AIR WAR COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY

Air Force Intelligence Role in Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

Cristina M. Stone Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College Maxwell Paper No. 39

Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

November 2006

Air UniversityStephen R. Lorenz, Lt Gen, Commander

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Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air Uni-versity, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Maxwell Paper and others in the series are avail-able electronically at the Air University Research Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.

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Foreword

After the United States and coalition forces failed to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) stockpiled after Op-eration Iraqi Freedom, the president charged a congressio-nal commission with examining US intelligence capabilities regarding WMD. No great surprise, the commission found that the intelligence community had been “dead wrong” in many of its prewar estimates. Air Force intelligence is part of that intelligence community and shares responsi-bility for that failure. Air Force intelligence professionals play important combating-WMD roles at combatant com-mands, components, national intelligence agencies, and in operational units.

In this paper Lt Col Cristina M. Stone argues that the Air Force does not adequately prepare its intelligence analysts; targeteers; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operators; and unit-level and air and space operations center (AOC) personnel with the knowledge and expertise required to fill these positions. She examines the current status of the Air Force intelligence WMD expertise and pro-poses recommendations for improvement, utilizing Air Force intelligence-distinctive capabilities (predictive analysis, tar-geting, ISR operators, and unit-level and AOC operations) as a framework for discussion. To get to ground truth on the current status, the author conducted interviews with current and former WMD analysts and targeteers. Colonel Stone believes that in the areas of predictive analysis, tar-geting, and unit-level and AOC operations, Air Force intel-ligence training courses do not currently provide the requi-site WMD expertise. The author recommends that the Air Force leverage its technical and scientific core and expert organizations across the government to improve training for intelligence personnel requiring WMD expertise. Regard-ing ISR operations, she proposes that the Air Force develop enhanced collection capabilities. This paper recommends changes to Air Force intelligence training, technical WMD expertise, collection capabilities, and marketing to improve the nation’s ability to combat WMD.

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As with all other Maxwell Papers, this study is provided in the spirit of academic freedom and is open to debate and serious discussion of issues. We encourage your response.

STEPHEN J. MILLER Brigadier General, USAF Commandant, Air War College

About the Author

Lt Col Cristina M. Stone, USAF, is the deputy commander, 55th Operations Group, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. She is a ca-reer intelligence officer with unit, air and space operations center (AOC), and headquarters intelligence experience. She has served as a flying squadron intelligence officer in Korea, Central Air Force AOC intelligence analyst, US Air Force Weapons School instructor, Checkmate strategist, and Air Combat Command intelligence squadron commander.

She graduated from the US Air Force Academy with a bachelor of science degree in military history in June 1988 and received a master of arts degree in human resource management from Troy State University in 1995. She also graduated from the US Air Force Weapons School in 1993, Squadron Officer School in 1994, Air Command and Staff College in 2003, and Air War College in 2006.

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Abstract

Air Force intelligence professionals play key roles in com-bating weapons of mass (WMD) destruction at combatant commands and components and national intelligence agen-cies. The Air Force, however, does not adequately prepare its intelligence analysts, targeteers, ISR operators, and unit-level and air and space operations center (AOC) per-sonnel with the knowledge and the expertise required to fill these positions. This paper examines the current status of Air Force intelligence WMD expertise and proposes recom-mendations for improvement, utilizing Air Force intelligence-distinctive capabilities (predictive analysis, targeting, ISR operations, and unit-level and AOC operations) as a frame-work for discussion. In the areas of predictive analysis, tar-geting, and unit-level and AOC operations, Air Force intelli-gence training courses do not provide the requisite WMD expertise. The Air Force must leverage its technical and scien-tific core and expert organizations across the government to improve training for intelligence personnel requiring WMD expertise. In the area of ISR operations, the Air Force requires enhanced collection capabilities and better marketing of existing capabilities across the intelligence community. This paper also recommends changes to Air Force intelli-gence training, technical WMD expertise, and marketing and collection capabilities to improve the nation’s ability to combat WMD.

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�

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our en-emies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indi-cates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. . . . History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.

—Pres.GeorgeW.Bush —National Security Strategy of —the United States of America —�7September2002

ShortlyaftertheNational Security Strategywaspublished,theUnitedStatesandcoalitionforcesenteredIraqtodeposeIraqidictatorSaddamHussein.Oneof thekeyargumentsfortakingthisactionwasthatSaddamposedathreatduetostockpiledweaponsofmassdestruction(WMD),whichhemightuseorprovidetoterrorists.AfterSaddamwastoppledandtheIraqSurveyGroupconductedathoroughsearchfortheseweapons,nostockpileswerefound.Recognizingana-tionalintelligencefailure,PresidentBushchargedacongres-sionalcommissionwithexaminingUnitedStatesintelligencecapabilitiesregardingWMD.Thecommissionersconcludedthattheintelligencecommunitywas“deadwronginalmostall of its prewar judgments about Iraq’sweapons ofmassdestruction.”�Asoneof�6membersoftheintelligencecom-munity,2AirForce(AF)intelligencesharestheburdenofthisgravefailureandmustimproveitsprocessestoprecludefu-turefailureinthiscriticalareaofanalysis.OneofthekeyAFintelligencecontributionstocombatingWMDisintheareaof “human capital”—providing intelligence professionals tocombatWMDatcombatantcommandsandcomponentsandnational intelligenceagencies;however, theAirForcedoesnotadequatelyprepareitsintelligenceanalysts,targeteers,andintelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance(ISR)op-

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erators;andunit-levelandairandspaceoperationscenter(AOC)personnelwith theknowledgeand theexpertise re-quiredtofillthesepositions.

ThispaperexaminesthecurrentstatusofAFintelligenceWMD expertise and proposes recommendations for im-provement,utilizingAFintelligence-distinctivecapabilities3asaframeworkfordiscussion.Thesedistinctivecapabili-ties includepredictiveanalysis,targeting, ISRoperations,andunitandAOCoperations.Theauthorinterviewedcur-rentandformerWMDanalystsandtargeteerstoderivethedataoncurrentstatusofAFWMDintelligenceandcapturerecommendationsforimprovement.Thepaperbeginswithdefiningbaselinetermsofreference.ItproceedstoexamineeachAFintelligence-distinctivecapability,discussingcur-rentstatusandexistingintelligencegaps.Thepapercon-cludeswithrecommendationsforimprovement.

Terms of Reference

Iwillfirstdefinekeyterms:weaponsofmassdestruction,Air Force intelligence,Air Force intelligence-distinctive ca-pabilities,andcombatingWMD.Oncedefined,thesetermshelp toestablishabaseline forunderstandingweaponsofmassdestruction.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

JointPublication (JP)�-02,Department of Defense Dic-tionary of Military and Associated Terms,definesweapons of mass destructionas“weaponsthatarecapableofahighorderofdestructionand/orofbeingusedinsuchamannerastodestroylargenumbersofpeople.Weaponsofmassdestruc-tioncanbehighexplosivesornuclear,biological,chemical,andradiologicalweapons,butexcludethemeansoftrans-porting or propelling the weapon where such means is aseparableanddivisiblepartoftheweapon.”4Theseweaponsarealsoreferredtoasweaponsofmassdestruction/effect(WMD/E); chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear(CBRN);andchemical,biological,radiological,nuclear,andhigh-yieldexplosives(CBRNE).Forthepurposeofthispaper,the term weapons of mass destruction includes chemical,biological,radiological,nuclear,andhigh-yieldexplosives.

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Air Force Intelligence

ThetermAir Force intelligenceisusedthroughoutthispa-pertodescribeappropriatemilitaryandcivilianintelligenceprofessionalsintheAirForce.TheDirectorateofISR,deputychiefofstaffforAirandSpaceOperations(AF/A2),Pentagon,Washington,DC,isthestafforganizationthatisresponsibleforpolicyandfororganizing,training,andequippingAirForceintelligence.TheAirForceofficeforintelligenceanalysisistheNationalAirandSpaceIntelligenceCenter(NASIC),locatedatWright-PattersonAFB,Ohio;however,AirForceanalystspro-liferatethroughouttheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)—fromtheflyingunitsuptosuchnationalintelligencecentersastheDefenseIntelligenceAgency(DIA)andtheNationalSecurityAgency(NSA).

AF Intelligence-Distinctive Capabilities

TheJanuary2006AF/A2“Intelligence,Surveillance,andReconnaissanceForceDevelopmentSemi-AnnualNewsletter”identified the AF intelligence-distinctive capabilities as pre-dictiveanalysis,targeting,ISRoperations,andunit-levelandAOCoperations.5Definitionsforthesetermsfollow.

