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PAGE THE GENERA

valon Hill Philosophy Part SThe TOBRUK System

When PANZERBLITZ was released in1970, everyone agreed that it was a differentkind of game It tookq uitea b it of getting usedto.Once gamers became familiar w ~ t hhe system,however, it was quickly recognized as a land-mark design. It is quite possible that TOBRUKwill have the same impact.

TOBRUK is going to be a difficult game players to master. It is a complex tactical systthat is increasinglyfa ithful, i n echnical aspeto the historical period it covers. In shoTOBRUK is engrossing-a rare adjective in tday of mass produced, one-shot games.

THE TOBRUK M RKETING PPRO CHTOBRUK is a different type of game. It i s themost "tactical" land-warfare game Avalon Hill

has ever published. Yet, it is very dissimilar t othe man- to-man type games produced by otherpublishers. I t is NOT a PANZERBLITZ in thedesert. It is a completely new system. The rulesare constructed in an innovative 'ProgrammedInstruction' method which means that the rulesare presented in discrete, self-contained mo-dules. Each module is related to one of ninescenarios. Players are instructed to read eachmodule and play the accompanying scenario instrict consecutive order. In his way, playerscanabsorb and become familiar w it h many complexrules witho ut being overwhelmed by the totalityof the en tire rules package. Since players needonly read the f irst module to begin play, they canbe involved in the first scenario 3 0 minutes afteropening the box.Besides being an innovative gameon itsow nmerits, TOBRUK attempts to bridge the gapbetween boardgamers and miniaturists. This isnot unusual since the first prototypes ofTOBRUK were essentially miniatures rulebooks. The resemblance to miniatures will notbe lost on those gamers familiar wit h both typesof gaming.

Why is TOBRUK a new design system?Because the w hole design approach is radicallydifferent from other games. This approach isessentially the same Operation Research andStatistical Analysis (ORSA) techniques as usedby the Department of Defense and privatedefense contractors (Rand, et al). What makes itunique is that it is applied retroactively to aspecific historic event. This is not so coincident-al, since Hal Hock, the man whod id the researchand developed the basic game system, justhappens to make his living doing ORSAwo rkfora private fir m contracted t o the DoD. Hal spentliterally years gathering the data and'creatingthe specific computer tools needed to synthesizethe game's combat evaluation system. Heapproached this game design as if he wassubmitting it to the Army instead of to AvalonHill. It is that precise and that accurate.

Right from the start, players will findTOBRUK a different sor t of game. There is muchless terrain tha n usual-in fact, there isn't anyPlayers create their own through the us eof fieldemplacements. Scenarios are constructed wi thforty or fifty turns-although it is rare thatgames go even half that long. There is muchmore dice rolling than most boardgamers areused to. In fact, the dice rolling is morereminiscent of TRACTICS (a popular set ofminiatuce rules) than PANZERBLITZ. But mostplayers have found that, after a few games, thedice rolling 'blends into the background',becoming a necessary evil to al low the detailedgame system to handle a wide variance inweapons performance.

TOBRUK is being marketed in a radicadifferent manner than past AH games. Basicathe game is being released in two stages. Tfirst stage is a limited PRE-PUBLICATIrelease which is being offered only to GENERsubscribers and attendees at ORIGINS I.cluded in this wil l be a special limited run of 5games which will be numbered and signedthe designers to appeal to the serious gacollectors. In the fall, the game wi ll be officiareleased in the mail order line. Hopefully, tedition will include rules revisions, expandDesigner's Notes material (some of whappears in this issue) and ne w experimenrules . Owners of the pre-publication edition cupdate their game by simply exchanging thold rules booklet for the newone . We recognizthe reality of the situation: a game containsuch a mammoth, complex, n ew systembound to require some revision and tighteninRather than rely on updating via the QuestBox, we have guaranteed the game accuracythe PRE-PLANNED issuance of an updaedition of the ru le book. Why dow e bother wthe added expense and time requirements up-dating? Because the system is simply thgood and that important.

We realize that we are opening ourselvesthe criticism that people purchasing the ppublication edition are buying a 'half-finishgame. To this w e answer a resounding 'noWhat they are buying is a uniquecollector's itewith a built-in, guaranteed modernizatimechanism. We could have waited until the fto release this title. But then, there would habeen nocollector'sedition and no immediate udating system. The whole approach is nedifferent, and hopefully quite popular. The 5autographed copies sold out within a week maili ng Vol. 12, No. 1 of the GENERAL. Waren't content to stand pat on the same old trieand-true design and marketing methods. Juding from the response to the TOBRUK specoffer you aren't either.

RE DERS RESPONSEThe Readers Response in the last iss

resulted in some interesting figures which wbe taken under advisement in considering futupotential services Avalon Hill can render GENERAL readers. Only 38%of our sample haever played wargames with miniatures. Hoever, 83% expressed an interest i n our providithem with a series of introductory miniaturrule booklets. Of those who have playeminiatures, 66% still showed an interest in AH line of m iniatures rule books. 66% were alinterested in buying reduced 8" x 10" hesheets. A resounding 80% were in favor ofA H P H I L O S O P H Y Continued on Page

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THEGENERAL PAGE

(The story of the war in the North African desert betweel.1940and 1943 s incredibly long and compl ex and becauseof this, many bo oks an d articles are available to describeit. This summary will therefore ignore the maneuvers ofthe British and Axis forces which led them to theirpositions of May 26, 1942 and concen trate on thespecific events of the next four weeks; the Battle ofGazala.)Gazala? Who has ever really heard of the Battle of Gazalabesides those who have run acr oss it in general reading orin looking for accoun ts of the Battle of El Alamein? It cansafely be said that, of all of the battles of World War 11,few have been so poorly appr eciated in importan ce as hasbeen this one. The battl e itself is not.well recorded in thehistories and its immense and far-reaching impact on thedesert war in general and especially the Battle of ElAlamein three months later (Alam Halfa ridge) is almostnever properly written into the accounts. By some, theBattle of Gazala, and not the Battle of El Alamein, isregarded as the most important single large engagementof the desert war.The reasons for this are many, but primarily consist ofthree. First, the Battle of Gazala without a doub t was themost brilliant victory of Erwin Rommel's career,although in achieving it he made some of his mostremarkable blunders. It was upon this victory thatRommel was promoted to the ran k of Field Marshal, oneof the youngest men (49) ever to reach this grade in thehistory of the German army. Never before the battle orafter was Romm el held in such regard by the German andItalian General Staffs, Hitler, and begrudgingly, theBritish most notably in. the fo rm of Winston Churchill.Second, without the occurrence of this immense victoryprecisely at this time and in this manner, the GermanHigh Command almost certainly would have successfullylaunched and completed the planned Operation Her-kules the sea and airborne invasion of Malta. As it was,the collapse of the Eighth Army on the Gazala Line andthe subsequent catastrophic fall of the strategic port ofTobruk and the capture of its huge garrison was enough

