

was prepared based on the assumption that the project (and the rest of the

motorway) would not be part of a concession. This has not occurred in reality, as

Ionia Odos now have responsibility for the road as part of a 30 year contract

which commenced in 2007.

Although any toll revenues generated by the project currently benefit a private

operator, we have calculated the ex post impact on toll revenues for the purposes

of the financial analysis. The approach is based on relating the difference

between forecast and actual traffic volumes to annual toll revenues. For example,

if traffic volumes are twice those forecast, then the toll revenues would be

double. We haven’t considered necessary to undertake a more complex

evaluation of toll revenues; firstly because they represent a relatively small

proportion of the financial impact of the project, and secondly because the €0.03

per km rate is similar to the rate we understand is being used in Greece at present

(€0.04per km).

5.2.3 Externalities

Safety

Observed accident statistics in the study area have been made available from

PATHE (before opening) and Ionia Odos (after opening). These data cover the

period 2001 to 2010. The opening year (2008) has been excluded from the

evaluation as it has not been possible to determine whether the accidents

recorded in this year occurred before or after opening.

Table 8 provides a summary of the casualty numbers in the area covered by the

project. It should be noted that the coverage of the accident areas in the pre- and

post-project situation is uncertain, although we have presumed it to be the same.

We also acknowledge that accident reporting is likely to be considerably more

comprehensive on the new road compared to the old road, where many minor

accidents may not have necessitated a police presence and thereby may not have

been recorded. The pre-opening casualty numbers presented in the table are

therefore likely to represent a best case scenario.



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Table 8. Summary of Predicted vs. Observed Casualty Numbers

Year Slight Serious Fatal

Be

fore

Op

en

ing

2001 21 4 3

2002 23 5 1

2003 21 4 0

2004* 34 7 30

2005 13 3 1

2006 5 1 1

2007 6 1 1

2008 Excluded from analysis

Aft

er

Op

en

ing

2009 20 4 1

2010 (Jan-Jul) 7 1 0

Source: PATHE and Ionia Odos

* The casualty figures for 2004 are skewed by a serious accident involving a coach with numerous

passengers. The 2004 data has also been excluded from the ex post economic analysis to avoid the

monetary benefits becoming skewed by one major accident.

The casualty figures show a clear decrease in accidents since the project opened

compared to the five year period between 2001 and 2005. There is a large

decrease in casualties in 2006 and 2007 before the project opened. The reasons

for this are unknown. However, based on the limited amount of post opening

data available, the early indications are that the project is reducing the number of

accidents in the Agios Konstantinos area.

The ex ante CBA only presents the monetary accident benefits and does not

show the predicted number of accidents saved to generate this benefit.

Therefore, for the ex post evaluation we have used the HEATCO accident values

and applying these to the modest saving in accidents observed in Table 8. (Pre

project average of 2001-2007 (excluding 2004) & post project 2009 and 2010).

The ex ante CBA assumes an accident benefits profile whereby the opening year

monetary benefits are replicated throughout the appraisal period despite forecast

increases in traffic. The ex post evaluation has used the same assumption, but the

HEATCO values have been adjusted to reflect changes in GDP, so the accident

benefits increase over time.



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Environmental (noise, pollution, CO2)

Environmental externalities were considered briefly in the ex ante CBA, but the

impacts were not monetised. The considerable reduction in traffic using the

former main route through Agios Konstantinos would have had beneficial local

air quality and noise impacts for local residents. This is also supported by

anecdotal evidence provided by the Mayor of Agios Konstantinos, as most traffic

now uses the new road with limited noise and air quality impacts.

5.2.4 Wider impacts

The ex ante documentation for the Agios Konstantinos provides only little

detailed information about this project’s wider impacts. The ex ante

documentation reports a number of local and strategic wider impacts of the

project, as summarised below.

With regards to local benefits, the ex ante documentation mentions:

improvement to Air Quality, Noise, Groundwater and general urban

environment in Agios Konstantinos through the maintenance of speed

on the new facility and removal of through traffic in the town;

respect of the landscape and of the protection of cultural heritage

including the Spa at Kamena Vourla and other archaeological sites of

significance; and,

support of regional economic and cultural development through

increasing access to employment opportunities and minimising outward

migration from the area.

The following wider impacts are also considered:

as the project forms part of the PATHE Highway upgrade (one of 14

high priority TEN projects), it was expected for the improvement to the

north-south axis to improve Greece’s commercial connectivity with

external countries (particularly Balkan States) and major sea ports

including Thessaloniki; Athens; and Patra;

enhancement road characteristics of the north-south access to standards

consistent with those across the EU;

reduction of manufacturing costs (thanks to better travel links), leading

to an increase in Greece’s competitiveness.

Further to the above, the ex ante evaluation provides an estimate of the number

of jobs (direct and indirect) that the project was anticipated to generate in its

construction and operational phases. The detail of the forecast impact on jobs is

discussed further in the sections that follow. The remainder of this section sets



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out our general approach to the ex post evaluation and summarises the impacts

identified in discussions with key stakeholders with an appreciation of the project

and its social, environmental and economic impacts.

