air-to-air defense for attack helicopters

8/2/2019 Air-To-Air Defense for Attack Helicopters

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FROMDistribution authorized to U.S. Gov't.agencies only; Proprietary Information; 11JUN 1976. Other requests shall be referredto Army Command and General Staff College,Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027.

AUTHORITYUSACGSC ltr, 14 Oct 1999

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (1Men Date Entered)DOCUENTAIONGEREAD INSTRUCTIONSREPORT DOUENTAETION PFAGE 1 E O RE COMPLETING FORMEPORT NUMBER - 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER

'.Y.1' ,',o_.... 6 PERIOD COVEREDAir-to-Air Defense for Attack Helicopters. Final Xe 1 Ju n 766. PERFORMING ORO. REPORT NUMBER

7. AuTHoR4s) S...... . COdNTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(a)Knight, Robert C., MAJ, USA

9. PERFORM . - . 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASKAREA 6 WORK UNIT NUMBERSStudent at the US Army Command an d GeneralStaff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027II. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 12. REPOTE-

US Army Command and General Staff College i 1 JunU76ATTN: ATSW-SE _13. NUMBER OF PAGES

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Distribution limited to US Government agencies only: Proprietary Information.Other requests fo r this document must be referred to U.S. Army Command andGeneral Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.Approved fo r public release; distribution unlimited.17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of theebetract entered In lock 20 , If different from Report)

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18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTESMaster of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Thesis prepared at CGSC inpartial fulfillment of the Masters Program requirements, US Army Commandand General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

'19. KE Y WORDS (Continue on reveree side )f ecee*ary amd Identify by block number)

20L ABSTR AC:T (Coutftueo ,em st* Nfnuceeiy MW Ideu~iby by block numb")In iew of current Soviet emphasis on armed helicopters, is here a need for anair-to-air defensive weapon system fo r U.S. attack helicopters?he Soviet Union is oving into th e area of helicopter employment with a greateal of enthusiasm over a relatively short period of time. Doctrinally, theoviets have emphasized airborne operations to the rear o; enemy forces. Thisoctrine remains valid, with emphasis Deing placed on ainrobile operations --DO 1473 EDorT or i ov es is 7soLETE

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.rather han on parachutists. An advanced attack helicopter that is esignedfor antitank operations has been introduced into th e Soviet inventory.This attack helicoriter is armed with additional weapon systems.European weather phenomena will provide excellent periods during which attackhelicopters can be employed. Past tests an d experiments have pjroved thatdetection of helicopters by high- performance aircraft would be extremelydifficult even during periods of unlimited ceilings an d visibility. Weatherdata compiled in urope indicate that prolonged periods of ceilings of lessthan 1,000 feet occur frequently.US and Soviet doctrine is focused on using weather as a means of increasingthe survivability of attack helicopters. During periods in hich ceilingsare reduced, attack helicopters from the United States and the USSR willoperate on the battlefield. The tactics which will be employed by bothnations will be similar. In ddition the basic characteristics of thehelicopters will be th e same. These aircraft will be capable of moving overth b same terrain and performing the same maneuvers. Only within the areaof weapon systems does an obvious gap exist.The gap that currently exists in the area of air-to-air defense for attackhelicopters must be filled if the US is o continue its lead in ttackhelicopter operations.Classified appendixes ated at the classifi'ed library, US Army Conmnandand General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

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AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSE FOR ATTACK HELICOPTERS

A peetdIt ftd an GenolI eg in ia

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AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSE FOR ATTACK HELICOPTERS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyComm~and and General Staff College in artial

fulfillment of the requirements for thedegreeMASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

byROBERT C. NIGHT, USAB.A., UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT OMAHA, 1973

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas-19-76jT;:. ..


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iA

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate: Robert C. Knight, MAJ, USATitle of thesis: Air-to-Air Defense for Attack Helicopters

! ~App}ved by:by: , ..j Research Advisor

.lember, Graduate Research Faculty,_ ember, Consulting Faculty

Accepted thisZ -34ayf 1976 r- ,Director, Master-of Militart nd Science.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individualstudent author and do not necessarily represent the views of eitherthe U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmentalaaency.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PageABSTRACT ........................................................ iiiChapter

1. INTRODUCTION .............................................. 12. REVIEW OF RELA TED LITERATURE .............................. 63. WEATHER AND TERRAIN ....................................... 154. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS .................................... 245. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................... 31

APPENDIXES ...................................................... 3dTABLES .......................................................... 48BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................... 53

IN*F

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ACSTRACT

In view of current Soviet emphasis on armed helicopters, isthere a need for an air-to-air defensive weapon system for U.S.attack helicopters?

The Soviet Union is oving into the area of helicopteremployment with a great deal of enthusiasm over a relatively shortperiod of time. Doctrinally, the Soviets have emphasized airborne opera-tions to th e rear of enemy forces. This doctrine remains valid, withemphasis being placed on ainobile operations rather than on parachu-tists. An advanced attack helicopter that is designed for antitankoperations has been introduced into th e Soviet inventory. This attackhelicopter is armed with additional weapon systems.

European weather phenomena will provide excellent periodsduring which attack helicopters can be employed. Past tests andexperiments have proied that detection of helicopters by high-performance:Ircraft would be extremely difficult even during periods of unlimitedcrr-uilings and visibility. 'Weather data compiled in Europe indicate thatorolonged periods of ceilings of less than 1,000 feet occur frequently.

