PUTNAM'S HISTORY OF AIRCRAFT

PUTNAM'S HISTORY OF AIRCRAFT

Aircraft of theSecond World WarThe Developm.ent of the

Warplane 1939-45

Series Editor: Philip Jarrett

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nIle p<1ge photograph: l'SAAF />-5 J .l lltslaltgs Olt line resA ir Force I ,I I J H Taylor}

Aircraft of tire Second lIo rld li arTire Development of lire lIarpla"e 1939-45

Ser-ies Ed itor: Phil ip Ja r r e ttPhilip jar re tt is a freela nce author. editor. sub­ed itor and consultant specialising in aviati on .He began writing on aviation histo ry in 1967.an d in 19 71 became ass istant ed itor ofAerospace, the Royal Aeron au tical Soc iety'snewspaper . He was assistant editor of AeroplaneJlomh{vfrom 1973 to 1980. and pr oduct ionedit or of H ighl Internat ional from 1980 10

1989.

.\ t J F BowyerMichael Bowyer's int erest in aviat ion wasawoken when the hug e KI D1 airship passedlow overhead . By the mid- 1930s he wasrecording and soo n photographing aircraft . andth roughout the hostilities he co mpiled cop iousrecords of the events fro m a ring side scat. Afterserving in the RAF he became a leading avi­ation histor ian. journalist and autho r. co mbin­ing these act ivities wi th an academic career.

Cap tain Eric BrownCa ptain Eric Brown . the fleet Air Arm 's mostdecorated pilo t, had a th irty-one- year career inthe Royal N avy, He served as test pilot fro m19.t 2. eventually be ing appointed Chief Naval"les t Pilot at RAE Farnbo rough and co mmand­ing the Enem y Aircraft Flight. the l ligh SfX'Cd"li gh t and the Aerod ynami cs Fligh t. He co n­tinued test flying afte r the war. amassing aworld record total of -18 7 ba sic aircr aft typesbefore retirement.

R Wall a ce C la rkeR 'X'allace C larke has written wid ely o n aircra ftarmament for specialist ioum als, and his twoauthoritative volumes o n BrinshAircraftA nn .;11tem . published in 199 3 and 199 .t. werewidely acclaimed . He is also the UK represent­ative of the -I92nd Group Assoc iation. and hasproduced an acco unt of the grou p's secre tSecond \X'or ld \t'ar ope rations,

Les Coom besAfter service in the RAF from 193946 LesCoo mbes became a researcher and writ er onavionics and ergonomi cs. He specialises in thehisto ry of air force technology and in the de­sign and history of the aircraf t cockpi t. He isthe author of 111£ A ircraft Cockpir and TheFigh, ing Cock pil 1914-2010.

Xorrnan FriedmanNorman Friedman works as a naval analyst atthe Hu dson lnsut ute in X ew York and lectur esaround the world . Descri bed as 'America'sleading naval write r" he is the autho r of over20 boo ks an d numerous articles includingBritish CarrierAt'i.,Jlio". lr:'mh ip lksig" .;"JDcv elotnncnt and Slltul R.;JiJr. His updatededition of the highly acclaimed S /lt v llml iw uGuide 10 U'QrlJ X llt u /lreupom s:.".f lelll.f hasrecently been published .

j oh n G ul leyjohn G ollcy trained in Ca nad a on T iger .\ Iorhsand Harvards, the n co mpleted an AFU courseon .\tasters in the UK before conve rtin g toHurricanes and Typhoons. During 19·0--45 heflew with 245 Squadron. and then became aflying instructor. H is boo ks include Aircrm:C"li",i,eJ. the sto ry o f the Co mmonwealth AirTraining Plan .

Patr ick HassellPatr ick Hassell. an acrodynamicist , worked forHan dley Page. BAC . Douglas and Saab. Aftertwent y-five years in industr y he left DowtyPropellers in 1994 to co ncentrate on research­ing aviat ion history. particul arly in the areas ofaero naut ical tec hnology. air tra nsport . and thepol itical con tro l of aviatio n d evelopment.

Peter HearnG roup Ca p tain Peter Hearn. AFC. served 30years as an RAF Parachu te jumping Instruct or .training and serving with Airborne f orc es andthe SAS . He is the au tho r of seven books onaviation topi cs includ ing The S ky H'ople. hisinternationally acclaimed history of parachut­ing . He is also a novelist, a pu blished poet an da teach er of creative wr itin g.

E R Hoot onE R Hoot on . a defence wr iter, has writtennumerou s ar ticles for inte rnational pu blication .He pr oduces naval reference publicatio ns forjane's Inform ation G roup. and has wri ttenhooks on the C hinese C ivil War, the Tanke rWar and the Luftwaffe from 1918 to 1940 . Heis cu rrently completing ano ther hook on theLu ftwaffe for Arm s & Armour Pres s, taking thestory to 19.t-l .

Andrew Xah u mAndrew Xahurn has been fasci nated byeng ines eve r since his mother bought him anoisy Italian model aircra ft motor as a youngboy. He has wr itten widely on au tomo tivehistor y an d his books include TI't' RotaryAeroE"g ine,Alec Issieonis. and . as co-a uthor. TheRolls-R oy ce C recv. He is C ura to r ofAeron aut ics at the Science .\tuseum. London .

D r Al fred P r iceDr Alfred Price served as an aircre w officer inthe RAF. specia lising in electro nic warfa re andair fight ing tactics . Upon leaving the Service in19 7-1 he became a full-time aviation writer . andis the author or co -au tho r of 4 1 hooks . includ­ing i nstruments of D.J rk,,~.fS. Battle of Brita in: theHardest 0 ..,) -,an d 77,e S pilfi rr St ory. He ho lds aHistor y PhD from Lo ugh ho rough Univers ityand is a Fellow of the Royall Iistorical Soc iety.

Elfu n ;:IP ReesElfan ap Rces has been involved with hel i­cop ters for more tha n thirty years. owni ng an dpublishing the news journals Hd u"pltTInternational an d Hetidata S £u's and. from1969 . building up a unique collection of his­toric roro rcraft which formed the nucleu s oftoday's Int ern ation al Helicop ter .\ t useu m, l lealso represent s the helico pte r industry onseveral nation al and international bodies, andat weekend s flies his own vintag e helicopter torelax and maintain cu rre ncy.

Derek WoodDerek \X'Olld was founder ed ito r/pu blisher ofJ.J"~ s Dtfi.."aU·;:ek{\,. He has been an aviationand defence writer for over .t5 years. and wasthe London edito r of Interaviu gro u p of publi­cati ons from 1953 to 198 6 and air cc rres pon­dent for vario us newsp ape rs fro m 1961 1(1

1986 . H is hooks include 771£ S .;rrr.,", Jfu rg'i" .Project Ca ncelled. ToJrgt.'l !:'"gkm J and Allurktr lim illg RfJ .

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Contents

Introduction

Axis Aircraft at the Outbreak of War

Allied Aircraft Development in the Early War Years

Fighter D evelopment, lvlid- 194 1 to Mid-I 945

The Bomber Revolution

Airrnobility: Aircraft in Support of G round Forces

Naval Aircraft in the Second World War

The Helicopter's First War

Armament Di ver sifies

The Well-equipped Warplane

Propulsion

Testing and Ferrying

Training: a Vital Command

Index

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Putnam Aeronautical Boob 1997All rights reserved . ~o part of thi s book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form without pri or written permission from the publisher.

First published in G reat Britain in 1997 by Putn am Aeronautical BooksPutnam Aeronautical Books is

a divi sion of C hrysalis Books pic8 Blenheim Cour t

Brewery RoadLondon l':7 91'0"):'

www.pumamaeronautical.com

A member of the Chrysalis Group pic

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

A C IP catalogue record for thi s book is available from the Briti sh Library.Library o f Congr ess Catalonging-in-Publication Data : A catalog re-cord for this boo k is available on re-quest.

ISBS 0 85177 875 5

Typeset in M onotvpe Plantin by Strathmore Publi shing Servi ces, London ~7

Printed and bound in Spain

[Bibliographies are inclu ded at the end of each chapter]

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IntroductionPhil ip Jarrett

The year s 1939-45 saw rap id and unpreceden ted devel­opment in all spheres of aviation, as the warring nationsvied to gain a technological edge over their opponentsand win mastery of the skies, and thereby secure ultimatevictor y. Designers, enginee rs and scientists in industryand in research institutions laboured to imp rove theaeroplane and enhance its capabilities and equipment .

By the end of the Second World War enorm ousstr ides had been made, not only in weap onry and de­structive power , but in all of the essential technologiesthat would revoluti oni se air transport in the years ahead.For all its grim horror , the war acce lerate d the aero ­plane's development as noth ing else could have done.While it is undeniably tru e that mu ch wartime researchand developme nt work concentrated on what might betermed the destructive arts , equal or greater effort wasdevoted to the saving of lives and improving the perfor­mance, reliability and ergonomics of the complex ma­chine that the aero plane was becoming.

Supercharging enhanced the altitude performance ofthe piston engine, radar helped the pilot find his way atnight and locate other aircraft, new systems made flyingsafer and more comfo rta ble for aircrew, and the adventof the jet engine herald ed a new era in the conquest ofthe skies, offering hitherto undream ed- of speeds just asthe piston engined, propeller-driven aeroplane wasreachin g the limits of its development .

In these pages leading aviation writ ers pre sent an au­thorit ative account of this dramati c era in the history ofaviation techn ology, To set the scene, E. R. Hooton sur­veys the air arms of the Axis forces at the outbreak ofhostilities in 1939, examining their equipment and thepolitical, militar y, economical and technological facto rsor philosophies that had shaped them and either fur­thered or frus trated their development. It was not nu­merical strength that made Germany's air force the mostpowerful, as in this sense it was dwarfed by the Soviet AirForce.The secret of its strength lay in the modern designof the vast majority of its aircraft, Italy's RegiaAeronautica, altho ugh regarded as seco nd only to theGe rma n air force, suffered as a result of an under­capitalised aircraft industr y, an apparent reluc tan ce toabando n biplane fighters, a lack of suitably powerful aeroeng ines and the absence of a doctr ine of air power. Botharms , however , had used the Spanish Civil \Var as a test­ing gro und for their new front-line aircraft, allowingboth pilots and gro un d crew to become familiar withthem under combat conditions, and enabling initial

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mechanic al or ope rational shortcomings to be pin­pointed and resolved .

Jap an 's proving ground was the conflict with Ru ssiain 1939, where the inadequacies of its aircraft becam edisastrously evident. The problem s in this case were thattechn ologically modern aircraft were being built to out­moded requirements, and the conse rva tism of militarytraditionalists inhibited the development of modern tac­tical philosophies.

Derek Wood's survey of the development of Alliedaircra ft in the early war years spo tlights the mann er inwhich Germany's neighbours left the modernisation oftheir air arms too late, some adhering to the naive beliefthat their neutrality would be respected , and others trust­ing in static defenc es or outmo ded tactical concepts.Thefailure of the Euro pean aviation industry to meet thesudde n and overwhelming demand for modern combataircraft resulted in the USA's manu facturers receivingorde rs for a variety of types.This had the fortuitous ef­fects of bringing about an expa nsion of the Americancompanies' pro duction facilities and of enabling them toassess their pro ducts' performance in operational serviceand introduce improvements before the USA actuallyentered the war. In some instances, however, this had un­for tuna te results for the custo mer nations. T hose whoorde red the Bell Airacobra, Brewster Buffalo and Cur tissHawk 75A, for example, found to their dismay that theirinvestme nts had been wasted, and that their brand newfighters were no match for the Luftwaffe 's Bf 109s.T rag ically, the need was so desperate that some of theseaircraft were then put to work in India and the Far East,where they proved equally vulnerabl e to their Japan esecounte rparts.

However , there were grea t success sto ries. Out­stand ing examples were the No rth Am erican Mustangand 1\ litchell, Lockheed Hudson , Dou glas Boston ,Boeing 13-1 7 and Consolidated Liberator , all of whichsaw widespread usc afte r initial teething troubl es wereresolved,

Britain's industr y, too, had its share of failures andsuccesses.The Fairey Battle and \'\'estland Whirlwind didnot come up to expec tations, but othe rs, suc h as theAHo .\ lanchester and Hawker Typh oon , were trans­formed from problem children into mature and potentwarri or s. Development poten tial is the hallmark of greatdesign , and the aircraft lacking in this attr ibute, suc h asthe Hurricane and Stirling, flew br iefly into the spo tlightand then receded, Those having it in abundance were

AIR CRAF T OF THE SE C O:-;n \X'ORLD \\ 'AR

the Spitfire and ,\ Iosquito, the latter also being endo wedwith extraordinary versatility; a great asset in war. Oncthing many of thc successful machines had in commonwas the Rolls-Royce ,\ Ierlin engine, another productwhich had great development potential.

Russia's great strength at the war's outset lay in itsability to take the aggressor 's first mighty and unexpect­ed blow and then , after a massive logistics exercise inwhich its threatened factories were withdrawn to thedepths of this vast country, to rally, recoup its losses andhit back with a vengeance. It was fortunate for bothBritain and the USSR that Germany had failed to devel­op a successful long-range bomber, Had Hitler been ableto cripple the centres of manufacrure of either nation,the outco me would have been very different.

T he story of fighter development from 1941 onwardsis taken up by Dr Alfred Price, who begins by surveyingthe continuing and parallel development of Britain 'sSpitfire and Germ any's Bf 109, and the disadvant ages ofsuch prolonged continuation of a line, He then turn s hisattention on new fighter types introduced into serviceduring the war by Britain, Germany, the USA, japan andthe USSR, und erlining the essential requir ements of en­gine and armament and how these were affected by thespecific role or operational situatio n, Comparative per­formance da ta highlight the relative merits and demeritsof the principal types,

Nightfighting placed the emphasis on quite differentfighter attributes. and the section dealing with this aspectopens with an outline of Britain's night air defence sys­tem, at the time the only really effective system of its typein the world, and the way in which the fighter s operatedwithin it. The Luftwaffe system evolved on similar linesbut took longer to develop, and the incessant 'battle ofthe boffins' to devise increasingly better radars and , inresponse, more effective radar countermeasures, is acentral them e,

The use of the fighter-bomber was pioneered by theLuftwaffe, but once its advantages were perceived bytheir opponents the type became an important compo­nent of all of the combatant forces, Unlike a bomber, thefighter-bo mber could revert to its pure fighter role anddefend itself once it had released its bombs , MoreO\'er, itwas cheaper, required fewer crew, and had far betterspeed and altirude perform ance. Disadvantages were thesmall bomb load and limited radius of action, Such air­craft demand ed new operational techn iques and special­ly developed weapons, parti cularly for use againstdifficult targets such as tanks, Dr Price exposes the fal­lacy of the much-vaunted air-laun ched unguided rocketprojectile, which lacked accuracy and was quite ineffec­tive against arm oured vehicles.

He concludes with a survey of the developm ent anduse of rocket- and jet-propelled fighters, Interestingly,both Lu ftwaffe and RAF senior officers initially

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regarded their respective types, the Me 262 and Meteor,with almost casual interest , seeing them as outside oftheir requirements. However, once the ,\ Ie 262 hadproved its worth against US heavy bom bers and theBritish got word of Ge rman developm ents, both sidespursued the subject with vigour , Dr Price dismisses thepostwar myths that the Me 262 was not put into large­scale production early enough, and that Hitler' s edictthat the aircraft should initially be used as a fighter­bomber caused any appreciable delay in its operationalintroduction as a fighter.The great weaknesses of the " Ie262 were its un reliable engines and poor serviceab ility,and a comparison of victories claimed against losses re­veals poor results.

The spec tacular narure of the diminutive Me 163rocket-pro pelled interceptor belied its disappointing anddangerous Service use, and again we are presented withfigures which show it to have been far from successful incomba t.

Speculat ion can be a pointless pursuit, but the revela­tion of the outstanding superiority of the Vampire I whencompared with the Spitfire XIV, in all aspects of combatperformance, makes one wond er how the jet fightermight have affected air combat had the war continued.In truth, however, the jet fighters had a negligible influ­ence on the war,

In his chapter 'The Bomber Revolution ', ,\ likeBowyer stresses the differing tactica l philosophies thatdeterm ined the approaches taken by the various warrin gnations, Whilc Germany had concentrated on the small­er, short- range twin engined medium bombers and sin­gle engined Stuka s, believing dive-bomb ing to be anessential capability if accuracy was to be achieved,Britain 's bomber force was initially form ed with the aimof waging a strategic campai gn to destroy the enemy'sindu stries and navy, and therefore comprised long-rangetwin engine bombers, with a new generation of four en­gine heavy bombers under development . In both casesthe resulting machines initially proved inadequate andvu lnerable in the face of determined opposition, andboth sides learn ed their respective lessons the hard way,suffering little success and heavy losses.

\X'hile Britain upgraded only the Wellington , prefer­ring to introd uce completely new types, Germany fol­lowed a path of continua l upd ating of the originaldesigns, A significant contribution to the Allied causecame from the USA, where several excellent bombers ofvarious classes were developed, as mentioned earlier, InRussia the emphasis was again on twin-cngined mediumbomb ers, though one four engined strategic heavybomb er, the Pe-8, was developed. Ge rmany's only tru ebomb er in this class, the He 177, was dogged throu ghoutits operational life by inter minable powerplant problems,and never realised its potential.

japan put range before defence in bomber design,

and its twin engine bombers were suited to both armyand navy use, Again vulnerability was a major problem.An alternative solution was the high-speed unarm edbomber.This concept was embodie d with great successin the .\ losquito, originally dismissed by BomberCommand's Co mmander-in-C hief as being of no use,but soon to prove its worth - and with a significantlylower loss rate compared with its Bomb er Co mmandcontemporaries, as the auth or shows.

ja pan was the only nation to resort to the desperatemeasure of mass suicide or Kamikaze attac ks, mostlyusing ageing aircraft adapted for the purpose, but alsowith the purpose-designed Ohka, essentially nothin gmore than a rocket-propelled piloted bomb. Althoughthere can be no doubting the success of many of theseoperations, the cost in pilots' lives was horre ndous.

T he aerop lane which brought the war with japan toits climactic end was the B-29 Superfor tress, the evolu­tion of which had begun in 1938, before the war hadeven started, It was the most technologically advancedpiston engined heavy bomber of the war, but Germanyprogressed a stage further, developing the world' s firstopera tional jet bomber, the Arado Ar 23413. As the au­thor point s out in his conclusion, the prin cipal elementsof the Co ld \Var were ready at the war's end ; the jetbomber, the cruise missile (embodied in the VI) and theatomic bomb.

Airmobility, or the transpo rt of troops and equipmentby aircraft, came into its own in the Second \X'orld \X'ar,Peter Hearn describes how the Ge rman assault on theLow Co untries, using paratroops and glider-borne in­fantry, took the defenders completely by surprise .Although both the Russians and Italians, as well as theGe rmans, had developed the concept of airborne opera­tions in the interwar years, Britain was conspicuouslyslow in recognising both the threat and the potenti al ofsuch assaults, and lacked not only the aircraft but alsothe knowledge to follow suit. Thus disadvantaged,Britain's armed services had an uphill struggle to catchup with the techn ology, but were able to begin opera­tions in 1941. In the USA as well the military were slowto adop t the concep t, but at least they had the C-47, apurpose-built transpo rt which was to become the Allies'principal air-support aircraft, and ample produ ction fa­cilities well beyond the enemy's reach,The successfu l useof airborne divisions in the invasion of Europe and tosupport the Rhine crossing demonstrated that the lessonhad been learnt , but the disaster at Arnhem und erlinedthe cost of bad planning.

As Norm an Friedman shows, the part of the aero­plane in the war at sea was significant. Neither Germanynor Italy had any aircraft carriers, but large forces ofthese vessels were operated by Britain, japan and theUSA, In addition, land -based aircraft and seaplanes wereused in maritime roles by all of the maier powers,

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Although recon naissance and fleet protection were theroles initially performed by naval aircraft , the carriersalso served as floating bases from which strikes could belaunched, using torpedo and dive bombe rs. Naval air­craft also proved an effective deterrent to submarines,and convoy protection by land- and carrier-based air­craft, using prog ressively imp roved radar systems, be­came a vital and effective duty,

Both Britain and the USA suffered from the inabilityof the different Services to agree on their respective re­sponsibilities. T hus the RAF regarded its flying boats asan alternative to the fleet, and the Royal Na vy was notpermitted to have land-attack aircraft. In the USA it wassome time before the US Navy assumed responsibilityfor all maritime patro l aircraft, having hitherto been rc­stricted to carrier aircraft and water-based machines. Onthe othe r hand , the japanese navys freedom to use what­ever aircraft it wanted resulted in much duplicated effortand imposed a strain on the nation 's industries.

New techn ology and techn iques had to be developedfor attacking capital ships, both with bombs and torpe­does, and for operating aircraft from carriers which , inturn, imposed limits on aircraft size and weight.Furthermore, the limited num ber of aircraft that couldbe carried meant that one aircraft type might be requiredto perform several different roles, which effectively com­promised its design . The great variety of aircraft dcvel­oped to meet the wide range of requirements is apparentin the author's country-by-country survey.

It might be thought that rota ry-winged aircraft playedan insignificant part in the Second World War, but Elfanap Rees' chapter shows that the leadin g comba tant na­tions evinced a continued interest in their possibilities,and that rotorcraft were more active than is generally re­alised, Britain, Fran ce, Germany, japan and Russia allemployed autogyros of various types in a variety of roles,and helicopter developments by Focke-Achgelis andFlenner in Ge rmany and Sikorsky in the USA resulted inpractical machines which saw Service use in the latteryears of the war. In Britain, developm ent of the Weir he­licopter having been abando ned early in the war, theSikorsky helicopter was adop ted, but was not used oper­ationally before the war's end .

R Wallace Clarke's study of the developm ent of air­cra ft armament is divided of necessity into sections deal­ing with guns, gunsighting, powered gun turrets androcket weapons, each section then being subdivided intothe respective nations. As in all other aspects of the aero­plane's evolution, the 'baptism of fire' quickly revealedthe shortco mings of the various weapons and weapon in­stallations. Some lessons were surprising. Few pilotscould hit anything at ranges greater than two or threehundred yards, density and rate of fire was more impor­tant than the calibre of the shells, and solid steel shellswere more destructive than high-explosive projectiles .

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E R Hooton

The Henschel Hs 126 Corps aircraft had largely replaced the Hei..kel He 45 a..d He 46 in the Nahaufhlarungsstaffel.nby the outbreak of rm r,

conc ept of the Operational (Operaticer) Art, withStrategy confined to activi ty above army group level,' Ib is philosophy subsequently helped define military air­craft requirements,

Tactical operations were largely the resp onsibility ofthe Nahaufklarungsstaffeln on land and the Seenahauf­klarung sstaffeln as well as the Bordflicgerstaffeln at sea ,'[b e forme r were attached to Armee Kor ps and PanzerDivisionen and were essentia lly what the Royal FlyingCorps in the First World War had called Corps Aero­planes , single-engined two-seaters with the roles of tacti­cal reconnaissance (visual and ph otograph ic), artilleryobservation and direction , gro und attack and resupply,T heir floatpl ane equi valents in the Royal Naval AirService had similar tactic al reconnaissanc e and artillerysupport du ties, but responsibility for coasta l anti-subma­rine operations repla ced gro und-attack/resupply duti es,

In most of Europ e's air forces, Corps Aeroplanescomprised 20 to 40 per cent of the total first-linestre ngth , but in the Lu ftwaffe they were only 7,5 percent , '[b e major ity of the Nahaufk.liirungsstaffeln wereequipped with the Henschel Hs 126, a stressed-skinmonocoq ue, braced-wing monop lane with a radialengine and fixed unde rcarr iage , It was typical of the lastgeneration of such aircraft , being designed for operationfrom small , roughly prepared fields 10 a require me ntwhich emphasised visibility from the semi-enclosed

1Axis Aircraft at the Outbreak ofWar

Ge r m anyAt the outbreak of war in September 1939 Germany'sReich sluftwaffe was the world 's most powerful air force,This status was achieved not merely nume rically, for itsfirst-line stre ngth of 4,093 aircraft was nearly half that ofthe Sovi et Air Force (which had 7,32 1 on New Year'sDay 1939), but on the fact that the vast major ity ofits airc raft (92 per cent) were of modern design andconstruction,

Ge rma ny's success in completing aeria l re-equiprnentbefore its enemies gave the Luftwaffe an edge which itused to devastating effect over the next three years, Theedge was mad e keener by the structure and philosophyof the Lu ftwaffe, which was far more than the purely tac­tical force which most post-war aviation historians claim,Indeed , had it been a tactical force it would never havespearheaded Nazi Ge rma ny's success, but to understandits philosophy requires a slight diversion into Germ anmilitary thought ,

In the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars the Ge rma nGeneral Staff recognised that the appearance of massarmies meant that the old division of military operationsinto Tactics and Strategy was inadequate,They thereforeconfined Tactics to operations by army corps and theircompo nent un its (although these could be extended toarmies in certain circu mstances), and the activities ofarmies and army groups now came under the new

Ph ilip Jar rett

by Dr Price, but while one author is considering the air­craft from the point of view of the technology it embod­ied, the other is concerned with its effectiveness as acombat aircraft. ' Ib is serves to remind us that there areat least two sides to every que stion , and that conclusionsdepend to a large degree on the approaches on whichthe y arc ba sed ,

The second part of this chapter, contributed byPatrick Hassell, looks at the extraordinary businessof aircraft ferr ying , both within the British Isles fromfactory to Service unit, and across vast oceans and con­tinents, It is no usc having new aero planes pouringfrom the production lines if you cannot get them 10 theplaces where they arc desperately needed, and the ac­compl ishments of the Air Transport Auxiliary, theAtlantic Ferry Organisation and the Return FerryService were impressive, to say the least. The impact ofthe experience gaine d in intercontinent al operations onthe postwar deve lopment of commercial air tra nspo rtwas surely profound,

This volume concludes with john Go lley's account ofthe training systems ado pted by Ge rmany and the Allies,The title 'Vital Co mma nd ', chose n by him, stresses theimportance of training to all air arms, and the essentia land basic need for a syste m tha t ensures a continualflow of well-trained airc rew, Closely allied to this, ofcour se, was the provision of suita ble aircraft on which totra in the m, The au thor shows tha t the Lu ftwaffe hadample facilities and recruits, but tha t its training syste mwas inadequ ate and bega n 10 fragme nt owing 10 theurgent need to replace combat losses, whereas theEmpire Flying Training Scheme tapped resourcesaround the world, '\\oreO\'er, the significant contributionof the USA ensured that there was an ample supply ofwell-trained aircrcw to operate the machines,

Last, but by no means least, mention must be madeof artist Frank ,\ Iunger's splendid cutaway drawi ng ofthe Hawker Typhoon, und oubtedly the first suc h draw­ing of this aircraft ever produced , '[b e aim in this seriesis to featu re a cutaway in each volume, the aircraftselected being typical of the peri od covered rather thanexceptional. ' [b e Typhoon suits this cr iterion admirably,being very much a prod uct of the Second World \Var erawith regard to its design, structure and powerplan t.

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A I RC R A FT O F T HE S E C O:-;IJ 'X' ORI.IJ " ' AR

Wh ile Britain and the USA concentrated on output , re­liability and commonality of ammunition , Germany up­graded its weapons constantly and produced a widerange of new type s of gun , Nor was commonality a pri­ority of the japanese, the navy using different weapon s tothe army, and both Services mixing type s and calib res,

The sights used with the guns, and the turrets inwhich the gu ns were mounted, were as rich in their var i­ety as the guns themselves, and both were subject to con­stant development and improvement, Unguided rocketswere fairly basic devices, but Germany pioneered theguided missile with its wire-guided X4 and radio-guidedHs 293 ,

Every aeroplane embodies a number of systems andan assortment of equipment, some vital to the machineitself or its crew, and some 10 enable the aircraft 10 per­for m its appointed task, In C hapter 9 Les Coombs viv­idly illustrates the great adva nces made in the war years,and the rapidly increas ing complexity of the machinethat was the aeroplane, 'Well-equipped ' is, o f course , arelative term that cha nges in accord an ce with the stan­dard s of eac h parti cular period , Althou gh the aircraft ofthe early war period might have bee n regard ed as repre­senting the latest in technological acco mplishment , theywere not total 'weapons systems ' as we now und erstandthe term, Ind eed, compared with the machines of the latewar period they seem relatively simp le in some respects,The incessant ba ttle 10 increase safety and save valuab lepilots' lives, imp rove the performance and capabilities ofthe machine and counte r or outsmart the opponentmeant that significant progress was made in the fiveyears of war.

Andrew Nahum's short chapter on aero enginesestablishes the state of eng ine development at the war'soutbreak and looks at the problems engine desig nersfaced as they sought 10 improve efficienc y and reliabili­ty, The allied and inseparable subjects of high-octanefuels and supercharging are also covered, as are prob­lematic engines, Finally, the hurdles confronting thedesigners of the first jet engines arc outlined,

Chapter II com prises contributions from twoau thors, Capt Eric Brown , an accomplished test pilot,desc ribes the role of flight testing in warti me and high­lights some specific aspects and aircraft. His assessmentof the ,\ Ie 163 as a 'land mark in aviation tech nology'might seem 10 be at variance with the opinion exp ressed

AIR CRAFT O F THE SE CO:-;O ,"'OR!.D ," 'AR AXIS .~ t R C R A F T AT T HE OUTB REA K O F ,"' A R

Inadequate defen sive armament led to redesign of the Dornier Do I 7's fonca rd f uselage, and this cersion entered service ill thesummer of 1938 as the Do 172, seen here.Although the ai rcraf t had only a small bomb bay, it teas frequently used fo r loui-lerelsu rprise attacks because its shoulder mounted tcings made it easier fo r pilot s to judge their alt itude.

jumo 205C diese ls proved extremely unreliable, al­though they provi ded exceptional ope rating economy.H owever, rad ial engined versio ns proved popular abroadand they serve d with five air forces.

The other two were designed to follow ano ther typ­ical 1930s fashion, the conce pt of a bomber fast eno ughto outpace enemy fighte rs. T he concept reflected thetechnological revolutio n created by comb ining light­weight monocoq ue, stressed-ski n airframes with power­ful eng ines at a time whe n fighte r design emphasisedman oeuvrability at the expense of speed and firepower.Against biplane or braced-wing monoplane fighter s thefashion proved sound. as the He I II and Do 17 were todemonstrate during the next two years. Both wereelegant, streamlined des igns, but experience in theSpanish Civil War, and natural caution , dictated astrengthening of defensive armament to supplementself-scaling tanks.The He 1111'- 1 had only three M G 15

11" H eillkel H e III 1'3 (formerly H e III b) of 1935 was thesecond bomber prototype and the pattern for the under­pouered He IlIA series tcith BMWI'I 6.02 eng ines. Onlytchen the Daimler-Benz 600 and Jlmkers JIIIIIO u'ere intro­du ced did the He 111 become the fo rmida ble aircraft ichichUlli the 'third leg' of the K ampfg ruppen.

well as cramped, but it was cheaper to build and in 19-11was selected for production.

The naval equivalent of the Hs 126 was the AradoAr 196 floatplane, an elegant all-metal twin-float designof modern constructi on which was to prove surprisinglyagile. At the ou tbreak of war the Arado was being intr o­duced into the Bord tliegcrstaffeln, but these still hadmany He 60 bip lanes which also equipped theSecnahaufklaru ngsstaffeln and may be rega rded as thefloatplane equivalent of the He -15 .

Curiously, the Luftwaffe's first de facto chief of staff,Oberst (later Ge neralle utn ant ) Walther \'('e\'er, broughtwith him when he transferred from the army the latter'sbelief in the supremacy of Tactical air power, but exten­sive reading led him to change his mind. Within a yearWever had not only accepted that the Luftwaffe shouldhave an operatire r role with the emphasis upon bombe rsinterdicting the ene my rear at army/army group or fleetlevel and destroying enemy air power , but he had also'sold' the concept to the Army's high command. Theconcept was also acceptable to his political masters be­cause the bombers could also be used to cow Germany'sneighbours in peacetime by threate ning to annih ilatetheir cities and factories.

Luftwaffe bombers were the refore designed to strikeat Germany's immediate neighbours, and four designsemerged during the mid 1930s. The Lu ftwaffe require­me nts had assigned priority to bomb load, followed byspeed, defen sive arma me nt and range, but the generalrequirement was for an aircraft with a I ,OOOkm (600­mile) range, a maximu m speed of 350 km/h (215mph)and a I tonne (2,200lb) bomb load. The requirementwas met by three designs which were essentially comple­ment ar y, the Dornier Do 17, Heinkel He III andjunkers j u 86, the emp hasis in each design being onspeed, bomb load and range respectively, By 1939 the ju86 had been withdrawn from service because its junke rs

naissa nce and higher performance. By 1939 prototypesof the new aircraft, the Fockc- \'(/ulf Fw 189, were flying.Following a tre nd common in the late 1930s, it was amin-boom desig n, like the Fokker G. I and Lockheed1'-38. Like the contemporary Potez 637 army co-opera­tion aircraft, the Fw 189 (which entered service late in19-10) had twin engines, a retractable unde rca rriage anda fully enclosed cockpit, which made it seem a worldaway from the Hs 126, although the ir pe rformance andcombat capability were similar.

O ne prototy pe Fw 189 was modified to meet theclose -sup port or 'Schlacht' requirement. ' Ibis missionwas developed by the German Army du ring the Firs tWorld War, when Schlacht airc raft were essentially flyingstorm troop s designed ( 0 assist an advance on theground by attacking enemy troop s with automaticweap ons and small bom bs. Its wartime success meantthat in 193-1 an updated requirem ent was issued as theLight Divebornber , for which the Henschel Hs 123 wasselected .This was a cur ious mixture of old and new, withsesquiplane configuration, fixed undercarriage and opencockpit but all-metal monocoque construction andmixed-construction wings. The ' Ein-Zwei-Drei', as itwas popularly called , formed the basis of the Stuka (Stu­rzkampfflugze ug) Gru ppen, and despite the suppo rt ofthe Lu ftwaffe's head of developmen t, Ob erst Wolframvon Richthofen, it was gradually withdrawn fromservi ce .

In 1937, however , Richthofen (a cousin of the famous' Red Baron ' and minor 'ace' in his own right) becam echief of staff to the Condo r Leg ion, the Ge rman expedi ­tionary force fight ing in Spain for Franco's Nationalists.The Legion had copied the Span ish and used its obsol­ete Heinkel He 51 fighte rs for the Schlacht role wi thgreat success, and had recommended the developmentof dedica ted gro und-attack aircraft with armo ure d pro­tection for the Tactical role. It is interesting to note tha tthe Russians came to a similar conclusion , leading to thedevelopment of the Ilyushin 11-2 ' Ilyusha ' ,

At the outbreak of war only one Schlach tgruppeexisted, and this was equipped with the ageing Hs 123,which was essentially a flying mach ine-gun nest, withtwo M G 17s which could be suppleme nted by up to200 kg (-I-IOlb) of bombs or two 20mm (0.78in) M G FFcannon. Its poten tial replacements, the Fw 189Vlb andthe Hs 129, both twin-en gined aircraft, were flying inprototype form by the outbreak of war. The former wasa two-scat armoured version of the Fw 189 (the Schl achtmodel of which was to be designated Fw 189 C), withfour MG 17s and two M G FF forwa rd and two 7.9mmMG 8 1s aft, while the latter was a dedi cated single-sea tdesign with armour plate 6-12mm thick, 75mm thick ar­moured glass and an arma ment of two 1\IG 17s and twoM G FE The Hs 129 's protection was its only advan­tage, for the aircra ft proved severely underpowered as

Th e Focke- Il:z//f Fu: 189 1'3 Ulli the third prototype of thettcin -engined Corps aircraft designed to replace the Hs 126 .111e type began to enter service from the alltlllm/ of 1940.

cock pit. The rad io and the topographic camera in therear bay (supplemented by a hand -operated camera onthe port side ) were the most impo rta nt item s of equip­ment , while the armame nt, typ ically, was derisor y,comprising a single fixed 7.9mm (0.30in) MG 17 ma­chine-gun for the pilot and a similar-calibre M G IS on amovable mounting for the observer. The ma ximumbomb load was only 100kg (220lb) . Against the latestgenera tion of high-performance fighters, such aircraftwere dead meat with only their manoeuvrability toprotect them .

•\ Iany of the Nahaufklarungsstaffeln retained some ofthe olde r Heinkel He -15 biplanes and He -16 bracedmonoplanes with wooden wings and fuse lages of weldedsteel tube cove red by doped fab ric and metal panels.This form of constr uc tion had appea red in the FirstWorld War and was exte nsively employed until the early1930s, when it was supplanted by all-me tal, stressed-skinmonocoque construction techniques which producedlighter bu t stronger airfra mes. Yet the Corps Aero planeitself was becoming an anachronism , able neither to fightnor flee, and the Luftwa ffe had begun develop ing a moremodern conce pt from 1937 based upon tactical recon-

Entering service f rom Jllly 1939, the A rado A r 196 replacedthe H einkel H e 60. Designed as a spotter aircraft, it was usedfor a variety of dillies including escort fighter, and couldsometimes match the B eaufi ghter. Two of these aircraft helpedto capture the British subma rine HAtS Seal.

12 13

A I R C R A FT 0 F 'I'll ESE C O X D W 0 R L D \X' A R A X I S A I RC RA F T A T Til E OU T B REA K O F W AR

A design tchich rcas ill the right place al the right lime. Like several passenger aircraft of the lime, the J Ullkers J u 52 could beadapted 10 a bomber, and sereral despatched 10 Spain ill 1936 performed both roles. La rge numbers reere buill as bombers otcing10 the failure of the Dornier Do 11/13/23 fa mily, and uirtually all had been transferred 10 transport units by S eptember 1939.A I that lime it rcas also used for training and electronic intelligence, schile during the rcar it ",as filled tcith a large magneticcoil for magnetic minessceeping.

who assumed the position of Ge neralluftze ugme ister in1938, but also under his predecessor , Richthofen , whoinitially went to Spa in to test new types including proto­type ]u 87s. Ano ther enthusiast was Oberst Hans]eschonnek, the Lu ftwaffe chief of staff in 1939, whoseearlier staff appointment gave him conside rab leinfluence in aircraft deve lopme nt. The combina tion ofinfluences was to have a pern icious effect up onLu ftwaffe bomber development, as was beco ming clearat the outbreak of war.

A demand for a dive-bom bing capability wasinclu ded in the requ irement for the Lu ftwaffe's nex t­generation med ium and heavy bo mbers, the ]u 88,Do 217 and He I n .The first, envisage d as a high- speedthree-seat airc raft with a speed of 500 km/h (3 10 mph),a range of 3,000km (1.850 miles) and a maximum bombload of 2 tonnes (4,4 10Ib), had added to it a requirementto conduct 30°-angle dive-bom bing attacks, and Spa nishexperience ind icating the need for better de fensivearmament led to a four th cre w member being added. Asa result of num erou s design changes, the weight of the ]u88 dou bled and performance dropped , so that the initia lprod uct ion aircraft, which was entering servic e at theoutbreak of war, had a maximum speed of 460km/h

17" performance of the J UI/kers Ju 88 1'3, the first prototype 10 hare J Ullkers Jmllo 2 11s, clinched the auiard ofthe 'Schnellbomber' contract 10 thc manufacturer. Produ cnon of the Ju 88 u'as undcr tcay ill September 193 9, alld the typebecame olle of the Lu fncaffe 's II1OS1 useful aircraft,

A major weakness of the first generation of Germa nbombers (Do 11/13/23 and ]u 52) had been poor bombsights, which led to intense interest in dive-bombing forgreater acc uracv, From its earliest davs the Luftwaffe, .had Sturzkampffl ugzeug uni ts, and the Light Di\'e­bomber requirem ent which led to the Hs 123 wasaccompanied by a Hem")' Dive-bom ber requi rementdrafted aro und the ]u 87, the emphasis of this latter re­quirement being on bomb load . Despite the acquisitionof the Lotfe 70 tachom etri c bomb sight by Septe mber1939 , the Lu ftwaffe was the only land-based air arm witha large dive-b om ber force , which comprised 24 per centof all Ge rma n bombers. T he ]u 87 cou ld carry a 500 kg(1,102Ib) bomb some 600km (370 miles) , and could beused for either tactical or operaticer missions, but dcfe n­sive armament (two fixed M G 17s forward and onemovable M G 15 aft) was limited and it required condi ­tions of aerial superiority to operate effectively. A lon ger­ranged version was completing development forant i-shipping operations as the]u 87 R, and a study wasalso under way of a carrier-borne versio n of the ]u 87 B,the ]u 87C.

Dive-bom bing fascinate d the Lu ftwaffe deve lop mentorganisation not only under Generalleutna nt Ern st Ude t,

received the appro priate direction-finding (O F) loopaerial. The RAF by contrast was slow not only creati ng abeaco n networ k and equ ipping its aircraft but also pro­viding sufficient navigator s. The Lufthansa pra ct ice ofall-weathe r ope ration extended into the night , and this,too, was copied by the Lu ftwaffe, all of whose majorbases had Lorenz instrument -landing syste ms and all ofwhose bombers had the appropriate receivers. The sys­tem was modified into an instrument bombing system,'X-Verfahren', one of three in service or at adva ncedstages of development at the outbreak of war.

Th e JUllkers J u 871'3 prototype first fleu: ill 1935, and ayea r later a pre-production aircraft served briefly ill Spainunder the supervision of Oberst ll'iJifram VOII Richthofen. Itreturned 10 Germany ill 1937, but later ill the y ear a mlm ­ber ofproduction dive -bombers U'ere sent to Spain and beganthe type's fa mous career. By the outbreak of u'ar eightS tnkagruppen ",ere ill service, three under R ichthofen asFliegerfiihrer zb V (later Fliegerhorps 1'111).

machin e-guns in nose, dorsal and ventra l positions, butlater versions suc h as the 1'-4 had armour protection forthe pilot , a second M G 15 in the nose and two firingfrom the side with a fifth crew member to operate them .Similar improvements were made in the He III H-2 ,while the Do 172 expa nded its defensive arma mentfrom three to four M G 15s but ventral cove r was im­proved throu gh a redesigned nose. The Do 17 was ex­ported to Yugoslavia and an imp roved expo rt versionwith 0 H 60 IA in-line engines was under development atthe outbreak of war as the Do 215, and was destined tojoin the specialised Aufklarungss ta ffeln of the LuftwaffeHigh Comma nd (ObdL). By the beginning of the warthe Lu ftwaffe had I , I 71 medium bombers or 28 .5 percent of its first-lin e strength, but their individual bombload was limited.The hor izontal bomb bays of the Do 17could not accom modate anythin g larger than 250kg(550Ib) bombs, and with a full bomb load the tac tical ra­diu s was reduced to about 320 km (200 miles) . T he HeIII had thre e times this range, but the verti cal cells of itsbomb bay could accommodate nothing larger than500kg (I, 1201b) bombs, heavier loads, including a1,000kg bomb, having to be carried exte rnally, with theresulting drag limiting range.

On e feature of Luftwaffe bombers not generallynot ed was their ability to operate in all weath ers.This re­quirement came from M ilch, whose direction had en­sured that Lufthansa possessed such a capability beforethe Nazis cam e to power. T his was emulated by theLu ftwaffe, which esta blished a network of rad io beaconsthrou ghout the Reich , and every multi-engined aircraft

14 15

AIR CRAFT OF THE S E C O:-:D WORLD \X'AR

Un like the RAT; the Luft waffe developed a long-range escort fighterlinterceptor ill the M esscrscluniu Bf JJ0, Production ,,'asslou: during the summer of J939, and only a few Z erstorergrup pen had received the type ichen Poland ,,'as inuaded. 771C situ­ation gradually improved, and scithin a year the Bf JJ0 1ms being used for other roles including reconna issance.for zchich thisBf I JOC-5 was developed,

AX IS A I RCRAF T AT T IlE OUT BREA K O F W AR

(286mph) and a range of 1,770km (1,100 miles) . Themaximum int ernal bomb load was 1,800kg (3,960lb) or2,000kg externally, the internal bomb load beingconfined to 50kg bombs,

The dive-bombing requirement was also extended toGe rma ny's four-engined bomber , the He 177, which wasscheduled to be in wides pread service by 19-12,Unfo rtu nately for the Luftwaffe this extremely sophisti­cated aircraft, designed to the Bomber A requirement ,was to be plagued by developmen t prob lem s.The proto­type 's four Daimler-Benz DB 60 I engines were pairedin two nacelles as the 0 B 606, and were pron e to over­heating, This exacerbated the aircraft' s weight problemcaused by the need for strengthening to meet a 60° dive­angle requirement. It had been anticipa ted that theloaded weight of the operational He 177 would beappro ximately 27 tonnes (59,500lb) , but successiveprototype s increased in weight until the first productionversion (He 177A-I ) had a loaded weight of 30 tonnes(66,100lb),

The idea of a four-engined bomber diving at 60° hasbeen much derided by aviation histor ians, but it sho uldbe noted tha t RAF Specification P 13/36, which leddirectly to the Halifax and indirectly to the Lan caster, in­eluded an un specified dive angle requirement, 70° at onetime being seriously conside red . In the event Go ringpersonally authorised rem oval of the dive-bomber re­quirement early in the He I77's deve lopment, but Ude t'scompa rtrnenta lised organisation with its blinkered engi­neers was un able to resolve the bomber 's problems until19-13, The absence of the He 177, which was to havebeen the backbone of the long-range anti-shipping force,crea ted a major problem for the Luftwaffe at the

16

outbreak of war , Fortunately Focke-\\'u lf ha d been de­signing a lon g-range mar itime reconnaissance vers ion ofthe Fw 200B four-engined airliner for the ja pa nese Navyas the Fw 200C, and in September the Luftwaffe placedan orde r for a sma ll number.

Interestingly D ipl Ing Heinrich Hert el, who had con­du cted init ial design work on the He 177, joined thejunkers organisation in the summer of 1939 and tookcharge of the Bomber B design . This was a ju 88 re­placement, the requ irem ent for which was issued in jul y1939 and the developmen t of which proved as accidentprone as that of Bomber A. In this programme also theLu ftwaffe was to prove too amb itious and Udet 's organ­isation inadequate,

The dive-bombing requirement also plagued theDo 217, a genuinely twin -cngincd heavy bomber whichmay be regarded as the equivalent of the AvroM anchester. The maid en flight was in August 1938 anddevelopment was under way in 1939, but the umbrella­like dive brake in the tail proved a major head ache andeventually, in 1939, Udc t autho rised the temporar y sus­pension of the dive-bomber requirement, As the han­dling characteristics of the aircraft proved unsatisfactor y,a major redesign was autho rised, lead ing to the Do 217Ethe following year.

The Luftwaffe's bombers (and those of Italy's RegiaAeron auti ca) were also its 'eyes' , both in their normalconfiguration and in ded icated lon g-r ange reconnais­sance versions, The latter were ass igned to separateArmy and Luftwaffe Fcrn aufkl arungsstaffcln , altho ughthe Karnp fgeschwad cr themselves conducted a greatdeal of reconnaissance for their own missions andGe rma n bombers were noted for their extensive

fenes tratio n, The majority of reconnaissance aircraftwere Do 171'/1' vers ions of the Do I 7E/",I bombe rs, withcameras in the bomb bay, suppleme nted by small num­bers of j u 88As and He III Hs.The philosophy of usingbombers for lon g-range reconnaissa nce was part of theFirst World War philosophi cal baggage, when dual usewas the norm, such aircraft being capable eithe r of out­pacing or outfighting the few fight ers which migh t inter­cep t them . As the Luftwaffe quickly discovered , thisphi losophy depend ed upon the enemy having old-fash­ioned fighters , and the introdu ction of high-pe rformanceinte rcepto rs placed aircraft suc h as the Do 17 in the in­vidious position where they could neither out-fight norout-run thei r opponents, especially when the latterhad radar to provide early warning of their victim'sapproach.

The solution was based upon adapting fighterdesigns for reconnaissan ce using their high spee d atlower altitudes or, even more effectively, flying at veryhigh altitudes which even forewarn ed inte rceptors haddifficul ty in reachin g. To meet the former requirementthe M esserschmitt Bf 11OC- 5 was already being devcl­oped at the outbreak of war, while for the latter require­ment , for which the British swiftly used modi fiedSpitfires, the Lu ftwaffe again used bombers. A prop osalwas received from junkers to conver t ju 86 airframeswith pressur ised cabins and improved engines as the ju86 H (later ju 861') , and this appea red in the summer of19-10 toge ther with the Bf II OC-5 ,

The only Lu ftwaffe reconnaissance uni ts with dedi­cated reconnaissance aircraft were the Seefernauf­klarungsstaffe ln and the Ku stenm ehrzweckstaffeln , theformer with the Do 18 flying boat and the latter with the

He 59 twin -cngined mul ti- role floatplane which wasused also for anti-ship operations and min elaying.Experience quickly confirmed that both were at the endof their operational lives, but the rep lacement for theDo 18, the three-cngincd Blohm und Voss B\' 138 withjumo 205 diesel engi nes, req uired conside rab le redesignand was no t available until the following summe r,Fortuna tely there were no suc h problem s with the HeI 15 multi-role float planc which was to replace the He59 ,The new aircraft was the antithesis of its pre decessor,an all-meta l monoplane with enclosed crew position sand a bomb bay which could hold min es or torpedoes,The floatpl ane configura tion was to impose increasinglysevere performance restric tions , but the He I 15 was toprove a robu st and reliable design .