Approach to ex post evaluation

The effects of the recent economic downturn have been particularly prevalent in

Greece. As such the impacts reported in this section need to be considered

within the context of such challenging economic conditions.

We have drawn upon the following sources of information:

a post opening study examining the post opening impacts of the bypass

on the towns of Agios Konstantinos and Kammena Vourla (Expected

Impact in the Agios Konstantinos and Kammena Vourla wider area from the

construction of the new ring road in the Maliakos bay area, June 2010);

a semi structured interview with the Mayor of Agios Konstantinos and a

representative from the Sterea Ellada region (July 2010); and,

focus group discussion (July 2010) with representatives from:

PATHE;

Greece Ministry of Public Works; and

Greece Ministry of Economy.

Economic Impacts

The economic benefits of this project need to be considered within the context

of a number of major infrastructural improvements in Greece including: Athens

Metro; Rio – Antirion Bridge, Athens International Airport; Athens Tram;

Thessaloniki Metro, Egnatia Odos, Ionia Odos and PATHE.

Impact on the Local Economy

The Agios Konstantinos bypass and Kamena Vourla bypass (separate to this

project, but integral to it) are two of the projects in the Maliakos bay intended to

improve the PATHE to cities in bordering countries and remove traffic from the

two cities bypassed.

A post-graduate study completed in June 2008 (supervised by the department of

Economic and Regional Development, Pantio University of Social and Political

Sciences) concluded the following with regard economic impacts.

The removal of traffic will initially result in a reduction in passing trade and

therefore revenue generated for businesses located on the old route. These

initial adverse impacts will however be offset by longer term gains



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attributable to the likely future growth in tourism fuelled by the change in

urban realm.

In accordance with the anticipated loss in employment for businesses

immediately following project open, an increase in tourist trade facilitated by

removal of the town centre traffic will help to increase local employment

opportunities.

Assuming that future land use planning in Kamena Vourla and Agios

Konstantinos is coordinated, both could benefit from the rewards of growth

in tourism.

The Agios Konstantios officials stated that, prior to the Agios Konstantinos

Bypass, that traffic had restricted the town’s ability to take advantage of passing

trade. This is because, during peak times in the summer season, temporary traffic

management prevented vehicles from stopping. Our consultation also

highlighted a series of further impacts.

On the whole the long-term effects were likely to far outweigh the adverse

impacts on local businesses (for example, 250 job losses at a local hotel on

the old route – shown in Figure 8). Moreover, the town would now be able

to exploit the opportunity to develop its tourism sector.

The tourism sector can now benefit from enhanced parking management,

sea front catering facilities, access to ferry terminal (connection with

Skiathos), better access to local cultural and historical monuments, improved

pedestrian environment, increased provision of holiday home

accommodation.

There is anecdotal evidence that Kamena Vourla may have been slightly

disadvantaged in comparison to Agios Konstantinos in economic terms, as

increasing numbers of people using the corridor appear to be stopping in the

latter relative to the former.

Relief of the old route has facilitated access and egress to Agios

Konstantinos’s sea port, which serves 400,000 passengers per annum

(Figure 9).



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Figure 8. Hotel in Agios Konstantinos – 250 jobs lost upon closure

Figure 9. Agios Konstantinos Port and ferry to Skiathos

Stakeholders’ anecdotal views suggest that the project has made a contribution

towards achieving the strategic objectives set out at the beginning of this section.



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This largely appears to have been achieved through improvements to journey

times, better safety and improved journey time reliability. Simultaneous to this,

the project has also contributed to improving the economic attractiveness and

future growth potential of the bypassed towns through removing traffic

congestion on less suitable routes through built up areas.

Administrative burdens and local authorities

Other than the contractual arrangements associated with the implementation of

the toll infrastructure, the project has not created any direct administrative duties

for the local authorities or businesses bypassed by the improvement. One

interesting feature of this project is that the concessionaire (Ionia Odos) has

continued responsibility for the maintenance of the old route alignment through

Agios Konstantinos as it forms the only diversion route in the event of tunnel

closures on the route. Consequently, remedial water drainage works undertaken

following project opening have been funded by the concessionaire rather than

the local authority. Such arrangements were obviously well supported by officials

in Agios Konstantinos.

Quality of life and community impacts

The post opening study, undertaken in 2010, suggests that there has been a

qualitative improvement in the urban and natural environment in the bypassed

settlements. In turn, these will offer immediate quality of life benefit for both

permanent and temporary residents.

Such findings were substantiated through feedback from Agios Konstantinos’s

officials, who confirmed that local quality of life impacts form the bypass had

been positive. The perception was that the effects of reduced traffic had been

much better than expected and consequently there have been significant benefits

to Agios Konstantinos’s residents in the form of reduced noise, improved air

quality, reduced severance between the town and sea, and safer access to the

coast. Furthermore, it was felt that the project had made a positive contribution

to local tourism as well as tranquillity and road accident problems along the old

route – all of which contribute to an improved community environment.

