air power and the fight for khe sanh

8/7/2019 Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh

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and terrorize many areas of the coun-tryside." The enemy also could masstroops, as he had in 1967 just southof the demilitarized zone, in numbersthat were "formidable in a local sense."These concentrations were by no meansdecisive, and they offered opportuni-ties for "careful exploitation of theenemy's vulnerability and applicationof our superior firepower and mobil-ity." So declared the official MilitaryAssistance Command year-end reviewof the war, which predicted that "ourgains in 1967 in South Vietnam" oughtto be increased many-fold in 1968." 2

Vei, Khe Sanh, and Cam Lo to meetHighway 1, South Vietnam's mainnorth-south artery, near the town ofDong Ha at the conflux of the CuaViet and Quang Tri Rivers. Khe Sanhwas one of several major bases alongHighway 9 south of the demilitarizedzone. Two of the others; the RockPile-named for a jagged hill nearby-and Camp Carroll, lay to the north-east, some 20 to 25 kilometers fromthe combat base at Khe Sanh, andfigured in its defense. North of thevillage of Lang Vei, which lay astrideHighway 9 roughly half the road dis-tance from Khe Sanh to the Laotianfrontier, U.S. Army Special Forces hadestablished a camp for a Civilian Ir-regular Defense Group composedmainly of mountain tribesmen nativeto the region. The highway, however,followed a circuitous route that for along stretch paralleled the border, sothat straight line distances were about3.3 kilometers from Lang Vei to the

The BattlegroundThe North Vietnamese buildup de-tected by U .S. intelligence seemeddirected at the Khe Sanh combat baselocated roughly halfway between the16th and 17th parallels, north latitude,in northwestern South Vietnam. (See

Map, p. 6). The base lay withinstriking distance of not one but twoenemy sanctuaries-or partial sanc-tuaries since American bombs hadfallen on both-Laos, just 16 kilo-meters* due west, and the demilitarizedzone, within 25 kilometers to the northat its nearest point. Geographically,Khe Sanh lay in Quang Tri, northern-most of South Vietnam's provinces.Militarily and administratively, it waswithin I Corps which encompassed thefive northern provinces of Quang Tri,Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin,and Quang Ngai.3

The Khe Sanh combat base, some450 meters above sea level, stood on aplateau due north of a village thatbore the same name. A road linkedthe base to Highway 9 which extendedeastward from beyond the Laotianborder through the villages of Lang

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u.s. Marines patrol a hill near the RockPile (in background), November 1966

Laotian boundary and 8 kilometersfrom Lang Vei to Khe Sanh.North of Khe Sanh flowed theRao Quan River, a tributary of theQuang Tri, which provided water forthe base but was scarcely a defensivebarrier. South of this stream and westof the plateau on which the combatbase stood were five important hills.Identified by their height in meters,they were from east to west Hills 558,861A, 861, 881 North, and 881 South.Across the river and directly north ofthe base loomed Hills 950 and 1015.*Beyond them was a succession of hillsand valleys that were forested or cov-ered by dense undergrowth and whichoffered excellent concealment for NorthVietnamese troops and supply convoysmoving into South Vietnam by way ofeither Laos or the demilitarized zone.

It was to impede this infiltrationthat U .S. troops first moved into theKhe Sanh area. In 1962, Army SpecialForces, the Green Berets, began usingthe plateau between the Rao Quan andHighway 9 as a camp for a CivilianIrregular Defense Group. Khe Sanhwas one of a network of border campsthat served primarily to gather intelli-gence for operations in the remoteareas of South Vietnam. For some 50months, Khe Sanh remained a preserveof the Green Berets whose activitiessufficiently annoyed the enemy to gringdown a 120-mm mortar barrage inJanuary 1966. Some 9 months later, inOctober 1966, a Marine battalion dugin on the plateau; in January 1967 the* For detailed map, see page 24.

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the runway seemed responsible, chan-neling warm moist air from the low-lands onto the plateau where it en-countered cooler air, became chilled,and created fog.8

Principal Commands andCommandersSuch was the Khe Sanh battle-field upon which tens of thousands ofAmericans, South Vietnamese, andNorth Vietnamese were destined to

fight. Operational control of the Amer-ican forces committed there, and of allUnited States forces engaged in theVietnam war, originated with Presi-dent Lyndon B. Johnson, Commanderin Chief of the nation's armed forces.He exercised his authority throughSecretary of Defense Robert S. Mc-Namara, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, USA,Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp, Commanderin Chief, Pacific Command, and Gen-eral Westmoreland, head of the MilitaryAssistance Command in Vietnam.

placements that would require a mini-mum of lumber-which had to bedelivered by air-for shoring. Theconsistency of the earth proved anadvantage to the Leathernecks, eventhough it also would simplify NorthVietnamese efforts at tunneling, a fav-orite enemy technique in previoussieges. Conditions within the mainperimeter were not duplicated on thenearby hills which had shallow layersof a more porous soil.7

Before long, the runway was againable to accommodate C-123's and C-130's, but nevertheless pilots boundfor Khe Sanh frequently found thefield unusable, primarily because ofbad weather. During the early monthsof the year, clouds and fog were preva-lent throughout the northwestern cor-ner of Quang Tri province. The air-field, however, seemed particularlybedeviled by fog. On many a morningwhen visibility was excellent from thehilltops surrounding the base, the run-way remained shrouded in mist untilsun and breeze combined to disperseit. A deep ravine at the east end of

President Johnson and Secretary McNamara were briefed on Khe Sanh, 29 January1968, by General Wheeler (standing). Also present (I. to r.): Gen. H. K. Johnson, USAjAdm. i. H. Moorer, USN; Gen. J. P. McConnell, USAF; and Gen. L. F. Chapman,USMC


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In January 1968 the individualmembers of the Joint Chiefs of Staffwere Gen. Harold K. Johnson, ArmyChief of Staff, Adm. Thomas H.Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations,Gen. Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., com-mandant of the Marine Corps, andGen. John P. McConnell, Air ForceChief of Staff.

As the principal commander inthe Pacific at the time of the siegeof Khe Sanh, Admiral Sharp was re-sponsible for the planning and execu-tion of operations in sppport of theRepublic of Vietnam. His responsibilityencompassed selective attacks againsttargets in North Vietnam as well asoperations against hostile forces in theSouth. The ultimate American goalswere to protect the people of South

Vietnam, eliminate the threat to gov-ernmental stability posed by Viet Congguerrillas and North Vietnameseregulars, and prepare South Vietna-mese forces to assume the burden oftheir own national defense.

In carrying out his responsibilities,Admiral Sharp worked through hisservice component commanders andsubordinate unified commanders. Theformer were: Gen. John D. Ryan,Commander in Chief, Pacific AirForces; Gen. Dwight E. Beach, Com-mander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces,Pacific; and Adm. John J. Hyland,Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.General Westmoreland headed the uni-fied, or multiservice, command inSouth Vietnam, which functioned asan operational headquarters despite theword " Assistance" in its title.oBesides serving as the seniorAmerican commander in Vietnam,Westmore1and had to work closely withthe head of the American diplomaticmission in Saigon. That is, militarydecisions could not be made withouttaking into account U.S political,economic, and social progr .tms, which

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Admiral Hyland (I.) was Commander inChief, Pacific Fleet. General Beach (r.)commanded U.S. Army Forces, Pacific

were under the aegis of the U.S. Am-bassador. Because of the close rela-tionship of civil and military matters,frequent consultation between soldierand diplomat was essential. "That thisarrangement worked smoothly" was, inWestmoreland's opinion, "a tribute tothe succession of prominent and tal-ented ambassadors" appointed to thepost. During 1968 the incumbent wasEllsworth Bunker .10

Initially, the embassy had beendirectly responsible for American sup-port of Saigon's pacification campaignto extend its authority throughoutSouth Vietnam. General Westmorelandwas given increasing authority overthis aspect of the war until, in May1967, the embassy's pacification officeand the equivalent section of West-morel and's staff combined to form asingle agency within the assistancecommand. Robert W. Komer, a formermember of President Johnson's staff,assumed the rank of Ambassador andbecame Westmoreland's Deputy forCivil Operations and Revolutionary De-velopment Support. The Americancontribution to the pacification effortthus became an exclusively military

responsibility. "We are," wrote Gen-eral Westmoreland, "now organized topursue a 'one war' strategy ." 11The U .S. Military AssistanceCommand embraced several subordi-nate organizations, among them Sev-

enth Air Force, Westmoreland's AirForce component command. Gen.William W. Momyer headed the Sev-enth Air Force and also served asWestmoreland's Deputy for Air Oper-ations. From his headquarters at TanSon Nhut Air Base near Saigon, Mom-yer directed Air Force operations overthe southernmost portion of NorthVietnam and all of South Vietnam, inaccordance with Westmoreland's di-rectives. Targets deeper in North Viet-nam were attacked by Air Force planesbased in Thailand or Navy aircraftassigned to carriers of Task Force 77.

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General Westmoreland (I.) and Ambassa-dor Ellsworth Bunker (r.) greet GeneralWheeler at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, uponhis arrival in February 1968

cally, the C-130 squadrons returned totheir home bases to be replaced byother aircraft on temporary assign-ment.

