airborne assault forces_2012

`REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved

OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 04-05-2012

2. REPORT TYPE

FINAL

3. DATES COVERED (From - To)

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

Airborne Assault Forces: The Most Expedient And Practical

Forcible Entry Response Available In Today’s Contemporary

operating

5b. GRANT NUMBER

Operating Environment

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

MAJ SEAN P. KELLY

5e. TASK NUMBER

Paper Advisor (if Any): COL Robert L. Gardner

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

AND ADDRESS(ES)

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

Joint Military Operations Department

Naval War College

686 Cushing Road

Newport, RI 02841-1207

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.

Reference: DOD Directive 5230.24

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of

the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect

my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

14. ABSTRACT

Airborne assault forces: The most expedient and practical forcible entry response available in today’s contemporary operating environment.

The 21st Century operating environment is shaped by many symmetric and asymmetric threats, factors and actors. Today’s military force needs

to remain agile, rapidly deployable and capable of accomplishing the Nation’s objectives anywhere in the world. Given the reality of the United

States (U.S.) fiscal constraints, political and military leaders will continue to reduce the Nation’s global footprint with the intent of not losing

global influence. The U.S. must maintain the ability to rapidly deploy to address future global challenges. Faced with a reduced number of

forward deployed bases and an uncertain security environment, a joint force commander is left with two options when required to gain entry into a

contested foreign territory - airborne assault or amphibious assault insertion. This paper evaluates the two traditional means of forcible entry

operations available to a joint force commander based on the operational factors of time, space and force. A comparative analysis of both forcible

entry capabilities is used to determine the advantages and disadvantages that both options present to the joint force commander when forced to

respond with a swift U.S. military intervention. In addition, select cases from OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, OPERATION JUST

CAUSE, and OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY are discussed in order to further illustrate the unique capabilities and advantages that

airborne forces can provide to the joint force commander. In today’s uncertain environment, the airborne assault force provides the joint force

commander the most expedient and practical forcible entry response available.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Forcible Entry Operations; Airborne Assault Forces; Amphibious Assault Forces; Time, Space, Force

Factors; Low-and-Mid Level Contingency Operations

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

18. NUMBER OF PAGES

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Chairman, JMO Dept

a. REPORT

UNCLASSIFIED

b. ABSTRACT

UNCLASSIFIED

c. THIS PAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

29

19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area

code)

401-841-3556

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, R.I.

Airborne Assault Forces: The Most Expedient And Practical Forcible Entry Response

Available In Today’s Contemporary Operating Environment

by

Sean P. Kelly

MAJ, USA

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the

requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed

by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

04-05-2012

ii

Contents

Introduction 1

Traditional Forcible Entry Operations 3

Operational Factor Time 4

Operational Factor Space 7

Operational Factor Force 10

Summary of Counter Arguments and Rebuttal 15

Conclusion and Recommendation 17

Notes 18

Bibliography 20

iii

Paper Abstract

The 21st Century operating environment is shaped by many symmetric and asymmetric threats,

factors and actors. Today’s military force needs to remain agile, rapidly deployable and capable

of accomplishing the Nation’s objectives anywhere in the world. Given the reality of the United

States (U.S.) fiscal constraints, political and military leaders will continue to reduce the Nation’s

global footprint with the intent of not losing global influence. The U.S. must maintain the ability

to rapidly deploy to address future global challenges. Faced with a reduced number of forward

deployed bases and an uncertain security environment, a joint force commander is left with two

options when required to gain entry into a contested foreign territory - airborne assault or

amphibious assault insertion. This paper evaluates the two traditional means of forcible entry

operations available to a joint force commander based on the operational factors of time, space

and force. A comparative analysis of both forcible entry capabilities is used to determine the

advantages and disadvantages that both options present to the joint force commander when

forced to respond with a swift U.S. military intervention. In addition, select cases from

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, OPERATION JUST CAUSE, and OPERATION

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY are discussed in order to further illustrate the unique capabilities and

advantages that airborne forces can provide to the joint force commander. In today’s uncertain

environment, the airborne assault force provides the joint force commander the most expedient

and practical forcible entry response available.

1

Introduction

If the United States (U.S.) is denied access to a foreign country, which capability is better

suited to gain entry when conducting a wide range of contingency operations - airborne assault

or amphibious assault forces? Faced with a reduced number of forward deployed bases and an

uncertain security environment, a joint force commander is left with two options when required

to gain entry into a contested foreign territory - airborne assault or amphibious assault. In

analyzing Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO) in terms of operational factors and potential

missions, airborne assault forces provide the joint force commander a better forcible entry option

than amphibious assault forces in respect to factor time, space, and force.

The 21st Century operating environment is shaped by many symmetric and asymmetric

threats, factors and actors. Today’s military force needs to remain agile, rapidly deployable and

capable of accomplishing the Nation’s objectives anywhere in the world. Given the reality of

the U.S. fiscal constraints, political and military leaders will continue to reduce the Nation’s

global footprint with the intent of not losing its global influence. The next quarter century will

challenge U.S. joint forces with threats and opportunities ranging from regular and irregular wars

in remote lands, to relief in crisis zones, to a combination of security, engagement, and stability

operations in support of failing or failed states.1 In all cases, the U.S. must continue to

demonstrate steadfast engagement and the ability to rapidly deploy to address these worldwide

challenges.

