CONTENTS

E C O N O M Y P R O B L E M S

Crisis and Russia ................................. 2

The Russian President

Dmitry Medvedev Visits Salut .............. 8

Vladimir Putin Visits

Tactical Missiles Corporation ............. 11

B I G B O S S TA L K I N G

Ups & downs for United Aircraft ........ 12

I N D U S T R Y

Zhuk-AE AESA

is ready for demonstrations

to the customers ................................ 16

E X H I B I T I O N

Under New Year Tree ......................... 20

Airshow China 2008 ........................... 22

WA R P L A N E S

J-10 «Tzianbin»:

«the dragon» is ready to fight ............ 25

ADA LCA light multipurpose fighter .... 34

C I V I L AV I AT I O N

Arab capital for Aeroflot ..................... 44

PUBLISHER & CEO

Nikolay Laskov

FIRST DEPUTY GENERAL DIRECTOR

Alexander Chernov

PUBLISHING HOUSE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Vladimir Ilyin

MARKETING DIRECTOR

Alexander Kiryanov

KEY ACCOUNT DIRECTOR

Nina Gusyakova

CREATIVE DIRECTOR

Dmitry Bykovskiy

PR DIRECTOR

Sergey Kovalski

EDITOR

Vladimir Karnozov

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Vladimir Zhilinko

DESIGNERS

Alvina KirillovaSergey Velichkin

IT DEPARTMENT

Anton Pavlov

PHOTOS IN THIS ISSUE:

Nikolay Laskov, Vladimir Karnozov, ITAR-TASS, HAL,Chinese Ministry of Defence

Circulation: 10,000

The magazine is registered in the Committee for Press of the Russian Federation. Certificate #016692 as of 20.10.1997.Certificate #77-15450 as of 19.05.2003. Any mate ri al in this publi ca tion may not be repro du ced in any form without the writ ten per mis sion of the publisher. The edi to ri al staff’s opi nion does not neces sa ri ly coin ci de with that of the authors. Adver tis ers bear res pon si bi li ty for the con tent of pro vi ded mate ri als. Authors bear res pon si bi li ty for the accu ra cy of the facts and infor ma ti on they pro vi de.

© AIR FLEET, 2009

ADDRESS

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PUBLISHED BY

SINCE 1997

1.2009 (75)

E C O N O M Y P R O B L E M S

2

The world-wide financial crisis started in

autumn 2008, with liquidity problems hitting certain

North American banks. During the fourth quarter

of the past year it evolved into a global economy

downturn. Now, the crisis is taking its toll on

Russia’s power and capability. The country’s GDP

rose by 6% in 2008, against 7% in 2006-2007,

reflecting poor results of the last quarter. This year

GDP is expected to have no growth or even fall by

few percent.

The Russian power will continue to contract for

awhile. In crisis environment, the world’s consump-

tion of fossil fuels runs low. Manufacturers reduce

production rates due to weak solvent demand.

They buy less energy and raw materials to feed

their plants and factories. Economists believe that

Russian economy will go strong again after the

price of crude oil rises above 70 dollars per barrel. It

will be doing more or less OK with the figure within

the corridor of 50-60.

When this story was written, the price was fluc-

tuating between 37 and 45 dollars. That’s below the

critical mark. And this reduces the amount of money

at hand to support Russia’s ailing defense industrial

complex, military and civil aviation.

Kremlin strategists working on the country’s

2009 annual economy plan balanced it on the

assumption that during the year a barrel of crude

oil would sell at 50 dollar on average. There is some

hope their assumption may turn out right. It was

made in November, when the oil was selling for

merely 34-38 dollars. The strategists calculated,

however, that, even at 50 dollar per barrel, the

Russian economy will make losses.

The strategists have predicted a budget deficit

this year, after a decade of profitable growth. The

years of 2009 and 2010 will be to be critical for the

Russian industrial enterprises and airlines. Some

of them will fly into bankruptcy or be devoured by

larger and more stable players. The Russian govern-

ment has indicated that it is ready to buy stakes in

private and mixed-capital companies provided they

operate in the strategic areas or carry substantial

social function. This will increase state share in the

economy, on the account of private capital.

In December 2008 Kremlin-controlled struc-

tures increased their stake in NPO Saturn to over

50%. It made the first case in the recent Russian

history when privately-control aero engine manu-

facturer went back from the private hands to the

state control. Saturn makes D-30KP/KU turbo-

fans for Il-76TD/MD airlifters and Tu-154M airlin-

ers, AL-55 non-reheated turbojets for Hindustan

Aeronautics HJT-36 trainers, cruise missile pro-

pulsion systems, marine and industrial turbines.

The company hired much money for the PowerJet

SAM.146 turbofan project undertaken jointly with

Snecma of France. But it ran out of funds in late

2008. The government moved for rescue, provid-

ing money in exchange for a control stake in the

enterprise. The SAM.146 powers Sukhoi Superjet

100 small commercial airliner. If not for the

crisis and inflated banking interest rates, Saturn

would never have gone back under government

control. This view is widely shared in the Russian

aviation community.

Addiction to petrodollarsRussia is as much dependant on export of

fossil fuels and raw materials as the oil-rich Arabs,

Iran, Venezuela etc. Saudi Arabia holds the title of

world’s largest oil exporter. Russia comes second.

But Moscow takes the lead when it comes to a

grand total of raw material export, taking account of

natural gas and minerals. Officially, the share of the

fuel sector in the nation’s economy is given at some

30%. But some experts estimate that the share of

“fossil fuel + raw materials” – based sector of the

Russian economy is as large as 70%.

CRI$I$ AND RU$$IAAfter collapses in 1991 and 1998, the Russian economy was on the way of recovery for almost ten years, riding

on the back of rising oil and natural gas prices. Late last year the petrodollar income started contracting. This

poses a threat to Vladimir Putin’s grand plans on reinstalling Russia as a manufacturing nation. What is going

to happen to Russian aviation?

PRICES FOR CRUDE OIL, BRENT

Vladimir Karnozov

144,98

65

274135

3

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

A good example of how issues with energy

resources can influence relations between great

powers and their collaborators is the natural

gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine. It took

Moscow and Kiev a whole month to come to terms,

with dead losses exceeding US dollar 5 billion for

Russia alone. Political damage to the relations

between Moscow and Western powers is difficult

to underestimate.

There has been bravado in the Kremlin-

controlled offices and the mass media about “sub-

stantial and growing” achievements of the current

administration in the deed of improving the national

economic system. Reality is darker. The Russian

economy remains strongly dependant on raw mate-

rial exports, which account for over 70% of hard

currency earnings. Volume of domestic manufactur-

ing stays low.

Little is produced in the home territory these

days. In contrast, the Soviet Union manufactured

almost everything locally. Home-made products

provided the lion’s share of the Soviet Union’s own

consumption. In fact, the Soviet people saw very

few foreign-made products in the shops, with the

rear exemptions being Indian tea, Cuban sugar and

Egyptian fruits.

All changed in the 1990s. Collapse of the

communist-style command economy opened doors

wide to foreign manufacturers. The Japanese came

with their cars, the South Koreans with home appli-

ances, Chinese with clothes and the Europeans

with all sorts of machinery (save war machines)

etc. Airbus and Boeing duly obliged Russian carri-

ers seeking modern, fuel-efficient and comfortable

airliners. Their number in the Russian fleet has

exceeded 300 units (including 84 B737s, 16 B757s,

76 A320s, 27 B767s and 12 B747s).

Not surprisingly, local output of commercial

airplanes, ships, machine tools, power units and

all other sorts of high-tech machinery dwarfed. In

some areas, such as super heavy trucks and high-

power gas turbines, Russian production ceased

entirely. This was because the foreign competitors

offered a better combination of price, reliability,

consumer qualities and after-sales support.

Today, it is difficult to name even few high-tech

areas where Russia has been keeping pace with

the US, European and Japanese manufacturers.

Perhaps the only exceptions are certain points in

defense, nuclear power and space. The leading

positions there have been kept with great difficulty.

Quite often, Russia’s leadership in a particular area

is due to the huge Soviet-time investments into

base science, technologies, development centers

and production sites.

Aviation is the area where Russia lost a lot in the

past fifteen years. To such an extent, that in some

key areas the Russian manufacturers needs huge

investments to regain competitive level. For instance,

the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) needs Rouble

500 billion to attain competitive level with the leading

western manufacturers by 2015. Of that total, Rouble

300 billion is required for development programs,

and 150 billion for technical renovation. As of this

time, government-approved programs allocate less

than 30 million in the period of 2009-2010.

Russia’s first president Boris Yeltsin and his

ministers did not care much for downturn in domes-

tic production of processed goods. And they had

had reasons for such an attitude. During Yeltsin’s

term Russia’s sovereignty was threatened. The

Kremlin inhabitants were preoccupied with fighting

separatists on all sides and doing other things to

keep Russia united. They succeeded, saving the

federal republic from a sort of collapse that hap-

pened to the Soviet Union (and which had sparked

separatist movements in the largest of former

Soviet Republics).

Economy-wise, Russia kept afloat by means

of increasing oil and metal exports. Heavy taxes

on exporters provided a stable flow of petrodollars

into the state treasury. This helped Moscow raise

a stable income in the hard currency. It was big

enough to buy from the West what the nation was

no longer producing at home.

Vladimir Putin continued Yeltsin’s policy and

perfected it. He strengthened state control over the

industry, including large producers of fossil fuels and

raw materials. At the same time, these companies

enjoyed favorable terms as far as business expan-

sion and technical renovation were concerned.

Putin’s administration has tirelessly been sew-

ing the network of oil and gas pipelines. This effort

has not been purely economical; it has carried a

political significance. New pipelines have been laid

down to provide more links between the oil fields in

Siberia and the consumers in Europe and Asia.

The Kremlin has made a few steps aimed at

strengthening Russian presence and influence on

the global market for fossil fuels and the sources of

energy in general. Putin’s administration made great

efforts in Venezuela, Algeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia

and other oil-rich countries of the developing world.

The policy of befriending other oil exporters has

produced mixed results. However, it is certainly an

achievement that, as of today, Moscow’s relations

with the above mentioned countries are best ever

in history.

After fifteen years of “don’t bother me any

longer, my little brothers” policy towards Cuba and

Syria, the Kremlin has recently chosen to resume

financial and military aid to Habana and Damascus.

Conveniently positioned in terms geographical,

Cuba and Syria are meant to serve as bases for

Russian penetration into their neighborhood: the

Spanish-speaking America and the Muslim world

Tu-204 in CUBANA colors

4

E C O N O M Y P R O B L E M S

respectively. Besides, Syria and Cuba have some

natural resources that need substantial investment

to exploit. Moscow shows willingness to provide

the requisite funds and technologies in return for

control over those resources.

Despite a heavy pressure from the West insist-

ing on Iran’s isolation, Moscow has been developing

relations with Tehran. This involves direct deliveries

of advanced rocketry (like the Thor-M1 surface-

to-air missiles – 29 launchers were shipped in

2007-2008), and prolongation of license production

rights for Russian designs such as armored vehicles

and assault rifles. The two large oil exporters have

not become close friends, thought. But they have

been improving coordination of their efforts on the

global scene. There is a growing understanding in

both Moscow and Tehran that, through expansion

of mutual trade and joint industrial undertaking,

the two nations may lessen their dependence on

the West. Russian and Iranian manufacturers would

expand outlet for their products, thus enlarging their

anchor markets.

Automotive industryAs it was mentioned above, the Russian manu-

facturing industry has been suffering from the

transition from command to open-doors economy.

Heavy and medium machinery and electronics have

been most affected.

Let us take automotive industry for illustration.

Production of Russian legacy cars has halved. The

nation now has only one large maker in the form of

AutoVAZ in Togliatti (makes Lada and Kalina series

cars). Also, there is a tiny production of UAZ 4x4

vehicles in Ulianovsk. Moscow-based AZLK ceased

production completely; Izhevsk (Izh) and Nizhny

Novgorod (GAZ) dropped their legacy models in

favor of out-of-production Korean and US designs.

By car numbers, local production accounts

for less than 40% of total sales. By value, it is

less than 20%. In 2005 Russian arms vendor

Rosoboronexport assumed control over AutoVAZ

“so as to save it for the nation”. While the maker

continues afloat, the change of proprietor does not

seem to have brought feasible changes in Lada

competitiveness.

The Russian government has been following

the situation in the automotive industry. But findings

have been rather upsetting. The national legacy cars

sector will invariably continue losing its positions to

foreign manufacturers. Furthermore, the open doors

policy attracted Chinese makers. They seem to have

been using Russia as a convenient testing range for

their cheap products.

The Kremlin tried to amend the situation by

offering global car manufacturers erect their plants

in the Russian territory, promising relaxed taxation

terms. A few Japanese and European makers seized

this opportunity. They opened “screwdriver assem-

bly workshops”, producing copies of “global model”

cars. Although these new workshops have created

some new jobs in Russia, they produced little effect

on the overall situation in the Russian automotive

industry and the inner market. And this could not

have been otherwise, since most of the car com-

ponents are imported (rather than made locally).

When the crisis hit, the Kremlin had a rude awak-

ening. Newly erected “screwdriver” factories did

not decrease the inner market dependence on the

outside world in the given area. With a substantial

drop in car sales in the late 2008, the newly erected

facilities had to stop working. Relatively low-rate,

“screwdriver”-based sort of in-house manufactur-

ing does not justify local production economically

in competition with ready-to-use cars assembled by

bigger plants abroad.

A manufacturing nationThere is a growing understanding in the Russian

society and the corridors of power that the national

economic policy should be based on the notion

that Russia is a manufacturing nation. The country

developed that way since the dawns of time.

In the early Medieval, Slav swords and mails

were most desirable trophies for both European

and Asian invaders, including German knights and

Mongolian cavalrymen. Better quality of Slav-made

arms became apparent in 1240, when the army

of Novgorod (Rus strongest northern city) subse-

quently crashed the elite of the Swedish (1240, the

Battle of the Neva River) and the German knights

NUMBER OF COMBAT, TRAINING AND TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT IN THE SOVIET INVENTORY

YEAR 1917 October 1924 1928 1930 1933 1941 June

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT 1109 326 1078 1581 316517500 combat

12100 training

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A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

(1242, the Battle of the Chudskoe Lake). These

great victories reflected the fact that Slav-made

armor was stronger and lighter than that of the

opponents.

In 1380 the Moscow-led army of the united

Russian duchies crashed numerically larger force of

the Golden Horde. Again, the Russians demonstrat-

ed better quality of their armor. Besides, for defense

of cities and castles, the Russians used cannons.

Their craftsmen went swiftly from light guns to

very heavy cannons (such as the Tsar Cannon, now

a Kremlin memorial). Artillery was something the

nomad invaders did not have.

The fall of Kazan (a khanate on the Volga River)

to the army of Ivan IV the Terrible in 1556 led to

merging of the Russian and Tatar technologies. This

enabled Russia to capitalize on this unique blend of

European and Asian achievements in arms manu-

facturing techniques. And helped the tsar’s army

withstood heavy pressure on Eastern and Western

directions. In many ways, the Russian victories of

the time were due to the advanced blade and fire

weapons produced in the country.

In 1709 the Battle of Poltava saw Peter the

Great soldiers defeating Europe’s strongest army

of the time, that of Carl XXII of Sweden. This great

victory was preceded by Peter’s sustained efforts

on improving the structure of the Russian army and

industry by means of West-European “technology

insertions”. Since then Peter’s lasting legacy was

mobilizing Russian resources to complete on equal

terms with the West.

Under Peter the Great, Russia became an empire.

St. Petersburg attracted great many talented West

Europeans for permanent residence. This helped

Russia master many of the then-advanced European

technologies. Although in somewhat smaller scale,

this strategy was carried out by Peter’s successors.

As a result, the Imperial Russia kept pace with the

Western Europe on military technologies, including

artillery and armored ship building.

There is a lot of evidence to that. Perhaps

the most illustrative is naval hardware: battle-

ships, armored cruisers and submarines. Warships

of these classes were constructed by domestic

manufacturers to the standards corresponding to

those in the United Kingdom, Germany, France and

the United States. From time to time, the Russian

Imperial Navy purchased new warships in other

countries. The purpose was to assess them and,

if necessary, set up local production. But larger

portion of newly made weapons was developed

domestically. Thus, Russia kept among world’s top

five countries in advanced weaponry making and

armed forces organization.

Born in 1917, the world’s first Republic of the

Workers and Peasants had to fight enemies on

all sides of its immense territory stretching from

The Baltic and Black Seas all the way to Pacific

waters. The new Kremlin inhabitants understood

early in their careers the importance of high-

tech, massive local production of military equip-

ment. Revolutionary leader Vladimir Lenin launched

GOELRO project calling for “total electrofication”

of the country. Thus, Lenin laid foundations of

Russia’s next-generation economy.

In 1929 Josef Stalin launched the great indus-

trialization campaign by adopting the Soviet Union’s

first Five Year Economic Plan. In four years that

followed the Soviet industry assembled 4,289 new

aircraft, and 2952 more in 1933. The new indus-

trial policy focused on erecting thousands of small,

medium and large plants all over the country.

Among others, aviation plants were erected in

Irkutsk, Novosibirsk, Komsomolsk-upon-Amur. To

this day these plants remain Russia’s largest pro-

ducers of fighter aircraft.

In the 1930s, the Soviet Union developed

faster than any other country. In 1939 it became

the world’s third largest economy after the USA

and Germany. Stalin laid foundations of the Soviet

military-industrial complex, which later evolved into

the Russian defense-industrial complex. Whatever

is being said and written today about Lenin and

Stalin, one fact remains undisputed: the communist

leaders succeeded in bringing the Russian industry

into a new quality level, sufficient enough to defend

the USSR from its aggressive neighbors such as

Japan and Germany.

When, in the late 1930s, the world went onto a

massive war, the Soviet Union emerged as a promi-

nent exporter of advanced war machines. Moscow

supplied fighters, bombers, tanks and cannons to

Republican Spain, China, Czechoslovakia etc. The

Soviet-made equipment fared well against that of

the Japanese in China and Mongolia, and against

that of the Germans and Italians in Spain.

In particular, the popular Polikarpov I-16 was

the world’s first fighter to have retractable landing

gears. Equipped by powerful M-25 radial piston

engines (later replaced by more powerful M-62/63 –

these motors were manufactured in Moscow, at the

enterprise now known as MMPP Salut), the I-16

developed top speed of 450km/h, a record for its

time. Strongly-built and agile, I-16 fighters won

numerous air duels with contemporary Japanese,

German and Italian designs.

In summer 1939 the Red Army aviation and

armor units crashed numerically larger Japanese

expedition force in Mongolia. Japanese equipment

was outclassed by the Russian one. Suffering three

times larger losses and complete defeat in the

battlefield, the Japan made decision to maintain

peace with the Soviet Union for the next five years.

“Disproportioned” losses in 1939 made Tokyo

refrain from attacking the Soviet Union even when

its strategic ally Germany had its forces fighting at

Moscow outskirts in winter 1941/1942.

When fascist Germany invaded Soviet Union

in June 1941, VVS RKKA (acronym for the Air

force of the Workers and Peasants Red Army) had

17,500 combat aircraft. This number included 9,288

fighters (of which about two thousand copies of

brand-new MiG, LaGG and Yak types), 5,065 frontal

bombers (including 458 Pe-2 diving bombers),

2,147 heavy bombers, 611 close air support air-

6

E C O N O M Y P R O B L E M S

planes (including 249 Il-2 armored attack aircraft)

and 560 reconnaissance.

The bloody and vigorous war with the fas-

cist Germany 1941-1945 gave another boost to

development of the Russian weapons school and

production capability. The Soviet Union managed

to produce more aircraft, tanks and cannons than

Germany. Despite heavy losses in 1941-1942, the

Red Army’s might grew fast, surpassing that of the

invaders in 1943. Although the German industry

was larger, the Soviet Union attained high produc-

tion rate of military equipment by increasing its

share to 65-68% of the total output.

During the war, the Soviet Union manufactured

102,8 thousand tanks and self-propelled cannons

against 65 thousands for Germany. The Soviet

aviation industry grew fast. In 1941 the industry

had 466,4 thousand workers on about 80 plants,

including 174.4 thousand people employed on 24

airframe and 7 aero engine plants. Daily produc-

tion output exceeded 50 airplanes. In 1945 the

Soviet Aviation industry increased its labor force to

640,213 and number of airframe plants to 34.

After WW2 the Soviet Union’s might was only

matched by that of the USA. Moscow even managed

to outdo Washington in space, by placing Sputnik

into orbit in 1957 and making Yuri Gagarin first man

in space in 1961. Only USSR and USA appeared

capable of development and series production of

strategic bombers (the Tupolev Tu-95 and Tu-160

versus B-52, B-1B and B-2) and intercontinental

ballistic missiles with multiply warheads. In the

last years of its existence the Soviet Union created

through-deck aircraft carriers (other producers the

USA and France only) and nuclear-powered subma-

rines (US, France, UK and China only).

Sometimes the high Soviet technologies

became available to its friends and neighbors.

During 1988-1992 the Indian Navy operated the

Chakra, a nuclear submarine of the Project 670

type that previously served the Russian Navy as

the K-43. The Indian Navy acquired eight Tupolev

Tu-142 ASW aircraft sharing airframe and systems

with the Tu-95 Bear strategic bomber. Next step is

associated with the Project 971 nuclear subma-

rine, Tu-22MR supersonic maritime reconnaissance

aircraft and the INS Vikramaditya through-deck

aircraft carrier.

Oil trapThe pace of Russian technology development

slowed down with the collapse of the Soviet Union

in 1991. Some experts, including then– Russian

prime-minister Egor Gaidar, believed that the sharp

fall of crude oil prices delivered a final blow to the

Soviet Union. Why and how did it happen? Gaidar

has the answer.

The 1973 war in the Middle East caused a sharp

rise in oil prices, from 1.9 dollar at the turn of the

century to 12 in 1974. This urged the Soviets to sell

their “black gold” to the West for hard currency. The

market accepted the offer. In the period of 1971 to

1975 the daily production of oil in the Soviet Union

rose from 7.6 million barrels (one million ton) to

9.9 million barrels (1.4 million ton). This enabled

the Kremlin not just stabilize the national economy

– the Soviet Union launched massive investment

programs in the national defense and questionable

“free-bee” programs on support of communist-

style political regimes in the developing world.

As time went on, Kremlin planners got used

to these “extra funds”. They put together national

economy development plans, taking for granted

smooth petrodollar flow into the state treasury.

The Soviet leaders mistook the behavior of the oil

market. They allowed too much exposure of the

national economics to the international market

outside their control. After a rise to 35-40 dollar per

barrel in the late 1979-early 1980, the oil prices fell

from the peak of 50-60 to 15-17 dollars per barrel

in the late 1980s. The price then stabilized at this

level for a decade.

The Soviet Union tried to keep its earnings high

by increasing, in 1987-1989, the output to 12.6 mil-

lion barrels daily or nearly 20% of the world’s total.

Export rose to 3.7 million barrels daily or 15% of

OPEC capacity. Still, because of the low prices, the

flow of petrodollars came lower than expected. This

caught Moscow off guard, and corrective action

was not made. The oil-addicted industry did not

timely curtail large-scale production of numerous

and expensive weaponry. This soon rendered the

whole country a bankrupt.

In 1990s the Russian government made Rouble

exchangeable. It was definitely a quantum leap in

the economy management. But this measure alone

did not save the national banking system from a

complete collapse in 1998. The most plausible

explanation of the 1998 events is that that the Urals

brand oil was selling for merely 7.8 dollars per

barrel, the lowest point in the recent history. In the

conditions of weak demand, Russian oil production

drops by 40%. It then ran at 6.2 million barrel daily,

making it just 8.3% of world’s production – the

export was 2.3 million, or 7.5% of OPEC capacity.

As the oil price grew again, the Russian finan-

cial system recovered. In 2000 the price went up to

30 dollars. This urged Russia rise its daily produc-

tion to 7.7 million barrels against Saudi Arabia’s 8.7

million in 2002. This quickly stabilized the nation-

al economy. During 2003-2007, Rouble to Euro

exchange rate was more or less stable, averaging at

35 (it floated between 33.33 and 37.83). During the

first three quarters of 2008 the exchange rate fluctu-

ated between 36 and 37. The US dollar was selling

at 30.6 Roubles in September 2003. It dropped 27.7

in 2005, and then steadily fell (2006 – mid 2008) to

the lowest point of 23.2 in July 2008.

The International Monetary Fund commended

on the strong economic performance of the Russian

economy, noting that it had been “not only to high

oil prices”, but also “a good marco economic

management”. Was it just some flattery for the

Kremlin? Months after this comment came, the

period of Rouble’s stability ended. In October 2008,

the exchange rate to Euro came to 34.4 (reflect-

ing the relative rise of the dollar to Euro) and then

skyrocketed to 41.63 at the year-end. The dollar

also rose sharply, to 30 a the year-end and 33.5 in

January 2009.