Property and land use

At a local level, the officials at Agios Konstantinos identified that the removal of

traffic and congestion, paralleled with fast access and reliable road access from

Athens, has created conditions for regeneration of the town to strengthen its

tourism economy. Whilst the project does not appear have generated immediate

changes in land use, its impacts in traffic terms is being used as an opportunity to

reconfigure spatial planning policies in the town. It was estimated by one

stakeholder that the project had facilitated the construction of 2,000 new homes

over the wider local area – many of which are thought to have a holiday home



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function. The importance of tourism in the town is demonstrated through an

increase in the summer population to around 15,000, compared to just 5,000 in

the winter months.

Skills, Labour and Employment

Whilst it is not clear how these figures were prepared, Table 9 summarises the

number of jobs forecast to be created as a result of the Agios Konstantinos

project at the ex ante stage. With an absence of baseline assumptions and the

range of other factors influencing employment growth in the vicinity of the

project and Greece more generally, it is not appropriate to provide a quantitative

estimate of the number of jobs created by this project.

Table 9. Summary of forecast job creation

Construction Phase Operational Phase

Project

Phase

Direct

Jobs

Indirect

Jobs

Expected

Duration

Direct

Jobs

(Increase

per

annum)

Indirect

Jobs

(Increase

per

annum)

Agios

Konstatintos 5585 4495 6 years 65 50

Source: Ex ante CBA

There is very limited evidence of the measured actual impacts of the bypass on

skills, labour and employment. There is perception amongst local officials that

the project will aid local tourism, which will in turn lead to job creation for

people in the area. Figure 5 above suggests that there has been increase in the

employment levels in the prefecture within which the project passes. However,

given that the geographical coverage of the prefecture is much greater than the

project’s influence area and there is an absence of employment data beyond 2007,

it is not possible to verify whether this upward trend is permanent or attributable

directly to the project. The project was constructed using resources from the

local area, however it was not possible to confirm whether or not these were in

line with expectations.

Environmental impacts

No post opening environmental impact monitoring has taken place for this

project and hence it is not possible to verify the forecast benefits on the physical

environment in quantitative terms. From the information available at the time of

post opening evaluation, the following can be assumed regarding environmental

impacts:



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reduced traffic levels in the town will have inevitably resulted in a

substantial reduction in air pollution and noise levels;

the removal of traffic from the town has enabled the local authority to

re-modal its spatial planning framework to enhance opportunities for

tourism activity and reduce severance between the main town and

seafront;

Figure 10. Old road through Agios Konstantinos to be integrated into future master

planning proposals

the removal of traffic has helped to mitigate the disruption caused by

remedial drainage works needed to remove flooding risk in Agios

Konstatinos;

the use of tunnels along part of the route means that it has been

sympathetically integrated into the landscape to minimise visual

intrusion to properties overlooking the route; and,

public areas and the urban environment has dramatically improved

following the opening of the motorway, which in time will promote

tourist activity.



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Other Impacts

To conclude this qualitative assessment of wider impacts it is worth mentioning

that feedback from stakeholders and our own site visits that the project will make

a long term contribution to the strategic objectives set out at the beginning of

this section. More specifically the improved route demonstrates a step change in

service level on the A1 through this part of the north south corridor and is in

accordance with that provided on other parts of the TEN-T network.

Utilisation rates

As requested by the TORs, we have considered the evolution of the utilisation

rate of the project since opening. We have calculated this by considering, for the

year 2010, the ratio between the actual flow (AADT) and the total potential flow

(AADT) that could be accommodated on the E75, based on our route capacity

calculations.

Table 10 shows the total AADT in 2010 on the E75. The table also shows the

total maximum capacity available, based on a calculation of Congestion

Reference Flow given by the UK formula:

350,75*100

*100

*** AAWT

AADT

PkDPkFWfNLCapacityCRF

where,

NL = Number of lanes per direction = 2

Wf = Width factor = 1

PkF = Percentage of 2 way daily flow occurring in peak hour (assumed to be 10

for this project)

PkD = Percentage directional split of peak hour traffic (assumed to be 50 for

this project)

AADT/AAWT (assumed to be 1 for this project)

Capacity = 2300 – (25 x proportion of HGVs) = 2300 – (25 x 16.7%) = 1884



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Table 10. Utilisation rates on the E75 Agios Konstantinos Bypass (2010)

Observed Flow Theoretical

Capacity

Utilisation

Rate

Agios

Konstantinos

bypass

17,213 75,348 23%

Source: Own calculation based on Ionia Odos tunnel data and UK capacity formulae.

Based on our calculation, we have found that utilisation rates on the bypass are

around 23%. However, we note that, due to the assumptions underpinning this

calculation, this result should be treated as purely indicative and only represents a

snapshot of the current situation.