However, since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of the cold war, the U.S. has

conducted a global repositioning effort, reducing the number of forward operating bases and

opting to garrison a majority of its military forces stateside.2 According to the 2008 National

2

Defense Strategy, the “U.S. will continue to transform overseas U.S. military presence through

global defense posture realignment, leveraging a more agile continental U.S. (CONUS)- based

expeditionary total force and further developing a more relevant and flexible forward network of

capabilities and arrangements with allies and partners to ensure strategic access.”3 In

consequence, with the reduced overseas footprint, the type and timeliness of response present the

joint force commander with a complex set of issues that require him to weigh all three

operational factors. This complex problem is further complicated when the U.S. is denied access

to that foreign territory.

This paper focuses on the two traditional means of forcible entry operations available to a

joint force commander - airborne and amphibious assault operations. In 2008, a third forcible

entry option was introduced in Joint Publication 3-18, “Forcible Entry Operations,” known as

air assault by rotary or fixed wing assets. However, a joint planner could argue that air assault as

a means to conduct forcible entry in a contested environment is not a viable forcible entry option.

JP 3-18, appendix B (Airborne and Air Assault Operations) does not adequately describe the

application of air assault assets or the planning considerations required to air land the assault

force in a contested environment. Other than mentioning that air assault assets can be used for

both offensive and defensive purposes, JP 3-18 does not mention the requirements,

characteristics, or considerations that need to be applied by a joint staff when choosing a landing

zone (LZ). Consequently, the only mention of a landing zone in appendix B, JP 3-18, contradicts

the original purpose of forcible entry operations. As illustrated, “units can be air landed on

terrain under the control of friendly forces near the line of contact or on secured locations in the

enemy’s rear; however, it takes time to land a sizeable force and a secured LZ is necessary.”4

This would indicate that air assault operations are a viable option only after an LZ is secured. In

3

other words, in a contested environment, the LZ would have to be secured by either an airborne

or amphibious assault force prior to conducting the air assault. Therefore, if the requirement is to

have a secured LZ, than air assault assets are not a viable forcible entry option.

Traditional Forcible Entry Operations

In today’s globalized world, the joint force must be capable of rapidly and effectively

deploying forces from “multiple dispersed locations, and if necessary, fight our way into a

denied theater.”5 Joint Publication 3-18, “Forcible Entry Operations”, defines forcible entry

operations as, “a joint military operation conducted against armed opposition to gain entry into

the territory of an adversary by seizing a lodgment as rapidly as possible in order to enable the

conduct of follow-on operations or conduct a singular operation.”6 The U.S. is capable of

conducting two primary forcible entry operations –airborne assault and amphibious assault.

Airborne assault operations “provide the commander with the unique ability to quickly

respond on short notice and mass rapidly on critical targets by parachute insertion.”7 Whereas

amphibious assault operations “are a military operation launched from the sea by an amphibious

force, embarked in ships or craft with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force ashore

to accomplish the assigned mission.”8 There are advantages and disadvantages of each operation.

Based on the threats outlined in the 2010 Joint Operating Environment, there are three missions

that a commander may face that could require forcible entry to protect U.S. National interests:

(1) Collapse of a functioning State (Security Force Assistance to ensure regional stability), (2)

Response to a humanitarian disaster (deny terrorist access/safe haven, bolster security, secure

lodgment for the flow of humanitarian assistance), (3) Failed Nuclear State (secure WMD

facilities and critical documents/material). In that context, if the U.S. cannot gain access to a

4

foreign country to respond to one of these missions, timeliness, selection of the right force, and

decisiveness will be the key to opening the door.

Operational Factor Time

According to military theorist Milan Vego, “mastering the factor of time in combat

essentially means acting faster than the opponent. The key to success is to shorten the time for

estimating the situation, making a decision, and deploying and maneuvering one’s combat

force.”9 The ability to react in a timely and decisive manner is critical to the joint force

commander’s ability to seize the initiative at the outset of contingency operations. When

considering factor time, a joint force commander must understand that in order “to be credible

both as a deterrent and as a viable military option for policy enforcement, the joint forces must

be capable of rapidly deploying and fighting to gain access to geographical areas controlled by

forces hostile to U.S. interests.”10

In a situation where an adversary denies access to foreign

controlled territory, the joint force commander will have to decide which forcible entry

capability is a better option in terms of factor time. When it comes to rapid deployment of

forces, airborne assault is a more timely response in terms of notification (N-hour) to

deployment. “The unique capabilities of the airborne make it a prime player in contingency

operations. Its highly lethal, no-notice, fast deploying forced entry capability has numerous

utility in any contingency operation of the past thirty years in both low-and-mid intensity

operations.”11

U.S Army airborne forces are comprised of six airborne infantry brigade combat teams