There were several reasons for thispolicy. Bases in Vietnam were crowdedand could not easily accommodate theC-130 ground crews, administrators,and equipment that would have beenpart of a permanent change of sta-tion. Since the C-130's flew missionsthroughout the western Pacific, AirForce planners preferred to adjust thenumber of aircraft in Southeast Asiaaccording to existing needs rather thanrisk the possibility that planes per-manently assigned there might be idleat a time when other C-130's werebeing overworked in, for example,South Korea. Another possible motivefor temporary assignment was to avoidhaving to transfer housekeeping unitsto an area where a troop ceiling was ineffect.13

Operational control of the Air Forcefighter-bombers in Thailand wasvested in Momyer, who employedthem as directed by Admiral Sharpthrough General Ryan's headquartersin Hawaii. Admiral Sharp directedTask Force 77's strikes against theNorth, operating through his Navycomponent commander, Admiral Hy-land.12

A component of Seventh AirForce of vital importance to KheSanh's defenders was the 834th AirDivision, commanded by Brig. Gen.Burl W. McLaughlin. When he as-sumed command of the air division inN ovember 1967, he found himself con-fronted by one of those organizationalpeculiarities so common to the war inSoutheast Asia. Although the C-7 andC-123 squadrons serving in SouthVietnam were assigned to the 834thAir Division, the C-130's that didmost of the heavy hauling were ontemporary duty from the 315th AirDivision and based in the Philippines,Okinawa, Taiwan, or Japan. Periodi-

Among the Vietnam war's dead-liest weapons was the Boeing B-52Stratofortress, a massive 8-engine jetdesigned originally for dropping nuclearbombs from high altitudes. Assigned tothe 3d Air Division with headquartersat Andersen Air Force Base, Guam,the planes operated from that island,from U Tapao Air Base in Thailand,and occasionally from Kadena Air Baseon Okinawa. Maj. Gen. Selmon W.Wells commanded the air division dur-ing the siege of Khe Sanh.

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Generals Ryan (I.) and Momyer are shownin a C-130 airborne battlefield commandand control center, monitoring a 1967tactical strike. Momyer pinned on hisfourth star at year's end.

Khe Sanh campaign was Vo NguyenGiap, a one-time school teacher inHanoi. Beginning in 1944 with 34men, two revolvers, 17 modern rifles,14 flintlocks, and a machine gun, hebuilt the Viet Minh army and a dec-ade later led it to victory over theFrench at Dien Bien Phu. WhetherGiap was physically present and ac-tively in command of North vietna-mese forces at Khe Sanh is unknown.Some U .S. officials, General Momyeramong them, believed he had entrustedthe attack to a subordinate. Whicheverthe case, as Defense Minister in theHanoi government, Giap exercised theultimate authority over North Viet-namese operations at Khe Sanh andelsewhere.1G

The Enemy MassesGeneral Westmoreland believedthe North Vietnamese would attackKhe Sanh. Its nearness to enemy sanc-tuaries and infiltration routes made it

an inviting target, and American in-te1ligence was able to verify a hostile

The Strategic Air Command wasresponsible for providing B-52 strikesas requested by General Westmoreland.Besides the bombers themselves, B-52operations required the deployment ofHoeing KC-135 aerial tankers andground radio relay stations. The com-mand also assigned liaison officers toSeventh Air Force headquarters tocoordinate the bombings with otheroperations. "During the Khe Sahnemergency," reported General West-moreland, "1 slept in my headquartersnext to the combat operations center"and, after consulting intelligence andoperations officers, "personally decidedwhere the B-52's would strike" 14

Despite an influx of Army unitsinto I Corps during 1967, operationalresponsibility rested with LieutenantGeneral Cushman, commander of theIII Marine Amphibious Force. Theequivalent of a corps commander uil-der General Westmoreland, he had athis disposal the Ist and 3d MarineDivisions and the I st Marine AircraftWing. Maj. Gen. Rathvon McCallTompkins commanded the 3d MarineDivision and provided the reinforcedregiment, the 26th Marines led by CoI.David E. Lownds, that defended KheSanh. All three officers had fought theJapanese in the Pacific in World WarII, and Lownds had also seen action inKorea.15

The North Vietnamese general be-lieved to be in personal charge of the13


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mounted 90-mm guns, 10 Ontos anti-tank vehicles--each consisting of six106-mm recoilless rifles mounted on atracked chassis-and four "dusters"mounting either two 40-mm cannon orfour .50-caliber machine guns. Theselast, designed almost a generation be-fore as antiaircraft weapons, wereprized for their murderous effectagainst ground troops.27

The burden of keeping the Presi-dent informed about what the enemycould do was carried by W. W. Rostow,Mr. Johnson's Special Assistant forNational Security Affairs. To accom-plish this, Dr. Rostow, a well-knowneconomic historian, set up an informalintelligence evaluation section consistingof himself, an Air Force general, andtwo civilians. The officer was Brig. Gen.Robert N. Ginsburgh, a World War IIArmy artillery officer and HarvardPh.D. who had transferred to the AirForce in 1949 and was serving asliaison agent between the Joint Chiefsof Staff and the White House. One ofthe civilians was Art McCafferty, chiefof the White House situation room;the other was a secretary, Mary LeeChaternuck, who screened the avail-able translations of captured docu-ments.

President Johnson Takes a HandThe mounting threat to Khe Sanhcaught the eye of President Johnson.As early as mid-December 1967, hehad become aware that an enemy of-fensive was in the making and thata likely objective was Khe Sanh. There-after, he took a personal interest inthe adequacy of American measures toprotect the endangered base.28


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Massing his forces against Khe Sanh,General Giap (r.) tried unsuccessfully torepeat his Dien Bien Phu victory

The Viet Minh buildup was com-pleted by 13 March 1954, when Gen-eral Giap inaugurated the siege with asudden and devastating artillery bar-rage. After 2 days, the Viet Minh heldboth outposts that were to have pro-tected the airfield.

French headquarters at Hanoiresponded by scraping together asmany transports as it could-includingtwin-engine Fairchild Flying Boxcarsflown by American civilians-andtrying to parachute supplies, equipment,and reinforcements* to sustain the gar-rison. Air strikes, however, failed tosuppress murderous fire from Com-munist antiaircraft guns that were ap-pearing all around the besieged valley.These weapons prevented the trans-ports from flying straight, level, andlow to parachute their loads into thegradually contracting drop zone. TheFrench fought valiantly but the VietMinh tightened the noose around thegarrison. On 7 May 1954, having ex-pended their last ammunition, theFrench were overrun by the enemyforce. Incomplete records indicate thatFrench casualties during the battletotaled about 5,000 dead, with some10,000 troops, half of them wounded,taken prisoner. Giap's losses were anestimated 23,000.

Comparison with Khe SanhThe decision to defend Khe Sanhwas made with Dien Bien Phu in mindand the defenses of the Marine base

were strengthened accordingly. com-parisons of the status of the Marinesat Khe Sanh and the plight of theFrench at Dien Bien Phu revealed thatthe Americans enjoyed a marked super-iority in two essential r:ategories-fire-power and logistic support.To augment the firepower of theDien Bien Phu garrison, the Frenchwere able to muster fewer than 200planes on a daily basis. These included

such diverse types as Morane 500light observation planes, compactGrumman F8F fighters, and 4-engineConsolidated Privateer patrol craftthat had evolved from the wartimeLiberator bomber .In defense of Khe Sanh, theAmericans could draw upon a South-east Asia armada of 2,000 planes and3,300 helicopters. These aircraft,moreover, benefited from reliable com-munications, and many of them hadthe ability to destroy a target con-

* A cumulative total of 16,500 de-fenders served at Dien Bien Phu duringthe siege.

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cealed by fog or darkness using in-ternal equipment-as in the case of theMarine and Navy Grumman A-6's-or by relying on radar direction pro-vided by control facilities on theground. The ability of Army gunnersat the Rock Pile and Camp Carroll tosupport the Marines with 175-mmbarrages promised the Khe Sanh garri-son a source of assistance that couldnot be affected by bombardments of theMarine base itself.

The Marine advantage in logisti-cal matters was even more strikingthan the difference in firepower. Radarenabled transports to parachute cargoaccurately in any weather, a kind ofversatility unknown at Dien Bien Phu.Cargo extraction equipment developedby the U .S. Air Force also permittedthe delivery of items too bulky to dropby parachute. In addition, the trans-ports flying to Khe Sanh in 1968 werevastly improved over those of 14 yearsearlier. The most efficient of the AirForce transports was the C-130,credited with a maximum payload inexcess of 20 tons, which actually de-livered an average of some 13 tonsper sortie during the battle. Also avail-able were Fairchild C-123's, consideredcapable of carrying almost 8 tons, andde Havilland C- 7 A's built to deliver3 tons of cargo. Like the C-130, bothof these types operated at about 60percent of rated capacity. By com-

parison, in 1954 the French flew asmall number of Fairchild Packets,twin-engine transports with a 7-tonmaximum payload. They had reliedprimarily, however, upon old DouglasC-47's originally designed to carry 3tons, the same maximum load as thesmallest and least used of the AirForce transports available to the KheSanh garrison.