Unlike its rivals, the Lu ftwaffe had only one modernsingle-engine fighter design at the outbreak of war, andvir tually all the jagdgruppen had the Bf 109, with astre ngth of 1,151 aircraft. The selection of the Bf 109was a political and operational triump h for its designer ,Professor Willi ,\ icsscrschmi tt, who had had to overco mepersonal prejud ice (from the Lu ftwaffe's seco nd-in­command, Ge nera loberst Eberhard M ilch) and conser­vatism which might have been epitomised in Udct(whose 62 victories were won in traditional fighters) . Farfrom being a stick-in-the-mu d, however, Udct qu icklyrecogn ised the value of the Bf 109 and his dem onstra­tions undoubtedly helped to extinguish any oppos itionfrom tradi tionalists,T he Bf I09E was the prime first-lin eaircraft , with a maximum speed of 550km!h (3-12mph)and a formidable arm ament of two 20mm M G FlOcannon and two ,\ IG 17 mach ine-guns, but a substant ialnumber of the olde r Bf 109Ds were in service with the

17

AXIS A IRCRAFT AT TilE O UTBREAK OF \\ ' A R

traditional con struction , with steel tu be or wooden air­frames covered with wood or do ped fabric , and most o fthe bombers had similar cove rings on their wings.Co m pared with the all-metal rnon ocoqu e, these weakerstructu res took a higher proportion of the take- offweight, imposing pe na lties upon both ran ge and pay­load, while the materials were more vu lne rab le to envi ­ronmental co nd itions which reduced aircraft life.

' In c problem was compou nded by the inability o fItal ian aero-engine ma nufacturers to provide high­power, water-cooled, in-line motor s, wh ich forced themto rely upon radials often developed from foreign

Like the JII 52, the S acoia-Marcheu i 5. 81 Pipistrello (Bat)teas a bomber transport uhich sau' extensive service ;11Spain, tchere it proved obsolescent.yet e'l.'mill 1939 it fo rmedthe backbone of the Gruppi B T, although increasingly it wasrestricted 10 night bombing.

airfie lds behind ene my lines. N ot even the Soviet AirForce. which had pio nee red airbo rne ope rations, hadsuch a force .

19

ItalySecond only to the Lu ftwaffe in prestige at the out brea kof the Second World War was Italy's Regia Aeron autica .Eu rope 's second autonomous air force, it had some2.800 firs t-line aircraft in September 1939. The prestigehad bee n gained through the inheritanc e of the mantle ofthe great prophet of air power , Gen Guilio Douhet,through its operational experience in Ethiopia and Spainas well as numerous record-breaking flight s. Conse ­que ntly many air forces ordered Italian aircraft beforethe Second \'<'orld \,<Tar, and as late as the summer of1940 even the RAF was seeking Caproni light bombers.

T he reality was that the Regia Aeronautica was atu rkey rather than an eag le, du e largely to Italy's weakindus tr ial base, with both aircraft companies and com­po ne nt manufactu rers under-capitalised , leading to lowrates of production . Neverthe less, industr y was seekingto meet the Regia Acronautica 's expa nsio n pla n,Programme R, and all the modern bombers suc h as theC RDA Cant Z. I00 7b is Alcione (Kingfishe r) , Fiat BR 20Cicogna (Stork) and Savoia-Marchetti S .79-1 Sparvie ro(Sparrow Hawk) , wer e low-wing cantilever monoplan eswith retractable undercarriages, while the other compo­nent of the Gruppi Bombardamento Tcrreste, the S.81Pipestrello (Bat) bomber-tran sport had a fixed under­ca rriage. However, as with most of the RegiaAerona utica's combat aircraft, their fuselages were all of

Italy 's elegant Cantieri R iuniti dell'Adriatico (Cam) Z .1 00 7bis Alcione (Kingfi sher) ente red service ill 193 9 and helped fo rmthe backbone of the uxirtime Gruppi Bombardamente Terreste, ye t it also summarised the uieahnesses of the Italian aircraftindustry, being of all-uooden construction because there was insuffi cient investm ent fo r all-metal aircraft, and hoe ing threeengines becau se the industry U'IlS incapable of producing high-poaered engines .

Twin-en gin ed aircra ft with two- or three-man crews,such as the Bf 110, were grea tly influence d by experi­ence in the First World War , notably with the BristolFighter and the Caudron C. I I. In the face of the high­performance fighte rs suc h as the Bf 109 which emergedin the late I930s, all of the lon g-range figh ter s were toprove a disappointment. lackin g the speed or manoeu­vrabili ty to dogfight with the single-eng ined aircraft.Most were to be reduced in status to grou nd -attack du­ties in daytime, althoug h some, like the Bf 110, were tocam a new lease of life as night fight cr s.

Certainly the outbrea k of the war saw the Luftwaffeac tively co nside ring two d esigns as suc cessors to the Bf110 in the Zerstorergruppcn. The ,\ lesserschmi l1 ,\ Ie210, of which the prototype flew on 5 September 1939,was the favourite, given ,\ lesserschmitt 's experience,prestige and influ ence, while the Arado Ar 240, whichfirst flew in ,\ '13y 1940, was the back-up programme.Both were extremely sophisticated designs with de fen­sivc armament including remotel y controlled ba rbettes.Unfortunately both de signs disp layed appalling handlingcharac teri stics, especially with rega rd to stabi lity.The M e210 programme in particular proved prolonged and sodisastrously un succe ssful that it provided Milch with anoppo rtunity for revenge upon the des igner, wh om hehumiliated in 1942.

In one respect at least the Luftwaffe was streets aheadof its rivals, That was in the provision of air transport,although this was by accident rather than de sign . In itsearly da ys the Luftwaffe intended sup pleme nting its DoII bombers with a small number of ju 52/3m transportswhich would be opera ted by Lufthan sa and be cap ableof conversion into bombers with the appropriate kit.Alth ough it was an all-metal mon opl ane with a cantileverwing , the " HmIC ju' (Au ntie junkers) , as the aircraft wasnicknamed. was technically an olde r-ge ne ration designwith a str ucture of corrugated alumi niu m over a tubularsteel framework, a stro ng fixed undercarriage and thr eeBMW 132 radi al engines.

The failure of the Do II series, despite radical re,de sign, led to the decision to usc the ju 52/3m as a stop,gap pending the arrival of the seco nd -gcneratiorbombers (Do 17, He Ill, ju 86). T he air bridge whichallowed General Franco to move thou sands of troop sfro m M orocco to Spain in the earl y days of the SpanishCivil War, mostly relying upon converted ju 52 /3mbombers, alerted the Luftwaffe to the adva ntages of airtranspo rt . At the out break of war some 550 were in ser­vice, and apart from a doze n aircraft in an X- Ver fahrenbombi ng unit, all were tran sports. Half of them wereassigned to general tra nsport d utie s (including thoserequisitione d from Lu fthansa), ready to fly in replace­ments and supp lies to forwa rd uni ts, while the remainderwere assigned to Flicgerdivision 7 with crews trainedeithe r to drop troops by parachute or to fly them into

18

A I RC RAFT 01' T ilE S ECO:-: D \\ ' OR L D \\ ' AR

Zerstorergruppcn pen ding the delivery of adequatenumber s of Bf I lOs, and also in. the Nachtia gdgruppcn.Deve lop ment of the replacement Bf 109F with highe rperfo rma nce, including a maximum speed of 600km/h(373m ph) but weake r arma ment, was already underway, and mention sho uld also be made of a carrier-borneversion with improved range , th e Bf 109'1', under deve l­opment at the outbreak o f war.

The success of the Bf 109 made the higher echelonsin the Luftwaffe reluctant to consider an other fighter,but the value of heavier arma ment and a more robustundercarriage led Ud et's organis ation reluctantly to con­sider just such a requ irem en t. B y the outbreak of war,therefore, work was well advanc d on the Fw 190 with aradial , air-cooled engine, and in June 1939 the p rototypemade its maiden flight. The lack of integration withinUdet's organisation meant that IlWO years were to elap sebefore the new fighter entered service, and it required ajagdgeschwader technical officer to provide the directionwhich was to make the Fw 190 o ne of the great fighte rsof the Second World \,<Tar.

Udet's influence, and that 0 f the Nazi Party in theshape of M esserschmitt' s good friend Rudolf Hess, alsohe lped en su re the Luftwaffe had a long-range fighter(Z erstorer or De stroyer in German terminology) in theBf 110 , of which 102 were available. The Bf 110 wastypical of attem pts by many air forces during the 1930sto devel op an aircraft which c ould either acc ompanybo mber formations th rou ghou t their mission s or inte r­cept enemy bombers far fro m their targets (an importa ntrequirement in the days before rad ar was wide ly avai l­able) . C ur ious ly, altho ugh the L uftwaffe had developeddrop-tanks by the outbreak of war, the idea of extend ingsingle-engine fighter range by these mean s docs notap pear even to have been considlered , although a similarcriticism migh t also be applied to the US Eighth AirForce in 194 2.

To supplement the Bf 109, development had begun of theFoeke- Inllj' Fu: 190, the 1'1 prototy pe depicted here fiying fo rthe first lime ill JlIlIe 193 9. A s u -ith the Haicker Typhoon,the design U'IlS plagued by engine problem s, although ill theCIlse of the German aircraft th ey u'ere exacerbated bybu reau cracy ill the RLII

AIRCRAFT OF T HE SE CO:';D \X'ORLD W AR

The prototy pe Societe Anonima Piaggio P I 08 four -engined bomber flew ill 1939, and u'as the 0111.1' Axis dedicated heavybomber design tcith separa te engines 10 see operational service. Although the Focke- \l'llif H ,' 200 f lew bomber missions mxrB ritain, it u'as designed as all airliner, schile the engines of the contemporary Heinkel He 177 <cere paired ill W 'O nacelles.

AXIS A I RC R A F T AT Til E O U TBRE AK O F WAR

A ll important lesson of the Spallish Civi/ lYur u'as the requirement for a dedicated dive -bomber, and all Italia n response wasthe Savoia-Ma rchetti S .85, zchich was ill service with 960 Gruppo ill 1939. The design proved a failu re and the S 85s !cerereplaced by Ju 87s at the earliest opportunity.

design s.The Piaggio I~ XI RC 40 in the Z. 100 7bis de vel­oped 1,000hp at take- off, and the Alfa Romeo 126 RC34 in the S.79-1 developed only 780 hp at a time whenthe latest version of the contempora ry Junkers [urno 2 11in the Ju 88 developed 1,200hp. To co mpe nsate for in­creased struc tural weight the designers of both theAlcione and Sp arviero ad op ted a three-en gine solut ionwhich increased dra g, even with lon g-chord engin ecowlings . The C icogna had two Fiat A.80 RC 41 18­cylinde r eng ines rated at 1,000hp but proved decidedlyunderpowered, partly becaus e the heavy struc ture alsoincluded a nose gun turret. In this respect the C icognawas unique in the Regia Aerona utic a, whose leade rshippiously (and somewhat optimistically) hoped thei rbombers would ou trun most interceptor s.The defensivearmament of all Italian bombers was based up on single,rifle-calib re (7.7mm) machine-guns, altho ugh thesewere often supplemente d by one or two heavy-calibr e(12.7mm) weapon s, the Z.l 007 bis hayin g two.

Curiou sly for an air force allegedly shaped in Dou het 'simage, the Regia Aeronautica .h ad no war-winning air­power doctrine like the RAF and, increasingly, the USArmy Air Co rps . When created in 192 5 the RegiaAeronautica was based up on a str ike force (Aerial Army)of bomber and fighter squadro ns, of which a fixed num­ber were assigned to co -operate with the army and navy,suppleme nting their dedicated reconnaissance squad­rons. In 1931 the then Air 1\ l inister, Marshal Italo Balbo(who was killed by his own AA gunners in 1940) , intro ­du ced a more flexible arrangemen t. As a result theGruppi Bombardamento were assigned ad hoc mission sdependent up on the situation, and might be called up onto arrack targets on land or at sea. However , the re was nopractical co-o rdi nation betw een the three services and the

20

Regia Aeron auti ca therefore shaped air mission s to itsown whim.

Never the less , during 1939 experiments were welladva nced with torpedo bombing by Gruppi Bombard a­mente, and during that year the S. 79-11 began to enterservice. This had the same eng ines as the Z .1007bis butco uld carry two torpedo es externa lly, and the squadronswhich received these aircraft put Italy in the forefront ofant i-shipping operations. Indeed , the Germans paid th eItalians the complime nt later in the war of emulatingtheir tactics and acquiring their torpedoes. At the ou t­bre ak of the Second \Vorld \Var a successo r to the S.79was being developed , originally as the S.79b is and lateras the S.84 (a designation sha red with an unsuccessfulD C-3 lookalike) .The new bomber featu red an improvedaerodynamic sha pe with twin fins and rudders, but whileit had a heavier arma ment (six 12.7mm machine-guns)than the S. 79, its performance proved infer ior, altho ughit was to sec operational service from 1941 onwards .

The Regia Aeronautica was also not blind to the ad­van tages of mod ern four-engined bombers.The Piaggi oco mpany had been working on variou s expe rimental de­signs since the mid-1 930s, beginning with the P.23(sometimes referred to as the P.123) and the P.50 , andthe expe r tise gained led to the all-metal, mon ocoquecons tru ction I~ 108, which first flew in 1939. It featureda stro ng defensive armame nt including two rem otely­cont rolled wing turrets and six 12.7mm machine-guns,but while this flying fortress was qu ickly ordered intoproduction , it did not ente r service until 194 2. Like th eG ermans, the Italians were also interes ted in the conce ptof dive-bombing, altho ugh it was never embrace d withsuch fer vour in Rome.The Savoia S.85 , with two 500hpPiaggio I~VII RC 35 radi als, was issued to Squadri glie in

1939 but had a totall y inadequate performance andnever saw active service, bein g rep laced by the [u 87Blate in 1940.

A major problem for the Regia Aeronautica (and theArrn ee de l'Air) was the fragme nta tion of the develop ­ment and procurement organisation under Balbo'sinfluence. Aircraft selection and orde rs were pr imaril y(but not exclusively) the responsibility of the Direzion eGe nerale Costruz ioni e Approvigionamenti (D G CA) ,from which technicians were excluded, while technicaldevelopment and evaluation were the respon sibility ofthe Direzione Superiore Studi Esperienze (D SSE) , thespecifications bein g drawn up by the Air Staff. Thisarra ngeme nt compartrncntalised deve lop ment, with littleexchange of ideas, and its most perniciou s effects wereseen in fight er development.

By the mid -1930s it was clear that the trad itionalfighter, des igned largely to destr oy enem y Co rpsAeroplanes, with its light armament and emphasis up onmanoeuvrability and pilot visibility, could not meet thenew generation of high -speed bombers. High perfor­manc e and heavy armament were required for this task,and relu ctantly air staffs ordered fighters with thesecharacteristics - except in the Regia Aerona utica .

In September 1939 more than 70 per cent of theItalian fighter force con sisted of biplanes built in the tra­diti onal manner, and the Regia Aeronautica was still re­equipping Gruppi Ca ccia Terreste with biplanes! Thebackbone of the se Gruppi were equipped with the FiatC R.3 2, powered by a Fiat A.30 RA liquid-cooled vee en­gine, the aircraft being a development of the C R.30 withthe same powerplant. The only con cession to tech nica ladvance was the provision of two 12.7m m machine-gunsrather than the traditi on al ritle-calibre weapon s, while

2 1

the later C R.32bis had two suc h weap on s added in thelower wings. By the end of 1939 this was being rep lacedby the C RA2 Falco (Falcon) with the Fiat A,74 RC 38radial and one heavy and one ritle-calibr e machine-gunin the cowling, Relatively fast at 430km/h (267mph) , theFalco was an anachronism, althou gh it was pu rchased byseve ral air forces, including that of Hungar y.

W hile the Regia Aeronautica appeared reluctantly toaccept the low-wing mon op lane fighter , a spe cificationnot being issued until 1936, in practice it sought tomould the new generation of aircraft in the shape of thetradition al virtues .The successfu l design s, the Fiat G .50

The Regia A eronautica 's conservatism 'loas expressed ;11 theselection of the fixed-undercarriage Societe A nonimaAeronautica d' Italia (Fiat) C R.42 sesquiplane as its stan­dard figh ter ill 1939, when the uorld's major air forces u'ereselecting all-metal cantileuer monoplanes for this role.Nevertheless, this aircraft 1I0t 011/.1' maintained the First\l'brld IYu r fighter tradition, but also proved an export suc­cess, being selected, like its Fiat predecessors, by several airforces, including those of Belgium, Hungary and Sueden.

A IR CRAFT OF T ilE SE CaS!) WORLD W A R

A step ill the right direction fo r the Gruppi Caccia Terreneu'as the Fiat G.50 Freccia (A rrow), which entered serv icef rom 1938.v"t the design still meed more 10 tradition than 10

technology, being slow and lacking fi repoue r.

Frecci a (Arrow) and the M acchi M C.200 Saetta(T hunderbolt) both embodied modern constructiontechniques, but the emphasis was up on manoeuvrabilityand they had only two 12.7mm machine-guns, whiletransparent cano pies in each design were replaced byopen cockpits at pilots' requ est to provide better visi­bility. Both aircraft were handicapped by having to usethe 840hp Fiat A.74 RC 38 at a time when the Bf 109E­I had a 1,050hp liquid-cooled , invert ed vee, Daimler­Benz DB 60lA which gave it a top speed of 550 km/h(342mph) compared with the Saetta's 505km/h(3 14mph) and the Freccia 's 470km/h (293mph), the lat­ter being only 42km/h (26mph) faster than the Falco bi­plan e. The same radial engine was also used in theCa proni Vizzola F.5, which competed against the Frecciaand Saetta and resembled the former , though featuringtraditi onal construction techniques. Althou gh it was notselected for ma ss production , a small number of pre­production aircraft entered service in a hom e defenceunit.

The Fiat A.74 RC 38 was also selected for the onlyItalian attempt at a long-range fighter , the Fiat C R.25,which first flew in 1939 . Onl y-a handful of this twin-en­gined aircraft, with a pair of heavy machine-guns in thenose and one in the dorsal turret, saw service from 1942,largely in the air transport escort role.

To support the army the Regia Aeronautica had itsGruppi and Squadrigli e Osservazione equipped largelywith the Meridional i Ro 37, a fixed-undercarriagesesquiplane of traditional construction which was a typ­ical contemporary Co rps Aeroplane. The original pro ­duction version had the Fiat A.30 RA liquid-cooledtwelve-cylinder vee engine, but this aircraft was supple­mented later by the radial-engined Ro 37bis with eith erthe Piaggi o P.IX RC 40 or Piaggi o PXR.

The Italians had been quicker than most to perceive

22

First fioum ill 1939, the Fiat CR.25 u'as also all attempt toproduce a long- range escort fi gh ter like the Bf 110, and olleproduction machine was used as a 'hack ' by the Italian AirA ttache ill Berlin . Its inadequacies as a figh ter were quicklyrealised and it was produced only for the strategic reconnais­sallce role, although it was also used to escort transporta ircraft.

the requirement for gro und-arrack aircraft, largelythrou gh the effort s of Co l Am edeo M ecozzi in the late192 0s. By 1939 Italian divisions could call up on theSquadriglie Assalto, which had three purpose-builtdesigns. The Breda Ba 64 was an all-m etal, cantilevermonoplane design with open cockpit and retractableundercarri age, while the Capro ni Bergam aschi API wassimilar but of traditi onal construction and with fixedundercarri age. The Breda design had four rifle-calibremachine-guns in the wings, while the AI'. I had threemachin e-guns, one each in the wheel fairin gs and one inthe fuselage, but there was a considerable degree of com­monality, both aircra ft carrying a total bomb load of400kg (8801b) and being available in single-seatfighter /arrack and two-seat reconnaissance versions, andboth being at the end of their service lives,

The Ba 65 , which formed the backbone of theSquadriglie Assalto, was powered by a Gnome-Rhone 14radial built under licenc e as the Isotta-Fraschini K.14 ,and was also produced in single-seat arrack (Ba 65) andtwo-seat reconnaissance-bomber (Ba 65bi s) versions. Itfeatured substantial improvements in armament, withtwo rifle-calibre and two heavy machine-guns and up toI tonne (2,200lb) of bombs, but its obsolescence wasdemonstrated during the Spanish Civil War, by whichtime a potential replacement was under development byBreda. This was a twin- engined attack bomber of ultra­modern construction with three heavy mach ine-guns inthe nose and a single 7.7mm weap on in the ope n rearcockpit. Production began in 1939 as the Ba 88 Lince(Lynx). The Lince could carry up to 500kg ( I ,OJOlb) ofbombs, but it was underpowered and the massive na­celles for the Piaggi o I~Xl RC 40 radial s created tremen­dous drag in an otherwise clean airframe.

An unusual feature of Regia Aeronautica policy wasa series of requirements for aircraft dedicated to the

The SA Industrie M ecchaniche e A eronautiche M eridiolla liRo (Romeo) 37 entered service in the mid 1930s as a fig hter­reconnaissance aircraft. N o attemp t was made 10 enfo rce thefo rmer requirement, and it was the basic Corps aircraft of theRegia A eronautica. A radial engined uersion, the Ro 37bis,supplemented the Ro 37 ill the S quadriglie Ossercaz ioneA erea.

colonial policing role.The original design was Ca pro ni'sCa 133 bomber-transport, a high- bra ced-wing mono­plane with three radial eng ines capable of carrying500 kg (1, IOOlb) of bombs externa lly or eighteen soldiersinte rna lly. A new generation of multi-ro le aircraft was inpro duction by 1939 from Ca proni Bergam aschi , basedup on the Berea (North Wind) light airliner. All wererwin-engined, cantilever-wing monoplanes of traditi onalconstruction. The Ca 309 G hibli (Desert \\lind) havinga fixed undercarriage, bu t the Ca 310 Liberccio(Southwest \,\Iind) and the Ca 311 had retractabl e un­dercarriages. Althou gh lightl y armed (three 7.7mmmachine-guns) and carrying a bomb load of only 400kg(8801b) these airc raft and evolutionary developmentswere to be used extensively during the Second WorldWar and many were exporte d. The Ca 309 was manu­factured under licence in Bulgaria with 240hp Argus AsJOC engines as the Papagal (Parrot).

G iven Mussolini's determination to ensure that theMe diterranean was iI/ are N ostrum (O ur Sea) the Italianfleet was well served with seaplanes which could patrolthe waters aro und the navy's extensive network of bases.T he twin-hulled Savoia S.55, used for many record ­breaking flight s, was being withdrawn and had beenlarge ly repla ced by the single-eng ined Ca nt 2 .50 IGabbiano (Seagull) flying boat. In the offensive role theelegant trim otor Ca nt 2 .506 Airon e (Heron) float planehad ente red service with the G ruppi Bornb ard am en to,\ larittimo in 1938, and could carry a torpedo or a 800 kg(1,764Ib) bomb intern ally.To direct the navy 's guns thebattleships and crui ser s carried the M eridi onali Ro 43tloatplane, although its performanc e both in the air andin wate rs other than flat calm were poor. To provide airprotection for the fleet at sea, a fighter version of the Ro43 was produced as the Ro 44 .

Italian aircraft were extensively exporte d to Europe,

A X IS A I R C RAFT AT THE O UTBRE A K OF W A R

One of Europe's leading aircraft exporters was the S ocietaItaliano Caproni, which produced a succession of cOllserva ­tire designs. Indeed, as lat e as 1940 B rita in 's A ir M illistrywas in the la te stages ofordering some Ca 31Os. H ie Ca 133,of uhich 011 air ambulance version is seen here, u'asa typ icalbomber-t ransport design, and fo rmed the backbone of thecolonial a ir fo rce ill Africa by 1939.

the Middle East and Latin Am erica. In addition to air­craft selected for the Regia Aeron au tica, a number of de­signs were built spec ifically for export or built underlicence. One of the most successful was a twin- enginedversion of the S.79, the S.79B, which was fitted with avariety of eng ines depending upon the custo mer'schoice. Romania's first bat ch had 1,000hp G nome­Rhone K.14 II C32s, while the second batch , jRS.79B,had the I ,220hp junkers jurno 211 Da liquid-cooled veeengine and was manufactured under licence from 1940with a rede signed tail.

The Ca pro ni Bergam aschi Ca 135 had been an un­successful competitor with the Cant 2 .1007 and S.79,but it had some exp ort success, customers includingHungar y, which selected the version with I'ia ggio I~XI

RC 40 radials (Ca 135bis) , this version featuring a man­ually operated dorsal turret. Hungary also selected the

The Offi cine M eccanichc 'Reggia ne' SA iCaproni), com­monly called Reggia ne, produced the Re 2000 Int ercettore(Interceptor) 10 meet a Regia A eronau tica requirement for amonoplan e fig hter. A lthough it was 1I0t selected fo r domesticuse. from 1939 it was exported 10 and also ma nufa ctured illHu ngary under licence by MAl 'llG as the Heja I (H awk I),pictu red here.

23

A I R C R AFT 0 I' TilE SE C 0 x IJ \X'0 R I. J) \X' A R A X t S A I RC R AF T A T TH E O UT BR EAK O F \X'AR

M itsubishi's A rmy Type 97 heavy bomber (K i-2 1) u'as designed to meet a 1936 specification, bill produc tion oj the K i-2 1-1depicted here was slou: and some heavy-bomber Chutais had the misfortune 10 receive the Pial BR .20. III the Second IfbrldIfb r the K i-21 ,ms codenamed 'S ally ' by the Allies .

The Industria A eronautica Romano (IA R), backbone ojRuma nia 's aircraft industry, produced the sesquiplane IAR37 Corps aircraft. lr proved unsatisfactory otcing ro its IAR14K engine, a derivative of the Gnome-Rhone 14K, and al­ternatiuc PO'WCl" ",as sought. IVith the BM II" 132A the air­craft became the IAR 38, zchich first fleu : ill Jalluary 1939,and the follm cing year, pottered by the IAR 14K lJ C32, it,ms designated IAR 39, seen here, awl became the primefront -line 'version.

Reggiane Re 2000 Serie I fight er which had competedunsuccessfully aga inst the G.50 and ,\ IC 200 . An all­me tal fighter powered by a Piaggio PXI RC 40, it laterproved more manoeuvrable than the Bf 109E, bu t itsunprotected wing fuel tanks were a weakness. The fighterwas sold to Hungar y, where it was dubbed Heia (Hawk) ,and produced under licence from 194 2 with G nome­Rhone 14K as the Heia 11 .

A design which flew only in pro totype form was theCaproni Bergarnaschi Ca 335 M aestraie (M istral). Thiswas a two-seat fighter reco nnaissance design withHispano-Suiza 12 Ycrs liquid-cooled vee eng ine, and alicenc e was acquired by Belgium's SABCA , which wasproducing the aircra ft as the S.47 at the time of theG erm an invasion in 1940.

The Balkan allies of Germany and Italy had small air­craft industr ies whose limited facilities were largely em­ployed to produce aircraft of traditi onal construction,usually of obso lete German, Italian , Czechos lovak,French and Polish design . By 1939 only Hungary andRoman ia had prod uced indigenous combat aircraft, theformer 's Corps Aero plane squadrons including theM anfred \'('eiss WM 16 Budapest. A derivative of theFokker VD biplane with a G nome-Rhone radial engine,this was produced in two versions, with the 9K Mistral(Budapest I) and the 14K Mistral-M ajor (Budapest 11) .

Rom ania produ ced a similar aircraft with the samepowerpl ant as the Bud apest 11, the JAR 37 sesquiplanewith enclosed coc kpit. The unreliability of early licence­built Mistral-Maiors led to the stop-gap installation ofthe BMW 132A as the IAR 38, but by 1939 improve­ment s in .\ iistral-M aior rcliablity led to renewed installa­tions in the IAR 39 . The same engine was also selectedfor the count ry's first modern fighter , the IAR 80, whichmad e its maid en flight in April 1939. This all-metalmonocoque figh ter capitalised up on existing pro duction

24

to the exte nt tha t it used the tail of the PZL P.24E fighter.It was scheduled to receive four rifle-ca libre (7.92m m)machine-guns, but the difficul ties of acq uiring these andother components in a Europe now at war , as well as thelack of machine tools , prevented the fighte r ente ringservice until early 1941 .

j apa nItalian aircraft sold to jap an participated without distinc­tion in a conflict which ende d imm ediately before theoutbreak of the Second World \X'ar. In M ay 1939 a dis­pute on the M anchu rian-Mon golian border between theKhalkin Go l river and the village of Nomonhan flaredinto a full-sca le war in which the Fiat Type I (BR.20) wasused. The battle ended in ignominious defeat for thejapanese, who lost 158 aircraft destroyed or damagedbeyond repair. This conflict ac tua lly saw the third clashbetween Russian and japanese pilots, who had met onthe Korean border in 1938 and in China from 1937. Onpaper jap an had more than 2,000 first-line aircraft, butjanu s-like organisation fragme nted its streng th into theArmy Air Force a AAF) and Na vy Air Force a NAF) ,and it was the former Service's air arm which washumili ated .

The role of the japanese Army was to secure nationalinterests on the east Asian mainland , the prime threatbeing perceived from the Soviet Union, while in the ab­sence of any japanese enthusiasts of Douhet, its air armexisted to support that role. Its early leaders had beenofficers 'ticket punching' before tran sferring to othe rcomma nds, one of the most distinguished bein g Lt G enToio Hid cki, who was Inspector G eneral of the jAAFbetween December 1938 and july 1940, then becam eWar Mini ster , and in 1941 the Prime Mini ster. In 1939a new plan to expa nd the JAAF by a third to 142squadro ns (C hutai) was accepted. By this time the jAArwas developing its own career str ucture, yet thedefinition of aircra ft requirements still tend ed toward sthe conserva tive while ben efiting from a subs tantial cap­ital investment into the aviation industr y made duringthe early 1930s. This investment meant that by 1939most japanese combat aircraft were cantilever mono­planes with monocoque airframes, altho ugh the failu reto develop modern liquid -cooled in-line motors meantthat most aircraft had rad ial engine s. M ost jAAF aircraftrepresented First \Vorld \X'ar requirements in the shapeof late 1930s technology, altho ugh there were signs ofphilosophi cal development.

This con ser vatism is espec ially str iking in the bomberforce, which continued to follow the First World Wardivision into single-eng ined, two-sea l light bombers andmulti-engined heavy bombers.The major ity of bomberswere in the former catego ry, and both the y and themulti-engined aircraft suffered from notably small bombloads. The M ay 1936 requirement for a new generation

of light bombers specified a maximum speed of 400km/hand a normal bomb load of 300kg (66 1lb) to replace theArmy Type 93 (Kawasaki Ki- 3) .T his requirement led totwo low-wing aircraft with enclosed cock pits and fixedundercarri ages. The M itsubi shi Army Type 97 Single­eng ined Light Bomber (Ki-30) differed from theKawasaki Army Type 98 , also a Single-engined Ligh tBomber (Ki-32) , in that the latter, uniquely for japane secombat aircraft of this period , had a liquid-cooled veeeng ine (Kawasaki Ha-9) .T he bombs, up to a maximumof 450kg (993Ib) , were carried intern ally, and their de­fensive armament consisted of a single rifle-calibre(7.7mm) machine-gun facing forward and one in therear cockpit. At the sugges tion of a Ca pt Fujita Yuzo, aground-attac k aircraft specification based upon the Ki­30 was issued in December 1939, and prototypes madetheir appearance in the summe r of 1939. Althou ghlightly armed (two fixed and one movable rifle-calibremachine-guns) and with a small, externa lly carr iedbomb load of 180kg (400lb), the aircraft was armoure d.It entered service from 1940 as the Mitsubi shi ArmyTy pe 99 Assault Aeroplane (Ki-5 1).

The traditi onal light bomber concept was challengedwhen the japanese enco untered the Tupolev SB- 2-.\\1 00in China in November 1937. T his led almost imm edi­ately to a requirement for a twin- cngincd light bom berwith a maximum spee d of 480km/h (298mph) , a 400kg(882Ib) intern al bom b load and a defensive armame nt ofup to four rifle-calibre machin e-guns. The KawasakiArm y Type 99'l\\'in-engined Light Bomber (Ki-48) wasa four-m an aircraft and development was well adva ncedin 1939, the aircraft entering service the following year .

By 1939 the heavy bomber C huta is had received theMitsub ishi Army Type 97 Heavy Bomber (Ki-21),which was designed to meet a 1936 specificatio n to re­place the Mit subi shi Army Type 92 (Ki-20) andM itsubishi Army Ty pe 93 (Ki- I) . T he speci fication in­clud ed a five-hour end urance, a maximum speed of

25

400km/h (248mph) and a no rma l bom b load of 750 kg(1,653Ib) which might be extended for short-range mis­sions to I tonne (2,205Ib) . Initial production model s ofthe Ki-2 1 had a lon g, enclosed, dorsal machine-gunposition . Later production models had improved protec­tion including a fifth machine-gun in a remo tely-operat­ed tail position and lam inated rubber shee ts added to thefuel tanks. Delays in produ ction of this aircraft led to thepurc hase of the Fiat BR.20 as a stop-gap, but th is was anexpe rime nt the j apanese did not repeat.

The limitations of the Ki- 21 were evidently acknowl­edged by the Army, which issued in 1938 a replacementheavy bomber spec ification. This called for a ma ximumspee d of 500km/h (311mph), a 3,000km (1,864-mile)range, a I tonne bomb load and improved active/pass iveprotection including self-sea ling tanks. The prototype ofwhat becam e the Nakaj ima Army Ty pe 100 HeavyBomber (Ki-49) made its maiden flight in August 1939and entered service two years later, bu t the type neversupplante d its predecessor.

In fighter design , too, the japanese Army proved asconservative as the Regia Aeronauti ca. The last biplanefighter, the Kawasaki ArmyTy pe 95 (Ki- IO), had almos tdisappeared by 1939 and had been replaced by theNakajima Army Type 97 (Ki-27), combining modernconstruction techniques with a fixed und ercarriage ,open cockp it and a pair of rifle-calibre machin e-guns.T he Ki-27, which evolved from a private-venture de­sign, the Type PI' , was clearly designed to traditi onalfighter concepts, although later prod uction versions hadenclose d cock pits and could carry either four 25kg(55Ib) bombs for ground-a rrack missions or two 130litre (28 .6 Imp gal) drop tanks to extend range. The re­placem ent , the Nakajima Army Type I (Ki-43) , was al­read y flying in prototype form in September 1939, andwhileit featured a retractable undercar riage and higherspeed (the specification of 1937 called for 500 km/h

A I RC RAF T O F T HE SECO:-: D W ORLD WA R A X I S AIR CRAFT AT THE OU TB R EA K O F WAR

Virtually all of the J apanese Army fighte r Ch utais in 1939 u'ere equipped with the Nakajima Army Type 97 (K i-2 7), zchichwas million dressed as lamb, the traditional fig hter concept embodied ill Ilew technology. It was still the backbone of theseChutais in 1941, receiving the codename 'N ate '.

torpedo attac ks unti l the battleship s could fight the de­cisive ac tion, their guns being d irected by obse rva tionaircraft. ~

T he j apanese Navy was no exception, and even untilthe end of the Second World \'\'ar it was dominated bytraditi onali sts who believed in the supremacy of thebattl eship. This orthodox y was challenged by two men ,the most notable of whom was Admiral Yamam otoIsoroku , newly appointed comma nder-in-chief (officiallycomma nder of the Co mbined Fleet) in Sept ember 1939 ,and the charismatic Co mmodo re (Rear Admiral inN ovember) Oni shi Takajiro. A br illiant staff officer whohad exploited every oppor tunity to broaden his hori­zons, Yam amoto had lectured on the importance of airpower , and especially torpedo bombers, as an instructorin the Naval Academy in the I920s. He had headed thejNAF in the mid-1930s, and as a Navy Mini ster enco ur­aged the construc tion of aircraft carr iers to take thebat tle to the enemy. He was complemented by On ishi , afounder of the Nakajima Aircraft Compa ny and by 1941chief of staff of the land -based II th Air Fleet, whosoug ht also to exploit the numerou s islands on the east­ern edge of japan's Pacific empire for land -based airpower.

T he majority of the aircraft in service in 1939 camefrom progr ammes initiated between the 8th and 11thyears of the Showa reign (8-Shi to II -Shi) , i.e. 1933 to1937. The lon g-range, land-based str ike force largelyhad the Mitsubi shi N avy Type 96 Attac k Bom ber(G 3M) , developed at the instigation ofYamam oto whenhe headed the N aval Bureau of Aeronauti cs' Techn icalDivision. The spec ification he issued in 1933 went onlyto M itsubi shi and produced a twin-cngined tor pedobomber whose opera tional debut in August 1937 in­volved a 2,000km ( I ,250-mile) transocean ic bombing

Captain (later M ajor) Fujita Yl IZO u'as one of the feu' vis ion­aries ill the J apanese A rmy Air Force,and his demand fo r ahigh-performance reconnaissance aircraft led to the appear­alice in November 1939 of the prototype M itsubishi ArmyTy pe 100 command reconnaissance aeroplane (K i-46). Thesecond version, pictured here, u'as the K i-46-IJ withM itsubishi Ha 102 engines, which uas faster than the K i-4 3and entered serv ice in 1940.

Aeroplanes. Small numbe rs of the Naka jima Army Type94 Reconnaissance Aeroplane (Ki-4) sesquiplane re­ma ined in first-line service , but they had largely beensupplanted by the Tachikawa Army Ty pe 98 Direct Co­operation Aeroplane (Ki-36) . This had a modemairfra me with an enclosed cockpit, yet essentially repro­duced the earlier aircraft with suc h featu res as its fixedunde rcarriage, light armame nt (two 7.7mm machine­guns and 150kg (3301b) bomb load) , bu tdespite (or because of ) them it proved very popular.

Ca ptain Fujita Yuzo, who influenced the Ki-51 attackbomber specification, also drafted one in july 1935 for ahigh-s peed reconnaissance aircraft to support armiesand army gro ups. The spec ification for what became theMitsub ishi Ty pe 97 Comma nd Reconnaissance Aero­plane (Ki-15) included a requirem ent for a maximumspee d of 450km(h (280mph) and a combat radiu s of400km (250 miles). With its fixed undercarriage andlong, enclose d coc kpit it resembled contemporar ymailplanes, bu t it proved successful, and in Septe mb er1939 production of an up-engined versio n with aM itsubis hi Ha-26- I entered service as the Army Type 97Comma nd Reconnaissance Aeroplane M odel 2 (Ki- 15­II) with a top spee d of 5 10km(h (317mph) . Unusually,this latt er aircraft so impressed the japanese Navy thatthey orde red similar aircraft as the M itsubi shi NavyTy pe 98 Recon naissan ce Aeroplane (C 5M) .

It was Fujit a, now a Ma jor , who drafted thespec ification for a successo r in December 1937. Thiscalled for an aircraft with six hours' endurance at400km(h (249mph) and a maximum speed of 600 km(h(373mph). The elegant, twin -engined prototype firstflew in November 1939 and, despit e failing to meet theofficial spec ification, it was faster than the Ki-4 3 fighter.T his facilitated its en try into service the following year asthe M itsub ishi Army Ty pe 100 Co mma nd Recon­naissance Aeroplane (Ki-46).

In contras t to the jAAF, the japanese N avy laid grea temphasis up on range for both land- and ship-based air­craft. The Navy's role was to protect both the maritimeapproac hes to the homeland and the Empire's islandpossessions, which extended into the central Pacific ,primarily against the USA. The ability to detect and toengage enemy forces as early as possible, and if possi­ble beyo nd the range of enemy aircraft, was a key fac­tor in japanese naval aircraft specifications andoperations. Indeed , it was exploited by jap anese carriertask forces as late as the summer of 1944. T he ability ofland-based aircraft to reach distant targets was demon­strated in China from 1937 onwards, and the japaneseNa vy anticipa ted str iking the enemy fleet with bothland- and carrier-based air power. Yet in 1939 it wasunive rsally believed that the role of naval air power wasto support the battle fleet , detecting and trac king theenemy and then eroding his stre ngth throu gh bomb and

In 1939 most of the J apallese A rmy Air Force's Corpssquadrons had the Tachihazca Army Type 98 direct co-oper­ation aeroplane (K i-36), which, like K i-27 and K i-43, <msatraditional design exploiting Ilew technology . It was ext reme­ly popular with its cre'll.'S, olle reason tchy a trainer versionappeared ill 1939 as the A rmy Type 99 advanced trainer(K i-55), codenamed 'Ida '.

then led to a more detailed specification nine monthslater which included a maximum speed of 540 km(h(335mph) and a five-h our endurance with an arma mentof two forwar d-firing and one movable rear -facin g ma­chine-gun. Only Kawasaki responded, with th e ArmyExpe rime ntal Ki-45, which first flew in janu ar y 1939.Eng ine pro blems delayed its introduction into service,however , and these were not overcome for two years.

Inevitably the majority of jAAF airc raft were Co rps

The prototype Na kajima A rmy 7y pe 1 rK i-43) Haya busa(Peregrine Falcon) fl ew as the u'ar began and was a replace­ntent for the K i-2 7, although built according to the samephilosophy. W idely encountered during the <var, it was code­named 'Oscar ',

(3 11mph)) , it was still a traditi onal design . Ind eed, thespec ification dem anded manoeu vrabilit y at least equal tothat of the Ki-27 . The new fighter, dubbed Ha yabu sa(Per~rine Falcon ), ente red service in 1941 .

Like its contemporaries in Europe, the japaneseArmy was interested in the twin-engined , lon g-rangefight er concept, although the speci fica tion issued inM arch 1937 was essentially a blank shee t of paper . Theresponses from Kawasaki, Mi tsubi shi and Nak ajima

26 27

AIR CRA F T O F T il E S E C O:-:D \X' OR!.D \, 'AR AXIS A IRCRAFT AT T HE OuTIIREAK OF " 'AR

77/C other element of the carrier strike fo rce ",as 10 be theA ich i Sat'y Type 99 ca rrier bomber (lJ3A I), uhich enteredservice in 1940, Codenamed ' Ibl', this dive bomber wasgreatly injluenced by the H einkel He 70, Heinkel andA ichi having had a strong business relationship since the late1920s,

3,700km (1.300 to 2,000 nm ). The prototype of theNakajima Navy Expe rimenta l 13-Shi three -scat escortfighter did not fly un til 1941 . and proved a failure, butredesigned it becam e the Navy Type 2 ReconnaissanceAeroplane GIN),

T he Navy's desire for a bombe r destroyer was un de r­lined in a 14-Shi requ irement issued in Sep tember 1939,which had actually bee n drafted the previous year. T hiscalled for a land-based aircraft with 600km/h (373mph)maximum speed and the ability to reac h 6,000m(19,700ft) in 5,5 minutes, T hree years were to elapsebefore the prototype M itsubishi Navy InterceptorFighter Raiden (T hunderbolt), or J2,\ I. first flew, and

Yokosuka Navy Carrier Bomber Susei (Comet) . or D4Y.first flew at the end of 1940, nearly thre e year s elapsedbefo re it joined dive-bombing units. owing todevelopment problems,

The Navy's fighter in 1939 was typical of itscontemporaries, being produced to a 9-Shi (1934)requirement , The Mitsubishi Navy Type 96 CarrierFighter (A5M ) was an all-metal gull-wing design with

an open cockpit and fixed undercarriage, The usual pairof rifle-calibre machine-guns were fitted. although latermodels augmented this with a 20mm cannon ,Development of a replacement was well advanced, hav­ing begun in 1937 in the light of combat experience 0 \ 'CI

China. and while manoeuvrabili ty was stressed, thespeed and arma ment requirements (500km/h or31 1mph and two 20mm cannon with two 7,7mm ma­chine-guns ) clearly demonstrated that the JNAF wasseeking a radical design, The ,\ Iitsubishi N avy Type 0Carrier Fighter (A6M) entered service in 194 0 and wasto prove one of the great fighters of the Seco nd WorldWar, with a ph enom enal range (for the per iod ) of1,870km (1,0 lOnm),

T he limi ted range of its predecessor forced the JNAFto sen d attack bom bers unescorted deep into C hineseterritory, where ma ny fell victim to enemy fighters,Recog nising the problem, and influence d by the FrenchPotez 63 1, a lon g-range, twin -engine fighter speci ­fication was issued in 1938, T his called for an aircraftwith a maximum speed of 520 km/h (322 mph) , goodmanoeuvrability to meet single-scat fighte rs and a nor­mal range of 2,400km which cou ld be extended to

Mitsubishi's Navy 7j'pe 96 carr ier fig hter lAS.! /), later codenanted 'Claudc 'ifo n ncd the third element of the ca rrier triunnnrateand u'as a conserva tive design exploiting modem technology. A replacement fo r th is fig il/er ",as about 10 enter service in thefor m of the M itsubishi Sat) , Type 0 carrier fi ghter IA 6.1/2), the famed Z ero or 'Ze ke'.

simplified designation G5N, but it proved unsu ccessful.Like the JAAF, the JNAF str ike force consi sted

mainly of single-engined aircraft, alth ough in this casebecause they were designed pr imarily to operate fromaircraft carriers, By 1939 a wholesale change in the dive­bomber and torpedo-bomber squadrons was welladvanced, with trad itional-construction biplanes of the8-Shi and 9-Shi programmes being replaced bymonocoque-construction, cantilever monoplan es,

Re-equi pment of the torpedo bomber units had beengiven priority, for the Yokosuka Navy Type 96 CarrierAttack Bomber (B4Y) was neve r more tha n a stop-gapdesign following the failure of the Yokosuka Type 92(B3Y), T he 10-Shi (1935) spec ification laid greatemp hasis upon endu rance , which was to be up to sevenhours, and an externa l payload of 800kg ( 1,7601b), T hewinner of the competition was the N akajima N avy Type97 Ca rrie r Attack Bomber (B5N) , which entered servicein 1938 and was the first Jap anese carrie r-borne aircraftwith a retra ctable und ercarri age, The aircraft possesseda formidable range of between I , I 10km (normal) and2,260km (maximum) (590nm and I ,220nm), which wasunmatched by Am erican torpedo bombers even in 1944 ,So radical was the design that a conse rvative fall-backdesign with a fixed undercarriage was produced byM itsubi shi as the B5M , but saw little active service . In1939 a 14-Shi specification for a replacem ent aircraftwas issued, calling for a range of between 1,850km (with800kg load) to 3,300km (without bombs) ( 1,000 to1,800nm), which led in 1941 to the Nakajima N avyCa rrier Attack Bombc r Tenzan (Heavenly M ountain), orB6N,

In re-equipping dive-bomber units the Na vy provedmore conservative, and du ring 1939 the Aichi NavyType 96 Carrier Bomber (D IA l), stro ngly influ encedby the Heinkel He 66 , was due for rep lacement by theAichi N avy Type 99 Carrier Bom ber (D3A), which re­tained a fixed undercarriage but was strongly influencedby the Heinkel He 70, Production was delayed by theneed to redesign the cowling and improve the tail, butwhen the aircraft entered service in 1940 these designcha nges gave it great manoeuvr ab ility as compensationfor the inadequate defe nsive arma ment of three 7,7mmmachine-gun s, T he offensive load was no more tha n370kg (8 15Ib), although the bomber had a range of\,470km (795nm),

Its replacemen t was already on the drawin g boa rd,and also reflected Ge rma n influence, To meet an 13-Shi(1938) requ irement for an aircraft with a range of1,480km (with bombs) and 2,200km (without bombs)(800- 1,200nm) , Yokosuka designed an aircra ftinfluenced by the Heinkel He 118 but with man y radicalfeatu res including internal bomb load , retractable under­carr iage and a liquid-cooled vee engine (the prototypeshad imp orted Daimler-Benz D B 600Gs), Altho ugh the

Development of the M itsubishi Navy Type 96 attack bomberIG31\1) U 'QS begun at the instigation of Capt (later Admiral)}amamolO Isorohu, and gave the Japanese Savy an unri­ca lled long-range strike arm in 1939, 7iJ..o y ears later,uihen these bombers received the codename 'Nell', some helped10 sink the British capital ships HMS Prince of Walcsand Repulse,

mISSIOn against C hinese targets in bad weathe r. Thebiggest drawbacks to this family were tha t their 800kg(1,7461b) bom b load had 10 be carried externa lly, andtheir three rifle-calibre machin e-gun defen sive arma­ment (in three retractable turrets, two dorsal and oneventra l) was inadequate,

In Sept ember 1939 a prototype replacement aircraftdeveloped to a 12-Shi requirem ent mad e its first flight ,and was to provide the Japanese Navy with an aircraftcapable of carryi ng an 800kg torpedo inte rna lly3,700km (2,000nm) , The cigar-like Mi tsubishi N avyType I Attack Bomber (G 4M) was to have a heavie r ar­mam ent , with a 20mm cannon in a tail position and four7,7mm machine-guns, but there was no provision for ar­mou r or self-scaling fuel tanks , The previous year sawwork begin on an even more ambitious project for anattack bomber wi th a range of up to 6,500km(3,500nm) , Based up on the Douglas DC-4 E four­engined airliner, the first prototype of the NakajimaExperimental 13-Shi Attack Bomber Shinzan (M oun­tain Recess) flew at the end of the year and had the

By 1939 the J apanese Naval A ir Force had largelyre-equipped its car rier groups zcith modem strike aircraftsuch as this Nakajima Navy Type 97 carrier attack bomber(115NI), Du ring the war these aircraft, codenamed 'Kate ',rure used for both lerel and torpedo bombing as uell asrCCOtI1WlS SQIlCC.