(ABCT) geographically dispersed in bases located in North Carolina (82nd

Airborne Division-

Global Response Force), Italy (173rd

ABCT - EUCOM), and Alaska (4/25th

ABCT-PACOM),

5

capable of deploying anywhere in the world within 96-hours in support of all geographic

Combatant Commanders. Additionally, the 75th

Ranger Regiment, has three, organizationally

identical, rapidly deployable light infantry special operations battalions with specialized skills

that enable them to perform a variety of special operations missions.12

The Army maintains the

Regiment at a high level of readiness. Each of the three battalions are capable of deploying

anywhere in the world with 18-hours’ notice.13

The 82nd

Airborne Division’s Global Response

Force (GRF) consisting of one ABCT is America’s premier strategic response force. In 2008,

the Secretary of Defense established the GRF to enhance the nation’s ability to respond quickly

to a wide range of contingencies. The GRF rotates annually between all four ABCTs assigned to

the 82nd

Airborne Division and when deployed the GRF becomes OPCON to the Combatant

Commander.14

Normally forces capable of conducting forcible entry operations will be introduced in

either phase II (Seize the Initiative) or phase III (Dominate). In both phase II and III, rapid

response, agility, and flexibility are essential factors. The 18-hour readiness timeline airborne

forces maintain is more responsive than the steaming time at sea consumed to reposition

amphibious assault forces within striking distance of the objective. As described in JP-3-18

“Forcible Entry Operations”, “Airborne forces offer the joint force commander an immediate

forcible entry option since they can be launched directly from the continental United States

without the delays associated with acquiring intermediate staging bases or repositioning of sea-

based forces.”15

Airborne forces, in terms of responsiveness and speed to the objective, allow

the joint force commander to execute operations within the enemy’s 24-hour decision cycle.

6

In terms of operational mobility, air transport is far more responsive than surface

transport. The only exception would be if the naval task force just happened to be prepositioned

within immediate striking distance of the objective, which in most situations is not the case. The

prime air transport for airborne assault operations is the C-17 Globemaster III. The C-17 has a

global range with in-flight refueling and can travel at a speed of 450 knots at 28,000 feet.16

There is nothing in the surface transport inventory that can match the speed and operational

reach of the Air Force C-17 Globemaster III. To further illuminate the point, “Aerospace power

projection is more responsive in that it is easier and faster to load planes with a tailored

contingency force package than to load a ship or a train. It is always faster to fly than to drive or

sail over large distances, thus, air power projection is inherently faster.”17

The bottom line is that

the airborne assault is more responsive and timely in terms of operational mobility when one

does a comparative analysis of air transport vs. sea transport capabilities.

The final advantage in terms of factor time that airborne forces present to the joint force

commander is operational surprise. One of the main considerations for operational surprise is

speed to the objective. According to JP-3-18 “Forcible Entry Operations,” airborne operations

are executed by specially trained forces and can be launched at a considerable distance from the

target area with such speed as to cause tactical or operational surprise and prevent effective

action by the enemy.18

Additionally, airborne forces are capable of executing forcible entry

operations at night, in moderate weather conditions, and at low altitudes. These additional

factors increase the chance of defeating an adversary’s early warning radar capability, while

increasing the likelihood of achieving operational surprise. In contrast, amphibious assault

forces must reposition sea-based forces, establish and maintain local sea and air control which

significantly reduces response time and could increase the chance of detection.

7

At the end of the day, both capabilities are responsive; however, in terms of timeliness to

the objective, air transport is inherently faster than sea transport. The time spent steaming at sea

to reposition amphibious forces can be a disadvantage if swift U.S. military intervention is a

requirement. In addition, amphibious operations have to address any mine or submarine threats

present in the operating area, which is unavoidably slow and deliberate. Countermine and

antisubmarine operations are additional time considerations that airborne operations do not have

to contend with in route to the objective area. Gaining local sea control is a time consideration

that can significantly decelerate a commander’s response time.

Operational Factor Space

There are clear operational advantages airborne assault operations present the joint force

commander in terms of factor space. Military theorist Milan Vego defines operational space as,

“both a means and an objective. It is the means because sufficient space is needed to

successfully conduct military operations. It is the objective because to conduct military

operations it is necessary to control a given space.”19

This paper evaluates factor space in terms

of sufficient space and control of a given space.

Amphibious assault operations are constrained by a number of space factors that airborne

operations are not encumbered by when executing a forcible entry. First, when setting the

conditions for an amphibious assault, naval forces must establish temporary local sea control. In

order to secure a sea echelon area to marshal the landing force,20

the Navy must conduct mine

sweeping / clearing operations and establish dominance over an adversary’s submarine

capability. Establishing local sea and air control is critical to the deployment of amphibious

assault forces. Second, once the sea echelon area is secured and local sea control has been

8

established there has to be enough surface space in order to establish sea lanes for the movement

and maneuver of the amphibious forces ashore. Finally, the third and most important space

consideration comes down to choosing the assault force landing objective area, which

traditionally is limited to beachhead landings. In terms of forcible entry, these factor space

limitations present the joint force commander distinct disadvantages for a number of reasons.