US and Soviet coctrine is ocused on using weather as amaeans of increasing the survivability of attack helicopters. Duringoeriods in which ceilings ar e reduced, attack helicopters from theSrnited States and the USSR will operate on the battlefield. The tacticsalhich will be employed by both nations will be similar. In addition thebasic characteristics of the helicopters will be th e same. These

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ivaircraft will be capable of moving over the same terrain and performingthe same maneuvers. Only within the area of weapon systems does anobvious gap exist. The gap that currently exists in the area ofair-to-air defense for attack helicopters must be filled if the USis to continue its lead in attack helicopter operations.

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Chapter II JTROi, !TI10 1

Increased emphasis concer-ning the future of Army aviation an demiploi~ent of helicopters -in md/high intensity conflict combined-ith enierqin-q results of the 19'73 M~ideast War indicate that attacknelicopters are an inttegral ;ret-er of the combined anuis team.

in~ ~ 1 viwor-ce ~o tack helicopters, the missionof ar cvalyits n Erop,-he soviet air threat to helicopters,I

aEcurrent" coctrine. id tie tar~ical employment of US Air Fortedsserts, is there a recquirement1 For an air-to-air defense capabilityfor attack helicopt.ers?

In order t1,ovaluate thr --nuirement, -"he feasibility of sucha svstC er ust, be evaluated . 2rreriz tactics an d doctrine of boths~-rvices m..ust be exam~ine. .c-eynrination mus. be iade whether

ztJnq asse-.s3nll method i ~ien-il, in act, accomplishth...oni witch mninitiuri loss of .-en and equipment.

Limited tests and experimTentation have been conducted concern-~i-to-air defense for helicopters. At t;i. writinn, however, there1

e~ ,o on-qoin-. te -s, stadies. or ,roqjrains which address air-to-air:ce:nse for hielicopters.


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formations is ecognized by m.--any nations. This has led to the develop-mien-L of sophisticated antiaircraft weapon systems. radar to detectlow-flying aircraft, and inrtense tralininq of ground antiaircraft radarcrews. At the sahme time, advanced helicopters are oeing developed toovercome these defenses. Within ouir own Services, existing tactics anddoctrine are being changed and new doctrine and tactics are beingdeveloped to increase helicopter survivability.

STTxE:T OF THE PROBLEM

Is there a requiretaent rcr -,-n air-to-air defense capabilityIor att.4ack helicopters? Can sucha helicopters survive on the battle-field, using cuilrent weapona systems and being suppo.-ted by Air Forcetactical fighters? Ca n they cor-mal-ete their assianed missions withminimum losses of me n and eauinnert? Are the US Aniiv and Air Forceworking together as a team? Can they do so? Are Array attack helicop-ter and Air Force tactical fighter crews equipped anld trained as a team?ZTif naot, can they be equipped an d trained?

JETH"ID OF I1VESTIGATIOl

The basic mnethod for evaluating a requirement for art air-to-air defense capability will be through research of available documients.

Pattests will -be nalyzed to oeternine if asi air-to-air weapon systemis feasible. Current tactics and doc.trine will be evaluated. Missions

X: tne US Ai r Force and m sions of air caval ry units in urope will


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3ti thoroughl-i analyzed. Tite air tlrieat of other nations, as well ascn*ei:r nroposed em;ploy~nn of ;wij t~s~ il l also be analyzed.

1iiarl-n dat-i wli ;-searchet: and -.resenteA!. oata will Dto analt at wil11 ei 'L;ier support the rec-ui renient or demnrsteate that no suchre&iuirenment exi si.-s

*Hel icop ters will -fight on future battlefields and theywill perform a variety of missic-ts, o icudectosbynthforward edge of th e battle area. "-,Any of these -missions ill dependPrimarily on thne element of surprise as a means of survivability.This stuoy assts,-es tl*1d tiAe 'LS Air Force can support helicopter

#6aton Lni 1,s cp IIite %Jased on its priorities.Oter threats to eictrswill not bie exa-mined in epth.

--.e of these will be oulined 4-o --up~ort the fact t-hat the Army issoending a considerable a;::;ountL of rionev on research in order to improve1--_-ie survivabilitv of the helicopter. if the threats being tested arevaiid, and rteans tooecnethesE threats are developed- the question

reriains ifwh:seng accornpli shed concerning the air-to-air

Helcortes wreaAuvdtes-1el irV*e*n--Fisupl~-issions, troop transport, and a close air su;iport role. Vietnam

,rovided an active 'iostile- enviro--ient which tested the abilities ofcrtes and the survivabi 4ity of helicopters aigainst the enem7y '4lround

!+ as -jeer, due, npa'- to e ou-standing corbat record of


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adverse weather condiLions, enter in to iny Furopan scenar 10 . [lieseLwo factors should be mior considerations.

If, in Fic,, iL is detenined thj'n e ', Air Force and theUS Army could work as an integral team on air operations, will weatherpermit it? If ir superiority was achieved, or not even contested,could the US Air Force fly every day that helicopters could? In iewof the increasing numbers of US an d USSR attack helicopters armed toperform antiarmor operations, th e probability of meeting engagementsbetween these two opposing attack helicopter forces increasessignificantly.