28 29

A IRCRAFT OF T HE SECO:-:D \X'ORLD \\' A R AXI S A I R C RAF T AT TilE OU T B RE A K OF \X'AR

For long- range reconnaissance the Japallese N avy relied ill 1939 IIpOIl the fo ur engined Kaua nishi N avy Type 97 flying' boat(H 6K) , tcith a normal rallge ofmore than 2,20011/11 (4,000km). It U'aS frequently encountered during the wa r, uihen it U'aS co­denamed /Mauis '.

engine problems were to have a detrimental effect upondevelopment.

The single-engined attack bombers all had a sec­ondary reconnaissance role. Indeed, the Yokosuka D4Yactuall y entered service in 1942 with a reconnaissanceunit , but the eyes of the fleet were its seaplanes. Long­range reconnaissance requirements were met by two9-Shi designs with braced wings, the four-enginedKawani shi Navy Type 97 Flying Boat (I-16K) and therwin-engincd Yokosuka Navy Type 99 Flying Boat(H5Y) .The latter was supposed to complement the for­mer but proved underpowered, but the H6K proved agreat success, having a normal ran ge of more than4,000km (2,200 nm) . By 1939 a replacem ent LargeFlying Boat was under development to meet a 13-Sh i

Every Japallese major warship f rom cru iser size upzcardscarried a fl oatplane, and ill 1939 mOSI u'ere the N akaj imaNavy 7'ype 95 reconnaissance seaplane (E8 N 1).W ilh a largeisland empire CO defend, the JapGllese made extensive lise ofthis seaplane, later codena med 'Dave " f rom shore bases aswell as f rom seapla ne tenders and carriers,

30

requirement for an aircraft with a ran ge of 8,300km(4,500nm). The prototyp e of what became theKawanishi Navy Type 2 Flying Boat (H8K) did notappear until the following year , and when it enteredservice it was to prove a valuable tool, with arm ourprotection and a de fensive armament of five 20mm can­non and three 7.7mm machine-guns.

Seaplanes were embarked in man y japanese ships toprovide tactical reconnaissance and fire control, but sea­plane carriers as well as seaplane tenders were also avail­able to strengthe n reconnaissance and anti-submarineforce s. On e of the most widely used floatplan es in 1939was the Nakaj ima Navy Type 95 Reconnaissanc eSeapl ane (ESN) , a single-float open-coc kpit bip lane oftrad itional construc tion, and its successor adopted a sim­ilar design philosophy, ente ring service as the Mitsub ishiNavyType 0 Obser vation Seaplane (F IM) .

For longer-ran ge reconnaissance in cruiser s andseaplane carriers the Navy used the Kawanishi NavyType 94 Reconnaissan ce Seaplane (E7K) , a twin-floatdesign othe rwise similar to the E8N. Development of arepl acement had been under way since 1937, and was tobe won in 1940 by the Aichi Navy Type 0Reconnaissanc e Seapl ane (E I3A) , a min-float , all-me talmonoplane with an enclosed cockpit. A potenti al re­placem ent for which a 14-Shi (I 939) requirement wasissued called for a high-speed reconn aissance seaplanewhich could evade fighter s.Two years were to elapse be­fore the first flight of what became the Kawanishi NavyType 2 High-speed Reconnaissance SeaplaneShiun' (Violet Cloud), or E151', and the aircraft was nota success .

The japanese Navy placed much emphasis up onnight operations in which the enem y would be struckfirst by ver y long-range torpedoes and then by gunfire,

and in this field the japanese were to win several vic­tories. even agains t enemy forces who had the advantageof radar.10 support this role sma ll number s of the sin­gle-engined Aichi Navy Type 96 Night ReconnaissanceSeaplane (E IOAI) biplane flying boat were in service ,embarked in the light cru isers which led the destroyerflotillas. but from 1938 these were being replaced by thesimilar Aichi Type 98 Night Reconnaissance Seaplane(E I IA I) , des igned to an II-Shi requirement .

The sub mari ne arm, whose tasks were to provide ad­vanced warning of ene my fleet movements to theCombined Fleet and to erode enemy fleet strength,naturally had a seaplane requirement, In 1939 this wasmet by Watanabe Na vyT ype 96 Small Reconn aissanc eSeaplanes (E9W I) , which were kept dismantled in sma llhanga rs and re-assembled when required . A 12-Sh irequi rement for a replacement saw the appea rance in1939 of the prototype of what became the twin-floatYokosuka Navy Type 0 Small Reconnaissance Seaplane(E14YI). This little-known aircraft entered service in194 1 and had the unique distincti on of bombing theAme rican mainland the following year.

Bibliography

T here is a wealth of literature on Ge rman aircraft, ofwhich the autho r has relied up on :

G reen, \,<T, Ifurplalles of the Third Reich (Galahead Books,New York, 1990);

Hornze, E L, Arming the lufncaffe (University ofNebraska Press, Lincoln , 1976);

Smith, j R & Kay, A, German Aircraft of the Second If-orldIfar (Putnam, Lond on , 1972).

For the Luftwaffe at this time see:

Hooton, E R, Phoenix Triumphant (Arms & Arm ourPress , London, 1994).

Little has been writt en in English abo ut Italian aircraft orthe Regia Aeron au tica.The only comprehensive work onaircraft is:

Thom pson, jonathan \,<T, Italian Civil and M ilitaryAircraft 1930-1 945 (Aero Publi shers, USA, 1963) .

For the Regia Aero nautica sec:

Ceva , L & Curami, A. 'Air Army and Aircraft Industr yin Italy' in Boog, Hor st (ed) , The Conduct of the AirIf-ar ill the S econd lI'orld Ifar (Berg Pu blishers,Oxford, 1992), and

G reen , W & Fricker, j , 71le A ir Forces of the Irbrld(.\ lacDonald, Lon don , 1958).

For an exhaustive study on jap anese aircraft see:

Fra ncillon, R j , Japallese Aircraft of the Pacifi c Ifur(Putnam, London, 1970) .

T here is little in English about the development of thejapanese air forces apart from :

Eiichiro Sckigawa , Pictorial H istory ofJapallese M ilita ryAuiation, edited by Taylor , J W R and ,\ Ionday, D(Ian Allan , Sh epperton , 1975)

as well as

Green & Frick er (op cit).

For the jAAF, sec a series of US Arm y post-war mono­graphs publi shed in microfilm form by the USGove rnrnent Printing Office :

No 76, 'China Area air operations record jul y 1937 toAugust 1945';

No 77, 'japanese preparation s for operations inManchuria 1931-1 942' ;

japanese Studies on Manchuria series No 4, 'Air ope ra­tions 193 I-1 945 ', is also of interest. Also see passim:

Sabu ro Hayashi & Coo x, A D, K ogun (The MarineCo rps Association , Quanti co, Virginia, 1959).

For the jNAF, there is:

.\ Iasatake Okumiya & jiro Horikoshi with Caidin, M ,Zero (Cassell & Co mpany, London , 1957), and

.\ li tsuo Fuchida & Masatake Okumiya, M iduay tThe bat­lie that doomed J apall (Hutchinson & Co, Londo n,1957).

Xote: It should be noted that the family name comesfirst in japan .

31

2Allied Aircraft Development in the Early War Years

Derek Wood

Th e standa rd single-seat fi ghter ill H olland ill 194 0, thePokker D.SSl u'as outnumbered and outperformed by theBf 109 .

before the war, but all this was to no avail, The BelgianAir Force also possessed Fiat CR. 42 biplan e fighters andsixteen Fairey Battle light bomb ers.

A modern monoplane fighter designed by Renardhad been under test in 1939, but it crashed during tr ials.In its last variant it was the Renard 38 with a Merlin en­gine. It had a speed of over 300mph (480krn/h) anda mixed cann on and machine-gun arm ament, butalthough it showed great potential it did not go intoproduction .

In Holland the key aircraft manufacturer was Fokker,which supplied the Dutch armed services.The standardfighter was the Fokker D.XXI, first flown in 1936.Powered by an 830hp Bristol ,\ Iercury radial engine, theD.XXI had a fixed und ercarriage and a maximum speedof 270mph (434kmlh). It was highly manoeuvrable, butnot fast or well-enough armed to match the Bf 109.T heFokker G.Ia was a twin-cngined, twin-boom fightergro und-attack aircraft of high perform ance but was

The first real mows towards air rearmament among theEuropean nations that would eventuall y face Germanyin war came in 1935. In that year. Adolf Hitler re­nou nced the terms of theTreaty of Versailles, introducedconscription and unveiled the new Luftwaffe. OnGermany's borders were potential enemies - Poland ,Belgium, France, Holland, Denmark and Switzerland.Beyond Poland lay the great enigma, Russia. In the dis­tance was Great Britain, while across the Atlantic lay theUnited States of America.The attitude of these countriesto a forthcoming conflict varied , as did their ability toproduce modem aircraft and build them rapidl y inquantity.

Poland had a well-developed aircraft industry wi thsome basically sound designs, includin g a modern twin­engined light bomber, the PZL 1~ 3 7 Los. A high­performance modern fighter was, however, lacking. Adozen squadrons equipped wi th Bristol .\ lcrcur y­engined PZL I'l l c fighters went to war, but proved nomatch for the ,\Iesserschmitt Bf 109. The P ll c was anall-metal, high gull-wing machine wi th a fixed undercar­riage and a top speed of 242mph (390mph) .

Belgium had expec ted that its neutrality would be re­spected; a forlorn hope. It had a small aircraft industry,the products of which included several foreign typesbuilt under licence. Arrangement s had been made for theHawker Hurricane to be assembled under licence inBelgium, bu t the invasion put a stop to that after just afew had been completed; a squadro n of purchasedHurricanes was wiped out on the gro und. Twenty-twoGloster Gladiato r biplane fighters had been pur chased

Th e Rolls-Royce-M erlin-pozcered Renard 38 prototype. Apromising modem design, bill development ceased after theinvasion of Belgium ill 1940.

Belgian A ir Force Gloster Gladiators. In surprise auachs they '<'ere cinually tciped 0111 ill 1940.Th e Gladiator 'IUS highlymanoeuurable, bill, as a biplane. U'as outclassed by modem monoplane fi ghte rs. One II/Iil operated icith the RAP ill theBattle of B rita in, and the type U'as fo r a period the OIl [V defen ce of Xl ulta . Th e Gladiator also sau: action in Noncay an d

ill the IreSlem Desert.

Polish PZ L R 3 7 I.iJS light bombers. A useful aircraft, the Los u'as orenchelmed ill the sudden Lu ft tcaffc auack ill S eptember193 9. S om e escaped 10 Roma nia and ,cere ercntually used agains t R ussia .

32 33

A I R C RAFT OF T H E SE CO:-;O \X' ORLD W A R A l. LI E D A I R C R AFT DE v E I. 0 P .\ 1E :-; T 1:-; T H E EAR I. Y \\ ' A R YE A R S

The Liore et Oliver Leo 45 1, shoum ill the foreground ill this picture, «'<IS the best medium bomber ill the Armee de l'A ir illJ940, bill 100 JeU' U'ere available, II had high perforillalice, bill poor armament.

avai lab le only in small numbers. Holland. like Belgium.was neu tral and it did not conside r that it would bedirectly threatened in any war.

Potentially, the two most powerful focs that G erma nyfaccd were France and G reat Britain. Fran ce had had asuccession of gover nments with various aircraft policies- most of the m bad. The disorganisation was such thatmany different type s were ordered in small quantities.T he great disaster came in 1936. when the PopularFront took office. It proceeded to nati onalise a greaterpart of the industry an d split it into six companies which .in turn . acquired factories from the remaining pr ivatesector. The result was chaos.

G uy La Chambre becam e Air M inistcr in 1938 andtried to pick up the pieces with very little time 10 spa re.He made great efforts, but the overall situati on washopeless, A new pro duction programme was initiated in1938 requiring the constr uction of 2,500 up-to-date mil­itary aircraft, but the bulk of the defence budge t went 10

the army and funds were therefore inadequate, even ifthe industry could have coped with tbe expansion.T herewer e at least two promi sing fighters undcr developmentand two or three bombers but, in the main , front-lineequipment was obsolescent or obso lete.

Far and away the best fighter prod uced in France wasthe single-scat Dewoitine D520. Powered by a super­charged 9 1Ohp Hispano 12Y 45 in-line engine, it had amaximum speed of 326 mph (524k.m/h) and a serviceceiling of 36,000ft ( I I ,000m), and its range was 6 15mile s (990km). Its 28ft 9in (8m) spa n and 33ft 6in(10m) length made for a fast and highly man oeuvrablecombat aircraft. Armament consisted of one 20mm can ­non firing through the airscrew hub and four 7.5mmmachine-guns in the wi ngs. Originally a private venture,the D520 flew in October 1938 . The first order for 200was placed in 1939, although this was later increased to2,200, plus 120 for the Aeronavale, The first batch was

Ulldollbredly Ihe Frellchfighrer wirh rhe besrperforillalice ill1940 «'OS rhe De-<.t'Oirille D.520; hou·C'l.'er, rhere «'ere 1I0rmOllgh oj Ihelll.

34

del ivered in January 194 0. but when the Germanoffensive opened on 10 .\ lay only thirty-six were opera­tional. Further units were re-equipped with the typebefore the armistice. and they all performed well. Intotal, 905 0 520s were built . and a number sub­sequcntly opera ted with air forces of the Axis powers.Lim ited fur ther development of this promising designtook place during the war.

The Bloch 152 radial-engined fighter also had a rea­sonable performance, with a top speed of 316mph(274k.m/h)and a service ceiling of 38,000ft ( 11,600m).Several hundred were in use in 194 0, but not enough 10

affect the outcome of the battle in the air. The mostwidely used Frcnch fighter was the .\ lorane MS406,powered by the 860hp Hispano-Suiza 12Y 3 1 in-l ine en­gine .With a maximum speed of 303 mph (488k.m/h), the,\ IS 406 was sturdily built and man oeuvrab le; it couldnot, however, match the perfor mance of the Bf 109 andsuffered accordingly.

Before the war the French bombe r fleet was declaredobsolete or obso lescent and replacem ent programmeswere hastily initiated. T he most promising of the newtypes was the Lion': ct Olivier LcO 45 1 medium bomber,powered by two G nome- Rhone radials. Streamlined ,and with a maximum speed of 285mph (485k.m/h), theLeO 451 had a service cei ling of 26,500ft (8,000m) andcarried up to 2,800lb (I,270kg) of bombs . However, itsdefensive armament was poor, with single 7.5mm ma­chine-guns in the nose and ventral positions and one20mm can non in a poorly enginee red dorsal mounting.

Despite prob lems over the non-availability of certainvital items of equipment, and other delays, there werejust over 470 LeO 45s in service by M ay 1940 and eightgroups were fully equipped, After the armistice the air­craft were used operationally by the Vichy French andlater by the Free French.

Another streamlined modcrn bomber was the Amiot

77,e lIIosl IIIl l11erOIlS illlerceplOr ill Ihe Frm ch Air Force ill1940 «'OS Ihe .\Ioralle .\IS .406, «'hich had a 20111111 call1lOIlfi rillg rhrollgh rhe propeller shaft alld 1«'0 «'illg-lIIollllledlIIachille-glllls. Despile a lOp speed oj j llsl en."r 300lllph il«'as /10 lIIarch Jor rhe Gerlllall HJ 109.

35 1/354, which was also used for reconnaissance.Powered by two Gnome-Rhone radials, the 35 1/354 hada crew of four and could atta in a top speed of 265mph(426k.m/h). Its ra nge was 1,500 miles (2,-t00km) and itsarm ament consisted of one 20mm cannon and two7.5mm machine-guns. A bomb load of 2,500lb(I ,130kg) could be carried .The 351 had twin fins, whilethe 354 had a single fin and rudder.The first productionaircraft left the factory in late 1939 and about fifty hadbeen de livered by the time of the invasion ; thefactory ncar Paris was subsequently overrun by theGermans.

OUi of the motley assortment of machin es that wentto war with the French Services, one other stands OUl ,

the Bloch 174/175 twin-e ng incd reconnaissance bomber(see photograph overleaf). With a span of 39ft l Oin(11m) and powered by two G nome-Rhone 14N 49 ra­dia ls, the twin -finn ed 174/175 had a range of 1,000 miles(I,600km). Its maximum speed was 325mph(522k.m/h) , and it had the rcmarkablc scn 'icc cciling ofO\'er 35,000ft (l0,670m). T hcsc capabilities, plus goodmanoeuvrabili ty, madc thc 174/1 75 difficult to intcrccpt.Its arma ment compriscd scven 7,5mm machine-gunsand, as a bombcr, the 175, it cou ld carry 1,000lb

35

(450kg) of bombs. Marcel Bloch (better known after thewar as M arcel Dassault) was a good designer, yet hisefforts were 10 have lillie practical effect , as only forty­nine 174/1 75s were used operationally and productionwas very slow.

Overall , France had too little timc available and 100

cha otic an industry 10 re-equip the Armee de l'Air andthe Aeronavale with sufficient numbers of the right air­craft. A shortage of parts, and even sabo tage, con ­tributcd to the gloomy picture. After the armistice ,development at French factorie s all but ceased, and thisseriously affected the industry after the war, It had tocatch up with five years of lost tech nology and designknow-how, not to mention miss ing the beginning of theict age ,

The USA , altho ugh not in the conflict untilD ecember 194 l , was indi rectly a major parti cipant inthe air war from 1939 onwards . In thc latc 1930s France,Bclgium, Norway. G rcccc and Britain orde rcd militaryaircra ft from the USA to fill gaps in thcir im·cntorics.T his had two cffccts. First, it cnab led US factor ics to cx­pand at a time of acute contract shortage, and sccond, itgave firms im'aluablc opcrational cxpcricncc with theirproducts bcforc thc countrv entcrcd thc war.

A IR CRAFT OF Til E S E C O:-:D \x' O R L D \, ' A R A L LI ED A I R C R AFT DE v E LOP ,\ \ E:-: T 1:-: TilE EAR L Y \X' A R Y E A R S

Orde red for the (:S N avy as the Breuister F2A , this fighterwas also the subject of a m isgu ided RAP order ill 1939,uhere it was kn oum as the B uffa lo. Unsuitable fo r Europeanoperations, RAF Buffa loes were sent 10 M alaya andSingapore, tchere they fell v ictim 10 high-performancefupanesefighters.

The fi rst American fi ghter 10 see action ill the S econd Il'brldIl'il r, the C urtis Hawk 75A (1'-36) sau' seruice tcith theFr ench A ir Force and, later, the RAH The latter selll them,as the i\lohawk, 10 India and Burma. S everal USAACsquadrons u'ere equipped icith the 1'-36.

A Bloch 175 bomber ill German ma rkings. The 175 and its reconnaissance counterpart, the 174, had high speed and alt itudeperforma nce. There were, luncete r, so feu: of them that they did 1I0t affect the outcome of the air wa r O'IJer Fr ance.

A very modern-look ing, streamlined fig hter, the Bell 1'-39 A iracobra did 1101 have a performan ce 10 match, particularly atalti tude, and u'as therefore unsuited 10 the European air lm r. M allY u'ere supplied 10 the USAAF and 10 Ru ssia, uhere theylcere used for ground a/lack . 771C 1'-39 lms un ique ill hoeing the engine behind the pilot, driving the propeller through all

ex tension shaft .

1'-36A Hawk was a standard fighter with the USAAC.The French Hawks were powered by the Pratt &

\X1hitney Twin Wasp engine, and these were designatedMohawk III by the RAE The maiority of the 100-plus,\ lohawks delivered to the RAF in 1940 were, however,powered by the I,200 hp Wright Cyclone GR-1 820radial, and in this form were designated .\ tohawk IV.With a top speed of 302mph (485km/h) , a service ceil­ing of 32,000ft (9,750m) and six 0.30in machin e-guns,the ,\ lohawk was a good deal better than the Buffalo,although it was still unsuitable for Europe. Later the.\ Iohawks were operated in India and Burma against thejapanese air forces.

Two further fighters had useful careers with the RAF,neither in its original intended role.These were the 1'-40Tomahawk and the 1'-51 Mustang. The Cu rtiss Toma ­hawk was virtua lly a liquid-cooled-engine development

A decelopment of the Curtiss 1'-36 with all Allison liquid­cooled engine ill place ofa radial, the 1'-40 u'as built in largenumbers for the USAAC and for export.Wi th the RAI; as theToma hasck, the ai rcraft was used for knc-level tactical recOIl­naissance ill the UK andfighter ground a/lack in the M iddleEast.As a" interceptor its lack ofalt itude performance ruledit 0 11/ ill the European theatre.

airscrew boss, while there were two nose-mount ed andfour wing-mounted 0.30in machine-guns.

Airacobra s were initially ordered by France, but afterthe armistice the contract was taken over by Britain .Following Air Fighting Development Unit trials, onesquadron, No 60 I, was re-equipped with the type. It wasfound that perform ance at altitude was very poor andmechanical unreliability led to serious serviceabilityproblems. The Airacobra was briefly used for gro undstrafing, but was withdrawn from operations after fourmonths.T he bulk of the 670 ordered were cancelled and,instead, went to the US Army Air Corps, while manywere supplied to Russia, where they proved suitable forlow-level attacks.

Two other interceptor s were ordered which alsoproved unsuitab le for the European conflict, namely theBrewster Buffalo and the Curtiss Hawk 75A. TheBuffalo, an ugly barrel -shaped fighter , was first orderedby the US Navy as the F2A. In 1939 the British Pur­chasing Co mmission decided to order a land-based ver­sion, as did Belgium . After Belgium collapsed, its orderfor 28 was taken up to add to the 170 for the RAF, wherethey were named Buffalo. First deliveries were made inj uly 1940, but flight trials showed conclusively that theBuffalo would be no match for the Bf 109. Its speed of292mph (470km/h) and general performance were low,and the armament of four 0.5in machine-guns was inad­equate.The Buffaloes were, therefore, shipped to the FarEast, where they later suffered severely at the hands ofjapanese fighter s.

Britain ordered another radial-engined fighter, theCurtiss Hawk 75A, which in RAF service was named.\ lohawk. Again, this was an aircraft ordered and operat­ed in quantity by the Fren ch air force, the remainin gorders being switched to Britain after the armistice.The

Some of these types were very successful either in theshort or long term , while others proved quite unsuited tooperations in the European theatre when pitted againstthe Luftwaffe. A typical example of the latter was the Bell1'-39 Airacobra. One of the first interceptors to have atricycle undercarriage, the Airacobra was unique in hav­ing its 1,150hp Allison V-1710-E4 engine mounted be­hind the pilot, the propeller being dr iven via a longextension shaft. A 20mm cannon fired through the

The main list of aircraft is as follows: Bell 1'-39Airacobra, Boeing B-17 Fortress, Brewster F2A Buffalo,Consolidated I'BY Catalina, Co nsolidated B-24 Lib­erator, Curtiss Hawk 75, Curtiss 1'-40 \X'arhawkjTomahawk, Chance-Vought V-156F Chesapeake,Douglas DB-7AIB Havoc/Boston, Grumman F4FWildcat/Martlet, Lockheed Hudson, Martin 167,\ Iaryland, North American Harvard , North American1'-51 .\ lustang and Vultee Vengeance.

36 37

A IR CRAFT OF T HE S E CO:-;D \X' O RL D W AR

Designed and bnilt in 1 17 days to meet a British zcartime specification. the North American M ustang had a laminar-flou:wing uhich gave it very good lour-altitude performance. II was used by the RAFfor tactical reconnaissance, and later, uhenfilled with the Rolls-R oyce M erlin in place of the Allison engine, it became the outstanding long-range, high-altitudefi ghter of the U'll r.

ALI.I E D A I R C R AFT DE v E I. 0 I' ,\ \ E:-; T 1:-; THE EAR L Y XX' A RYE A R S

Designated A-20 by the US/lAC and called Boston by the RAI; this Douglas design was a very effective bombcrkutack air­craft and was also used as a fighter. The aircraf t shoum here is all RAF Boston I, BDllI, Boston Is u'ere converted ill Br itaininto Havocs as night fi ghterlintruders. and later BDllI u'as fi lled wilh a Turbinlite airborne searchlight .

of the M ohawk. France ordered 140 export 1'-40s, butthese were not delivered ; they were taken up by the RAFalong with an additional 606 machines. Variants coveredTomahawks M k I, IIA and lIB.

The Tomahawk served as a low-level tactical recon­naissance aircraft with army co-operation squadrons inBritain, as poor altitude performance did not allowfighter operations in the European theatre. Tomahawks

Named the Wildcal in the US Na vy and M arines andM artlet ill the British Fleet Air Arm, the Grumman F4Ffighter u'as built in large numbers and saw service through­011/ the zmr on board ships and from land bases. H ie Marllel,in December 1940, u'as thefi rst American aircraft in Britishservice to forcedtncn all eIlemy machine in the Second Il"brldIl'br. ln this pre-delirery photograph the ,lIarrlel 1I bears anAmerican civil registration together with Br itish markingsoierpaintcd ill zchite.

38

did , however , work as interceptors in the Western Desertin addition to performing effective gro und-attack opera­tions , With a 1,040hp Allison V-I 710-33 engi ne, the air­craft had a top speed of 345 mph (555km/h ) at 15,OOOft(4,570m) and carried six 0.303in machine-guns.

In 1940 the RAF took the unprecedented step ofcommissioning the design of a fighter in the USA to in­corporate the lessons learned in the first eight monthsof the war, A prototype of the NA-37, destined to be­come the M ustang, was designed and built in the re­markable time of 117 days, It had a laminar-flow wing ,a low-drag radiator and a very high standard of finish ,As a result the M ustang had a maximum speed of390m ph (625km/h) at low altitude and a range of justover 1,000 miles ( I ,600 km). ' In c I, 100hp Allison en­gine, however , as on the Airacobra and the Tomahawk,did not give the required performance at altitude, thu smaking it better suited to low-level tactical reconnais­sance. Some 800 Allison-engined M ustangs wereacquired by the RAE

\X' ith an armament of four 0.50 in and four 0.30inguns and an oblique camera, the type was used fromearly 194 2 onwards, rep lacing Toma hawks. 'IncMustang was to come into its own later as the war 's mostsuccessful lon g-range interceptor when re-engined withthe Rolls-R oyce Merlin . This development is dea lt within anothe r chapter.

The Royal Navy also took an interest in US fighterdesigns, and on the fall of France took over a Frenchorder for single-seat Grumman G -36A aircraft,

designating them ,\ lar tlct I. This was followed by anorder for 100 G-36Bs, 90 of them with folding wings.Initia lly the I ,200hp Wright Cyclone was fitted. but thcsecond batch had the Pratt & Whitney Twin Wasp radi ­al of the same power. the se being known as "' Iartlet ,\ IkII. Deliveries were made in 1940, the second batch fol­lowi ng in 194 1- 2. A Greek order was also taken over in194 1.

Tough, reliable and armed with fou r or six O,5inmac hine-guns, the ,\ lartlet was a god send to the FleetAir Arm (FAA), It was used in every theatre of war, op­erating from flee I and escort carriers, Under Lend­Lease , enacted in the USA in 1941 , the FAA received asteady stream of ,\ lartlets and \V'ildcats, the latter beingthe name for the type used by the US Navy and US,\ la rines and then standardised on by Britain in 1944 ,The Martlet had a span of 38ft (I Im), a maximumspeed of 328mph (527km/h) at 21,000ft (6,400m) , aservi ce ceiling of 37,500ft (l 1,435m) and a normalrange of 845 miles (I,300 km), Its load ed weight was7,0021b (3,175kg) ,

In the fields of light and medium bombi ng, recon­naissancc and training , the USA was ab le to providefirst-class aircraft, several of whic h were contin uouslydeveloped throu gh the war. O ne of thc most successfulfrom the outset was the tricycle-undercarriage Doug lasDB-7 light bomber. Ori ginally the subject of a large pre ­war French order and one for the RAF, the DB- 7 firstflew in August 1939 and, after the German invasion, theoutstanding French orders were taken over by the RAJ'

39

Thereafter, thc US Army Air Force s adopt ed thc type asthe A-2 0, the 'A' prefix stand ing for attack,

The RAF used its first DB-7s as trainers, the nam eBoston bein g adopted. A quantity of DB-7s and DB- 7Aswere converted into night intruders and nightfightcrs inBritain and called Havocs. The ,\ Ik I had two 1,200hpTwin \X'asp radials. while later deliveries were fitted with1,600hp Wright Double-Row Cyclones. As a night­fighter the Havoc had a 'solid' nose housing eight 0.303machine-guns and airborn e radar, while the intruderversio n had a glazed nose with guns in the lower nose, aVickers K gun in the dorsal position and 2,400l b( I .OOOkg) of bombs.

' Inc Havoc II nightfightcr had an unglazed noseaccommodatin g no fewer than twelve 0.303in machine­guns. ' In c light bomber version of the aircraft, theBoston III, was the most widely used varian t with theRAE deliveries beginning in spring 1941. It proved theideal replacement for the obsolescent Blenh eim, whichhad borne the brunt of the day light bombing since thewar began and had suffered heavy casualties.The BostonIII was fast, with a ma ximum speed of over 300mph(482km/h) , manoeuvrable and well liked by its crews ,The ,\ Iark III had a span of 61ft -lin (18m) and a rangeof just over 1,000 miles (1,600km) when fully loaded .With a crew of fou r it had a maxi mum bomb load of2,0001b (907 kg) . Gun armament con sisted of four fixedO,303 in machine-guns in the nose, and twin 0.303s inthe dorsal and ventral gun positions, An intruder versionof thc Boston III carried four 20mm cannon in an

AIR CRA FT OF T ilE SE CO:-:O \X· ORI.IJ \X'AR A I. LIE 0 A I R C R A F T 0 E v E I. 0 P ,\ \ E:-: T I x TH E E A R L Y xx·A RY E A R 5

aile of the most successfu l Americall front- line aircraft of theSecond Irorld lI'ar, the N orth American M itchell u'as pro­duccd 10 a total ofnearly 11,000 and served ill eury theatreof ' mr. It u'as named after the aviation pioneer General'Bil£v',IIitchell.A medium bomber zcith a crC'«' ofjit'e, it hada top speed of aur 280 mph and a range of 1,350 miles.77/C example S/IIY'«'II is a M itchel! 1 (lJ-25lJ), the firstdelivered 10 the UK, tcearing RAF prototype markingsand the serial FK 161.

orde red until 1938. Thereafter the B-17C was procured ,of which thirty-eight were supplied to the USAAC and,in 19-1 I , twenty to the RAF as the Fortress 1.The B-17Chad a 67ft lOin-long fuselage of circular cross-section,four Wright Cyclone R-1820 eng ines of \,200hp eachwith turbosupc rchargers, and a crew of ten. Win gspanwas 103ft 9in (31m) and all-up weight -I5,7501b(20,750kg).

T he lessons learn ed by the RAF were inco rpo rate d

A heaoil» armed high performance medium bomber, the.IIartill B-26 ,lIarallder had a high txing loading, uhichmeant long take-offs and landings.m'/l streamlined, it had atop speed of aver 300 mph. A standard bomber ill the 1IC',,:ly­created USMI; the M arauder also equipped squadrons ofRAF and Sou th African Air Force ill the ,l lediterrCllleCllItheatre of 'mr. Depicted is all RAF .IIarallder I.

Co nsolidated B-2-1 Liberator. Both benefit ed from earlyservice experience with the RAJ'

The B-1 7 da ted back to a far-s ighted Army Air Co rpsdesign competition of 193-1 for a bomber to carry2,000lb of bombs for at least 1,020 miles at a speed ofover 200 mph. The pro totype was flown in 1935, andsteady development continued thereafter.

Because of lack of mon ey and political opposition, thefirst fully ope ratio nal version, the B- 1713. was not

A Boeing B-I 7C Fl ying Fortress 1 of the RAJ: Ttcenty of these aircraft u'ere supplied 10 Bomber Command ill 19.JI. Ouing10 mechanical and other problems. togetherwith poor armament, they u'ere IlOt a success. The redesigned B-I 7E corrected thesedeficiencies, its improrements including a neui fin and a tail tu rret, 111 this form it opened the offensive by the US Bth Air Forcefrom Britain and, with later marks, becamefamous as olle of the most important heary bombers of the u'ar.

photographic reconnaissance work . It had very cra mpedcrew positi ons separated by bulkheads, and was onlymoderately successful. A mo re capacious, higher pow­ered deve lopment to British requirements was the,\ lar tin Baltimore, which first flew in Jun e 19-11 andentered RAF service early in 19-12 . Like the .\ la ryland ,the Baltimore was employed in the ,\ led iter ranean area.A tota l of \, -1 73 was produced for the RAE

Two important and wide ly prod uced Am ericanmedium bombers began flight tests in 19-10, the NorthAme rican B-25 Mi tchell and the ,\ la rtin 13-26 ,\ lar­auder. The original prototype for the 13-25, the NA--IO,was destroyed during initial flight tests in 1939, but theUSMC was so impressed that it called for major designchanges to be inco rpo rated and had enough faith toplace an orde r for 18-1 of the new NA-62, the first ofwhich flew in August 19-10.

A mid-wing 67ft 7in (20m) -span aircraft with two1,700hp R-2600 rad ials, the B-25, had a five-man crew,a five-gun armament and carried 3,OOOlb (I,360kg) ofbombs.The range was 1,350 miles (2,100km ), and it hada maximum speed of over 300 mph (-I82km/h) . To solvestability problem s, d ihedral on the outer wing panels wasdeleted. Over 9,700 Mit chells of all marks were built , ofwhich 800-plus were delivered to the RAE The changesin the Mitchell, particularly concern ing armament (apr ime consi deration in the Second World War) , are con­sidered elsewhere in this work .

\X'hen the US Army Air Corps issued a requirementfor a high-perfor mance medium bomber in Janu ary1939, the emphas is was laid on speed .T he G lenn Martincompa ny's submissio n was based on an aircraft with avery high wing load ing (i.e. a small wing area) and a highdegree of streamlining. Like the 13-25, the resulting air­craft by ,\ lar tin, the B-26 ,\ laraude r, had a tr icycleundercarriage. The high wing loading inevitably led tohigh land ing speeds and training problem s. With ashou lde r-wing, the B-26 had plenty of fuselage capaci ty,allowing a bomb load of -I,800Ib (2, I 77kg) . Armam entconsiste d of nose and tail 0.30in machine-gun s plus two0.50s mounted in a dorsal rurret. Powered by two1,850hp R-2800 Double Wasp radials, the M araud ercould achieve 3 15mph (500km/h) at 15,000ft (-I,570m)and cruised at 265 mph (-I26km/h). Range was 1,000miles (1,600km) and service ceiling 25,000ft (7,600m).

The US Ar my Air Co rps becam e the US Army AirForce in June 19-1 2, and its first Maraud ers were deliv­ered that year, while airc raft supplied to the RAF did notbecom e operational until mid 19-1 2. On subsequent vari­ants the wingspan was increased from 65ft to 71ft(19 m to 21m) and armament was steadily increased .Production continued throu gh to April 194 5.

'1\\'0 Ame rican four-engined bomber s were to have amajor effect on the outcome of the Second " 'orld \\lar,namely the Boeing B-1 7 Flying For tress and the

underfuselage pack. T he ,\ larks IV and V whichappeared later in the war had a power-opera ted twin- gundorsal turret.

A light attack bomber which failed to gain a US con­tract but which was supplied to Euro pe was the M artin167, named ,\ laryland by the RAE A three-seater , the,\ laryland was powered by two 1.200hpTwin Wasp radi­als initially, with sing le and later two-stage supercharg­ers. It carried up to 2,0001b (907kg) of bombs and sixmachine-guns, four of which were in the wing. Someseven ty-five M arylands were taken over from Frenchorde rs, and altoge the r the RAF acquired 225 , the major ­ity being ship ped to the ,\ liddle East for bom bing and

HIe M artill Baltimore development of the ,lIartillM aryland which U'aS originally designed 10 French require­ntcnts and later used by the RAJ: Classified as a lightbomber. the Baltimore u'as largerand faster than its forebearand carried better defensive armament,The Baltimore servedill the ,IIiddle East and Italy .

Named the M aryla nd by the British, this ,\Jartill bomber,ms 1I0t ordered by the USMC. M ost of those supplied to theRA F u-ere sent 10 the,IIiddle East, uihere they u'ere used forbombing and reconnaissance. The M ary land 'ms also usedby South African Air Force squadrons. From the M ary landU'(1S developed the larger Baltimore bomber for the RAI;which had better performance and lesscramped creU' accom­modat ion.

40 41

AIR CRAFT OF TIlE SE CO:\D \X'ORLD \X'AR

A Liberator I of RAF Coastal Command. Tlcis Iype and its sllccessors made a major contribution to lice war against lice U­boat by closing liceAtlantic air gap, as lice Liberator Icad a range of 2,400 miles. 17/C early air- to-surface-vessel (A S l') radaraerials CWI be sem 011 liceicings, 1I0se and above lice rear fuselage, The Liberator weill 011 to become licestablemate of liceB-1 7ill lice US daylight bombing offensive ill Europe, and served ill all war theatres.

ALLIED AIR CR AFT D E VELOP .\ I E:\T 1:\ TIlE EARLY WAR YEAR S

Firsl11O'W1I ill 1939, the Lockheed P- 38 Lightning remailled i.lprodllclioll llmil llce m d of llce wa r. Fasl. alld possessed of longrange, liceLightning carried a Iceavy 1I0se arma melll, and turbosuperchargersfo r liceA llison engines u'ere carried ill the booms.aile famous event ill lice Lightning 's Icistory u'as lice shooting dozen of a bomber carrying liceJ apallese Admiral Yamamoto,500 miles f rom the fig hters' base.

in the next major variant of the Fortress, the B-1 7E.Me chanical reliability was improved, the bomb sightmodified and gun freezing dealt with. M ost important,though, was an increase in the defen sive armament. Therear fuselage was red esigned to incorporate a tail gunturret , and an enlarged tail unit was fitted . Armamentwas increased to twelve 0.5in guns and one 0.30in(including two power-op erated twin- gun turrets) andthe bomb load rose from IO,500lb to 17,600lb (4,760to 7,980kg). The B-1 7E had a service ceiling of36,600ft (l I, 155m), a max imum speed of 317mph(5 10 km / h) and crui sed at 210mph (337krn/h). Its all­up weight was 53,OOOlb (24,OOOkg). The B-1 7E cameinto service in the Pacific and European war theatresin 1942.

The second heavy day bomber to achieve fame, theB-24 , was a later and very different-looking aircraft. Italso had the distincti on of bein g produced in largerquantities than any othe r single Allied type during theSecond \'('orld War (a total of over 18 ,000).

Wh en, in 1939, the Army Air Corps formul ated aspecification for a heavy bomber, it demanded betterrange and capa city than the B-1 7, together with highspeed. Co nsolidated Aircraft set out to meet these usingthe Da vis patented long-span , narrow-chord wing. Thishigh-aspect-ratio wing had a low angle of attac k, and itsdesign thu s gave high lift and low dra g, which meant in­creased range.

On the Co nsolida ted M odel 32 bomber , which be­came the 13-24, the sho ulde r-mo unted wing allowed for

42

a large bomb bay with the bombs stowed vertically, anda catwalk between the front and rear sections of the fuse­lage. It also had roller-shutter bomb door s which re­duced airflow disturbance associated with con venti onalbomb-bay doors. Finally, the M odel 32 was the firstheavy bomber with a nosewheel undercarriage, the mainlegs retra ctin g outwards into the wing s.

While the USAAC ordered a small number of earlyLiberator s, the RAF orde red 285 , of which 120 hadoriginally been ordered by France.The first of these wereused as transports. As a result of operational experience,the RAF Liberator Is were fitted with 0.5in machine­guns, one each in the nose and tail, one either side of thefuselage and one in a tunnel gun position underneath. Inaddition, self-sealing fuel tanks and intern al armour werefitted.

The Liberator went into RAF squadron service withCoastal Command in June 1941 . With its range of 2,200miles (3,530 krn) it was known as a VLR (very longrange) aircraft, and for the first time Britain could beginto close the gap in mid-Atlanti c where German U-boa tshad been operating unhindered by land-based aircraftsurveillance and attack.The B-24 Liberator was steadilydeveloped and had a distin guished career in bomber,maritime and transport roles.

The early marks had four 1,200hp Pratt & WhitneyR-1 830-33 engines with mechan ical superchargers.Span was 110ft (33m) and length 63 ft9in (19m) . Grossweight was 53,60 0lb (24,300kg) , maximum speed292mph (460km[h) , cru ising speed 228mph (366krn/h)

and service ceiling 30,500ft (9,300m). Bomb load was4,000lb (I ,800 kg) .

Britain pioneered the use of air- sur face-v essel (ASV)radar for airborn e maritime surveillance. This becam e ama jor factor in the U- boat war. The equipment wassteadily developed for lon ger range and clearer presenta­tion for the operator. With its exceptional range theLiberato r made full use of ASV in both British andAmerican service, the former from June 1941 onwards.

The first Coastal Command aircraft to be fitted withASV was also American , the ubiquitous Lockh eedHudso n. This type was the first American aircraft to beused opera tionally by the RAF in the Second World War.T he Hudson was a military conversion of the Lockheed14 civil transport, and was purchased in quantity by theBritish in 1938. It was a classic example of a good basicairframe bein g adapted to undertake numerous tasks ina wide variety of climates. The Hudson was used formaritime reconnaissance/attack, general reconnaissance,bombing, training and as a transport.

Powered by two 1,100hp Wright C yclone radial en­gines, the Hudson had a maximum speed of 246mph(395km[h), crui sed at 170mph (273km[h) , and had anendurance of 6hr. The weap on load (of bombs or depthcharges) was 750lb (340kg), and armament consi sted oftwo 0.303 machine-guns in the nose, two in a dorsalBoulton Paul turret and one in the belly. A crew of fivewas carried.

The successor to the Hudson was another adaptationof a Lockh eed transport, this time the M odel 18. Bearing

43

a close resemblance to the Hudson , the type was knownas the B-34/B-37 Lexington in the USAAF, the PV-Iwith the US Navy, and the Ventura in the RAE With two2,000hp Pratt & Whitney Double Wasp engines, theVentura had a maximum speed of 300 mph (480krn/h) ,cru ised at 260mph (420krn/h) , had a range of 1,000miles ( I ,600krn) and a serv ice ceiling of 25,000ft(7,260m) . Armam ent was two 0.50 and six or eight0 .303in guns plus 2,5001b (I, 135kg) of bombs. TheVentura saw limited service with Bomber Co mmand in1943 and then serve d with Coastal Co mma nd and theair force s of Australia , New Zealand , South Africa andCa nada.

A radical American fighter design was orde red inqu antity by Britain in 1940 but later cancelled, whichcaused arguments and recrimination s. The aircraft, theLockheed 1'-38 Lightning, was designed to meet a 1937USAAC requirement for an inte rceptor to attain360mph at 20,000ft (6,000m) and reach that height insix minutes - very ambitious for that prewar period .Lockheed chose a twin-boom , twin-engine layou t withradiator s and turbosuperchargers mounted in the boom sbehind the Allison in-line engines.The pilot sat in a cen­tral nacelle which also housed the single canno n plusfour machine-gun armament.

The RAF had ordered 143 Lightnings in M arch1940, and there was also a French contract. These wereall to be powered by the same un superch arged 1,040hpAllison V-1710-33 engine as the Curtiss Tomahawk, alsoordered by both nati ons. The orde rs were placed before

AIR CRA FT O F THE SE CO>;D W ORLD W AR ALLIED A IR CR AFT DE\·EL OP.\I E>;T I >; T H E EARLY WAR YEARS

71,e North American A I:6, named Texan ill the USA and Harvard by the RAJ; "'as undoubtedly the key aduanced trainer ofthe Second World IItlr, Thousands ofaircreu:fleu: the Iype ill the USA and throughout the British COIIIIIIOl/v:eallh countries.It had a lOP speed of 205 mph.After the u'ar it uu s also used fo r count erinsu rgency uorl:

All early production Hurricane M k J eight-gun fighte r, U 62J of No 87 Squadron, tcith nco-blade.fixed-pitch propeller.TheHurricane U'QS very manoeuorable and a stable gun platform, and bore the brunt of the air fighting ill France and ill the Battleof B ritain.

American Airways began ferryi ng Amer ican aircraft tothe RAF in the Middle East via \,(Iest Africa.

BritainThe period Sept ember 1939 to April 194 0, known as the' PhoneyWa r', hardl y prepared Britain for the disasters tocome . The air fighting over the Western Fro nt was spo r­adic and , apart from giving RAF pilots some combat inHurricanes, it did not give the overall expe rience neces­sary to counter later massive Ge rma n air attacks. Ce rtai nlessons were learned, the most important of which wasthat the the n-c ur rent generation of min-enginebombers, such as the Blenheim and \'('ellington, couldnot survive in daylight without escort when confro ntedwith mode rn enemy fighters. Du ring the Battle of Francethe single-engine standard light bomber. the FaireyBattle, proved to be a disaster and suffered severecasualties.

Afte r the evacuation from Du nkirk and the Fra nco­German armistice, Britain 's situation as an islandfortress off an enemy-held Euro pea n land mass was per­ilous in the extreme. During M ay and June 1940 , 959aircraft were lost, of which 477 were fighters.

T he aircraft raw material situation had rad icallyaltered . Delivery of aluminium-co nta ining bauxite fromFrance ceased with the armistice, and supplies had to beshipped all the way from British G uiana, in the face of agrowing U-boat campaign. Ca nada was a key aluminiumsupplier. In the last quarter of 1939 some 12,000 tons(12,200 tonnes) of ingots of alum inium arrived inBritain; in 194 0 this rose to 48,000 tons (48,770 tonnes) .Canada also supplied quantities of high-purity magnes­ium and cryolite, essentia l for top -g rade aluminium

previously, both industry and the USAAC/USAAF re­ceived a steady flow of combat information which ind i­cated where imp rovem ent s on aircraft needed to bemade. These included the fitting of self-sealing fueltanks, aircrew armour protect ion , heavier armame nt forboth figh ters and bombers and, for fighters, the necessi­ty for higher altitude pcrformanee and better rates ofclimb. T he requ irement for grea ter range/endurancemea nt larger intern al fuel capacity and reliab le droptanks. Operational expe rience also showed up mechani­cal defects and maintenance problems which cou ld beremedied on types which wou ld ultimately be flown on awar basis by both air forces .

A fur ther British contribution in 1941 was to openthe door on British technical secrets to the Americans.This included providing the cavity magnetron, a high ­power valve developed at Birmingham Unive rsity whichmade poss ible the production of centi metre wavelengthradar. This was to revolutio nise air- to-surface, air- to-airand grou nd-based radars.

Finally, the ferr ying of American-b uilt aircraft acrossthe Atlantic had been organised . The ferry service wasinaugurated on 10-11 Novernber 1940 with sevenLoc kheed Hu dsons led by Ca pt (later Air Vice-Mar shal)D C T Benn ett of British Overseas Airways Co rp­oration. It took them ten and a half hours to fly fromG ander, Newfoundland, to Northern Ireland .This trail­blazer was to lead in later years to vast nu mbers of multi ­engined aircra ft traversing what was to be the lon gestoversea main air supply route in the world. To get ferr ycrews back to North America an cast-west service wasbegu n in September 1941 by BOAC , initially using sixconvert ed Liberator bom bers. In August 1941 Pan

The Harvard was used under the air training schemein Canada and Southern Rhodesia and the commonalitywith the Texan was a major asset after December 1941.The Har vard was of metal construction and powered bya single 550hp Pratt & Whitney \\'asp radial. .\ Iaximumspeed was 205mph (330km/h) and endurance 3.9hr.

The arrangements between the USA and Britainwere quite remarkable . A non-combatant up to Decem­ber 1941 , America was supplying large quantities of warmate rial. including hundreds of aircraft, to a friendlynation at war. By 1941 Britain was quite literally runningout of dollars, and faced a situation where she would beunable to pay for the aircraft she so des perately needed.O n II ,\ Iarch 194 1 President Roosevelt signed aCongressional 'Lend -Lease' Bill which comp letelyaltered the situation right throu gh un til the defeat ofJapan in 1945.