to influence Hitler to allow Rommel to push into Egypt inhopes of a quick seizure of the Suez Canal. For thispurpose, Herkules was postponed and the troops andsupplies intended for use in the operation sent toRommel's army instead. Malta remained unattackedexcept by air and served as both the staging area for theBritish El Alamein buildup and the key Royal Navy portfrom where submari ne and surface units could control theMediterranean and efficiently strangle the Afrika Korpsby sinking its supply ships sailing from Italy. The decisionby Hitler for the postponement and subsequent aband on-ment of Herkules would not have been made without theGazala victories, and it was one of the most seriousstrategic mistakes of the war.Finally, the collapse of the Gazala Line and Tobruk's fallshook the entire British Empire as nothing had sinceDunkirk. Churchill himself was shocked as severely aswhen the Japanese had sunk the battleships Prince ofWales and Repulse a t the beginning of the wa r. Hereceived the news from th e hand of President Roosevelt,while meeting with him in Washington, and his firstaction was t o ask Roosevelt directly for the Lend Lease of300 of the new Sher man tanks which were intended forequiping the American 1st Armored Division. Roose-velt's immediate answer was yes, and upon that answerthe fate of the El Alamein battle was essentially sealedbecause in addition to the 300 Sherman tanks which faroutclassed all but a few Axis vehicles, 100 self-propelledguns and massive stocks of assorted other materials wereshipped to the British without delay. No other singlefactor was more responsible for the rapid rebuilding ofthe Eighth Army than this, and with the new Shermansabsolutely dominating the battlefield, Rommel's attemptsto break through the El Alamein Line three months laterbecame in his own words, a battle without hope. AnAxis loss at Gazala, or even a less spectacular victorymight well have not produced the same response and thehistory of the desert way may have unfolded in aconsiderably different way. For these reasons, then, theBattle of Gazala was of overwhelming importance inchanging the course of the desert war.

The Gazala Battles officially began in mid-afternoonthe 26th of May, 1942, when large elements of Italian aGerman infantry with heavy artillery support assaulthe South African positions on the Gazala Li(Scenari o two in the game is based up on this action. )understand this or any of the other portions of the bathowever, it is necessary to have a limited understandingthe reasons why the Gazala Line was built by the Britishthe first place and how the Germans came to attack The Line was established in the period between the retrof the Eighth Army under German pressute out of tarea of Libya known as Cyrenaica (see map) and beginning of operatio ns in May. It was not designed toa truly effective defensive line from the outset, but rathan impenetrable shield behind which divisions could assembled for an offensive unimpeded by the Axis. Tbuil dup necessitated the establishment of huge forwasupply dumps immediately behind the line itself athro ugho ut the battle the British were restrained in actpartially because of worry that these stores would captured by the Germans, an idea which as it turns was indeed part of Rommel's plan.The line ran from Gazala and the coastline on the noalmost straight south to Bir Hacheim for a distance over 40 miles. It was manned by two Commonweadivisions, the 1st Sout h African and th e British 50whose six brigades were disposed in what came to known as boxes or defensive positions which coulddefended from any direction. One addit ional brigade, First Fre e French, was located at the line anchor pointBir Hacheim in a defensive box of such complexi ty ththe position was almost impregnable. Behind the lwere scattered various reserve forces mostly in boxes atwo full armored divisions and two armored brigadtogether containing nearly seven hundred tanks, 167which were the newly-arrived American Lend-LeaGrant's which were far superior to any Axis vehicleat tstart of the engagement. In the Tobruk fortress itself wanother full division, the Second South African reiforced by one more brigade.

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PAGE THEGENERAThe boxes of the line were marvels of defensive ingenuityand such a departure from normal British defensivepolicy that field officers from all fronts travelled toGazala to inspect them. They were surrounded by denseminefields and connected by a mine marsh of suchcomplexity (over one-half million mines) that t he area tothis day has never fully been cleared and has killed ormaimed thousands of Arabs since the end of the war.Unfortunately, however, portions of this huge screenwere unprotected by fire of any kind and could, therefore,be breached by Axis sappers. In the battle as will berelated later, this did indeed occur on a large scale.Facing this formidable barrier were nine German andltalian divisions and one separate brigade. A total of 560tanks (332 German and 228 Italian) could be thrownagainst the line supported by hundreds of self-propelledanti-tank guns and thousands of towed anti-tankweapons includ ing48 88's which, unlike the British, werethought of by the Axis army as offensive as well asdefensive equipment and accompanied most armoredattacks. This was a very potent strike force and Rommel,true to f orm did not hesitate to use it when he felt the timewas right.The time was right on May the 26th. Th e British, backedby almost complete knowledge of the Axis armydispositions, predicted and expected the attack.Rommel had t wo choices for the assault. He could strikethe line directly in hope of a breakthrough on a smallfront for deep penetration to take theairfiel dsand supplybases at El Adem, or he could launch his forces on thelong trip down the line and around Bir Hacheim for thepurpose of engaging the British armor behind the line.Knowing that while significant British armored units stillexisted he had no free dom, the second option was chosen.To make the British believe that the first option was beingconducted Rommel instructed the DAK (DeutscheAfrika Korps-the German armored portion of the Axisarmy consisting of the 15th and 21st Panzer divisions)commander, General Criiwell, to take one Germanmechanized infantr y brigade and two ltalian infantrydivisions and all of th e Axis heavy artillery which was toocumbersome for a fighting march of over 50 miles, andattack the north part of the line. To further $onfuse theBritish, trucks with airplane engines and propellors ontop were to raise huge clouds of dust behind the frontalattack thus making them believe large mobile forces wereassembling there. In the meantime, the actual mainattack, consisting of DAK, the 90th Light (mechanizedinfantry) division and two mobile Italian divisions was toassemble at Rot unda Segnali to begin the long southwardmovement to right hook the British line. It was hopedthat the British would be surprised and their armordestroyed completely on the 27th with Tobruk itselffalling four days later.By anybody's appreciation, the plan was, on the whole,brash t o the point of being reckless and seriously weak inkey areas. For example, no thought was given to thepossibility that the British armor might indeed not bedestroyed on the 27th in which case the strike force wouldbe stuck behind the line living off a 100 mile supply link.No thought seemed to be given to the fact either that theFree French might resist the attack of the one Italian.division (the Trieste) assigned to take Bir Hacheim and bein a position to cut this supply line. In the battle, both ofthese unforseen events did indeed come about.The frontal feint attack by Group CrUwell began onschedule at about 2 P.M. o n the 26th (Scenario 2) andseven hours later the big sweep was initiated. Over 10,000vehicles began to drive south and their progress wasreported to the British every mile of the way by theefficient eyes of the South African Armoured Cars. Thefeint had fooled no one and the sweep by night was nosurprise. But the British Command for some reason didnot act on this knowledge and the warning call toconsolidate the armored divisions behind the line whichhad been broken up t o achieve better area coverage wasnot glven. This meant that three brigades, the ThirdIndian Motor at Point 171, the Seventh Armored atRetma and the Fourth Armored at Bir Beuid, wereunwarned that a massive attack was headed in theirdirection.It took them by surprise on the morni ng of the 27th. TheThird Indian Motor was absolutely destroyed (Scenario3 , the Seventh Motor was forced to retreat quickly, andthe Fourth Armored was slammed into by almost the