Available weather data compiled over a period of years inFulda, Germany, will be examined. in determining whether the Army andAir Force can operate as a team, the European weather will be evaluated.rature itself may hamper the combining of these forces. Periods oflow ceilings and reduced visibility provide needed concealment forattack helicopters. Both the US and USSR can be expected to takeadvantaqe of this type of weathier to conduct antiarmor operations.This iill increase the possibility of a situation which pits attackhelicopter against attack helicopter. In ight of this, can the UnitedStates afford a void in ir-to-air defense capabilities for attackhel i opters?

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Chapter 2REVIEW OF RELA'rrD LITERATURE

The growing role of attack helicopters on future battlefieldsis fully appreciated by many world powers, as indicated by the followingextract:

"Until recently, helicopters played a secondary role on thebattlefield. They were employed for providing various types ofsupport for the ground forces. However, the situation at thepe - time, as borne out by the foreign press, is quitedifferent. The need for effective air operations in destroyingmobile and small targets, particularly tanks, has revived interestin helicopters .

"The air defense methods to be employed against helicopterswill depend upon the nature of the actions carried out by thelatter, the number of antiaircraft subunits and also upon theirfire potential ."

"In view of the fact that the helicopters will rarely beused in middle altitudes, the antiaircraft gunners must masterthe art of destroying targets at altitudes just several metersabove the ground. Here a considerable amount of importance isattached to anticipating the course to be followed by the heli-copters and the targets of their strikes. If it is determinedthat t~he deployment of the antiaircraft subunits is not inkeeping with the interests of air defense, then the deploymentshould be changed to insure that the helicopters will appearwithin the range1 of effective fire of the PVO (air defense)weapons . . .

This quotation presents the views of a Soviet General Officerconcerned with air defense. Other Soviet officials are analyzing airdefense doctrine to improve their employment of Soviet helicopters.

IV. Gatsolayev, LTG of Arty, Soviet Army, Military Herald,11o., 1973, pp. 65-70.

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7The Soviet Iriiu qalined an appreciation of helicopters as a

rfsul i; ofi Uni ted StaLes involvement iii Vietnam. Usinq data producedas a result of Vietnam, the Soviets embarked on a ne w venture. Anincreased number of helicopters were introduced into th e Soviet militaryduring the previous decade. Although souces differ in heir estimates,

. the figure of 2,500 helicopters is enerally accepted. 2

The first production of a true helicopter gunship within theSoviet Union occurred in 970. The MI-24 HIND was, according to aCzechoslovak aviation magazine, ". . designed on the basis of technicalspecifications similar to the S-C7 IBLACKHAWK. ''3 (A S attack helicopterprototype) No other comments were provided concerning this interestingstatement. The HIND is eavily armored, mounting a machinegun in henose. Rocket pods, along with four antitank quided missiles (ATGM),are mounted on its wings. Classified data is included in ppendix I.

Soviet employment of armed helicopters is he subject of variedreports; each Soviet analyst has his ow n views. One source states thatSoviet helicopter assets are distributed throughout the armed forces.uring wartime, at leas' one tactical air army could be expected to

support each Soviet front (army group).4 Classified sources presentyet another figure, which is rovided in appendix II.

2The Alilitary Balance, 1974-1975, the International Institutefor Strategic Studies, London, Eng., 1974, p. 0.3Another f4i, Letectvi a Kosmonautika, No. 9, 1974, pp. 20-21.4Gazaham H. Turbiville, Military Review, October 1975, p. 5.


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Additional h l i-ripLer Lhreil., -ire tioted it, Soviet pl nili nq forheliborne assault forces. The following was taken from a Sovietrmi I itary journal

"The importance and significance of tactical (heliborne)landing forces have greatly increased in odern combat. Theseforces may be assigned various tasks: delay the entry of theenemy's reserves; destroy nuclear attack weapons; occupy andhold water crossings and sections suitable for crossing inforce; destroy command posts in the rear; hold mountain passes,gorges, road intersections, and other important tactical areasor facilities of the enemy. In addition, they can seizesections of a shoreline dnd thus contribute to the landing ofMarines. "5

The Soviets initially focused on transporting airborne infantryunits on heliborne operation5. This was based on the inherent lightweight of such a unit. The increased lift capability of current Sovietlift helicopters leads to th e planning for etipleovent of motorizedinfantry units. After testing this concept, the Soviets realized thepotential of lifting motorized infantry ahead of advancing divisionsto seize key terrain.

The Soviets are dlso well aware of the vulnerability of aheli.)orne force to ground and aerial weapon system-. Tactical fightersand :elicopter -%unships are included in the planning froc, the time troopsare picked up until they ar e airlanded. One W0arsaw Pact nation noted:

I"It seems that the enemy will endeavor to wipe out a tacticalassault operation from the moment it is discovered, during theassault landing. Therefore, an airborne tactical assault shouldbe given protective fighter cover during the entire process.

5K. Urtavev, The Battalion of an Air Assault Force, VoennyiY'estnik, No. 3. 971, pp. 20-25.