Under ' Lend-Lease' the USA could sell, transfer,exchange , lease or lend any defence article, providing thereceiving country's defence was deemed to be vital to thedefence of the USA. Co ntinued deliveries to Britain werethu s assured .

It had not , however , been a one-way street. In the1938- 9 period British contracts with American firmswere worth more than those placed by the USAAC.These served to 'pri me the pump' of US industry at atime when American rearmam ent had hardly begunand, as mentioned earlier. allowed for mu ch needed fac­tory an d wor kforce expansion. In addi tion , as noted

-- --=-.. ---_.

the long-dra wn-out Battle of Britain had been foughtand ma ny lessons about air fighti ng had been learned,particularly the need for climb and altitude performance.Without supercharge rs the Lightning clearly did notmeet European conditions, and the RAF cancelled theorder following trials with three aircraft at A&AEEBoscornbe Down in late December 1941 and early 1942 .

Lockheed wanted the contract ad hered to on theoriginal term s, but this was not found possible. At thetime the re was also a sho rtage of superchargers in theUSA. As a result, the USAAF took over the British orderand placed a larger one following America's entry intothe conflict. The USAAF subsequently used the Light­ning in all war theatres as a lo ng-range fighter , fighter­bom ber and reconnaissance aircraft. Production con­tinued until 1945. The final version, the P- 38L, had atop speed of -l l-lmph (666km/h), could climb to20,000ft (6,000m) in seven minutes and had a serviceceiling of 44, 000ft (13,400m) .

In addi tion to the aircraft detailed above, a variety ofother types were purchased by Britain , usually in sma ll­er quantities. On e exception was the North Am ericanNA-1 6 Harvard two-seat advance d trainer, which re­mained in RAF service until the late 1950s. First orderedby the RAF in 1938, the Har vard was ente ring service bythe end of that year. Contracted and paid for up to early1941 , Harvards for the RAF totalled 1, I00 . UnderLend -Lease a fur the r 4,000 were delivered. T he USAemployed the type in large num bers as the 1: 6 Texan .

44 45

AIR CRAFT OF TilE SE CO:-;D \\ 'ORLD ,,'AR A L LI E D A J R C R AF T D E v E L 0 1' .\1 E :-; T 1:-; T ilE EA R I. Y \\' A R YE A R S

Probably the most famous oj all fig hter ai rcraft, the M erlin-pouxred Vichers-Supermarine S pitfi re. l\7ith its elegant lines,it proved capable oj steady development throughout the war as more engine poteet became available. S/IIYu)// here is aSpitfi re M k I.

77,e S pitfire V ,cas a major update oj the Spitfire 1 and ll, with more poicer and va ried armament. It ,,'as the first rariant 10

be used as a fighter-bomber.77,e Spitfire s; in early 1941 , "YlS in time 10 meet the improved German BJ 1091:" Th is photographS/IIYu.'S Spitfire Vbs oj No 340 lle de France Squadron, unth m'o calm 01/ andJour machine-guns.

.'11/ early production Hatoker Typhoon IA icith a1/ armament oj twelve machine-guns. The ,Ha rk IB had four 20mm ca1/1/01/,zchich becam e standard. The Sabrc-engined Typh oon ,""s designed as a 10'1<'- 10 medium-altitude interceptor. bill it suffered fromearly structural and engine problems. Ultimately it became O1/e oj the most successful ground-attack aircraft oj the ,car, usingrocket projectiles, bombs and caIIl101/.

In 1937 the Air .\ t inistr y issued specification E18/37for a high-speed fighter intended to utilise new 2,000hpengines. One example was to be fitted with the NapierSabre, which had cylinders arranged in an ' H'configuration. The other was to have the Rolls-RoyceVulture engine with an ' X' cylinder arra ngement, theVulture also being scheduled as the powerplan t for theAvro .\ lanchester heavy bom ber. Both engines had 24cylinders. Hawker submitted a common airframe designfor both the engines specified, the Vulture-engined ma­chine becoming known as the Tornado and the Sabre­eng ined one as the Typhoon .

The Tomado new first, but was later abando nedbeca use of tech nical problems with the Vulture and

for the later marks of Mu stang fighter. The Merlin­engined Mustang became one of the best inte rceptors ofthe Second World War.

Despite the many setbacks of war, the indu stry wasable to provide the fighting machines to defend Britainand to str ike back. The air battles over Fra nce and thesubsequent Battle of Britain taught many lessons whichaffec ted then current produ ction and future d evelop­ments. Both the Hurricane and Spitfire had been im­pro ved with higher-rated Merlins and constant- speedpro pellers. To provide more firepower an improved20mm cannon installation was to be available for bothaircraft by 1941. There was, however, clearly an upperlimit to Hurricane performance improvements,

system of subcontracting parts and compo nents waswidely extended. By including small engineering works,garages, and even such companies as toy makers, acountry-wide network of aro und 15,000 subcontracto rswas created .

The only major failure in the shadow scheme was atCas tle Bromw ich. Swinton had wanted it to be parentedby Vickers, as it was for Spitfire manufacture. \,\'henSwinton was replaced by Sir Kingsley Wood in 1938,Castle Brornwich was placed in the hand s of the NuffieldOrganisation . As a result , instead of a massive output ofSpitfire s, by Ma y 1940 nothing had come ofT the line.Lord Bcaverbrook, the Minister of Aircraft Production,immediately placed the factory in the hands of Vickers,and by the end of September 1940 125 Spitfire s hadbeen produced there.

The key to fighter production was the supply ofRolls-Royce .\ lerlin engines. Any disruption of Merlinproduction during the Battle of Britain would have leftHurri cane and Sp itfire airframes sitting useless at theend of the line. While Bristol chose to haw a motor carcompany operate its shadow factory, Rolls-Royce decid­ed to run a shadow itself at Crewe. The new factor yfinished its first Merlin in .\ Iay 1939. During the sum­mer of 1940 Rolls-Royce worked up to a rate of deliveryof 400 engines per month.

A further Rolls-Royce factor y, at Hillington ncarGlasgow, was completed in October 1940. In the USAFord turned down a licence contract to build the Merlin,but it was taken up by the Packard Motor Company,which later built thousand s of M eriins, including those

production . Refining and cru shing cryolite ore had beena Danish specia lity, but this source was cut ofTwith theGerman invasion. Specialised timber, textiles, paper andrare materials like platinum and radium had to be pur­chased and import ed from all over the world.

Produ ction of aircraft in Britain exceeded tha t ofGermany in 1940, and continued to grow despite thebombing of factories up and down the count ry inI 94()-.4 1.

The basis for the aircraft indu str y and its transition toa rearmament state was established in the period 1935 to1938 by a very far-sighted politician, Lord Swinton , whobecame Secretary of State for Air in mid-1935. First, hecut the existing lengthy time between fully tested proto­type and in-service date by ordering 'o ff the drawin gboard ' and incorpora ting modifications on the line. Healso ordered common engine mountings which allowedfor easy fitrnc nt of alterna tive powerplan ts,

Swinton 's greatest achievement, however , was to pro­vide for massive produ ction expansion when the emer­gency came. He launched an Air Ministry schemewhereby state-owned factories would be set up by non­aviation companies such as car manufa cturers. T heywould equip and man age the works and turn out aircraftand aero engines from a 'parent' company in the aircraftindustry. ' Ib is was known as the shadow factor y scheme,and was announced by the Prime Minister in March1936 .

The parent company had to provide specificationsfor plant , jigs, tools, etc, full drawings and training forkey peop le. In addition to the shadow scheme, the

46 4 7

AIR CR A F T OF T HE SECOl' D W O R LD \X' A R A LL IED A I R CR AFT DEVELO I'.\ \E:-IT I N T HE EARL Y \X'AR Y E A R S

A promising design.the Irimlalld l17hirht'illd <<'as the fi rst ncin-engined single-seat fig hte r 10 serve unt h the RAR Unfortunatelyit required long rlllI'Ways f or landing, and had problem s zcith its Rolls-Roy ce Peregr ine engines, uhich 'Were 1101 used 011 othertypes. II 'Was fa st at lou: altitude and was used for bomber escort. Later it u'as fined icith IU'O 500 Ib bombs, supplement ing its

four 20mm call1lOIl, and u'as used for ground attack.

Th e noin -H ercules Bristol Beaufight er was the RAP'sfi rSI effective nightfighter tohen equipped unth airborne-interception (A I)radar. II replaced the slou: Blenheim and, with four Call/lOll and six machine-guns, had deoastating firepotcer. Beaufightersu'ere used ill Europe and the M iddle and Far East, being adapted 10 carry rocket projectiles, bombs and evell torpedoes. 71,eversion shoum here is a B eaufight er IC long- range fig hter of RAF Coa stal Co mmand .

48

subsequent cancellation due to Rolls-Royce's concentra­tion on the Mcrl in. The Typhoon was first airborne inFebrua ry 1940, but unfortun ately the specification wasdrawn up in the era when it was ant icipated that most airfighting would be at low and medium altitudes.Co nsequently the Typhoon did not have the necessaryclimb and high altitude performance, and it sufferedfrom rea r-fuselage str uctural problems. T he engine alsocontinued to give trouble owing to its use of sleevevalves, which eventua lly had to be ma nufactured in adifferent material using imported Amer ican machinetools.

At one point the Typhoon programme was nearlycancelled . For tunately this did not happen, and the ma­chine evolved into one of the best fighter/gro und-a ttackaircraft of the war, with four 20mm cannon and eithereight 60lb -warhead rocket projectiles (27kg) or two500lb (227kg) or 1,000lb (454kg) bom bs.The Typhoonin its final in-service form had a maximum speed of412mph (660km/h) at 19,000ft (5,790m) . Other detai lson the Typhoon arc covered in a later chapter.

T he main development in RAF single-scat fighte rsdevolved on the Sp itfire, which proved itself capable ofremarkable improveme nts in performance and , in manyversions, rem ained in large-scale productio n thr ough tothe war's end. The Sp itfire II , with a I ,175hp Rolls­Royce Merlin XII, went into service in August 1940 andwas succeeded, in February 1941 , by the Spi tfire V witha Merlin 45 of 1,440hp. Carrying either eight machin e­guns (Mk VA) or two 20mm cannon and four machine­guns (M k VB), it had a maximum speed of 374mp h(600km/h) , could climb to 20,000ft (6,000m) in 7V, minand had a normal range of 470 miles (760m). Its ceilingwas 37,000ft (11,200m). T he Sp itfire VC had a 'univer­sal' wing which could acco mmodate the arma me nt of theVA or VB or four 20mm cannon. T he Mk V beca meavailable as the Luftwaffe was putting the improved­performance Bf 1091' into service,

In the meantime, came ra-equipped unarm ed Spit­fires had been doing exceptional work as high- altitudephotogra phic reconnaissance aircraft. T he PR Spitfirewas later pu t into produ ction as the M ark IV, and 229were built.

Another fighter for which there were high hopes butwhich suffere d from lack of altitude performance was theWestlan d Whirlwind. Like the Loc kheed Lightning it wasa twin-engincd, single-seater with heavy armame nt con­centrated in the nose, Designed to meet spec ification1':37/35 , the Whirlwind was powere d by 885 hp Rolls­Royce Peregrine I in-line engines , developed from thefamo us Kestrel.The aircraft went into squadron servicein July 1940 but was not ope rational until Dece mberowing to lack of engines, Rolls-R oyce being totally in­volved in Mcrlin productio n. T he Whi rlwind was fastand effective at low altitude, particularly as a bomber es-

49

cort and later as a fighter-bomber, but it requi red longrunways to cope with its high landing speed . With noPeregrine development in view, the \X' hirlwind 's opera­tiona l life and production were limited. Armed with four20mm cannon in the nose, the Whirlwind had a maxi­mu m speed of 360 mph (580km/h) at 15,000ft (4,570m)and a service ceiling of 30,OOOft (9,100m). Climb was5.8min to 15,000ft (4,570m) , and range was 800 miles(1,280km) .

O ne very successful twin-engined fighter eme rgedfrom the Munich Crisis of 1938. Ca nnon armame nt wasbeing intr oduced in Ge rma ny, and France , and the RAFhad no long-range fighte r for use as a nightfightcr andfor escorting bombe rs.

Bristol evolved a design which would use the wings,rear fuselage, tail unit and undercarriage of the Beauforttor pedo bomber, already under development. Thesewere married to a new front fuse lage. Ca lled theBeaufighter , and powered by Hercules radials, this air­craft first flew in July 1939. Four proto types were or­dered , followed by Specification I':17/39 covering theprodu ction of 300 aircraft. A number of modificationswere introduced before the first Beaufighters were deliv­ercd to the RAF in Augu st 1940, in the midd le of theBattle of Britain . The RAF's Blenh eim fighters wereprovi ng very disappointing against modern oppositionas they were too slow and poorly arm cd; they cou ld evenbe outpace d by the Ju nkers [u 88 bomber!

With night defence beco ming of pa ramount impor­tance, the Bcau fight er was the obvious answer. It couldcarry the new air inte rcep tion (AI) rada r previously in­stalled in the Blenheim, and its armament of four nose­mounted 20mm cannon plus six machine-gun s in thewings was the heaviest of any fighter of the period .Du ring the night blitz against Britain in 1940/4 1 thenumb er of Beau fighters in service rose and so did thetally of night 'kills' .The first Luftwaffe aircraft destroyedat night by a Beaufighter with AI radar was a [u 88 on 19November 1940.

The aircraft was also fitted with Rolls-Royce Merlins(the Mk II) as an alternative to the Hercules, but the ma­jority of production machin es had the Hercules engine.T he Beaufighter proved itself to be extremely versa tile. Itbeca me Coastal Command's standard long-range fighterand was equip ped with bombs , rocket projectiles or atorpedo. It served in the Middle East and Far East the­atrcs, in the latter being known by the Japanese as 'whis­peri ng death' .The Beaufightcr I had a span of 57ft lOin(17m), a loaded weight of 21,000lb (9,500kg) , a maxi­mum speed of 330 mph (530km/h) and a range of 1,500miles (2,400km) . Its Hercules III engines deliveredI ,365hp each.

This was a classic example of the adaptation of asound basic airframe to perform a variety of tasks, Afterthe campaig n in France it was realised that a

AIR CR AF T O F T HE SECO :" D \x' ORL O W AR AL LIED A I RCRAFT D EV E L OP .\I E :" T I :" T ilE EA RL Y W A R Y E AR S

Fi rst Jlm<'11 ill 1936, the A rmstrong lf07,ilu'orlh 1f07litley night bomber U'aS a standard RAF 'heavy' ill the early war years, 011the early ua ria nts , as shoum here, the eng ines u'ere Tiger radials, bill from the ,\ /ark I I' onuards the pouerplant changed 10

Rolls-Roy ce M erli/IS.11I addition 10 Bomber COII/II/alld, the Whilley was used ill Coa stal COII/II/alldand as a para troop trainer

a nd glider tug.

str ike/ground-a ttac k aircraft had to have the ab ility to de­liver weapons dire ctly and then fight if necessary with areasonable chance of survival . T he Fairey Battle lightbomber conce pt was truly dead .

Versatility along these lines went further with anotherdesign which was to becom e one of the really great mil­itary aircraft of the Seco nd \X'orld War, the de HavillandM osquito. When, in 1938, the Hatfield- based companyproposed a bomber design wi thout armament but withfaster speed than proposed fighte rs, the idea was greetedby the RAF with little enth usiasm; wha t they wanted wasa bomber with heavy armament. Largely due to theefforts of Sir Wilfrid Freeman, the Air ,\ lember forResearch , Development and Prod uction, the project waskept alive. An orde r was placed for fifty aircraft in M arch1940 [0 meet specification 8.1 /40 . The prototype wascompleted in eleven mon ths and flew in N ovember1940.

\X'hat eme rged was a streamlined two-seat aircraftwith two 1,250h p Merlin engines , a speed of over380 mp h (600km/h ) at 17,000ft (5,180m) which , as abomber, carr ied a load of 2,000lb (900kg) for l ,370miles (2,200km). Even more revolutionary was that itwas of all-woode n constr uctio n. It was clear tha t theM osqui to was admirably suited to fulfil other roles.Accordingly, prototypes for photographic reconnais­sance and interception followed.

The lon g-range PR M osqui to was urgently neededby the RAF and was the first into service, in September1941. T he fight er Mosqu ito with AI radar was not in ser­vice unti l Janu ary 194 2, but thereafter it replaced theBeaufighter and the Havoc. Its arma ment was four

50

20mm cannon plus four machine-guns in the nose. T helogical follow-u p was the fighter-bomber i\ losquito, withbombs in add ition to guns. The ,\ losqui to was steadilydeve loped through the war, achieving faster speeds,greater range and higher altitude. For two-and-a-ha lfyears from its entry into service, the ,\ losqu ito was fasterthan any other type in service with the Allies or the Axis.In Bomber Command it was the fastest aircraft through­out the war.

When the war began, Britain's long-range mediumbomber force relied on three types, the Whitley, (seephotograph, page 52), Wellington and Ham pden. Ofthese the best all-round operational aircraft was theVickers " 'ellington. It was, however, clear to the AirM inistry that larger, heavier machines with increa sed de­fensive armament would ultimately be needed. In1940/4 1 operations highligh ted the usual crop ofdeficiencies: lack of self-sealing fuel tanks, low perfor­mance, defective armour plate and, above all, poor de­fen sive armament. Lack of suitable navigati onal aids wasan added factor , bu t hard ly the fau lt of the airframe man­ufacturers. By the end of 194 0 medium bombers wereused only at night, as day light raids were too costly.

Of the three aircraft , the Wellington (affectionatelyknown as the Wimpy) proved to be the best and mostreliable, and it therefore had the longest Service life,ultimately in a variety of roles. It used geode tic, lattice,construction which was very strong, and the aircraftcould take a lot of pun ishment . Originally fitted with twoBristol Pegasus engi nes , the \Vellington was also pro­duced with Rolls-R oyce ,\ lerlins and the n BristolHercules. With 1,145hp M erlins, the ,\ Ik 11 carried a

Nicknamed the ' IFimpy ', the Vickers Wel/illglOlI bomber u'as a contem pora ry of the I,(;hilley and Hampden ill the RAI; billserved ill much larger numbers. Tnitially unth Pegasus engines and also produced tcith M ertins (,\Ik 1/), the l'(HlillglOlI from the,\Ik III onuards was pouered by H ercules. Geodetic lattice structu re was ex tremely tough and could unths tand a 101 of dam­age. Th e Irel/illglOlI played a major role tci th Coastal Command and also operated as a bomber ill the M idd le and Far East.These are lrel/illglOllS Is of No 9 Squadron.

A ll usual layo ut with a long tailboo m cha racterised the Han dley Page Hampden, the th ird B omber Co mmand main type 10

enter the wa r. It suffered, houeuer.from poor accommodation for the crew and ineffectice defensive aramament. It U'aS fast andhad long range;mod ifications were made and it u'elll all 10 perform uell, later u orking as a Coastal Command torpedo-bomber.Basic pouer U'aS IU'O Pegasus radials, bill 100 u'ere built as H erefords with Napier Dagger engines.

51

AIR CR AF T OF TilE SE CO~D \x' O R L D WAR

The most versatile high-performance uarplane of the Second Il'ilrld Il'a r, the de Hav illand M osquito was a brilliant design. Ofuooden cons truction, it U'aS faste r than any interceptor then in service schen it first flew in November 19o10. Used for for long­nInge precision bombing, pathfinding, day and night fighting, low-level attack, reconnaissance, maritime attack and special du­ties, it remained in RAF serv ice wail the advent of the Ca nberra jet bomber. Illustrated is the third (PRJ prototype, Wol051.

ALLI ED AIR CR AFT D E\' EI. OP .\\ E:--; T I~ Til E E A R L Y WAR Y EARS

With the Lancaster, the Handley Page Halifax u-as the mainstay of the RAr~s bomber offensive again st Germany. Early markshad M erlin engines until, zcith the ,Ilk III, the aircraft standa rdised 0" the Hercules radial. Th e Halifax ,,-as also widely usedfor ma ritime zcort: with Coastal Comma"d and as a glider IIIg.

TIlemost famous B ritish heavy bomber of the Second Il'brld Il'a r, the AVTO La ncaster, U'aS the result of the marriage of the firs t­class M anchester airframe, uhich had two unreliable H,llIIre engines, with fou r Rolls-Royce Mertins. In the second halfof theu-ar the Lancaster fo rmed the backbone of Bomber Com ma nd, along with the Halifax, and carried the largest bombs, includ­ing the giant 22,OOOlb 'Grand S lam '. Illustrated is the prototype Lancaster I, a converted M anchester.

pilot and four crew. Bom b load was 4,000lb (1, 180kg)and range 2,200 miles (3,540km) at 180mph (290km/h)at 15,000ft (4,570m) . Armament comprised a min-gunnose turret, a four-gun tail turret and two beam guns.Span was 86ft 2in (26m) , and length 64ft 7in (19m).Wellington production totalled 11,461.

The medium bomber s had emerged as a result ofRAF specifications issued in 1932 and 1934 . By 1936the Air Staff, watching the gro wing power and size of theLuftwaffe, issued far-sighted specifications for new andlarger bombers carrying increased bomb loads. Twowere to be twin -engined and one four-engined .

Avro and Handley Page had the Rolls-Royce Vultureeng ine specified, while the Shorts design was to have

four Bristol Hercules radials. The Vulture consisted oftwo Rolls-R oyce Peregr ines one above the othe r, drivinga single crankshaft. This resulted in an X-eon figurationengine rated at 1,800hp, but with considerably higherpower potenti al.The Avro bomber design , the Type 679 ,subsequently named the M anchester , retained theVulture, while the Handley Page project, which becamethe Halifax, was switched to a four-Merlin layout in193 7.

The Manchester sold iered on with the Vulture. It flewin prototype form in July 1939 and first ente red servicewith Bomber Command in November 1941. Theairframe was excellent, but the Vulture was a constantsourc e of trouble. It did not reach its designed power

output and engi ne failures were frequent. If Rolls-Rovcehad not had all its efforts concentrated on the ,\ Ierlin, thecompa ny would certai nly have deve loped the Vulture toan acce ptable standard. As it was, time and effort were ata premium and the Vulture was an also-ran.

There then occurred one of the most remarkable air­craft transfo rmations in wartime . Avro fitted a,\ lanchester airframe with four M crlins and flew it inJanuary 1941. The result , as the Lancaster, became thebes t-known and mos t successful RAF heavy bomber ofthe war; it was also the largest load -carrier of all Alliedbombers, being capa ble of deliver ing the giant 22 ,000lb(9,980kg) 'G rand Slam ' bom b.

Apart from a change to Hercules rad ials on 300Lancaster li s and mod ified bomb bays , the Laneas terairframe was to remain virtua lly the same throughout thewar; a tribute to good design . The Lancaster I had fourI ,280 hp Merlin XX engines , carried a crew of seven andwas armed with twin 0.303in machine-guns in nose anddo rsal positions and a four-gun turret in the tail. Its spa nwas 102ft (3 1rn) , length 69ft olin (2 1m) and its all-upweight was 50,000lb (22,680kg) . M aximum speed was287mph (460km/h) , cruising speed 200mph (320km/h)an d range 1,660 miles (2,670 km) with 14,000lb(6,350kg) bomb load; ceiling was 19,000ft (5,790m).

T he four-Me rlin Halifax flew on 25 October 1939,the first produetion aircra ft following on II October1940. By the following mon th the first squadro n wasbeing formed. Like the La ncas ter, the Halifax had a crewof seven and a range of 1,860 miles (3,000km) with5,800l b (2,630kg) of bom bs; its maximum speed was265 mph (426km/h) at 17,500ft (5,330m) and service

ceiling 22,800ft (6,950m). Its span was 98ft lOin (29m)and loaded weight 58,0001b (26,300kg) . Armament wastwo 0.303i n guns in a nose turret and four in the tail,while some aircra ft had beam guns. The maximumbomb load was 13,0001b (5,900kg). M any detailmodifications were carried out on sub-marks un til theHercules-engined .\ Iark III beca me a definitive produc­tion variant.

T he histo ry of the Sh ort Stirling was a somewhatdifferent matter. Air .\ Iinistr y policy changed with the in­creas ing perceived threat and, as a result, apa rt from theM anchester and Halifax, which were initially classified asmedium bombers to I~ 13/36, a fur the r requ irement ,8.12/36, was issued for a fast four-engine, lon g-rangeheavy bomber. The word 'fast' has to be taken in termsof the aircraft in service in 1936. For example, the FaireyHend on and the Handley Page Heyford bombers hadtop speeds of 155mph and 142mph respectively,

Short 's submission for 8. 12/36 was for a large four­Hercules aircraft with a crew of seven or eight , usingtechno logy based on the compa ny's proven flying boats.The Air ,\ Iinistry, however , placed several restr ictions onthe speci fication includ ing, ridicul ous as it may seem, alimit on the wingspan to fit a standa rd RAF hangar. Thismeant that the wing was of low aspect ratio, thus limiti ngthe operational ceiling - a definite draw-b ack when inservice.

The Stirli ng had a wing spa n of 99ft Iin (30m) and alength of 87ft 3in (26m). As it had a shoulder-wing itpossessed a very tall main und ercarriage. Production ofthe Stirling was held up by Lu ftwaffe bombing raid s, butit went into ser vice with No 7 Squadron in Au gust 1940,

52 53

AIR CR A F T OF T ilE S E C O :-; D W OR LD \X' AR ALL IED A IR CRAFT DE\·ELO P.\ IE:-;T 1:-; T HE EARLY WA R YEARS

The first four-engined bomber 10 be used operationally in the war, the Short Stirling with four Hercules radials initially scentinto squadron serv ice in August 1940. Because of its lour-aspect-ratio wing its service ceiling was limited. A s a bomber theStirling u'as last used in 1944, but it u'as widely employed as a glider /IIgand transport.

• 1

1. • ".J. ~_ -

.,. ~

•

-.

The Boeing B-29 S uperfortress represented a quantum leap in aircraft design.With its high speed of350mph, pressurised cabin,remotely com rolled gun turrets and range of over 3,000 miles, it u'as remarkable in that the original officialrequirement was issued in February 1940 . The B-29 was the type which dropped thefirst two atomic bombs on Hiroshima andNagasaki in 1945.

during the Battle of Britain . T he Stirling thu s achievedtwo 'firsts' , the first four-engined monoplane bomber togo into service with the RAF and the first to go on oper­ations in the Second World War.

The Hercules delivered 1,400hp, and with thesethe Stirlin g had a maximum speed of 260mph(420km/h) and a maximum cruising range of 2,330miles (3,750km) with 3,500 1b (l ,590kg) of bombs, or590 miles (950km) with 14,000lb (6,350kg) of bom bs.Its all-up weigh t was 59,400l b (26,940kg). Its arma mentcomprised a two-gun nose turret , a four-gun tail tur retand , initially, a ventra l two-gun 'dustbin'. Later the ven­tral tur ret was removed and a two-gun dorsal turretfined. T he turrets had hydraulic recu perators, but un for ­tun ately the location of two of them coincided with theRAF roundel on the fuselage. By using the roundel as atarget, enemy fighte rs were able to put the turrets out ofaction. As a result , the recuperators had to be moved .

Through 1940 and 1941 Britain was developing andgaining operational experience on the types of largelong-range bomber which would form the backbone ofBomber Co mma nd's operations at night. At the sametime , the USAAF was modifying and perfecting its ownkey four-e ngined day bombers, the B-17 Fortress andthe B-24 Liberator , describ ed earlier. In 1943-45 thetwo great air fleets would conduct a round-the -clockcampaign, a form of air warfare never before seen.

Two events of May 1941 were ultim ately to changemilitar y and civil aviation completely on the one hand ,and brin g untold destru ctive power from the air on theothe r, On 15 May 1941 a 29ft -span (8m) single-seatmonoplane, the E.28/39, took off from Cranwell,

54

Linc olnshire, flown by P E Sayer. In one vital respect itdiffered from all other aircraft in Britain , for it had nopropeller. It was in fact jet-p rope lled, and the only ma­chine of its kind, apart from two in Germany, theHeinkel He 178 and He 280 , which had also flown inproto type form.

Nei the r side was aware of the other's gas turbin ework. Flight Lieutenant (late r Air Co mmodore Sir)Frank Wh inle had pioneered gas tur bine design devel­opme nt, and his firm Power jets Ltd was given a contractin 1939 to build a flight engine . Design and developmentof the airframe was entrusted to the Gloster AircraftCo mpany under the terms of specifica tion E.28/39, the'E' standing for expe rime nta l.

all/side Germany the first jet aircraft 10 fly was the Gloster£ .28/39, which took 10 the air with a lVhiule IV.I turbojet ClI ­

gine on 15 Afay 1941. From this design grew the two greatjet engine industries of the USA and Britain, and it led theway to the civil and military jet fleets of today.

Powered by an 8601b-thrust Power jets \\'.1 gas tur ­bine , the E.28/39 had a maximum speed of 466mph(750km/h) , well in excess of any pisto n-engined aircraftof the period. It cou ld climb to 30,000ft (9 ,000km/h) in22mi n, and had a service ceiling of 32,000ft (9,7 50m)and a loaded weight of 3,7481b (1,700kg).

A second prototype was built, but later cras hed whenthe ailerons beca me jammed during a high-altitudeflight. T he first prototype continue d flying at inter valsthr ough to 1944 with higher powere d engine s and otherrefine men ts. In 1946 it was put on perma nent display inthe Science Museum in London .

In Novembe r 1940 the RAF issued a specification fora twin-engined jet fighte r based on designs submitted byGloster Aircraft. In Februar y 194 1 an order was placedfor twelve 'G loster-Whittle' aircraft, a type which was tobecome the Gloster Meteor.

As related ear lier, Britain shared its technical secretswith USA and this included Wh ittle's aero gas turbinework . It was to have far-reaching consequences as com ­panies in both countries turne d towards the gas tur binefirst for fighters, then for bombers and later transports .T he tech nology gap becam e ever wider between the vic­torio us Western Allies and those nations defea ted or leftto mark time during the Seco nd World \XTar. It can all betrac ed back to Whittle and the E.28/39 .

T he second key event of May 1941 was the issue of a

55

letter by the USAA C to Boeing, stating that an orderwould be placed for 250 aircraft of a 'superbomber' type .Boeing had received an official requirem ent for such anaircraft in Februa ry 1940. It was to carry 2,000lb(900kg) of bombs at a speed of 400mph (640km/h) andhave a range of 5,333 miles (8,580km). A tricycle un­dercarriage, pressurisation and heavy defensive arma­ment were spec ified.

Boeing had been working on designs of such abombe r since 1938, and three prototypes had been or­dered in 1940.The project was known as the model 345 ,the army designatio n was XB-29, and it later beca mefamous as the B-29 Superfortress which was to lay wastethe cities of japan by dropping the first two atom icbombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki . Even to considersuch an incredibly advanced project in 1940-41 , withlittle money available, represent ed one of the most far­sighted acts in the history of military aviation .

RussiaIn the early hours of 22 june 1941 Hitler invaded theSoviet Union in Operation Barbarossa. Surprise wascomplete, and by noon on the same day 1,200 Russianaircraft had been destroyed on the ground and in the air.

Losse s of bases and equipment contin ued as theGerman army adva nced , In the early stages the main op­position came from Polikarpov 1-152/1- 153 biplane and

AIR CRAFT OF THE SECO S D W ORLD \X'AR

Bibliography

A L I.I E I) A I R C R A F T DE VE L 0 I' ,\ t EST 1S T H E EA R L Y WA R YEA R 5

Jackson, A J, Avro A ircraft since 1908 (Putnam, London1965)

The 1/-2 Shturmouih armoured ground-attack aircraft played a major part ill the ultimate S ooiet victory lnJer the German ill­oasion columns. Heavily armed, the 11-2 u'as produced at the rale of 1,200 per month, and production far ontstripped mostother Secolldll'ilrldll'fIr types. Illustrated is ali I/-2M3.

Andrews, C F, Vickers Aircraft since 1908 (Putnam,Lon don 1969)

Angle, G D, (ed) , Aerosphere 1939 (Aircraft Pu blications,New York 1939)

Balchin, N, TheA ircraft Builders (Hi\ISO, Lond on 1947)

Barnes , C H, ShortsA ircraft since 1900 (Putnam, Lond on1967)

Barnes , C H , Bristol Aircraft slllce 1910 (Putnam,London 1964)

Bowers, P M , Boeing Aircraft slllce 1916 (Putnam,Londo n 1966)

Bridgman, L (ed), Jall e's All the Ifilrld s Aircraft 1941(Sampson Low, London, 1941)

Brown , D, Shores, C & Macksey, K, The Guiness Historyof Air Ifil lj'a re (G uiness Superlatives, Enfield 1976)

Fra ncillon, R J, Grummall Aircraft since 1929 (Putnam,Lond on 1989)

Francillon, R J, M cbonnell Douglas Aircraft since 1920,101 1 (Putnam, London 1988)

Jackson, R, Air Ifa r aver France 1939---40 (Ian Allan,Lond on 1974)

James, D N, GlosterA ircraft since 191 7 (Putnam, Lond on1971)

Lumsden, A, British Piston Aero-Engines and theirAircraft(Airlife, Shrewsbury 1994)

Mason, F K, Hawker Aircraft since 1920 (Putnam,Lond on 1961)

Nowarra, N J & Du val, G R, Russian Civil and M ilitaryAircraft, 1884-1 969 (Fountain Press, Lond on 1971)

Swanborough, G & Bowers, P M , United S tates M ilitaryAircraft since 1909 (Putnam, London 1989)

Swanborough, G & Bowers, P M, Ullited Sta tes Na vyAircraft since 1911 (Putnam, Lond on 1968)

'HIpper, 0 , Armstrollg Whitworth Aircraft since 1913(Putnam, London 1973)

Taylor , M J H (ed) , Jalle's Encyclopedia of Aviation(Bracken Books, Lond on 1989)

Thetford, 0, A ircraft of the Royal Air Force since 1918(Putnam, Lond on 1971)

1-16 monoplane fight ers, both of which had beencombat-tested in Spa in. Most of the bombers in Sovietoperational service were also obsolescent and sufferedacco rdingly at the hand s of the Lu ftwaffe.

However, a number of modern designs were alreadywell into the development/production phase. As theGerma ns approached Moscow a remarkable operationwas under taken . Threatened factories were moved byrailway to east of the Ura l mountains and to Siberia. Itwas a mammoth undertaking, but it was successfullyconcluded. The Lu ftwaffe had failed to develop a suit­able long-range bomber and, therefore, the new factorysites were safe from attac k.

In these factor ies Yak-I , MiG-I , MiG-3 andLaG G- 3 fighters were stead ily produced and developed,incorporating the lessons learn ed from combat experi­ence . Designer Ilyushin buil t the 11-2 single-engine closesuppo rt/anti-tank aircraft which becam e famous as the'Shturrnovik'. This was flown in October 1940 and putinto large-scale production in M arch 1941. Its armamentwas two cannon and two machine-gun s, and it had a topspeed of 292mph (470krn!h) . Ultimately the Russiansbuilt 36,000 11-2s.

Like the Lu ftwaffe, the Soviet Air Force conce ntra tedon light and medium twin-engine short- range aircraft. Atypical example was the Petlyakov Pe-2 with a three-m ancrew, two M-1 05R in-line engines of 1,1OOhp and car­rying a bomb load of up to 2,200l b ( I ,OOOkg) .

56

Arma ment consisted of four machin e-gun s. T he Pe-2had a span of just over 51ft (15m) and a maximumspeed of 335 mph (540 k mlh) .

The very heavy aircraft losses incurred by the SovietAir Force in 1941 led to urgent requests to Britain andAmerica for warp lanes . T here then began a steady flowof fighters and bombers including Tomahawks, Kitty­hawks, Hurricanes, Airacobras and Bostons. As the warprogressed more advanced types were supplied. In total,thc USA ultimately sent 14,833 aircraft to Russia, whileBritain 's direct contribution includ ed no fewer than2,952 Hurricanes.

Capable of lnJer 330 mph, the Petlyakou Pe-2 was a firs t­class light bomber design, also used as a figh ter and for re­connaissance. It was produced ill large numbers.

57

AIR CR AFT O F THE SE CO:-;D \X'ORtD WAR

3Fighter Development, Mid-1941 to Mid-1945

Dr Alfred Price

airframe to meet his requirement . The Bf 109 was asmaller mac hine all round, and its wing area of 16.17m'(174 sq ft) was one quarter less than the Spi tfire's 242 sqft (22.48m').

T he engine fine d to the Bf 1091'-2 was the 1,200hpDaimler Benz DB 60 lN engine, while the Spi tfire V hadthe 1,470hp Rolls-Royce Merlin 45. Both fighters had amaximum speed of just oyer 595kmJh (370mph), how­eyer. At this time drop tanks were little used, and withoutthem both fighters were limited to an effective combatradius of about 100 miles (160km).

The Bf 109 ' Friedrich' was the lighter of the twofighters, its loaded weight of 2800 kg (6,173Ib) beingabout 160kg (350lb) less than that of thc Spitfire VB. Onthe other hand, the larger wing of the Sp itfire gave it awing loadin g at 27lb/sq ft (I. 13kg/m' ), compared with35.51b/sq ft (1.49kg/m') for the Germa n fighter. Thatmeant the Bf 109 was inferior to the British fighter in aturn ing fight.

The Spitfire VB was the more heavily armed, carry ingtwo 20mm Hispano cannon and four 0.303in machin e­guns spaced out across the wings. T he 'Friedric h-Z', incontrast, was armed principally for fighter-to-fightercombat and had a single 15mm cannon and two 7.9mmmachinc-guns gro uped close toge ther in the nose of theaircraft.

Throughout the remainder of the war the develop­ment of fighter aircraft in G reat Britain and Germany

The a ir supe riori ty fighter in m id-1 941In the middle of 1941 , near ly two years into the SecondW'orld \'\'ar, two aircraft stood out as representing thestate of the art among the air superiority fighters then inservice : the Su permarinc Spitfire Mark VB and theMesserschmin Bf 1091'-2. Both fighters were developedversions of designs that made the ir initial flights moretha n half a decade earlier , and both were in large-scaleproduction.

Wh en, in the mid-1930s, they had designed the twofighters, both Reginald Mi tchell and Willi Messerschminhad the same goals in mind. Each sought to produ ce ashort- range interceptor fight er with the highest possiblespeed and climbing performance, mating the smallestpossible airframe to the most power ful engine then avail­able. Given the similarity of the requirem ents, it is hardl ysurprising that the resultant aircraft should have severalpoints in commo n. Both were low-wing monoplaneswith all-metal stressed-s kin construction, faired cockpitsand retractable undercarriages .

Wh cn considering the relative merits of thesefighters, however, one mu st bear in mind that aircraftdesign is largely a matter of compromise. If the designerconcentrates on improvi ng one aspect of performance orcomba t capability, almost inevitably this wi ll be at theexpe nse of something else.

Argu ably,Willi Mcssersch min did slightly better thanRegina ld Mitchell in des igning the smallest possible

The Spitfi re XII : pottered by the 2,035hp Rolls-Roy ce Griff011 61 engine tcitl: a nco-stage supercharger, U'QS one of the mosteffective air superiority fighters ill service at the end of the Second Ifbrld Ifur. (Vickers) (See pages 60-6 1.)

The Ibught F4U Corsair was the fastest and most effective carrier-borne fighterlfighter-bomber type to see large-scale serv iceduring the Secolld lForldlfur. (See pages 64 and 74- 5)

Two broadly comparable machines uhich ranked as the most effective ai r superiority fighters ill service ill mid-1 941.Left: A Supermarine Spitfire VB of No 92 Squadron. Right : A M csserschmiu Bf 109 'Friedrich ' of]agdgesc1/U'ader 2,01/csideits camouflaged hangar ill northern France. (Spitfire:Vickers; M essersclnnitt: v ia Schliephake)

58 59

A IR CRAFT OF T HE S E C O:-:O \\ ' O R L D " 'AR FI GHTER DEVEL OPMENT . M ID -1 9 ~1 TO .\I I D - 1 9 ~ 5

\

The Spitfire XII was optimised for operations at lou' altitude, and had its unngs clipped CO give all increased rate of roll,

A close-up of the Griff0 11 engine fi tted coa Spitfire X /V Although it had a cubic capacity one-third greater than the M erlin,by inspired jugglillg with the ancillary components its designers kept the frontal area of the ,leW engine to unthin 6 per cent, itslength CO unthin Sin (7.5cm) and its ueight to withill 600lb (272kg) of the equivale nt fig uresfo r the M erlill. (Costain)

I loved the Sp itfire, in all of her many version s. But I have

to admit that the later Marks, although they were faster

Figures for init ial production oersion of each uariant

will be seen that the Spitfire Mk XIV had a wing loadingmore than 100b/sq ft (O.4kg/m') greater than the Mk I.

The 'bo ttom line' of these changes was that during itslong development life the handling characteristics of theSpitfire deteriorated steadily. Test pilot Alex Hen shawdescribed their effect :

Mark Entered service Engine power Maximum speed Weight (normal load ed) Win g loading

Sep 1938 1,030hp 362mph 5,8191b 24lb/sq ft583 km!h 2,639kg 1.01kg/m 2

V Feb 1941 1,470hp 371mph 6,5251b 27lb/sq ft597km!h 2,959kg 1.13kg/m 2

IX June 1942 1,560hp 409mph 7,400 1b 30.6Ib/sq ft658km!h 3,356 kg 1.29 kg/m2

XIV Jan 1944 2,035hp 446mph 8,400lb 34.7Ib/sq ft718km/h 3,8 09kg 1.46kg/m2

Development of the Spitfire

600lb (270kg) of the Merlin. It speaks equally highly forthe design staff at Supermarine that they were able to re­design the Spitfire to take the new engine.

The box below summarises Spitfire development. Itputs some figures to the improvement in performancethat resulted from that extra power. It also shows the in­creases in weight and their prog ressive effect on thefighter 's wing loading (for each mark for which figuresare given, the fighter 's wing area remained the same). It

the structure was liable to suffer a catastrophi c failureand break up . To cope with each major incre ase inweight, therefore , a fighter's airframe had to be strength­ened to restore its safe loading factor. And , naturally,each such increase in strength brought with it a furthertwist to the weight spiral.

During the Second World War Supermarine pu shedthe process of incremental development of the Spitfirefurther than anybody else. After the Mark VB, the nextmajor improvement to the performance came in thespring of 1942 with the intr oduction into service of theSpitfire Mark IX. This was powered by the new Merlin61 engine fitted with two supercharger blowers in series,one feeding into the other. At sea level the new enginedewloped a maximum of 1,565hp, just under 100hpmore than the Merlin 45. At high altitude the effect ofthe two-stage supercharger was more profound. At30,000ft (9,150m) the Merlin 45 , with the single-stagesupercharger, developed about 720hp. At the same alti­tude the Merlin 61, the same basic engine but with thetwo-stage supercharger, developed about 1,020hp , ornearly one-third more . With its additional blower andcasing, the M erlin 61 was 9in (23cm) longer and about200lb (about 90kg) heavier than the Mark 45 .

After the Mark IX, the next major imp rovement tothe performance came early in 1944 with the introduc­tion into service of the Spitfire Mark XIV. The newfighter was powered by the 2,035hp Griffon 61 engine,a 36.75-litre 'hanger' with a cubic capacity one-thirdgreater than the Merlin. By inspired juggling with theancillary components Rolls-R oyce designers kept thefrontal area of the new engine to within six per cent , itslength to within 3in (7.5cm) and its weight to within

followed one of two separate paths. On one of thesepaths, the well-proven Spitfire and Bf 109 designs weredeveloped to squeeze the last drop of performance out ofthem. On the other path, new fighter type s were bu iltand introduced into service .

In the next two sections we shall observe the aircraftthat emerged from each path of development, and seehow they fared in service.

Pushing the Well-proven De signsThe Spitfire VB and the Bf 109F-2 were well into theirrespective development processes in mid-I 941. Thesehad followed, and would continue to follow, more or lesscommon lines. Successive variants of these fighter s em­ployed more powerful (and therefore heavier ) engines toboost their maximum speed and climbing performance.They carried more powerful (and therefore heavier) ar­maments. They carried larger (and therefore heavier )fuel loads to provide the increa ses in range that opera­tional pilots demanded. And they carried more (andtherefore heavier) armour and other items of operationalequipment.

Each improvement in performance or combat capa­bility brought with it a weight increase, which in turn ledto other problems.The late-war Spitfire Mk XlV, for ex­ample, weighed more than a tonne more than the MarkI when it ent ered service before the war. \X'hen thefighter was on the ground or in normal flight the in­creased weight was not imp ortant, but in combat it wasa quite different matter. In a 6g turn every part of thefighter and those items attached to it weighed six timesas much. If the airframe was not strong enough to sup­port the additional weight , multiplied by the 'g' factor s,

60 61

AIR CRAF T O F TH E SE C O ND WORLD WAR FI G fI T E R J) E v E I. 0 P .\ \ E:-'; T . •\\ I D - I 94 I TO ,\\1 D - I 9 45

A late production Spitfire XIVfilled with a bubble canopy. The latter gave greatly improied visibility in the rear hemisphere,all important advantage in combat .

Figures for initial production version ofeach uariant

The ultimate pro duction varia nt of the Bf 109, theK-4 , was even more of a handful than the 'Gus tav'. Bothsub-types of the Bf 109 rem ained in large scale produc­tion in Germany unti l the last days of the war , thou gh ascombat airc raft they were mu ch inferior to the SpitfireMk Xl V.

T he Spi tfire and the Bf 109 equipped the bulk of thefight er uni ts in the RAF and the Lu ftwaffe, respectively,throu ghou t the whole of the period under review. Thesetwo fighters illustrated the extent to which the develop ­ment process could be pushed in time of war, but theyalso highlight ed its sho rtcomings. In the next sectio n wesha ll examine some of the new-generation piston-enginefighte r designs that ente red service afte r the middle of194 1 and proved successful in combat.

Variant Ente red service Engine power M aximum speed Weight (normal loaded) Win g loading

Bert a Feb 1937 680 hp 465km/h 2,150kg 1.14kg/m 2

289 mph 4,741lb 27.2Ib/sq ft

Emil Feb 1939 1,100hp 550 km/h 2,504 kg , 1.31kg/m2

342mph 5,5231b 31.3lb/sq ft

Friedrich M ar 1941 1,200h p 600km/h 2,800kg 1.49kg/m2

373mph 6,1731b 35.5 Ib/sq ft

Gustav-o Sep 1942 1,475hp 62 Ikm/h 3, 147kg 1.68kg/m 2

386 mph 6,940lb 40lb/sq ft

Developm ent of the ,\ Icsser schm itt Bf 109

The M esserschmiu Bf 109 'Kurfu rst', the final uersion of the fighter to go ill/a large-scale production. (v ia Schliephake)

a wing load ing of 1.68kg/m ' (40lb/sq ft) . T hat was badenough, but sub-variants of the 'G ustav' op timised toengage Allied heavy bombers carried even heavierweapon loads which pu shed their wing load ing up to1.8 1kg/m' (43Ib/sq ft) . Box 2 below summarises the dev­elopment.

The combina tion of the small wing, overloaded air­frame, narrow-track unde rca rriage and big 1,800h pengine driv ing a broa d bladed prop eller, produced somereally vicious handling tra its in the Bf 109G-6 . If an in­experienced pilot opened the throttle too quickly duringtake-o ff, or if he tried to lift the fighter into the air beforeit had reached flying speed, the aircraft was liable to rollon its back and smas h into the ground. Nobod y did thattwice.

performance envelop e is rarely achieved without a

deterioration somewhere else .

T hat deterioration in the Spitfire's handling charac­teristics came at the same time as major and sought-afterimprove ments in performa nce , That alone ma de themacceptable in time of war.

Other fighter designs proved mu ch less able to ac­commodate the develop ment process, however, A prim eexample of fighter design that suffered problems fromover-developme nt was the M esserschm itt Bf 109. Whenthe Bf 109 ' Berta' entered service in February 1937 itswing load ing was an acce ptable 1.14kg/m' (27. 2Ib/sq ft),and it handl ed beauti fully.

The Bf 109 'Fried rich' provided the best compromisein term s of performanc e, fighting ability and handlingcharacteristics. From then on, however, each increase inperformance or combat capability was bo ught at a highcost in term s of the aero plane's handling characte ristics.

Ideally, the Bf 109 should have been superseded inproduction by a new design in the spring of 1942 . Butthe Me 209 and Me 309 fighters intended to replace itwere not yet ready to go into production (they neverwould be) . There was no alterna tive but to continuedevelop ing the older fighter. As has been said , WilliJ\lesserschmitt did rath er better than Reginald Mi tchellwhen it came to designin g the smallest possible airframeto meet the orig inal requirem ent for an interceptor. Butwhen the Ge rman fighter was sub jected to the rigours ofthe development process, that advantage becam e a majorhandicap.