The main source of anti-crisis measures in

the Kremlin’s possession is so-called State Gold

and Hard Currency Reserves. In autumn 2008

the reserves rose to US dollar 600 billion. At the

end of the year the figure dropped to 430 billion

(no official explanation was given). “In recent

years it has become increasingly difficult to collect

and analyse meaningful data on Russian Federal

budget, and particularly the finances of Russian

national defense, owing to a number of presenta-

tional changes” – a good remark on Page 209 of the

Military Balance 2008 issued by the International

Institute for strategic studies (IISS, London).

In late 2008 the Russian government made

decision to provide Rouble 5 trillion to major

Russian banks so as to help Russian financial

system survive the crisis. Four banks were named

as primary receivers: Saving Bank, VTB, VEB and

Gazprombank.

So far, none of prominent Russian banks

went bankrupt. While executing a more careful

approach to lending money than before the cri-

sis, the banks remain busy and afloat. Ups and

downs with the Rouble do not seem to bother

them much, since many deals are made in the

“dollar+Euro” coordinates.

Banks are fine; who is suffering? Let’s look

at the Index of Moscow MMVB exchange. It

dropped from 1,600-1,800 points in early 2008

7

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

down to some 600 in October – December 2008.

I then dropped tobelow 600 in January 2009.

The Russian exchange index went down by three

times, while the western counties registered drops

by one-third at maximum. This reflects the fact

that foreign and local investors have been pulling

their money out of the Russian economy. The lat-

ter is no longer “a point of growth”. The oil selling

at 45 dollars per barrel, at the level of 1980, the

Russian economy is of no interest. The investors

are likely to come back when the crisis is over and

the oil prices go up again. It is not expected before

2010-2011, though.

ForecastWill Putin’s Russia follow the path of the

Soviet Union in similar circumstances? It remains

to be seen. There are signs that the attitude of the

Russian decision makers and society to the issue

of “real” and “virtual” economics is starting to

change. The decision in favor of “real economy”

development would entail a set of measures aimed

at development of in-house manufacturing capabil-

ity. One of the reasons is to lessen dependence on

the global market.

Today’s oil-based economy does not provide

stability in the view of unpredictable behavior of

the fossil fuel prices in the global marketplace. The

oil price dropped from 144.8 dollar per barrel (July

2008) down to 34.4 (November 2008), more than

fourfold within four months! This fact gives evi-

dence of how unstable the global market can be.

The Kremlin has made some corrective actions.

It has pumped Rouble 5 trillion into the four lead-

ing banks. It also provided support to a tiny group

of airlines and industrial enterprises. On the eve of

the New Year Vladimir Putin said the government

is putting together a list of 300-400 strategically

important and up to 1,500 socially important enter-

prises. These will receive financial aid from the

Russian government and favorable credits from the

four leading banks. On 26 December the Russian

government issued the list with 290 enterprises on

it, including United Aircraft Corporation, RSK MiG

and KAPO.

Besides, the Russian government has pre-

pared draft of the law for State Weapons Order

2009-2011. Spending on national defense is going

to be increased, Putin said. Besides, the govern-

ment is ready to increase the share of state funding

in research-and-development projects that were

previously meant to have shared funding (Russian

government, export customer, investors, manufac-

turers’ own money). These measures shall support

the Russian military industrial complex suffering

from a system crisis.

The federal budget for 2009 provides govern-

mental air of Rouble 2.5 billion to airlines operating

“socially important routes”. Draft budget for 2010

is twice that amount. Which airlines may get the

money? Not clear yet. It is believed that a good

portion will go to OOO Aviakompania. This is a

newly established company that is accepting con-

trol over AirUnion, Atlant-Soyuz, GTK Rossiya and

Vladivostok Avia. The merger is controlled by Sergei

Chemezov’s Russian Technologies state corpora-

tion (Rostechnologii). The new carrier, which is yet

to be formed, may provide serious competition to

Aeroflot on both domestic and international routes.

While the Kremlin’s promises may sound well,

will they be kept? At the end of the past year the

Russian government and banks gave the ailing

manufacturers and airlines only a fraction of the

promised funds. This fact was acknowledged by

Russian president Dmitry Medvedev on 10 January.

When visiting MMPP Salut plant (Moscow-based

manufacturer producing AL-31F/FN and AI-222

engines for Su-30MK/34 and Yak-130 warplanes),

he said the government works too slowly imple-

menting anti-crisis measures in the real economy.

He added that the current banking rates are not

affordable for companies of the heavy industries.

Medvedev is certainly right. The Russian banks

offered the industry credits at 6-10% before the

crisis and 16-20% after it hit. The latter is too

expensive for the manufacturing industry with long

cycles, such as aircraft production.

Critics say the Russian government unspoken

policy is to wait passively for the oil to get expensive

again, while providing restricted support to a nar-

row circle of “real economy” companies. Russia’s

Central Bank is expected to purposely reduce value

of the national currency in relation to US Euro/dollar

basket, further by 30-50%. (One dollar changed for

23.2 in July 2008, and for 31-33.5 in January 2009).

The weak Rouble would render export orders lucra-

tive for the industry. It increases competitiveness of

the Russian products in the international market.

Our prediction for 2009-2010 is the follow-

ing one. We expect Russian aviation industry to

execute a narrower focusing on well-selling legacy

products such as the Sukhoi Flanker series fighters,

Mil Mi-17 helicopters and Tupolev Tu-204 airliners.

Expected annual output is 40-50, 60-70 and 10-15

units respectively. At the same time, the schedules

of next-generation products will shift further into a

more distant future.

Explanation is that production cycle for a

certified aircraft, be it a Su-30MK, a Mi-17 or a

Tu-204, falls between 12 and 18 months. Pricing

(manufacturing expenses, labor costs, customer

value etc.) and price degradation over years of

operational service are known or predictable.

Banks will fund production of the tried products

since the risks involved are relatively low, and the

time cycle is short enough. Newer products may

offer higher gains, but they imply higher risks and

longer return times. The latter is less acceptable in

the conditions of liquidity shortage, market stag-

nation and instability.

8

On January 11, 2009 the Russian President

Dmitry Medvedev visited Salut MMPP

(Moscow Machine-Building Production

Plant), got acquainted with manufacturing process

of aircraft engines and industrial gas turbines and

chaired a meeting to discuss issues of stabilisation

of the situation in real economy. The President

was accompanied by his Assistants, Deputy Prime

Ministers and other Members of the Government,

the Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed

Forces, the Mayor of Moscow, and heads of several

leading Russian banks.

Salut is one of the leading Russian manufactur-

ers of aircraft engines and industrial gas turbines.

It was founded in 1912 and now produces AL-31F

engines for the Su-27/30 family of fighter aircraft

as well as other products vital for national defence

and energy industry. Salut was one of 295 enter-

prises defined by the government in December,

2008 as crucial for national economy and bound

to receive government’s support to overcome the

global financial crisis.

Addressing the meeting, President Medvedev

said: “As early as October, I gave a series

of instructions to the Government, which were

directed towards the systematic support for the

sector during the global financial crisis. The

Government is working, those instructions are

being fulfilled, although, I must admit that at

the moment we are not in a position to say that

we have done all that is necessary. The imple-

mentation of these measures is happening more

slowly than we expected, and what is more impor-

tant, more slowly than the current circumstances

require. I have just looked at the data: only 30%

of what had been envisaged has been carried out,

and parts of the instructions have extended the

time by which they need to be completed. We

must get to grips with all of this, and take the

necessary measures to energise our work.

Let me say that this is by no means a simple

situation, the volume of industrial production in

the period October-December last year, on aver-

age, fell by more than 6% per month, compared

with the same period in 2007. Of course, this was

the result of the decrease not only in domestic

demand, but also in the significant fall in export

prices which fell significantly in several different

production areas. In metallurgy there was a fall in

prices from 30 to 70%, in the machine building

sector the global market price fell from 20 to 60%.

All this, of course, does nothing to make the situ-

ation more straightforward.

Secondly, what makes the situation even more

difficult, and what creates problems, is the fact that

most businesses have quite serious deficits in their

cash reserves. The interest rates on credit taken

have increased, and additional demands are made

on companies to secure their credit against assets,

and other guarantees supporting the credit applica-

tion. And all this, of course, has led to the decreased

profitability of industry, and in many cases has led

simply to businesses operating at a loss.

Thirdly, all these factors have made the situation

regarding the budget more difficult, and of course,

particularly in the regions. Practically everywhere

we forecast a decreased budgetary income. To sum

it up – it’s a complex situation. I should say that we

did foresee this. This is wholly difficult time. The

main thing, that I wanted to speak about, is the fact

that we must be swifter both in our actions, and in

the answers we find to these problems. We have set

to work on passing the regulations and subordinate

legislation, but even here, many things are simply

taking an unforgivable length of time”.

President Medvedev pointed out some posi-

tive factors of the current economical situation: “a

lowered price on raw materials and on components,

which in the long run are sure to give industry the

ability to run a more flexible pricing policy. “Today,

(and of course this is bad for our metallurgists,

but nonetheless for companies such as “Salut” it

does have also a positive effect) the price of metals

is falling. But here we simply need to look at the

Russian engine manufacturers included in the

list of enterprises crucial for national economy

and bound to receive government’s support to

overcome the global financial crisis: Chernyshev

MMP (Moscow), Klimov (St.Petersburg), Perm

Motors Plant (Perm), Salut MMPP (Moscow)

Saturn (Rybinsk), UMPO (Ufa).

THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT DMITRY MEDVEDEV VISITS SALUT

Alexander VelovichPhotos: Nikolay Laskov

9

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

price offered to our consumers for the products. Of

course it should be accompanied by a fall in produc-

tion costs, which would be no bad thing. And, in

the end, even on the background of a falling growth

rate, we could see an increase in labour efficiency

in industry this year, irrespective of the very difficult

context”. The Russian President reminded that a

commission on increasing sustainable growth in the

economy has been created as part of Government,

comprising key industries and organisations, and it

had taken several most important decisions.

The President warned against reorganizations

and reforms for purely the sake of reforms them-

selves in the difficult times of the financial crisis: “I

am just drawing attention to the fact that our main

task is the protection of our production base, not

reform”. These particular words may be regarded

as a victory of Yury Eliseyev, the Salut Director

General, who is reported to oppose the inclusion

of his plant in an integrated engine-manufacturing

concern controlled by Russian Technologies cor-

poration. Salut still retains the status of a Federal

State Unitary Enterprise. This year the Russian gov-

ernment plans to provide RUR 300 billion (Russian

roubles) for credit guarantees for businesses, of

them one third is dedicated to the defence indus-

try complex.. However, the president remarked:

“All these credit procedures are very bureaucratic,

including in the banks themselves, where the time

it takes to make the agreement is simply endless”.

“Today it is simply unforgivable for the documents

to take so long to complete”, he added.

Prepayment for work on national defence

orders and on federal programmes was another

question discussed at the meeting. The president

stated: “The work on this is going extremely slowly,

everyone is complaining. Another theme that we

ought to consider – is what additional measures,

and mechanisms are needed in order to raise the

overall efficiency of the all steps we have taken

both in the budgetary-financial sphere and in the

support of the real economy”. The president urged

Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin to take the issue

under his control and to implement changes to

administrative technology “adequate to the current

tasks before us, and which is fully focused on the

serious financial crisis”.

10

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11

On 15 January, 2009 the Russian Prime

Minister Vladimir Putin visited the head-

quarters of Tactical Missiles Corporation in

Korolev, near Moscow. Avoiding traffic jams, the

prime minister arrived at the TMC premises in a

helicopter. He made a tour of the missile manufac-

turing plant and then Putin chaired a meeting on

the measures of state support to enterprises of the

defence industry complex. Deputy Prime Ministers

Sergey Ivanov, Igor Sechin and Alexei Kudrin,

the Minister of Economics Elvira Nabiullina, the

Russian Central Bank Vhairman Sergey Ignatyev

and over 30 other government officials, repre-

sentatives of financial institutions and director

generals of Russian defence enterprises attended

the meeting.

TMC incorporates 19 enterprises develop-

ing and manufacturing missiles and other guided

smart weapons for the Russian Air Force and the

Navy. The situation at TMC corporation is typical

of Russia’s defence industry which incorporates

about 1,400 entreprisese employing over 1.5 mil-

lion people. Putin acknowledged that the economic

crisis has influenced the denece industry complex.

“Many enterprises of this segment have encoun-

tered delays of payments for shipped orders,

their creditor’s debt has increased, they have met

difficulties in getting bank loans”. Under these

circumstances, “an adequate reaction of the state

is needed,” said the Prime Minister.

The Russian government plans to spend over

RUR 1 trillion (Russian roubles, about $30 billion

USD) for defence orders in 2009, and about RUR

4 billion in the years 2009-11. Putin believes that

this spending will allow the defence industry to

survive in the crisis when orders from commercial

sector have fallen significantly. Boris Obnosov says

that in 2008 80 per cent of TMC’s revenues came

from export orders, and only 20 per cent – from

contracts from the Russian Armed Forces. Among

the leading customers Obnosov names India and

China, and recently Venesuela, Algeria and Vietnam

as well. This year the proportion of export and

domestic revenues is expected to change signifi-

cantly in favour of domestic orders.

In December, 2008 the Russian government

approved the list of 295 enterprises crucial for the

national economy and bound to receive financial

support from the state. TMC, Almaz-Antey PVO

Concern, United Aircraft Corporation, RAC MiG

and other major defence industry enterprises are

included in that list.

Taxation preferences, state guarantees for bank

loans including writing off bank interest payments

and direct loans from the Central bank of Russia

are among the measures considered to provide

support for the defence industry. The state budget

figures for 2009-11 provide for RUR 100 billion for

state loan guarantees, plus RUR 50 billion more for

subsidizing interest rate payments, anti-bankruptcy

measures and direct capital investments.

The Prime Minister stressed: “As I said more

than once, we have to thoroughly monitor the

situation in the real economy sector, and literally in

a day-by-day mode evaluate the efficiency of anti-

crisis measures which awe are working out in order

to make, if needed, additional decisions in time

and correct what has been already adopted and

planned”.Amendments to Russia’s Taxation Code

have been adopted to make easier procedures of

tax debts restructuring and providing investment

tax loans.

The Prime Minister warned that the gov-

ernment will differentiate between enterprises in

financial trouble due to objective causes and

those which have constant difficulties because of

systematic poor management. Top manager of the

latter ones are likely to be easily replaced because

the state still keeps them in the Federal property.

The government and the Central bank have

provided commercial banks with substantial

money to credit the real economy sector, how-

ever so far this money is scarcely reaching enter-

prises because of very bureaucratic procedures of

approving bank loans.

The Prime Minister mentioned also the neces-

sity to continue investments in technology mod-

ernization of production plants as well as crucial

research and development programmes. “We have

to optimize federal defence task programmes and

direct the saved money for completion and realiza-

tion of projects critical for upgrading the technol-

ogy level of our defence industry”, said Putin.

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance

Alexei Kudrin confirmed that “optimization and

restructuring are needed, however, he warned that

there would be no increase in the overall sum of

R&D and production technology investment pro-

grams. So some of them could benefit only at the

expense of the others.

Indirectly acknowledging that so far restruc-

turing of the defence industry has not brought

anticipated results, the Prime Minister instructed to

speed up work on boosting efficiency of integrated

defence industry holdings. “What for have we

formed them? We need to make them really com-

petitive, and thus not only meet the requirements

of our Armed Forces, but also expand the export

potential of Russia’s defence industry”. Detailed

strategy how to reach that objective has not been

made public, though.

Alexander Velovich

VLADIMIR PUTIN VISITS VLADIMIR PUTIN VISITS TACTICAL MISSILES CORPORATIONTACTICAL MISSILES CORPORATION

12

B I G B O S S T A L K I N G

– Please tell us about results of the past year. How restructuring of the Russian aviation industry has been going?

– In the past year we carried on with consistent

efforts on reforming core business and enterprises

of our corporation. Let me remind you, the United

Aircraft Corporation was established in 2006, in

accordance with the decree of the president of the

Russian Federation. UAC strategy was approved in

February 2008. It postulates that the Corporation’s

structure shall have three new business units.

Initial plans allowed us three years to set them up

and running. But life makes us go faster. By the

end of 2008 the business units “Civil Aviation” and

“Transport Aviation” had been established. Now

we are doing some structural work to supplement

these new establishments by moving plants and

design houses under control of these units and

specializing them.

“Combat Aviation” business unit will take into

shape during 2009. It will take after Sukhoi and

MiG companies, by accepting control over their

assets. Initial plan called for forming this structure

sometime later, with completion of the founding

process in two years’ time. But life makes us go

faster. We had to initiate the founding process in

the end of 2008.

As per UAC itself… it is up and running now,

following completion of the founding process and

forming of the core team in the head office. By

now, the core team has been formed. It enables

us carry out all the functions that were prescribed

for UAC by the presidential decree [dated February

2006] and charter documents. By far and large,

UAC has accepted the function of control over the

whole of Russian fixed wing aircraft manufacturing

industry. Besides, councils of directors have been

formed on all daughter companies.

Corporate Strategy provided base for putting

together plans of our subsidiaries. The Strategy

was approved by UAC board of directors in the

beginning of 2008. It was then submitted to the

government for approval, and got it. The Strategy

lists aircraft models that UAC shall manufac-

ture at its plants. It also gives exact figures for

production output.

So, the primary result of the past year is that

we laid firm foundations for our industry to start

functioning as a system.

As we speak, I still do not have yet exact fig-

ures for UAC operational results and performance

in 2008. Preliminary calculations indicate that the

production output came to about Rouble 100 bil-

lion, roughly the same figure we reported for 2007.

In the conditions of world-wide financial crisis, it is

not bad, at least in my view.

A special effort – perhaps not so visible one

yet – has been done in the sphere of renovation.

We have done a lot introducing new technologies,

purchasing new equipment and installing it. Today,

anyone of our plants has newly installed facilities,

tooling, machines etc. This is something that

shall help us boost our competitiveness, improve

manufacturing quality and reduce costs. Higher

competitiveness shall enable UAC to hope for

larger orders in conditions of the modern market

dominated by western manufacturers.

– How hard is it to restructure the Russian aviation industry?

– It is a hard work, indeed. The new system is

being created not from a clean sheet. Much rather,

it is being created on the base of what Russia

inherited from the Soviet Union. Foundations of

the Soviet aviation industry were laid down back

in the 1930s. That time the Soviet Union erected a

number of new plants, and these still remain larg-

est in the country. Those are the aviation plants

in Komsomolsk-upon-Amur, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk

etc. Process of reforming this industry, changing

its structure and tuning it to the realities of the

modern world is a very hard work that requires

determination, patience and managerial skills.

– How long will it take UAC to restructure the industry? And how much will it cost?

– We need to invest over one billion dollars

into technical renovation of our enterprises. In

Typescript of an interview with Alexey Fedorov, UAC president and

Chairman of Executive Board

FOR UNITED FOR UNITED A IRCRAFTA IRCRAFT

UPS & UPS & DOWNSDOWNS

Vladimir Karnozov

B I G B O S S T A L K I N G

13

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

large part, investments go into development of

commercial aircraft production. More funds – in

order of several billion dollars – are needed for

development of new airplanes employing new

technologies. Related plans and programs are

supplemented by direct funding from the state

budget and by governmental measures meant

to help us raise funds on the financial market. I

believe that, despite the difficult situation in the

world’s economy, these plans and programs

will materialize.

We are working to enlarger production output

of our primary civilian product, the Tupolev Tu-204

narrow body airliner. Its assembly line is set in

Ulianovsk. In the meanwhile, UAC is setting up

production of new-generation regional aircraft,

the An-148 in Voronezh and Superjet 100 in

Komsomolsk-upon-Amur. Next year we shall bring

these new aircraft into the marketplace and hand

their first deliverable examples to airlines. Thus,

with addition of those two models, our current

product range will expand considerably.

There are important programs going on in the

military aviation. Development of the Su-35 and

MiG-35 multirole fighters continues in full gear.

These new aircraft shall appear in the marketplace

in near future.

Ulianovsk is selected for production of the

Ilyushin Il-76 heavy air lifter in a much upgraded

version with modern avionics, onboard systems

and power plants. This aircraft is compliant to

all national and international requirements. It

can operate with the Armed Forces and com-

mercial airlines. Ulianovsk-built Il-76s of this

renewed version can fly around the world with-

out restrictions, since they are compliant to all

international regulations.

– These days, when people listen to the radio or watch TV, they hear about job cuts and eco-nomic downturn. When I hear you it seems that UAC lives in another world, with plans for higher production output and introduction of new prod-ucts. Why is that so?

– If we do not launch new projects then there

will be no future for the Russian aviation industry.

That’s why we have no choice but to continue with

all of our key projects. Corrections to our plans

may take place, in terms of funding available for

a certain project. When UAC Strategy was being

worked out, we thought it over very carefully.

Especially, what aircraft models should be pro-

duced in the next ten to twenty years? Selection

of suitable models was quire serious. We took

into consideration the overall market situation, our

ability to penetrate certain markets in the global

marketplace, development of new technologies.

Screening took time and was very serious. It was

rendered complete, though.

Now, we simply cannot put on hold programs

that are on the list approved by the government –

the list UAC submitted to government together

with its Strategy. We submitted it and won govern-

mental approval. Today, we are all set to achieve

every target set before us by the President of

Russia and the Chairman of the Russian govern-

ment. There is no alternative to this: we either

master new products or forget about the future of

the Russian aviation.

– How does our plan correspond to the general situation in the global aviation market?

– The situation in the global aviation market is

such that without development of new generation

aircraft, without fulfillment of investment projects,

there is no chance to ensure future of the Russian

industry. I do not exclude the very chance of intro-

ducing corrections into our ongoing programs.

Changes that would reflect current economic situ-

ation as far as production volumes are concerned.

Markets are contracting right now. Seemingly, in

the next two-three years there will be no solvent

demand for new aircraft. But understanding of

this reality does not eliminate the very need for

us to create new products. So, we will introduce

new products in the military sphere and in the

civil aviation. There is no doubt about that. It is

the only way for the Russian aviation industry to

stay in business.

– You said that UAC has a requirement for billions of dollars to be invested. Do you consider

state budget allocations as primary source? Are you also targeting private capital?

– At this stage, state financing is, of course,

the primary source of funding for UAC. Our

Strategy calls for three phases of company devel-

opment. The first one is anti-crisis management,

it runs till 2010. At this stage the focus is on

recovery of our plants and design houses. Later

on, in 2010-2011, we shall enter equity markets

through the mechanism of Initial Public Offering

(IPO). Since that time, we expect higher income

of private investments into UAC programs. The

Strategy also calls for the period of stabilization,

from 2011 till 2015. Private capital is expected

to take the lead that time. Then, in 2015, we shall

enter the period of profitable growth. Private capi-

tal prevails over state investments, with minimiza-

tion of the government’s role as investor. That time

we will live on our own money and hired private

capital. To achieve this, UAC plans to employ vari-

ous mechanisms and tools normally used for this

purpose in the developed world. This period of

time is expected to coincide with a rapid growth of

the international aviation market, both combat and

civil aviation. Our goal is to get properly prepared

and, when it is high time for it, move forward and

capture a sizeable portion of the market.

– How confident are you when you speak about chances of this great plan to come true? It is difficult to image that it will come true today, in the conditions of world-wide financial crisis.

– Issues pertaining to financial support for

our capability extension programs were discussed

at UAC council of directors on 30 December.

The council took place in the White House of the

Russian Government. It was chaired by the dep-

uty chairman of the Russian government Sergei

Ivanov. Council members gave their assessment

14

B I G B O S S T A L K I N G

of the current situation in the industry, voiced their

ideas and plans for the future. They also discussed

issues pertaining to corrections to the mecha-

nisms of state support to the aviation industry.

By far and large, these mechanisms have been to

do with subsidizing banking interest rates (the gov-

ernment “slashes” interest rates on credits taken in

commercial banks). When these mechanisms were

introduced, it was taken for granted that UAC would

enjoy rather easy access to hired capital (there was

every indication to this). There were positive deci-

sions made by the council of VneshTorgBank (VTB),

as well as leadership of other large banks, including

the Savings Bank and VTB. However, at the end

of 2008, all changed. It happened that access to

affordable credit lines became more difficult. In

fact, the access was severely limited. Because of

this, we have not managed to make use of a large

portion of government-promised subsidies. In other

words, the state support, which had been promised,

was not actually rendered to us because we did not

manage to arrange enough credits.