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9T is threat will increase as the assault force approaches thelanding area. This can be prevented only by assigning a maximumnumber of fighter aircraft to provide air cover during the finalassault stage." 6

Whether or not the Soviet planners envision employnent offighter aircraft to support all helicopter operations can only be leftto theory. Soviet interest in an air-to-air defense system for attackhelicopters is a subject of yet another question. This topic isaddressed in part by a classified source and is included at appendix

The Soviets, living within the European environment, are morecognizant of the weather phenomena thdn the infrequent US visitors.During past wars the Soviets have skillfully used the weather to defeatenemy forces. One cannot dismiss weather as insignificant in any battle.Can it be assumed that the Soviets will not employ helicopters on thosedays that will preclude support froM fighter aircraft? That is, indeed,a doubtful assumption. if the Soviets are aware that the United Statesdoes not possess a dedicated air-to-air defensive weapon system for itsattack helicopters and that the weather will prevent use of fighteraircraft, who would oppose a Soviet helicopter threat?

US HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

The United States, with years of experience in employing attackhelicopters in Vietnam, is also changing doctrine and developing

l 6Henryk Majcherek, Fighter Cover for a Tactical Landing Operation,~,uskowy Przeglad Latniczny, September 1969, pp. 3-7.


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10advanced attack helicopters. In addition to experience qained indvne atac heicptrs Lides rsleVietnam, data produced as a result of the 1973 Mideast War has resultedin significant re-evaluation of current doctrine and testing of proposedcountermeasures.

Th e US Army expended twenty man-years and four hundred and seven-teen thousand dollars in unds to overcome the threat posed by radarand radar-controlled antiaircraft weapons. The HELORADE (HelicopterOperations in a Radar Environment) test has produced results that willassist helicopters in perating within a hostile radar environment.

Other systems being tested include the use of chaf rockets toblock radar. The rocket fires pieces of aluminum strips which blockradar reception of the actual target. A radio system, which will indicatethe direction to a radar installation, and study of the use of smoketo increase survivability are also ongoing combat developments efforts.

The testing of proposed systems for helicopters is ot a newinnovation fo r the army. The subject of air-to-air defense is ot neweither. In December 1970 General Dynamics, a civilian firm, submitteda proposal to th e US Army. The proposal was for an air-launched missilefor attack helicopters.7 General Dynamics outlined their proposedweapon system, which included test data based on actual firing tests.Detailed results, which are classified, are included at appendix IV.

Possibly as a result of the General Dynamics proposal, theUS Arwvy Combat Developments Experimental Command (CDEC) at Fort Ord,

7General Dynamics. Technical Proposal for RAM, an Air-to-Air"oiament System for Attack elicopters (U), Pamona Operation PublicationCPC-2514, December 1970.


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11California, conducted a series of tests entitled Test 43.1, Air-to-Air Defense for Attack Helicopters. The results produced from the

test were concerned with the detection capabilities of high-perfor-mance aircraft versus helicopters. Simulated engagements were alsorecorded by gun-mounted cameras that were installed in the jet aircraft.The results of this test, which are classified SECRET, are providedat appendix V.

Testing of air-to-air weapon systems for attack helicopters wasapparently curtailed from 1971 until September 1974. There is no datawhich indicates that any tests, studies, or evaluations were madeduring that period.

In August 1974 a report was submitted by the US Army MaterielSystems Analysis Activity concerning the use of the attack heliropterin an air defense role.8 The report focused on the feasibility ofemploying attack helicopters to augment the capabilities of existingground systems in defeating an air threat. Results of this report aresummarized in appendix VI.

Following this report was a second report from the Air WarfareDivision. This report was based on computer simulations, using anattack helicopter that mounted varied defensive missiles against asimulated high-performance aircraft threat.9 Computer simulations were

8US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, Air WarfareDivision. Comments on the Attack Helicopter in an Air Defense Role (U).Interim Note No. AT7 (Confidential). Air Warfare Division Publication.August 1974.9US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, Air WarfareDivision. Helicopter for Air Defense Missile Intercept Simulation (U).interim Note Sunnumbered) (Confidential. Air Warfare DivisionPubllication, September 1974.


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12made against several types of :igh-performance aircraft. The missilesystems employed were also varied. A summary of the results isprovided in appendix VII.

On the other side of the coin is the doctrine to p,,nnnrt an air-to-air capability. The problem of doctrine is compounded by the divisionof the responsibility for preparation of manuals to support helicopteroperations. The US Army Aviation School published a draft manual on theemployment of helicopters in a high threat environment. The fieldmanual, published in March 1975, presents a comprehensive approach tothe subject of aviation employment. 10 Included in the field manual arepotential threats to helicopter operations, which include an enemyhelicopter threat. Emphasis in countering this air threat is placed

on training crews in the technique of detection avoidance and maneuversdesigned to evade or destroy the enemy helicopter threat. Active engage-ment by the use of organic armament is not addressed in the manual.(One is led to assume that the maneuvers should be such that the enemyhelicopter will either fly into the ground or over friendly air defenseelements on the ground.) The purpose in presenting the possible threatis justified in the manual by stating that Soviet helicopters have anarmament system that ca,; be used against US helicopters.

The manual ephasizes the integration of the combined armsteam and exploitation of other services' capabilities. It states that

IOUS Army Aviation School, Field Manual 90-!. Employment of Armyin a High Thrsat Evirornment, March 1975 (Draft), DA Publication.