Predictive Analysis. TheDIAwhitepaper,“Implement-ing Predictive Analysis Technology within DIA/DS-RRA,”defines predictive analysis as “predicting the intentionsandprobablecoursesofactionofhumanbeings,eitherasindividuals or as populations. Understanding intentionsrequiresanalyststofirstunderstandculturalcontext,his-tory,behavioralpatterns, incentives, andethnicity in or-dertounderstandhowthethreathasevolvedandexists.”6Withinthecontextofthisresearchpaper,predictive analy-sis refers to Air Force intelligence efforts to understand,determinethecapabilitiesof,andpredictcoursesofactionof an enemyand itsmilitary forces.The termspredictive analysisandanalysisarebeingusedinterchangeably.

Targeting. JP�-02definestargetingas“theprocessofse-lectingandprioritizingtargetsandmatchingtheappropriateresponsetothem,takingaccountofoperationalrequirementsandcapabilities.”7ThisdefinitionisalsoacceptedinAFdoc-trine.8Inlayman’sterms,targetingislinkingtherightweap-onstotherighttargetstoachievethedesiredstrategic,op-

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erational,ortacticaleffect.Theintelligenceprofessionalswhoconductthisimportantmissionareaarecalledtargeteers.

ISR Operations. JP�-02definesISRas“anactivitythatsynchronizesandintegratestheplanningandoperationofsensors,assets,andprocessing,exploitation,anddissemi-nationsystemsindirectsupportofcurrentandfutureop-erations. This is an integrated intelligence and operationsfunction.”9ExamplesofISRoperationsincludeimageryandsignalsintelligencecollection.Forthepurposeofthispaper,whenreferencingAFintelligence ISR operations,thetermre-ferstocollection,processing,andexploitationoperations.

Unit and AOC Operations. Thisdistinctive capabilityreferstointelligenceactivitiesatoperationalAFunits(suchasflyingandground-basedaircontrolunits)andAOCs.�0Analysis,targeting,andISRoperationsallapplytounitandAOCoperations. It isaseparatecategoryasadistinctivecapabilitybecauseof theunique tactics, techniques,andproceduresthatexistwithintheseorganizations.Thises-say addresses the WMD-related issues that impact unit-levelandAOCoperations.

Combating WMD

TheDecember2002issueofthe National Strategy to Com-bat Weapons of Mass DestructionidentifiesthreepillarstotheUSstrategytocombatWMD:counterproliferation,nonprolif-eration,andconsequencemanagement.��Counterproliferationconsistsofactionstakento“deteranddefendagainstthefullrangeofpossibleWMDemploymentscenarios.”Nonprolifera-tionincludes“thoseactions(e.g.,diplomacy,armscontrol,mul-tilateralagreements, threat reductionassistance,andexportcontrols)takentopreventtheproliferationofweaponsofmassdestructionthatseektodissuadeorimpedeaccessto,ordistri-butionof,sensitivetechnologies,materiel,andexpertise.”�2Thefinalpillar,consequencemanagement,istheresponsetotheuseofWMDonUSsoiloragainstUScitizensandtheactionstakentobecomeoperationalagainafteranattack.�3

CombatingWMDisagovernment-wideenterprise,buttheAirForceandAFintelligenceplaykeyrolesineachpillarofthestrategy.Intelligenceprofessionalsprovidetheanalyticalunderpinningforcounterproliferation,nonproliferation,andconsequence-management operations. AF ISR operations

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providethedataanalystsneedtoreachtheirconclusionsonadversaryWMDcapabilities.Additionally, intelligencepro-fessionalsprovidetherequisitetargetingexpertiseforstrik-ingWMDtargetsshouldthesituationrequireit.

Background ofthe WMD Commission Report

Taken together, the Intelligence Reform Act and the WMD Commission’s recommendations constitute a powerful force for change in the Intelligence Community.

—Amb.JohnNegroponte —DirectorofNationalIntelligence —29September2005

On6February2004,PresidentBushsignedExecutiveOr-der�3328,establishingtheCommissionontheIntelligenceCapabilitiesoftheUnitedStatesRegardingWeaponsofMassDestruction.Thepresidentchargedthecommissionwithas-sessingwhetherthe intelligencecommunity is“sufficientlyauthorized,organized,equipped, trained,andresourced”�4tosupport theUScounterproliferationefforts.Specifically,theyweretaskedtoexamine“...thecapabilitiesandchal-lengesoftheIntelligenceCommunitytocollect,process,ana-lyze,produce,anddisseminateinformationconcerningthecapabilities,intentionsandactivitiesofsuchforeignpowersrelatingtothedesign,development,manufacture,acquisi-tion,possession,proliferation,transfer,testing,potentialorthreateneduse,oruseofWeaponsofMassDestruction,re-latedmeansofdelivery,andotherrelatedthreatsofthe2�stCentury.”�5Althoughtheimpetusforestablishingthecom-mission was the intelligence failure regarding Iraq’s WMDbefore Operation Iraqi Freedom, the president asked theteamnotonlytolookatIraq,butalsotolookatintelligencecapabilitiesversusotherstateandnonstateactors.

The Findings

Thecommissionteaminterviewedexpertsfrominsideandoutsidetheintelligencecommunityandreviewedthousandsofdocuments.�6WithregardstoIraq,theyfoundthatthe

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primarycausesofintelligencefailureincludedthe“inabilitytocollectgoodinformationaboutIraq’sWMDprograms,se-riouserrorsinanalyzingwhatinformationitcouldgather,andafailuretomakeclearjusthowmuchofitsanalysiswasbasedonassumptions,ratherthangoodevidence.”�7Initsreviewofintelligenceperformanceversusotherstateand nonstate threats, the team discovered that althoughtheintelligencecommunityhadachievedsomesignificantsuccesses,itstillknows“disturbinglylittleabouttheweap-onsprogramsandevenlessabouttheintentionsofmanyofourmostdangerousadversaries.”�8Thefollowingsum-marizesthemajorfindingsfromthereport:

•   Poor  target  development:  not  getting  intelli-gence on the issues we care about most. Thein-telligencecommunitylacksthecoordinatedcollectionsstrategyrequiredtopenetratesomeoftoday’sdifficulttargetsets(emphasisinoriginal).

•   Lack  of  rigorous  analysis. The intelligence com-munitymustimprove“analyticaltradecraft,”toincludetechniques,communicationskillsandsubjectmatterexpertise(emphasisinoriginal).

•   Lack  of  political  context—and  imagination.Technicalanalysisshouldbeweighedagainstpoliticalcontext(emphasisinoriginal).

•   Overemphasis  on  and  underperformance  in daily  intelligence  products.  Daily CIA-producedintelligenceproducts tended tobealarmistandmis-leading(emphasisinoriginal).

•   Inadequate  information sharing.Althoughprog-resshasbeenmadesince9/��,muchworkstillneedstobedoneintheareaofcounterproliferation(empha-sisinoriginal).

•  Poor human intelligence.Innovationisneededtode-velopsourcesinclosedsocieties.Additionally,careshouldbetakennottorelytooheavilyonuncorroborated,single-sourcehumanintelligence(emphasisinoriginal).

•  The challenge to traditional signals intelligence.Advances in telecommunications [have] resulted in

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somelossofaccess.Technologicalinnovation[s]arere-quiredtokeeppacewithtechnologydevelopments intheciviliansector(emphasisinoriginal).

•   Declining  utility  of  traditional  imagery  intel-ligence  against  unconventional  weapons  pro-grams.Adversariesareimprovingdenialanddeceptiontechniques to counter traditional imagery collection(emphasisinoriginal).

•  Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) is  not  sufficiently  developed. Capabilities are notwidelyunderstoodormarketed(emphasisinoriginal).

•  An absence of strong leadership.TurfwarscontinuetomakecoordinationandintelligenceintegrationdifficultandtheDirectorofCentralIntelligencewasunabletore-solvethedifficulties.�9(emphasisinoriginal)

Thecommissionteammade74recommendationsforcor-rectingtheseshortcomingsintheirreport;thepresidentac-cepted7�forimplementation.Therecommendationslever-agethedirectivesoftheIntelligenceReformandTerrorismPreventionAct (IRTPA) ofDecember2004.This legislationestablishedthedirectorfornationalintelligenceposition,theNationalCounterterrorismCenter,anddirectedinformationsharing between intelligence community members.20 Thecommission’srecommendedareasforimprovementincludedleadership/management(utilizingtheIRTPAtointegratetheintelligencecommunitybetter),collection,analysis,informa-tionsharing, integratingdomesticand foreign intelligence,counterintelligence, and covert action.2� The areas of im-provementthatdirectlyimpactedAFintelligenceincludecol-lectionandanalysis(includingtargetanalysisortargeting).