I believe that the mechanisms of state support

shall change in this New Year of 2009. The volume

of support may even stay the same, though. It is

necessary to introduce special measures of state

insurance for the industry. We have applied to the

government with respective initiatives. Today, the

state insurance becomes absolutely necessary. It

is an irreplaceable tool in the conditions of manual

control over the economy – something we have

today, in the time of the crisis. We believe that,

through successful employment of these mecha-

nisms, we shall be able to continue with technical

renovation of our core enterprises. Thus, we will be

able to increase production of our new airplanes.

My prediction is that the private capital will

be reluctant to take part in the long-term aircraft

manufacturing programs. Because of the risks

that are high enough and the fact that capital

turnover time is rather long. Therefore, for us it

is very important that the Government keeps vol-

umes of promised state support, while introducing

changes timely into the mechanisms of state sup-

port and insurance.

– You said that, in the New Year, the volume of state support would stay unchanged. What was the level of that support in 2008?

– In the period of 2009-2010 a total of some

26-28 billion Rouble is allocated for us in a num-

ber of Federal Target Programs. The lion’s share

of the government funding goes to us along the

lines of the Federal Purpose Programs entitled

“Development of civil aviation” and “Development

of Military Industrial Complex”. I hope that the allo-

cations in these Programs will remain unchanged

and that the money will actually be provided.

Aircraft manufacturing is one of the industries

that determine technical level of any large country

and its defense capability. Because of the economic

downturn the Russian government is considering

cuts in the state budget allocations for long-term

investment programs. But I believe these cuts will

not apply to aviation-related allocations.

Besides, there is a hope that the above named

Federal Programs will actually be revised for high-

er volumes of state investment into the aviation

industry. Current version of the Federal Program

“Development of Civil Aviation” expires in 2010. A

newer version is being put together right now. We

expect the renewed version of the Program to be

approved by the Russian government soon and put

into force in 2011. We also hope that this new ver-

sion would contain larger figures of state support

for the aviation industry.

– Mass media reports on job cuts both in Russia and abroad. Are you going to cut your staff?

– Unlike other industries, we plan neither cuts

to our staff, nor freezing or shelving of our key

programs. On the contrary, in 2009 we will create

some new jobs. Surely, we will make steps to opti-

mize structure of our staff. There are too many of

managers and auxiliary workers. At the same time,

we will increase numbers of those who actually

work in the shops. We will re-train people currently

employed in auxiliary areas.

– Perhaps re-training programs will address not only UAC staff, but also other industries. Are there any signs that people from other industries seek for jobs in the aviation industry?

– Yes, there are indications for that. Figuratively

speaking, UAC is a locomotive of a very large indus-

try. About 100 thousand people are employed on

UAC enterprises. With all of our supply chain taken

into account, the number of jobs in the whole of

Russian aviation amounts to half a million. We

need new technologies, and, respectively, skilled

personnel. In plain words, we need people who can

see to newly installed equipment, to ensure that

this equipment works to capacity and in an effec-

tive way. After UAC was established and started

working on ramping up production, we began to

feel shortage of skilled personnel. Our industrial

partners feel the same. They have also launched

restructuring process and invested a lot into new

technologies and equipment. Our industrial part-

ners feel shortage of skilled personnel, and so they

execute programs on training and re-training of

their personnel, and invite professional people to

take vacancies. All this requires a huge amount of

work. We have agreed to join forces. We have pre-

pared a list of measures that we would undertake

jointly with our suppliers, including those on train-

ing and re-training of aviation industry personnel.

– How does UAC product range look like? Does it differ much from the one that the Russian avia-tion industry had had before UAC was founded?

– Our product range was firmed up last year.

What we had in the beginning was a collection of

all the models that our plants were manufacturing

at that time, plus those that our design houses

were developing. Smaller half of these models

passed screening. Quite simply, the models that

made the larger half did not have prospects for

future. We focused on those models that had

15

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

some sales potential, those that could sell in the

open market, and those that were in demand with

our customers. It is still possible that UAC prod-

uct range changes somewhat, to reflect recent

changes in the global market for new aircraft

and in the view of the possibility that UAC joins

international alliances. We continue talking to

our European partners in EADS and also those in

Boeing of US. We are talking to the Indian aviation

industry. If we do join an international alliance,

some corrections to UAC production range may

become necessary.

– Does Russian industry lag behind the West in high technologies? If so, how big is the gap? How long will it take Russia to catch up with the West?

– In the sphere of combat aircraft, we are same

level with the world leaders. Sukhoi and MiG have

some fairly advanced models that meet expecta-

tions of our customers and compete successfully

on the international market. Roughly, we control

10-12% of the global market of frontline aviation.

New products are coming soon. They will further

increase our competitiveness and make it possible

to enlarge our market share, up to 15-16%.

The most problematic situation is with civil avia-

tion. There is certain technological gap here. We are

planning to catch up with the West by 2015. We are

going to do this by means of streamlining produc-

tion of the Superjet and selling it in large quantities

world-wide. Not just the baseline model, the Superjet

100 that is undergoing flight trials. We put faith into

the MS-21, a new design in the class of narrow

body commercial airliners. This airplane is meant to

make history. It shall be a real breakthrough for the

Russian aviation industry. Certification of this new

product is scheduled for 2016.

One more product with which we will be

positioning ourselves in the global marketplace

is a widebody short-to-medium haul airplane

(ShFBSMS). Development of this aircraft goes on

in accordance with a governmental order. This

new design is still under development, it is taking

shape. It is an open question whether UAC will do

this project alone or in a global partnership.

UAC plans to launch production of all of these

new types by 2015. We believe UAC will be a

worthwhile player in the global market for com-

mercial airliners.

– Does UAC have points of growth? Where are they?

– If we mean the places where production

of our new models is unfolding, then “yes”, UAC

does have “points of growth”. Sukhoi has plants in

Komsomolsk-upon-Amur and Novosibirsk where

Superjet production lines are being set up. Irkut

Corporation’s main production site in Irkutsk

installs new equipment and tooling for the MS-21.

Ulianovsk will make more aircraft, as we plan

expansion of the Tupolev Tu-204 family and com-

mencing production of the improved Il-76.

After the 70-seat Antonov An-148 is mas-

tered in Voronezh, the VASO plant in that city will

become the center of competence for regional

aviation. The plant in Kazan will remain the only

center in our country to make airplanes for the

Strategic Aviation.

I do not want to abuse other plants by not

naming them here, but those that I mentioned

above are the primary ones. They generate the

lion’s share of our industry’s production output.

They also work on new projects that UAC plans

to launch.

– Cooperation with other industries. What sort of influence do UAC activities produce on dwelling points and towns where your plants are located?

– All nine aircraft manufacturing plants that in

UAC structure are core enterprises for the cities

they are situated. Some of these are situated in cit-

ies with population as large as one million or more,

just to name Voronezh, Kazan and Novosibirsk.

Those enterprises play important role in the eco-

nomic life of their home cities. There are other

factories that are situated in smaller cities; they

are largest industrial enterprises there. Cities that

house those factories cannot live without them

economically. The plant in Komsomolsk-upon-

Amur provides a good example.

UAC is a head company on aircraft manufac-

turing programs. Great many enterprises of the

Russian aviation industry take part in those pro-

grams as suppliers. That industry is wide spread in

terms geographical, with hundreds of enterprises

located all over the vast territory of the Russian

Federation. A large part of those have been inte-

grated into the Rostechnologii State Corporation

(“Russian Technologies” headed by Sergei

Chemezov). Recently, we have signed a frame-

work cooperation agreement with Rostechnologii.

You see… It does not make sense to develop

aircraft manufacturing plants without develop-

ing their supply chain – plants that produce aero

engines, avionics and all sorts of onboard systems.

Developing only UAC plans is way to nowhere.

Rostechnologii has launched a huge effort on

consolidation of enterprises in the supply chain, on

their technical renovation, on specialization of cer-

tain enterprises and creation of new products. New

aircraft types require modern engines, avionics

and onboard systems. Only working hand-in-hand,

the United Aircraft Corporation and Rostechnologii

can both succeed. They can make Russian aviation

a success story of this century.

16

This year the Indian Air Force (IAF) will con-

duct comparative flight tests of combat air-

craft participating in the MMRCA (Medium

MultiRole Combat Aircraft) tender for deliveries of

126 new fighters to the service. For the contract

with estimated value of $7-10 billion the MiG-35

competes with the F-16, F/A-18, Rafale, Typhoon

and Gripen. Aero India 2009 air show will take

place in February at the Yelahanka Indian Air Force

Base near the city of Bangalor. It is expected that

there all major participants of the MMRCA tender

will do their best to present most favourably the

aircraft offered to the IAF. Regarding the MMRCA

tender the IAF is known to be most interested in

technology transfers, and, in particular, technol-

ogy of Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA)

antenna for the airborne radar.

The first Russian AESA radar has been devel-

oped specifically for the MiG-35 by Phazotron-NIIR

corporation, which developed airborne radars for

many MiG fighters, including MiG-21, MiG-23,

MiG-25 and MiG-29. In early December, 2008

results of the recent phase of ground and flight

tests of the new Zhuk-AE radar were disclosed.

According to Phazotron-NIIR’s statement, “the radar

is functioning steadily in various modes, providing

detection and tracking of aerial and ground targets.

Ground and flight tests have proved correctness of

the radar’s concept and major design decisions, as

well as fitness and efficiency of the radar’s subsys-

tems”. The Phazotron director general Vyacheslav

Tishchenko states that “the corporation will ensure

the demonstration of the MiG-35 in India”. “We also

confirm that we are ready to transfer all key AESA

technologies to our Indian partners”, he adds.

Mikhail Belyaev, test pilot of RAC MiG who was

at controls of the MiG-35 demonstrator together

with Nickolay Diorditsa during the test flights, com-

mented on the radar’s performance: “Already in

first flights the radar had showed very good results.

We are confident of its great potential”.

ZHUK-AE AESAZHUK-AE AESAIS READY FOR DEMONSTRATIONS TO THE CUSTOMERSIS READY FOR DEMONSTRATIONS TO THE CUSTOMERS

Alexander Velovich

I N D U S T R Y

17

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

Prior to Aero India 2009 show we met with

Phazotron-NIIR corporation deputy director gen-

eral, chief designer of Zhuk-AE radar for the

MiG-35 Yuriy Nikolayevich Guskov. He told us

about the results achieved in the AESA flight

tests. The Zhuk-AE demonstration unit installed

in the MiG-35 prototype provides about 130-140

km detection range of a fighter-size target. With

beefing up the radar’s performance, in particu-

lar, increasing the number of transceivers in the

antenna array, it is planned to achieve 250-280

km detection range. This exceeds capabilities of

existing radars of heavy fighters.

The twin-seat MiG-35 program demonstrator

with 154 board number will fly to Bangalor. In

demo flights at the air show Indian pilots flying

board 154 will be able to familiarize themselves

with principal modes of the AESA radar: detection

and tracking of aerial targets head-on and tail-on

looking up and looking down as well as ground

mapping. The Zhuk-AE chief designer promises

that the Yelahanka air base and aircraft at the

static park of the air show will be seen on the

radar display.

While in the demo flights at the show the

crews will be joint Russian-Indian, in the tender

flight tests the IAF pilots will fly the MiG-35 by

themselves. One more MiG-35 prototype will be

provided to the IAF for tender flights tests. That

will be a derivative of the MiG-29K naval fighter

with which the new model has a high level of stan-

dardization. The flight test program will be highly

intense and versatile. Yuriy Guskiv comments: “We

are prepared for that, we have recent experience

of the flight tests of Kopyo radar for modernized

MiG-21s of the Indian Air Force. We know how

thoroughly the IAF conducts flight tests”.

The MiG-35 can be delivered in single-seat

as well as twin-seat configurations, everything

depends on the customer’s requirements. Guskov

explains: “The single and twin-seat airframes are

absolutely identical, even the cockpit canopies are

the same. There is just one more big fuel tank in

the single-seater instead of the back cockpit. There

is no strict distinction between pilot and naviga-

tor/weapons control officer in the twin-seater,

both pilots can fully control the aircraft and all its

systems from either cockpit. There is a Russian

saying “one head is good, but two are better”.

Pilots give hints to each other, and help mutually

in flight. This is especially important while flying

demanding missions when much attention must

be paid to watching cockpit displays”.

Telling about the AESA flight tests which

went not without overcoming certain difficulties

the chief designer recalls: “The RAC MiG design-

ers had made a stake on us, and while there had

been no results, there was some tension. Some

high ranking program managers had doubts,

they said that maybe it would had been better to

seek co-operation with French or Israelis. Even

more so because at first we did not see any aerial

targets, even when switching on the radar on the

ground. The preparation position of the aircraft

on the airfield was in front of a hill that shadowed

the airspace, so in ground tests when power was

applied the radar screen was absolutely blank,

there were no aerial targets of chance to be seen.

But when the flight tests began, everything came

to normal. In the very first flight all five encoun-

ters with the target provided stable detection at

the predicted range”.

Important conclusions can be made from

the results of the first test flights. Guskov says:

“The AESA radar has high reliability, higher than

any previous radar. In spite of the fact that it

is a new radar, still in development, we did not

have any failures as such. We keep an eye on the

trancievers’ parameters, watch how they perform

in flight, communicate with Micran of Tomsk,

the supplier of transceivers. Most of them stay

as soldiers in the line of columns, all parameters

remain unchanged. But some deviations occur, we

analyze them”.

Yuri Guskov, General Designer Phazotron-NIIR Corporation

18

The chief designer adds: “We implemented

modular design that allows to extract a transceiver

from the array just with a screwdriver, to check it

with test equipment and, if needed, to substitute

with another one. This design approach was abso-

lutely right, it proved itself very well. Once we had

a need to dismount some of the transceivers. So

we were able to do that, to take some transceivers

to the laboratory, verify their parameters in the

evening, and the next day to take them back to

the airfield, install in their places and continue the

flight tests without interruption. Such design adds

some weight, and our radar now weighs about 220

kg, but I consider that to be a justified trade-off for

modularity and convenience of maintenance”.

For radar developers a step to AESA is a quali-

tatively new phase. Probably it can be compared

only with the introduction of jet engines instead of

piston ones. Yuriy Guskov recollects his feelings:

“So the first Russian AESA is flying and perform-

ing. At last it has happened. Still for me it was

very unexpected when so many people began to

congratulate us. Then I understood how impor-

tant this event was. While there were no results,

some of the industry leaders reprimanded us. It

was hard to explain that it was an absolutely new

radar, nothing of that kind had been ever tested in

Russia. If it were traditional transmitter-receiver-

antenna, such a radar could have been developed

in half a year. And here, with AESA, every step was

made with difficulty. Just an easy example: how to

measure sensitivity? It’s an easy task if you have

separate transmitter and receiver. Then you could

apply a calibrated signal to the receiver’s input and

just measure the sensitivity by noise coefficient.

But in AESA all amplifiers are inside the antenna!

And there are several hundreds of them, and their

sum provides the needed performance. So we

had to measure sensitivity by substitution method

with a horn antenna, comparing results with the

MiG-29K radar with ordinary slot antenna. Hence

we had to develop relevant equipment that would

be able to verify every radar. It was the same with

transmitting power. In ordinary radar you could

apply load to transmitter and just measure the

output. And in AESA demonstrator there are 680

transmitting channels, and you have to measure

the integral transmitting power. So new method-

ology is needed that would be able to determine

how the emission pattern is formed. The AESA

can have different transmitting and receiving beam

patterns. You can emit in one direction and receive

from another. And now you understand that you

have an absolutely new instrument at hand, and

you have to learn how to use it”.

The Phazotron specialists feel deserved pride

for the results achieved. Yuriy Guskov says: “When

everything began to function, it gave a powerful

emotional impulse for all those involved in the

program. There was no need to hurry up anybody,

each person did best and worked with utmost

intensity. And everybody felt joy. When I was

reporting the results of the first flight to our regu-

lar management meeting, I thanked everybody,

and quite of a sudden those gathered burst with

applauses. People had seen the results of many

years of their work”.

Now Phazotron-NIIR together with the trans-

ceiver developers, Micran JSC and Semiconductors

Research Institute, both of Tomsk, is refining

technologies of serial production of the AESA

radar. Major tasks are to increase reliability and

to decrease cost of transceivers. Guskov stresses:

“We can say that we have mastered the AESA

technology. There were several critical positions

there, and in course of research and development

program we had to solve these problems. And we

have done that. Now we are just clearing up some

points, refining technology, expand its capabilities.

It is fortunate that we work with Micran of Tomsk

as one team. And there was no blaming each other

even in the most difficult situations, and we had

some of those, no attempts to transfer responsi-

bility to a partner. We analyze the results of the

development together, look for solutions, find

them and advance further”.

Russia has additional trump cards in the IAF

tender. First, it is vast experience of military-

technical co-operation between our two countries.

Second, it is readiness to equal partnership on

the basis of most modern technology transfer.

Dmitry Medvedev, the President of Russia, said

during his visit to New Delhi in December 2008:

“we count that together with our Indian colleagues

we will be able to offer new forms of co-operation:

these could be technology transfers, creating joint

venture production enterprises and other forms of

partnerships beneficial to both sides”.

Recently Yuriy Guskov visited India and got

thoroughly acquainted with capabilities of the Indian

electronic industry. He has opinion that it is ready

to acquire and master industrial technologies of the

AESA radar, including those of monolithic integral

chips (MIC), and Russia is ready to transfer these

technologies. And it is very important that the

indigenous Russian AESA Zhuk-AE radar has only

indigenous components. At the same time British,

French and Swedish AESA manufacturers to some

extent rely on American suppliers. And it is known

that Americans usually are reluctant to transfer to

anybody key defence technologies.

It is important to mention that if Russia shared

technologies with India, it would not loose any of

them. All that is being done to win the IAF tender,

will be used to the benefit of Russia’s defence as

well. The MMRCA tender is of utmost importance to

Russia. The Russian President Dmitry Medvedev,

speaking at the meeting of the Commission on

Military-Technical Co-operation, said: “Defence

export strengthens our reputation as one of the

leading industrial powers of the world”. The head

of the Russian state stressed that “weapons export

is an important channel of income to the state bud-

get”, and the significance of military-technical co-

operation grows especially in the time of financial

crisis. Phazotron has made all than depends on

the corporation to ensure Russia’s high chances

in the competition with the leading combat aircraft

manufacturers of the world.

I N D U S T R Y

19

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

15-19 NOVEMBERJEBEL ALI, DUBAI,

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES WWW.DUBAIAIRSHOW.AERO

Dubai Airshow 2009Leading the Aerospace Industry

HOST SPONSOR

With 850 exhibitors at 2007, where will you be on show in 2009?

850show offs.

20

UAC and its subsidiaries invited prominent

Russian journalists and representatives of the

international media working in Moscow to “New

Year tree” sort of event. It happened in the premises

of the Museum of Vehicles located west of Moscow

city. Here is typescript of the speeches the Russian

aviation leaders made at this assembly.

Alexey Fedorov, President, chairman of the Executive Board, United Aircraft Corporation (UAC).

Today, in this Museum of Vehicles, we have

assembled for a meeting of aircraft developers and

manufacturers with those people who create the

image of our industry, who write, take photos and

produce reports about the Russian aviation and our

Corporation.

Absolutely fantastic and remarkable this place

is! I am honored to be here with you today, to

speak about our achievements in the passing year.

And to wish you every success in the New Year

of 2009! I am amazed of what I have seen in this

museum today. Honestly, I had not expected that

there could be some good people among us who

do not only grow their business, but also do this

wonderful, important work for next generations.

This is a great deed! There is much goodness in

it, which makes our war veterans satisfied. Also, it

pleases those who work in the sphere of aviation.

Hopefully, you will agree to me saying that the year

of 2008 – and we have assembled to say “goodbye”

to that year – was not easy for the aviation industry

and the airline industry. I think it is possible to say

with confidence that the next year is going to be

even more difficult, if not critical. At the same time,

a lot has been done, many good happenings have

occurred. I will not spend much time naming all

of the achievements we have had. Just one thing:

this year some newly built Russian aircraft took to

the air for the first time. Great changes occurred

in the sphere of aircraft manufacturing and the air

transportation system. I want you to remember

the passing year as a good one for the sphere in

which we work, the sphere of aviation. As for the

New Year of 2009, let me wish that all of you here

will have many good happenings in your life, so

that we would be proud of the profession we have

chosen, and the job we have been having. I wish

that the family life will make us happy more often

than dissatisfied. Well, from all of my heart, let me

wish you all the best in the New Year! Please never

forget that we do have one thing in common, those

of us who create new aircraft, who develop onboard

systems, who actually makes new aircraft, and who

write about aviation, who create public image of

our aviation. Good things to all of you, all the best

in the New Year!

Mikhail Pogosyan, UAC first vice-president for program coordination, general director of Sukhoi Company.

The passing year was quite eventful. Most

important things that happened were the follow-

ing: the Sukhoi Superjet 100 prototype made its

maiden flight; the Su-35 fighter entered trials.

Those are most important, but not the only events

that happened. I want to draw your attention to,

perhaps, not so visible event as maiden flight of

a new aircraft, but still very much an important

event. We have improved mutual understanding of

the common goals that we, at UAC, have set before

us. We have been watching how, step by step, the

United Aircraft Corporation is gradually becoming a

workable team with good coordination and mutual

support. Not so long ago we were just a collec-

tion of independent companies, which were put

together on a list… that’s it, the UAC was formed

UNDER NEW YEAR TREESpeeches of Russian aviation industry leaders before Russian media representatives, 20 Dec. 2008

Vladimir Karnozov

E X H I B I T I O N

21

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

that way. Now, we are a team. UAC structure is

taking shape, with business units being formed

inside of it. I think that for those of us who work in

UAC, these changes and trends are very important.

This is a good indication that we have been moving

forward. I hope the passing year helped us become

more understandable to mass media. I think there

is a growing understanding between those who

work in aviation and those who report on the events

that happen in the sphere of aviation. I do not think

that it is necessary that we all think similarly. But

what we do need is feedback, so that we would

understand the situation better. We need feedback

so that we would apply the common sense when

analyzing chain of events. Let me say a word of

thanks to all journalists here present. I thank them

for the work they have done and for the attention

they have paid to us and our aviation. Secondly, I

would like to raise this glass to unity between us

and for understanding between us, those who work

in aviation, who make aircraft and whose, who

make reports covering aviation events. Aviation is

something we have in common. All the best to you

in the New Year!

Alexander Roubtsov, Ilyushin Finance Company general director, UAC Executive Board member.

In the passing year we delivered a record num-

ber of airplanes to airline customers. Less than we

had planned, though. Still, one more step has been

made towards restoration of series production of

Russian commercial airplanes. UAC has made this

new step. Production rate at Ulianovsk factory is

reaching one airframe each month. It is, of course,

not something that makes us happy, but it is far

better that we used to have in not so distant past.

For us as a leasing company, it is important indeed.

Because our private investors trust us, they invest

their money into our aircraft acquisition and leas-

ing programs. These are investors that come from

Russia as well as other countries. The private capi-

tal stays with us. And all these good people come to

us prepared. They come prepared because of you,

the journalists who produce reports, who put into

light some bright things in aviation, and also not so

bright. For us who work in the financial sphere, who

see to sales of the domestic industry products, it is

very important. And it is certainly so because the

financial analytics and the airlines read every day

that come out in the press. That’s why they are well

prepared. I want to raise this glass to partnership

of the team that is assembled here today. In the

coming year, which is going to be not an easy one,

it is so important to keep trust and understanding

among us. Your experience and knowledge, your

vision of the situation, understanding of the issues

that our industry has, are important. I wish the New

Year to be beautiful to all of you. Let it make you all

happy! I wish you great holidays, so that you have

some rest and then come back with your batteries

recharged. So that, in the New Year, we would have

more power to fight for a better world. The world

that would see more Russian aircraft flying and

more airplanes coming out of assembly shops. Let

our production rates double and triple! I wish you

all every success in the New Year!

22

China’s aircraft industry is a rapidly grow-

ing branch, gradually catching up (not

without Russia’s hand) with technical and

engineering lagging behind western countries.

The biggest country in the world with the popula-

tion of 1,3 bln releases today competitive fourth

generation fighters, places into orbit manned

spaceships and earth satellite vehicles, creates

regional passenger liners and unmanned flying

vehicles of different designation. Strong evidence

of China’s high level aircraft industry was shown

at the seventh aerospace show Airshow China. It

started November, 4 in Zhuhai airport Guangdong

Province.