The next major production variant of the Bf 109, the'Gustav-o', entered serv ice in September 194 2 and had

than the earlier ones, were also much heavier and so did

not hand le so well. You did not have such positive

control over them . One test of manoeuvrability was ( 0

throw the Spitfire into a flick roll and see how many

times she rolled . With the J\ \ark 11 .. . one got two and ahalf flick rolls, but the Mark IX was heavierand you gotonly one and a half. With the later and still heavierversion s one got even less.The essence of aircraft design

is co mpro mise, and an improveme nt at one end of the

Spitfire IXs of No 3 13 Sqn. Each fight er carries a 90gal(408-litre) drop-ta nk under the fuselage.

62 63

AIR CRAF T O F THE SE C O~D W ORLD W AR 1' 1G H T E R J) E v E L O P .\ \ E x T . •\t I J) - I 94 ITO .\ 1 1J) - I 945

40.81b/sq ft1.72kg/m2

Wing loading

37.71b sq ft1.58kg/m2

11,400lb5,170kg

11,400lb5,170kg

\"'eight (normal loaded )

Figures for ini tial production version ojeach type

Armourers pr ime the zca rhead oj a Wgr 2/ rocket beforeloading it into the launching tube. Th is spin-stabilised Im ­

guided rocket sceighed / / Okg (242Ib) at launch, including thehigh-explosive warhead ueighing 36kg (79 / b).

Close-up oj the Wgr 2 / launcher fi tted to an Fu: 190.

435mph700km/h

405mph652km/h

Max imum speed

2,180hp

2,420hp

Engine power

Typhoon I Sep 1941

Type Entered service

The Hawker Typh oon and Tempest

Tempest V Apr 1944

line of ,\ Iikoyan and Gurevich, Yakovlev and Lavochkinfighter designs .

Each of these fighter types emp loyed the same basiclayout as a low-winged monoplane with single fin andrudder, fixed forward-firing armament, the enginemounted in the nose driving a tract or airscrew, and atailwheel und ercarriage.

It goes without saying that fighter perform ance de­pends on engine power. In this respect British and USdesigners were indeed fortunate in having support fromhighly effective engine manu facturers such as Rolls­Royce, Napier and Pratt & Whitney. Du ring 1942 eachof these companies began produ ction of engines in the2,000hp class suitable for use in fighters. In Germ anythe first such engines did not become available until1944. The Sovi et Union and japan both failed to bringinto service any single-engi ncd fighter type powered byan engine in that class.

The armament carried by a fighter depend ed on thetype of opponent it was inte nded to engage. The Ameri­can Thunderbolts and ,\ Iustangs were intended to fightmainly against enemy fighters or fighter-bombers, andfor that purpose their armament of eight and six 0.5in(12.7mm) machi ne-guns respectively was sufficient. Formuch the same reason , many Russian fighters carriedone 20mm cannon and two 0.5in weapons. japanesefighters at the beginning of the period carried two 20m mcannon and two rifle-calibre machine-guns. The RAFSpitfires and Typhoons were armed to engage enemybombers and fighters, the former carrying a combinationof rifle-calibre machi ne-guns, 0.5in weapons , and two20mm cannon and the latter twelve 0.303i n machine­guns which were soon replaced by four 20mm cannon.

T he Lu ftwaffe also armed its fighters to engageenemy bombers and fighters, and the initial produ ctionversion of the Fw 190 carried four 20mm cannon andtwo rifle-calibre machine-gun s. In action against USheavy bombers even this armament proved insufficient ,however. To provide additi onal firepower, some Fw 190scarried a laun cher und er each wing for a \Vgr 21, a210mm-calibre (8\1, in) spin -stabilised air-to-air rocket.

Among the new generation of single-engined fightersthe largest and the heaviest, by a wide margin, was theThunderbolt. The initial production version , the P-47C,

introd uced the Grumman F6F Hellcat and later theVought F4U Co rsair. 'The japanese Na vy introduced theMitsubishi A6M 3 (Allied codename 'Harnp'), followedmuch later by the Mitsubishi j2M3 'jack' and theKawanishi NIKI -j 'George'. The japanese Army beganits war with the Nakajima Ki-43 'Osca r' and in the clos­ing stages of the conflict its best fighter was the NakajimaKi-84 'Frank'. T he Soviet Air Force introdu ced a long

A Republic P-4 7 Thunderbolt of the 376th FighterSquadron, 36/st Fighter Group, dur ing the spring oj 1944.The Thunderbolt U'aS the fir st really effective single-enginedlong-range escort fighter to go into service in quantity: Thisexample carries a 90gal (408-litre) pressurised drop-tankunder the fuselage. (USA F)

A close-up of the Pratt & lVlzil1ley R- 2800-5 9 Double Il'ilSPengine fitted to a Thunderbolt . No te the large duct under theengine, to carry carburettor air to the turbosuperchargerfitted in the rear fuselage. (USA F)

Spitfi re M ark XI V versus Messersch mitt Bf I09G

How they Co m pared:

Note:This box and the follounng 'comparison boxes' in thischapter contain oerbatim excerpts from official reports ojcombat trials carried 0111 during the Second lfVrld Ifarusing captu red aircraft.

M ax imum speed The Spitfire XIV is 40mph (64km/h)faster at all heights except near 16,000ft (4,900 m),where it is only lOmph (16km/h) faster.

Maximum climb The same result : at 16,000ft thetwo aircra ft are identical, otherwise the Spitfir e XIVout-climbs the Me I09G .T he zoom climb is practical­ly identical when the climb is made without opening thethrottle. Climbing at full throttle, the Spitfire XIVdraws away from the M e 109G quit e easily.

Dive During the initial part of the dive, the Me109G pulls away slightly, but when a speed of 380mph(6 12km/h) is reached, the Spitfire XIV begins to gainon the Me 109G.

Turning circle The Spitfire XIV easily ou t-tu rns theMe 109G in either direction .

Rate oj roll The Spitfire XIV rolls much morequ ickly.

Conclusion 'The Spi tfire XIV is superior to the Me109G in every respect.

The new gene ration of fighte rsBetween the middle of 1941 and the spring of 1944 eachof the major air forces involved in the conflict fielded oneor more new air superiority fighters. The Luftwaffebrought into action the Focke-Wulf Fw 190. The RAFintroduced the Hawker Typhoon and later the Tempest,and the US Army Air Force brought in the 1'-47T hunderbolt and the P-5I A Mu stang, followed later byMerlin-engined variants of the 1'-51. T he US Navy

64 65

Figures fo r initial production uersion oj each ty pe

Th e Fu: 190D, uhich entered serv ice ill the autu mn of 1944,had a performance comparable unth that oj the P- 51 B, theSpitfire X IV and the Tempest.

September 1943 and, since it work ed at any altitude, itpermitted a more flexib le mode of operation. Using thenew tank the fighter had a radius of actio n of about 400miles (645km) . Later, small numbers of T hunderboltswere modified to carr y two 90gal drop tanks, thu s in­creasing their opera tional radius of action to 475 miles(765km) .

The lightest fighter type of this period was theJapanese Mi tsubishi A6M3 M odel 32 'H arnp '. Thiscarrier-bo rne fighter appeared in April 1942 and had aloaded weight of only 5,6091b (2,544kg). To achieve aperformance comparable with that of contemporaryfighter s in other countries, using a less powerful engine,designer jiro Horikoshi had to produce a very ' tight' de­sign. But that meant the fighte r had very little potentialfor deve lopment. During the first year of the war in thePacific the 'Ha rnp ' and its predecessor, the 'Zero ' , hadstruck fear in the hear ts of its oppo nents .Yet the real rea­son for this success was not so much the fighte r but thehighl y trained pilots who flew it. During the first eight­een months of the conflict, that band of prewar-trainedJapanese Navy fighter pilots was wiped out almost to aman. Their hastily tra ined replacements were far lesseffective.

Another fighter type that beca me the bane of itsopponents when it first appeared was the Focke-\VulfFw 190. A more sturdy machine than the Bf 109, the Fw190 was powered by the 1,600hp B,\ IW SO1 radi al. lbeFw 190 had a clear performance margin over the Spitfire

67

,\ laximum speed Weight (normal loaded) Wing loading

376mph 11,3S11b 34lb /sq ft605km/h 5,161kg 1.43kg/m 2

425mph 12,0391b 3S.3lb/sq ft6S4km/h 5,460kg 1.61kg/m2

FI GH T E R D E VE LOP .\tE>:T , .\tI D - 1 9 4 1 TO .\tI D - 1 9 4 5

Development of US Navy Fighters

Type Ente red service Engine power

1'61'-3 Jan 1943 2,000hpHellcat

F4U- 1D M ay 1944 2,25 0hpCo rsair

The ,lIilSubishi A 6,1I5, A llied code-name 'Ze ke 52 ', tchoseperformance was oil/classed by those of the US N avy 'sHellcat and Corsair fi ghters.

ducted forwards some 20ft (6m) and into the inlet of amechanically driven second-stage supercharger at therear of the eng ine .The hot exha ust gases had to be du ct­ed 20ft (6m) to the rear to d rive the turb ine befo re theyemerged from the rear fuselage.This arrangement mea ntthere was about 60ft ( ISm) of ducting running up anddown the fuselage, under the cockpit. The duct carryingthe compressed air had to be of the high-pressure type,while that carrying the hot exhaust gases rearwa rds hadto have sliding joints to allow for the expansion of themetal. With all that ducting and a 256 Imp gal (1,162litre) fue l tank inside the fuselage , the D ouble Wasp en­gine in the front and the turbosupercharger in the rear,it is hardl y surprising that the Thunderbolt was so big.Once its pilots learned to exploit the fighter's high speedand its excellent diving performance , however, the 1'-47proved successful as a long- range escort fighter evenagainst smaller and more nimble opp onents.

T he 166 Imp gal (753-litre) ferr y tank fitted initiallyto the P-4 7C was unpressuri sed, and so would not de­liver fuel at altitudes above 20,000ft (6, 100m) .Thunderbolts flew to the enemy coast below that alti­tude, using the fuel from the ferry tank. When theyreac hed the coast they dropped the tanks, often beforethey were empty, and comme nced a climb to be in posi­tion to engage enemy fighters when they met them.

The next major advance to the Thunderbolt 's escortrange came with introduction of the 90 Imp gal (40S­litre) pressurised drop tank . It became available in

A t the end oj the wa r the Kmxanishi N 1K2 'George'u-as olleoj the best Japallese N avy fig hters ill sen-ice, but too feu:u'ere

available fo r them to infiuence eteuts .

Figures fo r in itial product ion oersion of each oa riant

Figures fo r init ial produ ction cersion oj each type

Figures fo r init ial produ ction oersion of each type

66

~ laximum speed Weight (normal loaded) Wing loading

673km/h 3,977kg I .S7kg/m 2

-tl Srnp h S,77Olb 44.5Ib/sq ft

657km/h 4,3Sl kg 2.06kg/m2

40Smph 9,660lb 49 lb/sq ft

6S6km/h 4,299kg 2.02k g/m 2

426mph 9,4SOlb 4S. llb/sq ft

Maximum speed Weight (normal loaded) Wing loading

554km/h 2,543kg 1.02kg/m 2

33Smph 5,6091b 24.2Ib/sq ft

597km/h 3,434kg 1.47kg/m 2

371mph 7,5731b 351b/sq ft

596km/h 4,099kg 1.39kg/m 2

370 mph 9,0391b 33lb /sq ft

Maximum speed Weight (normal loaded) Wing loading

390mph S,600lb 36.9 1b sq ft

62Skm/h 3,900kg 1.55kg/m2

433m ph 13,500lb 451b sq ft

69 7km/h 6,122kg I.S9kg/m 2

440mph 9,2001b 39.5lb sq ft

70Skm/h 4,I 72kg 1.66kg/m 2

2,240hp

1,990hp

Sep 1944

Ap r 1944 I, 700hp

Apr 1942 1,700hp

Entered servi ce Engine power

Fw 190D-9

Fw 190A-S

Fw 190A-3

Variant

Kawanishi Late 1944N I K2-J 'G eorge'

T ype Entered service Engine power

P-5IA Apr 1942 1,200hp

Mustang

P-47C Apr 1943 2,300 hp

Thunderbolt

P-51B Dec 1943 1,620hp

Musta ng

Type Entered servi ce Engine power

Develop m ent of the Focke-WulfFw 190

US Ar my Air Force F ighters

Mitsubishi Ap r 1942 I ,130hpA6M3 'Hamp'

Japanese Navy Fighters

A I R C RA FT O F T ilE SE CO>:D W ORLD W A R

weighed 13,500lb (6,125kg) in the normal loadedcondition. That was more than double that of theMesser schmitt Bf 109G, and nearly twi ce that of theSpitfire Mk IX . The Americ an fighter was powered bythe Pratt & \'\/hitn ey R-2S00-59 Double Wasp turbo­supercharged radial, which developed 2,300hp at31,000ft (9,500m) . The weight and size of the turbo­supercharger unit dictated tha t it be fitted in the. rearfuselage . Locating it so far from the engine gave n se to

several problems. Air for the engine carburettor was col­lected bv a large inlet at the base of the engine cowling,and from there it was ducted some 20ft (6m) rearwardsto the turbosupercharger. After compression, the air was

M itsu bishi Jan 1944 I ,S20h p

J2M3 'Jack'

AIR CRAFT O F TH E S E C O:--:D W ORLD \X'ARFIG II T E R DE v E LOP ,\ \ E :--: T, .\ \ 1D - 1 9 ~ 1 TO .\ 11 D - I 9 ~ 5

and 30mph (32 and -I8km/h ) faster , depending onaltitude.

With a maximum speed of -I-IOmph (708km/h), the.\ Iuslang was faster than any piston-engined fighteroppos ing it. ,\ Ioreoyer, carrying IwO 75 Imp gal (3-10litre) tanks , its operational radius of action of 650 miles( 1.0-l5km) look it to Berlin and beyond,

The appearance of large numbers of Thunderboltsand ,\ Iuslangs over Germany in the spring of 19-1-1caused a crisis in the Luftwaffe. Home defence unitsflying the Bf 109 and Fw 109 found themselves in a sortof 'Catch 22 situat ion' . If a fighter carried eno ugh fire­power 10 destroy the American heavy bombers, it was10 0 heavy and unwieldy 10 engage with the Americanescorts. If the armament was reduced so thai the fightercould dogfight with the American escorts, it could notengage the bombers with much chance of success.

As a makeshift solution, the Luftwaffe intr oducedseparate Gruppen equipped with 'heavy' and 'light'fighters . The 'heavy' fighter type was the specia llymodified Focke-Wulf Fw 190A-8 'Stur rnbock ' Cbatter­ing ram ') filled with IWO20mm and two 30mm MK 108cann on . This version carried extra steel arm our 10

protect the cockpit area and extra panels of toughenedglass on either side of the can opy 10 enable it 10 engagein slugging matches against American heavy bombersfrom short range. The weight of the heavy can non andthe exira arm our made the Sturmbock highly vulnerableif it was engaged by American fighters, however. Becauseof this, each G ru ppe of Stu rm bock fighters was esco rtedinto acrion by two 'light' fighter G ruppen equ ipped withlightly armed Bf 109s filled with uprated engi nes. Thetask of the latter was to protect the 'heavy' fighters fromthe US escorts, These tactics enjoyed some success dur­ing the early summer of 19-1-1, until the numerically su­perior American fighter force devised countermeasures.

Additional armour fined to the Fw 1901'1-8 S turmbock .

-.

The Grumman F6F Hellcat carrier fighter had a consider­able performance advantage m:er the Japallese 1'16,\15 'Zeke52', and played a major part ill the US Xa ral victories illthe Pacific theatre dur ing 1943 and 1944

No rth American P-5l M ustangs of the 503rd FighterSq uadron, 33 9th Fighter Group, ill the summer of 1944,Thethree aircraft nearest the camera are the 'D ' version u:ilh thebubble canopy. The f urthest aircraft is a 'C'siersio n tcith theorig inal faired canopy.

air fighting over the Pacific, Now the ' tightness' of itsoriginal design was a liability, because the airframe couldnot acce pt an engine developin g more than 1,300hp.,\ li tsubishi did its best to squeeze more performancefrom the existing airframe, but with little success.

The cleanest airframe design of any fighter of thisperiod was that of the North American 1'-51 ,\ Iustang,The 1'-51A, the initial production version , was poweredby the Allison V-1710 engine and was quite an effectivelow-altitude fighter. Wh en the fighter was re-enginedwith the Merlin 6 1 built under licence by the US Packardcompany as the V-1650-3, the Mustang really came intoits own. T he Spitfire IX used the Rolls-Royce-built ver­sion of the same engine , Yet, when the IWO fighters flewat similar thr ottle setti ngs, the Muslang was between 20

,

/1

I

Figures for initial product ion cersion of each typ e

The Nakajima Ki-84 'Frank' u'as one of the best fighters illservice uith the Japallese Army A ir Force.

Type Entered service Engine power Maximum speed Weight (normal loaded) Wing loadin g

N akajima jul 19-13 1,130hp 515km/h 2,-I12kg 0.96kg/m2

Ki -I3-IIB 'Oscar' 320mph 5,3201b 22,91b/sq ft

Nakaji ma Aug 19-1-1 1,900hp 62-1km/h 3,6 12kg 1,26kg/m2

Ki 8-1 ' Frank' 388 mph 7,9651b 29.9Ib/sq ft

VB which soldiered on until the Spitfire IX entered ser­vice, From then on the performance of the Spitfire ad­vanced the faster, and the Mk XIV had a clear margin ofsuperiority even over the Fw 1900,

For the japanese N avy the mom ent of truth came inthe summer of 19-13, when the US N avy introduced theGrumman F6F Hellcat. This was powered by a 2,000hpPrall & Whimey R-2800-I OW, an engine similar to thatfilled to the Thunderb olt. The new American fighter hada maximum speed of 376mph (605km) at 22,800ft(6,900m) , giving it a comfortable performance marginoyer the 'Ha rnp'. \,(Iith the next generation of japanesefighters still more than a year from service , the out­classed 'Harnp' had to continue to bear the brunt of the

j apanese Army Air Fo rce Figh ters

rYJcke- lflr llf Fw 190s of J agdgeschuYlder 51 operating under harsh unnter conditions at a fo rua rd airfield ill Russia. Note that

the aircraft ill the background is hoeing its engine changed ill the open. (Romm}

68 69

A IR CRAF T OF T ilE S E COSD \X' ORI.D \X'AR

Focke l\'i/ if Fw 190A-8 'S lIIrmbock 'fighters of 1J. (S turm) GTlIPpe of ] agdgeschu:ader 300. These heav."ly a.rmol/red fighterscarried two u:illg-mol/med 30 mm Call1lOlI, and u'ere modified 10 engage ill short-range fire-fights tcith US heavy bomber

fo rma tions. (Romm)

Left: \ akovlev \ a k-9 fig hters of theSoviet A ir Force, 771is aircraft enteredservice ill A ugust 1942 and ( ' ill builtill large numbers . I I had a maximumspeed of 584kmlh (363mph) andueighed 3, 199kg (7,055Ib),

Soviet Air Force FightersFigures for initial production version of each type

Type Entered service Engine power ,\ lax. speed Weight (normal loaded) Wing loading

j\ tikoyan-Gurevich Autumn 19~1 1,350hp 655km1h 3,284kg 1.61kg/m2

MiG 3 ~07mph 7 ,2~2 Ib 38.3lb /sq ft

Yakovlcv Aug 19~2 1,260hp 584km/h 3,199kg 1.60kg/m2

Yak-9 363 mph 7,0551b 38.lIb/sq ft

La vochkin Spring 1 9~ 3 1,640hp 6~ 7km1h 3,358kg 1.66kg/m2

LA-51'N ~02mph 7,4061b 39.4lb sq ft

70

F IG II T E R D E v E I. 0 I' ,\ 1 E S T. ,\ 1I D · I 9 ~ ITO .\ 1 I D · I 9 ~ 5

How th ey Co m pared:

Spitfi re Mark VB t'erSlls Focke-Wulf Fw 190A-3

General The Fw 190 was compared with a Sp itfire VB from an operational squadron for speed and all-round man ­oeuvrability at heights up to 25,000fl. The Fw 190 is superior in speed at all heights, and the approximate differencesare as follows:At 2,000ft (600m) the Fw 190 is 25-30mph (~()-48km1h) faster than the Spitfire VBAt 3,000ft (900m) the Fw 190 is 30-35mph (~8-56km1h) faster than the Sp itfire VBAt 5,000ft ( I ,500m) the Fw 190 is 25mph faster than the Spitfire VBAt 9,000ft (2,700m) the Fw 190 is 25-30mph faster than the Spitfire VBAt I 5,000ft (~ ,600m) the Fw 190 is 20mph (32km1h) faster than the Spi tfire VBAt 18,000ft (5,500m) the Fw 190 is 20mp h faster than the Sp itfire VBAt 21,000ft (6 ,~00m) the Fw 190 is 20-25mp h faster than the Spitfi re VB

Climb The climb of the Fw 190 is superior to that of the Spitfire VB at all heights.The best speeds for climbingare app roximatel y the same, but the ang le of the Fw 190 is considerably steeper. Under maximum continuous climb­ing conditions the climb of the Fw 190 is about ~50ft/min (2.28m/sec) bener up to 25,000ft (7,600m) .

Dive Comparative dives between the two aircraft have shown that the Fw 190 can leave the Sp itfire with ease, par ­ticularly du ring the initial stages.

M anoeuurability The man oeuvrability of the Fw 190 is bener than that of the Spitfire VB except in turning cir­cles, when the Sp itfire can quite easily out-turn it. The Fw 190 has better acceleration under all conditions of flightand this must obviously be most useful during combat.

When the Fw 190 was in a turn and was attacked by the Spitfire, the superior rate of roll enabled it to flick into adivi ng turn in the opposition direction .The pilot of the Spitfire could experience great difficulty in following this ma­noeuvre, and even when prepared for it, was seldom able to allow the correct deflection . A dive from this man oeuvreenabled the I w 190 to draw away from the Spitfire , which was then forced to break off the attack.

The above trials have shown that the Spitfire VB mu st crui se at high speed when in an area where enem y fighterscan be expected. It will then, in addition to lessening the chances of being successfully 'bounced', have a bette r chanceof catching the Fw 190, particu larly if it has the advantage of surprise.

How they Compared:

Spitfir e Mark XIV verslls Focke-Wul f Fw 190A-3

Maxi1lll/m speeds From 0-5,000ft (0-1,500m) and 15,000-20,000ft (~ ,60D-6, 1 00m) the Spitfire XIV is only 20mph(32km1h) faster ; at all other height s it is up to 60mph (97km1h) faster than the Fw 190A.

M aximl/m climb T he Spitfire XIV has a considerably greater rate of climb than the Fw 190A at all altitudes.Dive After the initial part of the dive, dur ing which the Fw 190 gains slightly, the Spitfire XIV has a stight

advantage.Turning circle The Spitfire XIV can easily turn inside the Fw 190, though in the case of a right -hand turn this dif­

ference is not quite so pronounced.Rate of roll 'The Fw 190 is ver y much bener.Conclusions In defence, the Spitfire XIV should use its remarkable maximum climb and turning circle against any

enemy aircraft. In the anack it can afford to 'mix it' but should beware of the quick roll and dive, If this manoe uvreis used by an Fw 190 and the Spitfire XIV follows, it will probably not be able to close the range until the Fw 190has pulled out of its dive.

7 1

Hawker Typhoon jVIk IB(see page 64 ff)

KeyI Napier Sabre II. 2.260hp2 de Havilla nd Hvdromanc airscrew3 Oil cooler ... Carburettor air intakeS Coo lant radiator6 Coolant header tank7 Pressure relief valve8 Radiat or shutt er9 Radi ator shutter jack

10 Coffman cartridge: starter11 Starter cartridge magazine12 Alternat or13 .\ lagnclos14 Distributer15 Air compressor16 Vacuum pump17 Airscrew governor18 Supercharg er oil pump19 Hydrauli c reser voir20 Oxygen tank21 \~ 'irebs ba y22 \Xnip aeri al23 Gun heating duct24 Gun cam era pori25 .\ lova ble landing lamp26 Und ercarriag e jack27 Undercar riage up-l ock

28 Undercarriage fairing door jack29 Can opy winder30 Armour plate31 Rudder controls32 Elevator contr ols33 Aileron controls3.1 Rudd er and elevat or [Timcontrols35 Underca rriage emergency-lowering pedal36 Elevator rem ote mass-balance37 Rudder trim /ser vo tab38 Fabric covered rudder39 Split trailing-edge flap.10 Hap jack.II Flap interconnect linkage-l2 Forward-retracting tauwheelH Production break.1.1 Reinforcin g fishplates.15 Bomb carrier (up to I .OOOlh).16 Rocket and laun cher (four each side when carried).17 20mm Hispan o gun.18 .\ lal;tazine. t-rnrounds per gun.19 Access panel (forms magazine lid)50 Undercarriag e warning horn5I Upper identification light52 .\ la in fuel tank . self-sealing. -lOgaleach side53 Leading -edge fuel tank . self-sealing. 35gal each side5'- Oil tank . 18gal55 Air bottle for brakes and gun

56 Electro-pneumatic gun-firin g valve57 Pneumatic brakesSg Free-fall emergency und ercar riage lowering59 Tailplane tnm gear box60 \\ 'cb-anJ-hoom outer hay spars61 \\"arren truss centre section spars62 Co mpass63 Fuel cock6.J Carburetto r primer6S Cylinder primer66 Fuel tank pressur e cock6i Coo lant temperatur e68 Air IOU \Te

69 Supercharger pan el70 Oil temperature7 1 Oil pressure

72 Fuel contents73 Boost pressure7.1 Engine rpm75 "lap position76 Co ntracto r clock (radar idcnti ficarion)77 Starter butt ons78 Undercarriage position79 Oxygen pand80 Air pres sur e81 Engine start and CUtout82 .\ Iagnetc switches83 Undercarriage selector8.1 Hap selector85 Standard blind-flying panel

(Airspeed . artificial horizon . rate of climb.altitude directi onal ~TO. tum anJ bank )

A I RC RA FT OF T ilE S E C O~() wo s r.u \\ ' AR

How they Compared:

North American P-51B Mustang Vel'S U S Focke-Wulf Fw 190A-3

Maximum speed The Fw 190 is nearly 50mph (80km/h) slower at all heights, increasing to 70mph (112km/h) ab ove28,000ft (8,500m) ,

Climb There appears to be little to choose in the maximum rate of climb , It is anticipated that the Mu stang willhave a better climb than the new Fw 190D,The M ustang is cons iderably faster at all heights in a zoo m climb,

Dive T he ,\ Iustang can always out-d ive the Fw 190.Turning circle Again, there is not mu ch to choose,T he Mustang is slightly better. Wh en evading an enemy aircraft

with a steep turn , a pilot will always out-turn the attacking aircraft initially because of the difference in speeds , It istherefore still a worthwhile manoeuvre with the Mustang when attacked,

Rate of ro/l Not even a M ustang approac hes the Fw 190.Conclusions In the attac k, a high spee d should be maintained or regained in order to rega in the height initiative.

A Fw 190 could not evade by diving alone . In defen ce a steep tum followed by a full throttle dive should increase therange before regaining height and course . Dog-fighting is not altoge the r recommend ed . Do not attempt to climbaway withou t at least 250 mph (400km/h) showi ng initially.

F IG li T E ROE v E I. 0 P .\ 1 E x T . •\ll ll - I 9 ~ I 'I' 0 .\ 11 D - I 9 ~ 5

continued

Gr umman F6F-5 Hellca t a nd Voug ht F4U- I D Co rsair vers us Mi tsubishi A6.\ 15 'Zeke 52"

F4U- ID Corsair

T he F4U ranged from 48mph (77km/h) faster at sea level to 80mp h ( I 29km/h) faster at 25,000ft (7,600m) , In theclimb it .was equal to the M odel 52 below 10,000ft (3,000m) , at all altitudes above that the F4 U was superior, up to750ft/min (3.8 I m/sec ) better at 18,000ft (5,500m). Below 230mph (370km/h) the rate of roll of the two fighters wassimilar, above that speed the F4 U was mu ch the better. Below 200mph (322km/h) the Model 52 was far more rna­noeuvrablc than the F4 U, while above 230mph the F4 U was the more manoeuvrable,

GeneralDo 1I0t dogfight with the Zeke 52.Do not try to follow a loop or half-roll with pull-throu gh.Wh en attacking, use your superior power and high-speed performance to engage at the most favourable moment.To evade a Zeke 52 on your tail, roll and dive away into a high- speed turn.

How they Compare d:

No rth American P-5 I B .\ Iu sta ng versus 2'lesserschmitt Bf 109G

Maximum speed The Mustang is faster at all heigh ts. Its best heights, by comparison, are below 16,000ft (4,900m)where it is 30mp h (SOlan/h) faster , approximate ly, and above 25,000ft (7,600m) where it is 30mph faster, increas­ing to 50mph at 30,000 ft (80km/h at 9, 100m).

M aximum climb T his is rather similar.T he ,\ Ius tang is very slightly better above 25,000ft but inclined to be worsebelow 20,000ft (6, 100m) .

Zoom climb The Me 109G appears to have a very good high- speed climb , making the two aircraft simila r in azoom climb.

Dice On the other hand , in defence the Mustang can still increase the range in a prolonged d ive,Turning circle T he Mustang is greatly supe rior.Rate of roll Not mu ch to choose , In defence (in a tight spot) a rap id change of direction "ill throw the Me I 09G's

sight off.This is because the 109G 's maximum rate of roll is embarrassi ng (the slots keep ope ning).Conclusions In attack, the ,\ Iustang can always catc h the Me 109G, except in any sort of climb (unless there is a

high overtaking speed) . In defe nce, a steep tu rn should be the first manoeuvr e, followed, if necessary, by a dive (below20,000ft) . A high-speed climb will unfortunately not increase the range . If above 25,000ft keep above by climbin g orall-out level fligh t.

How they Compared:

Grumman F6F-5 Hellcat and Vought F4U-ID Co rsair versus .\ Iitsub ishi A6.\ 15 'Zeke 52'

F6F-5The F6F ranged from 25mph (40km/h) faster at sea level to 75mph (120km/h) faster at 25,000ft (7 ,600m). In theclimb the Model 52 was superior below 14,000ft (4,250m) , at altitudes above that the F6F was superior. Below230mph (370km/h) the rate of roll of the two fight ers was similar, above that speed the F6F was mu ch the better.Below 200mph (322km/h) the M odel 52 was far more manoeuvrable than the F6F, while above 230mph (370km/h)the F6F was the more manoeu vr able.

continued

74

To fight by nig htIn this section we shall exa mine the evolution of a qu itedifferent genre of fight er that emerg ed during theSecond World War : the nightfighter.

In May 1941 the German night blitz on Britain endedas the bulk of the Luftwaffe moved east for the attack onthe Sovi et Union . The damagi ng raids on the cities hadforced the RAF to give the highes t priority to developi ngmeans to counte r the night raider. As a result, when theblitz ended, Britain possessed the only really effectivenight air defence system anywhere. Borne of trial anderro r, foresight and mu ch hard work , the elements ofthat system remained in place for the rest of the war.

Before describing the nighrfighters themselves, it isimportant to understand how they fitted into the system.For, com pared with day fighting, night fighting wasmore of a team effort. As during a dayligh t interceptionprocess, the long-range, low-precision Chain Hom eradar provided early warn ing of the approach of raiders.This enabled nighrfight ers to take off in good time andhead for the general area under threat. When the raider s

The B ristol Beaufighter, uhen fitted with A I M ark I V radar,was the most effective nightfighter ofa/l ill the late spring of/ 94/ .

75

neared the coast they came within range of one or moreof the med ium-range, medium precision GroundCo ntrolled Interception (G C I) radars. GCI operators'ta lked' the night fighter pilot to a point in the sky abouttwo miles behind the bomber and at the same altitude.That put the bomber in the field of view of thenightfighter's short-range, high precision AirborneInterception (AI) rada r. When the fighter's radar opera ­tor had the bomber on his screen, he 'ta lked' the pilotinto a position where the latter had visua l contact withthe prey. Fro m there on the pilot carried out a visual at­tack, usually closing to short range - about fifty yards _before opening fire.

To operate within this system, the nighrfight er re­qu ired attributes different from those of the day fighter.It ideally needed a roomy fuselage to accommodate theAI radar and its operator, armament powerful enough todes troy or cripple a bomber wi th a few short bursts, and,since its patrols often lasted several hours, it needed amu ch longer endurance . Becau se of these requirementsa nightfighter needed to be a fairly large aircraft , whichmeant it required the power from two engines.

In mid-1 941 the most effective nighrfight er type inservice anywhe re was the RAF's Bristol Beaufighter.This two-seater carried an armament of four 20mm can­non an d six 0.303in machine-guns. On the power of two1,400hp Bristol Hercules engi nes it had a maximumspeed of about 300mph (about 480km/h). The AI M arkIV radar fined to the Beau fighter was a first -generationequipment , working on freq uencies in the 150 "1Hzband. The radar 's maximum range was just under threemiles (4.8km) or the figh ter's height above the ground,whichever was less.

The Beaufighter was not the only nighrfighter typethen in use by the RAJ'; as single-engined Hurricanesand Boulton Paul Defiants flew 'catseye' patrols,

AIR CRAFT OF THE SE C O:-:D WORLD \X'AR FI G li T ER D I' V I' L OP M 1':-:T .•\1 I D - 1 9 ~ 1 'I' 0 MID - I 94 5

RAF Xightfighters Figures for initia l production version ofeach Iype

Type Entered service Engine power Max. speed Weight (normal loaded) Radar range

Bristol Sep 1940 2 x 300mph 20,800l b 3 milesBeaufighter I 1,400hp 480krn/h 9,433kg 4.8km

De Havilland Mar 1942 2 x 370mph 18,547Ib 3 milesMosquito" 1,480h p 596km/h 8,4 l lkg 4.8km

Mosqui to 30 Apr 1944 2 x 424mph 21,7151b 10 miles1,690h p 682krn/h 9,848kg 16km

....'~ ~ I

The Boulton Paul Defi ant, pressed into lise as a night fighter, carried its four -gun armament in a /IIrrel mounted behind thecockpit. The type wasJar less effectite than the Beaufighter, houever.

A de Hauilland M osquito 30 oj No 85 S quadron, olle oj the units assigned 10 No 100 Group, tcarming its engines beforelake-off ill the scinter of 1944/5.

'Giant Wtirzburg' gro und radars and the Lichtensteinairborne equipment. At the end of July 1943 RAFbombers began dropping large quantities of Window tofill the German radar screens with hundreds of false tar­gets.

With the Hirnrnelbett system of close ground controlneutralised, the Luftwaffe was forced to make a radicalchange in tactics. As a temporary expedient it employedsingle-engined fighters at night , flying catseye patrols.

For twin-engined nightfighters the Luftwaffe intro­duced a new system of control. As the incoming raidingforce was detected on early-warn ing radar (the long­wavelength sets were not affected by this type ofWind ow), scores of nightfighter s took off and assembledover designated radio beacons. Then, operating underradio broadcast control, the packs of nightfighters weredirected to fly from beacon to beacon to br ing them pro­gressively closer to the bombers. From there they'ste pped off to join the stream, the crews searching forthe bomb ers visually and with radar. T hroughout thistime the fighter controllers broadcas t a running com­mentary on the progress of the bomber stream. The aimwas to set up long-running battles lasting throughoutthe time the bomb ers were over Ge rma ny or occupiedterri tor y.

In the autum n of 1943 the Luftwaffe introdu ced anew AI radar, the 'SN-2', with a range of four miles.Thisoperated on frequencies in the 90 Ml-lz band , and itslonger wavelength rend ered it almost immune to thetypes of Wind ow then in use. Also, to assist in locatingbomber streams at long range, German nightfighterscarried 'Naxos' and 'Flensburg' equipment to home , re­spectively, on emissions from the 'H,S' bombing radarand the 'Mo nica' tail warn ing radar.

A fur ther innovation at this time was the fitting of theso-called 'schrage Mu sik' installation in some night­fighters: one or two 20mm cannon in the cockpit or rearfuselage firing upwards at an angle of 60°. T his enabled

A M esserschmiu BJ 1lOG nightfighter, fined unth aLichtenstein radar aerial array on the nose.

By the time the Bf I IOF was in large-scale service,several RAF nightfighter squadrons had re-equip pedwith the faster and more effective Mosquit o II. Initiallythese types operate d only in the home defence role, how­ever, so the lower perform ance of the Messerschmin wasnot an importa nt factor .

The so-called 'Hirnmelbeu' system of close controlfor Luftwaffe nightfighters was more rigid than that usedin Britain. It employed a line of gro und radar stations inFrance, Belgium , Holland , northern Ge rmany andDenmark. T hese formed a barr ier through which theraiding forces had to pass, to reach their targets inGerma ny. Individual Luftwaffe nightfighter un its operat­ed with the same few ground control stations, each timethey went into action. Aircraft rarely ventured more than100km (60 miles) from their base airfields, and the Bf110 was quite adequate for this relatively und emandingtask. Op erating in this way, the Germa n nightfightercaused heavy attrition among RAF raiding forces.

Had matt ers been allowed to continue, the Himmel­ben system might have remained in use for the rest ofthe war, bu t the RAF produc ed a countermeasure in theform of 'Window' (now called 'Chaff) , aluminium foilstrips measur ing 30cm long and just over 1.5cm wide.T hese str ips were designed to jam the precision radarson which Himmelbett depended, the 'Wtirzb urg' and

In building up the nightfighter defences of Ge rmanythe Luftwaffe trod a generally similar path to that takenby the RAE Because initially the pressures were less,however, the process took a bit longer. After much trialand error the Luftwaffe developed its own technique foran 'all-radar' interception, having also found the catseyenightfighti ng methods to be relatively ineffective. In1942 the main German nightfighter type was theMesserschmitt Bf II OF, with a perform ance genera llysimilar to that of the Beaufighter I.T his three-seater car­ried an armament of two 20mm cannon and four 7.9mmmachine-guns. On the power of two 1,350hp DaimlerBenz DB 60 I engines the German fighter had a maxi­mum speed of about 500krn/h (3 10mph) . Its'Lichtenstein' AI radar worked in the frequencies in the440 ,\ IHz band and it had a similar perform ance to theBritish AI Mark IV.

attempting to engage enemy bombers illuminated forthem by searchlights or found visually. A two-seater, theDefiant carried its armament of four 0.303-in machine­guns in a power operated turret mounte d behind thepilot's cockpit. Since it lacked AI radar, the Hurricanecould not achieve mu ch at night , although AI sets werefitted in Defiants which served in this role until mid­1942.

The next significant nightfighter type to enter servicein the RAF, at the beginning of 1942, was the Mosquito.It had its share of teething troubles, but within a fewmonth s these were sorted out. The Mark" version car­ried the same type of radar and a similar armament tothe Beaufighter. Its maximum speed was 370mph(596krn/h) . As the war progressed the Mosquito, laterfitted with more advanced types of radar , equipped theentire RAF nightfighter force.

76 77

AIR CRAF T O F THE S E C OSO \X' ORLO WAR 1'1 G H T E R O E v E L OP .\ 1EST. .\l I 0 - I 9 ~ I T O .\ 110 - I 9 ~ 5

Spitfire IXs of No 73 Squadron, each carrying m'o 250pounders, laxy 011/ for a dive-bombing sortie at their base atP rkos in Yugoslav ia.

chosen targets proved to be difficult under operationalconditions, If a fighte r-bomber delivered a low-a ltitudehori zontal attac k from around 60ft (18m), its bo mbsneeded a fusing delay of at least ten seconds after im­pact. Othe rwise the aircraft was liable to suffer splin terdam age - or worse - when they detonated, Such an at­tack could be effective only agains t a target bulky enoug hto stop a bomb ram ming into it at speeds up to 300 mph(480km/h) , and those were rare, espec ially in a battlearea . If the bomb failed to stop at the target , the rest ofits travel was fraught with unpredictabilities. During oneRAF trial, fighter -bombers flying at 300mph (480km/h)released 2501b ( I I Okg) bombs from 60ft (18m) , aimingat vehicle targets on flat ground. Cine phot ography re­vealed cases where, afte r striking the ground, bombsbounced to Nice the height of the releasing aircraft andoften maintained disco ncertingly close formati on on it.During the ten seconds following the initial impact thesebombs continued on, often tumbling end over end acrossthe grou nd, as they exhausted their huge momentum.The distance they covered varied greatly, depe nding onthe type of surface. In some cases the bombs finally came10 rest more than half a mile (800m) from their initialpoint of impact (fortu nately for the peop le involved inthe tria l, the bombs were not livcl) .

High-altitud e hori zon tal attacks by single-enginedfighter-bombers were even less accurate. Such aircraftusually had the cockpit over the wing, which meant thatthe pilot 's view downward s varied between poo r andnon- existent . Since he could not see the target at the timeof release, it was impossible to aim the weapons using abombsight. T his type of attack could have only a nui­sance value .

T he only reasonab ly effective method of attack avail­able to the fighter-bomber, when it carried normal types

the side with the better electro nic equip men t and thecrews best able to use it effec tively.Throughou t the warthe RAF and the Luftwaffe remained the main players inthe night air defence battle . Although the other comes­tams also dabbled in this art, none of them was able toachieve any great success at it.

A 250lb (f 13kg) bomb mounted on the wing rack of aSpitfire.

The rise of the fighter-bomberThe Luftwaffe pionee red the usc of fighter-bombe rs, in­terceptor fighter s fitted with bomb racks, during theBattle of Britain in 1940, when it sent Messerschmilt Bf109s and Bf II Os to carry out small-scale attacks on tar­gets in southern England. There were obvious adva n­tages to using fighters in this way. They arc muchcheaper than bombers and they req uired a smaller crew.In engi neering term s the installation of bomb racks wasa relatively simple matter. Once the aircraft had releasedits bombs it could revert to the fighter role and it was wellable to take care of itself in combat. In speed and altitud eperformance the fighter -bomber was far superior tomost of the speciali sed bomber types . Indeed, if it wasnot possible to establish temp orary air supe riority over atarget area, the fighter-bomber offered the only chanceof delivering attacks without incurring prohibitive losses.

These clear advantage s tended to blind people to theshortcomings of the fighter-bomber, however.These air­craft carried a relatively small weight of bombs , and ifthe latter were to have any useful effect they needed to bedelivered with great accuracy, Moreover, since the car­riage of bombs usually preclud ed the use of drop tanks,the radiu s of action of fight er-bombers was usuallyrather short.

Initially the fighter-bombers carried normal types ofbombs weighing around 250 or 500lb (around 110 or250kg). Getting these weapons to explode close to the

A J Ullkers J u 88G nightfighter unth SN 2 rada r aerials 011the 1I0se and Flensburg homer aerials mounted 011 the lead­ing edges of the unngs.

fighter versions of the Jun kers ju 88. Larger and morepowerful than the Bf 110, the Ju 88G had a loadedweight of 13,000kg (28,900lb) and a maximum speed of622km/h (389mph) .

The thrust, par ry and counterth rus t battle of thenight war over Ge rmany did not end there, however. Inmid-1 944 No 100 Group of RAF Bomber Co mma ndbegan operations in support of the night bombing raids.As well as using specia lised jamming aircraft to disruptthe Ge rman radar network, the G roup employed sixsquadrons of Mosquito night fighters to harass thei rGe rma n counterparts in the air and on the ground .

During the final months of the war the MosquitoMark 30 was, by a wide margin, the most effectivenightfighter type in service anywhere. Its maximumspeed was 424m ph (678km/h) and it carried the latest AIMark 10 centimetric-wavelength radar , with a range ofup to ten miles (l6km). The Mosqu itoes of No 100G roup had to searc h for the Germa n nightfighters in asky full of friendly bom bers, but homing on radar emis­sions from enemy aircraft was a game that two couldplay. The RAF fighters carr ied the 'Serrate' and'Perfectos' equiprnents to enable them to home , respec­tively, on emiss ions from the SN-2 radar and the IFFsets car ried by their prey.

The nightfighters' war lacked the panache and spec­tacle of that fought by day. Single nightfighters stalkedindividual bombe rs and, later , individu al ene mynightfighters. Success in this type of action often went to

Luftwaffe Ni ghtfighters Figures fo r initial production version of each Iype

Type Entered service Engine power .\ lax, speed \X'eighl (normal loaded) Radar range

,\ Iesserschmilt Aug 194 2 2 x 500km/h 9,285kg 4.8kmsr 1101'-4 1,350hp 310mph 20,4741b 3 miles

Junkers OCI 1944 2 x 626km/h 13,106kg 4.8kmIu 88G-6 1,608hp 389mph 28,900lb 3 miles

the fighter to engage the bomber from below, from out ­side the field of fire of its rear gunner.

The new nightfighting tactics were challenging forthe Bf 110; when fitted with all of the extra new equip­ment , plu s externa l tanks to give it the necessary extraendura nce, it suffered a major drop in performance. Itwas not fast enough for the long pursuit opera tions thatwere now the orde r of the day - but it rema ined in ser­vice. So me units began to re-equip with the latest night-

Dnncing shounng the layout of the schrage Musit: upuard­fi ring call11011 installation filled 10 the Bf I 10 night fighter,unth lu'O 20", 111 catl1l01l.

78 79

AIRCRAF T OF TilE SECO:-;D WORLD \,'AR 1'1 G ilT E R D E v E L OI''\\ E :-;T, ,XI I D - 1 9 ~ 1 TO .\ \ I D - 1 9 ~ 5

During the war the air-launched rocket was touted asa highly effective weapon for use against tanks. T heHawker Typhoon, the main RAF fighter-bomber type toemploy this weapon in the ground-a ttack role, carriedeight of them on laun ching rails under the wings. Whenemployed against ground targets, the British 3in rocketcarr ied a 601b (27kg) warhead conta ining 171b (7.7kg)of high explosive. After launch the rocket acceleratedrap idly. It reached its maximum speed of about 1,000mph (1,600kmlh) in 1.5 seconds, having covered about550 yards (500m). At that point the motor burned outand from then on the missile lost speed rapidly owing toair resistance. During a typical rocket attack theTyphoon established itself in a 30° dive and fired theprojectiles from a range of 1,000 yards (900m) . T heaeroplane's dive angle and firing range were critical, andrequired very fine judgement at the time when the pilotmight himself be under fire. Even slight deviations fromthe ideal would cause fairly large miss distances at thetarget. If the reflector sight was set up for the abovefigures and rockets were fired in a 27° dive from 1,150yards (l,035m), the erro rs amounted to only 3° in angleand 15 per cent in range, yet they would cause the rock­ets to impact 17 yards (15m) short of the target, farenough to allow an armoured vehicle to escape withoutserious damage.

Despite the enthusiastic claims made for it at the time(and later), there is clear evidence that dur ing theSecond World War the air-launched rocket projectile wasnot very effective against tanks or arm oured vehicles.The weapon was just not accurate enough. According toRAF record s on operational rocket str ikes during 1945,the chance of scoring at least one hit on a tank from eightrockets was a derisor y two per cent. The M .I O rocketscarried by USAAF fighter-bomb ers perform ed no betteragainst tanks. That said, the rockets were very effectiveagainst unarmoured vehicles, artillery positions andother soft targets where a ncar-mi ss could cause seriousdamage. And against large targets such as U-boats orships, salvoes of rockets were often lethal.

.-

gun. From the summer of 1942 the Luftwaffe madelarge-sca le usc of SD 2s as cluster mun itions.

Tanks were among the most difficult targets for airattac k, being small and often well armoured. It requireda direct hit, or else a very near miss with quite a largewarhead, to put them out of action. Ge nerally speakingany weapon carried by a fighter that was accurateenough to have a good chance of hitting a tank, for ex­ample a 20mm cannon, was insufficiently powerful todestroy it, and any weapon powerful enough to destroy atank, for example a bomb of 50kg (l IOlb) or larger, wasinsufficiently accurate to stand much chance of hitting it.

The first serious attemp t to break out of that circle,using a converted fighter type, came with the introduc­tion of the Hurricane M ark lID. This aircraft carried aVickers 'S ' 40mm cann on under each wing and two0.303 in mach ine-guns loaded with tracer ammunition toassist aiming.The pilot approa ched the tank flying hori­zonta lly at a height of about 50ft at 240mph (about 15mat 385kmJh), and commenced firing at 600 yards(540m). The cannon were single-shot weapons, andeach loosed off a round with each press of the firing but­ton. A well-practised pilot could get off ten pairs ofaimed rounds during the firing pass.

The Hurricane lID was at its most effective againsttanks that had broken through a defensive line and hadoutrun their AA gun protection . In North Africa, wherethe Hurricane lID first saw action, such conditions oc­curred rarely after the summer of 1942. Certainly it wasreassuring for the army commander to know that he hadthis capability on call, however, in case such an emer­gency should arise. If they went against tanks in a defen­sive position with AA protection , the low-flyingHurricanes often suffered heavy losses.