These advantages seemed to out-weigh by far the problems the Amer-icans could expect to encounter. Likethe French, they would have difficultysilencing the cleverly camouflagedantiaircraft guns certain to be encoun-tered at Khe Sanh. These weaponscould take a heavy toll of transportsmaking deliveries to the Marine base.In addition, the weather would de-finitely be a handicap.5

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Why Khe Sanh?Khe Sanh was a valuable basefor allied ground operations against

infiltration routes entering South Viet-nam and, as events would prove, forattacks on North Vietnamese supplydumps located across the Loatianborder. By January 1968, the basehad evolved into a well organizeddefensive position with a runwaythat could accommodate the largestAmerican tactical transports. More-over, the base had become a symbolof U.S. determination to see the warthrough. Intelligence officers were con-vinced that the enemy, aware of thissymbolism, would lay siege to the baseand attempt to overwhelm its defend-ers in the same way he had crushedthe French and their auxiliaries atDien Bien Phu. Westmoreland's staffrecognized that an attack on Khe Sanhmight be part of some even moreambitious scheme-combined perhapswith a thrust from Laos through the AShau Valley toward Hue or Da Nang

to isolate a portion of I Corps-butthey were certain that Giap, whetherdirecting operations from Hanoi oractually in command on the battlefield,fully intended to repeat along Highway9 the kind of triumph he won 14 yearsbefore in the wilderness far to thenorth.6

Yet the possibility existed that bymassing troops against Khe Sanh,General Giap or his field commandermight be putting a pistol to his head.Ever since 1966, General Westmore-land had been fighting what amountedto a war of attrition. He used his re-markably mobile forces to strike sud-denly, attempting to engage the enemyso that America's awesome firepower,everything from M-16 rifles to 8-52bombers, could be brought to bear.His objective was not to capturehill or ridge line, but to destroyenemy soldiers and hostile units.7

Since Giap would have to concen-trate large numbers of troops in north-western South Vietnam, where there


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agreement that had ended the war be-tween the French and Viet Minh, andfinally "to limit the flow or substan-tially increase the cost of infiltratingmen and supplies into South Vietnam."

The goal of the United States infighting in the South, bombing theN orth, and pursuing other militarymeasures was the negotiation of anhonorable peace that would enable thenations of Southeast Asia to concen-trate upon economic and social needs.The President believed that successfulmilitary operations in Southeast Asiawould convince Ho Chi Minh, theleader of North Vietnam, that peacewas preferable to fighting. Mr. Johnsonalso maintained that American successwould serve as "a concrete demonstra-tion that aggression across intema-tional frontiers or demarcation linesis no longer an acceptable means ofpolitical change." 9

were comparatively few civilians toinhibit the use of American air andartillery, Westmoreland felt free tomake unstinting use of bombs andshells. Once this firepower had shat-tered the North Vietnamese divisionsthe highly mobile U.S. ground troopscould exploit the situation. The Amer-icans, it seemed, might well be able todo at Khe Sanh what the French hadtried and failed to do at Dien BienPhu.8The war in South Vietnam, whereintensive firepower was used againstenemy forces, was but one part of aU.S. strategy that included bombing ofselected targets in North Vietnam. InMarch 1967, in a speech before theTennessee legislature, President John-son listed three objectives of the bomb-ing campaign. They were "to back ourfighting men by denying the enemy asanctuary," to "exact a penalty" forNorth Vietnam's violations of the 1954

Ho Chi Minh, NorthVietnamese leader

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Can Tho, one of many cities struck bythe Viet Cong during the Tet offensive

the Perfume River--except for theSouth Vietnamese 1st Division's head-quarters. South of the river, the advis-ory compound of the U.S. MilitaryAssistance Command held out as dida few other pockets of resistance.

Help soon arrived: Elements oftwo U.S. Marine battalions reachedthe city on the 31st, punched throughto the assistance command compound,and crossed the river, only to fall backwhen they could not breach the Cita-del's massive walls. The Americans,reinforced to regimental strength, con-centrated on clearing the area south ofthe river. In carrying out this task,which they completed on 9 February,the Marines sought to minimize civil-ian casualties and destruction of prop-erty by using tear gas and employingdirect fire weapons that could be aimedprecisely. The fighting south of theriver, the Marines reported, resultedin 1,053 enemy dead.

In the old city, Vietnamese forcesdid most of the fighting, though aMarine battalion assisted for a time. On24 February, the flag of the Republicof Vietnam was raised over the bat-tered Citadel. Mopping up-killing orcapturing the North Vietnamese troopswho held out among the rubble-lasted until 2 March.

Recapturing Hue required 13 Viet-namese and three Marine battalions.Five U.S. Army battalions assisted bydisrupting the enemy's routes of supplyand reinforcement. Clouds and rainprevented air power from being ofmuch assistance during the fighting.16

The extent of the enemy's Tet of-fensive-that it was carried out on sovast a scale-had not been anticipated.According to General Ginsburgh, whowas working with Dr. Rostow in theWhite House situation room, "Weprobably did not pay sufficient cre-dence to. ..the element of theircampaign which talked about an up-rising in the cities. We paid less atten-tion ...than we should have probablybecause it didn't look like such a cam-paign would be effective."17

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republic's cities, reporter Robert Shap-len found destruction and despairworse than he had encountered duringWorld War II or the Korean conflict.Nearly 4,000 civilians had perished inthe fighting there, 2,800 of them exe-cuted by the North Vietnamese andViet Cong, and 90,000 persons re-quired food or shelter. The Commun-ists, moreover, had looted the citytreasury, sabotaged public utilities, andmade away with important records."Not only is Hue's spirit broken,"Shaplen wrote, .'it is a bureaucraticmess."

The administrative tangle was soonunsnarled, however, and the destitute

Precisely what the enemy had inmind as the goal of the Tet offensivewas not clear. The general uprising inwhich the North Vietnamese seem tohave placed their hopes, proved moremyth than reality. However, the no-tion that a society or social class canbe maneuvered into a situation whererevolution is inevitable has been com-mon to both European and AsianCommunism. After their successfulrevolution in 1917, the victorious Bol-sheviks had also expected a spontanf';-ous and successful uprising of theGerman proletariat. Similarly, the Viet-namese Communists may have reallybelieved the South Vietnamese peoplewere on the verge of revolt.18

Whatever Hanoi's actual hopes andbeliefs. the Tet Offensive failed to trig-ger a general uprising. It did, however,disrupt South Vietnamese society, de-stroying thousands of homes, andcreating 470,000 frightened refugeeswhose needs for food and shelterthreatened to inundate the Saigon gov-ernment. At Hue, hardest hit of the

Aerial view of Hue shows the six"square-ki lometer Citadel surrounded by three-meter-thick walls. Shiny aluminum roofsshow where dwellings were repaired orreplaced after the Tet offensive


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Lt. Cot. H. M. Dallman, USAF, landed atKhe Sanh with a load of ammunitionwhile the base was under enemy fire

Maj. Gerold 0. Johnson, set a coursefor Da Nang where the plane landedsafely.23

Although the shelling of Khe Sanhand its outposts continued, 3 dayselapsed before the enemy again probedMarine defenses. During the interim,he struck for a second time at the LangVei Special Forces camp. Some 10months earlier, in May 1967, enemysoldiers disguised as South vietnam-ese irregulars had managed to enterthe camp. Though they failed to cap-ture it. the episode did persuade theGreen Berets that the existing camp-site was ill chosen. To obtain betterfields of observation and fire, SpecialForces headquarters at Da Nang de-cided to rebuild the camp on Highway9 about 1,000 meters west of the oldsite. From this new location, SouthVietnamese and Montagnards could

continue to patrol the Laos-South viet-nam border.24Actually patrols were few duringthe late months of 1967. Reports ofextensive infiltration across the XePone River, which here separates Laosfrom South Vietnam, convinced Capt.Frank C. Willoughby, commander ofthe Lang Vei Special Forces detach-ment, that first priority should go toimproving the camp's defenses. Thewisdom of this decision was confirmedwhen refugees from the Laotian bat-talion driven from Ban Houaysan camestraggling into Lang Vei.At the beginning of February, thecamp boasted excellent defenses againstinfantry attack and some protectionagainst armor, which the enemy hadused at Ban Houaysan. The camp con-sisted of five mutually supporting posi-tions, each protected by barbed wire,trip flares, and claymore mines-thelast being electrically fired weapons,mounted on standards, which spewedfragments horizontally when triggered

by the defenders. The camp had itsown 4.2-inch, 81-mm, and 60-mmmortars and could call for fire supportfrom Marine batteries at Khe Sanhand from Army artillery farther to theeast. Antitank defenses consisted oftwo 106-mm recoilless rifles, four 57-mm recoilless weapons which were oflittle value against stoutly armored ve-hicles, and 100 M-72 light antitankassault weapons-disposable, preloadedrocket launchers that in effect wereI-shot bazookas-which proved lessthan reliable in combat.