The exhibition demonstrated that modern

China has achievements in the aerospace area it

can be proud of. “And should be”, – thinks party-

economic head of the country. Unlike the previ-

ous shows this one differed in the huge number

of high-ranking officials for Zhuhai. Suffice it to

say at the opening ceremony there were four

members from the Political bureau of the Central

Committee of the Communist Party of China

(CC CPC). At the tribune Army, Air Force and

Navy Commanders of People’s Liberation Army

of China (PLAC) took their places near deputy

Prime-minister Zhang Dejiang and Minister of

defense Liang Guanglie.

In the presence of such respectable audi-

ence PLAC Air Force which presence at previous

exhibitions was formal showed its beauty. The

pilots displayed the aircraft that had never been

shown before in public. We’ll give you the most

important of the full-scale exhibits:

Vladimir Karnozov

E X H I B I T I O N

AIRSHOW CHINA 2008AIRSHOW CHINA 2008

The Rostov Helicopter Production Complex (Rostvertol) signed a contract for the delivery of a

Mi-26TS helicopter, the best-selling helicopter in the world, to China at Airshow China 2008. A num-

ber of documents connected with helicopter deliveries were also signed.

“This is the second contract for the delivery of Russian Mi-36 helicopters to China,” Rostvertol

general director Boris Slyusar told Interfax. “The first was signed in August 2006 for the leasing of a

Mi-26 helicopter to a Chinese company for three years. Later, the Chinese company bought it outright.

We signed the transfer for it today too.”

23

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

– Two J-10 light multifunctional fighters

known as Dragon;

– Two J-8-II interceptors;

– FBC-1 Attack aircraft (another designation

– FH-7A) known as Flying Leopard;

– Cargo tanker aircraft on the basis of the

H6K bomber (developed Soviet Tu-16);

– Z-8K heavy lift helicopter (“cloned” French

Super Frelon);

– Z-9WE medium combat helicopters

(Chinese edit of Dolphin);

– Z-11W light helicopters (Equreuil /

Fennec).

Especially should be mentioned that the lat-

ter two were shown equipped with guided missile

weapon.

Separately there was shown Mi-171 medium

transport helicopter. Though there were no expla-

nations of this vehicle, it is supposed to be the first

of this type manufactured in China (at the aircraft

factory in Sichuan Province) using kit of parts pro-

duced at the plant in Ulan-Ude.

To this impressive “composite squadron” of

flying vehicles the industry added air prototype of

the L-15 supersonic operational trainer (based on

the Jak–130 with AI-222 augmented engines) and

Modern Arc 600 turboprop air carrier (developed

An-24/MA60 with Canadian engines and American

avionics), that made its first flight in October 2008.

The demonstration flights began right after

the greetings of the exhibition organizers and

Guangzhou governor. It was started by the new-

est J-10 fighter main exhibit of Sirshow China

2008 and the “face” of Chinese aircraft industry.

Manned by a combat pilot Dragon showed perfect

maneuverability and all that at 30 degrees heat

and high humidity. It didn’t show any breathtak-

ing exercises such as Pugachev’s cobra, hook or

tail-dive. It limited the show only to the classic

exercises – combat turns, low speed nose-up

pitch run. Judging by the demo flights turn rates

and momentary time-to-climb shown by J-10 on

the whole equaled F-16 and MiG-29 level. Dragon

pilot steadily showed difficult exercises on his

vehicle unavailable to Chinese planes before. Small

deviation angles of the pressurized instrument

section and careful operating afterburning brought

to the thought that Dragon pilot didn’t force out

the vehicle.

Two-three years ago foreign specialists told

me: “J-10 is still thing in itself, it’s difficult to

say if real fighter will come out of it or not”.

Today the same specialists say as one: “J-10 is

born”. Chinese military are very satisfied with the

vehicle. The project has thoroughly defended all

not small financial, manufacturing and intellec-

tual resources invested in it. Dragon can not only

fly perfectly. It can also successfully use guided

weapon in the training area – guided bombs with

optical or TV guidance, and also guided missiles

with radar head, television “eye” and infrared

eye. At their stands Chinese firms continuously

showed videos about work of J-10 crews at train-

ing areas.

Western sources say one hundred J-10s

have been built. Some Russian sources bring

this number to 300. According to the available

information our country hasn’t imported such

number of AL-31FN engines to China yet. But it’s

worth remember there is also Tai Hang Chinese

“clone” of AL-31F. J-10 was shown exactly with

this engine before the scrupulously selected

journalists at the first official presentation of this

plane last winter.

According to the information available the

work on the upgrade J-10 sometimes nominated

Super-10 is on. Maybe this vehicle is being devel-

oped for Chinese Navy for flights from aircraft

carriers. Its difference is in using more power-

ful engine – either AL-31FM2/3 or augmented

Tai Hang. There is also possible replacement of

standard radar with slot array (worked out by

Chinese specialists on the basis of British, Italian

and Israeli models delivered to China in 1990s,

A famous British magazine Flight International

published the Directory: World Air Force review

giving the numbers of the military aviation of all

the countries in the world for mid-2008. For today

this is the newest analysis of this subject. Though

in this review (as well as in other publications of

such kind) there is quite much inaccuracy and

frank “information noise”, it gives quite good idea

of the current aviation condition in different states.

And through some supplementary material it’s also

possible to get information about the changes of the

size of aviation in some states.

According to the review, the Chinese Air Force

currently includes 120 H-6 strategic bombers

(Tu-16 manufactured in China under Soviet license

at the aviation plant in Harbin) and 250 H-5 tactical

bombers (Chinese Il-28 modification). And if H-5 is

an outdated one capable to carry only “iron” free-

fall bombs, H-6s are actively converted into cruise

missile carrier, tanker aircraft and EW aircraft.

Its possible to suppose these vehicles will be in

service next decade.

Today the main combat aircraft of the People’s

Republic of China tactical aviation is the Q-5

supersonic day-time light attack aircraft (deep

modernization of the MiG-19 tactical fighter made

by Chinese specialists in early 1960s). There are

about 500 aircraft of this type in service mainly

equipped with free-fall bombs and unguided air-

to-surface missiles.

The J-7 tactical aircraft (the MiG-21) is the

most extended Chinese fighter produced in PRC in

some modifications: day-time J-7-I and J-II (devel-

opment of the MiG-21F-13) and also all-weather

J-III (MiG-21ML). On the whole PLAC Air Force has

392 J-7 aircraft of all modifications.

AIR POWER OF CHINA IN NUMBERS

Zhang Dejiang, Chinese Vice-premier and Boris Slyusar, Rostvertol General Director on Airshow China 2008

24

and also experimental board radar unit Jemchug

from Phazotron – NIIR corporation) for a new one

with electronic scanning. Its construction is likely

to use the technology given to Chinese partners

from Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute of

Instrument Design in the late 1990s, when experi-

mental copy of Pero aerial was sent to People’s

Republic of China.

Having created a good J-10 lightweight

fighter China is still not so good in developing

a heavy one. While the perspective vehicles are

worked on hard, industry continues producing

time-tested J-8-IIМ. At the posters of the con-

solidated corporation AVIC (created through the

fusion of AVIC1 and AVIC2 before the very open-

ing of Airshow China 2008) there was shown a

new upgraded modification of this veteran. Its

tests will begin in one or two years. And while

the homeland industry is creating its own fourth

generation heavy fighter, China can continue buy-

ing such kind of aircraft in Russia.

By the end of the second day of Airshow

China 2008 PLAC Air Forces commander general-

colonel Siui Tsilan appeared at Russian exhibition.

FGUP Rosoboronexport deputy CEO Aleksandr

Mikheev met him. The commander attentive-

ly examined the exhibits of Rosoboronexport,

Vertolety Rossii, ANK Sukhoi, NPK Irkut, NPO

Saturn, SPARK and UOMz. Telling him about the

main offers from Russian firms Mikheev espe-

cially noted Mi-26 and Ka-52 helicopters, Be-200

amphibious plane and also SPARK equipment.

The most time Siui Tsilan spent near Sukhoi

stand at the large-scale model of the newest

Su-35 4++ generation fighter. The PLAC Air

Force commander asked Aleksander Mikheev and

Sukhoi deputy director general Sergey Sergeev

one question after another. He asked about Su-35

combat capabilities, operational range with full

combat load, targeting complex and munition

stockpile. Siui Tsilan highly estimated combat

capabilities and aircraft specifications but at all

this he pointed out to Russian guests that J-10

flies not worse than Su aircraft and also China

has “something” from perspective researches.

The secret of Chinese success is simple.

Monthly average salary of workers and engineers

varies from 200 to 300 US dollars which is much

less than in Russia and gradually less than in

Western countries. At all this it’s quite possible

to live on it in People’s Republic of China using

the advantages of socialistic state structure. In

the 1960s-70s China founded the basis of its

own aircraft industry school. It was reserved in

the 80s and was forced at the end of the century.

Today the country is strong on its way to indus-

trialization and economic cooperation with global

companies which gives money to the treasury

and makes possible mass investment into aircraft

industry. At first the main work was concentrated

in “cloning” good foreign models. But gradu-

ally Chinese are coming to its own “free art”.

Patience and labor peculiar for Chinese turn the

question of reaching world aircraft manufacturing

heights into the question of time and maybe not

so long.

Second in the number of China Air Force’s

vehicles is Su-27 type fighter. There are 151

Su-27SK tactical aircraft and Su-30MK multifunc-

tional two-seater fighters imported by Russia and

also 98 J-11 (Su-27 copy produced in PRC). Thus,

on the whole China has 248 Su-27 aircraft and its

modifications. It’s worthy to note that this is the

biggest group of Su-27s beyond Russia.

The number of J-10 fighters (Chinese 4th gen-

eration aircraft equipped with one AL-31F engine)

is according to Flight International 140 vehicles.

It is possible that in the nearest future J-10 will

become China’s main fighter instead of J-6 and Q-5

1st generation vehicles.

The number of J-8 interceptors (close to the

Su-15 in their weight dimension characteristics

and performance) has reduced a bit and now is

only 96 aircraft. The reduction is likely to have been

done through discarding early modifications J-8

and J-8-I. At the same time small-batch manufac-

turing of J-8-II probably continues even today.

Though, the reduction of J-6s (MiG-19) looks

most radical. If in 2001 there were 2800 vehicles

of this type (which made Chinese tactical aviation

almost the most numerous in the world), now,

according to Flight International, there remained

only 25 J-6 fighters.

And finally J-5 (MiG-17) 1st generation fighters

absolutely disappeared from the AF, having been

manufactured in big amounts by Chinese aviation

industry in the 1950-60s and also imported by the

Soviet Union to PRC. It’s worthy to mention that

still in 2001 there were more than 1700 J-5 tactical

fighters of different modifications in the PLAC Air

Force combat and reserve units.

Thus there are currently 1770 combat aircraft

in the PLAC AF, which is some times less than

there used to be at the beginning of the decade. At

all this, the part of “4” and “4+” generation aircraft

complexes (Su-30MK, Su-27, J-11 and J-10)

makes 22%, 3rd generation aircraft (J-8) – 5%,

2nd generation (J-7) – 22% and 1st generation

(H-5, H-6, J-6 and Q-5) – 51% .

To compare, according to the Flight International,

today the Russian Air Force numbers more than

1900 combat aircraft, US Air Force– more than

2300 (and 390 in reserve). And Indian Air Force (the

second Asian nuclear power) numbers 740 combat

aircraft, 23% of which are “4” and “4+” generation

vehicles (Su-30 MKI, MiG-29 and Mirage2000),

47% – 3rd generation (Jaguar, MiG-23 and MiG-27)

and 30% – thoroughly modernized 2nd generation

fighters (MiG-21 bison). There are 53 Su-39MKI in

the Indian AF. Another 177 aircraft of this type will

be imported in the nearest future.

The main potential rival of China is Taiwan

which Air Force numbers 484 combat aircraft, 45%

of which are “2+” generation fighters (F-5E/E), and

the rest are 4th generation vehicles (F-16, Csingo,

Mirage2000-5).

In the nearest years, the Chinese Air Force

will receive another 135 Su-27/J-11 aircraft,

some J-10 fighters and maybe FC-1 light fighters

(mainly manufactured for exporting). At the

same time all the H-5, Q-5, J-6 and partly J-7

aircraft of early year of manufacture are likely to be

discarded. H-6 aircraft will stay as nuclear weapon

carriers. Thus by the middle of the next decade the

Chinese Air Force will number 1000-1100 combat

aircraft, about 50% of which will be modern “4”

and “4+” generation vehicles.

To solve EW tasks there are two Il-78 reequipped

aircraft at China’s disposal. In the short term the Air

Force will get also eight IL-78 cargo tanker aircraft.

The review doesn’t give any data about the number

of Chinese airborne early warning aircraft, though

it’s known that PRC works hard in this direction.

Military transport aviation of China has gradu-

ally reduced because of discarding numerous Li-2

and Il-12 reciprocating military transport aircraft

manufactured in 1940-50s. An-2 not long ago in

service with the Air Force also disappeared. As

a result today PLAC military transport aviation

has quite modern flying stock consisting of 5

Boeing-737, 5 An-12, 83 An-26, 5 An-30, 27 Il-76

(with another 30 having been ordered), 4 MA-60, 4

Tu-154 (and another 9 in reserve) aircraft.

In the Air Force’s helicopter fleet there are 31

Mi-8/171 assault support helicopters and 7 SA321s.

The training aircraft are represented by 170 new

JL-8 (K-8), also 149 JJ-6 (two-seated operational

trainer modification of J-6) and 39 JJ-7 (on the

basis of J-7) vehicles.

On the strength of relatively small army aviation

there are 3 Mi-6s, 198 Mi-8/17/171s, 22 S-70Cs,

and also 6 SA342s and 99 Z-11s, part of which is

equipped with assault antitank weapon. As trainers

there used 22 HC-120 helicopters (with another 6

ordered) and 48 Z-11s.

Obviously the weak point of Chinese Air Force

is practically full absence of specialized attack

helicopters.

PRC naval aviation has 30 H-6 missile bomb-

ers, 150 H-5 torpedo bombers, 23 Su-30MKK and

MK-2 (another 50 have been ordered) multifunc-

tional fighters, 98 J-6 fighters, 30 J-7s, 124 J-8s

and 100 Q-5 attack aircraft. Despite that the Navy

disposes 20 newest JH-7 bomber-fighters, which

Flight International on some reason put into the

training aircraft category.

Despite that Chinese Navy disposes a Jak-42

cargo aircraft and helicopter inventory including

3 AS-565s, 8 Ka-28s, 8 Mi-8s, 3 SA365s and 19

Z-9Cs.

The substantial negative side of naval aviation is

absolute absence of antisubmarine aircraft.

E X H I B I T I O N

25

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

«In the summer of 2007 a Chinese J-10 fighter “Tzianbin-10”, created on Israeli Lavi basis with Russian engines АL-31FN, managed to shoot down an American multipurpose fighter of the 5th generation F-22 Raptor above the Taiwan Strait. During the incident subflight Su-30 blocked other American Air Force aircraft off the “Feathered Raptor”. The shot down Raptor fell down the continental part of China and after that was taken to pieces “for spare parts” by the locals. And the successfully catapulted F-22 pilot was “quietly” – by mutual consent of the parties – sent by the Chinese to the American Command…».

This message as well as other ones of the kind

appeared in the mass media and in the Internet in

the autumn of 2008, having caused great anxiety

in aviation related circles. Chinese aircraft industry

was traditionally discussed as something inferior

and ineffective, incapable of manufacturing battle

planes that can compete with those produced by

USA or European aircraft industry. Now a number

of commentators have radically changed their

point of view evaluating Chinese fighters as almost

the best in the world, being capable of shooting

down the newest American “invisibles” of the

5th generation. So, we’ll try to figure out what

«Tzian-10» (the very plane that is said to have

shot down F-22A) actually is and to what extent it

is dangerous to American “Raptors” (and not only

to them)?

An image of any armament system has

a reflection of the time when it was created.

Speaking about J-10 manufacturing it should be

mentioned that by the middle of 1980-ies Chinese

Peoples Republic had Air Force though almost

the most numerous in the world but outdated.

The front-line aviation НОАК consisted of several

thousands of fighters of the 1st generation MiG-17

(J-5) and MiG-19 (J-6), and also fighter-bombers

Q-5, slightly «diluted» with two – three hundreds

of a bit more modern (but, nevertheless, hope-

lessly outdated as well) J-7 planes (variations of

«MiG-21F-13») and J-8 (increased double-engine

«clone» of the same MiG-21). All the equipment

correlated at best with the technology and concept

of the early 1960-ies and couldn’t stand up with

modern foreign aircraft systems.

CPR started attempts to create own, purely

Chinese fighter as far back as late 1950-s, i.e.

almost right after aircraft industry establishment

and production start of the first Chinese series

fighters «Tzian-5» (MiG-17). But the only true

success in the sphere could be considered J-8

interceptor development in 1970-ies that was an

enlarged double-engine version of the very same

MiG-21. Since 1960-s China worked at designing

of a most ambitious J-9 fighter project, based on

Russian and (less) European technologies, and

also accomplished considerable modernization of

J-8 fighter (later on resulting in J-8-II occurrence,

also comprising a number of 3rd generation MiGs

elements). However, considering their general

properties these planes were way behind MiG-29,

F-16, «Mirage»2000 and other aircrafts of the 4th

generation that had already been in series produc-

tion by that time. It was more and more obvious for

the Chinese authorities that a considerable push is

required which would at least substantially reduce

if not eliminate the gap between CPR and the USA,

and Western Europe in the sphere of military avia-

tion construction. And this push was only possible

with foreign technical assistance.

In the middle of 1980-s Ministry of Defense and

Central Military Committee CDC of CPR decided to

stop working at «Tzian-9» fighter. This project,

still being under development, was accepted out-

dated and prospectless. Instead, main efforts were

concentrated on a new project – «Tzian-10», that

was thought to be created on J-9 interceptor tech-

nological basis, that started being developed as

far back as 1964. This single-engine 13 ton plane,

made upon the scheme «duck» and designed for

М 2.5, represented a Chinese version of Sweden

Saab JА.37 «Viggen» with a number of solutions

borrowed from the Soviet MiG-23. However, J-10

had Israeli roots as well (the Chinese were not so

confused with “the 5th item” of the questionnaire

as their Soviet colleagues then).

It should be mentioned, that by the early

1980-ies Israel aircraft industry level increased

considerably compared to 1950-s, when the indus-

try started literary from nothing. That was due

to high professionalism of people employed in

aircraft construction (a lot of Israeli engineers

used to work in European, American and Soviet

aircraft construction industry), as well as due to

the experience, accumulated at constructing quite

a successful for its time «Kfir» plane on the basis

of French «Mirage»5 fighter. All the abovemen-

«THE DRAGON» IS READY TO FIGHT«THE DRAGON» IS READY TO FIGHTVladimir Ilyin

26

tioned enabled the Israeli to start solving a more

complicated problem that is the construction of

a battle plane of completely unborrowed design,

that would eliminate Israeli Air Force dependence

on foreign aircraft supply. The new fighter, which

was named «Lavi» («Lionet»), was designed for

striking tasks (immediate aircraft support and

battle field isolation), as well as for fighting air

supremacy together with more powerful planes of

F-15 type. It was to substitute for attack aircrafts

Douglas А-4 Skyhawk and fighter-bombers IAI

«Kfir» С.2/ С.7 in Israeli Air Defence.

One-place single-engine «Lavi», constructed

according to aerodynamic configuration «beskh-

vostka – tailless» with horizontal tail surfaces»

(this configuration is often called «duck», though

it’s not perfectly right, considering ailevators on

the wing of «Lavi») with a triangle low-positioned

wing and belly fixed air scoop a la F-16, had

modern airframe design, 22% of which (by mass)

accrued to structural components. I’d like to

note, that as for the amount of composite materi-

als used, «Lavi» was almost not inferior to the

American F-22А plane of the 5th generation that

appeared much later. The Israeli fighter was fit-

ted with digital wire-guidance 4-channel system

without duplicate mechanical wire, developed by

the Israeli company МVT jointly with American

Lear Astronics. For its time the system was a great

technical achievement.

The on-board RADAR system of «Lavi» con-

sisted of 70% Israeli developed elements and was

not inferior to the best foreign analogs. In par-

ticular, on-board multimode pulse-Doppler RADAR

Elta EL/M-2035 with slot array was comparable

by its characteristics to the newest American sta-

tion АN/APG-68, designed F-16С fighter. It could

trace air targets on «by-pass», field mapping and

avoidance of ground obstructions. Target detection

range of «light fighter» type was 55 km.

The Israeli plane cockpit was equipped with

three multifunctional indicators on electron-beam

tube: one coloured and two monochromes, as well

as with wide-angle windshield indicator. Especially

for «Lavi» the first in the world helmet-mounted

rear-sight indicator was also developed (further

used on Israeli F-15 and F-16). Fighter weap-

onry was placed on 11 joints of external store and

switched on both non-guided and guided defeat

weapon of ”air-to-surface”» and “air-to-air” type.

The plane was equipped with single engine

Pratt-and-Whithey PW1120 (with thrust 8440 kilo-

gauss on experimental samples and 9200 kilo-

gauss – on series aircrafts), providing maximum

speed for «Lavi» that is М=1.85. The engine was

created on the basis of the turbojet engine F100,

being smaller and lighter. PW1120 series produc-

tion was to be organized in Israel at American

authorization. Empty plane mass was 7070 kg

(somewhat less than F-16С), non-equipped take-

off weight – 9990 kg, maximum take-off weight

– 19230 kg, and maximum combatant load mass

on external suspension – 7260 kg (record number

for aircrafts of the type). I.е. «Lavi» was designed

as a light fighter-bomber, first of all oriented at

striking tasks solution above the battle line and in

tactical background. At that the plane had excel-

lent maneuver characteristics (stable bank angular

speed at altitude 4.5 km – 13.2 deg./s, unstable

bank – 24.3 deg./s), provided by high specific

parameters (thrust-to-weight ratio at normal take-

off mass 0.83, nominal wing pressure 336 kilo-

gauss/m2) and perfect aerodynamics. All that,

together with high performance on-board weap-

onry system, made the «Lionet» a dangerous rival

for 2nd and 3rd generation fighters. At the same

time rather low fuel effective output (0.37) limited

battle action radius of the plane that actually was

suitable for the Israeli having the neighbouring

Syria as a basic potential rival.

The fighter detailed engineering was started

in October 1982, and on December, 31, 1986 on

Israeli aircraft construction company IAI flight-test

base the first flight of «Lavi’s» prototype took

place. The aircraft was piloted by a famous test

pilot Menahim Shmul. The first Shmul’s flight was

followed by others, after a year the second plane

was ready, five more experimental aircrafts were

being built, and also a series of 300 fighters was

being prepared with supply start in 1990. However,

on August, 30, 1987 Israel Cabinet voted 12 votes

«for» and 11 «against» and closed the program.

The reasoning mentioned trivial budget difficulties,

but everybody understood that «Lavi» was merely

sacrificed to the economical interests of the USA:

American corporations, producing F-16 и F/А-18

fighters, felt in the «novice» potential threat to

their interests in international weaponry market,

and «Lavi» was to a great extent developed on

American money sent to Israel as financial aid...

Program shutdown actually put an end to

Israeli pilot-controlled military aircraft engineering.

But they were very well aware of high market price

for technical solutions acquired during «Lavi»

development. And if real planes sale appeared

impossible because of political and financial pres-

sure on the part of the USA, it was possible to

try selling at least «paper», technical documents

for the new fighter, thus recovering part of the

finances spent on the plane development. Having

considered all «pros» and «contras», Israel gov-

ernment made such an offer to China.

As a result Tel-Aviv signed a secret (first of all

– for the Americans) agreement about cooperation

with CPR in the sphere of development of a new

fighter for НОАК, on the basis of «Lavi» project.

The Chinese party, greatly interested in newest

western military aircraft construction technolo-

gies acquisition, and having no specifically warm

relations with most orthodox Arabic regimes, was

eager to extend defense technological cooperation

with Israel. In September 1988 the concept of

W A R P L A N E S

27

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

new aviation system was confirmed at the joint

session of the Chinese Communist Party Central

Committee, aviation ministry, and scientific tech-

nical committee of the ministry of defence of the

People’s Republic of China. And in October of the

same year the first batch of technical documenta-

tion received from the Israel party, was directed for

deep examination to 601-st and 611-th research

institutes (however, a number of sources indicate

601-st institute only). At this stage the program got

official name «Project 8810» (or «Project 10»).

The history of Chinese aircraft construction is

a most secret theme. Many events and solutions of

20 years old can be discussed in supposition mode

even today, based on far and away incomplete

and rather contradictory information, coming,

to a great extent, from Taiwan and Hong-Kong

sources, often providing unchecked information.

