agonism and security

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CENTRE OFINTERNATIONALRELATIONS

Creating Space forEmancipatory Human Security:

Liberal Obstructions and thePotential of Agonism

Jen Peterson

CIR Working Paper Number 51September 2009



Under review for publication, please do not quote without author’s permission

1CIR Working Paper No. 51

To negate the political does not make it disappear,

it only leads to bewilderment in the face of its manifestationsand to impotence in dealing with them

(Mouffe, 1993: 140)

Abstract

The human security agenda, as currently operationalized by the majority of powerful states andinstitutions, exhibits a distinct liberal character, simultaneously contributing to and legitimizingthe dominant liberal peacebuilding approach. As such, there has been a crowding out ofalternative conceptions of human security, including those which focus on emancipation. Thislatter approach to human security offers a more transformative vision through its focus onissues such as hegemony, power and freedom. Paths to such forms of human security haveyet to materialize, largely due to the characteristics of a liberal-internationalist approach whichhas narrowed the political space in which challenges to the status quo can be imagined andrealized. In its failure to allow for a genuine plurality of voices and in its insistence on creatingfalse consensus, liberal peacebuilding blocks the emancipatory promise of a genuine shift fromstate to human security. A potential starting point for imagining alternatives to liberalpeacebuilding and thus the creation of emancipatory forms of human security is to consider therole and possibilities for agonistic modes of politics and peacebuilding. Transforming inevitabledifferences that are part of human society into agonistic relationships—where differences existand are negotiated amongst adversaries (as opposed to enemies), opens up the political spacerequired to challenge dominant liberal approaches to human security and enables a shifttowards the emancipatory model.



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2 Creating Space for Emancipatory Human Security

Introduction

Broadly speaking, current work on thetheory and practice of peacebuilding tends tofollow one of two tracks. The first appears toaccept the underlying premise of an orthodoxversion of the liberal peace and focuseseither on the means by which some of thenegative, short term impacts of peacebuildingpractice can be reduced, or on increasing theefficiency of already existing processes. Thisbody of work, while accepting theimperfections of the liberal system,nonetheless appears committed to it as anideal, arguing that the failings of liberalpeacebuilding can be found in themechanisms through which it is delivered—aresequencing or reprioritizing of processes,often with increased levels of ‘localparticipation’, is presented as a potentialsolution to the failings of this project. Analternative track is taken by those whoquestion the underlying theoretical premises,norms and values of the liberal peacebuildingproject as it currently exists. Here, greaterattention is paid to the role of power, ideologyand hegemony. Solutions to the failings ofpeacebuilding are thus seen as requiring aconfrontation between powers, and thecreation of direct challenges to thehegemonic practices of liberal peacebuilding.

This paper travels along the second pathand seeks to challenge the ways in which thehuman security agenda is bothconceptualised and operationalised in currentpeacebuilding missions. Adopting thelanguage of Critical Security Studies (CSS),working towards human security will be seenas an emancipatory project which focuses onconflict transformation as opposed to meremitigation or resolution. In taking thisperspective, the author confronts a supposed‘impasse’ in security studies generally andthe peacebuilding literature specifically,namely that while a move towards a more‘transformative’ and ‘emancipatory’ approachis required, the practice and possibility forsuch a shift remains somewhat ambiguous

(Richmond, 2007b; Woodhouse andRamsbotham, 2005: 152). This papercontributes to resolving such ambiguity. Itargues that in order to move towards anemancipatory state of human security, thedominance and hegemony of liberalpeacebuilding must be challenged. Critiquesreveal that liberalism is itself a system whichrestricts the political space needed to makesuch challenges. Therefore, in order todirectly challenge liberalism, political spacesmust be opened, expanded. The concept ofagonism will be presented as a device forimagining how political space can be alteredin such a way as to challenge the dominanceof liberalism and thus the hegemony of adysfunctional mode of peacebuilding whichprevents the realization of emancipatoryhuman security.

Defining, critiquing and (re) engagingwith Human Security

Commonly defined as “prioritizing thesecurity of people rather than states”(Duffield, 2007: 111) by creatingenvironments where individuals exist in astate of ‘freedom from want’ and a ‘freedomfrom fear’ (Acharya, 2001: 443), humansecurity is often portrayed as a critical turn ininternational security theory and practice.With security traditionally approached interms of the protection of states and theirborders from external military threats, thegrowth of the human security agenda hasbeen portrayed as a major paradigm shift.Emerging in the mid to late 1990s, theconcept quickly became a central policy focusof many western governments (most notablyin Canada and Japan), multilateralorganizations as well as both internationaland local NGOs. Recently, there has beendebate over whether human security couldprovide a useful framework for the creation ofa common EU foreign policy (Kaldor, Martinand Selchow, 2007; Matlary, 2008) andwhether this could potentially be enforcedthrough some form of EU ‘Human Security





Response Forces’ (Vankovska, 2007). It is aconcept that has spawned countless

international meetings, commissions andreports and has been fundamental inmovements toward the creation of aninternational legal norm of a ‘Responsibility toProtect’, which would formalize and legalizethe right of the international community todefend the security of citizens when their ownstates fail to do so (for a good review of thehistory of human security see Acharaya,2001; Bain, 2001 and Duffield, 2007).

A seminal article by Canada’s formerMinister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy,

justifies a shift towards human security:Security traditionally has focused onthe state because its fundamentalpurpose is to protect its citizens.Hobbled by economic adversity, outrunby globalization, and undermined fromwithin by bad governance, the capacityof some states to provide thisprotection has increasingly come intoquestion. This capacity is particularlyobvious in war-torn societies. The statehas, at times, come to be a major threat

to its populations’ rights and welfare....This drives us to broaden the focus ofsecurity beyond the level of the stateand toward individual human beings, aswell as to consider the appropriateroles for the international community(Axworthy, 2001: 19).