Combating WMD and Existing Gaps

I believe we can do better . . . to grow intel officers that are even more flexible and adaptive in this long war, this Global War on Terrorism.

—GenT.MichaelMoseley —ChiefofStaffoftheUnitedStatesAirForce —�0October2005

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Asaddressedearlier,theintelligencecommunityrequiressignificant improvements in theability of itsmembers tocombatWMD.ToexamineAFequity in,andcurrentsta-tusof,AFintelligenceeffortsincombatingWMD,thispa-perutilizestheAFintelligence-distinctivecapabilitiesasaframework: predictive analysis, targeting, ISR operations,andunitandAOCoperations.

Predictive Analysis

Intelligenceplaysavitalrole inensuringthatpotentialadversaries donot acquireWMDor, if they alreadyhaveit, that theydonotexpand it.TheAF intelligencerole inthismissionareaistoprovidetheanalyticalhumancapitalto feedthemajorDODintelligenceanalysisagenciesthatwatchpotential enemycapabilitiesandadvisepolicyanddecision makers. The WMD commission cited “analyticaltradecraft”asacurrentweaknessintheintelligencecom-munity.Specifically,thecommissionreportrecommendedthattradecraft,“thewayanalyststhink,research,evaluateevidence,write,andcommunicate,”beimproved.22

AF/A2 recently asked major command senior intelli-genceofficers to review theWMDcommissionreportandtorecommendareasforimprovementforAFintelligence.IntheresultscompiledbytheAF/A2staff,all��respondentsremarked that AF intelligence analysis needed improve-ment.23Someofthemorecriticalremarksfollow:

• PacificAir Forces: “Technical analysis lacking;USAFintelligencecommunitydoesnotroutinelyverifyWMDintelassessments through [the] technicalreviewpro-cess conducted by knowledgeable subject matter ex-perts with actual WMD experience” and “Need moreUSAFIntelresourcessmartonWMDanalysis....”24

• Air Force Materiel Command: “AF [must] reconstitutestrategicanalysisabilityandaddressneedfortechnicalcollectionexpertise”and“Providetraining/educationtodevelopgreaterskillsinanalytic‘tradecraft.’...”25

• AirMobilityCommand:“Weneedtoreturntoorganiz-ing around specificmission sets anddeveloping [sic]

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specialistswith [a] highdegree of proficiency in thatmissionset....”26

• NationalAirandSpaceIntelligenceCenter:“Strengthenstrategic, science and technology, and weapons re-search/analysis....”27

ThesecommentsreflecttheneedtostrengthenAFcapa-bilitiestoconductmorerigorousanalysisand,specifically,WMDanalysis.TogettogroundtruthonthecurrentstatusofWMDanalysisinAFintelligence,theauthorinterviewedcurrentorformerWMDanalystsbywayofe-mail.

Theresultingcommentswerecompiledtoprovideaquali-tativeratherthanquantitativelookatthestatusofAirForceWMD intelligence. Although the number of interviews wasrelativelysmall,theresponsesweregenerallyconsistent.Thefocuswastoanswerthequestions“DoAFWMDanalystshavetherequisitetrainingandexpertisefortheanalyticalpositionsinwhichtheyserve?”and“Howdotheygaintheexpertiseiftheydon’thaveit?”Theinterviewquestionsincluded:

• Whatisyourdutytitle?

• WhatisyourbackgroundforWMDanalysisortargeting?

• Didyouattendanytrainingcoursesbeforearrivingonstation?

• Whatdidyoudoforin-housespin-up28training?

• Whodoyougotoifyouhavequestions?

• Whatresourcesdidyoufindhelpfulindoingyourjob?

• Doyouhaveanyrecommendationsforanyonemovingintoyourjob?

TheauthorselectedindividualstointerviewbyobtainingalistofintelligencepersonnelcurrentlyservinginWMDanalystpositionsfromtheAirForcePersonnelCenter,locatedatRan-dolphAFB,Texas.Toincreasethequantityofcollecteddata,theauthoraskedintelligencepeers forrecommendationsofpersonnelwithWMDanalysisexperience.Onehundredpercentofindividualscontactedrespondedtotheinterviewquestions.

Table�capturestheanswertothefirstquestion.Thelo-cationsrepresentagoodcrosssectionofthekindsoforga-nizationsAFintelligenceprofessionalscanserveinasWMD

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analysts, including intelligenceagencies,combatantcom-mands,subordinatecomponents,and intelligenceschool.The backgrounds of the individuals ranged from secondlieutenantsstraightoutofintelligenceschooltoascientistcross-traineewhohaddoneWMD-relatedresearchduringhisstudiesattheJointMilitaryIntelligenceCollege.29

Table 1. Interviews with current and former WMD analysts

Duty Title LocationDeputy chief, Estimates Divi-sion

Air Force Intelligence Analysis Agency, Penta-gon, Washington, DC

Deputy chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Team

US Central Command, MacDill AFB, FL

Chief, TBM/WMD analyst 607th Air Intelligence Squadron, OSAN AB, Republic of Korea

NCOIC, Asymmetric Threat Analysis

607th Air Intelligence Squadron, OSAN AB, Republic of Korea

Weapon system intelligence integration officer (hard and deeply buried targets analyst)

497th Intelligence Group, Bolling AFB, Washing-ton, DC

Section chief, International Officers Applications Course (WMD course instructor)

315th Training Squadron, Goodfellow AFB, TX

Source: E-mail interviews conducted by author with Capt Stefanie S. Peterson, 18 November 2005; 2d Lt Sean R. Tucker, 15 November 2005; NCOIC, Asymmetric Threat Analysis, 15 No-vember 2005; Maj James Gehringer, 2 December 2005; 1st Lt Tanya Silvio, 15 December 2005; Maj Lourdes Duvall, 10 February 2006; and MSgt Timothy Dukes, 14 February 2006.

Inansweringthethirdquestion,Didyouattendtrainingbeforearrivingonstation?noneoftherespondentsansweredyeswithregardstospecificintelligencetrainingcourses,al-though several had attended courses (either in residenceorthroughamobiletrainingteamcourse)afterarrivingonstation.ThesecoursesincludedtheOakridgeNuclearFuelCycleOperationsCourseand theLawrenceLivermoreNa-tionalLabsCounterproliferationAnalysisandPlanningSys-tem(CAPS)Course.Therespondentsdidnotappeartobeawareof thesignificant curriculumofferedby theCentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA),JointMilitaryIntelligenceTrainingCenter,ortheDefenseThreatReductionAgency(DTRA)onawiderangeofWMD-relatedtopics.30TheIntelligence Com-

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munity Proliferation Training CatalogprovidesaconsolidatedlistofcoursesofferedandisavailableontheJointWorldwideIntelligenceCommunicationsSystem(JWICS).3�

Theonly“standard”answertothefourthquestion(Whatdidyoudoforin-housespin-uptraining?)wasthatallre-spondentshadtodoalargeamountofself-initiatedstudyto get “up to speed” for their jobs. The 607th Air Intelli-genceSquadronhadamorerobustspin-upthatincludedturnoverwiththeincumbentandreviewofsignificantdeskbriefings.Others gained requisite knowledge through the“fire-hoseeffect”oflearningwhiledoing.32

Theanswers to thefifthandsixthquestions regardingcontactsandresourceswereasvariedastherespondents.ThismakessensesincetheWMDtargetsetisnotthesameforallanalystsinallareasofresponsibility.Forexample,theUSCentralCommandanalystsfocusedonnuclearis-sues,whiletheKoreaanalystsfocusedmoreonScudmis-silecapabilitiesandNorthKoreanchemicalandbiologicalagents. The most popular resource on the JWICS is theATHENASharedCounterproliferationInformationSpace,aWebsitemanagedbytheDIA.ThisWebsiteincludesany“hot”WMDinformationandprovideslinkstoWMDanalystsacross the government. It acts as adigital clearinghousefor WMD intelligence, but unless an analyst was specifi-callydirectedtoit,heorshemightnotbecomeawareofitduringhisorhertenure.WithintheAF,nocentralhumanintelligenceclearinghouseisavailabletohelpanalystsob-tainWMD-relatedintelligence,directanalyststoavailabletrainingopportunities,orconnectthemwithexpertswithinafieldofstudy.ThisisasignificantgapsinceAFWMDana-lystsarecurrentlylefttotrainthemselves.33

