AIR FORCE REVIEWVol 2, No 2

EDITORIAL

Modernizing Our Air Force:

A Way to Protect Our People's FreedomBy LTCOL ELMER R AMON PAF

The protection of our sovereignty and territorial integrity for the continuedenjoyment of our cherished ideals of freedom and democracy is the reason for beingof the Philippine Air Force. The PAF is ready and willing to defend these ideals andimprove the quality of life of every Filipino. Along with freedom is our responsibilityto see to it that our people are secure from both internal and external threats. Theseresponsibilities ultimately rest upon the political will and the combines effort of allconcerned instrumentalities of government to enable the Air Force to mount acredible defense.

The rejection of the military bases agreement by the Philippine Senate led to theeventual closure of the US military base and downgraded the external defensecapability of the country. This political decision brought the responsibility to protectthe from external aggression squarely upon the government. Unfortunately, therehas been an external defense vacuum since the departure of the Americans that hasyet to be fully and properly addressed by the government. This vacuum can be mosteasily filled with a fully modernized Air Force.

Close to a decade after the passage of the AFP Modernization Law in 1995, not asingle aircraft was purchased to realize the purpose of providing the Air Force withthe capability to perform its mandate.

Meanwhile, the repository of doctrine, flying skills and experience of our pilotsand controllers is in danger of extinction if no aircraft is to defend our skies. There isno way out of our primordial responsibility to defend our sovereignty, the only way isfor the political leadership to guarantee our people's freedom and their way of life.

Our sovereignty as a people and nation is our most precious treasure. Asservants of the people, it behooves the Air Force to be always at the ready to defendPhilippine Sovereignty. More than the men and women who vigilantly guardPhilippine Skies, it is the duty of every Filipino to help build a professional, well-equipped, reliable and credible Philippine Air Force in the interest of the commongood.

COMMANDER'S CORNER55TH ANNIVERSARY MESSAGE

LIEUTENANT GENERAL BENJAMIN P DEFENSOR JR AFP

Commanding General, PAF

The 55th year of the Philippine Air Force’s existence as an Independent MajorService is a great time to be a part of this proud organization. It is a time to takestock of what we have done, celebrating our achievements and learning from ourshortcomings to avoid future mistakes and further improve ourselves as aninstitution. After all, Anniversaries are not mere parades and ceremonies. They arealso a time to remember blessings and all of the significant events that added evenmore color to the Air Force Story.

In the past year, we were in the forefront of the renewed drive of ourGovernment to eradicate the bandit Abu Sayyaf Group by bringing air power to bearupon our enemies. We continue to take the lead in realizing the Government’sinitiatives in long-term sustainable development primarily through our long-rangeand medium-range air transport assets and our Technical Service personnel. Werelentlessly pursue our own development through our evolving modernizationprogram. We are distinguishing ourselves in the Balikatan 02-2 joint militaryexercises with the flying skill and professionalism that has earned the admiration ofour American allies. We even successfully defended our overall title in the AFP – PNPOlympics, harvesting a record number of medals. Coming in first has become ournew trademark. This is the new Air Force we are creating for the future.

The past year has not been without our own share of setbacks, but as ever, webounced back strong and made certain that the lessons learned formed part of ourrenewed drive towards constant improvement. Learning from these lessons haveallowed us to stay ahead and further sharpen our spurs as the First Force. For weintend to move forward and upward always. Every step we take, we becomestronger, we become better.

This year, in view of our declining air assets are new, and promisingdevelopments in our capability development efforts. Alongside fresh initiatives toacquire new systems, Our Commander-in-Chief gave us a job to fast-track thedevelopment of our basic doctrines in support of the employment of new weaponssystems and equipment. We are not merely acquiring material assets, we are alsodeveloping new ways and means to better utilize those assets, maximize them andinnovate in our primary mission to fly and fight.

I am thankful to be blessed with Commanders, men and women who made theAir Force faster, stronger and better. In particular, I am pleased with the efforts ofour staff to develop the study of Revolutions in Military Affairs, or RMA. RMA is thenew and emerging trend of future warfare. Primarily, it is the development of a newand revolutionary way of fighting through the employment of new and oldcapabilities. Given our mix of old and new equipment, I am certain that the PAF’s

wealth of intelligence and insight will allow us to develop our own capabilities toallow us to be in step with our neighbors.

We will always improve. For at the end of each performance, the question willnot be how much we have achieved, but how much we have given. Not how manyvictories we have won, but how much we have done. Not how much we werehonored, but how much we have served. The ideal of success is not enough if it doesnot carry the ideal of service. This is the ideal of the First Force.

This is your PAF today, ever more ready, willing and able to be the first todeliver, the first to respond and proud to serve. This is the foundation we have builtfor the future. And the future, as I have always maintained, is in the skies.

I’ll se you there.

THE FIRST FORCE CITY:

AN UNFOLDING STORYBy Joseph W. Buduan

Clark Air Base lives two lives. It is an historical landmark and a majorPhilippine military facility. Clark Air Base was born during that tumultuous period inPhilippine History known as the Filipino – American War at the turn of the 20th

Century.

Fort Stotsenburg

It began as Fort Stotsenburg, laid out in 1902 – 1903. Most of the American forcessent to put down the Philippine insurrection were cavalry units -- horse-mountedtroops – and were not used to fighting small bands of enemies on foot. Addingfurther aggravation to their already dire straights, their horses were soon dying outfrom eating local saw grass, thereby immobilizing the cavalry. Importing grass just tofeed the horses was not only costly but time-consuming.

Thus when the US 5th Cavalry came across fields near the village of Angeles inPampanga in the Central Luzon plain, where good grass grew, the American militarycommanders decided to turn the entire area into a permanent bivouac. Late in 1902US Army Engineers laid out a military reservation encompassing some 7, 700 acres.The camp was named Fort Stotsenburg, in honor of Col. John M. Stotsenburg, whohad been killed in April 1899 while leading an attack in Quingua in the province ofBulacan.

On September the First, 1903, Pres. Roosevelt declared Fort Stotsenburg to bean official military reservation. Five years later in April of 1908, Pres. Rooseveltissued another executive order, this time increasing the size of Fort Stotsenburg to156, 204 acres.

Within roughly a 20-year period, from 1902 - 1919 the crude bivouac hadslowly taken form as a modern American military facility. By 1917, hangars and otheraircraft support facilities were finished. In 1919, the Aerodrome of Fort Stotsenburgwas officially named in honor of Major Harold M. Clark, an early Army Aviator whowas killed in a seaplane accident later on in Panama. The Air Base still bears MajorClark’s Name to this day. By 1947, the US 13th Air Force that saw action in Leyte,Luzon and the Southern Philippines moved to Clark Air Base, starting its new era asan exclusive military air facility.

The Philippine Era

It was still roughly over 150, 000 acres wide for over 70 years until it wasmodified by the Military Bases Agreement of 1979; its overall size was reduced to131, 000 acres. The Agreement of 1979 effectively returned sovereignty over thebases to the Government of the Philippines. In February of 1979, then Armed ForcesChief of Staff Gen. Romeo Espino raised the Philippine Flag over Clark Air Base,signaling yet another new era for Clark under Philippine sovereignty.

Overseas American Military Bases

The idea of American military bases on foreign shores was brought about bythe tensions of the Cold War. America was alarmed by a potential “domino effect” inthe developing world as the Communist wave spearheaded by the Soviet Union andthe People’s Republic of China were gaining footholds in various smaller countries inthe former Indo-Chinese territories of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. As part of theAmerican-led strategy of Containment, it established military installations in its allyterritories. The US 13th Air Force also had stations in Okinawa and Guadalcanal, apartfrom Clark Air Base. Clark Air Base was the largest American military installationoutside of the Continental United States.

The Philippines was of key strategic importance during the height of the ColdWar since it was located practically in the midst of the Southeast Asian region. Itssea-lanes and airspace remain vital routes in the event of any great geopoliticaldevelopments that could escalate into open hostilities. It remains just as vital tomaintaining the balance in international politics to this very day. Keeping open thebusy sea-lanes that lead to the Far East and traverse the South China Sea remain keyto maintaining any kind of balance in the Asian region.

Clark Air Base is the linchpin that held this arrangement together andmaintained the balance in the Cold War Era here in the Asia-Pacific Region.Fortunately, the great thermo-nuclear war everybody feared never came to pass. TheCold War ended with a whimper as the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990. America thendecided to downsize or clear out altogether many of its overseas military facilities.

The PAF in Clark

The American Government was hoping to extend the Military BasesAgreement beyond 1991, but the Philippine Senate effectively terminated theagreement. By November of 1991, the last of the American personnel cleared out asofficial control over the base was fully turned over to the Philippine Air Force, endingthe great era of American military presence in the country. Then Brigadier GeneralLeopoldo S. Acot was the Clark Air Base Commander when the historic turnover took

place. Brigadier General Benito P. Diamos was the last Clark Air Base Command orCABCOM Commander and became the first Wing Commander when it wastransformed into the 600th Air Base Wing in January of 1993.