During the enemy buildup thatpreceded the siege of Khe Sanh, Gen-eral Westmoreland's headquartersasked III Marine Amphibious Forceand the 5th Special Forces Group toreview their plans for both fire supportand reinforcement of Lang Vei. AtKhe Sanh Colonel Lownds ke'pt tworifle companies in readiness to movewestward to the Special Forces camp

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A Nayy A-1 Skyraider is positioned forlaunch from the attack carrier USS CoralSea to fly combat missions oyer Vietnammade a normal landing, but beforeworried onlookers could relax, the roll-ing Lockheed burst into flame andveered from the runway. Pilot and co-pilot escaped through an overheadhatch, suffering only minor burns, andfirefighters rescued at least six passen-gers or crewmen who were more seri-ously hurt. Six others burned todeath.32

some 500 meters west of the battalion'smain position. Despite inroads byNorth Vietnamese foot soldiers, theMarines clung to part of the outpost,and a counterattack after sunrise on 9February routed the enemy. In thisaction, the last major ground attackfor some 2 week:;, the Marines lost 21killed but claimed at least 124 NorthVietnamese dead.31

Besides continuing to pummel KheSanh's ground forces with mortars,rockets, and artillery, the enemy madelife exceedingly dangerous for thecrews of cargo planes bringing insupplies. On 11 February, a MarineKC-130F, loaded with flexible blad-ders containing jet fuel for use inturbine-powered Marine helicopters,was hit by enemy fire as it approachedthe runway. Fuel appeared to bestreaming from the plane as the pilot

This was the most spectacular anddeadliest in a series of incidents inwhich transports, either landing or un-loading, were hit by gunfire or shellfragments, Through 10 February, sevenAir Force C-130's had thus beendamaged, though none were de-stroyed.3:1

The first of the two Herculestransports hit on 11 February was im-mobilized but escaped destruction be-cause of the bravery and skill displayedby the pilot, Capt. Edwin Jenks, hiscrew, a detachment of airmen sta-tioned at Khe Sanh, and a mechanicflown to the Marine base from DaNang. Captain Jenks' aircraft came

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Jenks realized that he could not waitfor a second hydraulic component to beshipped to Khe Sanh, since each hourspent on the ground multiplied thechances that the $2.5 million aircraftwould be destroyed. The pilot there-fore decided to try flying the C-130 toDa N ang, after the mechanic hadmade emergency repairs using toolsand materials available at Khe Sanh.

The flight to Da Nang would be adangerous task since a loss of fluidfrom the patched hydraulic system at acritical moment could mean death forall on board. Near noon on 13 Feb-ruary the repairs were finished. Jenksand his crew boarded the plane for atakeoff attempt. They succeeded incoaxing the craft into the air, takingadvantage of wretched w~ather--a 50-foot ceiling and horizontal visibilitylimited to 1,000 feet-to frustrateenemy gun crews. When the C-130 wassafely on the ground at Da Nang,mechanics counted 242 holes in thebattered transport.34By this time General Momyerhad become concerned about the dan-ger to which the C-130's were beingexposed in landing at Khe Sanh. Therugged, powerful Lockheeds were, ashe later termed them, a "make or breakresource" too valuable to risk unneces-sarily. From 12 February through theend of March, Air Force C-130'slanded at the Marine base on only fourdays, though they continued to delivercargo by parachute or by means ofextraction systems. Fairchild C-123K's,

under fire as soon as it had begununloading. Shell fragments severed ahydraulic line in the tail section, andthe leaking fluid caught fire. CaptainJenks and his crewmen escaped fromthe crippled plane and, acting on theinstructions of Lt. Col. William R.Smith, senior Air Force officer at thebase, took cover from the shells thatcontinued to fall within the Marineperimeter .

SSgt. Robert Mahaffy, a memberof Lieutenant Colonel Smith's Air Forcedetachment, aided by another airman,used a fire extinguisher .to put out theflames. However, the airman holdingthe nozzle was overcome by the chemi-cal fumes and let it slip from his grasp.The hose flopped about, sprayingchemicals in the sergeant's face andblinding him. Smith led Mahaffy tothe nearby Marine aid station where amember of the Navy medical corpswashed out his eyes. Neither of the twomen suffered permanent injury.

Once the flames were out and theinjured cared for, Lieutenant ColonelSmith moved Captain Jenks and theothers from the C-130 to an under-ground bunker where he distributedamong them the detachment's last fewcans of beer.Next, Smith radioed Da Nang foran experienced mechanic and a "rud-der package" to replace the damagedportion of the transport's hydraulicsystem. The mechanic arrived but theparts somehow went astray. Captain

Lt. Col. w. R. Smith,USAF, in front ofKhe Sanh's baseoperations andcontrol tower


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mentators to compare, somewhat be-latedly, the situation at Khe Sanh withconditions at Dien Bien Phu. Lifemagazine, for example, listed threeevents that had "cast doubt on the use-fulness of our military might as aninstrument of our Asian policies. "They were North Korea's capture ofthe U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo on 23January 1968, the Tet offensive, andthe "looming bloodbath at KheSanb." ~o

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., historianand onetime member of President JohnF. Kennedy's staff, wrote an open let-ter urging that: "Whatever we do, wemust not re-enact Dien Bien Phu." Mr.Schlesinger's letter, printed in theWashington Post on 22 March, dis-missed as folly the notion that anAmerican-held Khe S!'oh could haveany effect on infiltration as long as theMarines were immobilized there. Afternoting that air power had thus far

View of Khe Sanh from the cockpit of a C-130 transport delivering supplies to U.S.Marines


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feet, or skimmed low over the airstripto use a cargo extraction system.Enemy gunners would even fire throughsmokescreens into the flight path theythought an approaching cargo craftmight follow. American strike aircrafthelped reduce the volume and accur-acy of flak but could not silence theguns completely. One C-130 navigator,who served for more than a year inSouth Vietnam, stated that the "ground-to-air fire was. ..heavier and closerto the aircraft during a landing ap-proach at Khe Sanh than at any othertime and place" during his tour.4

Even before the North Vietnam-ese encirclement, landing a C-130 atKhe Sanh was no easy task. In goodweather pilots sometimes found it dif-ficult to judge distance when their finalapproach carried them over the deepravine at the east end of the runway.In bad weather, Khe Sanh became sur-prisingly hard to locate. As late asDecember 1967, airborne radar hadpicked up a fairly good return fromstructures built on the surface of theplateau, but as the likelihood of aprolonged b~ttle increased, the Ma-rines burrowed into the soil, and theecho became progressively poorer.5

Fortunately, pilots could rely forassistance on a ground controlled apeproach radar installed at Khe Sanh,operated by a MariQe air traffic controlunit. Another Marine radar, a TPQ-IOset, was available in case of emergency.An air support radar team normallyused the TPQ-10 to direct air strikes.

Landing under FireWhen the fight for Khe Sanh be-gan, Air Force transports and Marineaerial tankers were able to land to

unload their passengers and cargo. Fora short time after destruction of theammunition dump on 21 January, dam-age to the runway closed the field toplanes larger than C-123's, but the C-l30's soon were back on the job. Asthe tempo of combat picked up, land-ings became increasingly hazardousuntil the Marines were calling thetransports "mortar magnets" and"rocket bait" because they unfailinglyattracted hostile fire as they taxied tothe unloading area.6Even after the aircraft had landedsafely, men and planes remained vul-nerable to small arms and shell fire.Crews of C-123K's enjoyed a slightadvantage over those who flew thelarger C-130's. The lighter Fairchildcould lose enough momentum within1,400 feet of touching down near theeastern threshold of the runway to per-mit a 90-degree turn. Seldom did oneof these planes miss the first of twoturnoffs that led to the unloading area,

General McLaughlin, commander, 834thAir Division. He won his second star inAugust 1968

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a narrow metal-surfaced lane parallelto the main runway and located near itswestern terminus.

The Lockheeds, however, requireda roll of almost 2,000 feet whichmeant that these Hercules transportsfrequently screeched past both turn-otIs, had to continue to the west endof the runway, risk hits from enemysmall arms while turning around, andtaxi back to one of the exits. Thus, theenemy had repeated opportunities todestroy the C-130's.7The transport crews used a tech-nique called "speed otIloading" to re-duce the time they spent on the groundat Khe Sanh. The key piece of equip-ment was a pair of 7-foot metal run-ners fitted to the ramp at the rear ofthe cargo compartment. Within thatcompartment, the individually bundledloads were attached to pallets, measur-ing 108 by 88 inches, which rested

upon metal rollers built into the floor.Two parallel guide rails kept the plat-forms centered and, on C-130's, con-

tained a locking system that held theloads firmly in place. The C-123's hadno such locking device; its pallets weresecured by chains.After a transport landed, theload master could attach the metal run-ners and lower the ramp as the pilottaxied toward the unloading area. AtKhe Sanh, however, the procedure wasdifferent. Usually a member of the AirForce detachment at the base selecteda pair of runners stored beside the

taxiway and attached them to the plane.This was necessary because the run-ners were in short supply and mightnot be carried by every transport land-ing at the base.In the unloading area. the load-master unlocked the pallets or releasedthe chains so that the forward motionof the aircraft-aided if necessary bya vigorous shove-sent the pallets tothe rear of the cargo compartment out

the open hatch, and down the ramp tothe ground. Unloading a transport withforklifts could take between 5 and 1044