Inresponsetothefinalquestionregardingrecommenda-tions forpeoplewhowould replace them, respondents rec-ommendedseveraloptions.Theserecommendationsincludedattendingtrainingenroute,findingreplacementswithatech-nical background or affinity, and a good turnover with in-cumbents.Therecommendationofatechnicalbackgroundisworthfurtherelaboration.TheWMDanalystfortheAirForceIntelligenceAnalysisAgencywasachemistwhocross-trainedinto the intelligence careerfield.SinceWMD-relatedanaly-sisishighlytechnical,havingatechnicalorscientificback-groundisextraordinarilyvaluable,especiallygiventhe lack

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ofAF-specifictraininginWMDanalysis.34The497thIntelli-genceGroupanalystrecommendedthatindividualsnewtoaWMDanalystpositionbuildrelationshipswithsubject-matterexpertsearlyon.Sheremarked,“Ioftentrolledorgchartsandcold-calledtofindtherightpersonformyspecificinfodeficits.Notideal,butIfoundpeopletobeverywillingtohelp.”35

In summary, interview results revealed that,with the ex-ception of the cross-trained scientist, AF personnel servinginWMDanalystpositionslackedtrainingandexperience.In-housetrainingandformalcoursesattendedafterarrivingonstationwerecriticalingettingtheseanalysts“uptospeed.”Thereferencesourcesandcontactsvariedgreatlyfromoneorgani-zationtoanother,andsomeindividualswerenotawareoftheimportantintelligencecommunityWMDresources.Theinter-viewresponsessupporttheWMDcommissionreportfindingon“lackofrigorousanalysis,”highlightedinthispaper.36

TheAF falls short in training forWMDanalytical exper-tise.TheAFdoesnotofferspecializedtrainingfortheirWMDanalysts.AreviewoftheGoodfellowAirForceBaseplansforinstructionforbasicofficerandenlistedintelligencecoursesrevealsthatstudentsreceivesevenandeighthoursofWMDthreatinstruction,respectively.37Inaninterviewwiththeen-listedintelligencecoursemanager,theauthordiscoveredthattheWMDcourse instructordoesnotreceiveanyadditionalformaltrainingbeyondwhatwasprovidedwhenheorsheat-tendedthefundamentalscourses.Whathappensthenisthattheeight-hourplannedblockofinstructionusuallybecomesmuchshorterdue to the instructor’s lackof expertise.Thesituationfortheofficercourseisconsiderablybetter,sincetheinstructorhasbeenteachingtheWMDblockfortwoyears.Theinstructoradmits,however,thathedidnotfeelcomfort-ableteachingthesubjectmatterwhenhefirststarted.38Asapositivenote,theenlistedcoursehasacomputer-basedtrain-ing“workbook”thatinstructorscanusetoreviewtheWMDblockforstudy.Thistoolisnotcurrentlyavailableforusetopersonneloutsideofthetrainingwing.39

In addition toprovidingbetter baselineWMD training forallintelligencepersonnel,AFintelligencemustalsolookatprovidingfollow-ontrainingforindividualswhoendupserv-ing as WMD analysts in various intelligence agencies, com-batant commands, and components. Since theAFdoesnothavealargenumberofpositionsthatrequirethiskindofad-

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vancedexpertiseandunderstanding,itisnotfeasibletocreatean in-residencecourse.However,acomputer-based trainingcoursemadeavailabletotheentireanalystcommunitywouldbehelpfulforanyanalystwhorequiresarefresher.Thispro-videsananswertocurrentintelligencequestionsbygivingabackgroundforaproject.Additionally,analystsrequiringad-vancedknowledgecouldattendanynumberofcoursesofferedthroughouttheWMDintelligencecommunityandthenationallaboratories.TheAirForceInstituteofTechnologyatWright-PattersonAFB isalsocurrentlydeveloping twograduate-levelacademicprogramsoncombatingWMD:a�0-weekover-viewcoursedesignedtomeet“immediateeducationalneeds”and an�8-monthmaster of science degree in combatingWMDTechnology.40

Anotherchallenge theseAFWMDanalysts face isdeter-miningwhototurntowhentheyhaveaquestion.TherearemanydifferentplayersintheWMDanalysiscommunity,eachwithadifferent“pieceoftheanalyticalpie.”TobringtheWMDanalyticalplayerstogetherasacommunityofinterest,thedi-rectorofnationalintelligencestooduptheNationalCounter-proliferationCenter(NCPC)intheWashington,DC,area.TheNCPCisnotananalyticalagency.Theprimarycharterfortheorganizationprovidesacommunity-widevehicleforstrategicplanningandoversight.As theorganizationmatures,coor-dinationand intelligencesharingamong thedifferent intel-ligenceorganizationsandunderstandingofwhateachplayercontributestothefightwilllikelyimprove.OneoftheNCPC’scurrent initiatives identifiesall thedifferent formal trainingopportunitiesacrosstheintelligencecommunity.AdecisionhasnotyetbeenmadeastohowtheNCPCwillmarkettheseopportunitiestointelligencecommunitymembers.4�

Onapositivenote,AF/A2isexaminingseveralpossibilitiestoimprovebasicanalysisandtoincludepartneringwithuni-versities toenhanceanalyst training.AF/A2 isalsoevaluat-ingofficeranalystforcedevelopment.42AtGoodfellowAFB,the3�5thTrainingSquadron(TRS)isrevampingthebasiccoursestointroduceadditionalanalyticalrigorandtocreatemoreofabuilding-blockapproach.The3�5thTRSisalsoestablish-ingacompletelynewanalysis,correlation,andfusiontrainingcoursethatwilltargetindividualswhowillbeworkinginAOCanalysis,correlation,andfusionflights.Inthefuturesuchin-dividualsastheKoreanTheaterBallisticMissile(TBM)andthe

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WMDanalystsreferredtoabovewillhavetheopportunitytoattendtheanalysttrainingcoursebeforearrivingonstation.Fi-nally,the3�5thTRSisalsocreatingacorrespondencecourse,the Predictive Battlespace Awareness Baseline Course. Thiscourseisintendedtoprovideananalytical“baseline”forthoseindividualsattendinganyofGoodfellow’sadvancedintelligencecourses,butitcouldbeavailabletootheranalystsalso.43

Targeting

Counterproliferation,asdescribedintheNational Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction,consistsofactionstakento“deteranddefendagainstthefullrangeofpossibleWMDemploymentscenarios.”44FortheAirForce,oneofthekeyroleswithinthebroadareaofcounterproliferationiscoun-terforce targeting.TheAir ForceCounter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-yield Explosive (C-CBRNE) Mas-ter PlandescribescounterforceasdefeatingenemyWMDca-pabilitiesbeforetheycanbebroughttobear,whileminimizingthepotentialforcollateraldamage.45AirForceintelligenceisanimportantenablerinthismission,contributingtoassessmentofthethreattargetsetandprovidingtargetingexpertise.

AirForceintelligenceofficersserveastargetingexpertsincombatantcommands,airoperationscenters,air-to-groundunits,andinintelligenceorganizations;yettheAFdoesnothavespecializedtrainingforWMDtargetingexpertise.Basictrainingfortargeting isconductedintheCombatTargetingCourse (CTC) at Goodfellow AFB. Future targeteers will betaughttoanalyzeatargetasa“systemofsystems,”analyzecriticalnodes,anddeterminetheappropriateweaponstocre-atedesiredeffects.TheCTCfocusesprimarilyonconventionaltargets and conventional weapons, although discussion ofWMDisincludedintwooftheblocksofinstruction.46

WMD targeting requires specialized expertise—the targe-teerisnotonlyconcernedwiththeblasteffectsoftheweap-onsdropped,buttheeffectoftheWMDagentsoncetargetedisalsoaconcern.Theanalystmustbeabletoprojectthepo-tentialdispersaloftheagentsintotheatmosphereandtohar-nesspossiblecollateraldamagecausedbythisrelease.47TheexpertiseforplanningagainstWMDtargetsresidesprimarilywithintheDTRAandtheArmedForcesMedicalIntelligenceCenter(AFMIC).DTRAhasfieldedseveralsoftwaretools,such

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as theMunitionsEffectsAssessment, IntegratedMunitionsEffects Assessment (IMEA), and Hazard Prediction andAssessmentCapacity(HPAC).Eventhoughthesetoolsassisttargeteersinconductingprestrikeandhazardeffectsanaly-sis,traininginthebasiccourseonthesetools isextremelylimited.48 ImprovedpartnershipswithDTRAandAFMIC insyllabusdevelopmentwouldenhancetrainingatGoodfellowandimproveAFtargetingexpertiseforWMD.