Nevertheless, even on the basis of this kind of

information one can draw a conclusion that J-10

was from the very beginning considered not as

a destroyer of air supremacy fighting (as it is

introduced even today in a number of Chinese

and foreign publications), but as a tactical striking

plane, fighter-bomber, aimed at substitution for

numerous Q-5 fighter-bombers produced at the

beginning of 1960-s on the basis of Soviet 1st

generation MiG-19 fighter.

As Dimitry Regentov wrote in his article pub-

lished in the magazine «World’s aeroshows» (pub-

lishing house «Intervestnik») No. 6/2002, and

perhaps most completely (at least in Russian

mass media) illustrating the process of program

J-10 formation and establishment, «initially the

new fighter project development was assigned

to aircraft construction company in Sian (Shensi

province). But as long as it got an order for

heavy fighter-bomber FBC-1 «Feibao» develop-

ment («Flying leopard»), in 1991 Shenyan aircraft

construction company «Shanfei» (Lyaonin prov-

ince) and the «Chanfei» aircraft construction com-

pany from the city of Chandu (Sychuan province)

got the right to participate. But soon the project

leaders, considering the fact that «Shanfei» was

busy with J-8 plane park modernization, fully

transfer J-10 project to «Chanfei» company, which

includes one of the leading battle planes develop-

ment centers — 601-st research institute. So,

why the decision was taken for the benefit of the

«Chanfei» company?

The thing is that as far back as in 1980 by

the decision of State Council, CDC and scientific

technical committee of the ministry of defence of

PRC research institute № 601 in the city of Chandy

is defined as the general developer of J-7-III fighter

project (Chinese version of the Soviet all-weather

MiG-21МF). The staff was successful at perform-

ing the task that is why the Chandy Company was

also chosen this time, as they had good working

experience with relatively modern aero techniques.

According to the CDC decision, the project also

involved a number of other Chinese leading aircraft

construction companies. 606-th research institute

(aircraft engines), 607-th research institute (on-

board RADAR development) and other branch-

wise centers were enlisted as well...»

At the end of 1990 – beginning of 1991 they

started building real metal model of the plane

«8810» in Chandy. By that time 606th and 607th

research institutes finished bench-top labour-

rent of power plant and on-board RADAR for the

8810th model.

Perhaps, initially J-10 plane (as well as «Lavi»)

was to be equipped with the Pratt-and-Whitney

PW1120 American engine. But after the events of

1989 on Tyananmyn square in Beijing, any defense-

technical aid from the USA and their NATO allies was

out of the question and China had to apply for own,

far less perfect engines. Even within the frames of

J-9 program in CPR an engine with thrust of 12400

kilogauss was created, known as WS-6 (probably,

at its manufacturing «unauthorized» construction

elements of American F100 were used). However,

later the program was shut down.

In 1990, after 25 years break, Soviet-Chinese

defense-technical cooperation was renewed. As a

consequence, Chinese high-ranking military men

(most of them started their career at the time of

«great friendship» and were brought up in Soviet

school spirit) were detailed enough acquainted

with recent native designing in aero techniques,

capable of rising interest of the Chinese party. In

particular, they were shown a project of perspec-

tive S-37 attack-fighter. This one-placed single-

engine plane, developed both to suit the require-

ments of domestic Air Force and for export, to

greater extent, than «Lavi», met the requirements

of the Chinese Air Force, developing in the Soviet

tradition spirit. Multifunctional, perfectly equipped

and protected, possessing high characteristics on

low altitudes and high handling qualities, provid-

ing possibility of usage from airfield, S-37 made

the greatest impression on Chinese Air Force

authorities, literary penetrated by the ideology of

the indeed extraordinary project. Under the cir-

cumstances, when the cooperation negotiations

on S-37 program started with the USSR, fighter-

bomber on the «Lavi» basis was likely not to have

seemed that promising to the Chinese. Agreement

in principle was reached, according to which China

was to receive the 1st batch of 180 Soviet planes.

Later on, obviously, «Chinese» S-37 authorized

construction was meant.

But in December of 1991 the Soviet Union col-

lapsed. Altogether Soviet aircraft industry started

collapsing as well. The hope to bring project S-37

to a flight sample was vanishing, and the Eltsin

Russia seemed to China a much less reliable

defense and trade partner than the USSR. As a

result, the Chinese again had to rely basically on

own strength, as well as on «half-legal» foreign

assistance (bought, it should be mentioned, for

big money). Under the circumstances considerably

«promoted» «Project 10» acquires priority again.

At the end of 1993 aircraft construction plant

in Chandy finished assembling flight-demonstra-

tional sample of the new fighter. Its appearance

was not much different from the original «Lavi».

It was a one-placed plane with engine «V-13C»

(WP-13C, 7000 kilogauss, Chinese accelerated

version of the Soviet turbojet engine Р-11) and

series catapult seat of Chinese manufacture, but

with aircraft equipment and on-board RADAR

designed in Israel.

In the first part of 1994 aircraft-demonstrator

completed the first successful test flight. After for-

tunate debut J-10 got a name «Tczyanbin» («The

Winged Dragon»).

However, in 1993 there appeared a threat to

Chinese – Israeli defense – technical cooperation.

Mass media revealed information about “Lavi’s”

documents having been given to the Chinese that

caused indignation of the USA. At the beginning

of 1995 American Secretary of Defense William

Perry «suggested» to Itshak Rabin, Israeli Prime-

Minister that Tel-Aviv should stop participating

in Chinese fighter development. The suggestion

remained unanswered. But further cooperation still

had to be ceased: already by the middle of 1995 a

small note glimpsed in western mass media about

Israel official assignment of “Lavi” aircraft docu-

ments to China. Having considered the results of

cooperation, the parties seemed to have taken a

satisfactory – both to Beijing and Tel-Aviv – deci-

sion to separate on having achieved an important

intermediate goal – aircraft-demonstrator con-

struction. Further Israel participation in the J-10

program was fraught with relationship aggrava-

tion with the USA, and China was likely to have

felt powerful enough to victoriously accomplish

28

the program without Israeli participation. Since

then «Project 10» started its independent, purely

Chinese, life.

Probably to a great extent under the influence

of deep investigation and critical consideration

of S-37 project, they started in 601-st research

institute redesigning the initial «Tczyanbin» proj-

ect. Striving to make J-10 «even more strik-

ing» resulted in considerable enlargement of

the Chinese aircraft (that enabled to increase

fuel tanks capacitance and probably undertake

additional measures for battle survivability sys-

tem perfection), change in tail unit construction,

reconfiguration of cock-pit that became more

spacious. Airframe construction hardness had to

be improved, wing surface – increased. This con-

figuration made the fighter heavier that is why it

became even more urgent point for the designers

to invent a new, more powerful engine.

The engine development for J-10 was per-

formed by 606-th institute together with a num-

ber of adjacent structures since 1990. Turbojet

engine was identified as WS-10 and was presum-

ably accounted for the thrust about 10000-11000

kilogauss. There is evidence, that for «Tczyanbin»

equipment alternative engine was also created,

WP-15, but this engineering seems to have been

further stopped.

In the meantime, in the middle of 1996, test

fighter, constructed according to the corrected proj-

ect, performed its first test flight. It was assigned

number «8810—01». Half a year later they finalized

plane «8810-02» construction, which design was

considerably changed. In particular, cock-pit was

again reconfigured, air scoop design was changed,

it got adjustable, and to reduce RADAR detection

waveguide channel was altered to S-shape. But as

well as the demonstrator-aircraft, the first test fight-

ers seemed to have had the same «non-nominal»

WP-13C engine, that enabled to develop subsonic

speed only.

At the end of 1997 the first loss happened:

during the test flight aircraft with board number

«8810-02» suffered a crash. Flights were discon-

tinued and the best Chinese specialists started

investigating the causes of the accident. Integrated

study of wreckage on flight test range of research

institute 611 was performed, at that in western

and Taiwan mass media appeared statements that

the Chinese party turned for assistance to Russian

specialists, with whom they jointly managed to

puzzle-out the case.

On March, 23, 1998 the third prototype of the

plane performed its first test flight, «8810-03»,

that had modified tail unit as well as new, Chinese

developed weaponry control system and catapult

seat. In the spring of 1998 this fighter was after

all equipped with «nominal» WS-10 engine, which

made it possible for the first time to develop super-

sonic speed during horizontal flight in the middle

of 1998 (applicable to J-10). Actually, this engine-

upgraded fighter «8810-03» was considered the

first “true” J-10.

By the autumn of 1998, after two years of

intensive tests, the first stage of program J-10 was

finalized. The ceremony devoted to the event was

visited by the first State person – General Secretary

of China Communist Party Central Committee

Tszyan Tszemin. Sparkling newly painted fighters

from «8810-03» to «8810-06» were lined up on

the ground, and the aircraft with board number

«8810-04» performed a show flight demonstrat-

ing stunts.

At the beginning of 2000 the second stage

of «Tczyanbin» flight tests was over, and in May,

2002 information appeared about the first batch of

four pre-series fighter-bombers – with index J-10А

– disposal to НОАК Air Force. On March, 10, 2003

the aircraft was officially army-accepted. Six one-

placed fighter-bombers were directed to Air Force

flight-test center, where tactical tests went on up

to the beginning of 2004.

On December, 26, 2003 two-placed exercise-

battle J-10S aircraft got off first that was different

from J-10A, besides new cock-pit with extended

W A R P L A N E S

29

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

hood, longer fuselage that made it possible to pre-

serve one-placed aircraft fuel tank capacity.

The first series batch of J-10A aircraft was

disposed to the Air Force of the People’s Liberation

Army of China in 2004-2006. And by the middle

of 2008 Chinese Air Forces and Navy count-

ed, according to the most optimistic estimation,

approximately 100 – 140 J-10А fighter-bombers,

and also two-placed exercise-battle J-10S air-

crafts. All in all, from non-official sources, Chinese

Air Force is supposed to be increased up to 300

aircraft of the type by the middle of next decade.

Moreover, up to a hundred fighter-bombers will be

army-accepted by Chinese Naval coast aviation.

Some more dozens (or maybe hundreds) of the

aircrafts can be exported.

So, what is the new fighter that was so labori-

ously and persistently created by Chinese aircraft

industry?

It certainly should be mentioned that the plane

can be absolutely free called a great achievement

of CPR aircraft constructors, who managed to cre-

ate almost new battle plane on the basis of a for-

eign prototype that is not inferior to the best world

analogs. J-10 program embraced a number of

most modern technologies, including quite perfect

aerodynamics, airframe construction with wide

application of composite materials, digital remote

control system, and modern data-controlling cock-

pit field. Design and production of J-10A were held

applying computer assisted CAD/CAM systems.

Thus, if earlier Chinese battle planes were

technically about a generation behind their foreign

analogs, now after «Tczyanbin» series production

started this gap was almost overcome.

As it was mentioned above, J-10A is designed

as fighter-bomber, meant to act jointly with J-11

(Su-27) battlefield fighter (Air supremacy fighter).

I.е. here we can guess approximately the same

«duet» that Americans formed in 1980-ies by

aircrafts F-15 and F-16 and today they apply for

F-22 and F-35.

«Tczyanbin», having lateral static unsteadi-

ness, constructed according to aerodynamic con-

figuration delta with horizontal tail surfaces» with

a triangle middle-positioned wing, having lead-

ing edge flap and ailevators, arrow-type, wing-

attached all-movable horizontal tail surface and

single-fin vertical empennage, complemented by

two belly small surface fins. Main landing gear

with relatively narrow track gage is retracted into

fuselage, into «pockets» on the sides of air scoop

channel. Rectangular adjustable air scoop with

movable upper air inlet wedges is placed under

fuselage. There is a four-channel digital wire guid-

ance system that is likely to be the developed ver-

sion of the same system in IAI plane «Lavi».

Airframe construction is basically made of alu-

minum alloys with wide application of carbon plas-

tics. Though initially the measures of «Tczyanbin»

RADAR detection reduction were of quite limited

nature, they can be developed further (in particular

– modern radio absorbing coverings and materials

implementation, metal coating of cock-pit glass

cover, etc), that will enable to decrease J-10 abso-

lute cross-section from present 5 – 6 m2 to the

level of planes like «Rafael» or «Tayfun» (i.е. up to

1.5 – 2.0 m2 in SHF-range radio waves).

The first five pre-series J-10 aircrafts were

equipped with WS-10А engines(11200 kilogauss)

of Chinese design, and all the following fighters

were equipped with more powerful, light and

efficient Russian turbofan АЛ-31FN (12500 kilo-

gauss), that were modification of АЛ-31FN with

low-position drive gearbox. Now China has pur-

chased from Russia 180 engines of the kind. 100

of them were manufactured (or are manufactured)

in Moscow, in the «Salyut» plant, and 80 – in the

Ufa City. This number of engines gives a good

image of the amount of the first J-10A aircrafts

batch ordered by Chinese Air Force.

In 2006 «Salyut» offered to China an upgraded

version of turbojet engine, АL-31F-М1, with thrust

13500 kilogauss, increased life-cycle, digital con-

trol system of FADEC type, and also with multi-

angle УВТ system. It should be mentioned, that the

engine upgrade designed for «Su-27» aircrafts, is

already army-accepted by Russian Air Force.

There is also a reserve (mobile) version of

power plant for «Tczyanbin» – upgraded WS-10А

engine with FADEC control system and thrust,

increased by two tons (up to 13200 kilogauss), cer-

tified in China in 2006. Regardless of lower thrust,

as well as bigger, than of АL-31FN, dry mass and

size, these engines, being non-limited by Russian-

Chinese contract, are likely to be applied for export

fighter versions.

Experimental planes «Type 10» seem to

have been equipped with Israeli on-board RADAR

EL/M-2035, designed for «Lavi» aircraft. There

was information about the Chinese version of the

RADAR – JL-9. There is information about JL-10A

RADAR station on experimental and pre-series

aircrafts (China manufactured as well).

However the first series J-10A were most likely

equipped with Russian stations «Zhemchug» (man-

ufacturer – «Phasotrone-RRI») mass 180 kg, that

were developed version of on-board RADAR station

«Zhuk», partially made on western element base

and having higher characteristics (several stations

of the kind were supplied to China at the beginning

of current decade). The following fighters batches

are equipped, according to Chinese mass media,

with on-board RADAR station «Type 1471» (KLJ-1),

that are obviously Chinese version of «Zhemchug»

having improved characteristics while «working»

with ground targets. The station can detect target of

«fighter» class in front hemi-sphere at range up to

80 km and provide for «air-to-air» missile homing

at the distance up to 60 km.

According to some statements, at the begin-

ning it was intended tо equipped J-10 aircraft with

the 23-mm high firing speed six barrels gun. But

in current configuration it is equipped with the

23-mm conventional two barrels built in gun “Type

23-3” (the Chinese version of our GSH-23 gun). It

is located on the left side of the fuselage, in front

of the main landing gear wells.

30

As it was already mentioned above, the first

J-10 test samples had the same airframe, as the

“Lavi” fighters. That is why aircraft dry weight

(equipped with WS-6 type engine) probably was

from 7100 to 7300 kg (let’s remind, that “Lavi”

fighter dry weight is 7030 kg). Further on the

aircraft was considerably increased in dimen-

sions and therefore it become heavier. So, the

airframe weight was also increased. According

to the different sources it is now not less than

8000-9730 kg. In some sources, particularly in

Jane’s All the Worlds Aircraft reference guide

for the period from 2008 to 2009, the dry weight

of the J-10A aircraft is mentioned as 8750 kg.

Probably this weight must be taken as the most

realistic one.

The fuel tanks capacity of the J-10A aircraft in

comparison with the “Lavi” aircraft was increased

nearly two times and reached the level of 4500

kg. As a result of this the ratio of the fuel weight

to the dry weight of the aircraft became 0.51. And

now it reaches the same ratio (It should be men-

tioned that it is quite high) as F-35A (0.55) and

F-35C (0.61) fighters. That is why the flight range

without external fuel tanks at high altitude, which

is for J-10A equal to 1850 km (in accordance

with Jane’s All the Worlds Aircraft reference guide

2008-2009) looks to be quite realistic or even

marked down a little bit. According to the mass

media the ferry distance of 3000 km for the J-10A

with three external fuel tanks (two of them with

the capacity of 1600 kg each and one with the

capacity of 800 kg) also looks quite realistic (or

marked down).

Quite heavy and various assortment of combat

load, it is equal to 4000-4500 kg (in some sources

– up to 5500 kg), seemed to be an advantage of

the J-10A as the aircraft primarily task is to attack

ground targets. It is installed on the eleven external

pods. Six of the pods are under the wings and five

of them are under the fuselage. The external fuel

tanks can be installed on the internal wings pods

and on the central fuselage pods. Two front under

fuselage piers are used for mounting various con-

tainers with optoelectronic and aiming-navigation

equipment.

However, “Tczyanbin” really being a multipur-

pose combat aircraft, also does not relinquish to

any up to date European aircraft in fighter pos-

sibilities. It has maximum speed equal to Max

M2.1-2.2 and service ceiling (17000-17500 m).

These characteristics exceed the characteristics of

the analogue European aircrafts of the fourth gen-

eration “4+”. J-10А possesses practically equal

with the French fighter Dasso “Rafael” of the “4+”

generation thrust-to-weight ratio and also nominal

pressure on the wing (0.90 and 358 kgs/m2 in

French fighter and 0.87 and 360 kgs/m2 in Chinese

aircraft, respectively).

American fighter-bomber F-16C Block40 and

J-10A are designed to accomplish nearly the same

type of combat tasks. So it makes sense to com-

pare the characteristics of both aircrafts. This most

mass modification of the F-16 fighter-bomber,

which came to service within the US Air force

in 1990 and was equipped with the augmented

double-blow turbojet engine F100-PW-220(10800

kgs), primarily was designed to attack ground

targets. F-16C is equipped with the airborne radar

AN/APG-68 (weight is 160 kg; antenna’s diameter

is 0.38 m). It provides mapping mode, and also

can detect air targets, such as “light fighter” at

the range up to 45-50 km. Moreover, Block 40/42

is equipped with suspended containers with the

aiming-navigation equipment LANTIRN and also it

is equipped with the helmet-mounted acquisition

system (analogue of Russian “Schel” system).

The American aircraft is not as heavy as the

Chinese one (F-16C dry weight is 8300 kg, nor-

mal take off weight is 12600 kg). Fuel weight in

the internal fuel tanks of the F-16C is 3100 kg,

maximum combat load is 5500 kg. Chinese air-

craft maximum speed (corresponds to M=2.1-2.2)

is rather higher than F-16C (which possesses

M=2.00). The efficient flight range of J-10A with-

out suspended fuel tanks is more than (1850-1900

km in comparison with 1600 km of the F-16C).

Action radius at the minimum flight level with the

normal combat load (for J-10 A is 460 km that is a

little higher, than F-16C has (400 km).

Takeoff thrust-to-weight ratio of both aircraft,

while the takeoff weight is normal, is nearly the

same (F-16C – 0.86 and J-10A – 0.87). Steady

state theta displacement rate of the comparing

aircraft is nearly the same: for “Lavi” it is 13.2

degrees per second, for J-10A it differs little,

and for F-16C it is 12.8 degrees per second. At

the same time the rate of momentary roll-out for

“Tczyanbin”, designed as “bes’hvostka with PGO”,

is considerably higher (nearly 23-24 degrees per

second in comparison with the American aircraft

– 17.3). For F-22A fighter it is 27-28, for “Rafael”

and “Tayfun” it is 24.8, for SU-30MKI it is 22-23,

and for F-15C it is 16-17 degrees per second.

Later modifications of «Freedomfighter» –

F-16C Вlock 50/52 and F-16C Block 50/52+, that

were supplied to armament already in XXI, almost

simultaneously with J-10A, are equipped with more

powerful engines F100-PW229 or F110-GE-129

(13000-13200 kilogauss), probably providing for

American fighters inconsiderable dynamic advan-

tage to the Chinese aircraft.

One more foreign analog (and potential rival)

of J-10A is Japanese (American-Japanese, to be

exact) multipurpose fighter Mitsubishi F-2, that

was being created since 1987 to substitute for

fighter-bombers Mitsubishi F-1. The prototype

of the plane performed its first flight in October

1995, and the first series fighter was disposed

to Japanese Self-defense Forces in 2000. By the

middle of 2008 Japan had at disposal 76 F-2 out

of 94 ordered. The cost of a series F-2, according

to Japanese mass media, is $108 mln.

As well as J-10A, F-2 is based on a foreign

prototype – «never realized» American project

W A R P L A N E S

31

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

«Agile Falcon», pro-actively developed by the

company General Dynamics in 1980-1990-ies as

a considerable upgrade of F-16С aircraft, pos-

sessing improved maneuver characteristics (in

particular, unstable roll-out speed should be 21-22

degrees per second). However, opposite to «Agile

Falcon», Japanese fighter is oriented at, first of

all, not for air supremacy fighting and air defense,

but on striking tasks solution (in particular – “air-

to-ship”).

F-2 is somewhat enlarged (with «Agile Falcon»

wing surface 34.84 m2) F-16 with hardened air-

frame, which is designed with wide application

of modern composite materials. As a power plant

American double-blow turbojet engine General

Electric F110-GE-129 (13200 kilogauss) is applied,

providing М=2. Dry aircraft mass is 9530 kg, fuel

mass in inner tanks – 3600 kg, and maximum

take-off mass – 22100 kg. Action radius at «anti-

airborne» tasks solution (with two “air-to-ship”

missiles ASM-1/2, two guided missiles AIM-9 and

ПТБ) is 840 km.

As far as we can see, the Japanese equipped

their aircraft with more powerful and heavier

engine (dry mass АЛ-31Ф is 1530 kg, where-

as F110-JE-129 – 1740 kg). At the same time

inner tanks capacity in F-2 is much less than in

“Tczyanbin”. As to relative fuel mass (0.51 without

ПТБ) the Chinese plane is considerably superior to

its Japanese rival (0.38), which provides for J-10A

better range characteristics. The Japanese aircraft

has a similar to “Tczyanbin” thrust-to-weight ratio

(0.88 – 0.90), that seems to explain similar break-

down characteristics and ascensional rate of both

planes.

It should be specified that the Japanese air-

craft is less known than the Chinese analog,

though even 10 years ago F-2 construction pro-

gram was rather broadly highlighted in Japanese

mass media, herewith some editions even called

the plane «the second «Zero» (meaning the

famous Japanese fighter of the Second World War

Mitsubishi А6М «Reisen», more famous under

American «nickname» «Zero»). But as far as we

can judge by the present, quite scanty press infor-

mation, as well as by the decrease in the number

of F-2 fighters ordered by Japanese Self-Defense

Forces from 130 to 94 units (non-reasoned by any

noticeable changes in Japan foreign-policy posi-

tion since the beginning of the current decade),

«the second «Zero» far and away not completely

supported hopes of its designers, that conditioned

rather moderate present «PR» of the aircraft.

It should be mentioned that F-2 – is the first

in the world series battle aircraft, equipped with

on-board RADAR station with АФАР. But this is

just the very case when «you must spoil before

you spin». Japanese RADAR station having ultra-

modern structure and element base (as well as no

less «modern» cost), even today after almost 8

years of aircraft system operation, doesn’t match

design parameters: according to Japanese mass

media, detection range of air targets for this on-

board RADAR station is less than it was even of

the archaic station AN/APQ-120 of F-4EJ aircraft

«Phantom» II, equipped with dish aerial.

Considering all that, all in all, regardless of

a bit more conservative «board», J-10A today

seems to possess better combatant facilities than

its Japanese analog.

Of course, in its competition with the American

fighter – as to air supremacy fighting – F-22A

«Raptor», also equipped with on-board RADAR

station with АFАR, the Chinese fighter-bomber

has few chances to win both in close and distant

missile combat (however, as well as most of other

fighters of «4» and «4+» generations). That is why

the described at the beginning of the article air

combat, supposedly having taken place in 2007

above the Taiwan Strait between J-10A and F-22A,

is likely to be related to the category of newspaper

or Internet «fakes».

But for the fighter-destroyer of the 5th genera-

tion F-35A the new Chinese aircraft can be quite

a dangerous rival. And if to consider that number

ratio F-35А and F-22А, according to the existing

plans of the USA Air Force, must be approximately

9:1, than air combat between “Tczyanbin” and

“Lightning” II can appear a usual thing in hypo-

thetic Chinese-American conflict of 2010-2020.

It’s out of the question that unfeatured F-35A

equipped with on-board RADAR station AN/APG-81

with АESA and «built-in» in the integrated digital

data-control system, will be considerably superior

to the Chinese fighter in missile combat in non-

visual range, «playing» with it, almost “one-sided”

(enough to mention that “Lightning” II can detect

its rival, having ERS in heading flatten surface,

equal to several meters, at the range of 160-170

km, and “Tczyanbin” can «see» F-35A with ERS

=0.5 m2 at range of only 15-20 km. However in the

close maneuver air combat lighter and more flex-

ible J-10A will have all the advantages.