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Being struck by a bullet or shellfragment was not the only hazardawaiting aircraft landing at Khe Sanh.Shells bursting on the runway leftshards from their casings and jaggedchunks of metal planking that couldpierce the tires of taxiing planes.Among the most important work doneby Air Force personnel at Khe Sanhwas changing tires, often at consider-able risk, so that the transports couldget back into the air before shells orrockets converted them to junk. Someindication of the rigors of landing atthe base may be gleaned from the factthat during the 10-week siege the lifeexpectancy of C-130 tires in usethroughout Vietnam declined from 30sorties to 18}0

The dangers encountered on theground by the C-130's, the newest andlargest Air Force tactical transports,persuaded General Momyer to forbidlanding the valuable planes at KheSanh, a ban that remained in forcefrom 12 through 25 February. Duringthis period, 58 C-123K sorties landedalmost 300 tons of cargo, and C- 7 A'slanded eight times to deliver 13 tons.On 25 February, the C-130's resumedlanding, but only until the end of themonth. This 4-day burst of activityconsisted of 14 C-130 landings whichdeposited slightly more than 160 tonsin the Khe Sanh unloading area. Dur-ing March, C-123K's were the onlycargo craft to touch down at the Ma-rine base. The C-130's, however, con-tinued to deliver cargo either by para-chute or using an extraction system.11

minutes; speed offloading could befinished in as little as half a minute.Both C-123's and C-130's used thesame pallets, made of aluminum andplywood for a standard cargo handlingsystem. The cargo hold in the C-123was too narrow to accommodate the108-inch width of the pauel. Since theplane could handle a width of 88

inches, the platforms were simplyturned and loaded sideways.8Khe Sanh Marines found the lightand sturdy platforms ideal for use in

roofing bunkers. Because incomingplanes seldom had time to reclaim theempty pallets, a large number of theexpensive platforms, worth roughly$350 each, accumulated near the taxi-way. The Air Force contingent at thebase tried, with the help of Marineguards, to prevent their loss but theprevailing fog made this extremely dif-ficult. Visibility often was so limitedthat individuals could spirit away theplatforms with practically no likelihoodof being detected.9

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loads extracted from the C-130's. Lt.Col. William R. Smith, USAF, mis-sion commander at this time, went tothe heart of the matter when he asked :Why save the runway and lose KheSanh? The defenders agreed to usethe extraction system and, as theyhad feared, within 4 weeks the heavily-loaded pallets were playing havoc withthe runway. Nearly every load gougedout portions of the surface plankingand bent the surviving metal so badlythat it could not be straightened. Thedamage was confined, however, to asingle 700-foot section at the far west-ern end of the runway and did notpose a threat to the use of the air-strip.32

The Air Force employed a low altitudeparachute extraction system (above) anda ground proximity extraction system(lower r.) to resupply Khe Sanh

Low altitude parachute extractionscontinued throughout the siege, withthe last two sorties being flown on 2April. By that time, however, the 834thAir Division had introduced a sup-plementary method of cargo extrac-tion. The change was necessary be-cause of a lack of equipment for lowaltitude parachute extractions. The elec-trical gear used to fire the squib thatreleased the reefing line was criticallyscarce and there was a less acute short-age of the special steel pallets.3:1

To supplement or, if necessary, re-place the parachute extraction system,General McLaughlin and his advisersrecommended the ground proximity ex-traction system, in which cargo wasyanked from a rolling aircraft whena hook extending from the cargo com-partment engaged an arrester cablerigged across the runway .34

In 1966, the Air Force and Armyhad retired an experimental groundproximity extraction system and or-dered replacement equipment that hadbeen redesigned to eliminate the defectsthat had appeared during testing. Be-cause the low altitude parachute extrac-tion system seemed more versatile, the

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of the plane. As soon as the pallet wasgone, the pilot accelerated and tookOff.37However, an unexpected problemarose on this first mission. The Ma-rines who installed the arrester mecha-nism had drawn fire and were drivento cover before finishing the job. As aresult, the load-though probablyweighing less than the usual 25,000pounds-uprooted the moorings thatheld the cable in place. Luckily, theextraction equipment did its job priorto being itself extracted.38

new gear was never used. Fortunately,10 sets were located, including one inthe hands of the manufacturer, andflown to the western Pacific.35The Army logistic specialists whowould rig the loads to be extractedwere less than enthusiastic about theassignment. No manuals existed on howthe system should function but theArmy agreed to do what it could usingstandard pallets and following what-ever rigging procedures might emanatefrom General McLaughlin's headquar-ters. A message from the Office of theCommanding General. U.S. Army.

Vietnam, warned the 834th Air Di-vision that "the U .S. Army cannotassume/share responsibility for the per-formance of the system to include dam-age to aircraft, ground personnel andfacilities, or delivered materiel."36After a brief training session atNaha Air Base, Okinawa, the C-130crews were ready to try the extractionequipment just installed at Khe Sanh.On 30 March, a C-130 approached the

airstrip, touched down, and rolledswiftly along the runway. A boom, towhich a hook was attached, extendedfrom a loaded pallet through the open-ing at the rear of the cargo compart-ment. The huge transport rolled acrossan arresting cable which then rose toengage the hook and pull the load out

In a congested area like the mainbase, the ground proximity extractionsystem had definite advantages overlow altitude parachute extraction. Withthe hook and cable arrangement, theload was always under control. The pal-let could not escape from the cargocompartment unless the hook was en-gaged, and once the load was on theground the arrester equipment checkedits movement. This method, then, wassafer than parachute extraction becausethere was no way to release the pallettoo late or too soon, and no parachuteto malfunction. Also, the cargo cameto rest each time in almost the sameplace, thus eliminating even the remotepossibility of widespread damage tothe runway surface.39


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An airman of thecombat controlteam at Khe Sanhcatches 40 winksbetween dutiesat the beleagueredoutpost

platforms used in the container de-livery system. Marine helicopters thenflew the parachutes out of Khe Sanh,but until space was available in out-bound transports, the platforms hadto be stored near the taxiway. Accord-ing to an Air Force officer, these ply-wood pallets were fairly safe from thelarcenous impulses of Khe Sanh's de-fenders. Like the platforms used withparachute extraction gear, they wereawkward to carry Off.46

Even though they were not re-sponsible for clearing the drop zone,airmen frequently ventured into it inquest of what Lieutenant Colonel Daviscalled "supplemental rations or 'good-ies' " that were attached to bundlesdelivered by parachute. If no airmanwas present to remove these packages,the contents went to the Marines in-stead of to the intended recipients.Rather than have his men continue torisk death or injury in the drop zone,he recommended that luxuries of thiskind be delivered by the C-123K's thatlanded atop the plateau and were un-loaded by the aerial port mobilityteam.47

units had gathered supplies dumpedalong the beach and moved them tostorage areas. The airmen, who werecommanded by an officer, were mem-bers of an aerial port mobility teamconsisting of 7 to 14 enlisted men.The mobility team helped plan out-bound loads, prepared manifests forcargo and passengers departing fromKhe Sanh, and assisted in unloadingand recovering cargo.44

On 11 March, North Vietnameseforward observers began directing fireinto the drop zone whenever Marineretrieval teams moved onto it. Lieu-tenant Colonel Davis, who assumed thepost of mission commander shortlyafter the enemy adopted these tactics,declared that the drop zone had be-come "probably the most hazardousarea at Khe Sanh." 45

Nevertheless, members of Com-pany A, 3d Shore Party Battalion, didmost of their work on that dangerousground. These Marines employed fork-lifts and mechanical mules to recoversupplies that landed in the drop zone.They also retrieved the parachutes and55


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2-seat trainer version of the Skyhawk,was in charge. He checked the weatheraround Khe Sanh and reported if theceiling permitted effective flak sup-pression. If the report was favorable,a dozen A-4's took off from Chu Lai,while 12 to 16 twin-rotor CH-46 heli-copters and their escort of UH-l gun-ships left Quang Tri City for Dong Hawhere the larger helicopters loadedthe cargo destined for the outposts.