Pinatubo’s Fury

It seemed foreboding that the PAF took over Clark Air Base when Mt.Pinatubo, after centuries of dormancy, erupted in a fury that lowered the overalltemperature of the entire planet. So devastating was the eruption that it was a fulltwo years from 1991 – 1993 that the volcano remained a very real threat. Long afterthe eruption, lahar flows and intermittent ash fall continued to plague the province ofPampanga as well as the neighboring provinces of Zambales and Tarlac.

The first great task of the PAF was to clean up Clark Air Base. Although theAmericans did a great deal of cleaning up on their way out, the ash fall and the laharcaused by Pinatubo continued well after the Americans left. The 600th Air Base Wingunder Gen. Diamos practically spent its first year of existence cleaning up after thedevastation of the volcano. Slowly but steadily, Clark Air Base began regaining its oldform. Still, the after-effects of Pinatubo’s eruption lingered long after the volcanohad once again settled down, and PAF personnel were not too keen about staying inClark Air Base.

The Air Force City

But in October of 1997 a maverick Colonel named Benjamin P. Defensor Jr.became the new 600th ABW Commander, and a new era in Clark Air Base unfolded.Defensor brought a reputation of achievement to Clark as Commander of the 600th

ABW. It was under Defensor’s term that the Air Force City was born. Defensor ledthe way as the Air Force practically undid the damage done by Pinatubo andtransformed the moribund base into the PAF Model Base for 1998. The Air Force Citysoon became the model facility by which all other AFP Facilities would be compared.

There are now six tenant units calling the Air Force City home including two ofthe five major PAF Commands, the Air Logistics and Support Command (ALSC) andthe Air Reserve Command (ARC). Under the ALSC are the 410th Maintenance Wingand the 420th Supply Wing. With them are the 672nd Finance Service Unit and the

PAF’s own special operations unit, the 710th Special Operations Wing. The latestaddition to the growing list of PAF Units at the Air Force City is the 1st TacticalOperations Wing, which oversees all PAF operations in the entire Luzon Region.

Clark Air Base is no longer just a purely military facility, which gives furthercredence to the reality that is now the Air Force City. With the creation of the ClarkDevelopment Corporation in 1993 and the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) thebase is now a multi-purpose area that is geared towards not merely military purposesbut more importantly towards being an engine for sustainable long-term economicdevelopment for the entire country.

In fact, the 600th ABW is tasked with the security, preservation andmaintenance of the expansive 4, 400 hectares making up the entirety of the CSEZ andnot just the PAF Facilities therein. Among the non-military facilities under the mantleof the 600th ABW are the Diosdado Macapagal International Airport, the Duty Freeshops, the Mimosa and Fontana Leisure Estates and the Centennial Expo Site. In linewith the renewed Command vision of establishing and developing close ties with thehost communities, the 600th ABW also works closely with Local Government Units inAngeles and Mabalacat in livelihood programs and other Civil-Military Operations.With more private companies expected to settle in the CSEZ over the next few years,the Air Force City is expected to continue to grow and expand as the PAF itself takeson even greater responsibilities at Clark Air Base.

The Bases Conversion Development Authority

But the development of military facilities into multi-purpose metropolitancomplexes with mixed-use civilian and military facilities entered a new phase whenthe government decided to formalize this thrust through enabling legislation and notmerely by executive fiat. Suffice it to say that this action continues to be highlycontroversial.

Republic Act No. 7227 created the Bases Conversion Development Authority(BCDA). This statute accelerated the conversion of vast tracts of militaryreservations and former US Military Facilities into other productive uses under theauspices of the BCDA. Its policy statement declared “the government will acceleratethe sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the Clark andSubic military reservations and extensions… “

Funds to be used will come from the sale in part or in whole of Metro Manilamilitary camps and bases. It was also the declared policy of the government toenhance the benefits to be derived from the sale of these military properties topromote the economic development of Central Luzon in particular and ultimately theentire country in general.

As beneficial as the reasons for enacting this law may be, the BCDA has notreally lived up to its intended role of being the lead agency to ensure that thegovernment will gain maximum benefits from the sale of military real estate. Actingin the capacity of a private real estate broker more than a governmentinstrumentality, the BCDA has made some questionable moves.

For instance, among its many functions, the BCDA is tasked with replicatingmilitary facilities once they are moved to a new location after said facilities are

removed from their former locations in the aftermath of a sale of military real estate.This means that if a unit used to occupy a single-story structure with a total floorarea measuring 100 square-meters, in the event it is transferred after a sale, theBCDA must be able to provide for say a two-story structure with the same total floorarea for the unit upon its relocation. Otherwise, the BCDA cannot facilitate the saleof that particular property.

Unfortunately, the BCDA has gone ahead and done precisely that, with AFP Unitswinding up as victims because of this negligence. Some of the PAF Units andfacilities that transferred to Clark Air Base from Villamor Air Base are among theBCDA victims, having to settle for smaller workplaces and shortchanged facilities. Itis often a misconception that newer facilities are better facilities, such as in this case.The BCDA even wanted to build a new runway right through the PAF runway andrelocate the PAF yet again to an even worse corner of the reservation, after the PAFhad done the hard work of rehabilitating and improving the runway.

Implications For the PAF

While the template for mixed-use military and civilian facilities has foundsuccess in other parts of the world, the same cannot be said for the Philippines. Andthe most immediate loser in this scheme is the PAF. The greater injustice is that itwas the Air Force that took the lead in cleaning up and starting the rebirth of ClarkAir Base after the Pinatubo eruption and the departure of the Americans wheneverybody else was dallying and could not even see much hope for the base.

It was the Air Force that secured the entire facility, imposing law and order inthe tumult after the departure of the Americans and the eruption. It was the AirForce that got the facilities up and running less than a year after the devastationwrought when Pinatubo erupted. In fact, a PAF C-130 was the first aircraft to land atClark Air Base after the eruption and departure of the Americans in 1992. When Clarkwas formally turned over to the PAF, it was given the worst corner of the reservation,having been overgrown with vegetation and practically cemented in by lahar and ash.Yet in only a year, the Air Force City was born and PAF Units began relocating soonthereafter.

Now, even though the Air Force is legally mandated to secure Clark Air Base, itseems as if the BCDA is having a far greater say than the PAF about the future ofClark Air Base. Of the 4, 400 hectares making up the CSEZ, the PAF was given only350 hectares for its exclusive use. All of the air service facilities being used by bothmilitary and civilian air transport were all rehabilitated under the auspices of the PAF,not the least of which is the fully refurbished Haribon facility and the new C-130hangar. In short, after the Americans left and even before the BCDA, the CDC and theCSEZ were created, when nobody else saw much hope for Clark, the PAF had alreadyclaimed Clark Air Base and brought it back to life.

The Bottom Line

The PAF fully supports the development initiatives of the government. It haseven taken the lead in these initiatives through its own operations using its owninitiatives. That is precisely why the Air Force City was created. It was meant to be amodern metropolitan multi-use complex that enhances the fulfillment of the missionof the PAF. But because of some questionable undertakings of the BCDA, the PAF is

finding that instead of being a partner, its role and its voice in Clark Air Base is slowlydiminishing.

There is still hope to turn this unfortunate trend around, through dialogue andmore genuine empowerment for the PAF. The law itself mandates not merely a PAFpresence at Clark, but an empowered PAF that is a partner in its development. Adiminished PAF presence in Clark means a diminished capacity for development forthe CSEZ and the country as a whole.

The Air Force City is but a glimpse of what the PAF can accomplish when it isfully empowered. The PAF already has the institutional capabilities to be an effectivepartner, not merely an effective security force. All that is needed is to make certainthat as a real stakeholder, the PAF is not overruled or bypassed by those who do nothave the sympathy to see what Clark is all about. As stated earlier, it leads two lives,as an historical landmark and as a major Philippine military facility. Now it is aboutto have a third life: as a major engine for national development. No less than thePresident herself concurs that the future is in the skies. Who but the PAF couldbetter take the lead in building and securing that future? But for now, the queryremains: Quo Vadis, for the PAF, for Clark Air Base, and for the National Government.

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References

1. Executive Order Number 394 issued by Pres. Corazon C. Aquino in September of1991.

2. Republic Act Number 7227, the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1991.

3. Presidential Proclamation Number 163 issued by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos in April of1993.

4. Executive Order Number 80 issued by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos in April of 1993. Thisestablished the CDC, the BCDA and the CSEZ.

5. Republic Act Number 7898, an Act Providing for the Modernization of the ArmedForces of the Philippines and Other Purposes, 1995. (The PAF Modernization Programwas the template for the AFP Modernization Program)

6. PAF Memorandum of Agreement with the BCDA, signed during the term of Lt. Gen.Nicasio Rodriguez as CG, PAF.

3RD TOW “THE FIRST FORCE IN MINDANAO”By: 2LT RODOLFO N MANGAYA PAF

CAPABILITIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The Third Tactical Operations Wing (3rd TOW) is the First Force in Mindanaothat provides Tactical Air Power all over its area of responsibility. Its mission is toconduct sustained air operations in coordination with the ground and naval forces ofthe Southern Command. In order for the 3rd TOW to perform its mission, it performsthe following functions: close air support and interdiction, air mobile operations, airassault and air logistic operations, tactical airlift operations, resupply air operations,insertion and extrication, combat search and rescue, casualty air evacuations, airreconnaissance and surveillance operations, forward air control operations, maritimeair patrol in support to socio-economic and national development. Lastly, itorganizes, trains and develops its personnel and other personnel of the Army, Navy,PNP, reservists, and civilian auxiliaries to enhance unit operations, civil defense anddisaster preparedness. In short, 3rd TOW caters all air operation requirements ofSouthern Command, other government agencies, and some legitimate non-government organizations (NGOs) of the whole Southern Philippines.