TogainanunderstandingofthespecificrequirementsforWMDtargetingexpertise,interviewswereconductedoftar-geteerswhoarecurrentlyservingorhaveservedintargetingpositionsatcombatantcommandsandairandspaceopera-tionscenters.Theauthorusedthesamemethodologyfortheselection of participants and to conduct the interviews assheutilizedfortheWMDanalysts.Additionally,sheaskedthesamequestionstoWMDanalysts (listedinthePredic-tiveAnalysissection)thatsheaskedtocurrentandformertargeteerswithAOCorcombatantcommandexperience.Thedutytitlesandlocationsincludedcombatantcommandsandsubordinatecomponentsandarelistedinthetablebelow:

Table 2. Interviews with current and former targeteers

Duty Title Location

Chief of targets 32d Air Operations Center/ISR Division, Ramstein AB, Ger.

Chief of target development European Command, Stuttgart, Ger.

Target duty officer 607th Air Intelligence Squadron, OSAN AB, Republic of Korea

Chief of Target Materials Branch US Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, NE

Operations officer of Target US Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, NE Materials Branch

Counter-Scud targeting officer Combined AOC, Prince Sultan AB, KSA

Source:E-mailinterviewsconductedbyauthorwithMajDerekGardner,2December2005;CaptKasandraT.Traweek,�4November2005;andLtColCharlesOwen,5December2005.

These individualsvariedinbackgroundfromthosewithnoWMDexperiencetoonewithadoctorateinvirology.Of

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note,thechiefoftargetsinthe32dAOC/ISRDivision(thedoctoraldegree recipient)was selected forherassignmentundertheacquisitionintelligenceexperienceexchangetour(AIEET).Thisprogramrecruits�0scientistsandengineersayearintotheintelligencecareerfield,anditcouldprovideaviablewaytofillWMDanalysispositionsthathavetechnicalrequirements.49Thisexchangeprogramalsobenefitsthesci-enceandtechnologycommunitythroughamorethoroughunderstandingof intelligenceand the intelligencecommu-nity.Whenquestionedaboutthevalueofhavingascientistaschiefoftargets,the32dAOC/ISRDivisionchiefremarked,“Awesome—shedeliversinfowithimpactinsomanyways.You never know where the next WMD threat or questionarises,andIthinkeveryAOCneedsaWMDexpert.”50

Inansweringthequestionabouttrainingcourses,alltheindividualshadattendedtheCombatTargetingCourseatGoodfellowAFB;however,onlythe32dAOCchiefoftargetshadattendedWMD-relatedtrainingcourses.Forspin-up,alltheindividualslearnedthroughself-studyandcontactsinthefield.Withregardtocontacts,thecross-flowscien-tisthadavastnetworkofcontactsandresourcesthatshebroughtintothejobfromherpreviousworkasascientist.5�Thecounter-ScudtargetingofficerdevelopedaworldwidenetworkofexpertsinpreparationforOperationIraqiFree-domcombatoperations.52

TherecommendationstheseindividualsprovidedincludedhavingatechnicalorscientificbackgroundandfamiliaritywithDTRA,HPAC,andIMEAmodels.53DTRAofferscoursesforthesemodels,butDTRAcouldalsoprovidefamiliarizationtrainingasrequired.Inmid-2005,aDTRAcontractorvisitedGoodfellowAFBtofamiliarizeCombatTargetingCoursein-structorswiththesemodels.54DTRAalsoprovides“flyawayteams”thatcouldprovidetraininginforwardoperatingar-eas.TheAF targeteers,especially those inanAOC,wouldlikelynot run themodels themselves;however,awarenessoftheirexistenceandtheabilitytospeakintelligentlywiththeexpertswouldprovideanenhancedcapabilitywithintheAOCtounderstandtheWMDtargetset.

Insummarythetargeteerinterviewsyieldedresultssimi-lartotheWMDanalystinterviews.WiththeexceptionofthescientistontheAcquisitionIntelligenceExchangeTour,thetargeteersintervieweddidnothaveformalWMDtrainingor

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experience,butrathertheyhadlearned“onthejob,”asre-quired.Insteadofrelyingonanexistingnetworkofcontactsandresources,afewoftherespondentswereforcedtocre-atetheirownnetworkofexpertstofillexpertisegaps.TheinterviewresultssupporttheWMDcommission’sfindingsof“poortargetdevelopment”and“lackofrigorousanalysis.”55

Anothertargetingchallengeiskeepingpacewiththede-velopmentofspecializedweaponsfortargetingsuchWMDasthermobaricandagent-defeatweapons.Theseweaponsat-tackanddestroytheagentsbeforetheycancauseextensivecollateraldamage.56Thedevelopmentoftwosuchweaponswas put on the fast track following the attack of �� Sep-tember200�,expediting thenormal testanddevelopmentprocess.57Whiletheactualweaponswererapidlyfieldedtotheflyingcommunity,instructionontheseweaponshasnotbeenfullyincorporatedintotheCTCsyllabus.58InstructionintheCTCmustkeeppacewiththerapidweaponsdevelop-menttoensurethatgraduatesarepreparedtoweaponeerfortheseweaponswhentheyareaskedtodoso.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations

Thedatarequiredforanalysisandtargetingisobtainedthrough intelligence collection. The disciplines that playthemostcritical role incombatingWMD,as identified inthecommissionreport,arehumanintelligence(HUMINT),measurementandsignatureintelligence(MASINT),signalsintelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT).59TheroleofAFintelligencewithinthesedisciplinesandtheutilityforcombatingWMDisdescribedbelow.Duetoclas-sificationconstraints,thefollowingdiscussionofeachdis-ciplinewillbegeneral.

HUMINT. JP�-02definesHUMINTas“acategoryofin-telligencederivedfrominformationcollectedandprovidedbyhumansources.”60 TheWMDcommissionreportspecifi-callyhighlightedHUMINTasashortcoming.Accordingtothe commission report, when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimatewaswritten,theintelligencecommu-nityhad “littlehuman intelligenceon Iraq’snuclear,bio-logical,andchemicalweaponsprogramsandvirtuallynohuman intelligenceon leadership intentions.”6� Acquiring

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humansourcesforinformationonWMDisdifficultatbest.CountriesthatpursueWMDorhaveactiveprogramsguardtheirsecretsclosely.ThemoreegregiousprobleminIraq,however,wasputtingcompletetrustinanuntested,singlesourceprovidedbyanothercountry.62Ifasourceisques-tionableornotindependentlyconfirmed,intelligenceana-lystsmustmake itclear topolicymakerswhat isknownandwhatisassumed.

InAFintelligencetheHUMINTbusinesshadallbutfallentothewaysidebeforeOperationIraqiFreedom.TheAFcededallofitsresponsibilityforthismissiontotheDefenseHU-MINTServiceinOctober�995.63AFintelligenceiscurrentlyresurrectinganorganicHUMINTcapability.64ThefocusofthiscapabilityistogenerateintelligenceofparticularvaluetoAFcustomers.IncombatingWMD,AFHUMINTperson-nelcouldconduct interrogationsandworkinformantsontheairbornepartoftheWMDequation:deliveryplatforms.TheycouldalsobecomearesourcepoolfortheDepartmentofDefenseHUMINTService,whichproduceshumanintel-ligenceforotherWMDanalysisareas.

Tohave a viableHUMINT capability,AF intelligence isworkingtodeterminewhattheforcewilllooklikelater,pos-siblemissionfocusareas,andhowHUMINTpositionswillfitintoofficerandenlistedforcedevelopmentpaths.Insteadofdiscouragingyoungintelligenceofficersandenlistedper-sonnelfromtakingHUMINTassignments,AirForceintel-ligence leadership isworkingvigorously todefinea tracktokeeppeopleinthefieldandensuretheygetpromoted(aproblemareainthepast).65

MASINT. MASINTis“technicallyderivedintelligencethatdetects,locates,tracks,identifies,anddescribestheuniquecharacteristicsoffixedanddynamictargetsources.Measure-mentandsignature intelligence capabilities include radar,laser,optical,infrared,acoustic,nuclearradiation,radiofre-quency,spectroradiametric,andseismicsensingsystemsaswellasgas,liquid,andsolidmaterialssamplingandanaly-sis.”66 Whilesometimesreferredtoas“abatchofunrelatedtechnicalintelligencetools,betterdevelopedandfundedsep-aratelyratherthanunderasinglelabel,”MASINTcapabilitiescanbeusedtoidentifyWMDpresence,especiallywhenana-lyzedinconjunction withtheotherintelligencedisciplines.67ThecommissionreportfoundthatcurrentlyMASINTisnot

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sufficientlydevelopedorunderstoodacrosstheintelligencecommunity.MASINTplayeda“negligiblerole”inIraqiWMDanalysis,despiteitscapabilities.68

The Air Force plays a key role in the MASINT arenathroughsuchaircraftandsensorcapabilitiesastheRC-�35CobraBall.MASINTassetscouldcontributetocombatingWMDthrough“detectingtheconstructionofundergroundfacilities,monitoringtheactivitiesathard-to-findchemicalandbiologicalwarfaresites,andcopingwith increasinglysophisticated denial and deception measures directed atconventional imagery and signals intelligence systems.”69AnotherAFcontributioncomesthroughproducingtheana-lystswhointerpretthedata.Infact,thisisagrowthfieldfortheAirForcethatisexpandingitscapabilitiesinthisrealm.AirIntelligenceAgency(AIA)andNASICareimportantintel-ligencecenterpartnersintheMASINTarena.