First, if a crisis or limited contingency operation breaks out in a land locked country that

requires the U.S. to respond with a forcible entry capability, amphibious assault forces are not

capable of responding by traditional means. There are a total of forty-three land locked countries

in the world;21

a majority of which are in either the African continent or Eastern Europe.

Consequently, both geographical areas have a history of crisis and conflict. Second, it takes time

and space to establish local sea control. If an approach to the beach head is mined or threatened

by an adversary’s submarine capability, both will have to be neutralized, adding time

considerations to the rapid response requirement. Finally, in order for an amphibious assault to

be effective and lethal, traditionally one landing site is selected in order to mass critical

amphibious assault fire and maneuver capabilities ashore to overwhelm the adversary on the

objective. If more than one landing site is chosen, the ability to mass a ground force is sacrificed,

lessening the lethality of the amphibious assault force. Additionally, multiple landing sites

increase the unit’s sea control requirements, thus increasing the total operational space and force

required to establish local sea control.

When evaluating the airborne assault using the same criteria, it could be argued that

airborne forces provide the joint force commander with greater freedom of action. First, setting

the conditions for an airborne assault does not require preparation of a sea echelon area or

9

seaward sector.22

The C-17 Globemaster III’s global operational reach allows the airborne forces

to travel from the aerial port of debarkation (APOD) to the objective. Taking factor time and

space into consideration, once the C-17’s are over the objective it takes airborne assault forces

less than 50 seconds to land. However, airborne forces do require significant USAF support

beyond airlift. Although the “USAF can conduct limited airdrops without air superiority, large

operations require neutralization or suppression of enemy air defenses. This may require

suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), radar jamming, and fighter aircraft escort.”23

However, it is important to point out that this is not a new requirement or threat. The U.S. has

been forced to deal with enemy anti-access / anti-denial (A2AD) capabilities over the last fifty

years. Each time when required the airborne assault has prevailed.

Second, airborne assault is a better use of the exterior position. For example, airborne

operations are capable of bypassing all land and sea obstacles that normally encumber traditional

land and naval forces.24

Airborne assault forces have the ability to be dropped deep behind

enemy lines and strike enemy held territory with little or no warning.25

A detailed analysis of the

enemy’s A2AD capability will identify any uncovered or lightly covered areas that the air force

can exploit in order to punch a hole through to deliver the airborne forces to their target. The

same staff analysis will be applied to amphibious operations; however, the dissimilarity between

the two forcible entry options is that amphibious operations have the added burden of

establishing and maintaining sea control, which is an additional space consideration.

Third, airborne assault presents the joint force commander with the ability to conduct

sequential or concurrent operations by dropping tailored forces on individual or multiple targets

keeping the enemy off balance, otherwise known as the “oil-spot method”. This approach was

10

highly effective in both Operation Just Cause (Panama) and World War II. The “oil-spot

method” was applied once again in contingency planning for operations in Haiti. During the

planning for Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti), “XVIII Airborne Corps and 82d Airborne

Division planners developed three courses of action to conduct an airborne assault, by seizing 40

assault objectives for the flow of follow on forces.”26

This example illustrates the flexibility in

the number of targets an airborne force is capable of influencing. However, a political

agreement was reached while the airborne assault force was in flight to Haiti. It is believed that

the agreement was reached so quickly because the U.S. delegation was able to point to the

massed airborne assault forces in route to enter their country.27

In the end, when evaluating factor space in regards to forcible entry operations as “both a

means and an objective,”28

it would appear that airborne assault is a more advantageous option.

As a means, airborne forces require less secured operating space in route to the objective (Air

Avenue of approach vs. Sea Control). In terms of an objective, airborne forces are capable of

bypassing all land and sea obstacles that normally slow down sea forces to complete its mission.

Additionally, as of 2011, with only thirty one amphibious sea lift ships, amphibious forces are

not capable of influencing as many objectives as their forcible entry counterpart if the mission

required the seizure of multiple assault objectives.29

Operational Factor Force

When evaluating forcible entry options in terms of factor force there are comparative

advantages of both airborne and amphibious assault forces. The term force in its narrowest

meaning pertains to military sources of power that include troops, naval forces, and air forces.30

In terms of evaluating each forcible entry capability there are distinct advantages that airborne

11

operations present the joint force commander: (1) although both forces are flexible and

adaptable, airborne operations have a less overall combined force requirement to deploy; (2)

airborne forces require less shaping of the overall operational environment, and (3) airborne

assault operations are inherently easier to command and control.