Table 11 presents the utilisation rate at the end of the appraisal period (2030) if

the forecast traffic growth is realised (3% annual increase). This shows that the

project will be approaching half capacity in 2030 if the forecast traffic growth

between 2010 and 2030 is realised.

Table 11. Utilisation rates on the E75 Agios Konstantinos Bypass (2030)

Observed Flow Theoretical

Capacity

Utilisation

Rate

Agios

Konstantinos

Bypass

31,088 75,348 41%

Source: Own calculation based on Ionia Odos tunnel data and UK capacity formulae.

Meeting environmental requirements

The Greek planning process requires a comprehensive assessment of the

environmental impacts of major investment proposals, prior to the issuing of an

environmental permit. An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was

prepared in 2001, but we could not obtain it for this study. However, we are

aware that the EIA covered the extent of the project works and facilitated the

approval of the Environmental Permit and the EC Application for Funding

document.

The project does not pass through or near to any internationally important sites

(Natura 2000), and potential environmental impacts were mitigated where

required (noise barriers and animal crossings). However, the project did have an

impact on the local spring water, but this was successfully managed by the



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mitigation measures proposed. Indeed the successful management of the

potential hydrology issues was raised by the Mayor of Agios Konstantinos.

Unintended effects of the project

With the exception of traffic levels on the new road being lower than forecast,

the nature of the impacts identified in the ex-post evaluation were broadly in line

with expectations and stakeholders were unable to elaborate on any additional

unintended impacts.

Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis

There are clearly many uncertainties involved when forecasting the long term

impacts of large scale investment projects such as the Agios Konstantinos

Bypass. Although the ex post evaluation uses observed data from before and

after project opening, there are still many years of the appraisal period which are

unknown, as the project is so recent. We have therefore presented a range of

results in the form of a ‘low’ and ‘high’ case which aims to consider future levels

of traffic growth. The differences between the low and high case were presented

earlier in this report, and are presented in Table 12 along with the ex ante CBA

traffic demand assumptions for comparison purposes.

Table 12. Summary of traffic growth assumptions between low and high case

Ex Ante Ex Post

Low case High case

2008-2012 3% 0% 0%

2013-2019 3% 2% 4%

2020-2025 3% 1.5% 3%

2026-2031 3% 0.75% 1.5%


Note: The Ex ante appraisal period is 2000-2030 with an opening year of 2007. The ex post appraisal

period has been extended to 2031 to account for 2008 opening year.

It is our view that the two scenarios presented above represent a best estimate of

the lower and upper levels of impact attributable to the project, and the actual

impacts will lie somewhere between the two tests.

Margin of Error

The high case scenario demand over the 30 year evaluation period generates an

NPV of 21% above the low case scenario. This margin of error is due to the



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uncertainty relating to economic and associated levels of traffic growth expected

over the 30 year period.

5.3 Review ex ante cost-benefit analysis

This section of the report presents a review of the ex ante cost benefit analysis

(dated 2002) that supports the EC Application for Assistance and includes an

overview of the headline results, and commentary on the methodology and

approach to the ex ante CBA.

The ex ante CBA submitted for the project detailed the forecast costs and

benefits that the project would deliver over the 30 year appraisal period (2000-

2030), and the opening year was assumed to be 2007. The CBA only considered

one route option (which was built), but a number of sensitivity tests were

undertaken which are considered later in this section.

Table 13 presents the headline economic results presented in the CBA for the

Agios Konstantinos Bypass project. The figures shown are in 2000 prices

discounted to 2000 at 5%.

Table 13. Results of ex ante economic analysis

NPV (€ million, 2000

prices)

Economic IRR

(%)

BCR

Agios Konstantinos

Bypass 422.1 17.6% 3.1

Source: Ex ante CBA

This table shows that the project was forecast to generate considerable economic

benefits, and the BCR in excess of 3 proves that in economic terms the project

was predicted to be good value for money.

Table 14 shows the results of the financial analysis presented in the CBA. The

figures presented are in 2000 prices discounted to 2000 at 7%.



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Table 14. Results of ex ante financial analysis

NPV

(€ million, 2000 prices)

Financial IRR

(%)

Agios Konstantinos

Bypass -154.0 -0.7%

Source: Ex ante CBA

The results of the financial analysis show that the project was not forecast to be

financially viable. The high investment cost was cited as the main reason for the

negative IRR presented in the CBA. It is clear therefore, that this project was

justified purely on economic grounds.

5.3.1 Key aspects of ex ante CBA

The CBA calculated monetary impacts for the following benefit streams:

traffic impacts – including journey times and vehicle operating costs

savings; and,

reduction in accidents.

We note that costs and benefits associated with environmental impacts were not

monetised in the CBA.

The remainder of this section briefly reviews some of the key elements of the ex

ante CBA.

Traffic Analysis

The CBA contains traffic forecasts for the ‘without project’ and ‘with project’

variants for the forecast opening year (2007) and a horizon year (2030). The key

assumptions relating to the traffic forecasts are listed below.