At the end of 1942 the Ge rman Army introduced itspowerful new Panzer VI (T iger) tank, much of whosethick armour was impervious to rounds from theVickersS gun.Thereafter the RAF lost interest in the heavy can­non as an anti-tank weapon, in favour of the rocket pro­jectile.

To increase the effectiveness of the low-flying fighter­bomber, specialised weapons were needed. In June 1941the Luftwaffe introduced the first of these, the SD 2 anti­personnel bomb, weighing only 2kg (4.4lb). Althoughthe weapon proved extremely successful againstbattlefield targets and aircraft on the ground, theLuftwaffe soon discovered that it had a serious short­coming. Occasionally a bomblet failed to leave its con­tainer and remained lodged in place, and the crew of theaeroplane had no way of knowing it. \X'h en the aircraftland ed, the jolt freed the weapon , which then dropped tothe ground and deton ated on the runway. After severalGerm an aircraft were destroyed or damaged in this way,the SD 2 was withdrawn from service until a solutionwas found.

T he answer was to fit the SD 2s into a streamlinedcontainer that could be aimed and dropped in the sameway as a norm al bomb. Once it was safely clear of theaircraft, the container split open along its length to dis­gorge its load of bomblets. Thus was born the firstcluster-bomb , a weapon designed to produc e an area ofdestru ction on the ground rather like the blast of a shot-

An AB 250 cluster-bomb being loaded on the bomb rack ofa Fw 190. This container could hold I/P to ninety-sixSD 2 bomblets.

The SD 2 fragmenta­tion bomb, weighing 2kg(4.4lb), was thefirs t free­fa ll ueapon specially de­signed for release f romloui-flying aircraft.Afterrelease the bomb's casing

opened to form 'wings', causing it to decelerate rapidly anddescend to the ground relatively slowly.

The SD 2 Fragmentation Bomb

The SD 2 fragmentation bomb weighed only 2kg (4.4lb) , and was much smaller than any air-dropped weaponpreviously in general use in the Second World War. In the stowed conditi on the weapon was a cylinder 7.5cm (3in)in diameter and 9cm (3Y2in) long - about the size of a small beer can. After release, the bomb's casing opened to form'wings' which caused it to decelerate rapidl y. It then descended to the ground relatively slowly.

The SD 2 bomblets were carried in special containers which fitted on the aeroplane's normal bomb racks. Thetype of container carried by the Bf 109 held 96 of these bomblets, while that fitted to the Bf 110 held 360.

Designed for release during low-altitude attacks, the SD-2 was highly effective against 'soft skinned' vehicles,troops and aircraft on the ground. From the attacker's point of view there were several advantages to releasing a largenumber of small bombs rather than one or two large ones. The rapid deceleration of the SD -2 after release, and itssmall explosive charge, meant that when the weapon detonated the fighter-b omber was safely clear of any flyingsplinters. Also, since it could be delivered in low-altitude attacks, the SD 2s could be laid very accurately across smalltargets.

of bomb, was to release the weapons in a dive, but theaccuracy of such attacks compared poorly with those bypurpose-built dive-bombers. Almost all the interceptorfighters converted to this role lacked dive brakes, so intheir dives they gained speed rapidly. Even in a relative­ly shallow dive of 60° they built up speed rapidl y andoften exceeded 450mph (725kmlh). Because of theirhigh diving speed, and because their airfram es were notstressed for a tight pull-out manoeuvre, fighter-bombersusually released their bombs from altitud es above4,000ft ( I,200m) . Even when flown by well-trainedpilots, the accuracy of attack of a converted fighter wasconsiderably less than that by a specialised dive-bombertype. The latter delivered its bombs flying steeper andslower, and bomb release was at about 2,000ft (about600m) . This is not to say that fighter-b omb ers did notcarry out many effective attacks using normal bombs,but it requir ed more aircraft and many more bombs thanif a specialised dive bomber had done the job. Of coursethe spec ialised dive-bomber was far more vulnerable tofighter attack than a fighter-bomber, but in this businessone cann ot have everything.

Hatcher Hurricane lID delivers a training attack on a tank with its 40mm cannon . The need to make a straight-and-levelfiring rllll at very low altitude made the aircraft ext remely uulnerable toAAfire.

80 81

AIR CR A F T OF T il E S E C O:-: D \X'ORL D \X' AR 1' 1GilT E R DE v E L 0 I' ,\ 1 E :-:T, ,\ 1 I D - I 9 ~ 1 TO ,\ 1 1 D - 1 9 ~ 5

Flam e belches f rom the rear of a Jllmo 004 turbojet £III ringstart-up. This temperamental engine, nco of tchich poueredthe ,lIe 262, required ca refu l handling in fiight or it U'tlS li­able 10 flame-out or catch fi re.

tu rboje ts, both aircraft employed two eng ines . O f the twofighte rs , thc M c 262 was thc more adva nced , It had anexcellent perfor man ce when the engines develop ed theirfull thrust, bu t they did not do so for long (see box over­Icaf 'G erman Problems with the T ur bo jet Engi ne') . In anew con dition cac h of the two [umo 00 4 turbojets deliv­crcd 900kg ( 1,9801b) of thrust, giving thc fighter a max­imum speed of 8 70km/h (540mph) . Its nearest Alliedrival , the ,\lctcor I, was powered by two I, 700lb (77 0kg)thrust Rolls-R oyce W2B/23 eng ines and had a maxi­mum speed of 4 10m ph (660km/h) .

In the spring of 1943 Lu ftwaffe senio r officers re­garded thc M c 262 as an int eresting novelty, but onc thatme t no immedi ate need , ' Inc main ba ttlefronts were inN orth Africa and thc Soviet Union, and from timc totimc the re were daylight attacks on periph eral targets inGermany, Provided the re were eno ugh of them ava ilable,the latest versions of the Fw 190 an d the Bf 109were wcll ablc to dcal with thc cne my air opposition.

Atthough its ex ternal appearance was similar 10 the fighterversion, the Fw 1901' u'as extensive ly modified for theground-auach role, This draw ing shozcs the additional ar­mOllr filled along the underside and sides of the fus elage andon each side of the cockpit,

The M esscrschmiu ,lIe 262 ' m s the most effectice jet figluertype 10 enter service in the Second IIv rJdIl'u r, bill du e 10 theshort runn ing life of its engines it was able 10 achiere lillie.

Ente r th e jet fighterBy the spring of 194 3 two fighter types powered byturbojet engines were und ergoin g tests , thc Ge rman,\ Iessc rsc hmitt ,\ Ie 262 and thc Briti sh G loste r ,\ Ic teo r I.Owing to thc low powcr le\ 'els gcne ratcd by thc carly

A Gloster ,lIeteor I filled ,citli a belly tank 10 increase its range.

low altitude, making it the fastest arm oured attack air­craft of thc Sec ond \Vorld \Var. Such was thc importa nceof this aircraft that, despite the competing requirem entfor fighters , d uring 1944 mo rc than a third of all Fw190s were built as grou nd-attack variants. In thc closi ngstag es of the war the Fw 19010 went into ac tion ca rryingtwelve 8c m 'Panze rblirz' air- to-g round rockets, There isno evidence tha t these prove d any more effective aga instar moured vehicles than their British or Americancounterparts.

In the next sectio n we shall exa mi ne thc devel opmentand service careers of the fina l generati on of fightc r dc­signs in thc Sccond \X'orld \X'ar, thosc powercd by tu rbo­jct cngincs and roc kcts,

77,e Focke- 1I';lif Fw 1901' was tlie fa stest armoured groulldallack aeroplalle of tlie S ecolld lI'orld Il'ur, Tliis example fromS clilacillgescliu'tlder 2, based at S opoc, HUllgary , ill Jalluary1945, carries W I AB 250 cluster-bomb cOlI/ailler IInder tlieft lselage.

One prob lem co mmon to all converted interceptorfighters operating in the fighter-bomber rolc was thatmost of their protective armour was in the wrong place.Air superiority fighters did not carry mu ch armour, andmost of it was positioned be hind thc pilot to give protec­tion agains t rounds fro m ene my fight er s atta ckin g fro mbehind . Also, in front of his head , there was a tough enedglass windscreen to give protection from rou nds from abomber's rear guns. During a low- level attack on agro un d target, however, the ene my rou nds usually carnefro m below an d fro m ahead or the sides. The norm al ar­mour fittcd to a fightcr affordcd littlc p rotcction aga instthcsc.

' Inc Fockc-Wul f lOw 1 901 ~ thc ma in ground-attack\'cr sion of thc fam ou s Gc rman fightcr, was onc of thcfincst gro und-attac k air craft of thc Sccond World War.Although in its cx tc rnal appcarancc it was littlc diffcrcntfrom thc fightc r \'crsion , intcrn ally it had importantcha ngcs .' Ib su it it for thc low-Ic\'el, ground -attack rolc itcarricd about 360kg (abo ut 800lb) of armour along thcundcrside and lowcr sidcs of thc fusclagc , and cach sidcof thc cockpiL' Inus thc pilot and thc intcrnal fucl tankswcrc wcll pro tcctcd aga inst rounds co ming from ahcadand bclow. At thc front of thc acroplanc thc ruggcd air ­coolcd 131\1\'\' 801 cng inc ga\'c addcd p rot cction to thcpilot , and it co uld takc hcavy battl c dam agc and conti n­uc to run .'ln c lOw 19010 ca rricd two 20mm cannon andtwo 13mm machinc -guns, plu s an ordnancc load of upto 550 kg ( 1, 100Ib) of bo mbs. Its maximum spccd carry ­ing full ord nancc load was ab out 520km/h (325mph) at

A Hascker Typhoon of No 198 Squadron.fitted tcith eight 60 lb rockets, taxies 011I at W I airst rip ill northern France ill 1944 .Although the rockets tcere effcaivc against soft ta rgets, they u'cre 1I0t accurate enough 10 hare a good chance of scoring a directhit 011 a tank.

82 8 3

AIR CRAF T O F T ilE S E C O:-: D \X· ORI.D " 'AR F IG II T E R DE\' E I. 0 1'.\\ E :-:T . ~\ I D - 1 94 1 TO .\\ I I) - I 94 5

Ir"a ring a special sllit to give protection from call/act u'ith the volatile T-Stoff fllel, a pilot boards a i\lesserschmill Ale 163.The small dimensions of the rocket-powered fig hter are readily apparell/ in this photo.

Moreoyer these rugged and well-proven machines couldoperate from primitive forwa rd airfields and were easy 10

maintain in action. Any diversion of industri al resources10 build ict fighter s would be at the expense of the con­ventiona l fighter types the Luftwaffe really needed. Inthe type of war then being fought, what use was a tern­peramental, if fast, short-range iet fighter that requi redlong runways and constant nursing from its ma intenance

Rationale for the Turbojet Engine in Fighters

The concept of the tu rbojet engine had been known asan engineering possibility since the early part of thetwentieth centu ry, bUI not un til the late 1930s did workbegin 10 produce a practical unit of this type 10 poweraircraft, The main facto r driving the work in this fieldwas the dawnin g realisation, in several countries , tha tthere was a finite limit 10 the maximum speed that anaircraft could attain on the power from a piston enginedriving a propeller. That limit, imposed by the im­mut able laws of physics, lay somewhere very close to500mph (80 5km/h ).

The problem centred on the use of the propeller 10

convert the engine's ro tational power into thrust. As theaircra ft's forward speed neared 500 mph, the efficiencyof the prop eller fell away drastically. A few figures willserve 10 illustrate the point . In round terms, the Spi tfireMark I attained a maximum speed of about 300 mph(about 480km/h ) at sea level on the 1,000 or so horse­power from its Merlin engine . At that speed the pro­peller was about 80 per cen t efficient, and the 1,0001b(450kg) of thrust thus produced equalled the dragfrom the fighter's airframe .

Now consider the engine power that would be need­ed to propel the Spitfire at mi ce that speed, 600 mph(960km/h) . Drag rises wi th the square of speed, so ifthe speed is doubled the drag is quadrupled .Thus the1,000lb of drag at 300 mph becomes 4,0001b ( I ,8 14kg)of drag at 600mph. To overco me that amount of dragthe aircraft would need 4,000lb of thrust, But at600 mph the efficiency of the prop eller was reduced toabo ut 50 per cenl, so to driye the aircraft at tha I speedwould haye req uired a pislOn engine deyelop ing aboul12,000hp. During the Second World War the besl pis­ton engines produced a fraction oyer one horsepowerfor each pound of weight. Thus the piston engine need­ed to propel our notional fighter at 600 mph would hayeweighed about I I ,OOOlb (4,990kg), about double theall-up weight of the early production Spitfire. For high­speed flight the rurbojet was a far more efficient powerunit than the pislOn engine. The former produced itsoutput in the form of thrusl, without the conyersionlosses caused by the propeller.

crews? Nevertheless, to keep abreast of the latest tech­nological development s, the Luftwaffe placed an orderfor thirty pre-production .\ Ie 262s .

Interestingly, RAF senior officers felt the same wayabout the Meteor when it was first considered for pro­duction .The early British iet engines were more reliableand had longer running lives than their German coun­terparts, but as yet the Servi ce had no requirement foran aircraft with the .\ teteor's unique capabilities. Ea rly in1943 the Minisrry of Aircraft Production producedcomparative performance curves for versions of the.\ ieteor planned to appear in 1944, and the M k 21Spitfire sched uled 10 appear at the same time . These

Germ an Probl em s with the Turbojet Engine

The problem facing the designers of the early turbojetengines was that these ran at far higher temperatures,and at mu ch greater rotational speeds, than previousaircra ft engines. In Germany these difficulties were ex­acerbated by shortages of nickel, chro mium and othe rsteel-hardening ores needed in the production of high­temperature-resistant alloys. Because of this, Junkersengineers had 10 develop substi rute materials for use inthe critica l parts of the jumo 004.

The hottest part of the tu rboiet is inside the flam erubes. An ideal material for these would have been anickel-chrom e-steel alloy with small amounts of silicon,manganese and titanium as hardening elements, In thej urno 004, however, the flames rubes were fashionedfrom mild steel sheet and had a spray coating of alu­minium baked in an oven 10 prevent oxidatio n.This in­elegant material did not survive long at extre metemperatures . As a result, th roughout the time the 004was running, its flame rubes were slowly buckling OUIof shape.

Another critical area was the rurbin e blades . Theseworked in temperatures often exceeding 700·C, andthe centrifugal forces imposed tremendous stresses onthe blades . The rurbine blades on the jumo 004 weremanufacrured from a steel-based alloy containing 30per cenl nickel and 15 per cenl chromiu m, which wasnOl up to the task. During running the blades deyel­oped 'creep', Ihat is to say Ihe metal deformed andslowly Ihe blades increased in length . Wh en blade'c reep' reached a laid-down limit the engine had to bechanged.

Curtailed by flame rube bu ckling and blad e 'creep ',the running life of pre-production Jumo 004 enginesrarely exceeded ten hours.The Me 262 then had to begrounded for an engine change. Production engineswere a little better in this respect, with a notional run­ning life of 25 hours - still a yery low figure.

showed that although the Meteor had a higher maximumspeed at the extremes of low and high altirude, this wasoffset by its inferior rate of climb and its relatively shortendurance and radiu s of action .The only role in whichthe .\ \c teor I was superior 10 the best piston-enginedfighter types was that of shor t-range daylight home de­fence interceptor, operating aga inst targets at very highor ver y low altirud e.The RAF had no requirement for anaircraft with those capabilities. Nobody doubled that thejet fighter had enormous potential , however, It was de­cided 10 continue development of the .\ Ieteor and get itready for production, in case the war took an unexpect­ed rum. Both in Ge rmany and Britain , the war took that'unexpected rum' much sooner than expected,

In the summer of 1943 US heavy bombers bega nmounting deep-penetration daylight attacks on targets inGerma ny itself, and escort fighter s accompa nied the mprogressively deeper into Germany. For the .\ Ie 262 thischange in the war situation bro ught about a reversa l ofits forrunes. \Vilh its excellent rum of speed and power­ful armament, the Me 262 was seen as a fine homedefence fighter. Su ddenly the Luftwaffe had a clear op­erational requirem ent for a fighter with those capabili­ties. In the summer of 1943 the Luftwaffe ordered the

.\ Ie 262 into large-scale production, confident thatJunkers would soon solve the jumo 004 rurboier's relia­bility problems. The schedule called for initial produc­tion aircraft to be appear in January 1944, with outputrising 10 sixty aircraft per month by the end of May.From now on the Me 262 was the while hope for the fu­turc of the Luftwaffe fighter forc e.

In Great Britain the mood changed jus t as abruptly,and at almost the same time . Disrurbing intelligence re­ports from Germany told of novel types of air weaponunder development there , including high-speed fighterspowered by turbojet engines and rockets. Following adirective from Prime .\ Iinister \'\' inston Churchill , theMeteor was ordered into production with an order for120 aircraft. Later this was increased 10 300.

Thus, by the beginning of 1944, the RAF and theLuftwaffe each had a turboiet-p owered fighter type inproduction . Both were ordered for use as home air de­fence fighters, however, so the chance of their meeting inaction was small (in fact , they never did). In the event,however , neither the M e 262 nor the Meteor was the firstjet-p ropelled fighte r to go int o action. T hat honour went10 the Messerschmin Me 163, a small rocket-prope lledtarget defe nce fighter. The development of the rocket

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AIRCRAFT OF T HE SE COJ'O \' ·ORI.O W A R 1'1 G ilT E R J) E v E I. 0 P .\ \ E J' T . .\ \ I 0 - 1 9 4 IT O .\ 1 1 J) - I 9 4 5

Trailing smoke from its exhaus t, all iHe 163 begins its take-off rlll/.

During the fi lial six months of the war the Lufttraffe had 110 shortage of M e 262 fig hters, bill prociding pilots icith adequatetraining and supporting the type ill service gave Set'ere problems.

types of attack weapon being developed in Germ any. On13 Jun e 1944 the first of these, the VI flying bomb ,went into action. Between then and the end of themonth more than 2,400 of these missiles were launchedagainst London . About a third of the flying bomb ssmashed into the City, where they cau sed widespreaddestruction .

Distinctly und erp owered , the Meteor I was certainlyno great performer, yet it had a significant advantageover the available piston-engined fighters. Between sealevel and 4,000ft (1,220m), the band of sky inhabited byflying bomb s, its maximum speed of 385mph (620km/h)was about 30mph (48km/h) faster than anything else.That was suffi cient to spell the differen ce between thesuccess and failure in the interception of a V1. A singlesquadron of Meteors was hastily formed and sent intoaction against the robot weapons. During August 1944the Meteors accounted for thirt een flying bomb s, mostof which fell to cann on fire. However, on one famou s oc­casion a Meteor with jammed guns man oeuvr ed intoformation alongside a VI and the pilot nud ged up theflying bomb's wing to flip it out of control. Towards theend of August Allied ground forces overran the VIlaunchin g sites in northern France, and the main bom­bardment end ed.

Me anwhile , what of the Me 262? In May 1944 , as ameans of countering the expected Allied seaborne inva­sion of north-west Euro pe, Adolf Hitler ordered that allnew Me 262s comin g off the produ ction line be modi­fied to serve as fighter-bomb ers rath er than fighters.Some writer s have made too much of this edict, asser ting

Probl ems Co m mon to all Early Turbojet-poweredAirc raft

All of the early turbojet engines were temperamentaland required very careful handling. Moreover, as speedwas reduced the ram effect of the air lessened and theengine's power dropped away. Once speed had fallenbeyond a certain point, for example on the landing ap­proach , the turbojet responded very slowly to anymovement of the throttle . In that event the pilot wascommitted to continuing the landing even if he hadmisjudged his approach. If he advanced the throttle sand tried to overshoo t, the aircraft was likely to strikethe ground before it gained sufficient speed to com­mence a climb away.This limitation became particular­ly important for the Luftwaffe during the final monthsof the war. Marauding Allied fighters often caughtGe rman jet fighters on the landing approach , wher ethey were unable to take any evasive action and fell aseasy prey.

Another problem with the early jet fighters was thatthey had a short endurance, of the order of 45 minutes.Since they cruised much faster than the piston-enginedmachines the pilots had flown previously, navigationwas far more difficult. Several of the early jets werewrecked because their pilots became lost, ran short offuel and were forced to bale out. Clearly, those early jetfighter s were not suitable mounts for inexp eriencedpilots.

rocket motor at full power for only four minutes. Oncethe fighter had reached its operational altitud e and ac­celerated to fightin g speed, the pilot would shut downthe motor and deliver his attack coasting along at highspeed. As the fighter slowed, the pilot fired the rocket inshort bur sts to restore his fighting speed. In this way hecould extend the Me 163's endurance at high altitude toabout eight minutes, giving the fighter an effective com­bat radius of action of about 40km (25 miles) from base.Becau se of the explosive nature of the "l-Stoff, it was im­portant to exhaust the fuel before landing, and the rocketfighter returned to base as a glider. However, as someMe 163 pilots discovered to their cost, gliding could bean unhealthy activity in areas where Americ an escortfighters were on the prowl.

The Me 163 had a sparkling speed and climbing per­formance, yet it operated too close to the limits of whatwas possible for it to achieve much in action . M oreover,the T-Stoff was rather too exciting for general serviceuse, and the fighter's formidable rate of fuel consump­tion gave it a very restricted radius of action . At the peakof its deployment there were just und er a hundred Me163s in service with two front-line Gruppen, yet therewere never more than thirty of them serviceable, and onno day did more than ten of the rocket fighter s go intoaction . On its most successful day the Me 163 shot downonly four enemy aircraft. In its service career lasting al­most a year, it is doubtful whether the rocket fighter ac­counted for more than sixteen enemy aircraft in total.

It will be remembered that the Meteor I had beenplaced in production to counter the threat from the novel

fighter outpaced that of the two turbojet powered types,and the ,'vIe 163 began flying practice interception sagainst Allied aircra ft in May 1944 .

Power for the Me 163 came from a Walter 509A bi­fuel rocket motor. This ran on two liquid chemical fuels,code-named "T-Stoff and 'CvStorf by the Germans. 'r­Stoff was highly concentrated hydrogen peroxide, an un­stable and highly corrosive compound liable to decom­pose on contact with copper, lead or almost anythingcombustible. When it decomp osed, the chemical pro­duced heat at a rate similar to that of gunpowder. Notleast of its unendearing qualitie s was that it would de­compose violently if it came into contact with humanflesh. At take-off the Me 163 carried more than 1.5tonnes of the vile liquid, which mu st have done little forthe pilot 's peace of mind. The other fuel carri ed by thefighter, C-Stoff, was a relatively stable combination ofmethyl alcohol, hydrazine hydrate and a little water. Thetwo fuels came together in the rocket 's combustionchamber in the ratio of about three parts of TiStoff toone part of C-Stoff.This cau sed a violent chemical reac­tion that produ ced a jet of superheated steam and nitro­gen with a velocity of 1,980m/sec (6,500ft/sec) and atemperature of 1,800°C. That gave a thrust of 1,700kg(3,750lb) .

When an Me 163 took off, just over half of its weightwas fuel. At full thrust the Walter 509A consumed about8kg (18Ib) of fuel per second. That was fifteen limes morethan a pair of contemporary turbojet engin es developingthe same level of thrust. Because of this voracious ap­petite , the Me 163 carried sufficient fuel to run the

86 87

A IR CRAFT O F TH E SE CO:---D ',X' OR!.D W AR F IG H T E R DE \' E L OP ,\ 1E :--- T , ,\11 D - I 9 ~ I TO ,\1 1D - I 9 ~ 5

Figu res for initial product ion cersion of each type

Several postwar writer s have derid ed Luftwaffeleaders for failing to get the Me 262 into large-scale

l otal Me 262s delivered tothe Luftwaffe by May 1945 : more than 1,200

Greatest number of Me 262fighters in service (April 1945): about 110

Greatest number of Me 262 fightersorties in a day (7 April 1945): 59

Greatest number of Me 262 victoriesin a day (3 1 March 1945): 16

for mass production , Nor did Adolf Hitler' s order re­garding the initial use of the Me 262 as a fighter-b ombercause any appreciable delay in the type's operational in­troducti on as a fighter. First and always, the main factor

(225km1h)(I 93km1h)( l 77km1h)( l 77km1h)(169km1h)(I36km1h)(112km1h)(I 45km1h)

140mph120mph110mphII0mph105mph85mph70mph90mph

During the Second World War the jet fighter types that went into action produced uniformly disappointing results interms of the num ber of enemy aircraft they shot down, However, there can be no doubt that, had the war continueda few month s longer, this pictu re would have changed radically. In 1946 the RAF flew a compara tive trial in whichit pitted a de Havilland Vampire I with a Go blin II engine against a Spitfire XIV, As has been seen elsewhere, theSpitfire XIV was one of the most effective piston-e ngined fighters at the end of the war. Yet as these excerpts fromthe official report show, the Vampire outclassed the Spitfire in every aspect of combat performance that really mat­tered ,

Maximllm level speed The Vampire is greatly superior in speed to the Spitfire XIV at all heights , Its speed advan­tage is shown below:

Altitudegro und level5,000ft (I,500m)

10,000ft (3,000m)15,000ft (4,600m)20,000ft (6,100m)25,000ft (7,600m)30,000ft (9,100m)40,000ft (12.200m)

A cceleration and deceleration With both aircraft in line-abreast formation at a speed of 200mph (322km1h) indi­cated, on the word 'Go' both engines were opened up to a maximum power simultaneous ly,The Spit fire initially drewahead, but after a period of approximately 25 seconds the Vampire gradually caught up and quickly accelerated pastthe Spitfire,T he rate of deceleration for the Spitfire is faster than the Vampire even when the Vampire uses its divebrakes.This shows that the Vampire's dive brakes are not as effective as they should be ,

Dive The two aircraft were put into a 40° dive in line-abreast formation with set throttles at a speed 250mph(indicated, 400kmlh),The Vampire rapidly drew ahead and kept gaining on the Spitfire . continued

De Havilland Vampire I versus Spitfire XIV

How they Compared:

The de Havilland lompire I jet fighter outclassed the Spitfi re XII~ olle of the best air superiority fig hters at the end of theS econd IfiJrld IIll r, ill almost eceryaspect of combat performance,

production early enough , Yet, as we have seen, if any­thing the producti on of the aircraft was initiated tooearly, and Me 262 airframes started coming off the as­sembly lines before the engine to power them was ready

4 x 30mm

4 x 20mm

2 x 30mm

Arm ament

4AI 7kg9,7401b

4,308kg9,500lb

11,800lb5,351kg

\"eight (normal loaded)

262's comb at career. In mid-October the Kommandowithdrew from operations so that its pilots could receivefurther training and its jet fighters could be modified,Nowotny had been given an impossible task; to intro­duc e a revolutionary new fighter into combat in an areawhere the enemy held almost total air superiority, Theunit's general level of training was low, and serviceabilityof the .\ Ie 262 was so poor that rarely could it put upmore than five aircraft at the same time,

By the beginn ing of 1945 ,\ Ie 262s were coming offthe assembly lines at a rate of about thirty-six per week,Following the earlier debacle it was decid ed that whenthe jet fighter next went into action it would do so instrength, as a fully working system and flown by fullytrained pilots, Owing to poor weather and the all­pervading Allied air superiority, however, pilot convcr­sion training in the wint er of 194415 took much longerthan expected, Only in February 1945 were the Me 262fighter unit s ready to re-enter the fray, and not until thefollowing month did they start to launch large-scaleattacks on American bombe r formations . During thefinal two months of the war the jet fighter units waged alosing battle against enemy air forces with vast nume ri­cal superi ority,The cold statistics highlight the Me 262'slack of effectiveness under such conditi ons:

-t l Om ph660kmlh

870km/h540mph

953km1h592mph

" lax , speed

Early Jet Fighters

Type Entered service Engine thru st

,\ lesserschmin Mar 1944 RocketMe 163B x 1,700kg

x 3,750lb

,\ lesserschmitt Apr 1944 TurbojetMe 262A 2 x 900kg

2 x 1,9841b

Gloster jut 1944 Turbojet,\ Ieteor I 2 x 1,700lb

2 x 770kg

that it played a serious part in delaying the Me 262'sentry into action as a fighter. In fact, the [umo 004 en­gine was still not reliable enough for the design to be'frozen' for large-sca le production. Although it causedconsternation in the Luftwaffe at the time, Hitler' s ordermade remarkably little difference,

In September 1944 Hitler rescinded his edict and ,coincidentally, the nominal running life of the jumo 004engine finally reached twenty-fi ve hour s. Its 'life' was stillpainfully short , but at last the turb ojet could enter massproduction,

At the end of September the Me 262 underwent itsfirst ope rational dep loyment as a fighter, whenKommando Nowotny deployed with twenty-three of thejets to airfields in northwest Germany. The ventureended in failure, Poor serviceabil ity dogged the jetfighter, imposing severe constraints on its effectiveness.Although the new production jumo 004 engines hadlonger nominal running lives than their predecessors,they still gave a lot of trouble , Also, the airframe of theMe 262 had its share of 'bugs' that needed to be ironedou!.

For their part, the Allied fighter pilots soon discov­ered the Achilles' heel of the jet fighter. If it could becaught flying at low speed, immediately after rake-off oron the landing approach , it was extremely vuln erable .Tocounter the jets, Allied fighters began mounting standingpatrols over the airfields they used ,

During just over a month of operations on the west­ern front, Kommando Nowotny claimed the destructionof four American heavy bombers, twelve fighters andthree reco nnaissance aircraft. In achieving this meagretotal, the unit lost seven Me 262s in combat, while sevenmore were destr oyed and nine damaged in accidents orfollowing technical failures, Worst of all, fighter aceMajor \Valter Nowotny, the unit 's commander, was killedin action , It had not been an auspicious start to the M e

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AIR CR AFT O F T ilE S E C O:-:D W ORI.D W AR

contin ued

Zoom climb T he Vampire and Spi tfire XIV in line-abreast formation were put into a ~5° dive . When a speed of~OOmph (ind icated , 6~~km/h) had bee n reached , a zoo m climb at fixed throttle settings was carried out at approxi­mately 50°. The Vam pire showed itself vastly supe rior and reached a height I ,000ft (300m) in excess of the altitudeof the Spitfire in a few seconds , and qui ckly increased its lead as the zoo m climb continued. The same procedure wascarried out at fu ll throttle settings and the Vampire's advantage was outstandingly marked.

Climb T he Spitfire XIV climbs approximately 1,000ft per minute (5.08m/sec) faster than the Vampi re up 10

20,000ft (6, 100m) .Turning circles The Vampire is superior 10 the Sp itfire XIV at all heights.T he two aircraft were flown in line-astern

formation .The Spitfire was positioned on the Vampire's tail. Both aircra ft tightened up 10 the minimum turning cir­cle with maximum power. It becam e apparent that the Vam pire was just ab le to keep inside the Sp itfire's turning cir­cles. After four or five turns the Vampire was able 10 position itself on the Spi tfire's tail so that a deflection shot wasposs ible. The wing loading of the Vampire is 33. lIb sq ft (1.39kg/m') compared with the Sp itfire XIV's 35. lIb sq ft(on the aircraft tested , 1,48 kg/m ' ) .

Rates of roll The Spitfire XIV has a faster rate of roll at all speeds .The higher the speed the faste r the Sp itfire rollsin compariso n with the Vampire. At speeds of 500mph (indicated , 805km/h) there is a feeling of overbalance andaileron sna tch when attempting to roll the Vampire.

Combat manoeuvrability The Vampire will ou trna nocuvre the Sp itfire type of aircraft at all height s, except for ini­tial acceleration at low speeds and in rolling. Du e 10 the Vampi re's mu ch higher speed and superior zoo m climb, theSpitfi re can gain no advantage by using its superior rate of climb in combat.

Benceen 1939 and 1941 the Heillkel He 1lIH "'as thel.ujucaffe 's principal medium bomber.

massive raids up on \'\'arsaw's worthwhile targets with lit­tle regard for collateral damage. Dornier D o 17s assistedothers attacking encircled Polish force s and carried outinterdiction raids. With German air superiority quicklyestablished, arm oured forces with air support raced for­ward in the first blitzkrieg; slowly the world came toterms with the fact that Germany had caused a majorwar. Cou ld it muster the resources and supplies neededto win? How could Britain be hit hard from theFatherland without long -range bombers? What about theRAF - was it really ab le to bomb Ge rma ny effectivelyfrom bases in Britain ?

The Briti sh ex per ienceBritain 's bomber force, quite different from tha t ofGe rmany, had been assembled to carry out a strategiccampaign inte nded to destroy the Ge rman capacity towage war and to help sink its navy, For those pu rposes itwas using long -range, mi n-engine bombers, and a sec­ond generation was emerging, bigge r and necessarilyfour-engined because pairs of available engines nolonger provided sufficient power. All would spe nd muchtime over hostile territory, and because long-durationfighters were not available, defensive gu ns in heavypower-operated turrets would, hopefully, fully protectthem. These tu rrets added no thing to offensive results,which was one reason why Germa n bom bers weregenerally defend ed by a few single or paired guns in lightmountings, usually manu ally trained .

At the outbreak of war Bomber Co mma nd 's sixVickers-Armstrongs \V'ellington squad rons were rearm ­ing with the M k Ia, fitted with Frazer-Nash two-gu n

4The Bomber Revolution

Th e Jllllkers JII 87B-2 of 1940, a traditional fo rm of'S/IIka'dive bomber.

M. J F B owyer

Wh en hostilities commenced in Sept ember 1939, it too khundreds of bom bers and thousand s of bombs to wrec ka major city. When hostilities ceased , one bomber usingone bomb could cripple, indeed almost destroy, an entirenation . Such was the bomber revoluti on,

Eleven minutes before Germany declared war onPoland, three Junkers Ju 87Bs of 3./StG I screameddown to pulverise the approaches to the river Vistula'sDirshau bridge . The brutish, spine ch illing Stuka terrorhad been unleashed to start what their crews termed 'theeasy war', only the weath er preventing the ir friends inHeinkels from smas hing \V'arsaw. However, they hadmiscalculated; in a year's time they would be fighting avery tough war with very inadequate bombers.

T he spatted-unde rcarr iage 4,350kg ( IO,OOOlb) ju 87Bcarried a 500kg ( 1, IOOIb) bomb on a cent reline crad le,sup pleme nted by four 50kg (l IOIb) bombs beneath eachwing, in which a 7.9mm (O.3in) M G 17 machin e-gunwas installed. All was finely tu ned in the most effective ,lightest mainstream bomber, which had a top speed ofabo ut 370km/h (230mph) at 4 ,115m (13,500ft) , and acruising speed of 187km/h at ~,572m (l 75mph at15,000ft) . A weakness the ju 87 shared with manyGe rman bombers was its limited fuel capacity, giving amere 595km (370 miles) normal range. That matteredlittle unt il the easy war turned hard and the dis tancesincreased .

In September 1939 nine Stuka G ru ppen nominallyfielded 335 aircraft - mostly j u 87 B- Is - which ruth­lessly dive-bombed Polish communications, preventingreinforcements from reac hing the front . Heinkel HeIII s, of which 800 were operational, soon carried out

Franci llon, R J, fopanese Aircraft of the Pacific Ifa r(Putnam, London , 1970) . Sta nda rd reference wor kon Japanese military aircraft du ring the Second\'\'orld War.

Price, A, Hie Spitfire Story (Arms & Armo ur Press,London, 2nd Edition 1995) . Detailed and compre­hensive account of the deve lopment of the Sp itfire.

Gunston, W, Aircraft of the Sooiet Union (Osprey,Londo n, 1983). Stand ard reference work on Sov ietaircraft from 191 7 to 1982 .

Price, A, Bailie over the Reich (Ian Allan , Shepperton ,1973) . Account of the air attacks on Ge rmany du r­ing the period 1939 to 19~5, and the deve lopment ofthe German air defence system.

Price, A, Blitz 0 11 Brita in (Ian Allan, Shepperton, 1977).Accou nt of the air attacks on Great Britain duringthe per iod 1939 to 1 9~5 , and the development of theBritish air defence syste m.

Price, A, Fighter Aircraft (Arms & Arm our Press,London , 1989) . Account of the development of theday fighter aircra ft before and during the SecondWorld War.

Green, W, Ifilrplalles of the S econd tfbrld tril r, Volu mes Ito ~ (M acdonald , London, 1961). Usefu l generalreference work on fighter aircraft during this period.

Green, W, Irarplalles of the 7711'rd Reich (,\ lacdonald ,Lon don, 1970) . A standard reference work onGe rma n aircraft before and duri ng the SecondWorld War.

Bibli ography

Ethe ll. ], and Price, A, IfiJrld lfilr II Fi ghting J els (Airlife,Shrewsbury, 199~). Account of the deve lop ment andservice careers of the nine jet-propelled aircraft thatentered servi ce befo re the end of the Second WorldWar.

limiting the M e 262's capab ilities in combat was theshort running life and general unreliability of its JumoOO~ eng ines. Des pite imagi native efforts by the Junkersengineers, even in the sp ring of 19~5 the OO~ was not afully reliable unit. As a result, the M e 262 never cameclose to living up 10 its original pro mise.

At the beg inning of I 9~~ it had seemed that the sidewhich was first to bring into service large numbers of jetaircraft would gain a huge adva ntage in the bartle for airsup remacy. Ce rta inly the jets had the potential to winthat supremacy for, parti cularly in the case of theGerman airc raft, their per formance was far in advance ofanything previously ach ieved. Yet du e to poor service­ab ility these aerop lanes went into ac tion only in relativelysma ll numbers . In a large-scale conflict a few aeroplanes,no matte r how brilliant their flying performance, cannotand did not secu re decisive results.

In the event the Germa n and British jet fightersachieved remarkably lirtle in action. Had they not seencombat, the outcome of the war would not have beendifferent in any material respect.

90 91

A I RC RAFT OF T HE SECO~D 'X' O R L D \X' A R T HE BO.\\IlER RE\'OI.UTIO~

and two more later ditched . German pilots of JG I reck­oned that by keeping formation , giving ineffectivecrossfire, the bombers actually made interception easier.

Between 3 Sep tember and 18 December 1939 RAFBomber Command's Handley Page Hampdens,Wellingtons and Bristol Blenheims flew 861 daylight sor­ties and dropped 61 tons of bombs for a loss of forty -onebombers and highly tra ined Regular air force crews.That amounted to ten per cent of Command averagedaily strength. Ten German fighter s had been shot downand three warships damaged.

Protection of bombers could only come with con­cealment, something which darkness could provide.Thatgene rated many problems, not the least of which wouldbe target acquisition at night. The Germans had beenworking on that problem, making use of rad io beams,and soon the British would need to do likewise, Bombe rCommand, with no choice, switched to mainly night op­erat ions in Febru ary 1940. Ope rational flying in dark­ness emphasised needs for much technical developmentincluding new equipment , improved signals and homingsystems and airfield lighting. General agree ment wasreached on 10 January 1940 that four-gun tail turrets,first suggested by Vickers in October 1936, must befilled to Wellingtons, although it was mid- 1941 before

A Vickers Wellillglolllc of So 9 Sq uad ron near Hanington ill 1940, unth its drag-indu cing 'dustbin 'nxntral turret louered.

prese nce unknown, tracked them , intense accurate AAfire greeted them and cloud cover helped to protectthem . Two badly damaged Wellingtons crash -landed onreturn.

With only nose and tail turrets defending manyWellingtons, the Air Staff on 6 December 1939 decidedthat seventy-seven mu st be fitted with retractable bellyturrets. A dozen Wellingtons of :--;'0 99 Squadron soequipped set off in daylight on 13 December for theSchillig Roads. An 800 ft (244m) cloudbase did not stopAA guns firing and Ge rman fighter s being vectored onto the bombers, which , despite holding their formations,fought a disastrous battle . Five were shot down, anotherlater crashed, and only one fighter was destroyed . InBomber Command's opinion it was the cloudy weathertha t made the operation difficult.

Stubborn belief remained that bombe rs cou ld holdtheir own in daylight , and not until 18 December 1939,when twenty-four Wellington las of Nos 9, 37 and 149Squadrons headed for warships reported offWilhelmshaven, was reality accepted. Flying in four for­mations at about 14,000ft (4,267m) , they skirted'flak-ships' and then German fighters pounced. Easilyevad ing turret fire by bearing down upon the\\'ellingtons' blind beam s. they shot down ten bomb ers,

fierce AA fire which claimed two Wellingtons. Such op­erations were mounted up to the end of 1939. On 3Dece mber twenty-four Wellingtons were sent in daylightto attack naval ships near Heligoland . German rada r, its

: '

The Vickers-ArmstrongsWellillglOlIlc's 1I0se and tail turrets were typical of those fi tted 10 1940s Br itish bombers. This machine,R31 75, wea rs the codes of N o 149 Squ adron.

nose and tail turrets. On the first day of war \X'ellingtonssearched in vain for German naval ships until storms anddarkness closed in. Next day, fourteen aircraft of Nos 9and 149 Squadrons, operating off Brunsbuttel, met

Slim lines and a slender boom carrying the tail surfaces reduced the Handley Page Hampden 's surface area and drag. Th esearc N o 408 Squadron aircraft.

92 93

A IR CRA fT O F T H E S E C O:-;O \\ ' ORLO W AR

Had the Fa irey Bailie been smaller and Griff0 11 engincd, it might have pro-ved t'cry useful. These three belong to No 226Squadron .

THE B 0 .\ 111 E R R E v 0 L U T I 0 :-;

95

Pour 250lb General Purpose bombs fo rmed the im crnal load oj the Bristol Blenheim ,\Ik I.

To su ppor t the Brit ish Ar myBritain 's two othe r bomber typ es were regarded byBomber Comma nd as irrele vant, as they were developedfor arm y suppo rt 10 a 1,000lb (454kg) bomb load ,1,000-mile ( I ,609km) ran ge requirem ent. La rger than aJu 87 , the 1O,900lb (4,940kg), 54ft-s pa n (16.4m) single­en gine Fairey Battl e ca rried the prescribed bo mb loadfor 1,000 miles (1, 6IO km ) but failed on other cou nts .The intention had been 10 power it with a 1,500hpRolls-Royce Griffon engine based upon the 'R' engineused by the 193 1 Schneider Trophy winners. Non-avail­ability forced Faire y to turn 10 its I ,700hp 24-cylinderPrince double en gine driving contrarotating propellers,but its complexity caused the co mpany to fit a 1,000hpRolls-Royce .\ lerlin . The Battl e was thus seriou sly un­derpowered, its cru ising speed falling to a mere 148mph(238kmfh) at 15,000ft (4,570m). French-based Battles

Dropping largely ineffective bombs and avoidingcivilian targets, Bomber C ommand was going to find itdifficult 10 penetrate heavily de fended areas , especiall y inpoor weath er . But so me hard lesson s had been adminis­tered in good time, for to have launched large bomber sin daylight during the German western o ffensive wouldhaw been ca tas tro phic . Instead, the planned stra tegicnight bombing offensive aga inst the Ruhr and Rh inelandbegan when ninety-six bombers set out on 15/16 M ay1940. Only twenty-four crews even claimed 10 havefound their targets. The task ahead, to wage an effectivestrategic bombing offens ive, was daunting; how badthings might have been was shown by the RAF's lightbomber squad rons .

94

that came ab out. On 7 February orders were given 10 fitadditional armour and self-scaling fuel tanks. A loweredbelly turret cut the Welling lOn's speed by 15mph(24km/h) , so on 15 May 1940 the decision was taken 10

replace it with beam guns, saving 500lb (225kg), and theidea was extended to new bo mbers. Beam guns were atransient feature, all Briti sh 'heavies' by 1942 havingtwo-gun dor sal turrets .

\Vhereas Germany updated its bomber de sign sthroughout the war, Britain introduced completely newtyp es, upgrading only the Wellington. A potentially fasterM crlin-en gincd M k II for tropical usc made its first flighton 3 March 1939, but tailplane troubles caused devel op­ment to continue mainly with the Pegasus-powered vari­ant. A stronger undercarriage allowed increased weight,and a 24V electrical system improved equipment perfor­mance. \,'hen, in August 194 0, sup plies of Pega sus en ­gines were in doubt, pick-up points on \\'ellinglOnnacelles, design ed to cope with a variety of engi nes , ledto an orde r to fill the ga p with M erlin Xs in 200 air­frames .The Air .\ Iinistry insisted tha t a Pratt & WhitneyTwin Wasp 1,83 0hp ver sion should go ahead as the ,\ IkIV, alth ou gh the Mks Ie and III (Bristol Hercules) wouldremain standard version s. On 31 ,\ larch 1941 twoWellinglOn lIs bec ame the first bomber s to drop a4,000lb (1 ,81 Okg) bomb each, Emden being the target.

The need for heating, ample oxygen and extra crewcomfort were evident during lon g night flight s, as wasthe need for nav igation aids over blacked-out areas . Allaircra ft needed ready esca pe exits for use after di tch ing,along with dinghies; cr ews required ample tra ining andan air/sea rescu e service,

A lesson for Brit ainSuch African activity was utte rly different and remotefrom the ferocious fight about to break out over Englandfor, at the start of July 1940, the Luftwaffe was to un­leash its Stukas again. So powerful would be the blowsthat full-bloodied invasion would be unnecessary,Shipping, ports, industry and the remnants of the RAFwould be obliterated, and the civilian pop ulation blastedinto submission.

Brazenly the ju 87s sallied forth across the EnglishCha nnel and immediately enco untered something un ex­pected, T heir short range, even with an external long­range tank beneath each wing producing the ju 87R (Rfor 'Reichweit' , or range) was insufficient, but a fargreater shock came when the Srukas encountered, forthe first time, radar controlled, skilfully assembled andhighly effective fighter defences agains t which theiralmost non-existant self-defence rendered them easyprey. All German bomber crews discovered dur ing theBattle of Britain that only plentiful fighter protectioncould ensure survival, and it was not always to hand .

T H E 8 0 .\1 8 E R R E \,OLUT IO :->

In 1938 modified Wellesleys set a world long-d istancerecord by flying non-stop from Ismailia (Egypt) toDarwin - a journey of 7, 162 miles (l 1,525km) complet­ed in just over forty-eigh t hours. Such exceptional rangecame not by chance, British bombers having been con­ceived with needs to reinfo rce garrisons in overseas ter­ritories where distances were enormous.

\'('ellesleys proved ideal for East African operatio ns,:-'::0 14 Squadron on the first day of war moun ting along-distance raid on Massawa. Facing heavy anti-air­craft fire, the slow-flying, unwieldy bombers repeatedlybombed airfields, railways, dumps and in particular thetwo very busy Eritrean Red Sea ports of Assab andMassawa.Their meagre 1,377lb (625kg) bomb load wascarried within two large panniers slung beneath thewings.

A hard warOn 4 July thirty-three j u 87Bs of III./StG 5 1 attemptedthe first dive-bombing of Portland, where they encoun­tered strong defences, By 20 July 1940 battle casualtieshad cut the j u 87 force by a third, to 248 aircraft out ofits intende d holding of 3 16, and by the time theLuftwaffe launched its main Battle of Britain offensivethe Stuka's supe riority was ouste d by revolutionarychange .

At about 0830 on 12 August a group ofM esserscbmitt Bf II Os roared along the EnglishChannel, sections peeling away,T hey were were no ordi­nary Bf I 10 escort fighters, but fighter-bombers.Delivering fast, shallow-dive and low-level bombing at­tacks on south coast radar stations , they replaced the tac­tical light bomber and then reverted to being fighters .

97

Italia n interludeWhen Italy declared war in June 1940 a very different as­pect of the bombing campaign was immediately dis-

river crossing. The Luftwaffe protec ted and supportedthe army, Do 17s and He I I Is mainly carry ing out dayand night raids on cities, airfields, industrial premises,troops, transport and rail targets, \,(,hen surre nder nego­tiations were under way and the 9th Panzer Division wasat the edge of the city, KG 54's He I II s took out theheart of Rotterdam, killing 800 and making 80,000 citi­zens homeless in a menaci ng and cruel five-hour on­slaught. By mid-19 40, with France vanquished , theLuftwaffe could look back with satisfaction upon its warwork, albeit at a cost of 491 bombers and 113 Stu kas lostin action during May and Jun e; this total was thirty percent of the entire bomber force.

Long-span, high-aspect- ratio unngs gave the VickersA rmstrongs Wellesley lengthy du ration. 77/C undencing pall­niers housed the bomb load. This is L2654 of N o 14Squadron.

played. The Italians held Abyssinia, Eritrea andSomaliland, and the RAF faced them with foursquadrons holding many of the 80 Vickers \'\'ellesleybombers dispatched overseas out of 176 built. TheWellesley's size belied its general-purpose light bomb errole, sailplane-like wings making it appear frail. In reali­ty, geodetic constructio n conferred great strength, allow­ing Wellesleys to accept heavy punishment and still reachhome. Spann ing 74ft 6in (22.7m) , those high-aspect­ratio wi ngs had an exceptionally low wing loading ofI9Ib/ft' , and ideally supported the aircraft during ardu ­ous sorties involving eight hour s' flying over the wildEast African mountains. Not surprisingly, the two-m ancrew needed stro ng faith in their machine and espec iallyits single 925hp Bristol Pegasus XX engine . Only 39ftI in (12m) long, weighing only 6,8121b (3,090kg) emptyand 11, 1281b (5,048kg) loaded, the Wellesley carried upto 496 .5gal (2,257 litres) of fuel, and, cruising at about180mph (290km!h) at 15,000ft (4,572m), its range was1,340 miles (2,156km) , At full throttle the \'\'ellesleycould reach 200mph (322km!h) at 20, 100ft (6,126m).