3rd TOW is the only wing that is situated in the long war-torn Mindanao. The presenceof the 3rd TOW, the bedrock of Tactical Air Power in Southern Philippines, is a forcemultiplier to the ground and naval forces of Southern Command. During the All OutWar against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abusayyaf Group (ASG), 3rd

TOW performed exceptionally well in providing simultaneous sustained air operationsagainst the lawless groups. The virtually non-stop pressures coming from the airwere just too much for the enemies thus they were forced to give up theirstrongholds and surrender themselves to the government troops.

Just recently, 3rd TOW again has proven itself by successfully defending EdwinAndrews Air Base and Tactical Operations Group (TOG) 9 from the massive attack ofthe Misuari Renegade Group (MRG). It effectively and efficiently employed all its airassets like the OV-10s, SF-260s, MG-520s and UH-1Hs against the MRGs during thesiege of Jolo and Cabatangan last 19 November 2001 and 27 November 2001,respectively. Without the close air support provided by the 3rd TOW in thoseincidents, the AFP ground troops might have encountered strong resistance of MRGs

from Cabatangan Complex and have found it impossible to neutralize them in a shortperiod of time. In the operations against the ASG, the 3rd TOW was again veryinstrumental in the successful rescue of the Sipadan and Dos Palmas hostages andthe members of Miracle Crusade who were held captives by the Abusayyaf. Likewise,the Wing contributed a lot in the killing of hundreds of Abusayyaf members byproviding close air support, air interdiction, casualty air evacuation of friendly troopsand resupply missions that brought the fighting government troops in a state of highmorale.

Nowadays, 3rd TOW is still and willremain to be a vital factor for the totalannihilation of ASG and for thesuccessful rescue of the remaininghostages. In the ongoing Balikatan 02-1, the presence of the US troops inZamboanga City and Basilan Islandgreatly enhanced the operationalcapability of the government troopsoperating in the area. The high-tech air assets like the MH-47“Chinook”, HH-60 “Pavehawk” /“Blackhawk”, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles(UAV) “Predator”, P-3 “Orion” and othermodern equipment like the satellite

communication equipment and high powered weaponry of the US troops particularlythe US Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC) project tactical air power dayand night. The concept of air operations of Balikatan 02-1 is for the PAF to have thedaylight flyingmissions and nighttime for the JSOAC. These combined air operationsof 3rd TOW, PAF and JSOAC make the ASG on the run 24 hours a day and 7 days aweek thus making the bandits sleepless and tired of running from the pursuinggovernment troops. The three (3) month combined operations of RP-US troops havebeen very effective as manifested by the significant number of the ASG whounconditionally surrendered, were killed and captured. Numerous infrastructureswere also undertaken benefiting the local populace.

THE IDEAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS IN BASILAN AND JOLO ISLANDS

Basilan and Jolo Islands are only small islands but have the most difficultterrain to operate. Located both in the southern part of Mindanao, these two forestedislands have been a constant haven of Muslim terrorists and rebels. Because of theunforgiving terrain, the five-grid square on the map will take the army troops five (5)to six (6) days to travel by foot. Considering that the enemies in the said areas arecomposed of only ten (10) to fifteen (15) armed individuals and splintered intoseveral groups, they are very mobile and unpredictable. They also don’t stay inpermanent camps and only harbor in different places at very short period of time.Likewise, the enemies have the knowledge of the local terrain thus making themmove freely and swiftly mostly during nighttime. Given these situations, a companyor a battalion ground movement that will take five (5) to six (6) days to reach acertain objective with the enemy group composed only of ten (10) to twenty (20)individuals that are very mobile is inappropriate. The enemy concept of operationsmakes the bandits and terrorists a very difficult target of the government troops.

Given these conditions, the only way to counter the enemy’s concept of operationsis to have sustained airmobile operations that will quickly insert and extricate theground troops in and out of the battle zone. In this kind of concept, it requires onlyseveral well-equipped and highly-trained Light Reaction Force (LRF) composed ofseven (7) to twelve (12) soldiers who are capable of fast roping or rappelling from achopper and be deployed very quickly. With this, the five-grid square that will takethe army guys five (5) to six (6) days to walk will only be traveled in less that seven(7) minutes by LRF in air mobile operations using UH-1Hs. This will also fully exploitthe capability of the UH-1Hs in bringing the timely employment of force to block andstrike into the battle zone and go away with the practice of using them like taxi toferry VIPs. The concept of using UH-1Hs for insertion and extrication missions havethe advantage of speed and accuracy over the enemy, thus, attaining the element ofsurprise - a very important element in the operations in Basilan and Jolo. On theother hand, the extensive use of air platform in Jolo and Basilan Islands has greatpsychological impact both to friendly and enemy troops. The psychological impact ofthis to friendly troops is that it gives assurance to the fighting troops on the groundthat they can be evacuated easily and be transported to the nearest hospital if theyget wounded in action. It also gives the ground troops easy time to get into and outof the target objective without hassle and danger of ambush form the ground. For theenemies, hearing the roaring engine of the aircraft and the thunder-sounding guns,seeing the rockets and bombs drop from the sky make them worry a lot. Aside fromfire coming form the ground troops, the projection of force from the air gives theenemies small and limited space to go and hide thus making them vulnerable andeasy targets.

ROLE ON THE PAF MODERNIZATION

The aging fleet of air assets of the Philippine Air Force stationed at 3rd TOW isfar beyond compare from the high tech avionics and navigational equipment of theUS aircraft. The capabilities between the PAF and US aircraft may differ a lot but thecaliber of PAF pilots in terms of flying skills is unprecedented. However, it is still amust for the Philippine Air Force to be modernized. The PAF must have the advancedtechnology of weaponry, aircraft, communications, and information and targetingsystem in order to have efficient and enhanced capabilities in day and night airoperations. Without these, the lawless groups will keep on exploiting the presentlimitations of the PAF aircraft to operate at night.

For a very technical branch of service like thePhilippine Air Force, fighting at the different frontsof war requires reliable advanced air platform thatcan meet the present internal and external securityconcerns and other requirements of the Philippinegovernment. The horizon seen by the naked eyefrom the ground and from the air differs a lot.

From the ground, it is limited to the contoursand obstacles of the terrain; while from the air, theonly limit is as far as the eye can see the horizon. Itis the application of Tactical Air Power that canchange the outcomes of the wars of today and ofthe future.

As the only unit in the area that has the capability to project the lethality ofTactical Air Power, 3rd TOW will remain to be the edge force of Southern Commandagainst the MILF, CPP-NPA, ASG MBG, and other lawless elements in Mindanao.Therefore, ground commanders who orchestrate the battle plan in Mindanao mustseriously consider Douhet when he pointed out that “Anyone considering the groundand naval operations must of necessity remember that above land and sea is the air.”

EFFICIENCY OF WOMEN IN COMBATBy 1LT WILLIAM RACAL PAF

1LT JOYCELYN A PATRIMONIO PAF

(Basing from a male’s own sphere of concerns and observations)

Today, the modern society has started to take cognizance of the emerging roleof women in a more complex world of male oriented professions. Changes in viewshave become more apparent although some still expect a few of them to make it. Butthose who are categorically fated to succeed have ascended at par with their malecounterparts. Women are now seen to proliferate even the world of men in uniform.Suffice it to stay that they have invaded almost every place in this society.

They eat the same food. They use thesame sink. They sleep at one barracks(although in separate cubicles) and theyeven use the same squeaking steel bunks.They jog in our own pace, they sweatwhenever we sweat. They go wherever wego. They content themselves to anenvironment where a life of comfort andleisure is all too far from reality. In short,they too, to endure the uncertainty of adislocated life in the field.

They wear the same uniform and usethe same equipment. They control andoperate the same aircraft. They perform thesame mission and face the same level ofdanger in flight.

They undergo the same flight training with disregard to their inherent

physiological limitations. They are subjected to the same rewards for their well-

done accomplishments they will even serve the same set of punishments for their

misdemeanors.

It seems that nothing really separates ordifferentiates women from the rest. Yet somesay women still cannot outlive the stringencyof life in this field. Their efficiency in combatis still a discussion on the table. It has beenthe recurrent theme in the society ever sincethey were given the chance to provethemselves.

Their persistence to dominate this maleprofession has been an old age subject ofscrutiny by other illiberal members of thesociety. But as time passes by, little by littlequalms and inhibitions are being set aside.

In the Philippine Air Force, it has only been four years since lady pilots wereinvolved in combat operations. Not much can be concluded in this short period oftime, and with a few number of lady combat pilots as guinea pigs, the study issomehow limited. There maybe observations on the presence of women in the field,but these could not make a general conclusion as to whether women are reallyefficient in combat.