Annual traffic growth of 3% per annum over the entire appraisal period.

This is based on three previous road studies that were undertaken in

Greece for different projects, and forecast GDP growth. A description

of the studies used to inform this calculation was not provided.

36% of total traffic would remain on the old road through Agios

Konstantinos and Kamena Vourla.

This figure was derived from a traffic model which was developed

especially for this project.



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10% extra light vehicle trips assumed in the opening year in the ‘with

project’ scenario (i.e. induced traffic).

The 3% per annum increase in traffic was then applied to this traffic

flow.

The assumption underpinning this 10% increase has not been supplied

in the CBA document.

The ‘rule of a half’ has been applied to the additional generated traffic,

in accordance with the EU’s CBA guidelines.

The calculations used to determine the performance of the route with and

without the project were based on simple capacity formulae and speed-flow

relationships contained within the United States Highway Capacity Manual

(HCM).

Accident analysis

Improvements in safety were forecast to occur as a result of the project, and

these have been converted into monetary accident benefits. However, it seems

from the CBA that a detailed analysis of accident location and causality was not

undertaken, and the assumptions underpinning the monetary benefits derived

have not been provided. It is also noted that despite the 3% per annum increase

in traffic forecast, the annual accident benefit has been forecast to remain the

same. This therefore represents a conservative estimate, as increased traffic

would normally be expected to increase the saving in accidents in the ‘with

project’ compared to the ‘without project’ scenario.

Economic and Financial Analysis

The CBA the results of the economic and financial analysis and the results were

presented in Table 13 and Table 14 earlier in this section. Here we to highlight

the main areas where the analysis could have been undertaken differently.

Future year maintenance costs associated with the new highway have been

included both in the economic and financial analysis. Current guidance

recommends that maintenance costs are included in the financial analysis

only. Therefore the economic benefits presented represent a conservative

estimate due to the inclusion of the maintenance costs.

The CBA assumed that project would not be part of a concession. This has

not occurred as Ionia Odos now have responsibility for maintaining the

route in return for the toll revenues. Therefore any increase in toll revenues

as a result of the project now go to the private operator rather than

contributing to national funds.



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Sensitivity analysis and risk Assessment

A detailed risk assessment was not undertaken for this project. However, a

number of sensitivity tests were undertaken to demonstrate the robustness of the

economic benefits of the project. The tests which were presented in Table 15 are

as follows.

Table 15. Results of ex ante sensitivity analysis

Scenario Net Present Value

(€ million, 2000 prices) BCR

3% discount rate €663.9m 3.9

7% discount rate €267.3m 2.5

5% discount rate & 15% cost increase €400.4m 2.8

5% discount rate & 15% cost decrease €443.7m 3.5

Source: Ex ante CBA

The forecasts in Table 15 show that despite the variations in costs and discount

rates tested, the project was still forecast to deliver value for money. It should be

noted, however, that the CBA did not consider the potential for changes in

traffic demand.

5.4 Differences between ex post and ex ante

analysis

Table 16 compares the results of the ex ante economic analysis with the results

of the ex post CBA for the Agios Konstantinos Bypass project.



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Table 16. Comparison of ex ante and ex post economic CBA (2000 prices)

Ex ante Ex post

Low case High case

Net Present Value (€m) 422.1 233 283

Economic IRR (%) 17.6% 12.6% 13.4%

Benefit-cost ratio 3.10 2.1 2.4

Source: Ex ante CBA and own calculation (for ex post analysis)

Overall, PATHE estimated that the project would deliver value for money. With

an NPV of about €422, and a benefit cost ratio of 3.1. However, we have

reviewed in detail many of the key parameters and some significant changes to

the assumptions made in our ex post evaluation, and even with these changes the

ex post analysis has confirmed that the project has delivered value for money,

despite the lower than forecast traffic volumes which are currently being

experienced in the area.

We have identified the following sources of differences between the ex ante

analysis and the ex post evaluation:

the CBA assumed that 64% of road users will switch to the Bypass and

the observed data shows that 84% of traffic has switched to the Bypass;

traffic volumes on the new road are currently lower than forecast in the

CBA (most likely due to the recession), and the observed journey time

savings are actually greater than forecast;

our ex-post evaluation does not capture the benefits of the scheme in

the height of the summer season and therefore potentially represents an

under estimate of the true scheme benefits.

investment costs were underestimated by approximately €40m due to a

number of reasons stated earlier in the report;

the ex ante CBA included maintenance costs in the economic and

financial analysis, whilst the ex post evaluation included maintenance

costs in the financial evaluation only;

a discount rate of 5% was used in the ex ante economic analysis and

5.5% in the ex post evaluation (in accordance with the EC’s 2008 Guide

to CBA of Investment Projects);



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a discount rate of 7% was used in the ex ante financial analysis and 5%

in the ex post evaluation (in accordance with the EC’s 2008 Guide to

CBA of Investment Projects); and,

the Agios Konstantinos Bypass opened in 2008, and not 2007 as

forecast.

in the ex post analysis we have calculated the expected residual value of

the project at the end of the appraisal period by applying a linear

depreciation over 30 years to the capital expenditure incurred. The ex

ante CBA also calculated the residual value of the project, but this was

based on a series of calculations for each element of the project

construction (bridges, tunnels, surfacing, electronic message signs etc).