entire Afrika Korps arm or (Scenario I). The results areasdescribed in the Scenario writeups but in general, thethree brigades were neutralized but at great cost to theAxis. Rommel at the beginning of the campaign hadbased his planning on very erroneous and limitedknowledge of the British which, as has been mentioned,was not the case with them. He, for example, had no t beenaware of the strength of the Grant tank o r of its numbersin the Eighth Army nor had he been aware that new andbetter 6-pounder anti-tank guns were arriving in largenumbers (1 12 at the st art of the battle). Had he beenappraised by German Intelligence of these facts, he wouldhave been prepared for a harder fight and plannedaccordingly. As it was, the strength an d fighting ability ofespecially the British armored units surprised andshocked him and his army.Battered but not slowed the mass of German armor nowcontinued t o drive north. By mistake the Trieste divisionhad missed Bir Hacheim during the night and ran into theminefield nort h of it instead, so the ltalian Ariete armoreddivision was broken off to attack the French. Also, the90th Light broke away to head directly for El Adem inanattempt for a quickcoup , and thus only DAK remained todrive north. By afternoon they reached the Knightsbridgearea where a heavy British armored counterattack(Scenario 4) essentially stopped the advance. The worsthad happened to his attack and Rommel admitted it. Hisforces were broken up badly with the 90th Light divisioninvolved with huge British forces at El Adem, the 15thPanzer and 21st Panzer out of fuel and ammunition onthe Rigel and Sidra ridges and the two Italian mobiledivisions absolutely stuck by Bir Hacheim. He had lost somany tanks that, for example, only 43 remained in theentire 15th Panzer division. His supply line was nearly 100miles long and constantly being bombed by the R AF andfinally, the British armor had been nowhere neardestroyed.Rommel, however, was not aware of this last fact and soon the next day, the 28th, he ordered the 21st Panzerdivision to continue to push north which they did andreached the coast. Being so strung out like this and soweak, a concentrated British attack at this time wouldhave undoubtedly stopped the battle and possibly evenended the desert war. No attack came. On the next day,the 29th, Rommel finally properly percieved the situati onand, unimpeded by the British, gathered the 21st Panzer,15th Panzei, 90th Light and Ariete divisions together inthe area which soon was known as the Cauldron becauseof the boiling Axis activity inside of it. The Triestedivision in the south, had breached the mine marshnorth of Bir Hacheim in an area unprotected by fire, andat least some supplies could reach Rommel via this route.For full supply of the strike group, however, a more directand wider channel was needed an d this obviously wouldbest go through the minefield at Sidi Muftah.

But, in moving in this direction, it was discovered that oneentire brigade, the 150th. lay astride the desired path inone of the strongest boxes in the line. Without a directroute the Axis group would have been slowly destroyed,because not enough supplies could have reached such alarge force via the routes available. No optio n lay open toRompel except that of attacking the 150th frontally.Between the end of May and the second day of Jun e thisdesperate battle was conducted (Scenario 5) and forreasons still unknown to this day, no help was given to the150th by the rest of the Eighth Army until after its lastplatoon had been destroyed. This help came in the form ofa frontal attack on the Cauldron on the 5th of June, threedays after the collapse of the 150th brigade and longaf terthe Axis forces in the Cauldron had been almost fullyresupplied and re-equipped.The code name for the big, complicated frontal assaultwas Aberdeen (Scenario 6) and needless to say it was adisaster, running onto well dug in and extensive anti-tankand artillery defenses. Upon its failure Rommel took theopportunity to break out of the Cauldron in a counterat-tack which was very effective. Free of fear of anotherBritish attack and no longer hemmed into the Cauldronarea, Rommel could free significant German forcesfinally to go south and dispose of the Free French onceand for all. Again unhindered by the remainder of EighthArmy, this savage but one sided battle was conductedbetween the 8 th and 9th of June (Scenario 8) and broug htto a bloody close on the loth with the evacuation of theFrench.