There are many areas to consider regarding this issue. If missionaccomplishment alone is our concern, the presence of women is not a disadvantage.So far, as co-pilots and wingmen in the MG-520 and OV-10, the lady combat pilotshave performed as well as their male counterparts. Technical and tactical skills arenot much different since these are all acquired during training. However, theefficiency of women at the command level still remains to be proven since, as of thepresent, none of our lady pilots have reached such positions (e.g. Element Lead). It isin the area where, female commanders are tested on their decisiveness, which is,theoretically, greatly affected by their emotions and perhaps their “ficklemindedness”.

The greatest concern regarding thepresence of women in combat is theirbilleting facility. Previous commandershesitated to deploy women because theyhave to spend some more to renovateand improve the deployment areas so asto accommodate them.Although thesewomen have been trained to survive indifferent types of environment, wecannot remove the fact that they are stillwomen in a male environment and areprone to harassment. The livingenvironment is not only a concern forwomen combatants but also for the menas well, since this greatly affects moraleand subsequently missionaccomplishment.

Believe it or not, there are even some male pilots who are much more particularwith their personal hygiene than the females.

Problems regarding female combatants in the Air Force are not much differentfrom those in the Army and the Navy. The Philippine Army have tried putting theirwomen in the front line as company commanders and platoon leaders, and the sameproblem billeting is true. Likewise, in the Navy, midship women are not only allowedto assignments in the ships, which have provisions for women.

Not all people have the same view on the efficiency of female combatants.Perhaps there are still some who prefer women to stay home and watch their ownfamilies. But times change. Unlike before, where battles are fought physically, today,our battles are greatly influenced by technology. Time will come when battles will befought from the neck up and probably, by that time, more women will be involved.

Efficiency in combat is not gender-oriented. It simply depends on the attitudeof every individual towards his profession. There are only a few women who chooseto risk their lives in combat.

Unlike men, who are generally war-freak, most women still prefer to be thecaring and loving mothers at home.

Those who chose to risk their lives, definitely, are very efficient in their ownfields because they have placed their hearts and minds on it. Maybe, you cannot putall the women the world in combat, but only select a few who are determined andwilling to face the challenge.

THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARYAFFAIRS

A Visionary Strategy for the Future of the Philippine Air Force

2LT CHRISTOPHER ALLAN M MENDOZA PAF

INTRODUCTION

The role of technology in defense and security is increasingly proliferatingwhere the capability of the armed forces depends on the achievement of technology.Today, it is clearly that military theorists around the world are deeply contemplatingthe consequences of technology in the future conduct of warfare. Consequently, withthe advent of technical advancements, developed countries worldwide havebroadened parameters in the conduct of their national security affairs. A majorrevolution in national security affairs is dynamically emerging as a result of theadvancement in the area of information technology. Hence, a new concept ofinformation warfare known as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is beginning toshape the future of defense establishment.

The RMA issues emerged out of the post-Cold War era during the late 80’swhen debate about star wars and its implications to military strategy wasconceptualized. Moreover, military theorists and historians have long noted theexistence of historical revolutions. They believed that these historical revolutionswere caused by the introduction of new technological breakthroughs includingweapon systems. In contrast, the Soviets called these series of events as MilitaryTechnical Revolutions (MTRs). Their theory was founded on the concept that theincorporation of radically sophisticated capabilities into existing military forces wouldprovide them an advantage in the conduct of decisive military operations in theEuropean theater against NATO. Thus, following the introduction of MTR came theintroduction of the term RMA by analysts in the United States whose definition ismore technologically oriented.

THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

RMA is defined as a major change in the nature of warfare brought about bythe innovative application of new or even existing technologies which whencombined with dramatic changes in military doctrine, operational and organizationalconcepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations. Withthis definition, it’s quite obvious that past historical events illustrate some forms ofRMA. A representative illustration is provided by Krepinevich (1994), who outlinesten such “military revolutions” occurring from the fourteenth century forward,namely: The Infantry Revolution; The Artillery Revolution; The Revolution of Sail andShot; The Fortress Revolution; The Gunpowder Revolution; The NapoleonicRevolution; The Land Warfare Revolution; The Naval Revolution and; The NuclearRevolution.

THE RMA FRAMEWORK

Scholars widely believed that RMA are usually associated with three essentialelements, namely: technological change acting as a catalyst; transient innovations inthe tactical and operational levels and; the development of more enduring conceptsin the form of doctrines and organizational changes. Likewise, it is recognized thatRMAs comprise four types of simultaneous and mutually supporting change:technological change, systems development, operational innovation andorganizational change. On the other hand, it is expected that RMA impact in theconduct of warfare will come from the integration of four areas, namely: precisionstrike; information warfare; dominating maneuver and; space warfare. However, it ismaintained that the key to achieving the next revolution in military affairs will not befound in technology itself, but rather in the adoption of new operational concepts andorganizations as well as new and more relevant doctrine that fully exploittechnologies.

THE PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE RMA STRATEGY

In 1995, Congress passed Republic Act No. 7879, otherwise known as theArmed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Law. The law declares a state policy“to modernize the AFP to a level where it can fully and effectively perform itsconstitutional mandate of upholding the sovereignty and preserving the patrimony ofthe Republic of the Philippines”. It is under this premise that the PAF had its ownparadigm shift towards achieving RMA. The PAF as the primary defender of thecountry’s skies will develop its capability based on intrasystematic advantage.Intrasystematic advantage as a means to exploit RMA is what the nation’s economiccondition dictates. This RMA strategy is defined as exploiting Information Technology(IT) to enable one’s own military system to operate more efficiently and effectivelythan it did before, own-system features are the targets for change, and the criteriafor improvement are based on own- system performance. Through this undertaking,the PAF will exploit RMA to empower the five pillars of the Air Force ModernizationProgram with emphasis on Capability, Materiel and Technology. Moreover, aerialassets will be strategically revolutionized through the acquisition of aircraft capable

of gathering massive amounts of information, greater range of striking power, higheraccuracy and equipped with integrated weapons systems. Likewise, aircraft withC4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillanceand Reconnaissance) equipped with satellite video, gyro-stabilized cameras, side andforward looking radars and data communication links form part of the PAF inventoryto be purchased. As such, future military operations will reduce civilian casualtiesand compression of time on the battlefield. Significantly, through these highlyadvanced air assets, integration and coordination with naval and ground forces willfacilitate the overall conduct of military operations.

However, it is important to note that PAF RMAs embrace changes in otherfactors such as organization and concepts aside from technology. In other fields ofthe PAF Modernization Program, the development of doctrine and organizationalstructure of the Air Force will significantly provide the foundation in the conduct ofpresent and future air operations. The PAF as a technically oriented force mustenhance unity of command and economy of force to optimize available resources andto become cost-effective. On the part of doctrine development, the Air Force willcontinue to review, evaluate and validate new concepts, strategies and tactics thatare in consonance with the employment of acquired capabilities. Additionally, the PAFincluded Human Resource Development to enhance its forces with education andtraining, technical skills and value formation. Finally, Bases Support SystemsDevelopment will be pursued to provide forces with strategic, operational and tacticaladvantage. The development of PAF bases in geared towards the promotion ofaerospace industries, joint military, commercial and interagency operations, andaircraft maintenance centers.

As the PAF moves forward with its response to RMA, it may want to view thephenomenon both as an opportunity and a challenge. It is an opportunity because itwill empower military air power, and at the same time a challenge because of therapidly expanding role of the Air Force in the future. With RMA, the PAF is ready totake-off to soar the infinite skies equipped with a strategic vision to revolutionize thefuture of military operations.

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Endnotes:

1 Dr. Elinor Sloan, Canada and the Revolution in Military Affairs, 2000, p.1

2 Randall Whitaker, The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), 1995, p.1

3 Ibid., p. 9

4 Ibid., p. 9

5 Ibid., p. 9

6 Lt Col Edmundo F. Gammad PAF, Revolution in What, 1997, p. 4

7 AFP Modernization Program, 2001 Annual Report, p. 2

8 Randall Whitaker, The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), 1995, p.2

THE PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE DOCTRINEPROCESS

(1995-2001) AN ASSESSMENT“At the heart of war lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war inorder to achieve victory…It is the building material for strategy. It is fundamental tosound judgment.”

General Curtis E. Le May, USAF

INTRODUCTION

The need for an institutionalized process in the development of doctrines wasgiven impetus by the Armed Force of the Philippines only in the early 1990s duringthe crafting of the modernization program and its subsequent deliberations byCongress.

The AFP Modernization Program began with only four components, that is,without the doctrine development component. The four components wereOrganizational Development, Materiel and Technology Development, BasesDevelopment, and Human Resources Development. In the Philippine Air Force(PAFP), the premise for all these components was based on the perceived best way toorganize, equip, base and train to attain the level of the modern Air Force. It shouldbe noted, however, that the PAFM 0-1 is outdated and does not include the wholespectrum of the current PAF missions and functions. During the deliberation of theAFP Modernization Program, some lawmakers queried on the basis for themodernization plan, hence, the inclusion of doctrine as a component ofmodernization.

In 1995, Republic Act 7898, otherwise known as the Armed Forces of thePhilippines Modernization Law was enacted essentially with five-component areas.Among the five areas, doctrines development is considered as a fundamental basisfor other component areas. It is significant to note that it was during theCongressional inquiries regarding the rationale of other components that doctrinebecame a tacit requirement.