The helicopters left Dortg Ha ona schedule that would bring them overtheir destination just about the timethe A-4 's had hit known and suspectedantiaircraft emplacements with bombs,napalm, and tear gas. Two A-4's laid asmoke screen to conceal the final ap-proach of the helicopters, during whichfour other Skyhawks again battered theNorth Vietnamese with cannon, bombs,and rockets. As the CH-46's, their loadsstowed in nets that swayed beneaththe fuselage, approached and departed,

the helicopter gunships stood ready torescue the crew of any that mightfall victim to enemy fire. Seldom wasthis necessary. for adequate escort dras-tically reduced CH-46 losses.52

At times. the weather had com-pletely isolated the outposts. Early inFebruary. Marines on Hill 881S wentwithout food for 3 days until the fogdissipated. Similarly Hill 950 wasswathed in clouds for 9 days duringwhich no helicopter could land. Themen exhausted their supply of waterand a patrol had to probe the enemy-infested wilderness to fill canteens at astream. Fortunately. the weather be-gan improving as the Super Gagglecommenced operating.53

A Marine helicopter heads for outpostson a resupply mission


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Although they made their greatestcontribution to the supply effort insustaining the outposts, Marine heli-copter pilots flew in and out of KheSanh throughout the battle. Theybrought in reinfofcements during thebuildup, delivered fragile items thatcould not be parachuted, and carriedaway the wounded, sometimes flyingthem to a hospital ship off the coast.54

Tour of duty over, U.S. Marines prepareto board an Air Force C-130 at Khe Sanh

The Task CompletedThe magnitude of the Khe Sanhairlift was staggering. The number ofsupply drops made there by 15 Marchexceeded the total for all of Vietnambefore that time. Between 21 Januaryand 8 April. 8.120 tons of cargo wereparachuted to the defenders in 601 in-dividual sorties by C-123's and C-130's.Lockheed C-130's landed 273 times,C-123's 179 times, and C-7's eighttimes to unload a grand total of 4,310tons of cargo and 2,676 passengers.Flown out of the base were 1,574 per-

sons, at least 306 of them wounded.Air Force C-130's took part in 15ground proximity extractions and 52low altitude parachute extractions.55

The men who planned and exe-cuted this impressive effort paid a priceboth in lives and in planes destroyed.Forty-four passengers and an Air Forcecrew of four perished in the 6 Marchcrash of the C-123 hit by ground fireas it neared Khe Sanh. Two otherC-123's fell victim to mortar firewhile on the ground at the combatbase, and eight planes of this typesustained varying degrees of battledamage during supply missions. Therewas, however, no further loss of lifeamong C-123 crews or passengers.None of the jealously-hoarded C-130'swas destroyed, but at least 18 incurreddanlage and two passengers were killedas they left their plane. The few C- 7'sthat participated emerged unscathed asdid their crews.56During the action, Marine helicop-ters transported 14,562 passengers and

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4,661 tons of cargo to the main baseand its satellite outposts. Losses amonghelicopters bound for the outpost linenumbered as many as three in a singleday until a deadlier escort was pro-vided. After the introduction of theSuper Gaggle, only two cargo-carryinghelicopters succumbed to hostile gun-ners. The most serious accident sufferedby Marine aviation at Khe Sanh was

the lO February crash of a KC-13Owhich killed six men.57These statistics, fragmentarythough they are, support two conclu-sions. First, Air Force cargo planessustained the main base until troopswere available to open Highway 9.Second, Khe Sanh's outposts could nothave survived except for Marine heli-copters.

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T-28 (above) and Marine Corps A-6 (be-low) strike aircraft joined the fight atKhe Sanh

inland. Unfortunately, the weather wasso bad that visual strikes were possibleonly on an average of 3 days permonth during the first 3 months of theyear. Of the three, February was themost dismal, offering weather that Ad-miral Sharp characterized as the worstsince systematic bombing of North viet-nam began back in 1965.6

Naval aviators managed, however,to conduct successfulstrikes during Feb-ruary. One target was a radio and radarinstallation that controlled the Russian-built interceptors defending Haiphongand Hanoi. Carrier-based GrummanA-6's, with all-weather bombing equip-ment, shattered this link in the ene-my's defenses.7Despite attacks such as this one,the storms that shrouded the Northforced a reduction in the number ofNavy sorties dispatched there and re-leased planes and munitions for use indefense of Khe Sanh. As a result, dur-ing February Task Force 77 was ableto divert some 2,800 of its 3,672planned sorties-about 77 percent-against enemy targets in northern South

riant. But the Leatherneck system hadtwo main advantages: it engaged theplane after a comparatively short roll,thus reducing the chance of skiddingoff the wet pavement; and it could bereset in half a minute, rather than the10 minutes it was taking to disengageone aircraft and ready the Air Forceequipment to receive another. The M-21, therefore, was much better suitedto handling formations of F-4's whenthe planes had to land in rapid suc-cession.5

The Navy's air contribution atKhe Sanh reflected developments inNorth Vietnam. In January 1968 car-rier planes and Air. Force fighter-bombers were engaged in a campaignto isolate the port of Haiphong by sev-ering the transportation lines leading


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Khe Sanh in any but the worstweather.16In preparing to escort a supply

mission into Khe Sanh, planners firstdrew on their maps a line indicatingthe ground track of a cargo plane fro1t1the time that it dropped below 3,500feet above ground level until it regainedthat altitude after takeoff. On the ba-sis of this line, they then calculatedthe potential danger area, the terrainfrom which a 37-mm gun could hit aplane performing a particular mission-either landing, parachuting cargo, orusing an extraction system.A typical escort mission beganwhen the transpprt made rendezvouswith fighters and observation craft some18 miles from Khe Sanh. All the planeschecked in with an Air Force airbornecommand and control center which is-sued last-minute instructions. In theory,transports could proceed unescortedonly when clouds or fog denied the ene-my visual observation Qf the approaches

to the airfield. If visibility was good,they were to receive an escort eventhough it was necessary to wait forfighter protection. In actual practice,however, the senior Air Force officer onthe ground at Khe Sanh and the pilotof the incoming plane evaluated theprobable intensity of hostile fire anddecided whether or not to await anescort if none was on hand. Seldomdid the cargo planes postpone theirapproach.

If an escort was both necessaryand available, forward air controllerstook positions on each side of thetransport. Their job was to locate pre-viously uncharted gun positions, directfighter-bombers against them, and alsoto prevent the fighter escort from ac-cidentally bombing the Marines. Thefighters, which flew a racetrack patternaround the cargo craft, responded toinstructions radioed from the two for-ward air controllers and also attackedknown antiaircraft sites within rangeof the transport's flightpath. Thesestrikes, made with 20-mm cannon andfragmentation bombs, usually beganwhen the plane being escorted wasabout 1,500 feet above the ground}7

If neither fog nor clouds offeredconcealment, two fighters put downsmokescreens on both sides of the in-coming transport thrQughout the last3 miles of its approach. Flying at 480knots no more than 300 feet above theearth, each fighter carried four smokedispensers. This number provided amargin in case of malfunction, sincethree dispensers would create an ade-quate screeri.18

The approach of a transport wasnot the only occasion when antiaircraftsites came under attack. During thesiege of Khe Sanh, every identified 37-mm emplacement was repeatedly hituntil intelligence showed the gun tobe destroyed or abandoned. Weaponsof lesser size were attacked whenever

An A-4 Skyhawkaboard theUSS Coral Sea

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A USAF F-4 Phantomenroute to target

namese MiG's by bombing those air-fields that the short range enemy fight-ers would have had to use.21The Falconers

Air Force forward air controllers-tactical air controllers ( airborne) inMarine parlance-played a role simi-lar to that of the medieval huntsmanwho sighted his prey, removed the hoodfrom his trained falcon, and launchedit to make the kill. These controllerswere essential to the successful defenseof Khe Sanh. In general, tactical air-craft sent to assist the Marines re-ported initially to the airborne battle-field command and control centerwhich then assigned them to forwardair controllers on station over the base.Although more than one controller wasusually on hand, the volume of aerialtraffic WIlS such that flights of fightersoften had to wait their turn to attack.In these circumstances, the planes en-tered a holding pattern-which on oc-casion could extend as high as 35,000feet-and gradually descended as planeafter plane dropped its bombs.22

When the fight fQr Khe Sanh be-gan, four Air Force light observationplanes, were operating from the baseairfield. One was a Cessna 0-1, a sin-gle-engine, high-wing monoplane usedby both the Air Force and M,arine

they posed a threat to American air-craft. In all, more than 300 antiaircraftpositions were reported destroyed.19The introduction of radar-directedsurface-to-air missiles could have great-ly complicated the task of defendingKhe Sanh, but none of these weaponsappeared in the immediate vicinity ofthe base. In mid-January, four such mis-siles proved ineffectual against B-52'sflying over the demilitarized zone. Therewere no similar incidents around KheSanh, and no further missiles werespotted near the demarcation line untillate in May.20Enemy fighters might have inter-vened with deadly effect against thevital but vulnerable transports, a pos-sibility that American commanders keptalways in mind. When considered nec-

essary, cannon-equipped Air ForceF-4's that had bombed targets nearKhe Sanh remained in the area toprovide combat air patrol against anyincursion from the North. A fighterunit commander, who took part in thesemissions, claimed that the F-4's burnedso much fuel prior to dropping theirordnance that only one flight in sevencould furnish effective fighter cover.The practice of designating a combatair patrol, with no bombing assign-ment, was preferable. Carrier planeshelped meet the threat of North Viet-64


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troops, and from which direction at-tacking aircraft should make their runs.He then used a white phosphorousrocket or perhaps a smoke grenade tomark the target, and the strike com-menced.24

In addition to bad weather andhostile fire, forward air controllers alsohad to worry about friendly artillery.Careful coordination was necessary toavoid straying into the path of shellsfired from Camp Carroll, the Rockpile,or the Marine base itself.25Because of the Tet offensive and

the siege of Khe Sanh, air operationsbeyond South Vietnam's borders de-clined in relative importance. Pilotswho had been flying interdiction mis-sions outside the country were divertedto attack targets only a short distancefrom friendly positions.26When all went well, an air strikedirected by a forward air controllercould achieve spectacular destruction.One controller reported the existencewest of Khe Sanh of what appearedto be an ammuniti~n supply point forenemy artillery. He summoned fight-ers beneath an over~astto strafe, launchrockets, and drop napalm. and wasrewarded by the sight of hundreds ofsecondary explosions as crate4 roundsdetonated.21

Corps. The others were 0-2A's, alsohigh-wing monoplanes but constructedwith twin booms extending rearwardfrom the wings to the horizontal sta-bilizer. This planform, vaguely remi-niscent of the World War II LockheedP-38, permitted the mounting of twoengines, tractor and pusher, fore andaft of a stubby fuselage. All fourplanes sustained damage during theinitial bombardment but were flownto safety. Despite the departure of thelight aircraft, two Air Force officers,Majors Milton Hartenbower and Rich-ard Keskinen, remained behind toserve as air liaison officers in ColonelLownds' headquarters.23

In the best of weather, the for-ward air controller's job was difficultand dangerous. Flying through theclouds which had prevailed during theflight at Lang Vei, the controller hadto penetrate the overcast, which mightbe concealing a hilltop or ridge line,identify a target that could well beshooting at him, climb above the cloudcover, and lead the waiting fightersdownward through the murk.