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132 "attack helicopters perform traditional Army firepower tasks and will

continue to be supplemented by tactical fighters "Responsibility for the publication of field manuals for attack

helicopters rests with the US Army Armor School. In April 1975 a drafttraining circular was published concerning gunnery training for attackhelicopters."1 The circular states that ar.air threat exists due toenemy helicopters. There is no training recommended, or suggested, tocounter any air-to-air threat.

The lack of a stated need for air-to-air training in fieldmanuals is not a new problem. The need for an air-to-air defense weaponsystem is not a new concept either. The training aspect was firstsurfaced in 1969 by the US Army Aviation School combat developmentactivity. Recognizing a need for an air-to-air defense system, theyinitiated paperwork to develop a requirement for an air-to-air weaponfor attack helicopters. The process followed by the aviation school

is outlined in appendix VIII.In reviewing Air Force doctrine concerning support of heliborne

operations, a tremendous gap was identified. The only data concerninghelicopter operations was obtained in a two page summary of altitudesand techniques.12 The manual does not address procedures to be followed

11uS Army Armor School, Training Circular 17-17. GunneryTraining for Attack Hcicopters, 30 April 1975 (Draft), US ArmorSchool Publication.

1 2Tactical Figh-er Weapons Emploffment, TACM-3-1, Volume IV,15 August 1974, epartment of the Air Force, Tactical Air Command.

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Chapter 3.EAThRE A.rD TERRAIN

While tactics and doctrine can be developed that will increasethe survivability of attack helicopters against high-performance air-craft, weather and terrain must also be considered. One generalcoparison of tne European weather was related to the author uponreceipt of orders to Germany. The comment was made by a fellow aviatorwho had several years of flying experience in Europe. He said that theworst flying conditions in the United States were to be found atFort Lewis, Washington. in contrast, the most favorable flying weatherin Germany was found at Stuttgart. Yet, the weather at Fort Lewiswas more favorable for flying than was the weather in Stuttgart,Germany.

The differences in the weather in these two areas may veattributed to their geographical locations. Fort Lewis is located onthe coast. The weather is affected by the warmer waters of the oceanin winter months. The water temperature is normally warmer than thatof the surrounding land mass. Washington state is also affected bySiberian highs which cross the ocean before moving over the state.Germany is an inland country, not subject to the types of moist airmasses that move across Washington. Winds in Germany are also calmer,which prevents them from blowing the fog away. Terrain conditions

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16produce fog at all times during the year, and this fog remains inplace for extended periods of time.

Historically and doctLrinally, weather has had a tremendousimpact on combat operations. Current doctrine concerning employmentof aviation includes the element of surprise. One means of achievingsurprise is ". through taking advantage of adverse weather."13 Yet,current Army regulations restrict flying when weather conditions arebelow a five hundred-foot ceiling with less than a one half mile ofvisibility.14 These weather restrictions are even more confining whenflying within the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in Germany.It is within the ADIZ that the threat forces will initially cross theborder in the event that there is a war in Europe. Restrictions toflight within the P9IZ also include no flying from one-half hour beforesunset to one-half hour after sunrise.

Although weather phenomena in Germany are readily observed,they are extremely difficult to predict. The weather may be forecastedto be visual flying conditions (VFR); however, it is not uncommon for'lie forecasted weather to deteriorate to instrument flying conditions(IFR) in a matter of hours.

A historical summary of weather recorded at Fulda, Germany,over a ten-year period is at appendix IX. Of particular interest

13Field Manual 90-1, Employment of Amy Aviation Units in aHiagiThreat Environment (Draft), 21 October 1975, DA Publication, p. 3.14Amny Regulation 95-1, 1 October 1973, p. 4-8. I


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17are the weather conditions during the period between September and,ioveriber. i. curser.- 'examination of tie -ata "idicates that ceilings-- less than "> ia on mil e,., less than 200 feet,. :ith visibilitv of Iess tan one-half iie,car, be anticipated between 9--0-9300 hours from 28 to 32 percent ofthe time during the nonths of September and October. These conditionsare certainly favorable for attack helicopter operations.

The preceding paragraph examined a "worst case" example offlying weather. Ceilings of less than 1,000 feet, with visibilityof less than 2 miles, can be encountered from September through March,these conditions will exist from 17 to 38 percent of the time. Duringthese periods, heliborne oper;tions may also be conducted with relativeease without regard to interference from high-performance a.rcr:tft.

US Air Force pilots may well state that during the periodswhen ceilings are less than 1,000 feet they will be operational.However, the pilot's ability when flying At speeds in excess of 500knots, to locate a helicopter flying at tree top level at a speed ofless than 50 knots is open to question. Conbine this difficulty withflying witn a visibility of less than 2 miles and in a vailey w-ith onlya few hundred meters of turninq radius, and helicopter survivabilityincreases drastically.

At this point it is prudent to note that the CBEC test citedin Chapter II was conducted during the period 1 July to 30 Septenber.

l 5Air Weather Service Pamphlet 105-4, Volume IV Europe,2) Decber 1967, IS Air Force Publication.