In the PAF, doctrines development was ascribed to the Office of SpecialStudies (OSS). The OSS was officially created on 07 May 1976, as a Special Staff tothe Commanding General, PAF. This office was under the supervision of the AssistantChief of Air Staff for Plans (OA-5). However, it was deactivated on 01 February 1987with its functions and tasks were absorbed by OA-5. The activation of the Office ofStrategic and Special Studies, GHQ triggered the reactivation of OSS, PAF on 24February 1994 as a Personal Staff of CG, PAF.

The current PAF doctrine development efforts need more focus andimprovement both in terms of meeting the required number of operational andtactical doctrines and more importantly, in intrinsic qualities and values of thepublished doctrines. Most of these published doctrines were not subjected tonecessary testing and evaluation and eventual application. Some have been relegatedto the shelves and never had the opportunity to be read and applied by thoseconcerned.

It is therefore necessary to conduct an inquiry to find out how the PAFDoctrine Process is being implemented and to trace out problems affecting itsimplementation. Doctrine awareness is severely lacking in the whole PAForganization and it adversely affects the doctrine development in the PAF. The PAFdoctrine represents the summit of PAF thinking about the best ways to use air power.It is the PAF theory of how the air force can effectively contribute to nationalobjectives. As such, it deserves the best intellectual efforts and utmost attention byevery member of the Command.

SIGNIFICANCE OF DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

Doctrines development is an indispensable component of the PAFModernization Program and the PAF force development. The PAF must ensure thecontinuous cycle of doctrine development. It is not just a matter of producing therequired doctrines but continuously updating these to keep them responsive.Doctrine development is a large task. Locating, accessing, consolidating, andanalyzing all the pertinent data is a very large undertaking – as is the process ofdeveloping concepts and testing them. When the doctrines have been validated, theymust be properly disseminated to the officers and personnel concerned, anothermassive undertaking which entails the entire system of military education. Anotherimplication of the doctrine development process is one of continuous change in thebasis for doctrine, i.e. experience, technology and theory. The fast technologicalchanges and new ideas confront us nearly on a daily basis. Every new experience canhave a profound impact to the existing doctrines. It is therefore imperative that thedoctrine process must have an effective means of both generating and evaluating airpower concepts from the constantly changing experience-theory-technology base.

The success of the PAF depends more on mental than physical capabilities.People with greater mental acuity can outsmart even the most sophisticated militaryestablishment. As a major component of the PAF Modernization, doctrinesdevelopment will be a dynamic force multiplier. As mentioned earlier, the PAFdoctrine represents the apex of PAF thinking about the best ways to use air powerand how to effectively contribute to the attainment of national goals and objectivesand thus deserves utmost attention.

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

HPAF Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Nr 16 dated 07 December 1995was the first document issued pertaining to doctrine development in the PAF. Itestablished policies and procedures governing the development and revisions of PAFdoctrines. Under this SOP, changes affecting doctrinal application can rise fromchanges in government policies, technological developments, intelligenceassessments, policy reviews, commander’s proposals and new limits in funding,personnel and other related resources. Development of new doctrines, review of

existing doctrines and revision of any section of PAF Manuals may be suggested byany PAF Command, unit or member and will be processed through the chain ofcommand to the Doctrines board level. The CG, PAF reserves the right to veto theproposed doctrines recommended by the PAF Doctrines Board (PDB). A review of thisSOP was made in the first quarter of year 2001 and as a result, HPAF SOP Nr 03 dated10 July 2001 was issued replacing the HPAF SOP Nr 16. The provisions are similar butwith additional policies, procedures and components. On 05 April 2001, a CG, PAFletter directive was issued to all PAF units and Staff offices regarding the submissionof a monthly report on Doctrines Development and Implementation. The aim was tofurther enhance attention to doctrines development and awareness at all levels ofcommand. To date, there are only a few PAF units regularly complying with thisdirective. Indeed, most of the reports received were not substantial and werereflective on the lack of emphasis, attention and support to the PAF doctrinesdevelopment in both the PAF units and HPAF Staff. Moreover, a survey reveals thatsome PAF officers specifically those who have not been assigned at HPAF are notknowledgeable of existing policies, procedures and guidelines on doctrinesdevelopment in the PAF.

Shown below is a survey that reflects the perception of the respondents onthe effectiveness of existing policies, procedures and guidelines on doctrinesdevelopment in the PAF.

Table 1. Perceptions of the Respondents on the Effectiveness of the PAF Doctrine

Process

5 4 3 2 1F fw F Fw F Fw F Fw F Fw Total WM Interpretation

PAF

Doctrine

Process

7 35 19 76 33 99 6 12 0 0 222 3.42 FAIRLY

EFFECTIVE

On the basis of data presented below, it is evident that lack of attention,emphasis and support to doctrine development by commanders, heads of offices aswell as officers and men was the primary factor or problem affecting the doctrinedevelopment process in the PAF. This was followed by lack of expertise as a result ofinadequate number of dedicated writers and researchers with the capability ofmanaging doctrines development.

Table 2. Perceptions of the Respondents on Factors or Problems Affecting the PAFDoctrine Process

FACTORS NUMBER

PERCENT RANK

No adequate attention, emphasis and support havebeen placed on the doctrine process (to includeformulation and development of doctrines anddoctrine education)

45 69.23 1

Lack of adequate funds 28 43.08 3Lack of adequate facilities 14 21.54 4Lack adequate expertise (researchers and writers) 32 49.23 2

Table 3 shows the perceptions of the respondents on the adequacy ofattention, emphasis and support given to doctrines development. This pertains to thedegree of attention, emphasis and support as provided by commanders, head ofoffices including the officers and men under various PAF units and offices. Thecommander or head of office is considered however as a key factor in doctrinesdevelopment due to the hierarchical nature of military organization. Given the databelow, it may mean doctrine development is not given that much importance in termsof priorities as compared with other concerns of the units. It may also mean that theunit’s operation or performance of functions respectively is not doctrine based.Moreover, this may also be an indication of low-level doctrine awareness in the PAF.

Table 3. Perceptions of the Respondents on the Attention, Emphasis and Supportgiven to the PAF Doctrine Process

5 4 3 2 1PAF

Doctrine

Development

Process

F

8

fw

40

F

4

fw

16

F

3

fw

9

F

44

fw

88

F

6

fw

6

Total

159

WM

2.44

Interpretation

SLIGHT

The recommended solutions of the respondents to improve the PAF doctrinedevelopment process are reflected in Table 4 below. The writer enumerated potentialsolutions based on related literature and studies for the respondents to consider. Theestablishment of a full time doctrine center with a pool of doctrine researchers andwriters, the conduct of an intensified doctrine awareness campaign program, theallocation of funds for doctrines development, the masteral and other advancelearning for doctrine officers, and the recruitment of qualified researchers were thechoices made available to the respondents. As depicted below, 49.23% of therespondents believed that there is a need for a PAF Doctrine Center with adequatefunds, facilities and expertise to work on full time basis.

Table 4. Recommendations of the Respondents on the Solutions to the ProblemsEncountered in the Implementation of the PAF Doctrine Process

SOLUTIONS NUMBER

PERCENT

RANK

Establishment of a PAF Doctrine Center with apool of doctrine researchers and writers whichwill cater to doctrines development on fulltime basis

32 49.23 1

The conduct of an intensified doctrineawareness program in the PAF

23 35.38 2

Program adequate funds for doctrinedevelopment

19 29.23 4

Send selected officers to masteral and otheradvance studies to prepare them for doctrinedevelopment activities 16 24.62 5

Recruit qualified civilian researchers/writers 21 32.31 3

The OSS as the doctrine center of the PAF must be reviewed in the context onthe importance of doctrines development as an indispensable pillar in themodernization program and as a major concern of the Command considering itsimpact to the efficiency and effectiveness of the PAF. In the Unit Manning Document(UMD) dated 30 March 2001, the OSS serves as a Personal Staff of the CommandingGeneral, PAF that assists and advises him on the formulation of PAF doctrines andconduct of studies on air power and strategic and special projects of the Command.Likewise, the UMD prescribes the authorized number of personnel wherein thepresent manpower fill-up of OSS is only 40% manned based on the current UMD.

On resources, the OSS receives a quarterly budget of PHP 188,387. It must benoted that OSS performs multifarious functions and tasks other than doctrinedevelopment. The cost of developing one tactical doctrine to include publication anddissemination, notwithstanding the cost of educating the force would definitely bemore than the quarterly budget allocated to doctrines development.

CONCLUSIONS

The existing policy guidelines and procedures on the development of doctrinesin the PAF are fairly effective and thus, needs review and revision. Most officers arenot fully aware of the existing guidelines and procedures of the PAF doctrinesdevelopment. Likewise, the lack of adequate attention, emphasis and support todoctrine development process is the main problem that affects the implementation ofthe doctrine process and the development of doctrines in the PAF. Priorities are notset in proper place in the formulation of doctrines among various PAF units. There is aslight attention, emphasis and support placed on the doctrine process by allconcerned. The lack of adequate funds and facilities as well as lack of adequateexpertise adversely affect the implementation of the PAF doctrine process and theconsequent development of useful and dynamic doctrines that could make the PAF anefficient and effective organization. Hence, there is a need to review and revise policyguidelines and procedures to improve PAF doctrine process and the development of

doctrines in the PAF. Among others, the establishment of a PAF Doctrine Center andan intensified doctrine awareness programneed to be implemented.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OSS, HPAF to initiate a review of the HPAF SOP Nr 03, Subject: PAF DoctrineProcess, with objective of revising the current approach to doctrine development. Thereview should focus on mechanisms to improve the process such as incorporatingprovisions on educating the force on doctrines and ensuring that these doctrines arebeing applied. The process should not end with the publication of the doctrine. Theend state should be a dynamic, coherent and systematized intellectual process andnot just a bureaucratic compliance. A doctrine development strategy should beformulated along with the revision of the SOP.