Following this logic, human security hasbeen operationalised in two distinct, thoughcomplimentary ways. The first, which somebelieve has been adopted by the Canadiangovernment, maintains a focus on protectingindividuals in zones of active conflict andobvious threats to the physical security ofcitizens in weak or failing states. While theindividual becomes the central referent actor,the focus remains (primarily) on theprotection of individuals in times of insecurityand war. A broader approach, taken bystates including Japan and institutions such

as the UNDP, adopts a more holistic stancewhich emphasizes “the interrelatedness of

different types of security and the importanceof development, in particular, as a securitystrategy” (Kaldor, 2007: 183). Under thissecond perspective, human security becomesalmost synonymous with internationaldevelopment and poverty reduction. Humansecurity becomes a focus in times of violentconflict but also in instances where countriesare at peace. While distinct, both of theseapproaches can be categorized as a liberal-operational approach in that actors seek topromote human security via current

international mechanisms and institutionswhich operate under a liberal paradigm. i Both approaches largely concentrate onstrengthening and creating regimes such asthe Antipersonnel Landmines Treaty or theRome Statute (which is the basis for theInternational Criminal Court). The focusremains on concrete operational issues anddilemmas such as coordination betweencivilian and military actors (Hasegawa, 2007;Hataley and Nossal, 2004), or making alreadyexisting foreign policy and international

arrangements more ‘human security focused’(Glasius, 2006; Kaldor, Martin and Selchow,2007). While both attempt to expand thenotion of security to some degree, neitherdirectly challenge the ideologies andstructures which have facilitated and in asense tolerated international, national andhuman insecurity. Human security is thus nottreated as an issue unto itself, but remainslinked to traditional notions of security whichfocus on overt physical violence, and the roleof the state in contributing to or preventingsuch violence— human and orthodox securityare seen as intrinsically linked andconsidered ‘mutually supportive’ (King andMurray, 2001/02: 590). This does notrepresent a grand shift in security thinking,but rather an acceptance that current securityconcerns, while problematic for nation-statesand the international system, can also havea negative impact on individuals—therefore



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policies should be put in place to protectindividuals from the dangers of state andinternational insecurity. The focus remainson fine tuning already existing internationalsecurity relations in an attempt to protectindividuals from the destructiveness of stateinsecurity. In these cases, human securitydoes not actually represent a new securityagenda or paradigm, but rather an affirmationof already existing security approaches withthe addition of protection for individuals. It istherefore argued that in their adoption ofhuman security, “policy-makers are inclinedto graft it onto an existing, more traditionalsecurity agenda” (Kerr, Tow and Hanson,2003: 93) as opposed to actuallyreconceptualising the meaning of securityitself or entirely reformulating theirapproaches to achieving security. ii

Besides the concern that the humansecurity agenda does not actually representanything entirely ‘new’ in the field of peaceand security studies, one finds a moreconcerning and, for the purposes of thisarticle, most relevant arguments, namely thatthe (ab)use of the human security discourseserves to reinforce dominant power relationsand structures within the international systemand is therefore paradoxically itself a threat tohuman security. Through the human securitydiscourse a multitude of ‘new’ threats havebeen identified by the worlds more powerfulstates and institutions, with the same actorsthen positioning themselves as the mostcapable of resolving said threats. Thisreinforces and in many way increases thepower of these actors over weaker states andindividuals in the international system. Thecentral means through which this power ismanifest and legitimized is through linking theconcept of human security to practices ofliberal peacebuilding. The language andconcerns found within the former arecongruent with the stated aims andprocesses of the latter. Both focus on povertyalleviation through access to markets, thenecessity for formal elections, and individualfreedom. Indeed, liberal peacebuilding usesthe rhetoric of human security quite explicitlyto justify the need for their programming. Of

course, there is nothing entirely new aboutthis technique. The threat posed by povertyand human suffering has long been used to

justify security policies of states andinternational actors. As Duffield argues,using poor human development as a

justification for security and controlmechanisms is a centuries old strategy— “while appearing to be new [human security]is... a view of security that can be found innineteenth-century fears of social breakdownas well as the claimed link between povertyand communism at the time ofdecolonization” (Duffield, 2007: 115). Whilethe existence of poor or otherwisedisenfranchised group has historically led toadvancements in social planning andhumanitarian initiatives, there is an equallystrong history of linking the poor and‘underprivileged’ so threats such as crime,deviance, communism and now terrorismwhich in turn influences and legitimizespolicies to ‘deal with’ these groups. Clearly,the promotion of human security has bothhistorically and in current times serves as away of legitimizing mechanisms of dominanceand control. Political systems which appearto oppose liberalism, or which threaten thestatus quo in the international system arelabelled as dangerous, requiring a strongresponse which in turn grants dominantactors even greater power.

This greater power stems from the realitythat through the rhetoric and growth of thehuman security agenda, creating securitynow requires actors to make fundamentalchanges to entire socio-political systems.Reactions to insecurity, once focused simplyon protecting state borders from externalmilitary threats, now includes intervention inthe economic, socio-cultural and biologicalprocesses as they relate to individuals andcommunities. Health care and educationpolicies (including interventions intocurriculum and the writing of text books),cultural exchanges, legal reform—these arenow all legitimate avenues for intervention asthey serve to promote human security. Andwhile improving access to health andeducation or facilitating inter-ethnic dialogue





are not in and of themselves problematic— that they are now unproblematically

considered part of the security agenda is, asit increases the level of control of externalactors over communities and societieswithout any democratic process or clearaccountability between the interveners andthose being intervened upon. This isarguably a new form or imperialism or neo-colonialism. Such critiques can be linked tothe work on securitization which argues thatby positioning an issue as a security problemthe “democratic processes of consultationand accommodation and the legitimate

expression of dissent give way to a climate ofurgency that facilitates recourse to‘extraordinary measures’, such as increasesin executive power, secrecy and, ultimately,the threat and use of military force” (Ewan,2007: 186). Once something is labelled a‘security threat’ (such as poverty, genderdiscrimination or inadequate health care)rapid and often undemocratic policies can bepushed through without facing the thought,scrutiny and standard of public debate thatone would normally expect in relation to

major policy initiatives and militaryundertakings. In other words, even moreproblematic than its tendency to confirm orreproduce dominant views and practices ofsecurity is that human security has also hadthe effect of deepening and widening orthodox practices of security. It has createda discourse and thus a justification for moreinvasive forms of intervention, allowingexternal actors to involve themselves in thevery personal and even biological processeswhich support life. Pupavac (2005) uses theanalogy of ‘therapeutic governance’ todescribe these processes, contributing tosimilar critiques which suggest that thehuman security agenda is a form of ‘bio-power’ (Duffield, 2007), evidence of agrowing ‘bio-political tyranny’ (Duffield andWaddell, 2006: 20) which uses the altruisticrhetoric found within the human securitydiscourse to mask or legitimize

interventionist, neo-colonial and imperialistactivities.