When it comes to contingency planning, in either a low-or-high intensity conflict, both

airborne and amphibious assault forces can be tailored to meet the operational requirement. For

example, airborne forces are capable of being task organized to conduct vertical envelopment to

gain a lodgment with as few as 200 paratroopers or up to as many as 18,000. Current planning

figures for airborne insertion are based off of an infantry brigade combat team (ABCT) of

approximately 3,200 paratroopers. Some of the most well-known and studied airborne operations

are the division size operations conducted by the 82nd

Airborne Division in WWII.31

Consequently, the Army has only conducted six large scale airborne operations of 2,500 or more

paratroopers in its history.32

Interestingly, the Army has conducted approximately eleven

combat airborne operations with a battalion to brigade size task force (500-2,500 paratroopers),

and approximately eight small scale forcible entry operations with as little as 100 to 500

paratroopers.33

In terms of transportation requirements, nineteen C-17s are required to conduct

an airborne insertion of the alpha echelon (forcible entry force of 1,900 paratroopers) out of an

ABCT, with an additional seven C-17’s to heavy drop their equipment.34

These planning factors

do not include any additional USAF assets required based off of the enemy air defense threat.

However, it is important to point out that amphibious operations have to deal with not only the

enemy air defense threat; they also have to deal with threats associated with gaining and

maintain sea control, such as countermine and antisubmarine warfare. These additional

requirements will increase the overall combined force requirement.

12

For instance, amphibious operations require the support of both the Navy and Air Force

to support a forcible entry mission. According to JP 3-02 “Amphibious Operations,”

amphibious assault forces require either temporary or local sea control and air superiority.35

Amphibious assault forces not only have to contend with ballistic missiles from the shore, they

also have to contend with the threat of mines and submarine warfare.36

In addition to the USAF

requirements to support SEAD, amphibious operations have a requirement for Navy amphibious

transport ships, countermine and antisubmarine capabilities (threat dependent), as well as

combatant ships to protect the amphibious task force during the operation. The scale of the

combined force required for both operations is dependent on the mission; however the fact that

airborne forces do not have to contend with local or temporary sea control in addition to SEAD

threats is a factor force advantage.

Another planning consideration is that the Marine Corps most responsive capability, the

Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU- 2,200 Marines) “does not regularly conduct opposed

amphibious operations and can only conduct amphibious operations of limited duration and

scope.”37

The Marine Corps prefers to conduct opposed amphibious operations with a Marine

Expeditionary Brigade (MEB – 8,000-18,000 Marines), which obviously increases the joint force

requirement dramatically in terms of surface transport and sea control. This does not mean that

the MEU is not capable of executing an amphibious operation, it just means that according to JP-

02, Amphibious Operations, the Marine Corps prefers to execute with the larger MEB force,

which equates to a larger combined force.

To further illustrate the factor force differences between the two forcible entry

capabilities one only has to turn to the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom. In early

13

“October 2001, approximately 200 airborne forces from 3rd

Battalion, 75th

Ranger Regiment on

board 4 x MC-130’s conducted an airborne assault onto a desert landing strip southwest of

Kandahar, code named Objective Rhino.”38

“Having secured the landing zone, they assisted

follow-on helicopter forces of [Special Operations Forces] SOF Soldiers that had additional raids

to conduct in the area.”39

“One month later, in November 2001, the 15th

Marine Expeditionary

Unit (MEU) conducted the longest amphibious air assault in history with rotary wing assets in

order to build up the base of operations on the desert landing strip, later called Camp Rhino.”40

This narrative illustrates two important points: (1) airborne assault operations can establish a

lodgment with a minimal combined force, and (2) “this particular event demonstrated how rotary

wing assets can supplement the efforts of airborne forces in establishing a forward base of

operations.”41

A perfect example of gaining and maintaining access in today’s operating

environment.

Additional considerations a joint force commander needs to consider prior to

employment are command and control (C2), and operational shaping requirements. As

previously discussed, airborne forces have a less combined force support requirement; however,

they still need air space control in order to reach the target. With the proliferation of surface to

air missile capabilities, the vast majority of nations have some type of A2AD capability that can

threaten airborne forces in route to the objective. However, these threats can be minimized with

additional USAF air assets to conduct if required “counter air, tactical reconnaissance, air

interdiction, electronic warfare, and suppression of enemy air defense.”42

Despite these

additional USAF requirements, it could be argued that it takes less operational shaping to “punch

a hole” through an adversary’s A2AD network than it does to gain local sea control, especially if

the sea operating area is contested. Additionally, the airborne assault requires less preparation of

14

the battlefield because it is not constrained to a particular geographic landing sight like a

beachhead, as discussed earlier. In fact, certain shaping operations could compromise the

element of surprise, which is paramount to airborne forces’ ability to achieve deep operational

maneuver.

As for C2 considerations, airborne operations are easier to command and control than

amphibious assault operations. For example, in airborne operations you only have one

commander. The commander will jump with the Assault Command Post (APC) and exercise C2

of his forces from the APOD until mission completion. Unlike airborne forces who only have

one Commander, amphibious forces have a “Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF)”,

which is always a Navy officer and a “Commander Landing Force (CLF)”, which is always a

Marine.43

This relationship can be extremely tough to manage and could easily cause delays

during the planning phase, rehearsals, and especially during the transfer of command in the

execution phase of the amphibious operation. Having two commanders from different services

executing a combined mission can be contentious and cause delays in the response especially if it

is not regularly trained. Up until January 2012, the last time the Marine Corps conducted a large

scale amphibious assault operation in training or in combat with its Navy counterpart was the

Gulf War.44

A lack in recent training and traditional C2 challenges normally associated with

amphibious assault operations bring to question the Navy-Marine Corps teams’ ability to execute

a forcible entry operation if required in today’s operating environment. In contrast, each airborne

brigade combat team conducts at a minimum two Joint Operations Access Exercises (JOAX)

with the USAF and coalition partners each year. In addition to JOAX exercises, each ABCT

conducts night combat equipped proficiency jumps several times a month focusing on its core

task, forcible entry.