Rommel now (1 I June) pushed out of the Cauldron atoward the prize of El Adem with all three Germdivisions plus Ariete at significant strength. The Britresisted little although El Adem was not c;,ptured by German forces on the l lth and th at night the advastopped with the German and ItaliandivisionsseparatThinking this to be an opportunity to attack the Germdivisions separately, the British planned an assaagainst the 15th Panzer to begin on the 12th and to utwo fairly strong armored brigades, the Second and Fourth in the attack.The battle began as expected but when assembled in jump-off area a t Bir Lefa, the two brigades stopped awaited for orders from their divisional commandGeneral Messervy who was hiding in a dried-up wacistern (a bir ) af ter being almost captured by GermaThis wait was fatal, because Rommel seeing both unimmobile with the 15th Panzer to their southandthe2Panzer to their west, ordered both divisions to attimmediately.The subsequent crush~ ng f the two brigades (Scenariwas the most decisive defeat suffered by the Britishuntil this time and accomplished what Rommel hintended to accomplish 16 days earlier, theelimi nationmost of the British armor from the field.Little need be said about the rest of the campaign. TGerman and ltalian divisions had once again been wdown severely by the Bir Hacheim and Knightsbrifighting and were therefore unable to stop Eighth Arfrom successfully evacuating the line. The Tobperimeter was surrounded and, remembering the loand unsuccessful siege on one year before, Rommcarefully assembled strong strike forces for its attack oa two day period. He might not have been socautious,the fortress was not in this case held by tough confidAustralian troops, but by unexperienced South Afriand Indian troops who had just witnessed the complcollapse of their army and were naturally very shakeThe attack was launched at dawn on the 20th of Ju(Scenario 9 in the best of Blitzkrieg traditions. Tfortress was surrendered unceremoniously before dathe next da y and yielded the biggest bag of booty that hever been won in the desert by either side.Characteristically, Rommel's thoughts were not Tobruk at all but rather down thecoast a t Alexandriaathe Suez Canal-and El Alamein.References1. Merols Under Impulsive Loads2. The Effeerr of Sys tem Design C haraclerisrics on Firsr RouHtrring Probab11ir.bvofTank FiredProjectiles.BRL MemorandReport3. AFV 4, Light Tanks MI-M5 Profile Publications4. AFV 8, Crusader-Cruiser Mark VI , Profile Publications5. AFV 11, M3 Medlum (LeeIGrant) , Profile Publications6. AFV 6, Valentine Mark Ill , Profile Publications7. Armor in Profile, No. 15, Infantry TankMk. I I Matilda , ProPublications8. AFV 1, Panzerkampfwagen ll , Profile Pubiications9. Bellona Military Vehicle Prints, Serles 3210. Armor in Profile, No. 8, Panzerkampfwager IV , ProPublications11. Bellona Military Vehicle Prints Series Ten.12. Armor in Profile, No. 14, M13/40 , Proflie Publications13. Tonh Dora WE inc. publishers14. Ko np/bonzer 19/6-1966 Dr. F. M. Von Senger and Etteauthor15. Artnor R M. Ogorkiewicz author16. Germon Secret Weapons of W WII Lusar author17. German Tanks 1923.1945. Senger und Etterlin author18. TM-E30-451, Handhook of G erman Milirorr Forces WDepartment technical manual19. TM-E30-420, Hondhook o lrolion Milirarv Forces War Dep

ment technical manual20. German Infonrrv W eapons of WW II Barker author21. Brtrish and Americon Infanrry Weaponr of WW II Barker aut22. Mod ern War In Msnrarure Korns author23. Weapons and Toc t~cs .Hasting.s 1 Berlin Weiler author24. The Rommel Papers Liddeii Hart editorFor those interested in the design of Tobrukfollowing References a re suggested. For all playersmall selection of books can make the Gazala Battles'athe desert war very clear through reading. They are:Rommel by Desmond YoungRommel o . ~ Milirory Commander by Ronald LeWinTobruk by Michael CarverTohruk rhe Sron. of o Setge by Anthony Heck-stall SmlthThe Sidi Rezrg Borrles andCrisis in rhe Desert by J A. I Agar-Hamilton and L. C. F Tuc

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P GEThe Wedrrrrroneo nondrhe Maddle I>rr. 4volumes by I S.0 Playlairthe Britlsh Offlclal History)The Foxes of the Desert by Paul CanellBrozen Chorrors by Robert CrispToke These Men by Cyril JolyWirh Rommel in rhe Desert by H. W. Schmidt

DESIGNER S NCWeapons EffectivenessThree guidelines influenced the design of T o b ~ u k ndwere adhered to wherever possible in eac h stage of thegame's development. The first and foremost was therequirement that the effectiveness and pecularities ofweapons were to be emphasized in the game rather thanoperations and tactics as had been stressed in previouswargames. Weapons effectiveness analysis was to beconducted in a manner which was much more completethan in oth er games, and this analysis was to be reduced toa workable, playable methodolog y usingthe best possibletools to include the digital computer. Fortunately,procedures and data were uncovered during the researchfor Tobruk which made t he fulfillment of this guidelinepossible, and these procedures and data will be discussedfurther on.Second, it was planned that no data o r methodology usedin the game's design was t o be so complex o r difficult tofind that the average player of the game could not o btainit and perform his own weapons analysis or historicalcomparison should that be his desire. In general, thisrequirement was satisfied and most of the designmaterials listed throughout this booklet should beavailable to any player, although he may have to go tosome effort such as requesting Inter-Library Loan orsimilar procedure to obtain them. Some materials,however, such as very old (p reW WII ) artillery firingtables, etc., ar e of such a rare nature a s to be unavailablewithout considerable research and where this ha s been thecase, and the data extract ed from these sources judged t obe of enough importance to any one wishing to investigatethe Tobruk design process, the data has been enclosedwhere appropriate.An interesting sidenote is in order here. In doing themassive research necessary for proper effectivenessanalysis, it was discovered that some detailed data itemsabou t many of the we apons were still officially'classifiedand therefore, of course, unusable in the game. Therewere two reasons for this, the first being that manymaterials had just simply been overlooked whendowngradin g became justifiable a nd the second that,oddly enough, many of the British and Axis weaponsinvolved in the Gazala Battles are still in use throug houtthe world today. When absolutely required for a givenweapon, such data items were estimated based onunclassified data from similar weapons.The third and final guideline was that of giving thedefender the advantage in any doubtful battle resolution.This guideline was strictly adhered to whenever anyuncertainty existed. For example, most weapons in thegame have much higher possible rates of fire than arerepresented and used in the effectiveness analysis. Theproblem is that these higher rates of fire could only eused under very special circumstances which, giving thedefender the adva ntage of the doub t, were assumed t o beignorable except in certain identifyable cases (such asfinal defensive fires, barrages, etc.). Th e point is clear thaton a battlefield such factors as confusion, obsecurationand less than perfect knowledge of the enemy all work inthe defender's behalf but can't be easily modelled in agame. This guideline simply reduces the effect of suchunplayable factors.Under these th ree guidelines, the weapons' effectivenessanalyses of Tobruk wereconduct ed in the following ways.

A. Anti armor weaponsThe defeat of a n enemy armored target by direct-fire is aproblem of the foremost magnitude. The question Willthis projectile defeat this target at his range? may at firstseem to be rather simple to answer by just comparingprojectile penetration to a rmor thickness and making ayes or no decision based o n that. In actuality, however,the problems involved ar e so complicated that, even attoday's state of ballistics,and metallurgy, the only sureway of answering the q uestion is by taking the target outand s hoot inga t it with the weapon of interest. Reference 1

The Tanks by B. H. Liddell HartAfriko Korps by K. J. Macksey, M.C.&r Hokim by Richard Hoimesand, of course,The Rommel Papers edited by 8. H. Liddell HartPanzer Borrles by F. W. VonMellenthln

discusses these problems in some detail but obviously foruse in Tobruk the soluti on just mentioned was impracti-cal and assumptionsand approximations had to be made.In general, the entire problem could be boiled down intothree questions as related in the rules:1. Has the target been hit?2. Where has the target been hit?3. What has the hit done to the target?Reference 2 gives a detailed and very satisfactory methodfor answering the first question provided some data ab outthe firing weapon is known. In general, quasi-battle'conditions are assumed existing on the field withprojectile shape, stability, and especially muzzle velocitydetermini ng whether or not a given target is hit at a givenrange. For ea ch weapon used in Tobruk these parameterswere either found in references listed later or could besafely assumed, an d probability of hit curves such as theexample below could be generated for each and convertedinto dice rolls for use in the Hit Probability Tables.