In the case of Canada, for example, it issuggested that the adoption of a humansecurity approach has legitimized practices of“Boy Scout Imperialism” (Hataley and Nossal,2004: 9, quoting Hay, 2000). As a middlepower with little ability to impose its valuesthrough military means, this country hasadopted the human security agenda, at leastin part, to increase its power and influenceover global affairs. Political ambitions andinterests can be masked and legitimized to itsdomestic population and abroad by speaking

in the altruistic language of human security. Again, Canada’s insistence that itsinvolvement in Afghanistan is largely ahumanitarian intervention based on the needto protect Afghan civilians from actors suchas the Taliban, terrorists, warlords and drugsmugglers acts as an example of the rhetoricof human security being used to mask orlegitimize a deep, intrusive and often violentmode of intervention and control. While thereare undoubtedly positive outcomes in termsof the protection of individuals stemming from

many of Canada’s activities in Afghanistan,its national security interests, itscommitments to its most important ally and toNATO remain as the central driving forces inits willingness to protect human security in

Afghanistan. The use of the concept ofhuman security in this way is paradoxically athreat to human security as it justifiesviolence (sometimes physical, but alsostructural in its tendency to justifyunaccountable forms of dominance). Afurther example of this is illustrated by Bonner(2008) who critiques the use of the concept ofhuman security in Argentina given thehistorical (mis)use of the concept of ‘securitythreat’. The notion of citizen security there,similar to the notion of human security, hasbeen used to justify harsh responses from thestate and security apparatus against citizenswhen issues were deemed ‘securityconcerns’. This included increases in police



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violence, the targeting of the poor as potentialcriminals and the occupation of poorneighbourhoods by the police (Bonner, 2008:22). iii Another example of this problem canbe found in the case of Kosovo, where thecombined forces of the world’s most powerfulmilitaries were used to wage a violentcampaign in the name of Kosovan-Albanianhuman security. Further, the eight yearinternational mission that followed grantedinternational administrators completeexecutive power, which allowed internationalsto control nearly all aspects of economic andpolitical life. The control over the judiciary,security services, privatization process,borders and the funding of reconstruction anddevelopment programs by UNMIK and thecast of international actors who haveattempted to rebuild Kosovo, now in thename of human security for Kosovans of allethnicities, can be seen as a form ofdominance over domestic institutions, groupsand individuals—a limiting of freedom throughforeign executive control. Especially pertinentto this discussion is the reality that despiteinitial ‘acceptance’ of such control (at least onthe part of part of the Albanian population),increasing and ongoing dissatisfaction withthe international mission weakens andundermines the ‘human security’ justificationfor international actions. In the latter phasesof the mission we witness (sometimes violent)frustration with the UN by a large proportionof the population including the Albanianmajority (satisfaction levels dropped fromnearly 65% at the end of 2002 to less than30% by the end of 2004 [UNDP Kosovo2009]). Growing discontent by the majority

Albanian population who initially supportedthe NATO and UN missions is mirrored bycontinued feelings of resentment andfrustration over such control by other ethnicgroups in the area as well as the Serbianstate who still argue for their sovereignty overthe territory. This all reveals that what the UNand other actors portray as protecting andpromoting human security, has actually beenperceived as another form of dominance by arange of key stakeholders in the region.Frustration over the lack of accountability

between internationals and locals, the realand perceived class imbalances betweenthese two groups and the stifling ofdiscontented voices through crackdowns ondissident groups such as Vetevendosje expose flaws in the human securityargument. One form of dominance has beenreplaced with another. And while the era ofcontrol presided over by the internationalcommunity has proven to be considerablyless physically violent—levels of violencebetween Serbs and Albanians have beendrastically reduced since the immediate pre-conflict phase under Milosevic’s rule, theinternational mission has not vastly improvedthe lives, the human security, of Kosovans.

All ethnic communities continue to suffer fromrates of unemployment unseen in North

America and Western Europe—41.4%overall and 60.5% for women in 2005 (UNDPKosovo, 2007: 20). Nearly 44% still live inpoverty (ibid, 7), and freedom of movementfor many minorities living in ethnic enclavesremains limited, all despite one of the largestand most well funded humanitarian cumdevelopment missions since the MarshallPlan. While some might suggest that theplans to bring human security to the people ofKosovo are simply operationally flawed orpoorly implemented, given the expertise andhard work of both the domestic andinternational staff on the ground it is perhapsmore feasible to argue that the explanationrests more generally with the dominanthuman security approach adopted by theinternational community. Issues such asresolving unemployment, inequality in thedistribution of wealth between ethnic groupsand genders was never the primary goal ofthe intervention, and thus staffers on theground have never been fully equipped orgranted the flexibility that would allow analternative form of human security to bepursued. With the establishment of regionalstability and physical security the penultimateaim, even the limited goals of the liberalhuman security agenda are pushed to thebackground and new forms of humaninsecurity in the form of external control andnon-democratic processes are utilized.





While discussions such as those offeredabove are valuable in term of their analysis of

the current use of the human securityagenda, revealing both its practical andpolitical flaws, these critiques stand up wellonly in their application to the narrow liberal-operational approach to human security.While some rightly critique human security asa rhetorical device used by dominant westernliberal powers to impose, sometimesviolently, a narrow vision of peace, othersseek to rescue, or (re)engage with theconcept—arguing that many of the critiqueswrongly ignore the normative concerns and

emancipatory potential of the concept and itsconcomitant agenda (Bellamy andMacDonald, 2002: 373). While humansecurity is most visible in the way it has beendefined and acted upon by mostly western,powerful states and institutions, otherversions or perspectives on human securityremain as useful analytical tools in imaginingand creating alternative approaches toalleviating violence, both physical andstructural (Galtung, 1969). These alternativeperspectives on human security can be

loosely categorized as emancipatoryapproaches (Richmond, 2007a; Bastian,2004) and consider progress towards humansecurity as being achieved through “‘thefreeing of people (as individuals and groups)from the physical and human constraintswhich stop them carrying out what they wouldfreely choose to do’” (Richmond, 2008: 131quoting Booth, 1991). In terms of theterminology that is used, this approach tohuman security actually appears quite similarto the liberal-operational approach, the keydifference being that the emancipatoryperspective recognizes that the verystructures which claim to further individual(human) security and development mayactually be a form of ‘bio-political tyranny’(Duffield and Waddell, 2006) insofar as theliberal approach justifies deep and invasivecontrol in the name of human security. Underthis emancipatory perspective, the