But all the speculations are only true for

unlikely «duel» combat between the two fighters.

In real life it’s not single aircrafts that fight but

aircraft groups. That is why in the conditions of

large-scale armed conflict simpler, cheaper and

wholesale “Tczyanbin” is likely to have additional

«bonuses» in front of more expensive and more

complicated «Lightning»II.

It should be also pointed out that the most

probable equipment of the Chinese aircraft with

perspective on-board RADAR station with ESA or

AESA, as well as undertaking additional measures

to reduce J-10А RADAR detection must come by

the second half of 2010-ies (i.е. when the mass

army-acceptance of F-35 is to start) should equal

the chances of both fighters in remote air combat

as well.

The striking armament of J-10A today mostly

includes aerial bombs and non-recurrent bomb

holders gauge 250 or 500 kg, as well as НАР.

Thus, in one of the standard striking configura-

tions the aircraft can carry up to eight free-falling

bombs gauge kg 250 кг, two suspended tanks and

two «air-to-air» missiles PL-8/9/13 of small range.

However lately China develops up-tempo guided

aviation ammunition, which is first of all to equip

the newest multipurpose fighters J-10A.

In 1998 tests of the first Chinese series

GB LT-2 finished, which was created in LOEC

32

(Luoyang Electro-Optical Technology Development

Center) based on the Russian CАB-500L. Presently

this ammunition is produced in series. They equip,

besides J-10A, new light bombers JH-7A (army-

accepted by CHINA Air Force), upgraded fighter-

bombers Q-5G, multipurpose fighters J-8-IIМ, and

also light fighters JF-17 («Super-7»), supplied to

Pakistan. Guided bomb has the standart deviation

3 – 5 m, semi-active optical homing duration 20

sec and capture range homing head system, equal

to 4 km.

GB-1 is army-accepted as well, manufactured

by the state corporation Sichong Group and seem-

ingly being a developed version of GB LT-2. It is

equipped with optical semi-active homing head,

providing КВО of about 3 m. Ammunition mass –

570 kg, besides J-10A it is also carried by light

fighters JH-7А.

LOEC Center in 2006 finished guided gliding

aviation bomb tests that were indicated as LS-6. The

ammunition is equipped with optical semi-active

homing system. Its mass 540 kg, warhead mass

is 440 kg, shell diameter is 377 mm, wing span –

2.46 m. LS-6 wing is made of carbon plastics. They

inform that during the tests the bomb showed stan-

dart deviation 7.5 m. It should be mentioned that

bombs LТ-2 and LS-6 were publicly demonstrated

in 2008 within the weaponry of J-10A.

LOEC is as well developing high-precision

aviation ammunition of the second generation,

that have bigger tonnage, interference protection

and application flexibility. If КАБ of the 1st gen-

eration LT-2 had only optical semi-active homing

head, in the new ammunition, LT-3, it will be com-

plemented with composite inertial-satellite guid-

ance system. Aviation bomb, by its composition

reminding of the American CАB GBU-31 JDAM,

has a tail quickly-mounted unit with aerodynamic

controls and control system module as well as

plated aerodynamic surfaces, meant for gliding

characteristics improvement.

On GB LT-3 new optical coordinator is applied

as well, substituting for wind direction indica-

tor type coordinator, used on GB LT-2. The

new ammunition is conceptually close to GB

GBU-54 and «Upgraded Payvuvai» IV, also having

combined (inertial-satellite + optical) guidance

systems.

CASC (China Aerospace Science and

Technology Corporation) creates a set of high-

precision aviation weapon «Fay Teng», in particu-

lar – guided aviation bombs FT-1 and FT-3 with

inertial-satellite guidance. Bomb FT-1 (500 kg)

has crosswise wing small elongation and cross-

wise developed tail unit with controls, having

electric drive. It can glide (depending on the alti-

tude of bomb-dropping) on range of 7-18 km and

hits the target with the precision up to 30 m.

FT-3 is small gauge ammunition (250 kg);

the shell is fitted with folding wing module. On

the tail module (inside which there is a unit of

inertial-satellite guidance system) four aerody-

namic small empennage tops are installed, behind

which Х-shaped tail unit is fitted. Manufacturers

state, that this type of aerodynamic configuration

provides for better gliding stability, as well as con-

tributes to application range increase (according to

some sources it reaches 60 km).

Heavier than FТ-3, GB FТ-2 mass 440 kg (con-

ceptually similar to the American GB Boeing Long

Shot) is equipped with new folding wing module

with large elongation. They inform, that КВО of the

ammunition is 20 m.

CASC also created unique, having no analogs

in the world, superlight (mass – 35 kg) GB FТ-5,

aerodynamically similar to the American 500-kg

aviation bomb Мк.83 mass 500 kg. Ammunition of

the kind can be applied not only at pilot aircrafts

(in particular J-10А), but also at small combat UAV,

that are sure to be investigated in China as well.

To fight over-water targets J-10А can be

equipped with new light “air-to-ship” missile

С-704, developed by CASIC (China Aerospace

Science and Industry Corporation). Guided missile

is equipped with tele-homing head and is capable

of effectively hitting boats and small ships in

daytime, in plain weather conditions. Solid fuel

“air-to-ship” missile with start mass of 300 kg has

range of 35 km. It is produced according to regular

aerodynamic scheme with trapezoidal crosswise

wing and tail unit. The upgraded version of the

missile – С-704KD – is equipped with infra-red

all-day homing system.

To fight small-sized moving targets in com-

bat CASC creates «air-to-surface» missile AR-1.

Guided missile, as to its dimensions similar

to the American helicopter missile AGM-114

«Hellfire», has optical semi-active homing sys-

tem. Optical axis of the laser corrector has angle

with longitude missile axis, which facilitates

surface targets capture.

J-10A weaponry will be also supplied with

antiradar missiles– Russian Х-31П or Chinese

guided missile of the similar type. At the same time

a disadvantage of the Chinese fighter consists in

the absence of strategic-tactical cruise missiles in

its ammunition, similar to the Russian Х-59М and

Х-59М2, American JASSM or European «Storm

Shadow» and KEPD-350. However, China will pos-

sibly purchase the weaponry for J-10A in Russia.

For missile air combat of intermediate

range the Chinese fighter can be equipped with

«Шаньдян-10» (SD-10) missiles, that are the

authorized version of the Russian missile of Р-77

type with combined (inertial + active RADAR)

guiding system. Guided missile of the type must

be basic weaponry of «air-to-air» type for Chinese

multipurpose fighters Su-30МКК and Su-30МК2

(J-13), as well as upgraded Su-27СК (J-11).

But the standard aircraft ammunition is

Chinese missiles of intermediate range «Пили-11»

(«Удар молнии-11», PL-11) and «Pili-12»

J-10A FIGHTER AND ITS PROTOTYPE THE IAI”LAVI” AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS

Type of the aircraft “Lavi” J-10A

Wing span, m 8.78 9.70

Length, m 14.54 15.50

Height, m 4.78 4.78

Wing area, sq.m 33.00 39.00

Dryweight,kg 7070 8750

Takeoff normal weight, kg 9990 11440

Takeoff, mаximum weight, kg 18370 19300

Маximum combat load, kg 7300 4500

Fuel capacity, kg:

In the internal fuel tanks 2625 4500

In the external fuel tanks 4165 4000

Маximum М 1.85 2.20

Maximum ground-level М 1.20 1.20

Climbing capacity, м/s 254 –

Economic range without external fuel tanks, km - 1850

Ferry range, km - 3000

W A R P L A N E S

33

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

(«Thunderbolt-12 (Удар молнии)», PL-12). The

first one is a bit altered Italian missile Alenia

«Aspid»1А. Its development started in 1992, and

PL-11, equipped with semi-active mono-pulse

radar homing head, has the starting mass 220

kg, maximum speed, correlating with М=4, and

shooting range in front hemi-sphere up to 40 km.

They informed about successful manufacturing of

its upgraded version – PL-11A – with active radar

homing head.

PL-12 missile is the newest Chinese develop-

ment among the weaponry of “air-to-air” type, per-

formed jointly with Russian specialists. Its devel-

opment started in 1999, and in that second half of

current decade « Pili-12» was army-accepted by

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY OF CHINA. Missile

with double-mode hard-fuel engine has starting

mass of 220 kg (according to other data – 180

kg) and aerodynamic configuration similar to

«Pili-11». It is equipped with composite guidance

system similar to Р-77, and can use the so-called

«plunging» trajectory, providing shooting range

up to 80 km. they also informed that the missile

was developed with air-burning engine, having

maximum range increased up to 150 km.

Besides, the fighter can carry intermediate

range missiles with ТGS PL-13 or PL-13M, that

are authorized versions of the Russian missiles

of Р-73М type capable of hitting air targets at the

range up to 20-30 km. Missiles, equipped with

thrust vector control system, can fly with 40-times

overload and developed the speed relative to

М=2.5. Starting mass of PL-13 is 105 kg, and

PL-13М – 115 kg.

Nominal J-10A armament also includes small

range thermal missiles PL-8, PL-9 and PL-9С

(starting mass 115-123 kg), that are developed

version of the Israeli guided missile «Piton»3

(Chinese-Israeli defense-technological cooperation

heritage of 1980-1990-ies). Missile weapon can be

used in different combinations, for example – four

missiles PL-11/PL-12 and two PL-8/PL-9 or two

missiles PL-11/PL-12, two PL-8/PL-9 and three

suspended fuel tanks. As we can see, as far as

guided weaponry of “air-to-air” type is concerned

the Chinese fighter is almost not inferior to the

best foreign analogues.

The updating of “Tczyanbin” is running on.

Most probably the evolution of this advanced

aircraft will be continued in the direction of further

increasing of its air characteristics due to install-

ing more powerful engine with UVTAL-31 FN-M1,

and also due to decreasing of radar and thermal

detection ability, adaptation of the up to date avi-

onics and armaments. It was mentioned in mass

media with citation of “the circles being closed

to Chinese aircraft industry” that in 2006 airborne

radar “Type 1473” was created in China for J-10A

aircraft. This radar is able to detect J-11 (Su-27)

at a range exceeding the range of detecting J-10

aircraft by airborne radar N001E, which is installed

on “Sukhoi” aircraft. If you take into consideration

that ERS of Su-27 several times larger than the

same of J-10A, then you can supposed that the

new Chinese radar is able to detect an air target

“light fighter” type (ЭПР=3м2) at the range of

80-90 km, and the range of detecting a target

like Su-27, will exceed 100km. Probably they are

talking about the radar with ФАР of passive type,

that is developed in China independently (but with

Russian specialists as consultants) since 1990.

The other way of possible J-10A upgrading

is installation of Russian airborne radar on the

aircraft.

In prospect it is possible to equip “Tczyanbin”

aircraft with Chinese or foreign made (first of all

with Russian) radar with EASA.

Although F-10aircraft is delivered now to

Chinese Air force and Navy only, a number of other

foreign countries have already taken interest in this

fighter. It is quite natural that the first would-be

customer, most probably, will become Pakistan,

the main China partner on military-technical coop-

eration. In April 2006 it was told that the Pakistan

government approved the plans of acquisition

of 36 fighters J-10 type in export version (it is

called FC-20, and it is going to by 100 more air-

craft. Thereat according to Mass Media the prime

cost of one fighter was appreciated as 41 million

US dollars. Possibly, these fighter-bombers (in

case contract for aircraft delivery will be made)

will be equipped with Chinese double-flow turbo-

jet afterburner WS-10A engines and west made

airborne radars (the most possible version is

GRIFO2000 radar with slot antenna).

In October 2007 there was information about

Iran’s intention to purchase 24 planes of “Tczyanbin”

type. Though later the Iran party officially declined

the fact of negotiations with the Chinese about

J-10 purchase, it can still be presumed that some-

thing was done in this direction. Among other

potential purchasers Thailand, Nigeria, Angola and

Sudan were also mentioned…

On the whole it can be stated, that on the

international aircraft market “Tczyanbin” rep-

resents a new product of good quality, capable

of competing with aircraft industry production

of the USA and Europe. As to our country, I’d

like to remind of the fact that F-10 is to a great

extent the result of native aircraft industry (in

any case, engine, as well as pert of avionics and

armament there are Russian). And if the USA

once ignored the prototype of “Tczyanbin” – the

Israeli aircraft «Lavi» – for the benefit of own

aircraft industry (indeed, what is small Israel in

comparison with the large USA?), it would be

very stupid of Russia to behave like that towards

the Great eastern neighbour. “Tczyanbin” air-

craft is already created, series manufactured

and (whether anybody likes it or not) will inevi-

tably join world aircraft market. Under these cir-

cumstances the position of our aircraft industry

supporting J-10A program and participating in

the aircraft production, looks like perfectly right.

As smart managers say: «If you can’t prevent

the booze-up, you should head it…».

34

India, the second world’s most populous coun-

try and a nuclear power, has today one of the

largest and rather modern air force of 740

aircraft with 23% of them belonging to 4th and

4th+ generations (Su-30MKI, MiG-29, and Mirage

2000), 47% are 3rd generation (Jaguar, MiG-23,

and MiG-27), and 30% are 2nd generation MiG-21

fighters with half of them made of MiG-21bison

deeply upgraded aircraft advanced to nearly 4th

generation. One can assess the quality level of

the Indian Air Force aircraft fleet knowing that in

the middle of 2008 it totaled 53 Su-30MKI aircraft

with a combat potential exceeding that of any

foreign batch-produced fighter with the sole pos-

sible exception of F-22A. The high level of training

performed by Indian pilots is recognized by those

of the U.S. Air Force, who are not at all bad in the

profession, but have been repeatedly “beaten” by

Indians at international war games.

All the fighters of the Indian Air Force, however,

have been developed and often built abroad, in

Russia, France, and the U.K. Despite the consider-

able success made by the Indian aircraft industry

within the past decades, until recently the Indian

were unable to learn a complete cycle of making a

combat aircraft from look to batch production. India,

though, has been making efforts in this direction for

about 50 years now, ignoring financial predicaments

and occasional failures. The history tells us that this

type of persistence is inevitably rewarded…

The first “nearly homemade” Indian aircraft

was the HF-24 Marut fighter-bomber (Spirit of the

Tempest) designed under the supervision of Kurt

Tank, who is an outstanding German designer,

who made FW 190 and Ta-152 piston fighters,

which were among the best in the world. Marut

made its maiden flight in the March of 1961 and

was initially designed for the top speed of Mach 2.

The British license-built Rolls-Royce Orpheus Mk

703 turbojet the Indian aircraft makers had avail-

able was underpowered and a super sound speed

could be reached only in dives.

The Indian aircraft industry manufactured 147

Marut jets. The fighter-bombers were used during

the India-Pakistan war in 1971. Some attempts

were made to build an advanced and more speedy

HF-73 fighter-bomber based on HF-24, but the

sole prototype was lost during tests. One series-

built Marut aircraft can be now observed in the

polytechnic museum of the city of Bangalore.

Among the Indian designs of the 1960-1980

was the Ajeet air superiority aircraft made in 1975

based on the Folland Gnat subsonic fighter. India

also made Kiran jet trainers, and a number of

piston trainers.

In the late 1970s, the Indian Air Force Staff

worked out AST 201technical requirements for

development of a light fighter to replace MiG-21

and Ajeet. The primary task of the future aircraft

was air defense, and the secondary – direct air

support of land forces and (partial) insulation of

combat zone. The aircraft was to be small, travel

at a supersonic speed, have high maneuverability

and advanced arms systems.

ADA LCA LIGHT MULTIPURPOSE FIGHTERADA LCA LIGHT MULTIPURPOSE FIGHTERVladimir Ilyin

W A R P L A N E S

35

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

The initial development program of the new

jet under implementation in the “depth” of the

Air Force was called Super Gnat, which in a way

mainly positioned the future fighter as a successor

to Gnat-Ajeet. The affordability and cost effective-

ness were the widely used criteria for the program.

Under the long-term Indian Air Force development

plan adopted in 1981, the new Indian aircraft were

to replace 11.4% of fighter squadrons by 1991

with the goal of 40% to be reached by 1994-1995.

The Air Force determined its total demand of the

aircraft at 250 jets.

The preparatory work for creation of the air-

craft that could be called a fourth generation com-

bat jet was launched in 1980. A group of Indian

Air Force and Industry experts drafted a report

then saying that a such-like program was techni-

cally and economically feasible. At the same time

the authors of the report thought that some parts

of the new aircraft (some onboard equipment,

systems, and construction materials, including

onboard radar, flight-by-wire control system, and

composite materials) would have to be purchased

abroad. A bit later (likely in the middle of 1983)

similar reports (with alike conclusions) made on

the Indian government’s order were provided by

four west-European aircraft builders: BAE, MBB,

Dornier, and Dassault-Breguet. In the very year of

1983, the government made a fundamental deci-

sion to launch the program. The Indian new gen-

eration fighter was finally given the green light!

In the May of 1985, the Aeronautical

Development Authority (ADA) founded in 1984,

as it seems specially to implement the fighter pro-

gram, presented the government with a detailed

report on the perspectives of the new aircraft

based on previous research. A month later, the Air

Force made customer technical specifications for

the fighter and a group of HAL experts was teamed

up in the ADA to perform the pre-draft preparation

of the project called LCA (Light Combat Aircraft.

Indian Defense Minister N. Rao told the parliament

commenting on the event that the “completely

Indian aircraft developed by Indian experts with

minimal help provided by foreign firms…will not

lag behind aircraft of other countries in the level of

applied technical solutions.” According to the min-

ister, the LCA was to be prepared for the maiden

test-flight as soon as 1989.

Expulsion of various designs of the new fighter

started in the aerodynamic tunnel of the National

Aeronautical Laboratory (NAL), as did research

for selecting specification requirements for the

main aircraft systems. The initial development of

the LCA multipurpose onboard radar project was

jointly carried out by the Electronics and Radar

Development Establishment (LRDE) of the Indian

Defense Ministry and HAL. The choice of a power

plant for the LCA is of primary importance. At the

early stages of the program prototype fighters

were supposed to be fitted with foreign engines

(the RB199 bypass turbofan engine with after-

burner was mentioned among others), and the

series-produced aircraft were to be powered by a

future GTX Indian engine.

In accordance with initial calculations, the new

aircraft was to have tailless configuration, a delta

wing with a front edge curve (both completely tail-

less configuration and tailless configuration with

small-surface foreplane located close to the wing

were considered), an aerodynamically unstable

structure, and a digital flight-by-wire control sys-

tem. Composite materials were supposed to be

widely used in the airframe design.

The specification demands were also gradu-

ally clarified. Under preliminary estimates, the

LCA empty weight was to be around 6,000 kg,

and the max takeoff weight was to total 10,500

kg. So the weight of the fighter was to be close

to that of the main Indian combat aircraft of the

time MiG-21. Media reports would repeatedly say

that LCA was to have better performance than the

F-16 U.S. fighter.

The LCA production was supposed to be

arranged in Bangalore. There was a reservation,

however, that if the wing of the aircraft was to be

made of coal-plastic, the console production could

be relocated to one of western firms, possibly British

Aerospace. As N.Rao put it, the cost of the project

development was estimated at $500 million.

The project works on LCA were lead by

the ADA headed then by Dr. Kota Harinarayana,

a renowned Indian aircraft builder. Hindustan

Aeronautics Limited (HAL) became the leading

contractor to take charge of the main part of

the program with its research and development

department located in the Indian “city of science”

Bangalore. The construction of the first prototype

was to be launched in 1990 with the first aircraft

to be ready a year later, in 1991.

As it has been mentioned before, the LCA was

intended to be an aircraft meeting rather strict

speed and maneuverability requirements. It was

to be very stable and steerable, reliable, easy and

cheap to use, and also demand a relatively short

take-off and landing strip. The latest aircraft tech-

nology was to be integrated in the fighter’s design:

reduced static stability structure, composite mate-

rials of key design elements, digital multichannel

flight-by-wire control system, integral “board”

with microprocessors, “glass” cockpit, up-to-date

onboard radar, automated breaking control sys-

tem, etc.

The French impact on the LCA look resulted

in the aerodynamic structure of the aircraft. The

tailless scheme, which was profoundly advanced

by Dassault’s Mirage aircraft, was chosen. Though

the use of foreplane would improve maneuverabil-

ity, it would also result in a 0.76 m longer fuselage,

as well as to greater weight and radar signature.

On January 7, 1986, the Defense Research and

Development Organization presented a detailed

fighter construction plan to Prime-Minister

R.Ghandi and the minister of defense. The plan

laid the basis for the LCA program. It is noteworthy

that the Indian government, traditionally avoiding

putting all eggs in one basket where military and

technical cooperation is concerned, simultane-

ously collaborated with the Soviet Union and

western countries. The LCA program was explicitly

“focused” on the West. Besides Dassault other for-

eign firms were engaged in the program, including

Alenia providing assistance in manufacturing coal-

plastic panels for wing coating, Martin Marietta

(control system), and BAE (consultancy for devel-

oping the aircraft automatic control system).

36

In the March of the very 1986, a U.S. Defense

Department delegation came to India, which com-

prised 20 experts working in military R&D facilities

specialized in aircraft and engine building and

radio-electronic systems. Cooperation between

India and the U.S. in the LCA program was dis-

cussed, including such issues as building the

fuselage, development and construction of avia-

tion electronics. Pentagon officially announced its

intent to support India’s HAL in the LCA aircraft

development.

Looking ahead we will say that the fuselage

finally remained to be Indian, but the Americans

further received contracts for deliveries of engines,

advanced alloys, and composite materials, as well

as for development of the LCA digital flight-by-wire

control system. The development of the system is

worth focusing on. The Indian gave up the idea of

making this crucial element of the aircraft them-

selves at early stages of the program. In 1988,

Dassault offered its analogue flight-by-wire control

system. For a number of reasons the system din

not satisfy the Indians and in 1993 the U.S. General

Dynamics (currently Lockheed Martin), which had

obtained a lot of experience in the field while cre-

ating and upgrading F-16, was chosen to create a

four-channel digital flight-by-wire control system.

The digital flight-by-wire control system final

adjustments were carried out in the U.S. through

modeling at a special NT-33 aircraft with additional

checks performed at the F-16 fighter. The works

were completed in 1996.

In 1986, India concluded a contract with the

U.S. General Electric for the delivery of F404-GE-

F2J3 engines to be used for LCA prototypes. It was

supposed to be a temporary measure with further

prototypes and series-produces aircraft to be fit-

ted with Indian engines. It is common knowledge,

though, that there is nothing as permanent as

temporary measures…

The LCA outline design started in 1987 and

finished in 1988. The works were carried out with

Dassault’s technical support (the support price

was $10 million). The aircraft under construc-

tion was to closely meet the requirements of the

local theatre of operations and fully integrate the

national combat expertise, including that obtained

during the India-Pakistan war in 1971.

The analysis carried out by Indian experts

showed that the new multipurpose fighter was to

be close to MiП-21 (which proved perfectly effec-

tive in air fights with Pakistani F-86, F-104, and

F-6) in its main features. It also was to have better

maneuverability, farther range, increased variety

and number of weapons, as well as new avionics

equally effective against air and ground targets.

The LCA concept was close to the follow-

ing aircraft: JAS 39 Gripen (Sweden), Ching-

Kuo(Taiwan), and FC-1 (Super-7, China/Pakistan).

The look of the new fighter was influenced not only

by technical, but also political issues: India, which

was gaining international importance, needed not

only an aircraft, but also a kind of a symbol

of national independence in the field of high

technology.

It is noteworthy that, though, the Indian fighter

was designed for the Air Force, at the early stages

of the program a deck-landing aircraft based on

it was also considered: the Indian Navy bought a

British-built Vikrant in 1961 (19,500 metric tons),

which proved highly effective in the war of 1973.

A more powerful Viraat (former Eagle) ship was

bought in the U.K. in 1996. It had a deadweight of

28,700 metric tons and had Sea Harrier fighters.

India had plans of further upgrade of aviation and

aircraft fleet of deck-landing aircraft.

On March 31, 1990, the new fighter project

was officially approved. At the end of the year a

LCA prototype construction was to be launched.

Note that the maiden flight of the new Indian

fighter was initially and optimistically planned for

1991, but later postponed until 1992. In 1990,

the Indian Defense Ministry announced that the

construction of the “demonstration” aircraft was

delayed until 1993 citing technical reasons so that

the wheeling-out was to take place in 1994 with

the maiden flight to follow no sooner than 1995.

All that meant that the beginning of series produc-

tion of the Indian fourth generation fighter would

start most optimistically in 1997 with the first

batch-produced jets to enter service not in 1996

as it was planned, but in the XXI century.