Secrecyshroudsmuchofwhatisdoneinthisrealm,add-ingtotheintelligencecommunity’smistrustoftheintelligenceproduced.ThecapabilitiesofMASINTsensorsarenotmar-ketedwell in theAirForce, letaloneacross theDODandgovernment.Amarketingeffortwouldenhancebothunder-standingandutilizationacrosstheintelligencecommunity.

SIGINT.SIGINTis“acategoryofintelligencecomprisingeither individually or in combination all communicationsintelligence,electronicsintelligenceandforeigninstrumen-tationsignalsintelligence,howevertransmitted.”70 SIGINTistherealmoftheNationalSecurityAgency,althoughallintelligencecommunitymembersplayarole.Itcanplayacritical role incombatingWMDbecause itprovidessomeinsightintowhatis“beingsaid,plannedandevenconsid-ered.”7�SIGINThaslimitations,however,astheenemycanintentionallyprovide falseormisleading informationorasmartenemycanmovetoacommunicationscapabilitythatismoredifficulttoexploit.Accordingtothecommissionre-port,theSIGINTcommunitylostaccesstokeyaspectsofIraqicommunications.72

As is thecasewithMASINT, theAirForceplaysakeyrole in SIGINT through such assets as the RC-�35 RivetJointandanalyticalcapability.TheprimaryAFrepositoryforSIGINTexpertiseandmanagementisAIA.AIAplaysakeyroleincapabilitiesdevelopmentandoversightoftheSIGINTmissionacrosstheAF.Italsoplaysakeyroleindeveloping

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capabilitiesandfieldingassetsthatcanovercomethechal-lengesdiscussedearlier.

IMINT.IMINTis“intelligencederivedfromtheexploita-tionofcollectionbyvisualphotography,infraredsensors,lasers,electro-optics,andradarsensorssuchassyntheticaperture radarwherein imagesof objectsare reproducedopticallyorelectronicallyonfilm,electronicdisplaydevices,orothermedia.”73Althoughimageryplaysanimportantrolein identifying movement of military equipment and largenumbersofpersonnel,itcanhavealimitedutilityagainstatargetthattheenemyisdeterminedtohide.Enemydenialanddeceptiontechniquesutilizedatsensitivetargetareascanlimittheutilityofimagery.74Anotherproblemwithim-ageryisthatitmayonlyprovidea“snapshot”intime,andanalysts cannot always determine what happened beforeoraftertheshotwastaken.75Imageryisespeciallylimitedagainstasuspectedchemicalorbiologicalfacility,asactiv-ityandstoragetakesplaceinsideabuildingandmaygivenoadditionalvisualsignature thatwoulddistinguish thefacility from normal industrial activity.76 Transshipmentactivitysometimescanbecaught,butimagerymaynotbeabletotellyouexactlywhat’s goingon.

AF platforms such as the U-2, Predator, and GlobalHawkarekeyimagerycollectionplatforms.Asintheother“ints,”theAFalsoproducesthepersonnelwhoanalyzeandinterpret the imagery. The processing, exploitation, anddisseminationofimageryproductsoccursatsuchnationalagencies as the National Geospatial-Intelligence AgencyandatAFDistributedCommonGroundSystemsites.Im-ageryanalystsatthesesitesprovideanalysisinnearrealtimetosupportcombatoperations.AFassetsandanalystsalso play a critical role in consequence management, aswasevidencedintheaftermathofHurricanesKatrina,Rita,andWilmain2005.TheAirForceprovidedimagerycover-ageoftheimpactedareastoassistthefederalgovernmentindeterminingthescopeofthedamage.77Thistypeofcov-eragecanplayasimilarroleafteranuclearorhigh-yieldexplosiveWMDattack.

InthecombativeWMDarena,AFsensorsandanalystssuffer from theshortcomingsof traditional ISRcollectionaddressed in the WMD commission report.78 The NCPCchiefof staff commented that thebestway tocounteract

2�

the shortcomings of traditional assets is to develop newtechnologiesand,moreimportantly,touse“existingtech-nologies in creative ways.”79 ISR operators must remainflexible and creative when conducting operations againstthedifficult-to-penetrateWMDtargetset.Theymustalsoworktofuseknowledgeobtainedfromallthedifferentcol-lectiondisciplines tobuild the truepictureofapotentialadversary’sWMDcapability.

Unit and AOC Operations

Predictiveanalysis,targeting,andISRoperationsareallcrucialtounitandAOCoperations.Planningandexecut-ingair, space,and informationoperationsoccuratunitsand AOCs and include operations against WMD targets.As such, intelligence personnel at units and AOCs musthave a good baseline understanding of the WMD threat,andcertain individualswithintheseorganizationsneedamoredetailedunderstanding.WithintheAOC,intelligencepersonnelmustputtheentirethreatpicturetogether.TheywillpullfromeachoftheAFintelligence-distinctivecapa-bilities for the expertise needed to accomplish this task.TheWMDexpertiserequirementsaddressedinthepredic-tiveanalysis,targeting,andISRoperationssectionsapplytothepersonnelattheAOC.

UnitpersonnelalsohavearequirementforWMDexpertisedrivenbythepotentialforcounterforcetargetingandsupportforairbasesurvivability.Iftheunithasanair-to-groundmis-sion,unitaircrewsmaybeasked todeliver thermobaricoragent-defeat weapons. Unit intelligence personnel supportthesemissionsandshouldhaveanunderstandingofboththetargetcomponentsandtheweapon’scapability.80Currently,suchDTRAeffectstoolsasHPACandIMEAarenotincludedinthesuiteof intelligence-automationtoolsavailableattheunitlevel.8�Thesetoolswouldbehelpfulforcombatmissionplanningand for training.Whenaircrewsdropsuchmuni-tions in trainingas theEGBU-�5Thermobaricweapon,ef-fectsmodelshelp tobuildanunderstandingofdelivery re-quirementsandweapon-performancecharacteristics.82

Unit intelligence personnel also play a key role in airbase survivability by training base support personnel onadversaryWMDcapabilities.Understanding the threat is

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an important aspect of preparation for and execution ofconsequence-managementoperations.Consequenceman-agementistheresponsetotheuseofWMDonUSsoiloragainstUSpersonsand theactions taken tobecomeop-erationalagainafteranattack.83AFintelligencehasequityin theareaofconsequencemanagementat theunit levelthrough base-level intelligence support to decision mak-ers, emergency responders, and force protection. As dis-cussedintheothertwopillarsofthestrategy,thelackofspecializedtrainingontheWMDthreatnegativelyimpactstheabilityofunit-levelintelligencepersonneltoprovidethesupport requiredbefore,during,andafteranattack.Forexample,anintelligenceofficerwhohasattendedthebasicintelligenceofficercoursereceivedsevenhoursofinstruc-tionon theWMDthreat.Once the intelligenceofficerar-rives on station, he or she will also receive the requiredCBRNEdefenseclassalongwiththeremainderofthebasepopulace.Atthatpoint,theindividualcouldbeassignedastheintelligencerepresentativetotheforceprotectionwork-inggroupandmaybeconsideredtheWMDthreatexpertforthewing.84Thetrainingreceivedtodatewouldbeinad-equateforthisresponsibility.Onepossiblesolutionwouldbetoprovidetrainingopportunities,trainingmaterials,orsomeonlineresourcestofillthegapinexpertise.