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- 18It was stated in the test sumnary that, "The experiment period (1 Jul-30 Sep) contains the best flying weather of the year. Visual fl.1njconditions are optimum, with ceiling and visibility Pxceeding 10,000feet and 10 miles, 96% of the time in July, 950 in -ugust and 93% inSeptember." (Emphasis added). 16 These conditions certainly containedsome favorable factors for the high-performance aircraft crews. Forthis reason, this study questions the ability of high-performance air-craft crews to locate helicopters when the ceilings are below 1000 feetand visibility is less than 2 miles.

TERRAIN

Weather is not the sole natural phenomenon that will have animpact on attack helicopter operations in Europe. It is necessary tobriefly discuss the terrain in order to emphasize the likelihood ofai to-air encounters by attack helicopters in Europe. Terrain inEurope favors employment of attack helicopters. At the same time,high-performance aircraft will hlave difficulty in detecting and engagingattack helicopters, particularly during times of reduced visibility.

The relief of the terrain in the Fulda Gap area is character-ized by a diversified landform. In the south, the Hohe Rhoen Mountainsreach an elevation of 950 meters. The mountain range extends for

4 approximately 50 kilometers between the Ulster and Fulda Rivers and

16 Project Analysis (Abbreviated), Attack Helicopter Air to Air,'-.I, 27 May 1970, US Army Combat Developments Command, Experimentationrummand.

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19continues up to the Werra at Vacha. Along this area, the gradients ofthe mountains are rather steep. The western portion of the Rhoen isalso rough. As it ontinues to the north, it orms a more open typeof landscape. Elevations in he area vary from 770 meters in he high-lands to 200 meters in he valley areas. The western area is composedof low rolling hills. Also in he western area are the Taunus Mountains.The major range runs generally northeast to southwest, with the highestelevation being approximately 30C meters. The southern slope runs

generally to the Main River Valley. The northern slope runs to theWesterwald, which is a large region of mountainous terrain. The areaof the Westerwald is lso laced with streams and valleys with steepsides. Farther west is he broad open valley of the upper Rhine. Thisvalley e'nds abruptly when it meets the escarpments of plateaus intowhich the middle Rhine gorge is ut. At the southern end, the gorgeis approximately 350 meters deep. As it oves northward it ecomeswider an d shallower. The middle Rhine Valley runs through these uplandsfor approximately 50 kilometers. The uplands between the Rhine andMosel Valleys is ailed Hunsruck. As it oes westward the terrainchanges from smooth plateaus to rugged hill country. This area iscovered with dense forest and large tracks of moors. To the southwest,after passing the Hunsruck, is n area of rolling hills called theSalr-Nahe Uplands. This area is isolated, steep-sided, and thicklywooded. These features give the area a more tugged aspect than doesthe Rhine-Hessiam Hills, which are to the east.


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20MThe vegetation in the Fulda gap area is 40- to 50-percent

covered by dense wods in th e higher elevations. The low, slopes andvalleys are primarily pasture and farmland.

Movement in this area is considerably restricted in the moreheavily wooded areas. These areas present obstacles to vehicularmovement, which must be confined to the trails through the woods.

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS OF WEATHER AND TERRAIN

The Soviets undoubtedly realize the limitations of their airforces in anti-helicopter operations. The United States -possesses anadvantage in aircraft technology, training, and combat experience.The technological advances include an all-weather intercept capability.US aircraft can engage other aircraft at altitudes without having toubserve them visually. Whether this same system is effective inlocating a stationary helicopter hovering at ground level is anotherquestion. Also to be questioned is the effectiveness of an infraredmissile fired toward the ground at a helicopter.

It will be during periods of reduced ceilings and visibilitythat the Soviets will prefer to conduct heliborne operations. UStactics and doctrine parallel this line of thinking.

Nearly every manual published by US agencies concerned withemployment of aviation assets emphasizes using the weather to concealmovement and to achieve surprise. A draft field manual published bythe Armor School states, "Adverse weather which reduces visibilityalso reduces the effectiveness of attack helicopters; however, low


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N71

accept for two reasons. First, it is difficult to conceive that-highranking military officials would use inter-Service rivalry to preventthe development of a self-defense weapon. To accept this premise wouldbe to accept the idea that if a US Air Force pilot were forced to bailout over enemy-held territory he could not defend himself on theground. Once on the ground he would be in a "traditional" Army infantryrole. Secondly, training is the responsibility of the conander.

Fg


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25attack helicopter into the Army inventory. Since its introduction,there have been no conflicts that surfaced any air threat to theattack helicopter. Other threats, such as radar controlled anti-aircraft weapons, received attention since they were a reality wefaced during operations in ambodia. A considerable amount ofmoney was spent by th e combat developments community to develop asystem to overcome the threat of radar controlled weapons. Duringthis time, new munitions were tested based on combat experience inVietnam. An air-to-air weapon system would probably have receivedthe same attention had the threat surfaced in ietnam.

The Soviets, lacking actual combdt experience with attackhelicopters, have embarked on a costly program designed to increaseattack helicopter assets and performance capabilities. On e ca n onlyquestion their rationale for undertaking such a program, recognizingas we do that the Soviets live, train, and conduct exercises inEurope on a daily basis.

Doctrinally, the Soviets have placed a great deal of emphasison th e employment of airborne forces in enemy rear areas. It ppearsfrom the current trend of increased helicopter assets that theiremphasis is n heliborne operations. This transition has been madeI inrather short period of time when compared to US advances in hisarea. Again we should attempt to determine why.