15

When it comes to factor force, “airborne forces may be strategically, operationally, or

tactically employed on short notice to drop zones anywhere in the world,”45

with less force and

less operational shaping required. In terms of overall factor force considerations, the airborne

assault force appears to present the joint force commander a better forcible entry option.

Despite the outlined advantages that airborne forces present to the joint force commander

in terms of factor time, space and force, they are not always the silver bullet. There are at least

three distinct disadvantages associated with employing airborne assault forces that a joint force

commander must consider: (1) amphibious assault forces are more lethal on the objective; (2)

airborne forces are harder to sustain logistically, and finally (3) airborne assault forces, once on

the objective are far less mobile than amphibious assault forces.

The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is the Marine Corps preferred amphibious

assault force.46

By the nature of its size, the MEB provides the joint force commander a much

more lethal and mobile assault force on the objective. A typical MEB ranges anywhere from

8,000 to 18, 000 Marines based on the mission requirement.47

The MEB is a versatile force

consisting of a Ground Combat Element (GCE), an Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and a

Logistics Combat Element (LCE), which is capable of providing up to 30 days of supply. A

reinforced infantry regiment, the GCE has an armor capability, indirect fire capabilities with a

full complement of 155MM Howitzers, 81MM and 120MM mortar systems. In contrast, in an

attempt to be more expeditionary, airborne forces phased out their light armor capability

(Sheridan Tanks) in 1997, with no planned replacement. Also, the ABCT employs the 105MM

Howitzer vice the more lethal 155MM Howitzer organic to the MEB. Finally, unlike the MEB,

airborne assault forces have to rely on the USAF for all fixed wing air capabilities.

16

The ability to conduct sustained offensive operations is an additional advantage in favor

of amphibious assault forces. When a MEB is ordered to conduct an amphibious assault, it is

capable of sustaining itself over a 30 day period.48

In contrast, an airborne assault force jumps

into the objective with only 72 hours’ worth of supplies. If the airborne assault force is not able

to secure a lodgment for the flow of follow on forces in 72 hours, then they will have to be

resupplied by aerial resupply. Consequently, this will increase USAF lift requirements, it will

require assault forces to be pulled away from the objective in order to conduct aerial resupply

operations, and it will increase the risk to subsequent USAF lift assets attempting to re-enter

unsecured airspace. The ability to secure a lodgment for the flow of follow on air land forces is

absolutely critical to sustaining airborne forces.

However, when timeliness and the presence of ground forces are paramount, airborne

operations are the quickest and most flexible method to deploy forces from a military

perspective.49

In terms of delivery platforms and responsiveness, the advantage goes to the

USAF. Additionally, in 2006 the Army went through force modularization. As a result, the 82d

Airborne Division added a fourth airborne infantry brigade combat team and added organic

indirect fire capabilities, engineer support (repair runways and breach obstacles), reconnaissance

support, and a robust brigade support battalion (BSB) to each ABCT. Logistically, this added

four additional days of supply (DOS) up from 17 DOS to 21 DOS in the Bravo Echelon (first air

land force). Additionally, in an attempt to increase lethality, the assault force, will jump in with

up to 16 Anti-Armor TOW High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV); and

each infantry battalion (two in each ABCT) can jump up to 18 Javelins.50

17

The airborne assault force will never be as lethal or as organically sustainable as the

MEB. However, the airborne force more than makes up this shortcoming in speed and agility,

which historically has proven to be critical to seizing the initiative in forcible entry operations.

The airborne assault force was created to be an agile, adaptable, and rapidly deployable force

capable of conducting forcible entry operations anywhere in the world. The future operating

environment may warrant a much larger and more lethal force, in which case amphibious assault

forces may present a better option to the joint force commander. However, in terms of speed to

the objective, airborne assault forces “provide the strategic mobility to be ready to go anywhere

in the world in less than 18 hours.”51

There is no other force in the United States Armed Forces

that is capable of matching the combined effort of the USAF and airborne assault forces with

regard to speed to the operational objective.

Nonetheless, with only two forcible entry options available to the joint force commander,

the U.S. cannot afford to eliminate either option. In fact, overcoming future challenges will

require a comprehensive joint force solution.52

Historically, the complementary employment of

airborne and amphibious assault forces when feasible has proved to be the most effective form of

deep power projection and operational access. The U.S. should resist the efforts to find the one

size fits all solution53

and look to expand joint forcible entry interoperability, focusing on the

ability to conduct simultaneous force projection operations. The days of a one dimensional

response to contingency operations are gone, a combination of both forcible entry options must

be considered. In order to defeat anti-access defenses, the joint force must be able to conduct

simultaneous interoperable forcible entry operations from both the air and maritime domain.