Beneath the overcast, the control-ler radioed instructions to the attack-ing planes. He told them what the tar-get was-a bunker, perhaps, ortrenches-whether it was defended,where it lay in relation to friendly

Soviet-built37-mm anti.aircraftgun usedagainsttactical air-craft atKhe Sanh


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0-1's. A ceiling of 300 to 500 feetcomplicated the controllers' task ofguiding strike aircraft to worthwhiletargets and also restricted the jets toshallow approaches in which the pilotscould not bomb with the required ac-curacy. The failure of tactical aviationin this action led to the adoption ofCombat Skyspot as a means of puttingbombs on target regardless of the wea-ther.

the computer furnished the heading, al-titude, and airspeed that the planeshould maintain. As the craft ap-proached that point in the sky at whichits bombs would have to be releasedin order to hit the target, the operatoron the ground began a countdown.Course corrections and the actual sig-nal to release bombs were broadcastfrom the Skyspot van.3o

In the defense of Khe Sanh, Com-bat Skyspot provided remote controlfor attack planes, fighter-bombers, andB-52's. Because of the complexity inoperating a large number of planes inthe immediate vicinity of the base, de-lays and some confusion were inevit-able. On 24 February, for example, anF-4 flight commander realized just intime that he was being directed into anarea where Skyspot-controlled B-52'swere dropping their bombs from highaltitude. Other incidents had less poten-tial for disaster, but the Skyspot systemdid at times acquire control of moreaircraft than it could handle. A pilotmight be directed to a succession ofholding points only to end up, afterburning a great deal of fuel, exactlywhere he had started and with his fullload of ordnance st~ll on board. Some-times. an aviator Tan low on fuel beforehis. turn came and had to jettison hisbombs and return to base. These fail-ings, however, were outweighed athousandfold by the successful strikesthat Combat Skyspot made possible.31

Progenitor of Combat Skyspot wasa radar bomb scoring unit used by theStrategic Air Command to test theproficiency of bomber crews in mockraids staged against cities in the UnitedStates. Even before the A Shau defeat,tests conducted in Texas had sho~nthat the scoring unit could also con-trol strikes by fighters or bombers. Avan-mounted computer accepted suchfactors as altitude, wind velocity anddirection, aircraft speed, temperature,and ballistic traits of the ordnance car-ried. On the basis of this information,

The 0-1 (I.) was used by Forward AirControl!ers to mark targets. Below is aCombat Skyspot facility, used to directstrike aircraft to targets in Vietnam


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Lt. Gen. R. E. Cushman commanded theIII Marine Amphibious Force from hisheadquarters at Da Nang

with foreboding. Lt. Gen. Keith B. Mc-Cutcheon, USMC, a onetime directorof Marine aviation who later com-manded III Marine Amphibious Forcein Vietnam, stated that opposition to theappointment of an Air Force general asa single manager for tactical combataviation was based to a great extenton concern that "it would recreate theKorean War situation." Whereas Gen-eral Momyer endorsed the commandrelationship set up in Korea, Marineleaders remembered it as depriving theI st Marine Division, only Marineground force in actual combat, of con-trol over the aviation units organized,equipped, and trained to support it.Some Marines saw unified man-agement as a threat to the future aswell as a retreat into an unsatisfactorypast. They feared that any shift ofoperational control for the Vietnamwar could serve as a precedent forbreaking up the air-ground team. SinceLeatherneck ground commanders reliedupon Marine aviation much as they didupon artillery, loss of the air arm wouldrequire extensive changes in tactics,organization, and armament. Further-more, a breakup of the air-ground teamwould definitely affect the mission ofthe Marine Corps.6On 18 January, Admiral Sharpreceived word of General Westmore-land's intention to meet the emergencyin I Corps by imposing closer controlover Marine air power. The admiralreplied almost immediately, cautioningthe general against any change thatmight violate existing doctrine and trig-ger an interservice debate over roles

destroying the integrity of the Marineair-ground team. The Marines believed,however, that the close relationship be-tween air and ground could not existunless the unified team was controlledby Marines. The Air Force soughtefficiency by bringi.lg Marine squad-rons under centralized direction; theMarine Corps worked for the same goalby avoiding centralization under AirForce control. General Westmoreland,it appeared, was trying to reconcile theirreconcilable.4

The extent to which the MarineCorps and Air Force differed on cen-tralized control was reflected in theircontrasting attitudes toward the exer-cise of command during the KoreanWar. In Korea, the Fifth Air Force hadexercised operational control over Ma-rine air units. To General Momyer thisarrangement seemed logical and desir-able. "If the battle for Khe Sanh de-velops," he dectared, "it may be theevent to get the air responsibilitiesstraightened out as we had them inKorea and WWIl." 5

Centralized operational controlwas a prospect that Marines viewed69


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and missions. He declined to approve aradical alteration in the status of Ma-rine aviation in Vietnam and suggestedfurther discussion with General Cush-man and his staff. He did not, however,rule out future consideration of a for-mal proposal affecting operational con-trol of the Ist Marine Aircraft Wing.7

governed Marine-Air Force relationsthroughout most of the Khe Sanhbattle. In essence,the conferees agreedto link the Seventh Air Force and Ma-rine control networks, using an AirForce airborne battlefield commandand control center to achieve coordina-tion.The 22 January Agreement

Rather than insist on an immedi-ate transfer of operational control,General Westmoreland went ahead withan arrangement designed to improvecordination between Seventh Air Forceand the Marine wing. On 22 January,representatives of General Momyer'sheadquarters conferred with GeneralCushman and his staff and fashionedan agreement that, whatever its failings,

This airborne battlefield commandand control center consisted of a C-130 whose cargo compartment hadbeen fitted with an air conditioned cap-sule containing electronic equipmentcapable of storing information, display-ing data for controllers, and furnishingreliable communication with groundstations and other aircraft. The gearcrammed into the airborne commandand control center constituted a "cen-tral nervous system providing data foron-the-spot decisions in fluid tacticalsituations." 8

The Air Force conferees hadmaintained that this control center, be-sides ensuring the orderly and effectiveapplication of air power, could alsocoordinate aerial attacks with artillerybombardment and make certain that

Interior of a C-130 airborne battlefieldcommand and control center


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Maj Gen. No J. Anderson commanded the1st Marine Aircraft Wing during the de-fense of Khe Sanh

Anderson, commander of the Ist Ma-rine Aircraft Wing during the defenseof Khe Sanh, later described the com-pact as an acknowledgement that "closeair support of Marine ground forceswas a job to be accomplished by thespecialized members of the Marine air-ground team, while other air resourcestook on more distant targets.'. Thelocation of the target did playa rolein the 22 January agreement, with theMarines insisting on concentrating theiraerial firepower against the targetsclosest to Khe Sanh, but geographywas not the only concern in assigningtargets}l

Another key consideration wascontrol. The agreement represented aplan, however imperfect in practice, toexert the firmest control in those areaswhere the danger of accidentally bomb-ing friendly units was greatest. For thisreason, all strikes in the sector closestto Marine positions were to be clearedthrough the Khe Sanh fire support co-ordination center and directed byeither a Marine airborne tactical aircontroller or an Air Force forward aircontroller. Procedures also requiredthat the fire support cordination center

friendly bombs did not endanger theMarines below. To do all these jobs,however, the airborne command andcontrol center would have to be in-corporated in the control network thatoriginated in the Khe Sanh fire supportcoordination center .9The fire support coordination cen-ter, which resembled in purpose theinstallation housed in the convertedC-130's operating above the base, washeaded by Lieutenant Colonel Hen-nelly of the 1stBattalion, 13th Marines.Located within the fire support co-

ordination center were the fire directioncenter, which with the aid of a com-puter converted requests for artillerysupport into fire commands, and a di-rect air support center through whichrequests for air strikes reached the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing's tactical air di-rection center. Planes from this wingnormally flew the missions requestedby Marine units in the field. But whenit was fully committed, liaison teamsat the direct air support center couldcall upon Air Force or Navy aircraft todeliver the necessary attacks. The de-mands of Operation Niagara were suchthat before the battle ended, the KheSanh direct air support center, in con-junction with the airborne battlefieldcommand and control center, had ob-tained the assistance of planes from allservices, Army aviation included.l