Previous tests and experiments indicate that helicopters cansurvive on future battlefields. The problem of detection of helicoptersis compounded by the problems associated with engagement and destructionof tlie helicopter threat. It is bvious that the Soviets are placing

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26a great deal of emphasis on the employment of helicopters. This factcan be based strictly on the increasing amount of helicopters inproduction over th e past decade. The Soviets are pursuing thisrelatively new field without the benefit of having actual combatexperience with helicopters. There must be some unknown factorsthat are responsible for this increased emphasis.

It is evident from comparing numbers of attack helicoptersin he US an d Soviet inventories, and the programed production ratesthat the Soviets will soon have parity in his area. It lso appearslogical to assume that both nations will employ attack helicopterson future battlefields with emphasis on using them in n antitank role.The tactics for such employment will be basically the same for bothnations, thus, these aircraft wilN be operating in he same environment.Should :his occur, US and Soviet helicopters will face on e anotheron the battlefield.

The analysis of European weather phenomena indicates that idealweather fo r employment of attack helicopters will exist for extendedperiods of time during the winter months. The data researched haveindicated that detection of low-flying helicopters will be extremelydifficult. The weather conditions for the experiments concerning thedetection of helicopters should be kept in ind. During the experiments,ideal weather conditions prevailed.

It ppears that the Army combat developers are generatingproblems. Current emphasis in the combat developments community is

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27on the use of standard scenarios. Studies being conducted must besupported by the use of a standard scerndrio. Many of the studies are-,"so conducted using war naming techniques. The problems come whenwe war game requirements around a battle to be fought in July.

Th e US Army Training and Doctrine Comnand publishes guidanceconcerning standard scenarios. This Quidance is lso applicable tothe war gdming conducted at the Combined Arms Combat DevelopmentsActivity. What is produced as a result )f his war gaming has animpact on equipment introduced irto the Army inventory. An examplewas the results of war gaming an infantry division against a threatarmored division. The war game produced an unacceptable loss ratewithin the infantry unit. To overcome this, additional TOW weaponswere used in nother gaming sequence. The results of this sequenceproduced favorable results. In view of these results, infantry unitsthroughout th e Army were issued additional TOW weapons.

Th e war gaming process currently in se, however, has the battlebeing fought during July, and weather conditions during this timeframe certainly favor the use of air support.19

For the purposes of war gaming, several approaches are pro-posed for analysis and consideration. First, why focus on a warto be fought in July? Certainly the Soviets realize that they lackthe technology the US possesses concerning the use of airpower.

19Letter. Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command,17 October 1974, TRADOC Europeap Standard Scenario for CombatDevelopments, p. 2.


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28They should also be aware that the US places a great deal ofemphasis and reliance on the ability of the Air Force to destroytanks on the battlefield. Why start a war whep our use of airpowerwould be detrimental to their ground combat units? If the weatherrendered airpower ineffective, it would seem logical to start aconflict when weather would prohibit or severely re-strict the use ofhigh-performance air assets.

Another proposal for the war game analysis would be to wargame a situation fought on a typical November to February day inEurope. The weather conditions would include ceilings of less than1,000 feet and a visibility of less than 1 mile. A typical missionin Eurooe would find elements of an armored cavalry squadron in thedelay. Assume that tie squadron comes under attack by a Soviet HIND Ahelicopter armed with SAGGER antitank missiles. Tactically, the attackhelicopter would be located on a hilltop overlooking the valley wherethe cavalry squadron is conducting the delay.

The Soviet attack helicopter might have clearance from theclouds by a watter of just a few feet, with the terrain below himbeing unaccessible by ground means. The aircraft remains behind thehill mass until it is ready to attack, then rises above the treetopsto fire. In less than 20 seconds it has fired, hit its target, anddropped back beh',nd the hill mass to move to another attack position.

The prescnt options open to the cavalry squadron are limited.if Vulcan units were attached they could engage the aircraft, ifthe observed it and took it under fire within the 20 second time frame.


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30Soviet helicopter would be a properly armed US helicopter.

Examining the sdMe situation fr~n a Soviet point of view,one readily understands why placing emphasis on attack helicopters

- may be productive. The US Redeye missile does not present a

9 i significant threat to the survivability to the HID A. nor does the- Vulcan/Chapparal. This is the sa're aporoach the US takes concerning

the Soviet SA-7 and ZSU-23. Sall arms fire presents a threat, butnot a significant one. US high-performance aircraft normally willnot be operating overhead anu will have difficulty in detectingand engaging helicopters. US neiicopters do not possess an air-to-air capability, so they will not be a threat to Soviet attack helicop-ters. It is little wonder that the Soviets are building up theirhelicopter assets.

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Chapter aCON~CLUS IONS AD RE OML IPIDAT 1011 SX

It s doubful animft the lad esearched, that theIUnited Statesca witia mfralledi arol onpsif the gaps in -doctrine, training, and weapons syst us are not filled.Currently. the United States- oossesses the necessary technology tociil these gat~s. In dditioii, th~e UX~ted States has within itsLervices the comat !seasoneo pii,,s so essential to fnintain a superiorfighting force. No other nation can snatch this techn-oligy and levelof experience.