18

1 Joint Forces Group (J59), U.S. Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operating Environment 2010,

(Suffolk, VA, 18 February 2010), 4.

2 Joint Forces Group (J59), U.S. Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operating Environment 2010,

(Suffolk, VA, 18 February 2010), 60.

3 Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, (Washington,

DC: DOD, 8 June 2008), 16.

4 Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Forcible Entry Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-

18, (Washington, DC: CJCS, 16 June 2008), B-2.

5 William D. Wunderle, “Forced In, Left Out: The Airborne Division In Future Forcible Entry

Operations” (monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General

Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies 97-98), 7.


18, (Washington, DC: CJCS, 16 June 2008), I-1.


18, (Washington, DC: CJCS, 16 June 2008), 1-7.

8 Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, (Washington, DC: CJCS, 8 November 2008) 20.

9 Milan N. Vego, Joint Operational Warfare Theory and Practice (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War

College, 2007), III-19.

10 Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Forcible Entry Operations, Joint Publication (JP)

3-18, (Washington, DC: CJCS, 16 June 2008), I-2.

11 Edward J. Sinclair, “The Air Attack Division: Air Land Battle Future’s Operational

Contingency Force?” (monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and

General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1991), 8.

12 The United States Army Special Operations Command, official Website, accessed 3 April

2012, http://United_States_Army_Special_Operations_Command.

13 The United States Army Special Operations Command, official Website, accessed 3 April

2012, http://United_States_Army_Special_Operations_Command.

14 82d Airborne Division Readiness Standard Operating Procedure (RSOP), Fort Bragg, NC,

2011, 1-2.

19

15

Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Forcible Entry Operations, Joint Publication (JP)

3-18, (Washington, DC: CJCS, 16 June 2008), I-7.

16 The U.S. Air force, official Website, “USAF facts,” accessed 3 April 2012,

http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=86.

17 John W. Nicholson, “America's Middleweight Force: Enhancing the Versatility of the 82

nd

Airborne Division for the 21st Century” (monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States

Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1994), 13.

18 Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Forcible Entry Operations, Joint Publication (JP)

3-18, (Washington, DC: CJCS, 16 June 2008), B-1.

19 Milan N. Vego, Joint Operational Warfare Theory and Practice (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval

War College, 2007), III-7.

20 Frank R. Boynton, “Force Projection Operations: Lessons From Amphibious Warfare

Doctrine” (monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff

College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 95-96), 4.

21 Amanda Briney, “The World's Largest Landlocked Countries List of the Ten Largest

Landlocked Countries in the World,” accessed 7 April 2012,

http://geography.about.com/od/politicalgeography/a/landlocked.htm.

22 Frank R. Boynton, “Force Projection Operations: Lessons From Amphibious Warfare

Doctrine” (monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff

College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 95-96), 4.

23 U.S. Army, Field Manual 90-26, Airborne Operations, (Headquarters, Department of the

Army, Washington, DC, 18 December 1990), 1-6, section 1-10b.

24 Gary E. Luck, JR “Inducing Operational Shock To Achieve Quick Decisive Victory: How

Does The Airborne Division Contribute?”(monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States

Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies 98-99), 36.


Does The Airborne Division Contribute?” (monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States


26 William D. Wunderle, “Forced In, Left Out: The Airborne Division In Future Forcible Entry

Operations” (monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General

Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 97-98) 27.

20

27

Global Security, official Website, “History of the 82nd

Airborne Division,” accessed 6 April

2012, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/82abn-history.htm.



29 Congressional Budget Office, The Congress of the United States, Analysis of the Navy’s

Fiscal Year 2012 Shipbuilding Plan (Washington, DC: CBO, June 2011), 21.



31 Matthew J. Konz, “Operational Employment of the Airborne Brigade Combat Team: The

503rd

Parachute Infantry Regiment as a Case Study” (monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United

States Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2009),

1.


503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment as a case Study” (monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS:

United States Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies,

2009), 1.


503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment as a case Study” (monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS:

United States Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies,

2009), 1.


2011, 1-2.

35 Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Amphibious Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-02

(Washington, DC: CJCS, 10 August 2009), I-3.


(Washington, DC: CJCS, 10 August 2009), II-7.



38 The United States Army in Afghanistan “Operation ENDURING FREEDOM October 2001-

March 2003”, official Website, accessed 7 April 2012,

http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Afghanistan/Operation%20Enduring%20Freedom.htm#a

fghan.

21

39

Shawn Shields, “Airborne Forces: A capability to overcome challenges during contingency

operations in immature theaters” (research paper, Naval War College, Joint Military Operations

Department, Newport, RI, 2011), 12.

40 Shawn Shields, “Airborne Forces: A capability to overcome challenges during contingency


Department, Newport, RI, 2011), 12

41 Shawn Shields, “Airborne Forces: A capability to overcome challenges during contingency


Department, Newport, RI, 2011), 13





(Washington, DC: CJCS, 10 August 2009), II-2

44 Tye R. Wallace, “Marine Expeditionary Brigade: Centerpiece of the Future” (monograph, Fort

Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College, School of

Advanced Military Studies, 04-05), 25.