An other easy war?On I April 1940, 1,726 of the Luftwaffe's 5,178 opera­tional aircraft were bombers and 419 weredive-bo mbers, many shor tly to be committed to the in­vasion of Norway, an operatio n und ert aken to secureiron ore supplies from Sweden and provide bomberbases from which Britain could be attacked . By captur­ing the Benelux countries and northern Fran ce, moresuitable bases were obtained, Junkers j u 87s had sup­ported rapid troop advance s, particularly at the Meuse

vies on the flanks, provided maximum protectivecrossfire, The need for well-conceived bomber forma­tions and finely executed fighter protection was a lessonall air forces bought dearly,

Like the Battles, 2 Group B1enheims were hurled intoaction in ,\ \ay 1940, usually fatally, without fighter cover,Gunfire broke apart their formations, allowing Bf 109fighters to pick off the bombers, :-'::0 longer 'faster than afighter', the Blenheim IV (two 920 hp Bristol M ercuryradials) had a top speed of 22imph (365krn/h) at sealevel and 266mph (365km!h) at 11,870ft (3,6 18m) . At15,000ft (4,572m) it cruised at 180mph (290km!h) , car­rying a 1,000lb (454kg) bomb load for a creditable1,460 miles (2,349km) . Until 1943 the Blenheim IV re­mained an army support aircraft, although it was muchused as a mainstream bomber for daylight ' nuisance'raids. At night B1enheims bombed Channel ports andheavy guns, then during the 194o-t I winter they tookpart in Bomber Co mma nd's main night offensive beforeintens ively operating against shipping; tasks for whichthe type was never intend ed.

,

96

The unu sual geometry of the Blenheim I V's 1I0se improved the nauigatorlbomb aimer's accommodation. Beneath it is a rear­

icard-fi ring, periscopically sighted gun. This is a N o 40 Squ adron aircraft.

proved useless for stemming the German invasiondespite the great courage and sacrifice of their crews,mauled during futile shallow-dive and medium-levelbombin g escapades, Between 10 May and 20 June 1940,115 Battles were destroyed during operational flying, thehighest loss rate for any British bomber.

The Bristol Blenheim fared little better , Defended bya fixed wing gun and another in a manu ally traversedturret, it was vulnerable to fighter interception but toughenough to take considerable puni shment. Sur vival camemostly through defensive tactics worked out in 1939 by\'\'g Cdr Basil Emb ry; a formation embr acing vies ofthree aircraft, stepped up and if possible having other

All F.24 camera is taken aboard a Blenheim I of N o 211Squadron ill 1940, ,\lally Blenheim sorties u'ere for recon­nais sance purposes.

AIR CRAf T O F T H E S E CO:->D WORLD W'AR

A IRCRAFT OF T HE SECO SD \X'O RLD \X' A RT HE 1I0 ,\ IRER RE\,OLUT IOS

Derclopcd f rom the M aryland, the less cramped Balt imorescreed tcith the RAF ill North Africa, Th is aircraft,Baltimore 1 AG688, ,,'as evaluated at the A&AEE ill late194 1,

Atlantic, France for bombers and Britain for advancedtrainers, One purchase was the Lockheed 14 airliner ,Displaying modern feature s and the comfort typical ofUS combat aircraft, it was easily modified into theHudson reconnaissance bomber.

In j uly 1940 more American-built combat aircraftbega n arriving in Britain , mainly fugitives from the con­trac ts of vanquished nations, Altho ugh they had modernhem s such as variable-pitch propellers, flaps, goodair-cooled engines, nosewheel undercarriages and highstandards of per sonnel comfort, most were ill-equippedfor the European conflict. Their duration and speed wereacceptable, but not their poor armament and small bombload s, They had been designed either to drive offAmerica's sout hern neighbours or defe nd the USA byattacking the japanese navy,

Rated highly was the thr ee-seat Glenn ,\ lart in M odel167F ,\ Iaryland bomber, 75 of the French order for 215ultimately reaching the British, The 61ft .lin (18 ,6m)span aircraft, with a loaded weight of 17,8901b(8.115kg), had a respectable top speed of 294mph at13.000ft (473kmih at 3,962m) and a max imum range of1,870 miles at 179mph (3,009km at 288km1h),Unfo rtunately its maximum bomb load was only 1,800lb(8 16kg) , and that for short -ra nge operati ons, For de­fence the Maryland relied upon two 0.30in (7 ,62mm)guns, making it quite use less, As with many other US air­craft, the British used them for purposes other than in­tended, the ,\ laryland undertaking long-rangephotographic reconnaissance, Among other coups, it se­cured the photographs up on which the Royal Navy'sTaranto raid of II November 1940 was based , TheBritish ordered ISO,\ Iaryland ,\ Ik li s which. with speedboosted by more powerful engines, were used for forma­tion level bombing raids over North Africa , where op­posing fighters included Italian biplanes,

The Mar yland 's 1940 successor, the Model 187Baltimore, drew upon combat feedback , The viewthrough the additi onal nose glazing was improved, adeeper fuselage allowed crew contact. and self-sealingfuel tanks, bulletproof glass, additional armo ur and

The Am erican inputBefore the war , Europeans had shopped acros s the

Stri ke and support aircraft would never be the sameagain, a point re-emphasised when, at midday, Bf 110fighter-bombe rs hit RAF Manston, paving the way for aDomier Do 172 medium-level raid ,The ju 87s were leftbehind to annoy Channel shipp ing,

T hat protected ju 87s cou ld still inflict serious dam­age was proven when forty smashed Dctling, O n ISAugus t others closed the major RAF anti-invasion baseat Lympne for two days, and on 16 August Stukaseffectively dive-bombed Tangmere, Ventnor radar stationand Lee-on-Solent's hangars, But the Tangmere raidalone cost nine ju 87Bs, almost half the attacking force ,Two days later, when j u 87s and ju 88s attacked Ford ,Thomey Island and Poling Chai n Home (CH) station,RAF fighters shot down sixteen ju 87s, Another twowere write-offs and fou r were seriously dam aged, \Viththirty-nine ju 87s shot down in two weeks of operationsagainst England, their raids halted and they moved ,congregating in the Pas de Calais, awaiting to sup porttheir army in an invasion which was impossible tomount,

The lessons the Battle of Britain gave to the Luftwaffebomber force were blata nt, Heinkel He Ill s, DornierDo 17s and even the newer jun kers ju 88s were verypoo rly defend ed , and there were insufficient fighters, allwith inadequate range, to protect them completely, Now,like the RAI; the Luftwaffe was forced into a night­bombing campaign, It started officially on 16 September1940, which greatly increased acc ident rates, especiallyas winte r closed in, but radio -gui ded blind bo mb ing ledto more accurate night attacks,

\X'hen the cost of the battle between july andSeptember was counted it showed an overall loss of 78 ju87s and 62 1 medium bombers,That rate was unsustain­able, T he RAF, desperately defending its homeland, notonly fought well bu t drew upo n reser ves cleverly andsafely mu stered by Air Chief Marshal Sir HughDowding well beyond reach of the raiding forces ,

Long rartge made the M arti» M aryland ca tuoble fo r photo­graphic reconnaissance. Th is ,\lary lalld 1 ,,'as under rest illBritain ill November 1941 ,

......-

. "Ill' -,

Germany's most ubiquitou s icarplane , the }llIlkers}u 88, ca rried its cffensire load externally.

Changing the Mcsserschm itt Bf 110 fig hter into a figh ter-bomber u'as a notel idea zcith ecerlasn ng consequences.

98 99

A IR C RAF T O F T HE SE C O:-;D \X' O R L D " ' ART HE 1I0 .\IB ER R EY O L liTI O:-;

A s the lightly defended Baltimores preted easy prey 10 fighte rs; the Mk 11/featured a dorsal turret, A sound design, Boeing 's M odel 29 9, the predecessor ojall B -1 7 Fly ing Fortresses.first fieu: on 28 Jllly 1935.

engines, the four-engined B-17C was one of twenty pu r­chased by Britain.

The B-17 originated in a 1934 competition for afou r-engine d bomber, Boeing copyrighting the tradename 'Flying Fortress' for the aircraft. Of all-metal con­struction, it initially had four 750hp Prall & WhitneyHornet R- 1690-E nine -cylinder radial engine s, a re­tractable undercarriage, a shapely 103ft 9in- spa n wingand a crew of eight. Defence comprised four single-gunpositions and a solitary nose gun . Fully loaded it weighed43,000lb (19,500kg) and carried up to eight 600lb(270kg) bomb s. It first flew on 28 July 1935. Its topspeed was aro und 250mph (400km/h), cru ising speed200mph (320km/h) , and service ceiling about 24,000ft(7,300m) , but uncertainties aros e because the prototypecrashed on 30 Oct ober 1935 .

Thirteen YB-I 7s with more suitable 930hp WrightCyclone G R-l 820-39 (G2) engines followed , and oneimp ortant static airframe. Arguments arose because theUS Navy viewed the 'flying battleship ' as a thr eat to itsbuilding programme, and funding methods caused thenew examples to be redesignated YI B-17s, the firstflying on 2 December 1936. All thirteen went to the 2ndBombardment Group (BG) whose lengthy flights testedan aircraft which formed the nucl eus of US strategic airpower. By the 1938 Munich crisis they had flown1,800,000 miles (2,897,000km) without seriousaccident .

Turbosupercharger s in the static test machine irn­proved all-round performance so much tha t, as the onlyYlB-17A (37-369) , it began flight tests in April 1938 andrevealed a ceiling exceeding 30,000ft (9,150m) and atop speed of 311mph (500km/h) , way ahead of the256mph (4 12km/h) shown by the others. Averaging238mph (383km/h), it could carry an 11,000lb(4,990kg) load for 620 miles ( I ,OOOkm), or more realis­tically 2,400lb (1,090kg) for 1,500 miles (2,4 15km). Not

DB-7s, supplemented by sixteen from a Belgian order,were poorly armed and too short of range to reachGe rmany. Special training was needed beca use of thenosewheel gear, so the first nineteen examples were afte rmodification set aside as Boston I trainers. Ma jor im­provernents soon followed . The Pratt & \\'hitney \\'aspswere replaced by Wright double-row Cyclones and moreaerodynamically satisfactory nacelles were fitted to theDB-7A. Stability was improved by increased-areavertical tail surfaces, but the type 's short duration re­mained a drawback.

The US Army had ordered the DB-7 as the A-20, theengine change from Prall & Wh itney to Wr ightR-2600-3 being a feature of 143 A-20As, each able tocarry a I, 100lb (500kg) bomb load. The A-20B/DB-7A,the first effective version for the USM C , had twoI,690hp R-26 00-11 engines and seven gun s, all of0.50in (12.7mm) calibre.

Not until late 1941 did the longer-rangedDB-7B/Boston III emerge, powered by two 1,600hpR-2600 -23 engine s. Here at last was a top performerwhose shoulder wing sat up on a slender fuselage, whosepilot had an excellent forward view and in which thenavigator or bomb aime r sat in an ideal glazed nose.Amidships the gunner had two guns and the pilot couldoperate four 0.30in (7.62mm) machine-guns fitted oneither side of the nose. The bomb load was 2,600lb(1 ,180kg). In RAF Boston Ill s six 8th USAAF crews on4 July 1942 mounted the AAF's first bombing operationover western Europe . By 1944 the A-20G version was inservice, sporti ng a dorsal turret and a clear-vision or soldnose.

As the night blitz was end ing, a new shape enteredEuropean skies when a Boeing B-1 7C Flying Fortresslanded at Presrwick, Scotland, after a direct 8hr 20minflight from the USA. Ultimately this bomber would havea profound effect up on the war. \X'ith turbosupercharged

bombers. A four 0.303in (7.69mm) turret version, theBaltimore III, had an all-up weight of 23,000lb(10,430kg) , attained 302mph (486km/h) at 11,000ft(3,350m) and had a range of 950 miles (1 ,530km) whencarrying a 2,000lb (9078kg) bomb load .

The first American bomber to see combat in Europewas the shapely all-m etal, stressed-skin Dougla s DB-7with nosewheel undercarriage and radial air-cooled Pratt& Wh itney Wasp engines. The prototype, flown inDecember 1938, was by early 1939 showing a credit abletop speed of 314mph (505km/h) and a climb rate ofhalf-a-mile a min ute . Only thirty reached France beforeit collapsed , the residue beginning to arrive in Englandduring July 1940. Although fast, the 105 ex-French

The most effective US light bomber U'(JS the short-range bill speedy Douglas A -20G BOSlOn /I,; uhich U'aS ideal for lou-level

at tachs as uell as fo rma tion daylight raids. S een here is BZ403 WIder test.

400hp more power from two 1,600hp \X' right DoubleCyclone G R-2600-A5B engines were all useful changes.Increasing the bomb load even to 2,000lb (9 10kg) wasnot easy, but arma me nt was muc h improved, at onestage totalling eleven guns. Four, ventrall y mounted,were to administer a parting gesture after low-levelbombing. Wing-mounted fixed guns, of little value in abomber, were replaced in other US aircraft such as theDouglas A-20, North American B-25 and Ma rtin B-26by gun packs on the sides of the nose , or by guns in a'solid' nose for ground strafing.

\X'hen the Baltimore went into action on 23 May1942, its poor manually traverse d gun defence was onlytoo obviously inadequate, for fighters shot down thr ee

100 101

A IRC RAFT O F T HE SECO ~ D W O R L D \, ' A R

Although it U'as less nimble than theA-20, N orth A merican 'sB-25C .lIitcllell carried a heavier bomb load. Fo ruu rd fi ring gunpacks made later ccrsions useful for lou-lerel strikes.

T HE B 0 .\ 1B ERR E \'O I. U T I 0 ~

Aboa rd each airc raft were ten 5gal (l 9-litre) fuel drumsto 'top up ' if needed. Each B-25B carried four 500l b(228kg) bo mbs, and two had wood en 'scare guns ' pro­tru din g from the tail. Sixteen prepared B-25Bs wereaboard the Hornet when it sailcd for the launch 44 0 mileso tT japan, Unfortunately small enemy ships were en­counte red , so to save the ope ration it bega n at 0800 on18 April 194 2, i l 4 miles from jap an ,

Lcading was Lt Co l jam es Doolittle aboard 40-2344,typi cally heavily laden at 31 ,000lb (l 4,0 60 kg), but allsixteen M itchclls were launched within an hour andbombed from 1,500ft (460m) with out loss, other targetsbe ing Kobe, Yokoh ama and Nagoya. Finding designa tedlanding airfields in China in verv bad weather was sodifficult that four crews crash- landed, eleven ba led ou tand 40-2242 landed at Vladivo stok, only to be promp tlyinterned.

The 8 -25C - loaded weight 33,500lb ( 15,200kg) _co uld with additio na l fue l deliver 3,200lb (I ,450kg) ofbombs during a 1,525-mile (2,450km) sortie. It had atop speed of 264mph (424kmlh) at sea level, and284mph at 15,000ft (45i km/h at 4,5i Om ). On shortmission s externa l racks increased the load to 5,200lb(2,360kg) . Production ended in M ay 1943 with theI ,61 9th example. A new plant to build B-2 5s opened inKansas Cit y, whe re between February 194 2 an d ,\ Iarch1944 2,29 0 B-25Ds. simi lar to the B-2 5C, were com­pleted .

Thc 8-25's stability rendered it ideal for medium­IC\'eI, stro ngly escorted formation bombing in Europe,where most losses were cau sed by AA fire. In the Pacifictheatre 'solid-nose' adaptation s inclu ded packages ofmachinc-guns and a hefty i 5mm cann on , making theB-2 5G and H model s good for low-level str ike. M oreco nven tiona l bomber B-2 5s of the 28th Co mpos iteGroup operating from the Aleutians raid ed targets inj apan's Kuril e island chain for a seco nd time on 10 july1943.

At the time of the Tokyo raid the other twin-enginedUS medium bomber, the con trove rsial B-26 M arauder,was availab le for operations. Originating in a plan for a2,000-milc (3,2 19km) range bomber with a 20,000ft(6, 100m) ceiling and able to fly at 350mph (563km/h) ,it had a 56ft ( I i m ) long fuselage matcd to wing s of onh'65ft (20m) span, gi\'ing a 501b/ft ' (244kg/m') \\ing load'­ing. ' Ib at hclped to producc a hazardous landing speedof 130mph (209km/h) . ' lbe circular-cross-sectionfuselage rcduced bomb bay size, thc load being only2,000lb (9 10kg) . Initial dcfcns ive armamcnt was againpoor , co mprising only one 0.30 in ( i .62mm) nose gun, a0.30in tail gun and two 0.50 in guns ( 12.i mm) in thedorsal .\ lar tin turret. Two 1,85 0hp Pratt & WhimevR- 2800 Dou ble Wasp eigh tcen-cy linder , two- stage su~pcrchargcd engincs fitted with ejector cxhausts d rovefour-bladcd propellcrs.

103

flyers unprotected by fighters were read y prey, andeas ily seen contra ils revealed the prec ise posit ion at alti­tudes where a pressure cabin was desirable.

Back in the USA reworkin g of the 13-1 i was underway in the belief that sufficient defensive guns wouldmake it impregnable. In the B- liE a forward dor saltwo- gun tu rret was added and twin ven tral guns were rc­placed by a 'ba ll turret ' for manning by the short ofsta tu re. A twin- gun rear turre t cove ring a major blindspot was faircd into an enlarged tail unit fined to im­prove the aircraft's stability.Thc weight rose to 54,00 0lb ,seven tons above the original, the first example flying on5 September 1941. The B-1 i E reach ed a top speed of3 1i mph (5 1Okm/h), and production to talled 512.

japan 's Pearl Harbor assault immediately precededthe operational introdu ct ion of the B-liE and a newgeneration of US bombers, the Co nso lidated 13-24Liberato r, North Am erican B-25 .\ Iitchc ll and ,\ IartinB-26 .\ Iarauder. All, during development, benefi ted fromthe fighting in Eu rope.

Na med after Billy Mirchcll, the 13-2 5 becameAmerica 's most widely used bomber, proving adaptableand very sta ble, Twent y-four were ordered off the draw­ing board in 193 9, the first flying on 19 Augu st 1940 andserving as the prototype. Production deliveries began inFeb ruary 1941 , and to improve handling the wingcentre section from the tenth example reta ined dihed ralwhereas outer mainplancs were horizontal. as on all sub­seq uen t B-2 5s. The forty B-25As, also lightl y defendedby four 0 .50in ( 12.i m m) guns, had self-sea ling tanksand extra armour. Weighing l i,8i Olb (8,106kg) emptyan d 25 ,322 1b ( I I ,486kg) loaded, the B-25A cou ld cam'3,000lb ( I ,360kg) of bombs for 1,350 miles (2, 1iOkm),mo re than man y aircraft in its class, and attained315 mph at 15.000ft (50i km/h at 4,5i Om). Improveddefe nce came with the B-25B 's dor sal and bellv turretsin lieu of waist and tail guns. As a penalty the weight roseto 26, 208 1b (I I ,88ikg), and speed fcll to 300mph at15.000ft (483kmlh at 4,5i Om). By December 1941 130B-25Bs had been delivered .

The ,\Iitchell's good endura nce was first exploitedduring anti -sub marine patrols otf the US coast. Earlv in1942 the 3rd BG moved to Australia, from wherc ' thefirst operation involved ten B-25 s island hopping to thePhi lippines and then attacking japancse shipping. InApril 1942 ope rations agai nst targets in New Guineabega n, and B-2 5s were subscquently active in thc Pacificrcgion th roughout hostilities.

Onc high light of thc .\ Iitchell's carccr followcd suc­ccssful trial launching of the 6i ft 6in (20.5m) -spanbomber from thc aircraft carricr USS Homet, no mcanfcat. T he l ith BG then prO\'idcd twentv-four B-25Bs fora carricr-Iaunched attac k on j apan . Thcir lowcr turretsand Norden bombsights wcre rcm o\'ed . and additionalfuel tankage allowcd 1,14 1gal (5,18i litrcs) to be carr ied .

(3i Okm/h) . \\' ith four 1,1100b (500kg) US bombs theopera tional rad ius was 450 miles (72 5km). lb operate ataround 28,000ft (8,630m) , the seven men aboard thebomber drew for hours up on oxygen supplies duringlon g, cold and exh austing sorties. They wore electr icallyheated clothing , layers bein g added as the aircraftclimbed to a regi me where the temperature could fall to-50·C. Fro m 10,000ft (3,050m) a bomb ing error of on ly450ft (140m) was c1aimcd whe n using the Sperry sight,but only on clear da ys, of which there were few,

Such a day was 8 july 1941 , when B-l i Cs ope ratedfor the firs t time . N o formation flying was undertaken bythe trio running up on Wilhelmshavcn to bomb from27,OOOft (8 ,230m). One, with an inch of frozen oil CO\ ' ­

cring its tailplanc, had to unl oad near N ordcney. Themost disastrou s opc ration occur red on 8 Scptcmber,whcn four Fortress Is set out for Oslo. McsserschminBf 109s intcrcepted onc at 27,OOOft (8,230m) , and an­othcr, badly sho t up , had wou nded aboard. A third fou ndcloud covcring the target, and the fourth ne\'er rerurned .Thc last sort ic took place on 25 Septcmbcr, and was thetwent y-fourth abor ti\·c sort ic out of fifty-two flown .

Thc Fortresses showcd how difficult it was to mounthigh-Icvel raids nccding clear wcathcr that was rarclyprcsent. Poor gun defenccs confirmcd that even high

102

surprisingly, an order for thirty-nine 8 -1 i Bs ( I ,OOOhpR-I 820-65) followed . These had an enlarged rudder, aflat nose panel for usc with the Sperry bo mb sight, andmore flap area . All were delive red by ,\ larch 1940 .

Then came th irty-eight B-1 i Cs , somewha t ditTcrentin appearan ce because the gun position s had been re­placed by a ventral bath an d large side panels which thegu nner removed before using his guns. Power was pro­vided by 1,200hp G R-1820-65 (G -205A) engines. T he8- 1i e's weight had risen to 49 ,65 01b (22,52 Ikg) , andthe first example flew on 21 july 1940. Furtherrefinements were incorporated in forty-two subsequentB-1i Ds.

A bclicf that high flying affordcd safc ty from inte r­ccption (somcthing the Gcrmans also bclicvcd) arouscda British desire to acquire rurbosupcrcharged 8-1 i s toscc whether they wcre suitable for high-level opcrations.The reluctan ce of the USA to rclcasc them was tcm­pcrcd by American intercst in wha t could be achie\'edun der combat, so it was agrecd to sell Britain twentyB- 1i Cs. Known as Fortrcss Is, thc RAF aircraft had twowaist , two dorsal and a single \'cntral 0 .50 in guns andonc or two 0.30in frcc guns in thc nosc. British tcstin gshowcd thc B- 1i e's top specd to bc 325mph (523kmlh)at 29,000ft (8.840m), and its cr uising spccd 230mph

first raid on Germany on 27 january 1943. On 17August their vulnerability became very evident when 60out of 376 raiding Regensburg and Schweinfurt wereshot down. On a second Schweinfurt raid enemy fightersshot down 60 out of 305 operating.The lesson the RAFhad learned in 1939 was being taught to the Americans,who clearly did not heed any warn ing. Du ring raids onGerma ny B-17s carried bomb loads of 4,000-5,000lb(1,8 14-2,268kg), compared with the 10,0001b (4,536kg)average load of the RAF's A\TO Lancaster.

Early B- 17 Flying Fortresses u'ere defended from open gunports, using hand-held tceapons. 171C B- I 7G, shoum here,hadimproved defences including mechan ically dricen turrets.

T ilE HO .\ tIlE R RE\,OL liT IO:-;

105

bombers with two-gun rotating tail turrets, availablefrom October 194 1. Soon after the japanese attack onPearl Harbor the US acqui red some of the British order,their value over the Pacific being only too obvious.

The B-24 had phe nomenal range, ample speed, fastclimb and fairly good load potential. Vital increased de­fence came with the B-24D (Liberator III), which hadtail and forward upper tu rrets along with waist positionsfrom which 0.50in (12.7mm) guns could be fired, as inthe B- 17. For an 11.6-hour ocean patrol the B-24D (ofwhich 2,696 were built) could carry a 3,000l b (1,360kg)bomb or depth-charge load, so the US Nan' as well asthe RAF ordered it. The USAAF began operatingB-24Ds from Britain in Octobe r 1942, but their stav wasshortlived, for they moved to North Africa and in 'I943made the famous low-level raid on the Ploesti oilfields inRomania. Not until summer 1943 were B-24s again agoing concern in the 8th Air Force.

In autumn 1942 a newer Flying Fortress, the B-17Fwith frameless Plexiglas nose, 400 modifications and ad­ditional gun s, replaced the B-17E. It ente red productionin April 1942 and 3,405 were built. T he loaded weightwas 56,000lb (25,402kg), and cventuallv the maximumpermissible take-off weight was 72,OOOlb (32,659kg).T he B-17F with a possible 9,600lb (4,186kg) bomb loadpartly carried on external racks became the standardUSAAF bomber in Europe until the B-17G, featuring aprominent chin turret to discourage frontal attacks(8.680 built) , was introduced in 1943. B-17Fs made the

A combination of high-aspect-rat io tcings and tu rbosupercharged engines gave Consolidated's B-24 Liberator longer range andbetter all-round performance than the B- 17. The B-24M depicted, like the H and subsequent Liberators, had 1I0se, tail, dorsaland ventral turrets.

range on an aeroplane wi th transport potential. Exhaustturbosuperchargers boosted its speed and rate of climb.When the XB-24 (four 1,200hp Pratt & WhimeyR I830-33s) flew on 29 December 1939 it was clearly agood performer, but was defended by only by six 0.30in(7.62mm) guns. Britain ordered the LB-3 0 variant witha 2,000- mile (3,219km) range and 3,000lb ( I,360kg)bomb load for its maritime reconn aissance potential. In1940 the British expressed reservations abo ut the verypoor defences, and the Americans responded with theLB-30A (first flown in janu ary 1941) with two tail de­fence guns , but this was still unacce ptable for Europeanoperations. Britain's first Liberators were converted intotransatlantic tran sports .

There was no doubt of the design 's potential. TheXB-24B tested oval cowlings which imp roved cooling,and the B-24A had twin 0.30in (7.62mm) tail guns andsix 0.50in (12.7mm) guns. The RAF acqui red twentyLB-30B Liberator Is and fitted them with a four 20mmgun pack. Cruising at 150kt carryi ng a 2,0001b load, theLiberator I could patrol for an amazing sixteen hours.Using the forward firing cannon a Liberator shot downa Focke-Wulf Fw 200 on 4 Oc tober 1941 in an unusualbomber-versus-bomber combat. Additional tankage al­lowed convoys to be met by Co ndors 800 miles(1,290km) out in the Atlantic.

Curiou sly, the USAAC ordered only seven YB-24s,nine B-24As and only nine B-24Cs, whereas the Britishcontinued to back the Liberator by ordering 165 Mk 11

104

M arrill 's shapely B-26 M arallder proued 100 uulnerable fo r lou-level attack. Formations of us 9rhAir Force B-26s attackedairfields and bridges ill the ueeks before the invas ion of northern Europe.

AIR CRA FT OF T il E SE CO :-;O \X· OR l. O W AR

The first of 1,100 Marauders ordered in September1939 flew on 25 November 1940, rapid production re­sulting in 200 by mid-194 1. After taking off loaded at26,6251b (12,077kg) the B-26 reached 3 15mph(507krn/h), but landing accidents during crew trainingwith the 'very fast ship' raised calls for cancellation.Production was halted in early 194 2 and resumed inMay, the B-26B-I O introducing a larger wing, of 71ft(2 1.6m) span.

The 22nd Bombardm ent Group at Muroc in Cali­forn ia introduced the bomber to opera tions with B-26anti-submarine patrols. In Febru ary 1942 the Gro upmoved to Australia, joining the 5th AI' and resuming op­erations in April with anti-shipping sorties and raids onNew Gui nea . Torpedo-bomber Marauders operatedduring the Battle of Midway but no sinkings wereachieved , Although B-26s were active over thesouth-west Pacific in 1942-1943, they really neededEurope's firm, long runways. T here, the Marauder washighly effective. It operated in large formatio ns at medi­um altitudes, often carpet-bo mbing airfields, well pro ­tected by shoals of fighters.

Arguably America 's best wart ime bomber was theB-24 Liberator. Had it not been for European interest itmight never have proceeded, as the USAAC was firmlycommitted to the B-17. Designed in 1939, the four-en­gined aircraft was planned to fly faster and further thanthe B-17 and carry an 8,000lb (3,620kg) load . Its high­aspect-ratio Davis wing conferred exceptionally long

T ilE Il 0 .\ \ B E R R E \'O L u T t 0 S

for 2,607km (1,620 miles) . Normall y loaded, the DB-3weighed 7.938kg (17,500Ib) ( 10,025kg/22,100lb maxi­mum). and it was defended by thre e 7.3mm (0.30in)guns. Early DB-3s had a nose turret, but by 1940 theDB-3f had a more point ed nose with additi onal glazing.With a top speed of 4 18km/h (260mph) and a range of4,023km (2,500 miles) , its normal bomb load was 998kg(2,200Ib) , altho ugh it had room for 2,495 kg (5,500lb) . Itwas used as a tactical or stra tegic bomber, and CaptAlexandr Molodchy of the long -range bombe r force .flying a DB- 3f, claimed on 7 August 194 1 to be the firstSoviet bomber pilot 10 attack Berlin.That fligh t involveda round trip of some 2,000 miles (3,220km).

The USSR's great stra tegic adva ntage was the depthof its territory, and the Pe-8 (or TB-7), Russia's onlyfour-eng incd strategic bomber, was built well inside theUSSR. With primitive nose, tail and dorsal turrets, it car­ried a crew of six, the pilots sitting in tandem.,\ Iachine-guns poked from the rear of the inner enginenacelles, underneath each of which was one radiator fortwo 1,350hp AM-35 A engines. A large aero plane, itspanned -10m (131ft 3in) , was 24.5 m long (80ft 6in) andweighed over 22 IOns when loaded . With a top speed of-I27km/h (265mph) it had a range of 4,700km (2,920miles) when carryi ng a 2,000kg (4,400Ib) load .

At the other extreme was a Russian equivalent to theStuka, not ready when the Germa ns invaded, Ilyu shinhad devi sed a tough, single-engine gro und-anaek air­craft. It began as the BSh-2, a two-seat armoured assau ltaircraft. and effectiveness increased with modificationinto the famou s 11-2. With a wingspan of 14.6m (-17ftII in) and length of 11.6m (38ft 3in), it weighed 5,556kg(12,250lb) loaded and cou ld carry a 599 kg ( 1,320lb)bomb load . ,\ Iuch weight was ascribed to extensivearmo ur protecting the crew and the engine from gro undfire.Two 7.62mm ShKAS machin e-gun s and two 20mmSh VAl'. can non were filled in the wings, below whichwere racks for four 25Akg (56Ib) RS-132 rockets.Alternatively it could have two 37mm (1.4in) or two57mm (2.24in) wi ng cannon for tank busting. In the rearcockpit was a 12.7mm (0.5in) machine-gun or 20mm(0.78in) cann on for ground strafing. The top speed was426km/h (265mph) and crui sing speed around 322km/h(200mph) , achieved using an AJ\ I-38F inline engine giv­ing 1,700hp for take-off and I ,550hp for cruise. Like theStuka, the 11-2 had a range of some 612km (380 miles) ,which meant basing it vulnerably close 10 the front line.

Typical of Soviet aircraft of the per iod was VladimirM Pctl yakov's Pe-2 twin-engine light bom ber for groundsupport , medi um-level dive bombing and tactical recon­naissance.With a span of 17.1m (56ft -lin) and thu s sim­ilar in size to the Douglas DB-7, it appeared 10 owe someof its origin to the Frenc h Potez 63. Of the crew of thr ee,the rear gunner was dangerou sly separated from the oth ­ers by a large fuel tan k. As well as a dorsal 7.62mm

107

Co nceited bef ore the '('(1 r, bill 1101 ill service until 1941, theIlyushin 1/-2 u'as a heavily -armed and tcell a rmo ured lightat tack bomber. Production began zcith the single-seater ,'er­sion ill 1941, the I",o-searer fo llounng ill mid-1942.

G roup had its own Air Army, there being three mainGroups. North , Ce ntral and Southern. which much im­proved the air forces. \'{' ithin each Air Army were AirDivision s comp rising three Air Regiments, whose taskwas to support the Red Arm y.T he Long Range Bom berForce raised during the war attacked targets well behindthe battle line and its bombers, with no sophistica tednight bom bing aids , carr ied out operations deep intohostile territory including Poland, Ge rma ny andHungary. As the Germans advanced eastwa rds theyoverran ma ny of the \'{'estern District factorie s, Rapid es­tablishment of new production sources well 10 the castallowed a turnaround in Russia's air force strength. andby the end of 1943 the Soviet Air Forces were fightingback stro ngly. By then aircraft were being known by theirdesigner or factory name, whereas p reviou sly theymerely had classification titles: BB for close-rangebomber, DB for long -ra nge bom ber, SB for fast bomberand T B for heavy bombe r; II for lllyushin , Pe forPetlyakov, Tu for Tupolev and so forth . precedin gbomber design numbers.

The three-m an , Tupolev des igned SB- 2 was in usefor mu ch of the war. Two 830 hp ,\ 1-100 inline engineswere set far forward and its huge wings, spanning20.33m (66ft 8in) , were supp lemented by a giant trian­gular tailplane. It had a top speed of about 393km/h(244mph ) and a limiting range of 1,250km (777 miles).Defended by two nose guns and single dorsal and ven­tral guns (replaced by turrets) later versions were pow­ered by two 960 hp M-103 engines. Owing 10 thei rvu lnerability, SB-2s usually operated at night . Som ewere fine d with skis, a special varia nt being theArkhangelskii Ar-2, powered by I , I OOhp M -105Rs andintended for close support and dive bombing.

T he backbone of the Russian bomber squadro ns wasthe 1937 Ilyushin DB-3 with twin 1,000hp M- 88 radialengines, in production by 1940 as the DB-3f or 11-4.Used also in the Russo-Finnish war, the DB- 3 had a21.35m (70ft 3in) span, and , with a top speed of abo ut370km/h (230mph) , cou ld carry a 907kg (2,000Ib) load

Soviet military policy recognised two threats; onefrom the cast and one from the west .Therefore its forceswere organised to fight independently and simultaneous­I\" the Western and Eastern Air Forces each even havingthe ir own sources of production . Both Air Forces com­prised four main elements: Air Forces of the Air Armiesor ,\ Iilitar v Dist ricts, Fighter Defence Force defe ndingspecial rear areas, the Long Range Bomber Force orIndependent Strike Force und er the SupremeCom mand. and the Air Force of the Red Fleets or NavalCo mmand s. Prewar control was entirely thro ughMilitary Distric ts. the n during the war each Army

Bu ilt in large nu mbers, the Tupolcu S8-2 'fast bomber' of the

late 1930s stemmed f rom the AST-40.

Steady derelopment of the AST-42 led 10 the Pctlya km : Pe-S, the S ouiet Un ion 5 only uartime heavy bom ber.

Russia 's Bom bersAt dawn on 22 June 1941 German troops stormed theUSSR from the Baltic 10 the Black Sea . Junkers [u 88s ,He I II s an d Do 217s raced in high to pulvcrise airfieldsclandestinely reconn oitred by Dorniers , and by noon theUSSR had lost 528 aircraft on the ground an d 210 in theair in the Western District . Ge rma n record s claim that bymid- aftern oon 1,200 Russian aircraft had succumbed .Ill-trained and poo rly organised. the Sovie t Air Force un ­doubtedlv su ffered a reeling blow and is thought 10 havelost 3,808 aircraft within five days.

A I R C RAFT OF T ilE SE COSD \'· OR I. D \, 'AR

Soon after the B-24Ds returned to Britain in summer1943 the v were replaced by the B-24H (3.100 built) andB-24J (6.778 built) . both of which had new. power­operated twin 0.50in (12 .7mm) nose gun turrets, andbetter waist positions. The slab-sided B-24 was easier 10

mass produ ce than the B-17. and a huge Ford complexat \\TilIow Run churne d out B-24s at an amazing rate,Twin 0.50 in (12.7 mm) guns were in the tail turrets ofthe 1,667 B-2-1Ls and 2.593 of the lighter B-24 ,\ \. T heB-24 was usuallv faster tha n the B-17. but the 'FlyingFortress' was long established and more charismatic.Two-thirds of the US 8th Air Force went 10 war inB- 17s; the rest had B-24s.

106

A IRC RAFT OF T HE SECOSD \X· O R l. D WAR THE B 0 .\ \ B ERR E\'O l. UTI 0 S

Germany's oldy dedicated long- range heavy bomber, the troublesome Heinkel He I 77A, had double coupled engines drivinghuge four -bladed propellers.This captured exa mple uoas tested at RAE Farnborough in 19014.

build a long-range bomber able to reach as far as all partsof the UK from Germany. The Reichsluftfah rt ­ministerium (RLM) drafted a specification that was sentonly to Heinkel. Naval backing was given on the under­standing that the aircraft would be used to co-operatewith U'-boat activity. It needed to carr y 907kg (2,000lb)for 6,600km (4,100 miles) at a speed of 539km/h(335mph). Aided by Daimler -Benz, Heinkel offered anovel four-engine bomber made possible by couplingtwo twelve-cylinder liquid-cooled DB 601 engines tomake a dupl ex DB 606 driving one propeller throughelaborate gearing. Having only two nacelles would cutdrag and save development cost and time. Large radia­tors would obviously be needed. Fuel consumptioncould be high, and there was no doubting the overallcomplexity. Guns in barbcttes would have reduced drag ,but tur rets proved easier to develop. The undercarriagegeometry was unusual, both pairs of legs parting, one toretract inwards and one outwards before being coveredby doors. Heinkel's He 177 bomber seemed likely tohave an all-up weight of 26,998kg (59,5201b) and to beable to reach 550km/h at 5,486m (342mph at 18,000ft) .Design work was well under way when Heinkel was toldto apply Uder's dive-bomber policy to the He 177. The31.39m (103ft) span bomber would need to dive at upto 60°, which meant restressing, adding much uselessweight and delaying the project by more that a year.Thefirst flight took place on 19 November 1939.

Future war , it was reckoned, would be total, therebymaking the destruction of indu str y, cities and the moraleof their people legitimate objectives. If new bombers be­came unstoppable and were the heart of air power, thenthe means to retaliate were essential. Many Luftwaffeofficers wrongly believed that the Do 17 and He IIIwere quite suitable for strategic operations, but neitherhad sufficient range to reach any part of Britain from

deterrent force to prevent Fran ce and Poland from stop­ping Germany re-establishing itself as a great power. Afleet of 400 four-engined bombe rs was proposed, to de­stroy enemy means of production and break civilianmorale.The army, opposing this concept, believed that itinvi ted retaliation , and pointed out that German indus­try lacked the capacity to build such aircraft.

The Luftwaffe's first chief of staff, Oberst Walter\Xh'er, favoured a broader based strategy in which theair force complemented the army and navy and did notoperate independently. Although We\'er expre ssed theview that ' the decisive weapon of air warfare is thebomber', he pointed out that a strategic bomb er fleetcould not destroy an enemy air force. He contended thatGe rmany needed ample fighters and AA guns for de­fence and the provision of air superiority for the armyand navy, While the destru ction of enemy indu str y mightbe sound policy, it could take a very long time.Nevertheless, he agreed that it made sense to have a fleetof long-range bombers.

The four-engine Dorn ier Do 19 and Junkers Ju 89were steadily going ahead when, in June 1936, the far­sighted \Xh 'er was killed in an accident. His successo rwas Gen Albert Kesselring, a military leader rather thana strategist, who questioned the heavy bomber plan .Cancellation of both large bomb ers came about becausedesign and production of engines to provide the requiredperformance was beyond achievement within the neces­sary timescale. The Luftwaffe then pursued the 1936short -range medium bomber programme becau se its air­craft were suitable for the likely restricte d sphere ofoperations covering Czechoslovakia, France and Poland .Ernst Udet began parading his belief that, becau se divebombing gave the most accurate results, all bombersshould have that capability.

Neverth eless, a firm decision was taken in 1937 to

Germany and th e heavy bomberGermany's strategic heavy bomber programme orig­inated in ,\ Iay 1933, when the air force supporteda study suggesting that it should acquire sufficient

of the 11-2 resulted in the 6,350kg (14,000lb) all-upweight 11-1 0 of 1944 . The wing and tail unit weremodified, thicker arm our was installed and engine powerrose to 2,000hp with the fitting of an AM-42, boos tingthe top speed to 455km/h at 2,133m (283mph at7,000 ft). Range was much enhanced, to about 1,239(770 miles), for which a 1,002kg (2,2101b) weapon loadcould be carried . Soviet fascination with rocket weaponswas evident und er the wings, where the aircraft car ried ahefty load . T here were two 23mm cannon in its main­planes and a 12.7mm or 20mm free gun in the rear cock­pit. The pilot had two forward firing 7.62mmmach ine-guns.

Although its design began in 1938, theTupolevTu -Z,of which over 3,000 were eventually built, did not flyuntil June 1941 and came into use in late 1943 as a Pe-2replacement. \X'ith two 1,750hp Ash-82/83, its loadedweight was 12,802kg (28,224Ib) and late exampl es at­tained 557km/h at 5,791m (348mph at 19,000ft).Defended by four 0.50 in guns and a 20mm cannon , ithad a span of 2.3m (69ft lOin), reached a ceiling of10,972m (36,000ft) and had a range of 2,494km carry­ing 1,497kg (1,550ml carrying 3,300lb) , which made itthe best Russian bomber of the war.

The Petlyakou Pe-2 u'as the US S R's pr incipal umtimetactical bomber.

The Tupoleu TtI-2 300mph bomber entered service in late 19012.

(0.30in) gun, replaced on later versions by a dorsal tur­ret, the rear gunner also controlled a ventral gun aimedthrough a periscope . Bombs were carried in small cellswithin the fuselage and the rear nacelles of the I,100hp.\ I- I05R inline engin es. The usual load totalled 598kg( I ,3201b), but could be increased to 998kg (2,200lb) , forthere was provision for add itional weapons below thewing centre section . Two 7.62mm (0.30in) forwardfiring guns were usually fitted in the nose. The Pe-2weighed 5,851kg (12,900Ib) empty and 7,679kg(16,9301b) loaded . Its low-level top speed was 460km/h(286mph) , and the maximum atta inable was 537km/h at4,998m (334mph at 16,400ft). It had a normal range ofabout 1,126km (700 miles) . A longer-range version car­ried an additional navigator.

Mid -war development to maintain the effectiveness

108 109

AIR CRAFT O F TH E S E C O~D \X· ORI.D W ART ilE II 0 .\ \ II E RR E v0 L u T I () x

Br itain 's second-generation bombers, the Halifax, S tirling and M anchester; u'ere designed to accommodate 2,OOOlb bombs,chich the Hampdm could also carry. Here a ,l lanchester is abolll to rcceit'e its 2,OOO-pounder.

111

711e ,1I~nchester's huge bomb ~Y, able to comain bombs larger than 2,OOO-pollllders,formed the nuc/eus of its four-mginedderivative, the Lancaster, an azrcraft of .vo 619 Squadron being sem here.

eng ines vibrated badl y, ran at very high temperatu res,overheated qui ckly and readil y caught fire, Co nnectingrods were breaking, tearing open oil tanks .Tightl y pack­aged eng ine parts received insufficien t lub ricatio n, andwith no firewa lls between the powerplant bays and themainpl anc, fires spread casill'. 111il su rfaces hadinsuffic ient area , and the seco nd prototype disinte gr atedowing to control flutt er.

Early trials showed that a loaded He 177 , carrying amere three guns, weighed 23,920kg (52,734Ib), had atop speed of only 460km/h (286mph) and a 4,85 5km(3,0 17-milc) range. By comparison, the 1940 Fw200C-0 bomber now had thre e 7.9mm guns, and the Fw200 C- 1 also featured a forward-firing M G FF 20mmcann on in a gondola. A 250kg (5501b) bomb was carriedbeneath each outer engine nacelle and another on anoutboard rack ; four in all. Before 1940 was out \\IinstonC hurchill was calling the Condo r ' the scourge of theAtlantic' , yet only twenty-six Fw 200Cs had been built,and on average only eight were serviceable. BetweenAugust 194 0 and Februar y 194 1 they were creditedwith sinking eighty-five ships totalling 363 ,000 tons(368,800 tonnes), making them an exceptionall y sue­ccssful investment.

The same could not be said of the He 177 Greif(G riffon) . Each troublesome example became heavier,and the sixth prototype reached 28,070kg (6 1,883Ib) ,giving it a very high wing loading of 280kgfm'(57A9Ibfft') . For take-off the DB 606A-l co uld provide2,700hp, bu t the engines gave con stant trouble.Airfram e, equipment, combatting fires in the air , aerody­namic problems, worries about structural strength andrepeated modification s - not to mention coping with allthc ingcnuity - rcsultcd in a disastrou s progr ammc. 'I\voprototypcs plamcd am ong thc Condors for trials in latc1941 wcrc immcdiatcly pron ounccd usclcss.

N ot until N ovcmbcr 1941 did thc first Hc 177A-Oprc-production airc raft fly. \\' ith a crcw of fivc and anall-up wcight of 30,000kg (66,139Ib) , it relicd for dc­fcncc up on fi\'c machinc-guns and a cannon . Itsoffcnsivc load was a mcrc 2,34 0kg (5,2901b) .

Had thc Gc rmans known, thcy might havc dcrivcdslight comfort from problcms bcsctting RAF 'bigbombers'. Thc A\'ro Manchcstcr' s Rolls-Roycc Vulturccngincs suffcrcd o\'crhcating and crankshaft troublcs,whilc thc Short Stirling's cng incs pcakcd so low that itscciling was aro und 13,000ft (3,962m). But whcrcas thcGcrmans had no hca\'y bombcr in prospcct, thc RAFwas looking forward to rccciving thc supcrb AnoLancastcr, which inhcritcd thc spacious bomb bay of thcManchcstcr, thc wor ld's first bombcr conccived as awcap ons systcm. This ncwcomcr, with room for12,000lb (5,440kg) of bombs, could convcy mu ch oftha t wcight dccp imo Gcrmany, and rcgularly dcli\'cr toBcr lin's factorics and officcs around 9,0001b at 20,000ft

110

Germany, In the event of war , bases in France and theLow Countr ies wou ld need to be seized to achieve that,unless a long -range bomber was available,

C hief of Staff Kesselrin g was rep laced by Hansjeschonn ck. who, driven by the belief that Hitler cou lddo no wro ng, stau nchly followed his leader 's ideas ,propos ing air force policies that were eco nomically im­possible and which gave little support to a lon g-rangebomber , By 193 9 Wcvcr 's carefully conceived plans hadbecome sub merged in daily reaction to the existing situ­ation, making a cohe rent stra tegic bo mb ing policy irn­possible to implem ent . The Luftwaffe was vir tuallysidelined into suppo rting a ground war, and became in­creasingly tied to the army.

Experience in Spain had shown how hard it was tofind a target , let alone hit it. At nigh t that woul d be ex­ccedingly difficult , so research was instigated to developradio bo mbing aids to support the Hc 177 force when itbeca me effective . In August 1939 Hermann G oringc1aimcd to place grea t imp ortance on thc He 177 and thenew high- speed J\lc sscrschmitt M c 210 multi -purposetype s, Then hc ordered that concentrati on be directedup on producing existing type s, not on entirely new de­signs and experime ntation, a policy little changed until1942 . Future bombers becam e steady improvem en ts ofthe Do 17 (the Do 217) and the ju 88 au 188) . O nlyHeinkel would develop a major new type while it keptthe Hc III in production until 1944 .

A low-powered , limited-perfor mance four-engineFocke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor reconnaissance bomberada pted from a tra nsa tlantic airliner design and orderedby the japanese was nearing completion. Co uld astrc ngthcncd, 13,\1\'\' 132H-powcrcd vcrs ion bc ada ptcdto bccomc an imcrim lon g-ran gc bombcr, at lcast tosatisfy thc na\'Y? From a prcwar batch of tcn Fw200C-Os (modificd Fw 200B s) six wcrc complctcd withdcfcnsivc guns carll' in 1940, and soo n thc Fw 200s ofI.fK G 40 co mmc nccd bombing shipping during thcNorwcgian campaign . By july 1940 thc C ondors wcrcbascd at Bordcau . M crignac , from whcrc thcy carricdout anti-shipping opcrations ovcr Biscay, and off Irclandand N orway.Thcy also madc a fcw bombing sortics ovcrthc UK in latc August 1940 , bccoming thc first four­cn ginc Luftwaffc bombcrs to raid Britain , but wcrc quitcunsui tablc for cmploymcm as stratcgic bombcrs.