dominance of the liberal peacebuildingagenda and their abuse of the term ‘human

security’ would itself be seen as a threat toindividuals’ security.The emancipatory approach addresses

issues which are lacking in the liberal-operational approach to human securityincluding the questioning of powerasymmetries between and within states aswell as the negative impact of markets(Bastian, 2004: 411). It also escapes severalconceptual and ethical problems associatedwith the dominant approach. For example, itneed not fall prey to accusations that human

security privileges the individual over thegroup, or homogenizes differences betweenhumans (Hudson, 2005) as both groups(social and political communities to which allhumans belong) and a plurality of individualvoices are granted space in an emancipatoryproject. Further while the dominant approachcan be seen as having a western cum liberalbias, the emancipatory approach can be seenas universally applicable (in a pluralistic, nothomogenizing liberal sense)—it need not relyon western values and norms as the

dominant liberal approach has done. Whatis universal about the emancipatory approachis that all individuals are perceived as havingthe right to define human security—whatsecurity is and more importantly how it isachieved is neither prescribed nor dominatedby a single actor or ideology. Insertingnotions of power, ideology and hegemonyinto the concept and therefore plans ofaction, the emancipatory approach can beseen as superior to the liberal view of humansecurity. It requires combating all forms ofinsecurity—the range physical, economic,social, political and ideological constraints towhich humans are subjected. It is thereforeargued that this emancipatory approach tohuman security offers possibilities andopportunities for building peace which do notfall prey to the homogenizing, self-interestedand at times destructive liberal approach to



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human security—which is both ineffective andoften itself a security threat.

Impeding emancipator humansecurity: The apoli tical approach ofliberalism.

Despite the conceptual and normativevalue of the emancipatory version of humansecurity, the liberal-operational approach hasemerged as the most dominant. The reasonsfor this relate to the strength of the liberalpeace discourse which has become theprima facie foundation for current modes ofintervention in weak and failing states. Inorder to understand how liberalism impedesthe growth of the emancipatory humansecurity approaches, a brief discussion of thegrowth, dominance and character of liberalpeacebuilding is required. A concept found inclassical liberal theory (see Paris, 2004 for agood review and history) the notion of ‘liberalpeace’ was “rediscovered in the 1980s”(Paris, 2004: 37) and grew to become theprevailing model of intervention in postconflict states from the 1990s onwards, notcoincidently, roughly the same time as theemergence of the concept ‘human security.Since this time, different manifestations ofliberalism have been identified. Within therealm of liberal peace implementation forexample, Richmond identifies fourgraduations, from hyper-conservative throughto an ‘emancipatory’ form of liberalism— which has yet to be practiced (2007b: 217-218). While different in the ways they areimplemented and their sustainability in termsof bringing an end to physical violence, thesedifferent liberalisms rest on similar ideologicalvalues and foundations. Regardless of thespecificities of implementation, in all modes ofliberal peacebuilding the focus remains onability of the individuals to reach a non-violentconsensus through rational deliberation. Thefoundations of all of these modes remains onindividual freedom (both in terms of politicsand economics), rationality and consensus.Even the ‘emancipatory’ notion of liberalismignores or at least forces to the background

other facets of human society such ascollective identities or what liberals mightclassify as ‘irrationality’. The adoption of thetheoretical premises of liberalism byinternational development and security actorshas translated into what some refer to as a‘peacebuilding consensus’ (Richmond,2007b) whereby a broad and generalagreement has emerged between powerfulliberal states, multi-lateral organization andNGOs regarding the nature of and means forachieving peace.

This peacebuilding consensus and theresultant governance depends on thirdparties imposing the choice of integration viavery specific qualifying moves (the adoptionof free markets, elections, human rights andso on) on all disputants. Actors which failto accept this become economically andpolitically excluded (Richmond, 2004: 144).

International order has come to be governedby a particular set of policies, guided byliberal principles which are seen as the surestpath to peace and security. However, as withhuman security, there has been a substantialcritical response to the emergence anddominance of liberal peacebuilding (Cooper,2005; Duffield, 2001; Pugh, 2007; Richmond,2008).

Amongst these critiques, one finds arather potent concern regarding a coreassumption of liberalism that is central tounderstanding stagnation in movementstowards emancipation. This critique, comingfrom those in the post-structural traditionnotes that that with the emergence of aunipolar (uni-ideological) world, we havebeen left with “the illusion that we can finallydispense with the notion of antagonism”(Mouffe, 1993: 2). In the present era thevalue of difference and of contestation havebeen made to disappear and replaced with abelief that we have reached a ‘consensus’(note the congruence with the peacebuildingliterature) in regards to the ideal modes ofhuman or social organization. Liberalpeacebuilding and liberalism in general now“depends on evacuating the dimension of thepolitical and conceiving the well ordered





society as exempt from politics....Allcontroversial issues are taken off the agenda

in order to create the conditions for a ‘rational’consensus” (Mouffe, 1993: 139-140). Asnoted earlier, those who attempt to reinjectthe political by questioning the status quo arepunished. They are marginalizedeconomically and politically, in someoccasions suffering formal rebukes throughdiplomatic measures or sanctions but also inmore subtle ways through exclusion tointernational forums and debates or aninability to attract funding from major donors.Thus, it is not accidental that organizations

lack the capacity to integrate politics, orchallenge dysfunctional hegemonic practices. Actors who engage in peacebuilding operatein a system in which questioning the statusquo and the ideological foundations on whichit exists is neither encouraged nor tolerated.Opening up channels of political debate orcreating mechanisms which would increasethe scope for alternatives leads to exclusionfrom and by powerful international politicaland economic communities.