British 6 pdr. TGP ammunition

Probabilityo Hitting7 ' by 7

A ,

Question 2 could in a similar way be answered by makinga few assumptions about alk targets and then a detailedanalysis of each. The general assumptions were:a) The aimpoint o n each target was roughly in the centerof the target.b) The only area s on the target which could be hit werethe areas facing toward the firing weapon. For examplehits scored on the side plates of a target which bydefinition is facing the weapon with its front ar e ignoredand s o on.C) Th e hits scored on the target are divided according tothe amount of area each portion of the target presents tothe firing weapon. Fo r example, suppose the Front Uppe rHull plate of a tank target donstituted 113 of the totalpresented area of the tank when viewed directly from thefront, then it would be assumed that 1 3 of the hits scoredon the front of the tank landed on that plate. In reality,this is not mathematically accurate but for use in Tobrukquite acceptable.With these assumptions, the projected areas of each targe twere analyzed using references 3 through 13 and AreaImpacted tables built for AFV.Finally, the incredibly complicated problem of question3 whether or not th e target was damaged if hit, had t o beaddressed. First and foremost, range dependent armorpenetration data for each weapon of interest had to begathered an d from amo ng literally dozens of sources, thedat a of references 14 through 18 was accepted for initialuse. Second, a rmo r specifics for each possible target hadto be obtained and vulnerable areas of each target wereextracted.With this basic mass of data the following step by stepprocedure was followed to determin e the results of eachpossible projectile/area impacted combination in thegame. With only five British and six Axis target AFVtypes, incidentally, this meant 1284 separate and distinctevaluations had to be performed:Step I: Armor penetration data is usually based onstatic firings of weapons against armo r plates of averagequality which, in the jargon of metallurgy is calledhomogeneous armor. Perforati on or piercing of the sameplate is a considerably harder task, however, and whatthis basic perforation capability of the projectile againsthomogeneous armor had to be calculated.

The Axe ofGreor Guns by Frank ComparaloThe Guns 1939-45 andGrenades and Morrarr by Ian V. HoggGermon Anri- Tank GunsInfanrrr Weoponr by John WeeksWesr ofAlarnein compiled by Col. G. B. Jarrett

Step 2. All Pz.lll, Pz.1V and Stua rt tanks in the gamwere protected in certain vital areas by armor considerably different characteristics than that homogeneous a rmo r by virtue of being hardened to resatta ck. Th e effect of this hardening had to be considereinasmuch as it could either add to or subtract from thvehicle's protection depending upon the size of thimpacting projectile.Step 3. All armor plates, whether homogeneous hardened, protect the vehicle by different amoundepending upon their sloping with respect to thattackin g projectile. This sloping is not simply the slope the plate with respect to vertical, but isalso the extra slopof the plate in the gro und plane and neither effect can ignored. This is such a complex problem that aillustration is in order for better understanding. Assumwe have an armo r plate me thickness being fired a

--- XL-Iand which can be pierced when vertical.

Sloping of that plate may cause the attacking projectileeither ricochet or even shatter depending upon tprojectile type and the hardness of the plate.But the sloping bonus enjoyed by the plate must evaluated taking into account that, mathematically, tprobability of the plate lying exactly perpendicular to tline of fire as shown below (from the too):

is exactly zero. In other words, in any actual battlefiecondition the plate will proba bly Ile at some angle to tline of fire such as illustrated below:

Assuming the ground is perfectly tlat (not a baassumption in the desert) and assuming a straight-linprojectile flight to the target plate (a bad assumptioanywhere but one which gives the defender the advantage), it can be safely assumed that the plate's verticaslope is constant. The horizontal slope, howevedefinitely varies as the target faces the firing weapodifferently. For example, by definition in the game, vehicle being engaged from the front may actually bsitting with up to a 30 degree horizo ntal angle with respecto th e line of fire. As mentioned before, hits scored on thtarget's side plates in this case are not counted, but thatdegree-30 degree bonus to the receiving plate cannot brealistically ignored, especially when it has a versignificant impact on whether or not the vehicle idamaged. During the desert war, incidentally, Germapanzer crews were instructed to approa ch the enemy at aangle, so th at this horizonta l slope bonus was maximizedA serious problem arises, however, in trying to accounfor this horizontal bonus in a realistic way. For examplin the case illustrated above th e target could be assumeto be always facing at t he maxi mum angle of 30 degreebut this would really be giving too much of a break to thdefender and, of course, assuming the opposite beintrue, t hat of only a 0 degree facing would be unfair to himA method had t o be developed to account for thiseffect i