49 Mark S. Childress, “Are Large Scale (Brigade Combat Team or Regimental Level and Above)

United States Army Airborne Operations Effective In the Context of 21st Centry Warfare?”

(monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College,

School of Advanced Military Studies 2008), 35.


2011, 1-2

22

51

Mark S. Childress, “Are Large Scale (Brigade Combat Team or Regimental Level and Above)

United States Army Airborne Operations Effective In the Context of 21st Centry Warfare?”

(monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College,

School of Advanced Military Studies 2008), 38.

52 Keith C. Walker and Richard P. Mills, Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army-Marine

Corps Concept, (Washington DC: The Director, U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center and

the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, March 2012), 7.

53 Keith C. Walker and Richard P. Mills, Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army-Marine

Corps Concept, (Washington DC: The Director, U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center and

the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, March 2012), 15.

23

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Boynton, Frank R. “Force Projection Operations: Lessons From Amphibious Warfare Doctrine.”

Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff

College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1995-96.

Briney, Amanda. “The World’s Largest Landlocked Countries List of the Ten Largest

Landlocked Countries in the World.” Accessed 7 April 2012.

http://geography.about.com/od/politicalgeography/a/landlocked.htm.

Childress, Mark S. “Are Large Scale (Brigade Combat Team or Regimental Level and Above)

United States Army Airborne Operations Effective In the Context of 21st Centry

Warfare?” Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and

General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies 2008.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.

Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Donnelly, Thomas, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker. Operation Just Cause: The Storming of

Panama. New York: Lexington Books, 1991.

Global Security. “History of the 82nd

Airborne Division.” Accessed 6 April 2012.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/82abn-history.htm.

Headquarters, 82d Airborne Division. Division Readiness Standard Operating Procedure

(RSOP). Fort Bragg NC, 2011.

Konz, Matthew J. “Operational Employment of the Airborne Brigade Combat Team: The 503rd

Parachute Infantry Regiment as a Case Study.” Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS:

United States Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military

Studies 2009.

Luck, Gary E. “Inducing Operational Shock To Achieve Quick Decisive Victory: How Does The

Airborne Division Contribute?” Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army

Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies 1998-99.

Nicholson, John W. “America’s Middleweight Force: Enhancing the Versatility of the 82nd

Airborne Division for the 21st Century.” Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United

States Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies,

1994.

24

Nordyke, Phil. All American, All the Way: The Combat History of the 82nd Airborne Division in

World War II. St Paul, MN, Zenith Press; 1st edition, 2005.

Shields, Shawn. “Airborne Forces: A capability to overcome challenges during contingency

operations in immature theaters.” Research paper, Naval War College, Joint Military

Operations Department, Newport, RI, 2011.

Sinclair, Edward J. “The Air Attack Division: Air Land Battle Future’s Operational Contingency

Force?” Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General

Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1991.

Sullivan, Gordon R. The U.S. Army: A modular Force for the 21st Century. Torchbearer National

Security Report. Arlington Virginia: Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United

States Army, 2005.

The Congress of the United States. Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2012 Shipbuilding Plan.

Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, June 2011.

The United States Air Force. “USAF factsheet.” Accessed 3 April 2012.

http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=86.

The United States Army in Afghanistan. “Operation Enduring Freedom: October 2001-March

2003.” Accessed 7 April 2012

http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Afghanistan/Operation%20Enduring%20Freedo

m.htm#afghan,).

The United States Army Special Operations Command. Accessed 3 April 2012.

http://United_States_Army_Special_Operations_Command.

U.S Headquarters Department of the Army. Airborne Operations. Field Manual (FM) 90-26.

Washington, DC, 18 December 1990.

U.S Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Department of Defense Dictionary of

Military and Associated Terms. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Washington, DC: CJCS, 8

November 2008.

U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Forces Group (J59). The Joint Operating Environment 2010.

Suffolk, VA. 18 February 2010.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Amphibious Operations. Joint

Publication (JP) 3-02. Washington, DC: CJCS, 10 August 2009.

25

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Forcible Entry Operations. Joint

Publication (JP) 3-18. Washington, DC: CJCS, 16 June 2008.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Operations. Joint Publication (JP)

3-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 17 September 2006 Incorporating Change 2 22 March 2010

U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense. National Defense Strategy. Washington DC: DOD,

8 June 2008.

Vego, Milan N. Joint Operational Warfare Theory and Practice. Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War

College, 2007

Walker, Keith C., and Richard P. Mills. Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army-Marine

Corps Concept. Washington DC: The Director, U.S. Army Capabilities Integration

Center and the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,

March 2012.

Wallace, Tye R. “Marine Expeditionary Brigade: Centerpiece of the Future.” Monograph, Fort

Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College, School of

Advanced Military Studies 2004-05.

Wunderle, William D. “Forced In, Left Out: The Airborne Division In Future Forcible Entry

Operations” Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and

General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies 97-98.

airborne assault forces_2012

Documents