Whatroledoesthisexpertiseplayinconsequenceman-agement?Whenthebaseispreparingforapotentialattack,intelligencepersonnelcanpreparemedicalpersonnelandleadershipandemergency respondersonwhat to expect.Thisbenefitextendstoin-garrisontrainingformedicalper-sonnel.Themoredetailedunderstandingtheyhaveofthreatcapabilitiesandintent,thebetterpreparedtheywillbeforconflict. Themodel already exists for thiskind of “exter-nal”training:aircrewandsecurityforcestraining.Medicalpersonnelintelligencerequirementslikelywouldnotbeasrobustasthoseofaircreworsecurityforces;however,therequirementshouldbeformalizedandincorporatedintoAFintelligenceinstructions.85

Aspartof thewingthreatworkinggroup (TWG), intelli-gencealsoplaysakeyroleinforceprotectionbefore,during,andafteranattack.Intelligencepersonnelactinanadvisoryroletounit leadershipwiththeOfficeofSpecial Investiga-tions(OSI)andSecurityForces.OSIandsecurityforcespro-

23

vide the “local intelligence,”and intelligencepersonnelareabletolinkintohigherheadquartersandnationalagenciestodigfor“specialintelligence”onthethreat.Theintelligencecontributiontothreatcharacterizationincludesunderstand-ingoftypesofagents;deliverymethods;andenemytactics,techniques, andprocedures. These insights canprovide aforecast for futureenemyactivity, includingthepossibilityof follow-onattacks.86Twounit senior intelligenceofficersinterviewedforthispaperindicatedadvancedtrainingwouldbehelpfulforintelligenceTWGrepresentatives.87

BothAOCandunitintelligencepersonnelwouldbenefitfromtailored,focusedWMDanalyticalsupport.Thenumer-ousagenciesthatproduceWMDintelligencedonotcreateairorAirForce–centricproducts.Asaresult,unitandAOCpersonnel resort to wading through the existing body ofdatatofindwhattheyneed.AWMD-focusedanalyticalap-plicationsbranch(orshop)atNASICcouldprovidetailoredsupportandanAFspintoalreadyexistingproducts.ThebranchcouldhelppointAFpersonneltothecommunityex-pertsandidentifytrainingopportunities.ThisshopwouldbebeneficialforNASICanalystsalso,anditcouldintegratethedeliveryvehicleknowledge,whichalreadyexists,withknowledgeoftheWMDagentsandwarheads.

Recommendations

How then do we teach and mentor and grow and mature and expose our folks and develop an intel cadre that is something beyond where we’ve been in the past?

—GenT.MichaelMoseley —ChiefofStaffoftheUnitedStatesAirForce —�3October2005

ThispaperaddressedAirForceintelligenceareasforim-provementinpredictiveanalysis,targeting,ISRoperations,andunitandAOCoperations.ItalsointroducedtheissueofreformingAFWMDintelligenceintheaftermathofOperationIraqiFreedom,established thebaseline termsof referencefordiscussionthroughoutthepaper,providedbackgroundinformationontheWMDcommissionreportandrelevanceforAF intelligence, stepped through theAF intelligence-

24

distinctivecapabilities,andprovidedanalysisofthestatusofAFWMDintelligenceineachoftheseareas.InterviewsofcurrentandformerWMDanalystsandtargeteersprovidedthebaselinedatatosupporttherecommendations.

TheUnitedStatesmustcontinuetodealwithpotentialstate and nonstate WMD threats. To prepare our policymakersandwarfighters,intelligenceprofessionalsmustbeproperlytrainedtounderstandandassessthreatcapabili-tiesandintent.AlthoughAFintelligencedoesnothavetheprimaryresponsibilityforWMDanalysiswithintheDepart-mentofDefense,AFanalysts,targeteers,andISRoperatorsplayakey contributory role tononproliferation, counter-proliferation, and consequence-management operations.Tomeetthechallengesoftheglobalwaronterrorismandimprove the country’s ability to combatWMD,AF intelli-genceshouldconsider the followingrecommendations forAFintelligenceareasforimprovement:

�. Partner with other intelligence community membersandacademiatoprovideamorerobustanalyticaltrade-craft courseof study in the intelligence fundamentalscourses.Providefollow-ontrainingatthemidcareerlevelonmanagingandteachinganalysis.

2. ImprovetheWMDtrainingcurrentlyprovidedintheintelligence fundamentals courses. Send course in-structors to a one-week WMD overview course pro-videdbyCIAorDIA.

3. IdentifyallAFintelligenceWMDanalystpositionsacrossDODanddeterminetrainingrequirements.EnsurethatreportinginstructionsreflecttherequirementforWMDthreatcoursesofferedbygovernmentagencies.

4. Leverage as much as possible from the existing AFscientist and engineer pool to fill technical analysispositionsthroughprogramssuchastheAIEET.Inthelongterm,increasethenumberofintelligenceofficerinitial hires with such technical undergraduate de-greesasscienceandengineering.

5. PartnerwithDTRAandAFMICtoteachweaponsef-fects models (such as IMEA and HPAC) familiariza-tiontotheCombatTargetingCourseattendees.Send

25

courseinstructorstoadvancedtraininginthesemod-elsandinWMDfundamentals.

6. ModifytheexistingCombatTargetingCoursetocoveremerging thermobaric andagent-defeatweapons ef-fects.

7. Build a primer (to include training support materi-als)ontheWMDthreatfordifferentthreatcountriesforunit-level intelligencepersonnel.CoordinatewithDTRAandAFMICtoensure leveloffidelityrequiredformedicalpersonnel.

8. Reinvigorate AF HUMINT. Provide a force develop-mentroadmapforHUMINTtoincludecommandpo-sitions.

9. Workwith the restof the intelligencecommunity todevelopIMINT,SIGINT,andMASINTcapabilities.

�0. MarketcurrentlyexistingMASINTcapabilitiestoin-crease understanding across the intelligence com-munity.

��. CreateaWMDapplicationsshopatNASICtotailortheexistingbodyofWMDintelligencetoair,space,andinformationoperationscustomers.

TheAFshouldseizetheopportunitycreatedbythepost-commissioninterestinWMDintelligencetoaddresssomeofitslong-standingproblemsinthisvitalarea.Tohighlightthe significance of this requirement, we once again turnto thefindingsof thecommission: “There isnomore im-portantintelligencemissionthanunderstandingtheworstweaponsthatourenemypossesses,andhowtheyintendtousethemagainstus.Thesearetheirdeepestsecrets,andunlockingthemmustbeourhighestpriority.”88

Notes

�. CommissionontheIntelligenceCapabilitiesoftheUnitedStatesRe-gardingWeaponsofMassDestruction,Report to the President of the United States(Washington,DC:WMDCommission,3�March2005,forwardinglettertothepresident).

2. Ibid.The intelligencecommunity includes theCentral IntelligenceAgency(CIA),DefenseIntelligenceAgency(DIA),NationalSecurityAgency(NSA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Recon-

26

naissance Office (NRO), Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Air ForceIntelligence, Marine Corps Intelligence, Department of State/Bureau ofIntelligenceandResearch (INR),Department of Justice/FederalBureauof Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security/Directorate ofInformationAnalysisandInfrastructureProtection,DepartmentofHome-landSecurity/USCoastGuardIntelligence,DepartmentofEnergy(DOE)/OfficeofIntelligence(IN),andDepartmentofTreasury/OfficeofTerrorismandFinancialIntelligence(INF).

3. SeeAirandSpaceOperations(AF/A2),“AirForceIntelligence,Sur-veillance,andReconnaissanceSemi-AnnualNewsletter,”January2006,Pentagon,Washington,DC,n.p.

4. JointPublication(JP)�-02,Department of Defense Dictionary of Mili-tary and Associated Terms, �2April200�(asamendedthrough3�August2005),577.

5. AF/A2,n.p.6. JP�-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, A-63.7. DefenseIntelligenceAgency,Implementing Predictive Analysis Tech-

nology within DIA/DI, http://www.cia.ic.gov/ciau/ProliferationCatalog/2006_proliferation_training.pdf,n.p.

8. JP�-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, 53�.9. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5.2, Intelligence, Surveillance and

Reconnaissance Operations,80.�0. InJP�-02, theairandspaceoperationscenter isreferredtoas

theAirForceairandspaceoperationscenterandisdefinedas“thesenioragencyof theAirForcecomponentcommander thatprovidescommandandcontrolofAirForceairandspaceoperationsandcoordinateswithothercomponentsandServices.”SeeJP�-02,Department of Defense Dic-tionary, �9.

��. WhiteHouse,“NationalStrategytoCombatWeaponsofMassDe-struction,”December2002,2.

�2. HeadquartersUnitedStatesAirForce,Air Force Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-yield Explosive Master Plan,30June2004,�5.

�3. Ibid.�4. ExecutiveOrder�3328,CommissionontheIntelligenceCapabilities

oftheUnitedStatesRegardingWeaponsofMassDestruction,6February2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040206-�0.html(accessed�9November2005).