This intolerance to deviation is

problematic on at least two front in relationsto furthering the goals of human security.First, the unwillingness to allow for realdisensus and difference in the political realmleads to tangible increases in humaninsecurity. When there is insistence on theremoval of antagonisms, the outcome is oftenmore violence. Differences cannot simply beremoved, they remain, and more importantly,because they are given no ‘outlet’ in formalmodes of liberal governance and institutions,they manifest themselves in dangerous andoften violent ways. Liberal institutions, notset up to internalize and integrate suchantagonisms are thus incapable of managingthese manifestations, representing a ‘fatal’contradiction within the liberal peacebuildingagenda. ‘Fatalities’, brought about byliberalism’s fixation with order andconsensus, are illustrated in many of theapproaches to development and post-conflict

programming seen across the globe—where“despite evidence of increased global

inequality and the acknowledgement ofenvironmental problems associated with‘development’ in international political circles,neo-liberal globalisation continues to berepresented as though there is no viablepolitical-economic alternative” (Langley andMellor, 2002: 49). The same policies, oftenwith ‘fatal’ outcomes continue to be useddespite consistent evidence of the harmsassociated with such policies. Failures areblamed on poor implementation, corruptofficials, a lack of proper monitoring or other

such externalities. The core beliefs whichguide of liberal practices are rarely called intoquestion much less altered. This inability orunwillingness to respond to seriouscontradictions within the liberal approach canbe characterized as paralysis which inhibitsactors considering or implementingalternatives with the eventual impact ofineffective or even counterproductive policy.

At the root of this paralysis is the reality thatthe homogeneity desired and required by aconsensus based model does not and

arguably can not exist. The heterogeneity ofvalues, systems and relationships in theglobal sphere clearly requires that alternative(and perhaps competing) approaches beconsidered, however, we are currently facedwith a mode of peacebuilding that denies this.The result is policies and programs that notonly fail to address all forms of insecurityincluding human insecurity, but also have thepotential to paradoxically make mattersworse. Such ‘fatalities’ are well evidenced incurrent peacebuilding strategies. The de-Baathification process in Iraq, and theunwillingness by some to involve Taliban inthe reconstruction of Afghanistan reveal aninability or unwillingness to consider the rolefor alternative, albeit highly problematic,voices in the building of peace. While notdenying the atrocities committed by either ofthese groups, the failure to at least engage



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can be seen as fatal to peacebuilding andthus its goal of furthering human security.

While these fatalities can increase humaninsecurity by inducing increased levels ofviolence or inequality within society, a secondand even greater threat to the potential ofpursuing emancipatory humans security canbe identified—namely liberalism’s tendency toforeclose political space. This danger relatesto the aforementioned fact that whileliberalism as an ideology promotes freedomand diversity, it does so in a very narrow wayand is actually opposed to a genuine pluralityof voices and positions. Liberalism argues forequality and in turn attempts to remove thepossibility for difference and deviation. Itpresents itself as a neutral, objective andmost importantly, rational, model for social,political and economic organization meaningthat those who oppose it are inherentlyirrational and thus dangerous. “Difference isnot included, rather it is erased, andpopulations are included in the liberal projectinsofar as they are, or are made, the same.”(Long, 2006: 216). Peace is seen asstemming from consensus and violent conflictarises from disensus. The ultimate goaltherefore becomes one of homogenization ofvalues and systems. However, theallowance for difference and deviation isimperative for an emancipatory approach tohuman security—as at the root of thisapproach is the ability to confront andquestion power, to challenge structures,contest their makeup and negotiate newrelationships. Thus, the possibility forworking towards an emancipatory project ofhuman security is limited by liberalpeacebuilders intolerance for difference andby the willingness of actors who aim topromote and install liberalism to,paradoxically, act illiberally to ensure thedominance of their system (Duffield, 2007;Martin, 2006). What liberal peacebuildingrepresents is a closure and diminishing ofdebate over the nature and path towardspeace—under this paradigm “the politicalterrain of post-intervention is one ofnarrowing and closure” (Duffield, 2007: 29).This represents the opposite of what an

emancipatory approach to human securityrequires, namely a broadening and openingof political space which is capable ofaccommodating difference.

Of course, there are those that woulddefend a system which attempts to create orwork towards a standard and universallyaccepted set of rules and procedures.Working towards a global cosmopolitan ethicor system are indicative of this approach.Such a call is based on the idea thatconsensus and agreement are the only waysin which peaceful relations can be createdand solidified—disagreement and conflict areultimately divisive and lead to violence. But,actual consensus is impossible, and a focuson and desire for it is, in fact, debilitating.Mouffe, for example, argues that “the illusionof consensus and unanimity, as well as thecalls for ‘anti-politics’ should be recognized asfatal... The absence of a political frontier, farfrom being a sign of political maturity, is thesymptom of a void” (Mouffe, 1993: 5).Liberalism, with its fixation on ‘rationalconsensus’ aims to remove politicalcontestation and difference from society—attempts are made remove to controversy,conflict and disensus (antagonisms) fromsocio-political life. By refusing integratepowerful dissenting voices and by excludingthose who favour non-liberal practices,prospects for peace are weakened. A falseconsensus based on exclusion or forcedassimilation will not lead to a just andsustainable peace. Thus, what is mostdangerous in relation to liberal peacebuildingis not simply the negative, tangible impacts ofsome of structures and policies, althoughthese are certainly problematic, but theprocess of depoliticization which masks theinevitable disensus which exist within societyand the shutting out of alternatives which thisentails. Simply questioning the specificprocesses and concepts related to liberalpeacebuilding is necessary but not sufficientwhen attempting to counter this hegemonicproject. The real challenge is to considerliberalism’s power to shut out alternatives andto imagine how counter-hegemonic practices,





which create opportunities for emancipation,might be achieved.

Agonism and the possibi li ty forcounter-hegemonic space

As shown above, liberalism and liberalpeacebuilding have worked to depoliticizepublic life and strip social relations ofmeaningful differences, with potentially fataloutcomes including threats to humansecurity. What this author will furtherdemonstrate is that within such critique existsa potential solution to the technocratic and

hegemonic processes of liberalpeacebuilding, one that could allow for theemergence of an emancipatory version ofhuman security. Work stemming from poststructural analyses of liberalism, particularlywork on the concept of agonism, can be usedto consider the ways in which the barrierscreated by liberal hegemony can beovercome. Some will resist or question theuse of post-structural thought in this regard.Generally considered a tool of critique it is notmeant to offer a set of principles to guide

policies. In this regard, the conceptual toolsof post-structural thought appear at odds withmuch of what is found in Critical SecurityStudies (CSS) where we find the basis for anotion of emancipatory human security. Thisis especially true when we consider calls bysome elements of CSS for the creation of‘concrete utopias’ (Jones, 2005). Yet, thereis an overlap in these analytical schools, withboth CSS and post-structuralism calling intoquestion dominant norms and ideologies andwith both exploring the concept of and

possibilities for ‘counter hegemonic forces’.While scholars such as Mouffe havehistorically worked towards moving the leftaway from the dogmatic and hegemonicaspects of Marxism, so too do elements ofCSS attempt to move us away from thehegemony of another ideology, liberalism. Ofcourse there are differences between theseapproaches. Many elements of CSS are

outwardly and unashamedly normative, someinvoking notions of a ‘universal good’ or