The Indian chief of staff said commenting

these decisions that “the delay of the LCA fighter

program can prompt the armed forces to consider

fielding a new type of an “intermediate” fighter

to replace MiG-21 and MiG-23”. As a possible

replacement both General Dynamics F-16 and

Saab JAS 39 Vigen supersonic aircraft and sub-

sonic AMX (AERITALIA, AERMACCHI, EMBRAER)

and BAE Hawk 200 were considered. The subsonic

aircraft would result in considerably reduced costs

while maintaining a high strike potential, but the

Hawk 200 or AMX fighting potential was evidently

not enough for winning air superiority formerly

performed by MiG-21.

Another possibility is that the combat field

insulation task could be performed by additionally

ordered MiG-27M fighter-bombers, whereas direct

air support could be carried out by 80-90 AJT

upgraded combat trainers purchased by the Air

Force. Looking ahead, the Indian Air Force gave

up the idea of subsonic attack planes rather soon

due to low combat potential and survivability, the

supersonic F-16 and JAS 39 jets are considered by

the Indians as the LCA “gap fillers” in the frames

of the MMRCA program in 2009, 20 years after

the described events. It is really true that unlike

Europeans, who are always in a hurry, the sons of

the most ancient Indian civilization don’t take two

W A R P L A N E S

37

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

or three decades for a long period of time even in

the dynamic field of military aircraft building.

In the late 1980s – early 1990s, the further

LCA strategy implementation was considered for

changes. For instance, a simplified version of the

fighter deprived of some earlier planned technical

solutions was offered to be built as soon as pos-

sible with minimum costs. And no sooner than at

the second stage of the program, when a simpli-

fied version was launched into series production,

extended work on a “full-fledged” LCA was sup-

posed to start. Besides, a number of squadrons

initially planned to be fitted with LCA aircraft

were then to receive advanced MiG-21. Looking

ahead, it is noteworthy that we can see today this

scenario implemented: 125 MiG-21UPG entered

service of the Indian Air Force partly filling the

LCA “gap”, the LCA Мk.1, which “do not entirely

meet the requirements of the Air Force” are being

batch-produced and the work on “full-fledged”

LCA Mk.2 completely satisfying the customer

demands have started.

Another LCA’s alternative to appear in 1991

is also worth mentioning. A project of a new

S-37 fighter combining high striking potential

and good “fighting” capabilities was offered dur-

ing the U.S.S.R. Air Force commander-in-chief E.

SHaposhnikov visit to India. After the collapse of

the Soviet Union followed by the fall of the Soviet

aircraft building, though, the offer quickly became

irrelevant.

In 1993, the Indian government finally sanc-

tioned the construction of a flight-demonstration

(experimental) LCA item. In the May of 1995,

the fuselage was launched into production, and

in December that year the coal-plastic wing fol-

lowed. The ceremonial wheeling-out of the LCA

TD1 (technological demonstrator, first) took place

on November 17, 1996 lagging nine months

behind the schedule. But the customizing of the jet

proved to be longer than expected and no sooner

than April 1997, test-pilot Rakesh Sharma, the

first Indian spaceman, who visited the Mir Soviet

Orbital Station, started the ground tests of the jet.

On January 4, 2001 the LCA fighter made

its maiden flight and was later named Tejas

(Radiance). On August 1, 2003 the jet exceeded

the sound speed for the first time. On August 14,

1998, the second TD2 prototype was wheeled out

from an assembling workshop. Just like TD1, it

also had the F404-GE-F2J3 U.S. engine. Its flight

tests started no sooner than 2002.

The TD1 and TD2 were first publically demon-

strated at the international air show Air India 2003,

which took place at the Yelahanka Airbase near

Bangalore on September 5-9, 2003 (the author of

the text was also present at this even historic for

the Indian aviation). The LCA flight let the Indians

feel justified pride.

Many of the Bangalore citizens to visit the

show were engaged in the aircraft industry so the

flight of the new fighters made them also proud of

their work. From the “aerobatic” point of view, the

LCA flight resembled that of a MiG-21. The Indian

aircraft showed a rather good rate of climb. The

Indian printed media said later that the LCA TD

“has a rate of climb exceeding that of MiG-29,”

which has the initial rate of climb of 300-330 mps

depending on the variant. But these claims are

likely to be invented by the authors.

Along with the creation of the aircraft itself, an

unhurried but purposeful work on the development

of the LCA onboard radar was under way. In 1991,

the design of the onboard radar for the aircraft

was launched. Under initial plans, the fighter was

to be fitted with an Indian version of the Swedish

Ericsson/GEC-Marсoni PS-05/A, pulse-doppler

multipurpose onboard radar developed for JAS 39

Vigen based on the Blue Vision radar of the BAE

Sea-Harrier.

But then some problems of adjusting the

Swedish radar to the Indian “board” emerged and

in 1997 a decision was made that the LCA radar

with features close to those of PS-05/A be made

by HAL’s radio electronics department on its own,

which did not exclude possible technical support

provided by foreign partners. Two test-bed aircraft

based on HS478М were fitted to flight-test the

onboard radar.

Two matrix color displays were used to show

flight and tactical information at the test aircraft.

They were MFD-55 crystal based and made by

the French firm Sextant Avionics. The resolution

of the displays was good enough to show a great

number of special signs and symbols neces-

sary during the flight. It is woth mentioning that

similar displays of the firm were installed at the

Mirage-2000-5 and Rafal French aircraft, as well

as at the Franco-German Tiger helicopter. Foreign

composite materials were used to build the LCA TD

and PV aircraft to make 30-34% of the airframe,

which resulted in reduced weight and bearable

g-loads of between +8 and -3. A ten-year program

was initiated to have these materials produced by

national chemical companies and until it ended the

materials were imported.

According to the Indian media reports, the

R&D works on the LCA program and construction

of TD1 and TD2 pilot aircraft cost India 21,880

38

million rupees ($730 million at 1992 financial

yea’s exchange rate). The overall costs of the

development of the new fighter, including the

engine development expenditures and excluding

series production were estimated at 50,000 million

rupees ($1.4 billion).

The opinion of the U.S. experts about the LCA

aircraft is also of some interest. Having studied the

features of the aircraft, they said it was “the next

generation of F-5 type aircraft.” They mentioned

that the design features of the fighter were high

enough with the small size and relatively low cost,

which would provide a good demand for it on the

world market. The Americans said, though, that

“the fighter has a relatively small specified life,

which will make it operational within 14 years,

whereas the advanced western fighters had the

same feature was much better.” The ADA chiefs

said to clarify the point that the LCA operating life

was calculated based on heavy climate conditions

and if the aircraft is used in countries with a milder

climate, the specified life could be extended.

Due to the fast tempo of mastering the lat-

est technology in aircraft building showed by the

Indians, the LCA design specifications looked

impressive. So, while at the initial stage of the

program the design empty weigh was estimated

at 6,000 kg, then due to optimism in wide coal-

plastic use the Indians decreased the weight to

the record low for a fighter of the class – to 5,500

kg, which seamed rather possible. The composite

materials were supposed to be used in the wing,

empennage and control surface design.

The percent of the composite materials used

in the LCA roughly twice exceeded that of the U.S.

F-22A Raptor fifth generation fighter and its Soviet

analogue MiG-MFI jet. For a comparison, the Saab

JAS 39 Gripen with a structure close to that of

the LCA and a similar engine (Svenska Flygmotor

RM12 based on the same F404) and a radar was

6,620 kg, that is 1,120 kg more. At the same

time, the internal fuel tanks of the Indian aircraft,

according to advertizing brochures, was to accom-

modate 2,400 kg of fuel compared to 2,270 kg of

the Saab aircraft. The LCA fuel efficiency was 0.44

compared to 0.34 of the Jas 39. The LCA prede-

cessor in the Indian Air Force, MiG-21bis (empty

weight – 5,350 kg), was fitted with the R-25-300

augmented turbojet engine with the thrust of 7,100

kgf and had only 1,790 kg of fuel in internal tanks

(fuel efficiency also 0.34). It is little surprise that

the LCA practical range of 2,000 km was to be

close to that of heavier fourth generation foreign

fighters (F-15 and F-16) and be much better than

that of not only MiG-21bis (1,250 km), but also of

Gripen (1,700-1,800) km.

The LCA thrust-to-weight ratio with the F404

with a normal takeoff weight was to be 0.91

compared to 0.81 of JAS 39 and 0.87 of MiG-

21bis, which would in theory give the Indian

aircraft acceleration and maneuverability features

exceeding foreign aircraft of the same class.

The LCA design speed and height features were

slightly worse than those of MiG-21 (Mach 2.0,

17,000-19,000 m compared to Mach 1.7 – 1.8,

16,000 m), but were good enough for effective

fight with up-to-date foreign tactical aircraft. In

general, the Indian Air Force was to receive an

aircraft comparable with the best similar foreign

jets and exceeding some of their features.

The construction of the first two prototype

vehicles PV1 and PV2 was launched in 1998.

The traditional natural model of the fighter was

replaced by a virtual model, which was a 3D data

base of detailed information on the configuration

and design of the aircraft (a similar approach was

first used in the U.S. for the development of the

Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit low observable stra-

tegic bomber, and was later used for F-22, F-35,

and T-50 fighter programs.

PV1 took off on November 25, 2005, and

the PV2 followed on December 1, 2005. Exactly

a year later, on December 1, 2006, flight tests of

the PV3 started. The fourth pre-series aircraft PV4

initially built as s prototype of the LCA-Navy carrier

fighter was further delivered as the second series

jet LSP2. Then an prototype of the PV5 two-seat

combat trainer was launched, as well as navy

prototypes NP-1 and NP-2, which have not started

flight tests as of today.

It should be mentioned that the takeoff weight

of empty demonstrator aircraft LCA TD was far

from the announced record low figure for the

series aircraft and totaled according to the Indian

media 6,800 kg. The pre-series LCA PV1 had more

carbon-plastic and the weight reduced to 6,300 kg.

The LCA PV2 had the design composite material

figure of 43%. But this fighter was also fitted with

some organic electronic equipment, armament,

as well as some onboard systems, which were

not installed on previous versions. It was likely to

increase the weight again. The exceeding weight

became one of the crucial problems for the Tejas

makers…

On April 12, 2007, the first series Tejas Mk.1

fighter LSP1 made its maiden test flight. On June

16, 2008 it was followed by LSP2 (former PV4).

Another six series aircraft (LSР-3 – LSР-8) were

supposed to be tested until the end of 2008, but

when the article was being written the information

on LSР-3 – LSР-8 flights was not available.

Unlike the fighters of other developing nations,

which are powered by engines made in Russia, the

U.S., France, or the U.K., a decision was made to

develop a specific engine for the Indian fighter,

which would compete with fourth generation

bypass turbofan engines with afterburner. The

development of the engine called Kavery with the

design static thrust in the full afterburning mode

was 8,500-9,000 kgf (a bigger figure was also

announced – up to 9,200 kgf), was entrusted to

the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE)

ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SERIES-BUILT TEJAS

Wingspan 8.9 m

Length with pressure head bar 13.20 m

Height 4.40 m

Wing surface 38.40 m2

Empty weight 5,500 kg

Internal tanks capacity 2,400 kg

Takeoff weight

Air superiority derivative 9,000 kg

Strike derivative 12,500 kg

Max combat load 4,000 kg

Max Mach number 1.6-1.8

Service ceiling 15,200-16,000

Operational range 2,000 km

Ferry range 3,000 km

Max exploitation g-number +9.0/-3.5

W A R P L A N E S

39

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

in Bangalore. The French firm SNECMA decided to

provide technical assistance to the Indian experts.

The bench test of the Kavery bypass turbofan

engine with afterburner started in 1996. The engine

was supposed to power five PV1 – PV5pre-series

aircraft. But the works on the engine development

started to delay. As a result, another 17 F404-JE-

F2J3 General Electric engines (7,300 kgf) were

bought in the U.S. to power demonstration and

pre-series jets. All the aircraft are now receiving

new and more powerful F404-GE-IN20 General

Electric bypass turbofan engines with afterburner

(8,200 kgf) developed on the Indian order with

design elements of the Swedish RB12 F404-400

bypass turbofan engine with afterburner and with

a digital control system of the F414.

Despite delayed works, the Indian Air Force

seemed to be optimistic about the perspectives of

the “national” engine in the first half of the current

decade. According to announcements made by

Indian government in 2005, the LCA series aircraft

were to start receiving Kavery engines in 2009. In

early 2005, an engine of the type developed 96%

of the maximum design thrust during tests.

Flight tests of the bypass turbofan engine with

afterburner installed at an LCA were planned to

begin in December 2006 and January 2007. The

problems to occur during the final engine adjust-

ments seem to have not been solved. As a result,

in February 2006 ADA concluded an agreement

with the French firm Snecma for support with

works on the engine so as to make it flight-capable

in 2009-2010. The goal was not achieved either

and despite the official continuation of the Kavery

program, the idea of installing the engine at Tejas

aircraft, at least in the mid-term planning, seems

to have been finally refused.

In the 1990s, the Indian Air Force were going

to buy at least 200 LCA fighters and 20 two-seat

combat trainers (while optimist would announce

300 or 500 jets) with the initial combat readiness to

be reached in 2003 with the full combat readiness

to follow in 2005. One LCA of the 220 item series

was expected to cost the humble $21 million. The

sum later escalated to $22.6 million, which is also

very little compared to other 4+ generation aircraft.

According to unofficial data, though, an aircraft of

the 220 item series would cost $35 million, which

seem much more true to life.

The Tejas planes were planned to start enter-

ing the Indian Air Force inventory in 2008 replacing

MiG-21FL, and MiG-21ML. It is noteworthy, that

the Indian Air Force currently has 19 air squadrons

of MiG-21 aircraft produced on a Soviet license.

A total of 125 MiG-21bis were upgraded to MiG-

21UPG(bison) and the rest, which are both morally

and physically outdated, are to be replace in the

near future.

In 2005, the Indian Air Force concluded a 20

billion rupees (over $445 million) contract with

the HAL for the delivery of the first 20 series

Tejas aircraft Mark 1 with F404-GE-IN20 General

Electric bypass turbofan engines with afterburner,

including 16 single-seat fighters and four two-

seat combat trainers. The agreement also had an

option for the purchase of another 20 aircraft. HAL

ordered a total of 24 F404-GE-IN20 engines cost-

ing over $100 million at General Electric in early

February 2007.

Let us focus on technical features and design

specifications of the Tejas Mk.1 first Indian series

supersonic aircraft.

The light single-engine multipurpose fighter

has the tailless aerodynamic structure with a high

delta wing variable-swept on the fore edge, single-

fin tail unit and one bypass turbofan engine with

afterburner installed at the fuselage rear. The static

stability of the aircraft is reduced. The Tejas fea-

tures, the designers claim, are to be as follows:

– high maneuverability;

– multifunctionality;

– all-weather day and night capability;

– compatibility of cockpit instrumental equip-

ment with night vision goggles;

– low radar echo, which is one third of that of

similar size fighters (that is about 2 m2).

The aerodynamic structure of the aircraft is

claimed to provide minimal wind resistance, little

specific wing load, high rate of turn for bank, yaw and

pitch, as well as good takeoff and landing features.

About 43% of the series-produced LCA air-

frame is made of composite materials. The fighter

skin is 90% composite materials. The use of large

coal-plastic panels provided a much lighter design,

as well as a reduced use of fasteners with 5,000 of

rivets necessary compared to 10,000 of a similar

size fighter with an all-metal riveted design. The

use of composite materials saved the necessity of

drilling 2,000 holes in the airframe inevitable for a

usual all-metal design.

The wing is made of composite materials

(longerons, wing ribs and skin), fuselage skin

and air inlets, as well as the elevons, keel, rud-

der, and air-brakes and undercarriage flaps. The

coal-plastic skin is 2.4-2.7 mm deep. The airframe

design largely incorporates aluminum– lithium and

titanium alloys.

As a result of implementation of some new

constructional materials (first of all composite

materials) and the latest technologies the duration

of manufacturing period of one LCA aircraft had to

be reduced from 11 to 7 months.

40

The fighter’s wing has reduced sweep in the

root which is made in order to provide the pilot

with forward and downward lookout as it is stated.

A three-piece wing-slat is situated on the wing

leading edge and the wing trailing edge is occupied

with two-piece elevons.

As it was mentioned previously the wing con-

struction is almost entirely made of composition

materials. Most of the longerons and stringers,

upper and lower one-piece skin panels which are

fastened with screws to the longerons are made of

these materials as well. The slit vortex generators are

mounted in the wing and fuselage matching joint.

The aircraft’s fuselage is semimonocoque

type. Two speed brakes are situated in its tail-end

on both sides of the vertical stabilizer and made

of carbon fiber-reinforced plastic. Two fixed hemi-

spheric section air intakes are placed on the sides

of the fuselage.

Though dimensions of «Ajita» are brought to a

minimum that together with the use of composite

materials provides it with small optical and radar-

tracking signature. In the aircraft design a number

of additional measures on decrease of radar cross-

section are implemented. Such measures are:

– Giving to channels of the air intake of the

bent Y-shaped form, aimed to shield compressor

blades from direct radar tracking;

– Rather wide application of radio absorbing

materials and coverings;

– Use of passive sensors and tracking

devices.

TD1 and TD2 test fighters are equipped with

the General Electrics F404-GE-F2J3 (1х7300 kg(f)

augmented dual-flow turbojet. Serial planes were

supposed to be equipped with the Indian GTRE

GTX-35VS “Kavery” engines (1х8500 – 8800 kg(f)

with the Douti/Smith KADECU digital control sys-

tem, however this engine never passed through

the test stage. As a result the MK1 fighters have

been equipped with the US F404-GE-IN20 aug-

mented dual-flow turbojets (8200 kg(f) and were

updated specially for the requirements of the Air

Forces of India (tropical edition).

The internal tanks of the aircraft volume is

3,000 liters. Five external fuel tanks with the vol-

ume of 800 or 1200 liters can be placed under a

wing and the fuselage. In the long term the under-

fuselage fuel tank was planed to be replaced with a

conforming external fuel tank of the same volume

which provides considerably smaller aerodynamic

resistance and smaller radar cross-section.

On the right side of the fuselage at cockpit

windscreen a fixed inverted-L type aerial refueling

receiver is mounted.

The plane having reduced static stability is

equipped with the Martin Marietta four-channel

digital electronic remote control system with the

higher level of protection against external elec-

tromagnetic influences. There are no duplicating

analogue or mechanical systems onboard.

The basis of the onboard radio-electronic

equipment complex makes a duplicated computer

(32 bit, ADA programming language), integrated

with other elements radio-electronic equipment

and weapons via three digital data buses which

correspond to MIL-STD-1553B standard.

In fuselage nose section the X-range MMR

(Multi Mode Radar) multipurpose coherent pulse-

doppler radar station is placed. It was designed

on the basis of the Ericsson PS-05/А radar sta-

tion. The station is capable to track up to 10 air

targets, allocate two most priority targets among

them and ensure launch of two “air-to-air” active

radar homing missiles for one of the targets. In the

“air-to-earth” mode the radar carries out district

mapping, provides detection of small targets, their

engagement with onboard weapons, flight in the

terrain avoiding land obstacles fly-by mode. The

slit antenna has small weight – less than 5 kg.

The development of the station was carried out by

the HAL company together withERDE (Electronics

Radar Development Establishment).

Besides onboard radar (the basic onboard

information mean) the aircraft can be equipped

with external multichannel (thermal, television,

laser) Lightning container tested onboard one of

LCA aircrafts in 2007.

The aircraft has modern information and con-

trol board of pilot’s cockpit corresponding to

the requirements to aviation complexes of «4 +»

generation. The basis of this complex are two

liquid crystal multipurpose full-color display (the

size of the screen is 125х125 mm) with a push-

button frame as well as the wide-angle indicator

on the windscreen with holographic optics. In the

twin-seater variant of LCA there are four displays

(125х125 mm) as well as two multipurpose con-

trol panels which have liquid crystal displays.

For conducting near air fight the aircraft is

equipped witha helmet-mounted visor manufac-

tured in Ukraine. The works on integration of

the Israeli helmet-mounted sight-indicator with

avionics were conducted. The controls of “Tejes”

are made by HOTAS principle that allows to pilot a

fighter without releasing control levers.

Radio-electronic warfare and communication

means are integrated with other elements of avion-

ics into the joint «Mayavi» (“Fokusnik”) onboard

complex. There are both built-in electronic warfare

equipment (station of detection of a radar and

laser irradiation, containers with shoot off heat

flares and chaffs) and external containers with

active jamming equipment.

The remarkable feature of the aircraft weapon

system is presence of both Russian and the west-

ern aviation weaponsin its structure. The Lightning

container with thermal and television (with high

definition) positioning and targeting equipment as

well as laser range gauge and target designator

(that provides possibility of application of guided

aviation bombs (KAB) and other precision weapon

without any external means of illumination) is sup-

posed to be mounted on the special (eights) under

fuselage suspension joint.

The plane is equipped with a built-in GSH-23L

gun (23 mm) with the allowance of am munitionof

220 rounds, placed under the fuselage (it is similar

to MiG-21bis fighter). On the seven external joints

of a suspension (six under wings and one under

PART OF CONSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS (BY WEIGHT) IN LCA AIRCRAFT

Technical demonstrator (ТD) Pre-production vehicle (PV)

Aluminum alloys 57,0% 45,0%

Carbon fiber-reinforced plastic 30,0% 43,0%

Steel 5,0% 4,5%

Titanium 6,0% 5,0%

Other materials 2,0% 2,5%

W A R P L A N E S

41

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

fuselage) according to the initial projectvarious

weapons with the total weight of 400 kg including

short and medium range “air-to-air” missiles (of

Russian, French and American manufacture) could

be mounted.

The Russian R-77 guided missile (till 2010

India should receive 1600 missiles of the kind from

Russia) and Indian DRDO ASTRA missile which

will go through flight tets in 2011 are themedium

range missiles with the active radar homing sys-

tem. The ASTRA guided missile of the 1st stage

should have the maximum range of fire equal to

45 km. And more sophisticated missile of the

2nd stage should engage the targets on counter

courses at a distance of up to 80 km.

Short range missiles with TGS are represented

at “Tejas” with the Russian R-73 and French Matra

“Majic”. The “air-to-surface” weapon includes

Russian Х-59МЭ, Х-59МК, Х-35 and Х-31. The

craft should carry guided aviation bombs (up to

KAB-1500), unguided air-to-surface missiles, free-

falling bombs and bombing cartridges of various

types. However at “Tejas” Mk.1 the weight and the

weapons designation on external joints of suspen-

sion may probably be essentially reduced.

By the middle of 2008 two LCA demonstration

aircrafts three test aircrafts and two planes of Mark

1 first series had been constructed and transferred

to flight tests (six more are under construction).

Their total time in the air exceeded 1000 hours in

December, 2008 . The first serial fighter accord-

ing to the Minister of Defence of India should be

transferred to the Air Forces in 2011, and the first

squadron of 20 LCA combat aircrafts is expected

to reach initial battle readiness in 2012.

It seemed after many years of delays that LCA

at last came to the “home straight” and the Indian

Air Forces have received the “national” fighter.

However as it turned out the optimism was prema-

ture: in the autumn of 2008 referring to the national

Ministry of Defense it was declared, that the serial

craft possesses «superfluous weight». The exact

figure of the overweight was not pronounced,

however it is possible to assume, that it appeared

to be rather essential. As a result the “Tejas” Mk.1

aircrafts as it turns out, possess underestimated

(in comparison with the estimated) flight charac-

teristics and do not correspond even to «minimal

requirements of the customer for combat load».

It was reported, that the weight of empty

“Tejas” MK.1 aircraft exceeds the estimated one

by 1500 kg, i.e. makes not less than 7000 kg (and

probably more). It is necessary to say, that the

growth of the craft’s weight during its designing

is quite usual. For example Mig-29 became 1.13

times heavier during the period between the initial

project and the first serial fighter (from 9,670 to

10,900 kg) that however didn’t make any remark-

able consequences for the program. Probably

the weight of the US F-35 grew even more sig-

nificantly but also did not result in any troubles

for the designers. However the increase of this

major characteristic by 1.27-1.30 times neverthe-

less forced the Air Forces of India reject further

purchases of this “overweight” fighter. Excessive

weight of the LCA can be possibly explained

with too optimistic belief of the developers in the

composition materials design of the glider and

overestimation of their ability to work with carbon

fiber-reinforced plastic. Probably, the acquiring

of extra weight appeared during the design of a

number of systems also took place.