2. OSS, HPAF to prepare a Letter Directive to be signed by the CG, PAFaddressed to all PAF units and offices requiring all personnel to be fully aware ofexisting PAF doctrines, to make use of these doctrines as guides to all operations andactivities, and to continuously develop these existing doctrines and formulate newones when necessary. In line with this, all units and offices will be required toprogram funds for doctrine development. Doctrine development topics must beincluded in the agenda of regular meetings and conferences at all levels. TroopInformation and Education Program (TI & E) should include the dissemination ofdissemination of doctrines and must emphasize the importance of doctrines in theefficiency and effectiveness of the organization. The subject of doctrine developmentshould be included and be emphasized in all career courses and trainings. All unitsand offices shall be required to comply with the PAF Letter Directive dated 05 April2001, on the submission of a monthly Doctrines Development and ImplementationReport.

3. OSS, HPAF to conduct a comprehensive study on the establishment of a PAFDoctrine Center that will function as its operating arm in doctrines development. Theon-going effort of the Air Education and Training Command (AETC) to establish an AirPower Institute (API) could be a starting point. The doctrine center should be aseparate unit under the direct control of the CG, PAF and under the functionalsupervision of the Director, OSS. It must have a robust means of both generating andevaluating air power concepts from the constantly changing experience-theory-technology base. This requirement implies the involvement of many more qualifiedpersonnel than the limited number at the OSS or those people at the PAF units andoffices who handle bureaucratic doctrinal chores as an additional duty. It must alsobe suitably equipped as a research and analysis center. Its location should be in aserene environment, as every step in the process of doctrine development requiresquiet, concentrated study and attention over prolonged periods. The doctrine centershall become the repository of all PAF operating manuals, policies and procedures,and after operation reports from all PAF units and offices.

4. A-8 in coordination with A-1 to program masteral and other advance learningon the broad and specific streams to a core of personnel projected to be assignedwith the proposed Doctrine Center or to be designated as Doctrine Officer. Broaddoctrine education and training could include one or combination of the following:

a. Strategic Planning Course

b. Masters in Operations Research

c. Military History

d. Masters in Public Administration

e. Masters in Business Administration

Among others, the specialist stream for doctrine development may includeHuman Resource Development, Logistics Management, Military Technology, ProjectManagement and Technology Management. These personnel shall be primarilyresponsible for doctrine development of the Philippine Air Force.

5. OSS, HPAF to prepare a comprehensive program for intensified doctrineawareness campaign in the PAF. This may include the production of Video CDpresentations of the PAF Air Power Manual, PAF Basic Doctrine and the PAFOperational, Tactical Doctrines, and the National Military Strategy. Personnel of theOSS/Interim Doctrine Center shall develop a schedule and conduct the lectures andpresentations up to the Wing level.

6. A-1 in coordination with OSS to spot, recruit and develop qualified civilianresearchers and writers. Networking with educational institutions and researchcenters would facilitate this effort. There are nine available slots for civilianemployees at OSS, HPAF

Reassessing the Philippine Air Force:

A Doctrinal PerspectiveBy Major Noel L. Patajo PAF

LT GEN BENJAMIN P DEFENSOR JR, AFP, Commanding General, PAF, statedthe essence of the Air Force Anniversary through the lens of doctrine of air power. Hesaid, several of the world’s great Air Forces, including the US Air Force, gained theirindependence from surface forces in order to move effectively and carry out the so-called independent missions-the most being strategic attack. General Defensoradded that the PAF was organized as an “Air Defense Air Force” after World War II,whose mission is to conduct prompt and sustained air defense mission in the defenseof the Philippines.

Since it became an independent Major Service, the formative years of the PAFbegan as the whole world also began to realign into bi-polar community. Within theArmed Forces of the Philippines, the PAF represents the revolutionized science ofwar-military air power. For a developing country, the Philippines adopted theconventional air force organization patterned after the modification of the Americanlessons learned during the war. For half a century, the PAF existed in a paradigm of aconventional air force yet utilized as a support unit to a constabulary force, that is theAFP. The AFP, the PAF in particular, are essentially defense essentials of ademocratic country against the communists. Currently, the AFP is still mandated bylaw to defend the national territory against foreign invaders and the PAF as theprimary air defense unit tasked to meet the enemy as far as possible away from thePhilippine territory.

Traditionally, anniversaries allow the unit to conduct organizational review ofits achievements and set directions for the future. Countless time, the PAF coinedphrases and motto to encapsulate the ideals of the past year and chart its future.This essay, however, intends to look into the Air Force past from the doctrinalperspective and in the process argue that the PAF is not a pure conventional airforce-good for air defense against invaders but as a constabulary air force-relevant tothe emerging need of the changing security environment. The essay maybe asuggestion to operationalize the First Force Strategy.

Air Corps

The first Filipino military pilot, LT Leoncio Malinao, flew the JN-4 over thefields of Pasay and Cavite in 1920 thus heralding the birth of the Filipino airman.1 Bythe end of that year, another 25 military pilots led by Lt Porfirio E. Zablan willgraduate from the Philippines first aviation school-Curtiss Aeroplane & MotorCorporation. On January 1, 1935 the Philippine Legislature passed Act 4194 formallycreating an aviation unit for the Philippine Constabulary that was tasked to assist the

Philippine Constabulary in maintaining peace and order and the government inperforming such civilian work as customs duty and aerial pest control.

Later in 1935, the Philippine Constabulary Air Corps (PCAC) with its twowings-tactical and service was placed under the jurisdiction of the Philippine ArmyAir Corp (PAAC). During the World War II, General Douglas McArthur inducted thePAAC into the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) and turned overfourteen P-26 Peashooters and three B-10 bombers.2 The Japanese began its attackof the Philippines with planes and the PAAC proved its mettle against odds. The airaction over Batangas proved to be the only recorded air-to-air combat experience ofthe Filipino airman. The defeat of the Filipino airmen and the destruction of theUSAFFE air corps paved the way for the wholesale defeat of the ground defenders.

“Air Defense Air Force”

The Second World War proved that the Air Force is capable of completelyindependent action in its own element and far beyond the range of land and seaforces.3 Consequently, the military thought after the world war favored the strategicstrike option that an air force offered. Corollary, the early air power theorist ideathat control of the air is a requirement to be achieved before any further operation inall mediums can start created an air force organization that favors the fighter unit-pursuit unit according to Gen Billy Mitchell, over other air force elements.

For the PAF, the 5th Fighter Wing became the lead unit of the PAF. Since then,the quality of the air assets in the 5th Fighter Wing became the barometer of thequality of the whole PAF. The air defense mission of the 5th Fighter Wing along withthe radar and warning control became the vital cogs of the Philippine Air DefenseSystems. In turn, the quality of the air defense system determines the ability of theAFP to conduct a respectable defense of the national territory if the proposition thatwhoever controls the air controls the surface will be true.

“Close Air Support Air Force”

Since the end of the cold war between the United States and the former SovietUnion and their respective satellite states, more ethnic conflicts have erupted andengulfed countries than ever before the Philippines has been no exception to ethnicstrife. The Christians and Moros in Mindanao have been at odds, sometimes at eachother’s throats, for centuries.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines considers the Mindanao conflict as a lowlevel conflict – hostile acts that are deliberately limited in scale or confinedgeographically. Specifically, in accordance with modern lexicon of warfare, it is lowintensify conflict and sometimes called revolutionary or guerilla warfare. It is uniquethat it directly targets the political – social structure of the country rather than itsArmed Forces.

“Close Air Support Air Force” is about air power employment in low intensityconflict. Broadly, it may be viewed as air power application by a small air force in

support of the surface forces against insurgents and or conventional formations offorces.

Aerial fire support for friendly surface forces has always been well understoodin the AFP, with Army and Navy commanders recognizing the significance of such airsupport. The broad AFP concept for internal security operations is known as "LambatBitag" operations series - Filipino words literally meaning Net and Snare involve theprominent role of air elements as well as surface forces.

In the land environment, the air roles are Close Air Support (CAS) andBattlefield Air Interdiction (BAI). CAS involves air attacks against the rebels incontact with AFP forces. BAI involves air action against rebel forces (including supplylines) which are in a position to directly affect the outcome of the land battle butwhich are not in contact with friendly land forces. BAI aims to isolate the rebels inthe battlefield.

Combat Air Support operations play a major role in achieving immediatecontrol over tactical objectives. Terrain barriers reinforce the need for air support.Primarily the PAF tactical wings conduct combat air support operations. Moreover,then Composite Air Support Forces (CASAFs) and now renamed Tactical OperationGroup (TOG) in the deployment areas in coordination with deployed ground combatforces are tasked to perform air support operations.