‘progress’—concepts which post-structuralistthought tend to resist due to their reliance ona belief of an objective or natural truth.However, progress narratives are not entirelyabsent in this tradition—“an idea of progressinforms poststructuralist arguments more sothan is generally recognized” (Booth, 2005:264). Mouffe herself calls for “democracy tobe radicalized” through the creation of newdiscourses and institutions (Mouffe, 2005:33). Laclau has likewise integrated a‘progressive’ notion of emancipation (Jones,

2005) into his work and Glynos (2003)integrates the work of both Mouffe and Zizekto show the notion of a radical democraticethos could be realized. This suggests thatdespite claims that neither CSS or post-structuralist thought are ‘policy relevant’ theydo both in fact share a common goal ofcreating counter-hegemonic discourses andalso contain a notion of progress. Thecritiques offered by these schools of thoughtare not merely tools for deconstruction, butalso contain the foundations for the

construction of new paradigms and concretepractices. One set of concepts specifically,the notion of antagonism versus agonismoffers insights into such alternatives. It setsout ideas and mechanisms that would allowfor political space to be opened and re-imagined, providing an avenue through whichwe can conceive of an alternative toliberalism’s firm grip over the practices ofhuman security

Creating Space For Counter HegemonicPractices: The Role Of Disensus And

AgonismTo be clear, the call for greater political

space to further an emancipatory approach tohuman security is not concerned with factorsthat would allow or encourage more actors toadopt a liberal approach to human security(though there are many studies whichaddress this: Brysk, 2005; Fischer, 2005;



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Hataley and Nossal, 2004; Kerr, Tow andHanson, 2003). Nor is it concerned withsimply increasing the role for civil societyactors, as in their current forms, these actorstend to support the status quo, themechanisms of liberal peacebuilding whichare actually the technology through whichspace is controlled and narrowed. Neithershould the call for increased political spaceand pluralism be confused or equated withsimply increasing the inclusion of lesspowerful groups in already existingstructures. This would be little more than aform of ‘flat pluralism’ which does nothing toredefine or expand political spaces (Wenman,2003). A plurality voices constrained withina narrow formulaic space does little topromote the systemic change that wouldallow for emancipatory processes to occur. Aheterogeneity of voices within a homogenoussystem can not alter the status quo.

Alternatively, the call to open up spaces foremancipation via agonistic processesdescribe below adopts a more flexibleconceptualization of space, bound neither bygeography, already existing institutions orideological dominance. While alreadyexisting actors will such as states, civilsociety and individuals would ‘populate’ thisspace the nature and parameters of theirengagement would be altered.

Countering the hegemony of liberalism andits tendency to minimize and narrow thepolitical space in which alternatives can beimagined and negotiated requires adoptingmechanisms which support and facilitateagonism. In brief, this requires actors tobegin distinguishing between “‘antagonism’(relations between enemies) and ‘agonism’(relations between adversaries) andenvisaging a sort of ‘conflictual consensus’providing a common symbolic space amongopponents who are considered ‘legitimateenemies’” (Mouffe: 2005: 52). Whileantagonisms will always exist—contra liberalperceptions and desires, the negativeimpacts of difference can be managed andtransformed when they are reconceptualisedas agonisms—here, diversity and conflict is

voiced, explored and tolerated. Agonisticpolitics counter the liberal project insofar as“conflict rather than consensus serves as thebasis for social and political renewal” (Martin,2006: 205, referring to the work of Gobetti,1995). A shift from consensus to disensusserves as a way of preventing the prevalenceof ‘fatalities’ discussed earlier, potentiallyreducing the possibility of antagonismserupting in dysfunctional ways (such asthrough violence) as competing groups areoffered alternative avenues for participation inglobal society. However, movement towardsan agonistic approach offers an even greateradvantage in terms of creating moreemancipatory paths to human security,namely the transformation of political spacethat occurs through such an approach. Thecollision of difference through agonisticprocesses potentially allows for somethingunique, new and perhaps (currently)unimaginable to emerge. It is not just aboutthe blending of competing views, butemergent properties stemming from suchconfrontations. When dissenting viewsengage in open confrontation, the emergent(unpredictable) outcomes alter the size andnature of political space allowing for thepossibility of unconsidered practices, policies,relationships or institutions. Thisunpredictability is of course a cause forconcern to some, especially those operatingunder a liberal paradigm where security isdefined as stability. However, givenmounting evidence regarding the flaws ofcurrent liberal peacebuilding approaches,alternatives are clearly required

But what is involved in this process ofagonism—does the current liberal system notalready allow for the inclusion and toleranceof competing positions? To a degree, yes.Liberalism contains elements of toleration forwhat can be included in political debate. Butwhat is to be tolerated in politics is limited toliberal ideals. Peaceful political and socialorder is based on a specific notion of‘rationality’ that is very narrowly conceived.Such rationality, and thus what is to betolerated in the political sphere does not allowfor what Mouffe (2005) refers to as ‘passions’,





peoples’ desires, fantasies, and attachments(Langley and Mellor, 2002). ‘Passions’ might

include but would not be limited to spiritualbeliefs, ethnicity, or class identity. Underagonism, such ‘passions’ would not beexcluded— positions based on passionswould not be deemed illegitimate/irrationaland actors who hold these positions andattempt to include them in the political spherewould not be classified as the ‘enemy’. Giventhat agonism requires opponents not to beseen “as an enemy to be destroyed, but asan adversary whose existence is legitimateand must be tolerated” (Mouffe, 1993: 4), the

opponents of liberalism need to be toleratedin the public and political spheres. Thisrequires peacebuilders and intervening actorsto reconsider their characterization of a rangeof positions and practices faced in areas ofinsecurity in ways that are not alwayscongruent with the ideological foundations ofpeacebuilding. In liberal practices ‘opponents’to liberalism (illiberal practices, the primacy ofreligion, social identities, a focus on collectiveover individuals rights) are seen assomething that should be ‘destroyed’—either

literally through violence and coercion, orfiguratively by being relegated to the privateor other ‘non political’ realm (see Hoover,2001 for further discussion). For example,the standard response of liberal democraciesto religion generally and religious extremismin particular, is to invoke the public-private dichotomy: religious liberty issafeguarded in the private sphere whilst atthe same time religion has no role inpublic reason or in the design of publicinstitutions (Malik, 2008: 89-90).