The impact of these differences results in an ex post and the BCR and IRR are

lower than forecast, however, the project still represents good value for money.

5.5 Role of CBA in decision-making process

As mentioned above, we held a workshop with representatives from the Greek

Ministry of Economy and Public Works and stakeholders representing both the

Agios Konstantinos project and also the Thriasio to Korinthos Rail project. The

discussion on the role of CBA in the decision making process was therefore a

discussion about CBA in Greece generally. A summary of the main points raised

is provided below.

The CBA was recognised as being both a necessary procedure to complete

the funding application and a useful tool for prioritising options within

projects where alternative options can be tested. It was noted that a CBA is

normally not prepared for smaller local projects.

The CBAs were produced by external consultants with audits by the Ministry

of Economy. This consisted of logical and common sense checks.

In the case of both the Agios Konstantinos Bypass and the Thriasio to

Korinthos railway, the CBA was not used as a tool to compare alternative

options. For the bypass in particular, there was little potential for alternative

route options due to the difficult topography in the area.

The CBA process has not been used to prioritise between different projects

(e.g. the Agios Konstantinos Bypass as opposed to the Thriasio to

Korinthos railway). Decisions at this level had been based on the

requirements for improving the priority axes and the total funding allocated

to Greece.



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The CBA is considered a useful process because it provides estimations of

the main impacts. However, it is considered limited because CBA struggles

to capture the potential for regional benefits which take time to materialise.

It was noted that whilst the applications had stressed these benefits they, had

been unable to be quantified within the CBA;

Feedback relating to the EC’s CBA guidance document was positive and the

guide was deemed helpful to standardise the CBA process.

There was a view that the level of effort required to complete a CBA is

proportional to the project being considered. It was noted that the majority

of the time input required is for the detailed project design and not the CBA.



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Detailed results

Figure 11. Agiou Konstantinou bypass – Greece. Economic analysis (€m, 2000

prices) – Low case

Source: Own calculations

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

BENEFITS

Consumers Surplus

Time Benefits & Vehicle Operating Costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.8 48.3 42.2 42.5 42.7 43.8 44.8 45.8 46.8 47.8 48.7 49.7

Accident Reduction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7

TOTAL BENEFITS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 45.4 48.9 42.7 43.0 43.3 44.4 45.5 46.5 47.5 48.5 49.5 50.4

COSTS

Investment Costs

Land 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.3 2.8 12.0 9.6 15.7 1.7 2.1 0.1

Roadworks 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.4 3.4 14.6 11.6 19.0 2.1 2.5 0.1

Tunnels 0.2 0.7 2.9 1.2 10.3 44.4 35.5 58.1 6.3 7.7 0.3

Constructions 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.4 3.1 13.2 10.6 17.3 1.9 2.3 0.1

Total Investment costs 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL COSTS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

NET BENEFITS -0.4 -1.3 -5.5 -2.4 -19.6 -84.2 -67.4 -110.1 33.6 34.3 42.1 43.0 43.3 44.4 45.5 46.5 47.5 48.5 49.5 50.4

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031

BENEFITS

Consumers Surplus

Time Benefits & Vehicle Operating Costs 50.3 50.9 51.5 52.1 52.6 53.1 53.2 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3

Accident Reduction 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0

TOTAL BENEFITS 51.1 51.7 52.3 52.9 53.5 54.0 54.1 54.2 54.3 54.3 54.3 54.3

COSTS

Investment Costs

Land

Roadworks

Tunnels

Constructions

Total Investment costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -130.6

TOTAL COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -130.6

NET BENEFITS 51.1 51.7 52.3 52.9 53.5 54.0 54.1 54.2 54.3 54.3 54.3 184.9

Discount Rate 5.5%

ENPV 233

ERR 12.6%

B/C Ratio 2.1



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Figure 12. Agiou Konstantinou bypass – Greece. Financial return on investment (€m,

2000 prices) – Low case


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

TOTAL REVENUES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 6.2 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3

Land 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.3 2.8 12.0 9.6 15.7 1.7 2.1 0.1

Roadworks 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.4 3.4 14.6 11.6 19.0 2.1 2.5 0.1

Tunnels 0.2 0.7 2.9 1.2 10.3 44.4 35.5 58.1 6.3 7.7 0.3

Constructions 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.4 3.1 13.2 10.6 17.3 1.9 2.3 0.1

TOTAL INVESTMENT COSTS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3

TOTAL OPERATING COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3

TOTAL OUTFLOWS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 14.2 16.9 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3