The 22 Ianuary agreement alsoestablished rules for the coordinationof air strikes. Maj. Gen. Norman I.73


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similar interservice organization wasestablished at General Rosson's corps.The Marine divisions retained theirdirect air support centers as did the re-inforced regiment holding Khe Sanh.Planning for scheduled air strikesbegan at rifle battalion headquarters and

moved up the chain of command, withconsolidated target lists being preparedat regiment and division. Rosson's head-quarters submitted to III Marine Am-phibious Force a consolidated requestcovering its assigned Army and Marineunits, and Cushman's staff combinedthis list with ones prepared by unitsunder the direct control of the Da Nangheadquarters. The combined requeststhen went to Tan Son Nhut for ap-proval by the tactical air support ele-ment, which now included Marines inits operations and intelligence sections.FiQal stop for the combined I Corpstarget list was the Seventh Air Forcetactical air control center, where Marinerepresentatives also were stationed. Thisagency matched available units and ord-nance with selected targets and issuedappropriate operation orders, called"frag orders" because a rigid formatpermitted very sparse or fragmentarywording with no loss of meaning.21

The lst Marine Aircraft Wing no

General Momyer, Seventh Air Force com-mander, was appointed single com-mander for tactical combat aviation inall of South Vietnam. Above he is beingchecked out in the cockpit of an A-37at Tan Son Nhut

longer merely advised the Seventh AirForce tactical air control center of anyexcess sorties. It now reported its totalcapacity calculated on the basis of onesortie per day by each jet aircraft. DaNang forwarded this data to Tan SonNhut along with the compilation of re-quests for air sUpport.22Single management had to providefor immediate strikes to meet battle-field emergencies (see Chart p. 79).When a division or one of its compo-nents needed air support in an emerg-ency, its can for help went to a Marineor Air Force direct air support cen-ter which could divert any air-craft under orders to hit a targetwithin the division zone of action. Ifnothing was available, division turned

to corps which had similar authority inits area of operation. Should nothing beavailable in the five provinces that78


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COMUSMACV for Air should con-stitute a precedent for centralized con-trol of air operations under other com-bat conditions, or need pose a threatto the integrity of the Marine air/ground team." He observed that uniquecircumstances had spawned unifiedmanagement and declared that GeneralWestmoreland should .'revert to nor-mal command arrangements for IIIMAP when the tactical situation per-mits." 28

The Air Force and Marine Corpshad differed over the issue of unifiedmanagement but, when General West-moreland imposed his solution, theycooperated in carrying out his wishes."The system worked," declared GeneralMcCutcheon. "Both the Air Force andthe Marines saw to that. But the way itwas made to work evolved over aperiod of time, and a lot of it was dueto gentlemen's agreements between on-the-scene commanders." 30

Once the future of their air-groundteam seemed secure, some Marinestended to modify the harsh initial judg-ment of centralized management thathad been based upon operations atKhe Sanh. Writing in 1970, GeneralMcCutcheon conceded that "whenthree Army divisions were assigned toI Corps and interspersed between thetwo Marine divisions, a higher orderof coordination and cooperation wasrequired than before." Single manage-ment provided this and, in his opinion,was ,can overall improvement as far asMACV as a whole was concerned.'. 29

Khe Sanh radar equipment and thecontrol tower played a vital role duringthe battle for Khe Sanh


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Lt. Gen. Selmon W. Wells, USAF, com-mander of 3d Air Division based onGuam

cells, The interval could be an hour,90 minutes, or 2 hours.,4The arrival by 7 February of 26additional B-52's-a detachment sentto the far Pacific in reaction to NorthKorea's capture of the intelligence shipPueblo off Wonsan harbor-simplifiedthe task of providing a grand total of48 sorties per day. Fifteen of the bomb-ers landed at Kadena Air Base, Oki-nawa and brought to three-Guam,Thailand, and Okinawa-the areasfrom which Stratofortress strikes mightoriginate. On 12 February, the JointChiefs of Staff advised Admiral Sharpthat bombing missions against targetsin Southeast Asia could originate atKadena,5After only a day's Bugle Noteoperation, General Wells' headquart-ers proposed a major change, to pro-vide six B-52's every 3 hours ratherthan three every 90 minutes, Adoptionof this proposal would permit evenmore devastating target coverage. Also,fewer 'launches would mean greaterease in scheduling maintenance, a lesshectic pace for mechanics, and a betteroppol'tunity to photograph and analyzebombing results, The change went intoeffect on 25 February.6

Close SupportA routine B-52 mission flown

from U Tapao, Thailand, on 12 No-vember 1967 contributed quite by acci-dent to an important tactical innova-tion. Nine B-52's took off from UTapao to hit troop concentrations androcket batteries in the vicinity of ConThien, but one of the planes failed toobserve the 3-kilometer safety zoneestablished to keep bombs from fallingaccidentally among friendly troops.This particular plane-there is doubtas to which one-dropped i,ts explo-sives within the safety zone about 1.4kilometers from Marine lines.

Neither the men defending ConThien nor their fortifications sufferedharm from this error. Indeed, the re-sults from the misdirected bomb loadverged on the astonishing, as secondaryexplosions blossomed near the defen-sive perimeter. The enemy was clearlytaking advantage of the safety zoneimposed on the Stratofortresses, a factthat lent greater urgency to an ideadiscussedthe previous summer, the useof B-52's in what amounted to closeair support.7

The successful, though accidental,close-in bombing at Con Thien servedas an example of what the B-52's coulddo in defense of a combat base suchas Khe Sanh. As early as 8 January1968, the topic arose during a meetingof representatives of the Strategic AirCommand's advance echelon in Viet-83


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nam and officers from III MarineAmphibious Force. Air Force confereeswere reluctant to encourage B-52strikes within the customary safetyzone except in emergencies. The Ma-rines then suggested a series of tests that,if successful, would gradually bring theB-52 salvos to a distance of only 1,000meters from friendly forces. To reduceto a minimum the risks involved, Gen-eral Cushman's headquarters urged theinstallation of new radar beacons atboth Con Thien and Khe Sanh to helpguide the planes to targets within the3-kilometer safety zone surroundingthe latter base.8

The 3d Air Division for a timeendorsed the installation of this equip-ment as a further aid to B-52 accur-acy. Additional study, however, ledGeneral Wells to reverse his stand. The

Intensive 8-52 bombardment of enemyforces at Khe Sanh is seen in this aerialshot. White dots indicate where bombsfell (white areas on right show cloudcover). The heavy saturation of Hill 881North (enemy-held) and the sparse pockmarks on Hill 881 South (occupied byU.S. Marines) show the remarkable ac-curacy of the 8-52. This montage waspieced together from reconnaissancephotos.

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Two kinds of planes were availableto drop the sensors. One was theNavy's Lockheed OP-2E, a conven-tionally powered patrol craft that hadbeen fitted with auxiliary jet engines.The other was the Air Force's SikorskyCH-3, a turbine-engine helicopter. Dur-ing sensor drops, both types wereshepherded by forward air con.trollerswho could call for flak suppressionstrikes if ground fire menaced theircharges. Because they were very vul-nerable to antiaircraft fire, the Lock-heeds were later retired in favor ofF-4's.9

The helicopters had originallybeen fitted with launchers designed toshoot into the ground a special seismicdevice called a helosid-contractionfor helicopter delivered seismic intru-sion detector-thus enabling the craftto hover above the sensor, plot itsexact location, and obtain radio verifi-cation from Dutch Mill that the devicewas actually broadcasting. During tests,crews of the CH-3's seldom receivedthis verification, for the shock ofsmashing into the earth was more thanthe sensor could endure. The squadroncommander continued experimenting,however, but soon gave up entirely onusing the helosids. He proposed in-stead to position a crewman in thedoor holding an acoustic device whichhe would toss overboard as the heli-copter hovered over the desired loca-tion. This method, as effective as it wassimple, proved invaluable in meetingGeneral Tompkin's deadline.1

Using Sensor DataCompletion of the Khe Sanh sen-sor field was just a beginning. Success-ful use of the data it generated woulddepend on reliable communication anda full understanding of how sensor in-formation should be interpreted toprQvide targets for artillery and air.A break in communication oc-

curred early in the fight. On 2 Feb-ruary, a 122-mm rocket plungedthrough the entrance of a bunker beingused by an Army signal detachment.The blast killed four and wounded one,but communication was quickly re-stored. The tragedy caused the 37thSignal Battalion to insist on blast wallsand other protective features in bunkersoccupied by its men,11

Making intelligent use of the so-called "spotlight reports"-map co-ordinates radioed from Dutch Mill-was difficult. Despite instructions tothe contrary, many officers, Air Forceas well as Marine, tended to think ofthe grid coord,inates as a target to be

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craters left by the nighttime firing, andan alert aerial observer located amongthese shell holes several freshly dug pitsabout 10 feet square. After sunset, thesignals resumed, and shells once againburst along the highway. Another earlymorning reconnaissance flight dis-covered six 37-mm antiaircraft guns,some of them shorn of camouflage bythe latest shelling. A mini-Arc Lightsoon burst upon the area, an

air power and the fight for khe sanh

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