Thus, serial «Tejas» weighs much more than

its Swedish analogue «Gripen». It has inevita-

bly caused correction of other characteristics of

the fighter. So, thrust/weight ratio of the fighter

(0.75-0.78 at normal take-off weight) became a

little bit less than at MiG-21bison. Maneuverability,

acceleration characteristics and climbing capacity

also decreased. Combat load of 4000 kg became

unattainable for «Tejas» Mk.1. Now it may reach

1500-2000 kg as its best (not exceeding the cor-

responding parameter of Mig-21). Most likely,

these aircrafts became comparable in the criterion

of «range – combat load».

In various sources it was specified, that the

maximum speed of LCA should be М=1.6-1.8.

However during tests, judging by the media reports,

the value of M did not exceed 1.4. Probably this

value is also maximum for serial «Tejas».

As a result of all these disappointments in

the end of 2008 the MoD of India took a serious

decisionfor itself to refuse further purchases of the

«Tejas» Мк.1 fighters, having limited the number

of serial fighters with 20 units (i.e. one squadron).

It has endangered the further continuation of the

whole program. It is possible to assume with a

high level of probability, that after similar delays

and technical failures any European, US or Russian

program in the field of military aircraftwould be

stopped (enough to remember a sad destiny of

US programs of F-111B, А-12 (АТА), RAH-66

«Comanche» or our program called MFI). However

for India the «Tejas» aircraft is nevertheless more

than just an aircraft. «Shining» is a symbol of

appropriation of entire independencein such major

for national defense area as military aircraft engi-

neering by the state. For such country as India

which has ancient cultural traditions, huge human

potential and thus some centuries were under a

colonial heel, it has not only defensive, but also

huge political value. Therefore it is possible to

expect, that program the LCA program neverthe-

less will be continued and led to victorious end.

Though it was decided to abstain from further

serial orders of the “Tejas” Mk.1 aircrafts, the

Indian Air Forces and the HAL company work

on the sophisticated version of the craft called

«Tejas» Мk.2. However the new contracts for

the serial production with the ADA agency will

be signed only after it is obvious, that this craft

meets the minimal requirements of the country

Air Forces.

It is supposed, that in “Tejas” Mk.2 design a

number of the improvements directed on optimiza-

tion of aerodynamic characteristics and weight of a

glider will be implemented. Replacement of some

elements of design, in particular – the chassis

42

(that indirectly testifies to considerable increase

of weight of «Tejas» Mk.2) is supposed also.

However the most essential part of moderniza-

tion will be installation of the new, more powerful

engine chosen in the framework of the interna-

tional competition. In December, 2008 the ADA

agency planned to direct to the General Electric

andEuropean consortium Eurojet Turbo an offer on

participation in this tender.

The F414 engine (10000 kg(f) applied in F/A-

18E/F) or EJ200 (9200 kg(f) installed in EF2000)

are expected to allow providing performance of

primary requirements of aircraft performance

characteristics which were initially required for

the LCA craft by the Indian Air Forces. The com-

petition winner-company will delyver 99 engines.

The agreement will include an option for addi-

tional delivery of 49 more augmented dual-flow

turbojets as well, that, taking into account the

reserve engines should provide manufacture of

125 «Tejas» Mk.2 fighters.

After the winner in the tender of engine manu-

facturers is chosen the modernization of the LCA

fuselage for the chosen engine will be performed.

At the same time the “Tejas” Mk.2 twin-seater

crafts will still be equipped with the F404-GE-IN20

engines (probably, using the option of 20 aug-

mented dual-flow turbojets of this type).

One more basic difference of «Tejas» Mk.2

from Mk.1 can be a new radar complex. By 2004

after many years of delays two MMR test radar

stations were constructed. However in 2006 it

became known that works on creation of this air-

craft radar met serious problems which questioned

terms of completion of the program. And the radar

station itself corresponded to the requirements of

the early 1990s could not be considered modern

any more in second half of this decade. In 2007 the

agreement providing rendering to the Indian party

help in operational development of the station by

an Israeli company Elta was signed. Searching for

a new onboard radar station corresponding to the

requirements of the present day was begun at the

same time.

Presently the possibility of equipping “Tejas”

Mk.2 with Israeli radar station with automatic

phased array called ELTA EL/M-2052 is observed.

The model of this station was shown at the

international exhibition «Air India – 2005» in

Bangalore. It is necessary to say, that very little is

known about this station intended for equipping

of F-16 class crafts (its weight makes «130 – 180

kg»). It has a small rectangular antenna. And the

information presented in exhibition booklets, to

put it mildly, raise certain doubts. In particular,

the declared ability of EL/M-2052 to detect to

64 air targets simultaneously looks colored (in

the US radars AN/APG-77 installed at F-22A this

parameter makes, on various information, 20-28

targets). At the same time it is possible to assume

that the characteristics of this station (which most

probably is just going to be created) will be at the

level of the latest European and American onboard

radio stations with automatic phased array. In

particular, the declared range of enemy’s light

fighters detection for EL/M-2052 of148 km looks

quite convincingly.

In January, 2009 the ADA agency signed the

contract with the European concern EADS, provid-

ing rendering to the Indian party help in updating

«Tejas». Thus the main attention will be paid to

struggle for weight decrease and measures for

chassis strengthening as well. The program is cal-

culated for 48 months. Thus the first «Tejas» Mk.2

in the serial configuration will take off not earlier

than in 2014, i.e. practically simultaneously with

the India-Russian fighter of the 5th generation.

We remind that initially it was planned, that

the LCA aircrafts first of all will replace the fighters

of MiG-21 type and «Ajit». However «Ajit» “quit-

ted the stage” in 1991 still before the prototype

of «Tejas» took off for the first time. Later the

MiG-23BN fighter-bombers (entered the service f

the India AF after the failure with “Marut”) were

added to the list of aircrafts submitted for replace-

ment for LCA. However and these crafts left the

service in 2007 not being replaced with a new

Indian multipurpose fighter. The MiG-21Ml and

MiG-23MF aircrafts also should be replaced since

2012 not with «Tejas» but with the multipurpose

MMRCA fighter: 126 crafts of this type should

enter the service (with transfer of the first vehicle

to the customer in 2012) following the results of

the international competition in which generation

“4 +” fightersparticipate such as MiG-35, F-16I,

F/A-18E/F (F-18IN), «Rafael», EF2000 and JAS 39

«Gripen».

Chronic prolongation of implementation terms

of the LCA program made in the mid-nineties

the Indian Air Forces begin search of alternative

variants of modernization fighter park allowing

to support necessary qualitative level before the

“national” fighter enters service.

In 1996 the Russian-Indian contract providing

modernization of 125 MiG-21bis fightersto the

level of MiG-21-93 has been signed. The modern-

ized MiGs which got an Indian name MiG-21UPG

(sometimes they are called MiG-21bison) started

to arrive in the Indian Air Forces in 2002, and by

2008 the program had been practically finished.

Modernization concerned basically the onboard

radio electronic equipment and weapons of the

aircraft. «Bison» has received new pulse-dopler

radar «Kopiyo-21I» with slit antenna, practically

not conceding to the MMR station created for LCA

(target detection range with radar cross-section

of 3 м2 is 57 km, simultaneous tracking of eight

and engagement of two targets), modern weapons

control system, allowing to use the guided “air-

to-air” and “air-to-surface” weapons, the inertial

navigation system upgraded with the module of

satellite navigation and also the complex of weap-

ons practically identical with the corresponding

complex of LCA. Thus the modernized aircraft

completely kept the high flight characteristics of

the MiG-21bis fighter whichnot concede to the

characteristics of «Tejas».

After 125 MiG-21UPG practically corresponded

to the level of generation «4 +» became part of the

Indian Air Forces the problem of the 2nd genera-

tion fighters replacementbecame much less sharp.

It may have allowed the management of the Indian

Air Forces to take easy the regular delay of the LCA

program connected with the necessity of creation

of a new modification of this fighter, deprived of

the disadvantages of the 1st generation fighters.

Most likely the modernized Swedish fighter

«Gripen» NG which started flight tests in 2008 will

become the nearest analogue of «Tejas» Mk.2. This

aircraft equipped with a new onboard radar with

automatic phased array has the extended fuselage

with the volume of the fuel tanks increased by 40

% and the F414G engine (10,000 kg(f), allowing to

fly with supersonic cruiser speed (up to М=1.2).

The weight of the empty aircraft has increased by

400 kg (i.e. to 7000-7100 kg), the maximum take-

off weight has made 16,000 kg, and ferry range

with full fuel tanks is 4070 km.

Besides the basic single-seater variant of the

«Tejas»fighter intended for the Air Forces, the

working out of other modifications of this aircraft

is conducted. In particular the training-combat

twin-seater variant of the fighter was being cre-

ated. There is a twin-seater training-combat pro-

totype PV5 is under construction. This aircraft in

general is similar to the single-seater. It carries

similar to «Tejas» Мк.1 onboard equipment and

weapons. The difference is in absence of a fuel

W A R P L A N E S

43

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

tank for 410 l behind the cockpit instead of which

the cockpit of the second pilot is created. Thus

part of fuel is moved to the additional capacities

located in other places of the glider. As a whole

the twin-seater at insignificant reduction of range

practically completely keeps the potential of the

single-seater.

Works on the deck-based variant of the fighter

called LCA-Navy are going on. In due time together

with the pre-series LCA crafts two prototypes of

this plane – NP1 and NP2 were laid down. Their

construction was essentially prolonged, and now it

is reported, that NP1 can be presented not earlier

than the end of 2009.

It was reported, that the generality in avionics

of the deck-based and land-based fighters makes

99 %. At the same time LCA-Navy should have

insignificantly changed control system, reinforced

chassis with the increased course of the shock-

absorbers ensuring landing to the deck of the

Aircraft carrier with a big vertical speed and

take off from a launching-ramp. In the design of

the glider of the deck-based fighter the corrosion-

resisted materials are used.

One of the constructional features of LCA-

Navy which distinguish it from other deck-based

fighters is the fuselage nose section with radio

transparent cowling of the onboard radar which

descends at take off and landing (as it is at Tu-144

or Т-4) by 4 degrees. That improves the lookout of

the pilot at actions on the aircraft carrier deck.

In the root of a deck-based aircraft wing

the additional rotary surfaces are supposed to

be installed. All these changes have resulted in

increase in weight of the glider in comparison with

the weight of a coast-based fighter.

Essential changes have also been made in the

fuel system of LCA-Navy: new means of quick fuel

draining for emergency landing to the deck soon

after take off are provided.

Take off of a deck-based fighter should be

carried out by means of a launching-ramp habitual

to the Indian ship pilots, without use of catapult.

Landing to the deck will be carried out by means

of three-barrier arrester and brake hook. The small

size of the fighter allows to do it without the sys-

tem of the wing folding complicating a design. This

system is regular for the majority of other modern

deck-based fighters with large dimensions.

Any characteristics of LCA-Navy were not

announced but it is known that the weight of this

fighter is 800 kg more than the weight of «Ajita»

Mk.1 (i.e. should make about 8,000 kg).

The deck-based variant of the LCA fighter is

planned to be used from the board of a perspective

light aircraft carrierproject «Vicrant» (the second

with such a name) laid down at the shipyard of

Cochin Shipyard Limited in Cochin on October,

7th, 2005. Creation of this ship was conducted

since the middle of 1990s in the framework of the

ADA program(Air Defense Ship). Initially developed

as a light aircraft carrier with the displacement of

25000 т, ADS (project 71) has gradually grown to

the sizes approximately equal to the sizes of heavy

aircraft carrier “Kiev”. The help in creation of the

Indian aircraft carrier was rendered by a number of

foreign (including Russian) organizations, and the

ship project was performed with the assistance of

an Italian firm Fincantieri SpA.

The ship with the displacement of 37,500 т,

the length of 252 m and the width (by a flight deck)

of 58 m is supposed to be equipped with four

gas-turbine engine with total capacity of 108,000

h.p., providing speed of up to 28 knots. According

to initial plans, the aircraft carrier should become

operational in 2012, and in 2017 it was supposed

to transfer the second practically the same ship

to the Naval Forces. However later the plans were

modified and the term of the «Vicrant»’s entering

service was prolonged at least till 2015.

It is supposed that the new Indian aircraft car-

rier will carry 12 fighters and 12 helicopters. It was

originally planned, that those fighters will be LCA-

Navy, however the mixed plane park consisting of

LCA-Navy and MiG-29К (the first aircraft of this

type have been transferred the Indian Naval Forces

in 2008) was being discussed later. Taking into

consideration the long terms of construction both

in the LCA program and in the construction of the

Indian aircraft carrier, it is possible to assumethat

real appearance of LCA-Navy on deck the Indian

ship can take place not earlier than in the end of

next decade (if it in general will take place).

Thus it is required to add changes in the

design of the deck-based aircraft similar to the

changes in the design of«Tejas». As a result the

weight of the deck-based craft will grow even

more, that will inevitably require more increase

the wing area. The power-plant problem may also

require resolving: even at transition to the F404

augmented dual-flow turbojet (10,000 kg(f) the

thrust/weight ration of the deck-based aircraft

can appear insufficient to take off with full com-

bat load from a launching-ramp. Apparently, the

Indian designers will encounter many difficulties

in order to to deny the Americans convinced, that

it is almost impossible to make a good deck-based

aircraft of an land-based fighter...

The Air Forces of India together with the indus-

try considered also plans of further development of

LCA which possibly can be partially implemented

in the «Tejas» Мк.2 project. In particular, it was

supposed to lower radar signature of the fighter

essentially by applying some new, more effective

radio absorbing coverings developed in India in the

conditions of high secrecy since 1980s.

The works on advanced, more powerful vari-

ant of the “Kavery” augmented dual-flow turbojet

were conducted. At the expense of application of

monocrystal blades developed by Metallurgical

research laboratory of MoD of India, it was planned

to increase gas temperature behind the turbine to

1850 degrees. According to the estimations the

new engine would allow LCA to fly with supersonic

cruiser speed. The works on a three-dimensional

thrust vector control with a axe-simmetrical nozzle

control system, and on a digital control system

with the full responsibility intended for modernised

augmented dual-flow turbojet as well. Application

of thrust vector control, according to the Indian

experts, allowed to create a variant of LCA without

vertical plumage in the long term, that essentially

reduced its radar signature.

On the basis of the “Kavery” engine it was

planned to develop an unboosted variant with the

increased degree of limbation intended for the

perspective training and combat aircraft. However

today after an actual failure of the «Kavery» pro-

gram these plans will hardly be implemented in

the near future.

In 1996 the financing of research works on

creation of a larger multipurpose fighter MCA

(Medium Combat Aircraft ) on the basis ofLCA

were started. MCA had to replace the “Jaguar” and

“Mirage 2000” aircrafts in 2010s. This aircraft was

intended to complement the Su-30MKI heavy mul-

tipurpose fighters. However after the signing of the

India-Russian agreement on jointwork on creation

of a fighter of the 5th generation, theМСА program

might have lost the urgency for India.

44

First brand-new A330-200 entered Russian

service in the last month of the past year.

On December 10 Aeroflot – Russian airlines

hold ceremony of meeting the aircraft arriving from

Airbus plant in Toulouse where it was built. Many

dignities and ordinary people gave their attendance.

Among them there was minister for transporta-

tion Igor Levitin. But the minister did not spoke

before audience. Why? Reasons were many. Here

are just a few of them. The deal on ten A330s for

Aeroflot was a part of a bigger one that involved the

Russian government, United Aircraft Corporation,

EADS, Airbus, Aeroflot and AerCAap – to name

only big players. It was arranged in spring 2008.

The Kremlin permitted purchase of new European

widebody jets in return for its maker’s obligations

to provide some work for the ailing domestic indus-

try. That work was meant to be additional orders

for manufacturing of parts for Airbus mainstream

models such as A320 family of narrow body jets,

A330, A380 widebodies and, in the future, for

A350. The Russian industry was also promised a

work share in the A350 project, which will spend

in development a few years. Aeroflot insisted on

replacement of A330s for A350s when the latter

becomes available. Airbus accepted this, yet not

through its own leasing arm, but via AerCap leas-

ing company. The Russian flag carrier placed order

for 10 A330s, with a rider of their replacement for

A350s. Shortly after AerCAP agreed to serve launch

customer for A320P2F converted freighters – the

joint program of EADS, Airbus, UAC and Irkut.

CEO Klaus Heinemann applied his signature at the

respective agreement at Farnborough Aerospace

International 2008. It seemed that AerCap was

very much involved in the cooperative programs

between the European and Russian industries.

Therefore, it came as a big surprise when the

very first A330-200 for Aeroflot appeared to be…

owned by quite another proprietor! When the

side VP-BLX landed in Moscow – Sheremetievo,

Aeroflot distributed press-releases which stated

that the deal for this particular airplane was signed

in March 2008 (in other words, a year after the big-

ger deal), with Wahaflot Leasing 1 Limited based

in Cyprus. But this was not the end for surprises.

Speaking on behalf of owner at the acceptance

ceremony in Sheremetievo was Erik Dahmen. He

introduced himself as senior director with Waha

ARAB CAPITAL FOR AEROFLOTARAB CAPITAL FOR AEROFLOT

Vladimir Karnozov

45

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

Capital, an Abu-Dabi leasing company. Little was

heard about both of those, which sparked our inter-

est. Below is the interview with Mr. Dahmen gave

our correspondent at the delivery ceremony on

December 10, 2008. Waha Capital traces its history

to Oasis Capital (In Arab language, “waha” means

“oasis”). To many of the non-natives, waha sounds

similar to the name of the religious leader of the 18

Century, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab an-Najdi

(1703–1792) who started a new flow in Islam. Now,

this flow is prevailing in certain countries, including

Saudi Arabia. Men calling themselves Wahhab’s

followers fought against Russian army and law

enforcement forces in Northern Caucasus and are

answerable for many terrorist activities in Russia’s

homeland territories. While “waha” and “Wahhab”

may sound markedly different to the native dwellers

of the Arabian peninsula dwellers, it does not for

most of the outsiders. And this puts them on their

guard. This is one of the reasons why the Russian

minister for transportation preferred to keep mum

at the ceremony. Apparently, he had not expected

this sort of challenge, perhaps not merely linguistic.

There was another reason for Levitin to stay silent.

The new Aeroflot airplane is actually registered well

off the Russian coasts, on the islands of Bermuda.

Hence its registration: VP-BLX. The ministry made

it clear that it prefers Russian carriers to put

their aircraft in the Russian register and get “RA”

registration. Aeroflot does not seem to have been

listening to the authority. But let us go back to the

lessor. Waha Capital calls itself “diversified invest-

ment company”. It holds some 40% in Addax Bank

based in Bahrain and has “interests” in Malaysia,

Ireland, US, Liberia and Cyprus. About 15% of

company’s shares are in hands of Mudaba sover-

eign wealth fund based in Abu Dabi, and 3% – in

that of Goldman Sachs. The rest belong to public

and unnamed private individuals. On 18th February

2008 Waha Capital, the Abu Dhabi-based and Abu

Dhabi Securities Exchange -listed holding com-

pany, announced that its investments in aviation,

finance, real estate, infrastructure and maritime

and logistics sectors will exceed AED 20 billion

over the next three years. This and other news

from the group can be found on their corporate

site http://www.wahacapital.ae/. On 19 October

2008 Waha Capital reported a net profit of AED 40

million for the third quarter of 2008, an increase of

34 percent over the corresponding period last year.

These figures were given by HE Hussain Al Nowais,

Chairman of Waha Capital.

AerCap’s involvement in Russian programs is

longer and greater than Waha’s. Late last year the

company had a total of 24 aircraft contracted for

lease with Russian airlines. Five of these aircraft

were delivered to the airline customers. “This

shows how important the Russian market is for

us”, commented Frauke Oberdieck, Vice President

Corporate Communications with AerCap. Most of

aircraft are intended for Aeroflot – Russian Airlines

and its subsidiary Aeroflot-Nord. As of late 2008,

Aeroflot operated six A320 family aircraft. First

AerCap-owned A320 was delivered to Aeroflot in

July 2008. Remaining five deliveries are due by

March 2009. The Russian flag carrier also has on

order ten A330s. Deliveries started in December

2008. These shall complete in April 2010. Aeroflot-

Nord signed for six B737-500s, of which two were

delivered in 2008. The remaining four aircraft are

owned by the securitization portfolio AerCo, for

which AerCap acts as servicer/marketing agent.

Deliveries of these airplanes started in September

2008, in the view of completion in February 2009.

Apart from Aeroflot, AerCap has it aircraft placed

with SkyExpress (one B737-500) and Transaero

(one B737-400). Again, these transactions involved

the securitization portfolio AerCo, for which AerCap

acts as servicer/marketing agent.

46

Interview with Waha Capital, Erik Dahmen, senior director, marketing.

– Mr. Dahnen, could you please tell us about your company?

– Waha Capita is Abu Dhabi-based and Abu

Dhabi Securities Exchange -listed holding company

that invests in in aviation, finance, real estate, infra-

structure and maritime and logistics sectors. Waha

is just registered in Abu Dabi; it is actually owned

by the Arabs. So, it is a truly Abu Dabi company.

We are based there and have very close ties to

the Abu Dabi government and other companies

there and the United Arab Emirates. It is a stable

company, professional. It has strong shareholders.

We are based in the country where there is a lot of

strategic views. Well, everybody heard of Abu Dabi

and Dubai, what they are doing in the world. We like

to think that we are part of this process, part of that

strategy, that of growth and the future.

– How many aircraft does it have in its fleet?– I do not know what is above the top of my

head. But we have an internet site – when people

can check this. Our corporate site is http://www.

wahacapital.ae/.

– Is the A330-200 being handed over to Aeroflot a good asset for your company?

– It is a fantastic aircraft and a good asset, too.

Besides, Aeroflot has a very good name in the mar-

ket. So, for us, it is all round good transaction.

– How many aircraft has Waha placed in Russia so far?

– For the moment Waha has only two aircraft

for Aeroflot. This A330, and one A320 which was

delivered to Aeroflot two weeks ago. We are open

for discussions for some more, but we have no

transaction apart from those two aircraft we have

already purchased. We do not have anything else in

Russia right now. But while I am here in Moscow,

of course I will to our friend in Aeroflot about

opportunities to do more business in the future.

– What are the Russian airlines you are going to speak to?

– I do not really know. As a leasing company

based in Abu Dabi, we are very interested in the

Russian market. I am here to find out if there is

something more we can do. We have spoken to

some in the past. I have spoken to Transaero, as

well as Sibir. But these are people we do not have

business with.

– How did it happen that AerCap signed the original agreement with Aeroflot for ten A330s, but the first aircraft was actually provided by quite another leasing company?

– I do not know. The company in question is

called AerCap. That’s not my company. AerCap

bought and leased ten A330s to Aeroflot. Our com-

pany, Waha capital, purchased one of the A330s,

plus an A320, from AerCap, with a lease to Aeroflot.

So, we did not buy aircraft directly from Airbus –

instead, we bought it from AerCap.

– What’s in common between AerCap and Waha?

– We are a leasing company and like AerCap,

we are also listed on stock exchange. Both of our

companies has a fleet of aircraft that we own and

lease to airlines worldwide. That’s all.

– Why AerCap sold Aeroflot’s aircraft to Waha?

– I do not know exactly why AerCap sold the

aircraft. My guess is that AerCap always had an

intention to sell their aircraft. Which, I think, is a

strategic move. Thereby, you use your purchasing

power, and do a transaction in the view that you in

the future will be able to sell the aircraft. Obviously,

with a whole intention to make a profit.

– Was the sale of Aeroflot aircraft caused by the world-wide financial crisis?

– No, it is not related to the crisis, not at all.

In fact, we agreed that would buy this aircraft well

before the crisis even started. We bought these

aircraft and placed with Aeroflot.

– Once we touched on the crisis, does it affect your company’s business?

– It affects everybody. For sure, it affects us.

Sometimes you see that some of our airline cus-

tomers are having financial difficulties, or having

difficulties like many other airlines in the market.

These are difficulties with the financial market, fuel

prices etc. For us as a leasing company I think the

crisis brings new opportunities. As it always does.

Smaller people selling, fewer investors… so, it

brings opportunities for whose who stay in this

business.

The crisis brings opportunities, but on the

funding side, the financing side, it brings chal-

lenges, including us. I think that in future transac-

tions you will find that there are fewer banks that

are lending money. In our discussions with banks

we have already found that. We have already found

that people are less willing to lend money. It is not

so much for Waha, but it is the case with some

other leasing companies.

– It seems that the aviation market contracts. Do you agree with this?

– Yes, I believe that there are fewer inves-

tors and fewer buyers. So, you are right, it is a

narrower market now. On the other hand, I think

that there is a good hope that in the New Year the

crisis will loose up a little bit. Banks, for example,

are optimistic. Banks that are now having liquidity

problems, that will in the New Year sort themselves

out. And will be more readily available for the leas-

ing companies like us and others.

C I V I L AV I AT I O N

47

A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )

48

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