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PAGE THEGENERAa probabilistic way, and to do in s u ~ h way as to notencumber the play of the game with for example anotherdice roll. Needless to say, after muchef fort such a methodwas discovered and the IMPACT computer programwritten to implement it int o the game. Without going intoany details of the IMPACT procedures, be it enough tosay that all important effects, such as plate hardness andprojectile type, were analyzed, and the result was suchthat this probabilistic horizontal sloping bonus wasamalgamate d into the Area Impacted Table for each AFVtarget. Th is means, for instance, that say 113 of a target'stotal frontal aspect was composed of its front lower hullplate which would represent 12 out of 6 (the maximumnumber of different results of rolling two dice) FrontLower Hull hits on its Area Impacted Table. With thebonus of the target's rand om facing factored in by the useof IMPA CT, these 12 hits might be reduced to perhaps 8,with the other four being defined as ricochets caused bythe target's facing at some angle.This is not a perfect solution, obviously, but it at leastaccounts for the problem to some extent and certainlyenough for a commercial wargame like To bruk. Even thepartial s olution as ust described (briefly by the way) has aterrific impact on the play of the game. Just notice howdifficult it is to get a hit to stick to the fron t o fa Pz.111JSpecial and this should become apparent.Step 4. Once a projectile is defined as having hit a tar getand not ricocheted, it must be determined whether or notthe projectile (or ts fragments if shattere d) has pierced theplate and what damage was done. An almost straightcomparison of piercing power vs. armor effectivethickness may be made to answer the first part, and ananalysis of target intern allayout and projectile design cananswer the second. One example of this process should besufficient to illustrate.Supp ose at a range of hexes a Pz.111J Special using th e50mm long weapon had scored a Front Lower Hull hit ona Honey tank. A quick comparison of theeffectivearmorthickness of the Honey at this point (70mm) and thearmo r piercing ability of the 50mm long APCBC (normalarmor-piercing amm nit ion ) at this ran gef7lmm) showsthat indeed the round has gotten into the Honey. At thisspot in the tank, however, is located the transmission andfinal drive mechanisms behind which sit the driver andhull machinegunner . Since the round has barely managedto break through the ar mor plate in front of the final driveassembly, it simply doesn't have enough remainingmomentum -(kinetic energy) to continue through theassembly itself and kill or injure one or both of these twocrewmen and so they can be considered safe. However,the mechanisms of the assembly most certainly will havebeen damaged by &he round itself or t he fragment s ofarmor plate which it probably blew into the assemblyupon entering, and so the mobility of the Honey hasprobably been destroyed and thus, an M kill scored.Finally, the 50mm APCBC round, like most Germana ndItalian ammunition, was cleverly designed to explodeafter piercing in to a target an d, in thiscase, the port ion oftarget entered happens to contain inflammable fluids.The combination of these factors produces a highprobability of fire, and t hus the '(P4)' result as well.All of this, and one M(P4)$6 is placed on the Honey sheetwith 1283 additiona l evaluations, some trivial, some verycomplex, needed to be done for analyzing the AFV'sinvolved in the game.

B. Gunfire Anti personnel WeaponsCompared to the abov e, the evaluati ons of these weaponswas relatively simple. In general, any rifle, suhmachine-gun, light machinegun or medium machinegun may beevaluated as having a probability of inflicting a kill orserious (battle incapacitant, all lighter wounds wereignored in Tobruk) wound o n a certain number of man-targets as a function of the:I. Weapon's rate of fire to include loading times,stoppages, cyclic rate of fire, and bur st fire tactics toavoi doverheating.2. Range from the firing weapon(s) t o the target unit andthe probability of one roun d from the weapon hitting one

game an d references 18, 19, and 23 provided the basicnumbers and types of weapons used by the personnelunits of each side. When combined, a firepower value inthe form of Gunfire Factor s for each personnel unit at allpossible ranges was calculated for each type of unit.Further elaborating will not be done here, but ifinterested, a player may refer to the above references,especially number 22, (although erroneous in spots) formore details of this process and data.C. Artillery and Mortar WeaponsThe evaluation of the effectiveness of these weapons isstrongly affected by a set of assumptions not required inthe evaluation of the previous two types. These assump-tions are very broad, but not unreasonable for a boardwargame. Briefly, they are:I. Any artillery (including direct-fire) or mort ar weaponcan be assumed to have associated with it a CEP , orCircular Error Probable, figure which very simplyrepresents the radius of a circle centered at the targetwithin which 50% of the amm unition fired by that targe twill land. Th is CE P is definitely range-dependent; that is,the closer to a targ et that the firing weapon is, the smallerthe CEP will become although, for some technicalreasons, it will never reach zero (perfect accuracy).2. Any target may be approximated by a circle on theground of some radius RT. As an example, a tank may heapproximated by such a circle:

as can a section of infantry:

and so on.w. Any munition type, such as an Italian 81mm mortarround for example, may have associated with it somelethal radius (RL) within which a target may bedamaged or destroyed. For example, the 81mm roundjust mentioned may hedescribed as havingan RLagainstan infantry target of 7.0 meters, within which any mantarget will probably be killed or seriously wounded by thefragments or blast from the exploding round. Against a

tank target, for example, this RL for damaging ordestroying the tank will obviously be considerably less.Under these th ree assumptions, then, the effectiveness offires against various targets may be analyzed. Theequations for this analysis are in common use throughoutthe military Operations Research community and won'tbe referenced here; although most OR textbooks andpapers discuss them and their derivations in detail. Theyconsist of:1. Probability of hitting a target, PH:

where e = 2 7181

2. Fractional coverage of a target F by one round oflethal radius RL:

where R is the distance from the burst to the target, P, S,and SIG parameters.3. And the fractional coverage FKN of a target with Nrounds each covering the target by amount F ascalculated above:

again occur in doing this, but for use in Tobruk theysafely ignorable. Artillery battery specifics input to calculation include the size of each battery (always fguns or howitzers except the 75mm(F) which was guns) and the ~n divi dual eapon rates of fire which wilrelated later. Dud rates of ammunition were aconsidered, and surprisingly enough found to be signcantSystems SpecificsA B O A R DThe board chosen for use with Tobruk requires lcomment because there is little to it. Th e 75 meter hexchosen to allow for reasonable manouver on the bowhile prohibiting the longest-range weapon used,88mm FLA K, f rom completely commanding an engment. In addition, the CEP's of all artillery and moweapons used in the game are such th at a 75 meter hexprobably receive most of their fire and rounds fallinadjacent hexes may be ignored. Th ere is no terrain ofkind on the board for two reasons. First, the actual teupon which most of the Gazala battles were foughindeed very flat and featureless. Any terrain protecdesired by the combatan ts in general had t o be provby they themselves through entrenchme nts and conment. Second and most important, though, it discovered throu gh play-test of Tobruk predecessorsalmost an y terrain fea ture of any kind o n a battlefiethis size (about 2 miles by 3 miles) absolutely dominatthe play of the game. As discussed in the IntroducTobruk is intended to be a game of weapons personnel, and not one of tactics as dictated by terrRommel himself in his Papers (reference 24) relexactly this feeling when he wrote:01 all theaten ot oparatlons, It was probably In North Africathe war took on Its most advanced form. The ~rotagonlsts nsides ware fully motorlzed formations, for whoseeinploymeflat and obstruction-tree dmert oflered hitherto undreamoosslbllltles. It was the onlv theater where the DrlnclDlmotorized and tank wartare, as they had b..ntaughitheoietlcbefore the war, could beapplied to thefull and further develIt was the onlv theater where the Dure tank battle between mformations wis tought.