A similar assessment can be made interms of historical responses to aboriginaltraditions. Ceremonies such as the Potlatch,which were practiced by several indigenoustribes in western North America, were seenas a fundamental means for redistributingwealth in their communities, contributing tointernal peace and justice. In the 19 th and20 th centuries these practices were banned

by colonial powers and successive Canadianand American governments in an

unsuccessful attempt to assimilate theaboriginal population. iv Now allowed by these‘liberal’ governments, they have nonethelessbeen relegated to the place of ‘tradition’ or‘culture’ as opposed to being taken seriouslyas a means of governance which couldreduce inequality and poverty within theremaining Aboriginal populations or evenmore broadly within society. Such social andspiritual practices were banned or removedfrom the formal political sphere in order toensure a smooth transition to the desired

vision for a future ‘Canada’ or ‘United States’.This can be usefully compared to currentexclusions of the social or religious to formalglobal political practices which seek to createa global liberal cum cosmopolitan realitythrough the destruction of the ‘enemies offreedom’.

In accepting the alternative agonisticapproach—the enemy/opponent (thingsdeemed ‘irrational’ in the liberal tradition)would not be destroyed (literally orfiguratively) but would be granted a role in the

negotiation and shaping of discourses, spaceand institutions. In relation to agonism, thismeans that ‘religion’ for example would notbe conceived of as an ‘enemy’ to bedestroyed, via relegation to the privatesphere, but rather an opponent which mustbe tolerated within the realm of the political.Class struggles would not be seen assomething to be quashed, its leader labelledas ‘leftists’, ‘socialists’ or other suchpejorative titles, but would be treated as alegitimate political movement and not merelyan enemy of the modern liberal order. Part ofthis process would involve breaking down theseemingly inescapable binaries into which theworld is often classed and recognizing thatpractices which do not mirror liberalism arenot necessarily il-liberal but simply and lessproblematically non -liberal. This agonisticprocess is much more than a utopian notionof dissenting voices all ‘agreeing to disagree’



14


or other such platitudes. It is not simply akind of Habermasian deliberative process—itinvolves an open confrontation of dissent,and the allowance for the creation ofsomething new from such confrontations. v Inaccepting these non-liberal politics, newpossibilities, such as emancipation, could beimagined and worked towards. While scepticsmight argue against the possibility of such afundamentally different approach to politics,Mouffe would counter that it “is certainly nomore unrealistic than the cosmopolitan vision.In fact, the emergence of China as asuperpower testifies that such a dynamic orpluralisation, far from being unrealistic, isalready at work” (2005: 117-118). Evidencesuggests that movements towards an as ofyet undefined post-liberal order in which thenon-liberal alternatives and liberal hegemonicorder collide is already occurring. Whethersuch collisions take the form of a violentantagonistic mode of politics or a less violentmode of agonistic relations depends largelyon the reaction of the dominant liberal actors.In sum, the political space required tochallenge the hegemonic practices andconcepts of a liberal inspired approach tohuman security, could be achieved by a shiftto agonistic politics which is premised on andfinds its strength in conflict, and not a falsebelief in consensus that characterise theliberal approach. The potential opportunitiesfor making this shift to a conflict based(agonistic) form of politics from the apolitical,consensus based liberal approach is exploredin greater detail elsewhere (Peterson, 2007),however, in general terms opportunities forincreases in and modification to the nature ofpolitical space can be created throughengagement and challenges to institutionalchannels, political discourses and specificsocial and political practices (Engberg-Pederson and Webster, 2002). vi What iscentral, regardless of strategy, is thatattempts to modify responses to insecurityadopt and value conflict over consensus.Consensus is a utopian ideal whilst disensus,a non violent mode of conflict, is not only areality but may also lead to progress as thecollision of dissenting views can lead to

unique and creative alternatives. While somemight fear that such a shift, and the openingup of political space in this way is inherentlydangerous insofar as it encourages andopens up new avenues of competition, oneshould be cognisant of the fact that it is thisvery fear itself that has made liberalinstitutions themselves incapable ofmanaging such manifestations of realcompetition . The world’s dominant liberalactors’ (states and institutions) inability to fullycomprehend or respond to manifestations ofdisensus is evidenced in their response toIslamism, the anti-globalization movementand the new ‘left’ in several Latin Americancountries. The strategy to deal with such actsof disensus through force, invasion ordemonization reveals liberalisms inability topeacefully co-exist or adapt to difference,seriously limiting the ability of this paradigmto support peace and contribute toemancipatory human security.

Overcome the limi tations ofemancipation and agonism

It has been argued that the emergence ofa more useful emancipatory approach to

human security detailed by some scholars inthe Critical Security Studies tradition, ishindered by the dominance and practices ofliberal peacebuilding, which activelydiscourage plurality and disensus— both ofwhich are needed to create and furtheremancipatory goals. Critiques of the currentliberal order, confirm that the technologies ofliberalism mitigate against the growth ofemancipatory approaches due to theirinsistence and fixation on consensus.Reliance on consensus is shown to be a fatal

weakness of liberalism as opposed to astrength. These weaknesses can arguablybe overcome through agonistic practiceswhich offer mechanisms for countering thehegemonic liberal practices that prevent thegoal of emancipatory human security frombeing achieved. However, the shift towardsan agonistic mode of peacebuilding is notstraightforward. There are several practical





and conceptual problems that prevent aneasy transition to an alternative model.