CASH FLOW -0.4 -1.3 -5.5 -2.4 -19.6 -84.2 -67.4 -110.1 -8.4 -10.7 2.4 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.5 1.0 3.8 3.9 4.0

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031

TOTAL REVENUES 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8

Land

Roadworks

Tunnels

Constructions

TOTAL INVESTMENT COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -130.6

Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3

TOTAL OPERATING COSTS 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3

TOTAL OUTFLOWS 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 -128.3

CASH FLOW 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.4 1.8 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 135.1

Discount rate 5.0%

FNPV (C) -173

FRR (C) -1.7%



Greece

Figure 13. Agiou Konstantinou bypass – Greece. Financial return on capital (€m,

2000 prices) – Low case


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Revenues 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 6.2 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3

Residual values

TOTAL FINANCIAL INFLOWS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 6.2 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3

Local contribution

Regional contrintribution

National contribution 0.2 0.8 3.5 1.5 12.3 53.1 42.4 69.4 7.5 9.2 0.4

Total national public contribution 0.2 0.8 3.5 1.5 12.3 53.1 42.4 69.4 7.5 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3

Total Operating Costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3

TOTAL FINANCIAL OUTFLOWS 0.2 0.8 3.5 1.5 12.3 53.1 42.4 69.4 9.8 11.5 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3

NET CASH FLOW -0.2 -0.8 -3.5 -1.5 -12.3 -53.1 -42.4 -69.4 -4.0 -5.3 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.5 1.0 3.8 3.9 4.0

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031

Revenues 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8

Residual values 130.6

TOTAL FINANCIAL INFLOWS 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 137.4

Local contribution


National contribution

Total national public contribution 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3

Total Operating Costs 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3

TOTAL FINANCIAL OUTFLOWS 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3

NET CASH FLOW 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.4 1.8 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 135.1

Discount rate 5.0%

FNPV (K) -85

FRR (K) 0.5%



Greece

Figure 14. Agiou Konstantinou bypass – Greece. Financial sustainability (€m, 2000

prices) – Low case


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

EU Grant 0.1 0.5 2.0 0.9 7.2 31.2 24.9 40.7 4.4 5.4 0.2

Local contribution




Operating subsidies

FINANCIAL RESOURCES 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Passenger vehicles

Goods vehicles

TOTAL REVENUES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL INFLOWS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Land 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.3 2.8 12.0 9.6 15.7 1.7 2.1 0.1

Roadworks 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.4 3.4 14.6 11.6 19.0 2.1 2.5 0.1

Tunnals 0.2 0.7 2.9 1.2 10.3 44.4 35.5 58.1 6.3 7.7 0.3

Constructions 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.4 3.1 13.2 10.6 17.3 1.9 2.3 0.1

TOTAL INVESTMENTS COSTS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3


TOTAL OUTFLOWS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 14.2 16.9 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3

NET CASH FLOW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -5.0 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3

CUMULATED CASH FLOW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.3 -4.6 -7.0 -9.3 -11.6 -2.3 -4.6 -7.0 -12.0 -14.3 -16.6 -18.9

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031

EU Grant

Local contribution




Operating subsidies

FINANCIAL RESOURCES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Passenger vehicles

Goods vehicles

TOTAL REVENUES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL INFLOWS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Land

Roadworks

Tunnals

Constructions

TOTAL INVESTMENTS COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3


TOTAL OUTFLOWS 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3

NET CASH FLOW -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -5.0 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3

CUMULATED CASH FLOW -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -5.0 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3



Greece

Figure 15. Agiou Konstantinou bypass – Greece. Economic analysis (€m, 2000

prices) – High case


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

BENEFITS

Consumers Surplus

Time Benefits & Vehicle Operating Costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.8 48.3 42.2 42.5 42.7 44.7 46.6 48.6 50.6 52.7 54.8 56.9

Accident Reduction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7

TOTAL BENEFITS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 45.4 48.9 42.7 43.0 43.3 45.3 47.2 49.2 51.3 53.4 55.5 57.6

COSTS

Investment Costs

Land 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.3 2.8 12.0 9.6 15.7 1.7 2.1 0.1

Roadworks 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.4 3.4 14.6 11.6 19.0 2.1 2.5 0.1

Tunnels 0.2 0.7 2.9 1.2 10.3 44.4 35.5 58.1 6.3 7.7 0.3

Constructions 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.4 3.1 13.2 10.6 17.3 1.9 2.3 0.1

Total Investment costs 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL COSTS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

NET BENEFITS -0.4 -1.3 -5.5 -2.4 -19.6 -84.2 -67.4 -110.1 33.6 34.3 42.1 43.0 43.3 45.3 47.2 49.2 51.3 53.4 55.5 57.6

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031

BENEFITS

Consumers Surplus

Time Benefits & Vehicle Operating Costs 58.5 60.1 61.7 63.3 64.9 66.5 67.1 67.7 68.2 68.7 69.2 69.7