�5. Ibid.�6. Report to the President, �9.�7. Ibid.�8. Ibid.�9. Ibid.,�2–�7.20. USHouse,Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of De-

cember 2004,�08thCong.,2dsess.,8December2004,n.p.2�. Report to the President,�7.22. Ibid.,�2.23. AF/A2,Compilation of MAJCOM SIO WMD Commission Report Feed-

back, n.p.24. Ibid.ThisremarkcamefromPacificAirForces.

27

25. Ibid.ThisremarkcamefromAirForceMaterielCommand.26. Ibid.ThisremarkcamefromAirMobilityCommand.27. Ibid. This remark came from theNationalAir andSpace Intelli-

genceCenter.28. Spin-up training is the formalor informalposition trainingcon-

ductedonceanindividualreportsforduty.29. E-mailinterviewsconductedbyauthorwtihCaptStefanieS.Peter-

son,�8November2005;2dLtSeanR.Tucker,�5November2005;NCOIC,�5November2005;MajJamesGehringer,2December2005;�stLtTanyaSilvio,�5December2005;MajLourdesDuvall,�0February2006;andMSgtTimothyDukes,�4February2006.

30. Ibid.3�. Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Community Proliferation

Training Catalog,2006,availableonJWICS,http://www.cia.ic.gov/ciau/ProliferationCatalog/2006_proliferation_training.pdf.

32. Ibid.33. Ibid.34. Ibid.35. MajLourdesDuvall,interviewbytheauthor,�0February2006.36. Report to the President,2–�3.37. �7thTrainingWing,Operations Intelligence Apprentice Plan of In-

struction,�5March2005,45;and�7thTrainingWing,Intelligence Officer Plan of Instruction,5May2004,4�.

38. MSgtTimothyDukes,3�5thTRS/DOCB,interviewbytheauthor,�6February2006.

39. Enlisted IntelligenceCoursemanager, interviewby theauthor,3November2005.

40. ColPatriciaCoomber,PhD,seniormilitaryprofessor,DepartmentofEngineeringPhysics,AirForceInstituteofTechnology;interviewbytheauthorbywayofe-mail,�9April2006.

4�. SandiZielinski,NationalCounterproliferationCenterchiefofstaff,interviewbytheauthor,�3February2006.

42. MajTimWest,AF/A2XFM, interviewby theauthorbywayof e-mail,3October2005.

43. ColIgorGardner,�7thTRG/CC,“StateofYourSchoolhouse2005:Building Future Intelligence Professionals” (address, Senior IntelligenceOfficerConference,GoodfellowAFB,TX,2November2005).

44. WhiteHouse,National Security Strategy,�7September2002,2.45. HeadquartersUnitedStatesAirForce,Air Force Counter-Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-yield Explosive (C-CBRNE) Mas-ter Plan,30June2004,�.

46. �7thTrainingWing,Combat Targeting Course Plan of Instruction,9January2004,9and�5.

47. Col Barry R. Schneider, Counterforce Targeting Capabilities and Challenges, TheCounterproliferationPapers: FutureWarfareSeriesno.22(MaxwellAFB,AL:AirUniversityPress,August2004),2.

48. Maj Derek Gardner, interview by the author, 2 December 2005.CaptKasandraT.Traweek,interviewbytheauthor,�4November2005;LtColCharlesOwen,interviewbytheauthor,5December2005;CaptDonJones,interviewbytheauthor,�6February2006;CaptRichardGlade,in-

28

terviewbytheauthor,�6February2006;andMajWillHastings,interviewbytheauthor,�6February2006.

49. MajSuzannaMcNabb,AFPC/DPASA, interviewby theauthor,5November2005.

50. LtColPhillipPratzner,32dAOC/IRD,interviewbytheauthor,4December2005.

5�. Maj Derek Gardner, interview by the author, 2 December 2005;CaptKasandraT.Traweek,interviewbytheauthor,�4November2005;LtColCharlesOwen,interviewbytheauthor,5December2005;CaptDonJones,interviewbytheauthor,�6February2006;CaptRichardGlade,in-terviewbytheauthor,�6February2006;andMajWillHastings,interviewbytheauthor,�6February2006.

52. Hastings,interview.53. Gardneretal.,interviews.54. CaptDanaLaclairandRoyLangston,3�5thTRS/DOBF,interview

bytheauthor,3November2005.55. Report to the President,�2–�3.56. Ibid.,25–26.Thermobaricweaponsarehigh-temperatureincendi-

aryweaponsthataredesignedtoburnthechemical/biologicalagentsinstorageareas.Agent-defeatweaponsusenontraditionaldestructionmech-anisms(suchaspuncturingagentcanistersinsteadofblowingthemup)tominimizecollateraldamage.

57. Ibid.,24.58. CaptRichardGlade,USSTRATCOM/J2223, interviewby theau-

thor,�6February2006.59. Report to the President, 366–90.Thecommission reportalsoad-

dressesopen-source intelligenceorOSINT.For theAF,OSINT isanes-sentialpartofall-sourceanalysis,butitisnotasrobustasaseparateAFintelligencemissionareaandisthereforenotincludedinthispaper.

60. Department of Defense Dictionary,245.6�. Report to the President,�5.62. Ibid.63. DebDewey,AF/A2XA,interviewbytheauthor,�5February2006.64. Ibid.65. Ibid.66. Department of Defense Dictionary,330.67. Report to the President,376–77.68. Ibid.,�6.69. JeffreyT.Richelson,“MASINT:TheNewKidinTown,”International

Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence�4(200�):�49–92.70. Department of Defense Dictionary,488.7�. MarkW.Lowenthal,Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washing-

ton,DC:CQPress,2000),65.72. Report to the President,�5.73. Department of Defense Dictionary, 250.74. Report to the President,�6.75. Lowenthal,Intelligence,63.76. Report to the President,�6.77. ColJoePridotkas,NASIC/CC,interviewbytheauthor,28Febru-

ary2006.

29

78. Report to the President,�6.79. SandiZielinski,NationalCounterproliferationCenterchiefofstaff,

interviewbytheauthor,�3February2006.80. MajBrianKravitz,4thOSS/IN,interviewbytheauthor,�0Febru-

ary2006.8�. Ibid.82. AngleatShelikoff,86thFWS/OA,interviewbytheauthor,8Febru-

ary2006.83. HeadquartersUnitedStatesAirForce,Air Force C-CBRNE Master

Plan,30June2004,�5.84. DaveCoffey,AirCombatCommandIS/FPI,interviewbytheauthor,

2February2006.85. ColMichaelAinscough,MD,AF/CPC, interviewbytheauthor,3

February2006.86. Coffey,interview.87. Kravitz,interview;andMajJohnManeri,20thOSS/IN,interview

bytheauthor,9February2006.88. Report to the President,n.p.

Abbreviations

AF AirForceAF/A2 DirectorateofIntelligence,Surveillance,and Reconnaissance, Deputy Chief of Staff for AirandSpaceOperationsAFB AirForceBaseAFIAA AirForceIntelligenceAnalysisAgencyAFMIC ArmedForcesMedicalIntelligenceCenterAIA AirIntelligenceAgencyAIEET acquisition intelligenceexperienceexchange tourAIS AirIntelligenceSquadronAOC airandspaceoperationscenterCAPS CounterproliferationAnalysisandPlanning SystemCBRN chemical,biological,radiological,andnuclearCBRNE chemical,biological,radiological,nuclear,and high-yieldexplosivesC-CBRNE Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-yield Explosive Master PlanCIA CentralIntelligenceAgencyCTC CombatTargetingCourseDIA DefenseIntelligenceAgencyDOD DepartmentofDefenseDTRA DefenseThreatReductionAgencyHPAC HazardPredictionandAssessmentCapacityHUMINT humanintelligenceIC IntelligenceCommunityIMEA IntegratedMunitionsEffectAssessmentIMINT imageryintelligenceIRTPA IntelligenceReformandTerrorismPrevention ActISR intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissanceJMEM JointMunitionsEffectivenessManualJWICS JointWorldwideIntelligenceCommunications SystemMASINT measurementandsignatureintelligenceNASIC NationalAirandSpaceIntelligenceCenterNCPC NationalCounterproliferationCenterNRO NationalReconnaissanceOffice

31

NSA NationalSecurityAgencyOSI OfficeofSpecialInvestigationsSIGINT signalsintelligenceTBM theaterballisticmissileTRG traininggroupTRS trainingsquadronTWG threatworkinggroupUSCENTCOMUnitedStatesCentralCommandWMD weaponsofmassdestructionWMD/E weaponsofmassdestruction/effect

32