“Conventional Air Force”

The conventional air force advocated so far adheres to the air power structurerecommended in the PAF Air Power Manual. Despite claims that the PAF lacks thedoctrinal depth, the existing PAF organization, structure, doctrine and thoughts pointto a balance Air Force. For brevity, the air power structure contains the air strategy –overall employment plan for air forces in war. The final air strategy product is thecombination of technology, manpower and doctrine.

The PAF also uses the concurrent campaigns such as air strike (strategic airforce), control of the air (air defense air force), and air support (close air support airforce). All three campaigns interlock to form the platform on which the Air Force (airpower) is based. Air operations, on the other hand, are integrated employment of airpower to achieve a specific campaign objective. There are many related air roles orcapabilities that an air force requires to exercise fully the potential of air power. Asmall air force like the PAF will generally not have the capability to exercise all theroles. It is strongly advocated that despite some of the non-mandatory air rolesstated in the generic air power structure, the PAF should strive to have the capacityto perform such air roles when needed and part of ensuring it can is by having acomprehensive basic air doctrine.

“Constabulary Air Force”

As stated earlier, the Philippine Constabulary Air Corps (PCAC) was intendedto perform support roles for peace and order operations. If we examine the PAFhistory, since 1947, the PAF has been performing air support roles to theconstabulary role of the AFP. The threat of invasion, according to present planners,will be very remote and that internal security operations will be the focus for theyears to come. As such, the “constabulary air force” will be revisited rather than the

“conventional air force”. With such assessment, the PAF through LtGen Defensorcorrectly adopted the “First Force” Strategy: Force Projection, InformationAdvantage, Rapid Response and Mobility, Strategic Impact, Tactical Synergy, ForceGeneration and support, Organizational brilliance, Research and applied innovation,Control of stations and Empowered quality workforce.

The “constabulary air force” proposed herein is forwarded as part ofoperationalizing the aforementioned First Force Strategy. The framework for the“constabulary air force” contains the following sets of technologies: intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; advanced command, control,communication, computer, and intelligence tools; and precision strike munitions. Inreference to the air power structure, the figure will show the model for the“constabulary air force”

Figure 1 “Constabulary Air Force” Framework

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) in the law enforcementmode, air operations will have the synergy of machines and technology with thehuman component. The air power strengths of speed allows the Air Force to be in thevicinity of security concern first ahead of ground troops, its range coupled with speedallows the PAF to cover far wider area in shorter time. The Maritime Surveillanceafforded by Long Range Patrol Aircraft will also deal with EEZ concern as well astransnational crimes threats.

Command, Control, Communication and Information (C3I) The PAF advocatesfreedom of action from the surface forces. This will be difficult to achieved with thepresent technology available at the moment. At most, the PAF will be providinginformation to surface forces that still possess the “permanence” the aircraft do nothave. Wholesale, this part allows the PAF to provide the Commanders essentialknowledge. In essence, the PAF will the core means to harness knowledge since ithas no limiting boundaries and it can serve as the link between ground and othersurface forces. With affordable technology, information will be communicated to theproper command and control facility to generate knowledge essential for the decisionmakers.

Precision Munitions the most appreciated role of the PAF is its ability toprovide the lethality needed by surface forces. When synergy is present and properdecisions are made to enforce laws by force, suitable for organized armed resistancesuch as organized crime, kidnap for ransom groups, other lawless element precisionmunitions delivered by the PAF can prepare the condition of the conflict areafavorable for the surface force. Precision munitions will allow the PAF to engagetargets without much worry for collateral damage to civilians and non-combatants.

The Way Ahead

The AFP is currently reviewing its basic doctrine-with it, the Major Servicesare also reviewing their basic doctrine. For a long time, the AFP has been organizedas a conventional force mandated by law for territorial defense. The concerns of theAFP for several decades concern the communist movement and secessionism andlately organized crime groups like the Pentagon and Abu Sayyaf. The President hadtasked the AFP to look into its doctrine and perhaps the AFP by accepting the factthat the bulk of its concern is constabulary in character, the proper doctrine shouldbe semi-conventional AFP that can shift its organization and force structure toconventional nature while continuously performing “constabulary” role.

The Air Force, on the other hand, should seek to achieve the ability to winwars by air power alone – more relevant in the current nexus of security and lawenforcement will be to achieve “constabulary” effectiveness through its air power.The small air force, to be relevant, should be able to strike when needed withlethality and precision if the information it relayed became essential knowledge forthe decision makers.

THE AIR DEFENSE COMMANDERMAJOR GENERAL NEMESIO M SIGAYA O-5658 is a

distinguished graduate of the Aviation Cadet Program Class 1970Afrom the Philippine Air Force Flying School. An energetic “fighterjock”, he flew the jets of Basa Air Base as a pilot trainee, elementleader, flight instructor and flight commander, among others,aside from also flying the Hueys of the Philippine Air Force.

GEN SIGAYA is a graduate of different courses both localand abroad. He has the distinction of being one of the six Filipinopilots who were trained to fly the F-8H Crusader in Dallas, Texas,USA. He took up his Masters in National Security Administration atthe National Defense College of the Philippines.

GEN SIGAYA has held various key positions. What paved his way to hispresent designation as the Commander, Air Defense Command was his previousassignment as the 530th CTW Commander during the campaign against the MILF andthe ABUSAYYAF in 2000 where the role of the Air Force during this campaign waspivotal in the victory of the AFP.

Q As the Commander of the Air Defense Command, what do you think is the roleof your unit at the present time?

A As the “Defenders of the Philippine Skies” and our nation’s first line ofdefense, the mission of the Air Defense Command is to defend, secure and protect theterritory of the Republic of the Philippines. Our mission and functions are specific,whether it is today or tomorrow. We are mandated to provide active air defense;conduct strategic strikes against enemy forces and installations; conduct combat airpatrol over Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Kalayaan Island Group (KIG); provideair surveillance, air warning, aircraft control, communications network in support ofPAF Air Defense System; strategically deploy ground base air defense against enemyair attack; provide air support to combat forces in maritime environment; monitor airand surface traffic on territorial airspace, EEZ & KIG; and perform other functions asdirected by higher headquarters. Unless these mission and functions are changed, ourrole will still be the same.

To accomplish this mandated task of providing active air defense, thePhilippine Air Defense System (PADS) was established by the Air Defense Commandwith two functions namely: Air Defense and Air Space Control:

1) The Air Defense function provides tactical early warning ofhostile air activity, identify all air traffic in the Philippine Air Defense IdentificationZone (PADIZ), intercept unknown aircraft penetrating the PADIZ and engage anddestroy hostile aircraft as needed. The reactivation of the Air Defense Alert Center(ADAC) at Clark Air Base after 11 years of inactivity at Basa Air Base has put moreteeth to our claim of the first line of defense.

2) Airspace Control or Air Surveillance Management andControl encompasses the functions of detection, identification and classification,continuous tracking of airborne objects, control and management of friendly air

assets and intercept of unknown airborne object in assigned area of responsibility.With the approval of the Air Traffic Management Group (ATCG) replacing the DirectAir Support Force (DAFS), we foresee a better-professionalized service of our AirTraffic Controllers (ATC). We see well-trained ATC personnel who will be able toreally man our country’s civilian air traffic in case of strikes by ATO controllers.

Q Can you share with us your vision of your unit or the Air Force as a majorbranch of the Armed Forces of the Philippines?

A I am an optimist. I see a modernized Philippine Air Force, as well as the AirDefense Command. I am optimistic that we will expedite the procurement of themulti-role fighters and radars because we know that the key to the future is still thecontrol- absolute control of the air. Given the nature of the fighter and surface-to-airthreat environment now proliferating in the region, it is imperative that we maintainan AIR FORCE capable of meeting these treats.

The first and most important role for an air force is control of the air. Withcontrol of the air, all other combat tasks whether on the ground or in the air, can beexpected to go much smoother. I foresee important transformation in our Air ForceOrganization depending on what is required by our national interest and nationalpriority.

The overall organization development of the Philippine Air Force will put moreparticular emphasis on key principles of joint operations and interoperabilityalong this line- Command and Control have to be well defined at GHQ down to thelower units. We should continue to seek new and innovative application toincrease our defense capability in the context of constraint of resource outlook.We will rely more on high level of competence and professionalism of the menand women of the PAF. I foresee a PAF that is able to respond quickly to short-notice tasks because of its preparedness. Our levels of readiness for key responseforces- like Air Defense, Intelligence, Maritime Surveillance, Maritime Patrol, andready- reactions ground forces should be increased as we continue to understandbetter the demands of the defense of the country in a short- warning conflict.

Q What can you say about the present capabilities of the Air Force in terms ofpreparedness in dealing with both external and internal threats of the country?

A Providing for the defense of the Philippines is no easy task. We have a verysmall and antiquated air defense forces. All of us know how many antiquated airassets we have at present. We should learn from our past and the lessons of warwhere Air Power plays an urban role in this defense.

The ability of the PAF to respond quickly to short-notice tasks rely much on itspreparedness. Our level of preparedness in external threats on some key responseforces like intelligence, air surveillance, maritime patrol, air defense and readyreaction ground forces needs to be properly addressed and defined.