Primarily, the power and dominance of thetechnologies of liberal peacebuilding continuedue in part to the fact that the uncontestedhegemony of liberalism has resulted in an“incapacity to think politically” (Mouffe, 2005:10). Liberalism in its current form actuallydiminishes our ability to imagine alternativesto it. In order to allow for a system wherebyconflict and insecurity could be managed via agonistic processes, the ability to think andact politically is necessary—liberal hegemonyhas worked hard to strip society of this

capacity making a shift to agonism and thus apossibility for emancipatory alternatives toemerge nearly unimaginable. Politicalimagination is lacking. Despite this, actors stillhave a degree of agency and do act in waysthat counter hegemonic norms. Examples ofemancipatory progress can be found in smalldoses in Sri Lanka where the human rightsand human security discourses have beeninstrumental in challenging thecommodification of natural resources, land,labour and culture and the global debate over

the price of aids drugs (Bastian, 2004: 413).Others point to the Zapatista movement inMexico, rubber tappers in Amazon and Self-Employed Woman’s union in India as otherexamples of counter hegemonic practices(Bhavnani and Foran, 2008). And while noneof these on their own represent a powerfulcounter-hegemonic process, they do indicatethe progress and movements towardsemancipatory notions of human security thatcan be achieved when politics is based onagonism and conflict as opposed toconsensus. More research is necessary tounderstand these cases, to understand theconditions which allow actors to operate witha greater degree of agency and successfullychallenge the hegemonic practices of liberalpeacebuilding.

Another potential limitation for a shift toagonism are concerns related to moralrelativism. The concept of agonism which

calls for ‘conflictual consensus’ and differenceto be integrated and openly contested within

society, for some, verges too closely to thedangers of a moral or political position whereall views and actions are seen as potentiallylegitimate given the social construction ornorms, values, laws and culture. Indeed, it isproblematic and perhaps impossible to arguewith any degree of credibility that all voicesshould be accepted and tolerated withinsociety. Mouffe’s work on agonism helpsmanoeuvre this supposed impasse, arguingthat the agonistic process does not suggestthat one

should consider as legitimate all thedemands formulated in a givensociety…. The agonistic approach doesnot pretend to encompass alldifferences and to overcome all formsof exclusions. But exclusions areenvisaged in political and not moralterms. Some demands are excluded,not because they are declared to be‘evil’ but because they challenge theinstitutions constitutive of thedemocratic political association. To be

sure, the very nature of thoseinstitutions is also part of the agonisticdebate, but for such a debate to takeplace, the existence of a sharedsymbolic space is necessary (2005:120-121).

The debate over what is permitted inpolitical space is now ruled by morality asopposed to politics—a problematicdevelopment which again depoliticizes life byshifting the focus from what is required for asecure and just political existence to anunproductive debate concerning good versusevil. Agonistic politics reframes questionsregarding inclusion from ‘is their position rightor wrong?’ to ‘does engagement with theirpositions create opportunities for better formsof human security’. Positions and actors canstill be excluded if they do not contribute tothe debate regarding how peace can be



16


furthered, if they have no interest in furtheringthe aim of human security. However, theycan not be excluded simply because they aredeemed by some to be ‘immoral’ or ‘evil’.While they might indeed be these things, theirbeing ‘evil’ or ‘immoral’ to many is notsynonymous with ‘useless’. Engagement, atleast on a political level may be productive inthe long run, should those actors themselvesalso be willing to engage politically with theiradversaries. Indeed, calling for a reinsertionof the political and a public sphere whichaccepts and values disensus and conflictover a false hope in consensus does notequate to a world without values, norms orrules. Agonism does not call for anarchy, nordoes it allow for an equality of all voices.What it does suggest is that exclusion ispermitted in cases where actors refuse toengage in a negotiation of the rules—wherethey refuse to accept plurality and conflictover how institutions and rules will beshaped.

The shift towards an emancipatory modeof human security, which not only improvesindividuals physical well being but challengesthe international political and ideologicalstructures that allow for domination andlimitation on human agency requires afundamental modification to our approach topeacebuilding. This requisite change,however, is not congruent with thedominance of the liberal peace perspectiveand its concomitant practices. With liberalismresting on a firm and unchanging notion ofwhat is good, it wrongly assumes globalsociety can and should do withoutfundamental clashes of values andperspectives—peace being achieved throughconforming to a natural and unalterable state.To escape this, actors need to accept the

reality of and need for continuous conflictwhich entails abandoning the notion of anachievable end. A grand metanarrative doesnot exist; there is no natural end point forhuman society but a better existence can beconstructed and negotiated. In this sense,emancipation while impossible to achieve canbe furthered through the spaces createdthrough agonistic pluralism. If humansecurity remains in the operational realm ofliberal peacebuilding, the requiredtransformations of economic and politicalpower asymmetries which create andfacilitate the suffering of groups andindividuals will remain unchallenged. Thepossibility of creating the counter-hegemonicvoices which would allow for this has beenconstrained by liberalism itself which hasdecreased societies’ potential to imaginealternatives— to paraphrase Mouffe,‘negating the political has left us bewilderedand impotent’, incapable of mounting seriouschallenges to the status quo. This isproblematic given that current suggestions onhow to move towards counter hegemonic andemancipatory processes include ‘conceivingof doing the impossible’ (Glynos, 2003), and“engage[ing] in unscripted conversations....opening ourselves to the spontaneity ofunpredictable encounters” (Duffield, 2007:234). These are tall orders at a time whenpeacebuilding and human securityprogramming are so carefully scripted,monitored and controlled, but perhaps couldbe achieved if the weaknesses of theapolitical consensus based model are morefully realized and actors learn to encourage,work within and value a model which seesopportunity and progress in disensus.





i

This dominant approach to human security both theoretically and practically supports a liberalperspective of peace and thus has become a rhetorical and practical tool in the liberal peacebuildersarsenal. For a thorough review of the links between the dominant mode of human security and liberalpeacebuilding see (Richmond 2007a, Richmond, 2007b, Thomas, 2001; Willett, 2005).ii For more detailed analysis regarding the concern that there is little that is ‘new’ in the new humansecurity agenda and associated critiques see Bonner, 2008; Ewan, 2007; Hudson, 2005; Kerr, Tow andHandon, 2001; Khong, 2001; McDonald, 2002; Nuruzzaman, 2006; Paris, 2001.Similar analyses of security institutions in Berlin have been noted by Eick (2003), where crackdowns onpoor and marginalized groups were made for reasons of ‘security’.iv Of course despite attempts by colonial regimes and newly formed governments in Canada and the USto ban these practices, historical analyses has revealed challenges to such suppression by Aboriginalpopulations, offering a historical example and potential case study for the opening of political space tochallenge liberal hegemonic practices. See Miller, JR (1990).v For a full comparison and analyses of Habermasian type deliberative theories and alternativedemocratic theories based on the work of scholars such as Mouffe and Laclau, see Honig, 2007 andKapoor, 2002.vi The utility of these avenues in terms of transforming political space are influenced by the work ofthinkers such as Gramsci, 1971 and Foucault, 1976.



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