Accident Reduction 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0

TOTAL BENEFITS 59.2 60.9 62.5 64.1 65.7 67.3 68.0 68.6 69.2 69.7 70.2 70.7

COSTS

Investment Costs

Land

Roadworks

Tunnels

Constructions

Total Investment costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -130.6

TOTAL COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -130.6

NET BENEFITS 59.2 60.9 62.5 64.1 65.7 67.3 68.0 68.6 69.2 69.7 70.2 201.3

Discount Rate 5.5%

ENPV 283

ERR 13.4%

B/C Ratio 2.4



Greece

Figure 16. Agiou Konstantinou bypass – Greece. Financial return on investment (€m,

2000 prices) – High case


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

TOTAL REVENUES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 6.2 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.7 5.9 6.2 6.4 6.7 7.0 7.2

Land 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.3 2.8 12.0 9.6 15.7 1.7 2.1 0.1

Roadworks 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.4 3.4 14.6 11.6 19.0 2.1 2.5 0.1

Tunnels 0.2 0.7 2.9 1.2 10.3 44.4 35.5 58.1 6.3 7.7 0.3

Constructions 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.4 3.1 13.2 10.6 17.3 1.9 2.3 0.1

TOTAL INVESTMENT COSTS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3


TOTAL OUTFLOWS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 14.2 16.9 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3

CASH FLOW -0.4 -1.3 -5.5 -2.4 -19.6 -84.2 -67.4 -110.1 -8.4 -10.7 2.4 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.9 1.4 4.4 4.7 4.9

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031

TOTAL REVENUES 7.4 7.6 7.9 8.1 8.3 8.5 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.7 8.8 8.9

Land

Roadworks

Tunnels

Constructions

TOTAL INVESTMENT COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -130.6

Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3


TOTAL OUTFLOWS 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 -128.3

CASH FLOW 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.9 6.1 3.5 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.5 137.1

Discount rate 5.0%

FNPV (C) -166

FRR (C) -1.3%



Greece

Figure 17. Agiou Konstantinou bypass – Greece. Financial return on capital (€m,

2000 prices) – High case


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Revenues 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 6.2 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.7 5.9 6.2 6.4 6.7 7.0 7.2

Residual values

TOTAL FINANCIAL INFLOWS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 6.2 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.7 5.9 6.2 6.4 6.7 7.0 7.2

Local contribution




Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3

Total Operating Costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3

TOTAL FINANCIAL OUTFLOWS 0.2 0.8 3.5 1.5 12.3 53.1 42.4 69.4 9.8 11.5 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3

NET CASH FLOW -0.2 -0.8 -3.5 -1.5 -12.3 -53.1 -42.4 -69.4 -4.0 -5.3 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.9 1.4 4.4 4.7 4.9

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031

Revenues 7.4 7.6 7.9 8.1 8.3 8.5 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.7 8.8 8.9

Residual values 130.6

TOTAL FINANCIAL INFLOWS 7.4 7.6 7.9 8.1 8.3 8.5 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.7 8.8 139.5

Local contribution




Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3

Total Operating Costs 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3

TOTAL FINANCIAL OUTFLOWS 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3

NET CASH FLOW 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.9 6.1 3.5 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.5 137.1

Discount rate 5.0%

FNPV (K) -78

FRR (K) 1.0%



Greece

Figure 18. Agiou Konstantinou bypass – Greece. Financial sustainability (€m, 2000

prices) – High case


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

EU Grant 0.1 0.5 2.0 0.9 7.2 31.2 24.9 40.7 4.4 5.4 0.2

Local contribution




Operating subsidies

FINANCIAL RESOURCES 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Passenger vehicles

Goods vehicles

TOTAL REVENUES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL INFLOWS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Land 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.3 2.8 12.0 9.6 15.7 1.7 2.1 0.1

Roadworks 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.4 3.4 14.6 11.6 19.0 2.1 2.5 0.1

Tunnals 0.2 0.7 2.9 1.2 10.3 44.4 35.5 58.1 6.3 7.7 0.3

Constructions 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.4 3.1 13.2 10.6 17.3 1.9 2.3 0.1

TOTAL INVESTMENTS COSTS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3


TOTAL OUTFLOWS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 14.2 16.9 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3

NET CASH FLOW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -5.0 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3

CUMULATED CASH FLOW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.3 -4.6 -7.0 -9.3 -11.6 -13.9 -16.2 -18.6 -23.5 -25.9 -28.2 -30.5

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031

EU Grant

Local contribution




Operating subsidies

FINANCIAL RESOURCES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Passenger vehicles

Goods vehicles

TOTAL REVENUES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL INFLOWS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Land

Roadworks

Tunnals

Constructions

TOTAL INVESTMENTS COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3


TOTAL OUTFLOWS 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3

NET CASH FLOW -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -5.0 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3

CUMULATED CASH FLOW 0.0 -2.3 -4.6 -7.0 -9.3 -11.6 -16.6 -18.9 -21.2 -23.5 -25.9 -28.2



Greece

agiou konstantinou bypass

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