A PAF with very few antiquated air defense assets and radars, dealing withexternal threats is a nightmare. Our preparedness in internal threats is adequate andis a force to reckon with. Our equipment is older that the pilots flying them but arestill reliable and could still be depended upon. However, the urgency to upgrade ourcapabilities is very relevant.

Q What is your concept of an ideal Air Defense System for the Philippines?

A An ideal Air Defense System for our country should be able to apply a strategyof defense-in-depth. Defense-in-depth requires coordinated, flexible and measuredapplication of defense capabilities. In conflict, our air defense system would be ableto terminate the conflict or threat promptly and prevent its escalation. Defense-in-depth exploits our geography by aiming to keep an adversary at arms length andmake any operations inside our PADIZ more difficult for an aggressor. The ability todefend our territory will greatly reduce the prospect of a successful attack in theRepublic of the Philippines.

This strategy of defense-in-depth will require an Air Force structure that can:

1) Provide timely warning on any changes in our environment anddevelopment in our region that may pose a threat to our country.

2) Exploit our strengths and overcome the vulnerabilities of ourgeography.

3) Prevent or quickly nullify threats vital to our airspace, resourcesand population center.

4) Sustain air operations over long distances and all weatherconditions.

Thus, the PAF should give emphasis on Air Defense System that is clearlyfocused on intelligence and surveillance operations using improved airbornesurveillance system and fixed mobile ground based radars and missiles. We musthave a highly mobile and capable air defense assets that can deal with hostilitiesquickly on our terms. We need to ensure that an adversary is left under nomisapprehension about our ability to strike any intruder of our airspace. Given thelimitation of our resources, our ideal Air Defense System must have selective useof advanced technology in areas such as command and control, informationtransfer and integration, all weather day/night air operations and ability tocontrol and concentrate forces rapidly and precisely.

The Air Defense System should be able to integrate civil and militarysurveillance and intelligence sources, including combat aircraft, mobile surface to airmissile systems with major surface combatant. Airborne Early Warning and Control(AEW & C) aircraft would considerably enhance our Air Defense.

Q With the passage of the AFP Modernization Law in 1996, what is the prospectimproving the capability development of the Philippine Air Force?

A The defense of the Republic of the Philippines is a national responsibility; it isour highest national priority. The Philippine Air Force is the First Line of Defense ofthe country. Therefore, the key priority for capability development should be focusedon the Air Force. The passage of the AFP Modernization Law of 1996 gave us hopethat our capabilities to protect our airspace be given priority. It is no longer anadvocacy but an urgent call to be addressed to.

Q How do you see your role, your unit and the Philippine Air Force in the future?

A The PAF should be modernized, highly competent and professional, able torespond to the new and more complex environment of the future. I see an AirForce more involved in the promotion of regional peace and stability. Along thisline, the Air Defense Command will play a vital role in the defense of our country.

Q Sir, can you relate to us your personal and professional circumstances, beforeachieving this rank and position? Your philosophy in life?

A If you do your job well, if you live a simple and honest life, if you do your jobprofessionally you will achieve what you want, cause in this world “nothing isimpossible” we can do it.

Ever since I took command of my first wing, I laid down my guiding principles,

which I wanted my men to follow. I coined the acronym “UNITY” which means:

U – for unwavering loyalty to the chain of command

N – networking

I – integrity, initiative, innovative

T – teamwork and transparency

Y – your morale and welfare (refers to our men)

“ NOTHING IS IMPOSSIBLE, WE CAN DO IT BECAUSE WE HAVE UNITY”

In Support of the Force Ahead of Its TimeThe Philippine Air Force, the dominant force in the Philippine skies, is

technically the first force in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Hence, it beingtagged as “First to respond…First to deliver…Proud to Serve…” is undoubtedlyjustifiable. It is in the light of the noblest visions of this Command that the Office ofSpecial Studies exerts all its efforts to provide the PAF the foresight for the defenseof the future skies, the hindsight from which lessons from the past are relearned, andthe extended arms ever ready to respond to the doctrinal concerns of the presenttime. Being a personal staff of the CG, PAF, the OSS functions to assist and advise theCG, PAF on the formulation of PAF doctrines and conduct of studies on air power,strategic and special projects of the Command.

In support of the force ahead of its time, OSS has initiated the formulation ofthe PAF Doctrines Development Matrix and has implemented the Presidential PolicyGuidance of creating the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Office in the PhilippineAir Force. These, among other accomplishments, have enhanced PAF’s vision of thefuture by drawing out the doctrines that will decide the outcome of future conflictsand by determining factors that will give the PAF the winning edge in fighting theseconflicts.

With the unfolding of the future warfare, the OSS has initiated the clearing ofthe skies of the future Philippine Air Force.

PAF DOCTRINES DEVELOPMENT

Ian MacFarling defined doctrine as the fundamental principles by whichmilitary forces guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is notimmutable and it needs to be regularly reviewed in the light of developments inhistory, theory and technology. If it is not regularly compared with these changes,doctrine can become dogma and is of little value to the people who must use it.

The AFP Modernization Act, RA 7898, recognizes the importance of doctrinesand the need for continuous review, formulation, evaluation, and validation to guidethe actions of the members of the AFP in performance of their mandated missionsand in support of the national objectives towards peace, stability and development inthe country.

The PAF has never taken this undertaking lightly. In its intention to maintainits efficiency in rendering service to the people, one of its concerns is to have sounddoctrines guiding its personnel. Prior to its publication, a doctrine has to undergoseveral phases of research and formulation, test and evaluation, and validation andrevision before it is submitted for CG, PAF’s approval. The process must becontinuous due to the changing technology, policies, organizational set-up, and otheraspects affecting its effectiveness and efficiency. The bodies concerned indeliberating PAF doctrines are the PAF Doctrines Study Group (PDSG) headed by theDirector, OSS and PAF Doctrines Board (PDB) headed by the PAF Vice Commander.

Just recently, OSS sponsored the PAF Doctrines Family Conference and WorkshopCY- 2002, which was participated by the Director for Operations of the FunctionalCommands, the Commanding Officer of Air Power Institute, Doctrine Officers of

different PAF units, and representatives from GHQ and other branches of service.It was purposely held to layout a solid foundation of the PAF doctrinesdevelopment program consistent with the PAF Modernization Program for theeffective and efficient development of the respective doctrines of the PAFFunctional Commands. The objectives of the said conference and workshop are torevitalize networking among doctrine officers, to layout plans for a strategicdoctrine development program for PAF, and to enhance the awareness andupdate on doctrine development in the AFP. The key inputs of the workshops arethe AFP Modernization Program, Existing AFP Defense Policies, CG, PAF FirstForce Strategy and SOP #03.

The approved outcome of the conference and workshop were distributed tothe Functional Commands of the PAF to guide them in their units’ doctrinedevelopment. Copies and pertinent output will be forwarded to the Air PowerInstitute (API), which is envisioned to be the PAF research center and tasked todevelop the PAF Doctrines.

One significant output of the PAF Doctrines Family Conference and Workshopis the PAF Doctrine Development Matrix, which aims to encourage the maximumparticipation of different PAF units in the formulation of different operational andtactical doctrines. The matrix is based on the AFP Modernization Program, of whichDoctrine Development is one of its pillars. Presently, it serves as the basis for thedoctrine development and programming of the staff concerned together with theother requirements in the PAF.

ACTIVATION OF RMA BRANCH

As has been always said, change is the only thing constant in this world; whatis essential today may not matter tomorrow. Even in the conduct of warfare, changesare inevitable when new executions of military operations are introduced due to newtechnologies, doctrines, and concepts. This is termed as Revolution in Military Affairs,which according to Andrew Marshall, is a major change in the nature of warfarebrought about by the innovative application of new technologies which whencombined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational andorganizational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of militaryoperations.

Based on the Presidential Policy Guidance during the 66th AFP Anniversary on21 December 2001 to create RMA Division under the Office of Strategic and SpecialStudies (OSSS) at GHQ and within its equivalent units under the Major Services, theRMA Branch was activated in the Philippine Air Force under the Office of SpecialStudies, HPAF.

Figure 1. The new Organizational Chart of OSS

The RMA Branch is envisioned to undertake researches and studies on themajor changes in the nature of warfare as influenced by new technologies, doctrines,and operational and organizational concepts. It will also undertake research anddevelopment to optimize the efficiency and effectiveness of the utilization of thepresent capabilities of the PAF and to determine the right technology for the PAF.Furthermore, Information Technology will be extensively exploited to study relevantconcepts, methods, principles, techniques and technologies applicable in the conductof PAF operations.

The recent change in the organizational set-up of the OSS is not the first time.The advent of developments in the military environment and the demand for aresponding PAF supported by sound doctrines triggered these changes, changes thatwill keep the PAF at par with the other Air Forces in spite of our technological setback.

REFERENCES:

After Activity Report on the PAF Doctrines Family Conference and Workshop CY 2002,OSS, HPAF. Col Villamor Air Base, Pasay City

Master Plan CY 2002, OSS, HPAF. Col Villamor Air Base, Pasay City

UMD CY 2002, OSS, HPAF. Col Villamor Air Base, Pasay City