B. VEHICULAR UNITSEach vehicle type used by either side during the GaBattles was very unique in performance and pecularReferences 3 thr ough 13 list these specifics in detail bshort list of the most important items will be presehere for completeness.1. British:

NomenclatureWeightMaxlmum road speedFlat desert speedMaxlmum armorCrewWeaponsUse In Gazala Battles

Maxlmum road speedFlat desert speedMaxlmum armorCrewWeaponsUse in Gazala BattlesComments

- U.S. M3 Llght tank HoneyStuart- 13 tons- 36 mph- 23 mph- 38mm- ; 2-man turret- 1 37mm ME, 2 30 cal BrownMMG's- Main battle tank whm necessa- Llght, fast and reliablevehicle.well sulted to the role of batank but used asone anyway. Sprlslngly goodannor lor lightvcle, very accurate main gun. Tman turret was a slight llablllty- ._- Cruiser Mk 11 Crusader I- 19 tons- 8 mph- 22 mph +- 49mm- ; 3-man turret- 2 pounder, 2 B e u MMG- Maln battle tank.- Very unreliable vehlcle withwa&n not equal to any otnothe field. Dlsllkedby Its c m snot feared by the enemy. Vcombustible when hlt. Poorlyranged armor which good apcould never overcoma. Clooa Sport (C.S.) version had 3 howmainly tor firing smoke.

man in the target at that range. Using these three equations, plus other assumptions3. The motion or cover state of the target being fired peculiar to Tobruk targets, the artillery and mortarupon. effectiveness may be calculated and, working backwards,References 20 through 22 provided enough data for the related to casualty production so that the same Casualtycalculations of these variables for each weapon in the Table used by gunfire weapons may he utilized. Errors

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TH GENERAL PAGENomenciatureWeightMaximum road speedFlat desert speedMaximumarmorCrewWeapons

- U.S. M3 Medium Grant- 0 tons26 mph- 7 mph- 7mmB +man turret, 2-man sponson- 75mm M2, 1 37mm M6.3.30 calBrowning MMG- Main battle tank.- Key British tank in battle. Veryheavy armor and two powerfulweapons-on last end very reliablechasis.

Nomenclature Sd. ktz. 139, Marder IllWeiaht 11 tons NomenclatureWeight in actionCrewAmmunitiongenerally usedCEP (indirect fire)Rate of fireAmmunitiondud rateHE round lethal radius

- 303 Vickers Medium Machine-42 Ib.&men~ax imumoad speed - 6 mphFlat desert speed 17 mDhMaximum armor 52mmCrew - 4; 2-man gun positionWeapons 1 76.2mm(r), 1 MG 37 MMGUse in Gazala Battles - Tank destroyer.Comments Eftectiveuse of modifiedca~tured- Ball, tracer- -- 00 rpm (cyclic)- -- -- World War design using Maaction. Reliable, effective given up, unhappily, by the Brinfantry only long after the wLike 3 mortar, usually attacheinfantry companies when neein sections ot two.

Russian field gun on capturedCzech chasis. Gun was so powerfulthat British at first thought thatself-propelled 88mm FLAK gunshad been introduced. Open top,limited gun traverse, and two-man gun crew limited overalleffectiveness- nfantry Tank Mk Ill Valentine I116 tons15 mph11 mph- 65mm3; )-man turret- 1 2-pounder, 1 Besa MMG- nfantry support tank, battle tankwhen needed.- Very wel l built and reliable equip-ment. Slow speed, 2-pounder gunand two man crew limited battleetfectiveness. Very thick and well-placed armor.

WeightMaxlmum road speedFlat desert speedMaximum armorCrewWeaponsUse in Gazala Battles

NomenclatureWeightMaximum road speedFlat desert speedMaximum armorCrewWeaponsUse in Gazala BattlesComments

Carro Armato Tipo MI3140- 14 ton- 0 mph11 mph- 50mm4; 2-man turret- 1 47mm L132.3 Breda 38 MMGMain ba ttle tank.Slow, self-propelled coffin withweak armor everywhere but theturret front. Good gun but not goodenough to prevent many Italiantankers from being killed in battle.Unreliable, highly combustiblewhen pierced.

NomenclatureWeight in actionCrewAmmunitiongenerally usedCEP (indirect fire)Rate of fire

55 inch Boys Anti-tank Rifle- 36 lb.1-man- Armor piercing incendiary-

15 rpm

Heavy weapon notable , and fed, tor three times the kick oshotaun but with almost no arm

Weight

Ammunition dud rateHE round lethal radius

capabil ity. Inasmuchit could damage light vehicles ntantry Tank Mk II Matilda II27 tons- 15 mph11 mph- 8mm- 4;aman turret- 2-pounder, 1 Besa MMGnfantry support tank, battle tankwhen needed.- Very slow vehicle with limitedeffectiveness due to 2-poundermain aun. Verv exoensive to build

break the track of any tank, it stil l of use until shaped chaweapons became generaily avable i n 1943.~ax imumoad speedFlat desert speedMaximum armorCrewWeaponsUse in Gazala Battles

NomenclatureWeight Obice DA 75/18, Semovente- 14 tons NomenclatureWeight in actionCrewAmmunitiongenerally usedCEP (indirect tire)Rate of FireAmmunition dud rate

- 2 pounder anti-tank gun1.8 tons- 5-men~ax imumoad speed - 19 mphFlat desert speed 11 mphComments Maximum armor 50mmCrew - 4; no turretWeapons 1 75mm L118Use in Gazala Battles Suooort field oun- AP non-explosive shot only- -

22 rmp--Standard British ATG at beginnof war but obsolete by 1942. Gazaia still main ATG althouSUDDOSedV reoiaced in arti ll

due to-cast huli. ~ep la ce dy Valen-tine betore El Alamein. Comments ~ a h i c a i ~ ~he ;ame vehicle as theMI3140 but with field gun insteadof anti-tank gun. Same weak-nesses as MI3140 but could fireeffective HE shell like German Pz.IV out to long range even while onthe move.2 Axis uk is by 6 pounder. Small, uncapshot shattered easily on GermomenclatureWelghtMaximum road speed- PanzerkampfwagenIll Model H- 19. 5 tons- 24 mph- 17 mph- 0mm- 5; 3-man turret1 50mm L/42,2 MG34 MMG

Main ba ttle tank.The heart of the Afrika Korps. Fast,reliable and well armed althoughshort 50mm unable to cope withGrant. Extra bolted on hard armorwas an effective counter to mostBritish weapons.

hard armor.Flat desert speedMaximum armor C Weapon nits 40mm Anti-aircraft Gun (Bofor2.4 tons6-menCrewWeaponsUse in Gazala BattlesComments

NomenclatureWeight in actionCrewAmmunitiongenerally usedCEP (indirect fire)Rate of fireAmmunition dud rateHE round lethal radiusComments

Even though weapons are identified as being used by oneside or the other, it must be stressed that both sides in thedesert made extensive use of captured weapons wheneverpossible. The reason for this was t hat, unlike AFV s,weapons in general required no special supplies of spareparts or maintenance equipment to be kept in operationand can be set up and used with far less training than inthe case of an AFV. The following lists the mostimportant data for each weapon type used in the game byeither side:

HE, AP- -- 120 rpm (cyclic)- 1.6 metersSwedish design standardizedmedium AAA by many countand still in use today. Effectivmain role but secondary roleATG limited by sights.Panzerkampfwagen Ill Model J,Special- 23 tons25 mph- 17 mph77mm- 5;+man turret- 1 50mm LI60, 2 MG34 MMG- Main battle tank.- Very dangerous vehicle-only realmatch for Grant on field but only19 wlth DAK on 26 May. Long gunvery accurate and lethal although twas the most powerful whichcould fit into the turret and thus the

Pz. Ill eries stopped developing atthis point. Like H, hard extra arm-or very difficult to defeat.