Uppermost in the mind of every coninander should be the wedlareof his men an d the training of ar effective fighting force. Tannis limi ted only by personrel tin-e, and imagination. It mray bE tiff*for all aviatiJor cwxnanders to ima.;ine that their attack helicopterswili -eet Sovie't attack helicopters or, Future 5aLLIefi-elds and tccr.mince training with that in mind.

Training literature needs to be revised to include air-to-airIdeFense for attack helicopters. The cost associated with suchtraining is inimal. it ould be accompVlished in conjunction with

- .c.-Arient t.raining renuireinents.Thcrine to supoort 'n--.-ininq is ot complex. Our

lwctrine is the basis for deteremning wnaz is required o vOe_nc~w- athut the ecemy. Doctrinally, hie will be using simila.- tactics

KIT'= operating in the same enivonment. Our current tactics for31


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32antiarmor operations is a stdrting point for the development of tacticsand doctrine. It is not very -uch different to engage a helicopterat a hover than it is to engage an armored vehicle. Both are nearlycomparable in size, ar:d both will be dt or near ground level.

Under similar weather conditions in Europe. and with Sovietdoctrine that advocates airmobile operations deep into the enemy rear,one cannot help but ponder the question: who is responsible to engagehelicopters conducting these types of operations? If ground unitscannot engage or are ineffecLive against such aircraft and high-performance aircraft are not available or are hindered because ofweather, this type of operation, conducted during periods of lowceilings, would be unopposed.

At any time of the year, in any given part of the world, andin any type of conflict there will be periods in which attack helicop-ters can operate with relative ease, Attack helicopters will havefreedom of movement across the battlefield, with little concern aboutbeing detected by high performance aircraft. Attack helicopters ofthe United States and the USSR will be habitually operating in thesame environment ind employing the same tactics.

The most !ffective system to defeat the attack helicopterthreat is a system which can operate under the same weather conditions,over the same terrain, have the same characteristics concerning flightmaneuverability, and, most ir .ave the appropriate weapon toengage and destroy the enemy. The Soviets may have this capability,the United States currently does not.


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33The largest gap that currently exists is in he area of an

effective air-to-air weapon system. At present, it ould be fool-hearty to attempt to engage an enemy helicopier with the 20 mm or

:- 7.62 m machine guns and attempt to obtain a hit using tracer burnout

as a means of adjusting fire. Once the enemy aircraft was fired on,it would take appropriate maneuvers to prevent it from being hit.In ddition, the Soviets can be expected to employ their aircraft inpairs, just as we do. Tne second aircrdft, with adequate armament,could easily destroy any attacking helicopter.

As a starting point, past tests and experiments should beused as a basis for th e development of an air-to-air weapon system.The threat which provides the validity of needing the system has beenvalidated several times in he past. The lengthy combat developmentsprocess should be shortened to field an effective air-to-air system

' i. he near time frame. The answer is certainly no t to go back towhere we were ten years ago and start over.

Training i. ir-to-air defense should be included in ll aviationunit training programs now, if he attack helicopter is o survive onth e battlefield tomorrow. The 1973 Mideast War demonstrated that whenoutnumbered and using the same type of equipment, the key to victorywas th e state of rpdiness an d training. We have no training for air-to-air combat in attack helicopters.

Until an effective air-to-air weapon system is ielded,commanders need to take the initiative to insure that U forces ar eprepared to fight while outnumbered and that they ar e an effectivefighting force using whatever equipment is available.


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BIBLIOGRAPHYAir Weather Pamphlet 105-4, Volume IV Europe, 2r, D1t.mber 1967, US Air

Force Publicdtion.Another Mi, Letectvi a Kosmonautika, No. 9, 1974, pp. 20-21.Army Regulation 95-1, 1 October 1973, p. 4-8.Foreig Mlitary 1 ih, Hq. Department of the Army, Office of the

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Washington DC, February1974 (5), pp. 4 & 5.

Gazaham H. Turbiville, Military Review, October 1974, pp, 5 & 6.General Dynamics, Technical Proposal for RAM, an Air-to-Air ArmamentS stem for Attack Helicopters (U). Pamona Operation Publication

CPC 514, December 1970.Henry Maicherek, Fighter Cover for i'actical Landing Operation.Wojskowy Przeglad Latniczny, September 1969, pp. 3-7.K. Urtyev, The Battalion of an Air Assault Force, Voennyi Vestnik,No. 3, 1971, pp. 20-25.The ;I-ilitary Balance, 1974-1975, the international Institute forStrategic Studies, London, England, 1974, p. 10.LS Army Armor School, *-ield Manual '7-50 (Draft), Attack Helicopter

Operations, October 1975, p. 3-5.US Army Armor School, Training Circular 17-17. Gunnery Training forAttack Helicopters (Draft), 30 April 1975, US Armor SchoolPublication.US Army Aviation School, Field Manual 90-1 Em lo nent of ArmyAviation in a High Threat Environment Dr-aft) , March 1975,

Department cf the Army Publication.US Army Aviation School, Field Manual 90-i, Employment of AmyAviation Units in a High Threat Environtment Draft), 21 October

1975, Department of the Army Publication, p. 3.:S Army Combat Developments Coniiand, Experimentation Command, Attackelicopter Air to Air 43.1, Project Analysis (Abbreviated),

27 May 1970.


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air-to-air defense for attack helicopters

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