WeightMaximum road speedFlat desert speedMaximum armorCrewWeaponsUse In Gazala Battles

I BritishNomenclatureWeight in actionCrewAmmunitiongeneraily usedCEP (Indirect fire)Rate of fire

Muzzle Loading Mortar, 210 ib.- 1-man6 pounder Anti-tank Gun- 1.22 tons- -men

NomenclatureWeight in actionCrewAmmunitiongenerally usedCEP (indirect fire)Rate of fi re

- HE- -20 meters- 12 rpm- -1.6 meterStandard British iiaht mortar. Still

Ammunition dud rateHE round lethal radius - AP non-explosive shot only-15 rpm

Excellent hard-hitting piece. O112 n hands of Royal Artillery unof Eighth Army at start ot batLike 2 pounder, no HE shell avable which limited use. impressperformance convinced Americarmy to adopt as 57mm ATG.

in use after a ore an war and highlyprized by British Intantry. Ammunition dud rateHE round lethal radiusComments

Nomenclature - Panzerkampfwagen V, Model E- 22 tons- 6 mph- 17 mph60mm- 5; +man turret- 75mm U24,2 MG34 MMG- Support tank, battletank if needed.- Good, reliable tank like Pz. Ill butnext to useless in tank battle duetoshortgun. Couldbombardenemyfrom up to 3000 meters even whilemoving with lethal HE, however.A few Special version of the Pz.IV wlth the new long-barreled75mm were used beglnning atBir Hacheim but not included ingame.

Weiaht - Medium Mortar, 3- 126 Ib.- 6-menMaximum road speedFlat desert speed Weight in actionCrewAmmunitiongenerally usedCEP (indirect fire)Rate of tireMaximum armorCrewWeaponsUse in Gazala Battlesants

- HE, smoke- 6-33 meters- 10 rpm7.1 meters- Standard British medium mortarstill in use although modified.Suf-fered from short range in desertand, like all British munitions, romsmall lethal radius of fragmenta-tion due to use of poor grade met-als in shells.

French 75mm gun, Model 18971.3 tons- 6-menNomenciatureWeight in actionCrewAmmunitiongenerally usedCEP (indirect fire)Rate of fire

Ammunition dud rateHE round lethal radius- HE, smoke, AP22 meters12 rpm- 3W/o- 12 meters- World War French mainfie ld g

Ammunition dud rateHE round lethal radiusComments

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THEGENERALPAGEUsedby FreeFrench tBir Hachehaboth as artillery and ATG. Limiledrange and high ammunition t bure rate due to age llmited usdbut six-gun batteryand high rate ffire made battery fires very effec-tive. Grant main gun based uponit.

?We of RreAmmunition dud rateHE round lethai radius10 rprn

Light, handy weapon but iike .55cal Boys hopelessly outclassed byaverage British tank. It could, how-ever, at least break tracks and sowas retained until shaped chargeweapons became avaliable.

ity projectlie and high rate ofrounded out the threat to tanWeapon itself, however, large, vulnerable to fragmetion, and heavy. These wenesses were corrected in 88ATG's later i n war.1 5mm Howitzer

NomenciatureWeight in actionCrewAmmunitiongenerally usedCEP (indirect fire)Rate of fire

25 pounder gun-howitzer1.8 tons8-menO.5cm. L.F.H. 18(l05mm howittons6-men

NomenclatureWelght in action7.92mm MG34 Medium machine-gun42 pounds&men

crewAmmunitiongenerally usedCEP (indirect fire)Rate of fireAmmunition dud rateHE round iethal radiusComments

HE, AP, smoke42 meters8 rpm20%13.6 metersStandardBritish field gun untillongafter the war. Effectiveas artilleryand when necessary as ATG al-though ack of suitablesight imitedrange.

Weight in actionCrewAmmunitiongensrslty usedC P indirect tire)Rate of fireAmmunition dud rateHE.round lethal radiusmmer

HE, smoke38 meters6 rprn15%16.7 metersStandard Germany army fhowitzer until end of war. Eftive, wail-designed plece eqin performance to 25 poundeAmerican 105mm.

Ammunitiondud rateHE round iethal radiusBail, AP800 rprn (cyclic)

Same weavon as section MG34Comments

except eqdpped with heavy tripodwhich allowed more accuracy andlonger bursts. Like section weap-on, high rate of fire producedam-munition suppiv problem. Usually 15 mm Howitzerattached to-company in haif-pla-toons with two weapons. NomenclatureWeiaht in action 15 em. S.F.H. 18 (150mmhowi5.4 tons.5 inch gunNomenciatureWelght in actionCrewAmmunitiongenerally usedCEP (Indirect fire)Rate of tire

4.5 inch Gun57 tons9-mencrewAmmunitiongeneraliy usedCEP (indirect tire)Rate of flreAmmunitiondud rateHE round iethai radiusComments

NomenciatureWeight in actionCrewAmmunitiongeneraliy used

2.8 cm. S.Pz.B.41 (28120 PAK)491 pounds3-menHE, smoke49 metersrpm15%23 metersStandard German medium hitzer. Companion piece to 10L.F.H. 18.

HE, smoke45 meters2 rpm20%17 metersStandard British medium piece inservice at Gazaia. Long range and

Armor piercing composite non-rigid, HE10 rprnI4 metersFirst production military weaponto use squeeze-bore princlpie togain high velocity (4550 ftlsec)projectile. Small sight and insta-bility of ammunition limitedaccurate range but tungsten car-bide projectilecould pierce almostany British tank.

CEP (indirect fire)Rate of fireAmmunition dud rateHE round lethal radius Ammunition dud rateHE round lethal radiusComments