Against undcfcndcd mcrcham ships , though,Condors had succcss far bcyond that implicd by thcirsmall numbcrs, and during August and Scp tcm bcr 1940sank ovcr 90,000 tons (9 1,500 tonncs) of Allicd ship­ping. On 26 Octobcr a Condor sct on firc thc 42,378-ton(43,000-tonnc) Canad ian Pacific Empress of Br itainnorthwcst o f Ireland, thc burning linc r bcing subsc­qu cntl y torp cdocd by thc U-32 . Co uld thc Hc 177 soonplay a similar part?

Thc answcr was a rcsounding 'n o', for its complcx

A IRCRAFT OF TilE SE CO:-;n WORLD \X'AR

Bremen under RAF night attack, photographed 0 11 2/3 JIl Iy1942 from a Lancaster of No 97 Squadron. A ircraft move­ment, drifting fia res and markers, and the seats of fires allcontribute to the horrific beauty of this picture.

at 200 mph (3,630kg at 6,10 0m at 320km/h). N o othermid- war bomber could equal that.

As Britain's champi on bomber prep ared for its 19-12ope ratio na l debu t, the first prod ucti on He-I 77A-I s alsoap pea red, with a top speed of 510km/h at 5,800m(3 17mph at 19,030ft) and the ability to cruise at430km/h (270mph), provided there was no eng ine fire.Some improvement was expected from mating two DB605 s to produce the DB 610, forecast to provide2,950hp for take- off and over 3,100hp abo ve 7,000ft.T hat was largel y hypothetical, the He 177A-3 settling forthe DB 606 , a success ion of modifications, differingguns and variou s weapon load s, with little pr ospect ofsuccessful bomber or maritime ope rations.

M eanwhile, the Condo rs of l./KG -10 m oved toN orway, bent on monitoring and attackingRussian -bound convoys, When the full exte nt of th eSta lingrad debacle became apparent, the Germansbegan ferrying troops out of their enci rc lement, So des­perate did they become that He 177s participated, fivebeing variously lost du ring such ac tivity betweenN ovember 19-12 and 2 Feb ruary 1943, along with nineFw 200s, 169 He I I Is and a j u 290 transport derivedfrom the ill-fated j u 89.

Feb ruar y 1943 saw delivery of the first He 177A-5 ,the most effective of its breed. Whereas Germany stillhad no strategic force, RAF Bomber Command could,on I M arch 19-13, call upon 330 Lan caster s, 237Wellingt on s, 2 14 Halifaxes, 147 Stirlings and 74M osquitoes in its squadrons. Of the latt er , twent y-two

all 16/1 7 September 1942 36 9 crm's claimed to have madea highly effective raid 011 Es sen. Amollg them U'ere thoseaboard the No 97 Squadron Lancaster, one of 93 involved,f rom uihich this night photograph U'as secured. ,\lore than100 largefires u'ere started.

The best-knoum RAF special attack of the U'a r breached theM oime Dam.Willer call be seen pouring through the uiall illthis picture, taken f rom a Spitfi re PR .X!.

were Oboe pathfinders which , within a week, were tomark the Krupp works at Essen so accurately in darkne ssthat it was devastated. Even by the end of 194 3 only 261

112

He 177A-5s had been built, primaril y for anti -shi ppi ngoperations.T hat left the ju 88, Ju 188 and updates of theDo 2 17 to continue sparse bo mbing of the British Isleswhile awaiting New Year's Eve, when OperationCapricorn, a combined V I flying bomb, V2 rocket andbo mbe r onslaught, would burst upon Lo ndon with teu­ton ic feroc ity. Instead, the V-wcapon s were, like thcbombers, not read y.

T he DB 6 10A- I-engined He 177A-5 had a ser vicecei ling of 8,000m (26,250ft) and a top speed of -I88km/hat 6, 100m (303mph at 20,000ft) , wh ere it cruise d at-I15km/h (258mph ) . Its range was 5,480 km (3,-100miles) at a start ing all-up weight of 25,8-10kg (59,970lb) ,the maximum overload permitted being 3 1,000kg(68,3-1Olb) . lts 31. 39m ( 103ft) wingspa n was close to theLa ncaster's 102ft (3 1.08m) , and its Icngth a similar19.-lm (67ft) .

In Novem ber 19-13 twenty He 177s of II./K G -10 ca r­ryi ng Hs 293 glide r bombs attacked a Biscay convoy indaylight, sinking a ship and losing three of their number.Of ano the r fourtee n attacki ng shipping five days later ,four were sho t down and three crash -landed . On 21Janua ry 19-1-1 somc thirty A-3s and A-5s draw n froml./KG -10 and l./K G 100 base d at C hateaudun andRhe ine too k part in the postponed ' Baby Blitz' onLo ndon. This was hardl y successful, KG 100 alone los­ing six aircraft be tween 21 Januar y and 2 ,\ Iarch, four ofthem to nightfight er s.

T he He 177A-3s fielded were har d ly glitteri ng per­forme rs. Operating at 30,8-1-1kg (68,000lb) , 32,886kg(n ,500lb) ove rloa ded, they proportio na tely ca rried verysmall loads, some bring ing to London only twelve 250 kg(550lb) bombs. T he average load for a 88 5km (550­mile) flight co uld total 7,690kg ( 16,950lb) , which couldcomprise two 1,800kg (3,968Ib) and two 1,000kg(2,200lb) bombs intern ally and two exte rna l 1,000kgbombs. The first He 177A-3 shot down in Brit ain hadcarried an 11,0001b load , and set out for a 6-15 km (-100­mile) flight carrying -I,2-15kg (9,360lb) of fue l.The aver­age top speed for the aircraft being emp loyed wasaround -I50km/h at 3,9 60m (280mph at 13,000ft). Fordefence there were five M G l3l s, an M G 8 1 and a20mm MG 151 in the tail, where lack of power traverselimited its usefulne ss. T he DB 6 10 in the He 177 A-5was now giving 2,580hp for take-off, 2,-I68hp at 5,791m( 19,000ft) . It was possible to shut down one of its DB605s, which usually led to troubl e, as the remainingpowe r unit tended to overheat.

The Hc 177s continued ope rating into ,\ Iarch,suffering from attacks by M osquito nightfighters, daystrafers and more from mechanical ma laise . T hey with­drew from operations that month, as th e Allies massed insouthern En gland for the D-Day assa ult. How useful-100 effective 'heavies' would have thcn been, for theycould have incinerated the glide rs, knocked out loadin g

11 3

TilE BO .\ IBER RE\,OL UTIO:-;

ports, ba ttered troo p concentrations and migh t have pre­vented the invasion . Instead , a few He 177s played amin imal part du ring the nights following the N orm and ylandi ngs by attac king Allied shipping in Caen Bay withadvanced weapo ns.

But the He I77's eng ine problems were never co m­plete ly cure d, merely ad jus ted. Four conventiona l en­gincs were later fitted to the He 277, the wings of whichwere exte nded to 39.95m ( 13 1ft 3in) to im prove th erange. A high- altitude vers ion, th e Hc 27-1 (four DB603A), wings pan -I-I .19m ( 1-I5ft) , carried an 4,006kg(8,832Ib) bo mb load. Its all-up weight was 36,0 IOkg(79,388Ib) , its ran ge 4,248km at II ,000 m (2,640 milesat 36,100ft) and the top spee d was 579km/h at 1O,990m(360mph at 36,060ft) . H owever, these were only expe r­imental vers ions flown too late to be of any value ,

On 3 July 1944 Ge rma ny's co nve ntiona l bo mber pro­gramme was largely halted in order to conce nt rate re­sources on fighter p roduc tion and a handful of adva nce dtypes, par ticularly jets. But that same month the ill-fatedHc 177 found some 'e leven th hour' success. \Vith aboutninety airc raft on hand, three G ru ppcn of KG I flew theGricf agai nst Russian tactical ta rgets while dwindlingfuel stocks lasted . This single unit's stre ngth was by asignificant margin the most powerful Lu ftwaffe striki ngforce on the Eas tern Fro nt. Ope rations were mainly sue ­ccssfu l, with little sign of the engi ne fires tha t had soplagued the type previou sly,They culminated in a seriesof daylight forma tion bo mb ing raids by eighty -p lus H e177s to demonstra te wha t might have bee n.

Japan's b ombersIn commo n with other types, japanese Air Forcebo mbers had a chronological ' Ki' number, and when or­dcrs were placed the aircraft were given a manufacturer 'sname, a type number indi catin g the year in the japanesecalenda r in which produ ction began , a function andmod el or mark number. Up to 1939 the type numberused th e last two digits of the yea r, i.c . '99' ca rne from2599 and 1940 was de no ted by 100, after which 1941and 194 2 used Type I and Type 2. Navy systems weremore co mplex, and thr ee styles were used. An expe ri­mental number was rep laced by a type number followedby year, function and model ide ntity figures. Aftermid-1 943 thc type number was repl aced by a namc.TheN avy mode l num ber had two figu res, one for the air­frame and one for the engine.

An ageing Army design frequentl y updated was theKawasaki Ki-48 (Army Ty pe 99 ), code named 'Lily' bythe Allies, Carrying a crew of four, it had two 1,000hpHa 25 eng ines, Close in size to a Blenheim, it weighed4,050kg (8,930lb) emp ty and 6,085kg (l3,4 17Ib) loadedand was quite agile. Its bo mb load was only 299 kg(660lb) , and the top speed of 479km/h (298mph ) waslinked with a 2,398km (l,490-mile) maximum range for

A I RC R A F T OF THE SE CO:-';D \\ 'ORLD \\ 'AR

Kawasak i produced the K i-4 8 'lily'veconnaissance bomber.

Manchurian border operatio ns. \\'id ely employed as alight bomber , the Ki-4 8 readil y fell to fighters if un­escorted, its only protection being four 7.7mm (0.30in)or 12.7mm (0.50in) free guns. Like the Hampden andthe Bf 110, the Ki-4 8 had a slender, cut-away, drag re­ducing fuselage to improve the gunner's view, Betweenjuly 1940 and 194 2 550 Ki-4 8s were built. The M odel2a followed , with I ,130hp Ha 115 rad ial engines in­creasing the top speed to 315mph while the bomb loadremained only 4 53kg ( I ,000l b) . Anoth er 1,450 exampleswere built before production ceased in late 1944 .

Wh en war began the Army made much use of theM itsubishi Ki-21 Type 97 'Sally' altho ugh it was obso ­lescent . Schemed in 1936 and operated between 1937and 1945 , this long-range four-seat bomber was also in­tended for use over the Ru sso-Manchurian border re­gion. Ca rrying a 748kg (1,6 501b) load and cruising at306km/h (190mph) , it had a top speed of 402km/h(250mph) at 3,048 m (10,000rt) and was powered bytwo l-l- cylinder two-row engines. The arma ment ofthree 7.7mm (0.30in) guns, one each in the nose, ventra land dorsal position s, was later increased when a rem otetail-cone gun was installed . Production of the Ki- 21-1began in 1938. Spanning 22m (72ft lOin) and 116m(52rt 6in ) long, it had a top speed of 433km/h(269mph). In De cember 1941 Ki- Zl s bombed HongKong, Burma and the Philippines.

The Mitsubishi G4M, codenamed 'Belly' by the Allies. servedthroughout the conflict.

The Ki- 21-1I had 1,400hp engines , more arma ment,and in lIb form a 12.7mm (0.50in) gun in a dorsalturret. Extra power gave a top speed of 478km/h(297mph) at 3,999m (13 ,120rt ) and carrying a maxi­mum load the aircraft had a range of 2, 172km (1,350miles) when cruising at 283km/h (176mph). Prod uctionended in September 1944 , nearly 2,000 Ki-21s havingbeen built within eight years. On 24 M ay 1945 nin e Ki­21s were dispatched in a spec tacular attempt to disruptB-29 activities on Okin awa. Seven reached the island bu tsix were shot down , leaving one to land troops who de­stroyed seve n B-29s and mu ch ammunition and fuel in acourageo us but futile suicide attack.

jap an 's heavie st land attack bomber, based on opera­tional experience gained in C hina, was the navy 'sMitsubi shi G4 ,\11 Type I Rikko, known to the Allies as' Betty' and possessing exceptional range of trans-Pacificpro port ions. As with other jap anese bombers, this wasgained at the expense of defensive arma ment, whichmade it highly vulnerable if unescorted, especially so be­cause the 5,000-litre ( I , IOOgal) wing tanks were unpro­tecte d. Design work starte d in 193 7, the japanese bythen relying up on their indigenous aircraft industry.Thenavy required a bomber with a 3,70 1km (2,300-mile)range when carry ing a torpedo or a 798kg (1,7601b)bomb load. That meant a light airframe, and the G4M Ihad two Mitsubishi Ka sei 1,530hp l-i- cylindcr radial en­gines .With a top speed of 428km /h at 4,200m (266mphat 13,780ft ), and cru ising at 315km/h at 2,999m( l 96 mph at 9,840ft), the seven-man G4M I, defendedby four hand-held 7.7mm guns and a 20mm tail cannon ,became operational in M ay 1941. Ca rrying a 998kg(2,200lb) bom b load or an 807 kg (1,7601b) torpedo, itweighed 6,758kg (14,900lb) empty and 9,500kg(20,944Ib) loaded. Of the 180 delivered by December1941 , the navy held 120 ready to bom b Malaya, thePhilippines and Dutch East Indie s. From Formosa on 8December they very effectively stru ck at Clark Field.Wh en the battl eship s HMS Prince of lI'ales and Repulsewere discovered , twenty-seven 'Bettys' based in Ind o­china were ordered to make the fateful torpedo attack.

M itsubishi 's K i-2 J 'Sally' u-as rapidly oil/classed dur ing theFar Easl war.

114

A late ent ry into bailie u'as the M itsubishi K i- 67 H iry u,alias 'Peggy'.

Subsequently G4M Is operated over the M arianas , theM arshall Island s, New Guinea and the Solom ons, andsank the USS Langley during a very successful but cost­ly pha se of the war .

The G4M2, with lam inar-flow wing and Kasei 21engines with methanol injec tion , carried 330ga l more ina pro tecte d tank in the fuselage. It first flew in N ovember1942.The prominent flank observa tion blister s had beenreplaced, and additional nose glazing and a dorsal turretwith a 20mm cann on were added, along with two more7.7mm (0.30in) guns. The weight of the 24.9m (8 1ft8in) span, 19.5m (64ft 5in) long aircraft rose consider­ably to 7.994kg (17,624Ib) empty and 12,500kg(27 ,557Ib) loaded. In 1943 ,660 were built. An improvedversion, the G4M3, appeared in M ay 1944, powered by1,85 0hp Ka sei 25s which gave it a top speed of 438km/hat 4,599m (272mph at 15,090ft ) and an enhanced rangeof 3,640km (2,260 miles) when cruising at 315km/h( l 96 mph). A revised wing layout, along with crew andfuel-tank protection , turned the 'Betty' into a sho rt-rangemaritime patrol bomber. In all 2,479 were built.

The finest japanese bomber was the late-war,\ Iitsubishi Ki-6 7 Hiryu, 'Peggy' , a 1941 army design in­troduced to operations in October 1944 as a torpedobomber and Ki-21 repla cem ent. Here at last was ajapane se bomber with good defence to revitali se, poten­tially, an outclassed force to tackle US Navy units. Theslim , clean form, carrying a crew of six or eight and de­fended by four 12.7mm (0.50in) and one 20mm guns,inco rpo rated Western ideas mixing combat needs andcrew safety. The prototype Ki-67 flew in December1942, with two 18-cylinder, two- row, two-speed super­charged, fan-c ooled Mitsubi shi Ha-I04 radial s deliver­ing 2,000hp for take-off. Easy to build and maintain, theKi-67, with a wing span of 22.5m (73rt 9Y.in) and alength of 19m (62 1rt 4in ), was progressing well. Thenthe Ser vices asked for more and more modifications, tosuch an extent that production was seriously retarded.Only 251 were deliv ered in 1944, yet the Ki-6 7 was thenone of the few bombers japan could depend up on . Bythis time B-29 raid s were badl y damaging japan's air­craft factories.

lIS

T ilE BOMBER REVOL UT IO:-';

Its speed and range allowed the Ki-67 to attack USbases on the M arianas and Okinawa, carry ing a 798kg(1,7601b) bom b load . With a top speed of 537 .5km/h at5,8 15m (334mph at 19.080ft) it stood a reasonablechance of evading fighters. C ruising at 399km/h(248mph), it possessed a normal range of 2,800km(1,740 miles) and a service ceiling of9 ,470m (31,070ft) ,and was clearly the type of bomber japan sho uld havedeveloped sooner.

The Unar med Bom b erThe conc ept was simple. A bomber would fly muchfaster if sho rn of defensive guns, gunners and the struc­ture and fuel conveyin g them. Overall it would be safer,and operation ally far more efficient. \\'hether it wasmulti-piston or even iet- engined, the hypothe sis stillmade sense. Expenditure would be less and tacticalflexibility grea ter, but getting such ideas accepted wasvery difficult, especially in 1938, for the RAF's I31enheimwas faster than oppos ing fight ers, though they were onlybiplanes. De Havilland, which in the Fir st World War hadproduced the D.H. 9 bomber, faster than existingfighters, was planning ano ther, to reach 400mph.

Within three weeks of its D.H.88 Co me t racer win­ning the speed prize in the 1934 Mild enhall toM elbourne McRobertson Air Race, de Havilland hadapplied its clean aerodynamics to the four-engineD.H .91 Albatross airliner.With war clouds gathe ring, thecompa ny pointed out that the Albatross could convey a6,000lb (2,72 1kg) load to Berlin in a non-stop returnflight. Wh en Specification P.13/36 , outlining a twin- en­gined bomber, arrived at Hatfield in August 1936 itaro used interest. Could the wooden D.H .91 be adapted?Turrets, bombs and torpedoes were all required for this275 mph (443km/h) bomber able to transport 4,5001bfor 3,000 miles (2,040kg for 4,83 0km ). De Havillandproposed a twin-Merlin wooden bomber in which speedwas param ount, but this idea from a company inexperi­enced in bomber design was dismissed by the AirMini str y.

In the first week of war de Havilland again ap­proach ed the ministry, presenting ideas for a small,two-man, unarmed bomber. Sceptical officials requestedmore det ails, so the company reminded them that Berlinwas two hours away! Estimates were carefully studiedand different engine installations considered, with theM erlin always best. A turret and gunner added 9151b(4 15kg), clipping a vital 20mph (32km/h) off the speed.Keeping the aircraft small was likely to give a top speedof 409mph (654km/h) , and by N ovember 1939 workwas concentrated on a 54ft-span twin Merlin-enginedbomber to carry a 1,000lb (453.6kg) load for 1,500miles (2,4 14km) at a speed approaching 400mph(644km/h). Althou gh its sur face area was twice that ofthe Sp itfire, it would have twice the power. A very

A I RC R A FT O F THE S E CO ~ D \X· ORI.D \X' AR THE B O .\ \B ER R E\· OI. r; T I O~

Unarmed and made of uood, the de Havilland M osquito I I' ,ms the fastest light bomber of its time. Its speed and effi ciencyalloued it to fly nco sorties to Berlin ill one night, usually immune to attack, delivering a 4,OOOlb 'cookie' each time.

smooth, aerodynamically refined wooden structure andducted radiator s would further compensate for size,making it at least 20mph faste r than the Spitfire.

The Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command, saidon 12 Decembe r 1939 that he had 'no use' for the un ­armed bomber, but that the newcomer showed promisefor high-altitude reconnaissance. Eventually, after stro ngarguments put forward by Sir Wilfrid Freeman, the AirMemb er for Research, Development and Production, anorder for fifty such aircraft was agreed, giving deHavilland a foot in the door. Design went ahead on awooden ph otographic-rec onnaissance (PR) machineweighing about 17,000lb (7,7 IOkg) and having a topspeed of 397mph at 23, 700ft (639km!h at 7,220m). OnI March 1940 a contract for fifty D.H.98 reconnaissanceaircraft for the RAF was confirmed .

On 25 November 1940 the prototy pe (W4050) madeits maiden flight , almost imm ediately confirming perfor­mance estimates. By February 194 1 it had flown at386mph (620kmlh) - 20mph (32km!h) faste r than thecur rent mark of Spitfire. Official tria ls at Boscorn beDown confirmed the high performa nce , luckily beforethe tailwh eel jammed on a roug h sur face and theMosqu ito's fuselage fractured . De Havillan d broughtalong a rep lacement unit from the PR prototype ,

11 6

\V4051, and carpenters armed with saws, glue and skilldemonstrated the ease of repair.

By .\ Iay 1941 the 16,0001b (7,257kg) prototype hadreached 392mph at 22,000ft (631km!h at 6,706m),making it faster than any existing fighter. An order forbombers followed , and a contract amendment nowcalled for ten PRlBomber Co nversion Type equivalent tothe later .\ Ik IV. On 15 N ovember \'\'4064 became thefirst MosquilO bomber to join the RAE

The true bomber prototype was W4057, the Mos­quito 13 .\ Ik V. Bomb-bay measurements showed thatdoub le the load could be carried if telescopic fins couldbe fined to bombs. Instead, the ir tails were shortened sothat the bomber could carry four 500lb (227kg) high -ex­plosive (HE) bombs. With emphasis on high flying forprotecti on, the next stage in Mosqu ito developmentcame when W4050 was grounded in October 1941 forfitment of two-stage supercharged Merlin 61s.

Not un til 31 May 1942 did the bomber conversion gointo action, as a PR aircraft flying high 10 assess theeffectiveness of the previous nigh t's 'T housa nd Bomber'raid on Cologne.The sixth fligh t that day was undertak­en by Sqn Ld r Channcr, who, for safety and 10 try forbette r photographs, decided to flyW4069 very low to es­cape radar and fighter s. He thereby initia ted a tactic now

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standard in the RAE In September 1942 came a head­line-grabbing low-level attack on the Ge stap o HQ inOslo. Four bombers, in C harmer style, flew low acrossthe North Sea to avoid radar detection. So low did the yattack that some bombs went through the front windowsof the building and out through the back. On e bouncedon a table at which a clerk was working.

Further proof of the .\ losquilO's bite cam e on 30January 1943, when Nazi leaders broadcasting speechesin Berlin were twice rudely inte rrupted. BetweenFebruary and Mal' 1943 Nos 105 and 139 Squadron s,holding up 10 thirty -two aircraft between them, deliveredhighly spectacular and accurate combined low-level andshallow-dive attacks culminating in calls on Zeiss Opticsat jena and the nearby Schon glassworks deep inGerma ny.

A Bomber Com ma nd survey showed that losses dur­ing day raids reached about eight per cent. Dog-leggedtracks were often flown, confusing defenders as 10 thetarget. Crews reckoned they had a five mph adva ntageover the Fw 190A fighter. Between 31 May 1942 and 31May 1943 726 day sorties were flown for a loss of forty­eight aircraft. A third squadron, No 109, was using ,\ IkIVs fined with special blind bombi ng radio equipmentcodenarned 'Oboe' which entailed a 'cat' station measur­ing an aircraft's range and directing its track . A 'mo use'station signalled to the crew the precise mom ent forbomb release. On 20 December 1942 No 109 Squad ronconducted an Oboe trial operation, relying up on the op­erators 10 give instructions as to when to release bombson Lutterade power station in the Netherlands.Alongside was a cemete ry, and when German radio an­nounced that bombs had fallen upon it, the RAF knewthat Oboe was accurate enough to revoluti oni se nightbombing accuracy. From .\ larch 1943, Oboe.\ losquitoes led Bomber Co mmand in raids up to a ra­dius of 278 miles (447km), beyond which it was im­practicable - so far.

Summer 1942 brought a new high-flying .\ losquilOwith a 2 psi (0.14kg/cm') pressurised cabin. Speci allymodified , the bomber prototype was first flown on 8August 194 2. A week later it was carrying gun s andready 10 tackle high-fly ing Junkers Ju 86R nuisanceraide rs. Weighing 22,350lb loaded, this was the heaviest.\ iosquito yet.

The two-stage supercharged .\ Ierlin .\ Iosquito wasprod uced as the ,\ Ik IX, the first bomber flying in March1943 . Within weeks a Mk IX carrying a 500lb (227kg)bomb below eac h wing was tested. The 23,OOOlb(10,433kg) weight at which it was flying confirmed thata Mosqu ito could lift a 4,000lb ( I ,815kg) bomb load ; asingle 'cookie' if the re was room in the bomb bay,MosquilO capac ity was exp lored, and a 4,000lb 'cookie 'was fine d in the swollen bomb bay of Mk IV DZ594,which first flew in July 1943. A lot of 'refining' followed ,

11 7

Specially supercharged Rolls-Royce Mertins and a pres­surised cabin enhanced the ,IJosql/ito XI'15 high-altitudeperformance.

and on 9 October 1943 the deci sion was taken 10 modi­fy more ,\ Ik IVs rath er than interfere with Mk IX pro­duction. The first operational 4,000-pounders weredropped on Du sseldorf by Mk IVs on 23 February 1944 .

The first production B Mk XVI pressure-cabinbomber was rolled out in Oc tobe r 1943. After twelve hadbeen built, Mk XVIs came off the prod uction lines ableto carry 4,000lb (1,8 15kg) bombs.

A typical .\ Iosquito M k IX had a top speed of abou t424 mph at 26,200ft (678km!h at 7,860m) , a figure

A IR e R A F T 0 F T II ES E C 0 :-: D \l; ' 0 R L D W A R T HE Il 0 ,\ 1 11 E RR E \'O L U T I 0:-:

J\losl ka mikaze assalllls, illeilldillg Ihis auack oll lhe carrier HJ/S Formidable 011 4 J\lay 1945, illwlved Ihe lise ofobsolesccmaircrafl . Th e effeclivmess of a kamikaze hil IIpOIl a highly combllslible aircrafl carrier is obviolls here. allhollgh a sllrprisillgIIl1mber ofauackers missed rheir largels.

very stiff at high speeds, making any man oeuvre by aship worthwhile, If thc aircraft was badly damaged bygunfire and its controls destroyed, engine damaged orpilot killed, inertia and the aircraft's characteristics tend­cd to kccp it on course unless a wing or other essentialcontrol surface was shot away. In some instances the air­craft continued to dive after both wings came away,changing it into a bomb.

Nothing except heavy. accurate gunfire could stop asuicide aircraft oncc the dive had bcgun . ,\ lurual supportwas needed, with no ship being lcft on its own , Startingfrom outside automatic weapons range, a suicide aircraftreached its targe t in about twenty seconds. In a dive itwas constantly accelerating, making it difficult to track ,To counter massive suicide attacks. destroyers and es­corts were positioncd as outlying early warning radarpickets which madc them highly vulnerable.

The full-scale kamikaze campaign began duringOctober 1944 ,T he dubious distinction of being the firstship to be hit fcll to HM AS Australia, a distinctivethree-funnel cruiser lying off Leyte, when, at dawn on 2 1October, a low-flyer approac hing from land and hit byAA firc rurn cd and thcn crashed into thc ship's foremast,setting fire to the br idge. T hirty officers and men losttheir lives in the ensuing explosion and fire. On 9Janua ry the battleship Mississippi was hit and Australiasuffered for thc fifth time. forty-four of thc crew dyingand thc injured totalling sixty-five, Between 2 1November and 13January 1945 kamikazes sank 22 shipsand damaged 126.

Next, the operations to take lwo jirna initiated inten­sive kamikaze activity, The nightfighter car rier Saratogasoon camc under attack , two bombs or torpedoes beingfollowed by four suicide aircraft. Nevertheless, fires wereunder control within an hour, the ship maintaining 25kt.Forty-five minutes later anothe r kamikaze attack waslaunched, two raiders being destroyed before a thirdplaced its bomb on thc flight deck , clouted the car rierthen tumbled overboard. Saratoga had by now lostfort y-nine aircraft and suffered 350 casualties , and hadto withd raw,

Action Icading to the seizure of Okinawa sawkamikazes reach their zenith, thc first mass suicide attackdevelop ing duri ng mid-aftcrnoon on 6 April, whennear ly 700 aircraft, 355 of them kamikazes, left Kyushuto sink shipping off Okinawa, About 400 penetratedouter defences, althoug h again many vented their wrathupon thc picket screen, Another huge force of attackersfollowed two hours later, quickly mauling two screeningdestroyers. Six ships were sunk and eighteen damaged ,nearly all by suicide bombers, and 300 enemy aircraftwere c1aimcd destroyed ,

Although it was spec tacular, thc small onc-manYokosuka ,\ IXY7 Ohka (Chcrry Blossom ), which bcganoperating in April 194 5, was a simply constr uc ted

their early twenties , prepared to repay a culrural debt bycalmly sacrificing their lives. Perform ing for hono ur(bushido) , not hatred , and eager to fly an obsolescentfighter or bomber to mutual dest ruct ion, a pilot's finalspartan days would bring a pure, noble end to lifc. Somcwaited for months, even sleeping soundly in the hourspreceding the final call.

,\ lost of the aircraft used were ageing and single­cngincd, including thc Aichi D3A 'Val', Mitsubishi A6,\ 1'Zckc' (or 'Zero') and Nakajima Ki 43 'O scar' fighter s,and the Nakajima B5N2 'Kate' and B6N2 'Jill' andYokosuka D4 Y2 'Judy' dive bombers. Fully laden for aone-way flight they often carried a 250kg (550lb) bomb.Twin-engined aircraft also used included the KawasakiKi-48 'Lily' , ,\ Iitsubishi Ki-21 'Sally', Nakajima JINI' Irving", the 30,5001b (13,835kg) ,\ litsubishi Ki-67'Peggy' and Yokosuka P IYI 'Frances', but these weremore vulnerable to inte rcepti on .

Suicide bombers had to elude extensive US fighterdefences. Once that was achieved it was difficult tothwart their intent. The first attacks involved groups ofaircraft which separated about thirty milcs from the tar­get area and then attacked singly to make themselve sdifficult to detect and distinguish. Some wave-skimmedto evade radar detec tion .

Off Leyte on 7 Decemb er 1944 kamikazes displayeda new tactic. A dozcn or morc gro uped over one targetand delivered a co-ordinated attack. No armoured shipwas ever sunk by suicide bombers. Against \'cry stccpdives, qu ick reaction by a ship and a positi\·c courscchange werc somctimes etfecti \·e. Although the pilot usu ­ally aimed his mac hine to its demise, controls bcca me

All effective hit 011 a ca rrier deck usually meant disposing ofmallY aircraft, like these Corsairs aboard Formidable, 771eship could thus become useless for mOllY hours, and some­times far longer.

The kamikazesVolunteering for any wartime mISSIOn might result indeath; becoming a Japanese kamikaze, kikusui or suicidepilot made it virtually certain. On 26 July 1944 two AichiD3A I 'Val" dive-bombers approached the British EastIndies Fleet at 8 ,000ft (2,400m) , their purpose unccr­tain. Although H,\ IS Ameer destroyed one, the other, hitby fire from H,\IS Sussex, bounced on to the ship , caus­ing little damage. A third 'Val' then crashed on to, and sc­riously damaged, the minesweeper H,\ IS l''estal, whichhad to be sunk by gunfire. It is believed that these werethe first kamikaze attacks, following a suggestion in ,\ lay1944 to pack obsolescent aircraft with bo mbs, explosivesand specia lly fused additi onal fuel, and to ask for volun­teer pilots of the Specia l Air Corps to ram them intoAllied warships.

During a specia l ceremony celebrating their flight tofinal glory, the first kamikaze pilots wore white robes.Late r, many settled for a white scarf, the traditional sym­bol. Their chose n title of kamikaze, or 'divine wind ', rc­called a typhoon which frus tra ted a Mongolian invasionof Japan in 1280, the hopc being that it might againcome to thc rescue, Pilots were dra wn from varied back­grounds , some being deferr ed university srudents in

which compared favourably with tha t for thc ,\Icrlin66-powered North American P-5 1 ,\ Iustang, which, ontests at Boscombe Down, reached 430mph at 22,000ft(688km/h at 6,600m ), after which its performance fellaway, Even German jets had a tough task to catch'Mossies'. De Havilland had the potential answer; aiet-engined ,\ Iosquito.

Did the ,\ Iosquito live up to the forecasts? Many fac­tors influence comparisons with other BomberCommand aircraft, but tota l sortie/overall loss relation­ships show: Stir ling 18,440/3.81 per cent, Blenheim12,214/3.62 per cent , Lancaster 156,192/2.13 pcr cent,and Mosquito (all versions including 100 Groupfighters) 39, 795/0.63 per cent, suggesting that dcHavilland was right to push its idea. Amaz ingly, thissmall aerop lane dropped 8,386 huge 4,000lb ( I ,815kg)bombs. On 20/2 1 February 194 5, and on the followingthirty -five consecutive nights, ,\ Iosquitocs bombedBerlin, suffering a 0.58 per cent loss rate . Du ring 194 53,988 night sorties were dispatched to the capital for aloss of founcen aircraft, a rate of 0.99 per cent . Thelargest number attacking in one night was 139 on 21/22March . Of those, twenty made two calls in thc onc night.Yes, the M osquito was un ique.

118 119

AIR CRAFT OF THE SE C O:--:D W OR LD \X' AR

mainly responsible, haying risen from six rnanuallvoperated 0.50in (12.7mm) guns to ten of the samecalibre in Sperry periscopically controlled retr actablepower-op erated turrets above and below the fuse lage.Twin tail guns were supplemented by a 20mm cannon.

As the most favoured submission, the Boeing XB- 29received a go-ahead in june 1940, funding for two pro ­totypes and a static test airframe following in August.,\ lay 1941 bro ught produ ction authorisation and anorder for 250, doubled the following janu ar y. By the timethe XB-2 9 (four 2,200hp Wri ght R-3350-13 s) flew, on21 September 1942, 1,664 B-29s were on order. Majorchanges had previously been inco rporated .T he fuselagewas slightly lengthened , engine cooling and tur bosuper­chargers were imp roved, a large fin fillet was added, theturrets were no longer retractable and the bomb bay wasmodified to carry 20,000lb (9.070kg). That new estimat­ed all-up weight was 114,500lb (51,940kg), and the pre­dicted maximum ran ge was about 5,330 miles(8,580km) when car rying only a ton of bombs.The nar­row-chord mainplanes raised conc ern , but they gave thcaircraft its long range. Large Fowler flaps would takecare of take-off and landing.

The second prototype, first flown on 28 December1942, developed an engine fire during a landing ap­proach on 18 February 1943 and crashed into a factory,

121

Boeing's B-29 Superfortress could deliver heavy loads to distant targets. Using mainly incendiaries, B -29s incinerated manyofJapall's largest population cellires - and then delivered the atomic bombs.

THE B O .\IBER R E\' OL IJ TI O:--:

adding their new high-lift aerofoil section to a high­aspect-ratio wing. A top speed of 405mph at 25,000ft(652km/h at 7,620m) was estimated for the 'super­bomber', which was fitted with the smaller, lighter Prart& Wh itney R-2800 engines of 2,000 hp. At an all-upweight of 85,672lb (38,86 Ikg) a range of 7,000 miles(11,265km) was estimated when carrying a ton ofbombs . The maximum feasible load was 10,000lb(4,540kg).

In january 1940 a speci fication for such a 'super­bomber' was issued to the Boein g, Lockheed , Douglasand Conso lidated companies, outlining a 400mph(640kmlh) bomber with a range of 5,333 miles(8,530km) when carrying 2,000lb (900kg). Wh en newswas received of the RAF's day bo mb ing losses, thespecification was amended to call for increased defensivearma ment, self-sealing fuel tanks and extra armour. Tocope with the additional loading, Boeing increased the.\Iodel 341 's overall size and revert ed to more powerfulWri ght R-3350s. Det ails of this des ign, the Model 345,submitted in Ma y 1940 showed a 141ft 3in (43.05m)wing and a doubl e-wheeled nosewh ecl undercarriage.While the range was unchanged, the maximum bombload had risen to 16,0001b (7,260kg), but the estimatedspeed had fallen to 382 mph at 25,000ft (6 15kmlh at7,260 m) . G reatly increased defensive armament was

' ....

. ; ' a

. ,.;.

"

.,

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Superfortress, scourge ofJapanBoeing's B-29 Superfortress "ill always be rememberedas the aerop lane which dropped the first two atomicbombs , which rapidl y ended the war with japan . FromPacific islands, 'Superfo rts' of the US XXth Air Forcehad already wiped out many Japanese indu strial cities,upon which they rained fearso me incendiar y loads.,\ Iillions of close-packe d, earthquake-frail japanesebuildings succ umbed completely to the B-29s.

In 1938 Boeing had produced a study for a pres­surised B- 17 in which a large-diameter circular-sectionfuselage was mated with normal wing and tail compo­nents. Owing to pro blems regard ing sealing the pres­sur ised sections while retaining gun positions, no orderwas placed . Boeing, anticipating that such an aircraftmight later be required , worked on the armame nt prob­lem, eventually producing a layout haying two pres­suriscd sectio ns linked by a small tu nnel, and this was afeature of subsequent projects. Convinced it was on to awinner, Bocing built a moc k-up as a priva te ventu re,

Over 5,000 pilots died in suicide attac ks. Long after thecampaign failed , pilots were still being herd ed to death inthe knowledge that thc Emperor, regard ed as a SupremeBeing, along with their country, had not the slightestconsidcration for the m as hum an beings.

120

. " .'., .

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rocke t-prope lled piloted bomb. \'{Iith a 5m (16ft 5in)wingspan, it weighed 1,895kg (4,718Ib) load ed, andusually had a 8 16kg ( I ,800lb) tri-nitro-arnin ol warheadfittcd to its 6m (19ft l Oin) cylindrical fuse lage. Firstused against shipping off Okinawa, it pose d less of athreat than might bc supposed because its slow launchaircraft was easy to intercept. Designed by naval ensign.\ Iitsuo Ohta , the .\IXY 7 was known to the Allies as theBaka (Idiot) , it first flew in summer 1944, pr oduction of755 examples of thc ,\ Iodel II (thc only operationalvers ion) star ting in Sept ember. Ca rried in the belly ofa Mitsubishi G4M2e land attack bomber, Ohkawas launched from about- 8,240m (27,000ft) at28D-320km/h ( 175- 200mph) and could glide at 5° on arun of83km (52 miles) at 368km/h (230mph). The elec­trically fired 5881b s.t. Type 4 ,\ Iodel 20 solid-fuel rock­et motors would the n stan accelerating the bomb to856km/h (535mph) befo re the terminal dive on to thetarget at 990 kmlh (620mph).

During April 1945 1,400 kamikaze sorties were dis­patched from Kyushu alone in operation 'Ten-Go', thedefence of the hom eland. The first night kikusui attac ktook place on 28/29 April, over half of the attac kers beingdestroyed . A serious error was the dec ision to make sui­cide ope rations comp ulsory , a crusade off the Philip­pines degenerating into an event devoid of all hu manity.

""= ..'. . _. ..... . .'-~ ..' - t . : ;,. '/,~~ ..-:- .1:' .. r:'-,- - .:" "-

~ . . '---- .. .. -.Japan 's dedicated kamikaze manned rocket bomb, thd'okosllka .IlX Y7 Ohka (C herry Blossom), ,,'as used ill relaticely smallnumbers.

A I RC R A F T O F Til E S E COl'.'D W ORLD W AR T il E 1l0 .\ t B ER RE VO LU T IO l'.'

To extend the flying-bomb campaign against Brita in, Heinkel He III bombers ,ure adapted to carry a VI 'cruise missile' f orrelease &Ver the No rth S ea, usually uncards Loudon. Th e campaign extended f rom slimmer 1944 to early 1945.

killing eleve n top B-29 people and man y in the building.Att enti on was at once concentrated on the fire problem,modification s bein g made to the third XB- 29, which wasalso lost in a crash, but not before it had shown a needfor different propell er s and a revised Gene ral Elec tricsystem of turrets contro lled from astrodo mes. Thesechanges delayed the fourteen YB-29s.

On I june 1943 the first Superfortress unit, the 58thBombardment Wing (Y H), was activated at 1\larietta ,ncar Bell's Superfortress plant. With 150 Superfortressespromi sed for early 1944, the first ope rational Wingco mprised five bombardment groups, the 40th , 444th ,462nd, 468th and 472nd, the last of which acted as atraining unit at Smoky Hill Field , Salina, where, on 27N ovember 1943 , the XXth Bomber Co mmand wasformed to control B-29 units. A second Ver y Heavy\'\ling , the 73rd , co mprised four more groups to abso rbthe next batch of 150 Superfortresses.

By the end of 1943 the Bell-Marietta andBoeing-Rent on plants also began turning outSuperfortresses, which now had a maximum permissibleweight of 138 ,000lb (62,597kg) and a normal grossweight of 133,500lb (60,556kg) , figures that indicatedthe huge size of the B-29.

The Superfortress was the first production aircraft tomake extensive usc of remotely-controlled armament .Four barbettcs, each hou sing two 0.5in ( 12.7mm) gunswith 1,000 rounds per gun, were installed , two on topand two underneath the fuselage, controlled remotelythrough a complex fire control system operated fromstations in the pre ssuri sed sections of the fuselage.Addition ally, the tail turret gunne r controlled two 0.50inma chine-guns and a 100-round 20mm M-2Type B can­non . Fourteen outer-wing, eight inner-wing and fourbomb-bay tanks provided a maximum fuel capacity of6,80 Igal (30,9 17Iit) until four more were added to thewing centre-section, givin g a total of 7,89 6ga l(35,892lit). That gave the B-29 a normal ran ge of about3,700 miles (5,954krn) when ca rry ing 12,000lb(5,443kg) of bombs.

On 2 April 1944 the first B-29 for Far East ope rationslanded at C hakulia, and on 24 April , only eighteenmonths after the XB- 29 first flew, a Superfortress ar­rived at Kwanghan to start an operational C hina-basedforc e.

About 100 Wichita-built B-29s of the 58th B\X' setout from India to attac k Bangkok on 5 june 1944 , manyequipped with 'bombing throu gh overcas t' (BT O), H,Xand Loran, along with electronic countermeasures(EC " I). The force bombed th rough the clouds usingradar. On 15 june forty-seven B-29s ope rating fromC he ng tu bombed the steel mills at Yawata by night in thefirst raid up on j apan proper since 194 2.The build-up ofSuperfortress mission s was slow until the capture of theM ariana Islands of Saipan, G uam and Tinian in july and

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Augu st 1944 allowed the construc tion of five extensiveairfields, eac h holding a Wing of 180 Superfortresses an d12,000 men. B-29 gro ups began arriv ing in thej\ larianas during October. On 24 N ovemb er III B-29sset out in daylight on a high-altitude mission led by Ge nO'Donnell aboa rd Dauntless DOily .This was the firs t op­eration by ,\ Iarianas-based B-29s, eighty-five of whichbombed targe ts in Tokyo. The first mass release of in­cendiaries took place on 18 December, when H an kowdocks suffered under eighty-four B-29s while anothersixty-three raided Mitsubishi at N agoya on 3 januar y1945. Fighter s were active, 400 attacks being made onB-29s raiding the latter target , and five bombers subse­quently be ing rep orted missing .

Maj or-General Cur tis E LeMay too k co mmand ofthe Mananas-based B-29s in january 1945 . Keen tolaunch incend iary atta cks on japane se cit ies, he decidedto switch B-29s to low-altitude night bombing, which in­creased the bomb load with out increas ing vulnerability,and daylight atta cks ended with the Tokyo raid of 4M arch. The first night fire raid , flown on 9 March , in­volved 334 ,\ Iarianas-based B-29s. Marker lead shipseac h released 180 70lb (3 1.8kg) MA7 nap alm bombsbefore the main force attacked, each bomber droppingtwenty-four 500lb (227kg) clusters of M.69 oil incendi­ari es inte nded to total 8,333 per square mile . The force,str ung out in three 400-mil e-lon g stre ams (640krn) , car­ried ou t a three-hour raid and incinerated 15.8 squa remiles of the heart of Tokyo, killing 83,793 people and in­juring 40,918. A million lost their homes and 26 7,171buildings were destroyed . Over the next eight day s simi­lar incendiar y atta cks were launched , twice up on Nagoyaand on Osaka and Kobe. Superfortresses were soo npartly str ipped of defensive armament to allow maxi­mum bomb loads to be carried.

Massive raids were launched throughout M ay, andthe terrifying onslaught raged into june. On the 17theac h of the four \'\lings visited a city; Omura , Amamatsu,Yokkaichi or Kag oshima. Operations were mounted at arate of two a week, LeMay targeting three or four town seach tim e following leallet warnings. Eventually sixtyurban centres were laid waste , Toyama being almos tcompletely destroyed . Almost untou ched wereHiroshima, Kokura, Niigati and Na gasaki.

When B-29-45-MO 44-86292, Enola Gay , releasedthe atomic bomb over Hir oshima on 6 August 1945 , itsurely marked the climax of the Superfortress's fam e.There was never any doubt that the weap on would bevery large, and fifteen B-29s were modified to carry it. Inmid-1944 the 39 3rd Bombardment Squadron (VH),part of the 509 th Composite Group, was taken over byCol Paul \Xl Tibbets to plan for the drop , and after muchtrain ing it moved in M ay to North Field , Tinian . Twooperational bombs arrived on Tinian and Hiro shima waschosen as prim ar y target. The 9 ,7901b (4, I 70kg) ' Little

Boy' cylindrical atomic bomb, 129in (3.27m) long and3 1.5in (0 .8m) in diameter , contained 137.31b ofura nium-235 . Enola Gay left Tinian at 0245hrs onAugust 6 1945 , and at 09 15hrs the nuclear weapon wasreleased from 31 ,600ft (9,630m) . At 800 ft (245m)above Hiro shima an expl osion equivalent to 20 ,000 tons(20.3M kg) of TNT devastat ed 4.7 squa re miles of thecity, killing more than 70 ,000 peopl e. Three days later asecond atomic bomb was released over Nagasaki fromCapt F Bock 's B-29-35 MO, 44-2729 7 Bockscar. In all,3,970 Superfortresses were built.

Although the nuclear weapon s her alded a revoluti onin warfare , mercifully the y did not necessarily give aglimpse of the future. That was displayed by the ad­vanced aircraft and weap on s available to Germany by1945 , which would form the basis of aerial bombard­ment during the rest of the 20th century.

A Glimpse of the FutureAs the war dr ew towards its co nclusion, weap on s for fu­tu re de cades were emerging. One was the Fieseler Fi 103FZG-76,or V I flying bomb, intended for a massive NewYear 1944 onslaught on London . Henschel's self-pro­pelled glider bombs were launched again st shipping in1943, and in 1944 radio controlled PC 1400 bombs wereaimed at war ships off Plymouth. The VI was quitedifferent, being a gr ound launched 'c ru ise missile' whichmade its own way to the target. It relied on a simple pul sejet, its ran ge bein g determined by the rate of fuel con­sumption. A small aeroplane with wing s and a tail, itsguidance was mainly gove rned by the orientation of itslaunch ramp. Fired from France in large salvos , flying

123

bombs came in at a few hundred feet, end ing their llight sby divin g up on the targ et area and exploding to producema ximum blast effect.

The only way to halt the attacks was to destroy thelaunch sites, weap on dumps and factorie s, or force thelaunchers out of ran ge, which was ultimately achieved.The Germans then started air-launching Vi s fromHeinkel He III H-22s, a risky affair involving hazardou slow flying and dangerou s launching. They were, how­ever , intro ducing the idea of stand-off air launchedcruise missiles. Perhaps because V Is could be seen andheard until the fuel ran out, the y were con sidered moredisturbing than the V2 or A4 ballistic missile, forerunnerof the ICBMs and moon rockets of later decades. Thefirst V2 fell with out an y warning at Chiswick inSeptember 1944 . N o warning of a V2's approach waspossible , altho ugh launch trails from sites around theHague were often visible. Postwar estimates stated that26 million AA shells bursting in close proximity wereneeded to destroy a V2 in flight.

M ore general co ncern might have ari sen had it beenrealised that jet-propelled bombers were available forraids on Britain. Germa ny expected a sho rt war until theLuftwaffe's failed assault in 1940 , and then to obtain vic­tory German scientists, aerodynamicists and engin eer smade a great effort to devise war-winning weapon s, butlacked sensible direction from the top. T he AradoAr 234B, the world 's first operationa l jet bomber, was atypical advance which came too late to affect the war'soutcome .

In 194 0 a fast, medium-ran ge reconnaissance aircra ftoperating at altitude to evade interception was called for ,

124

TIlE BO.\\B ER RE\,OL C;TIO:-;

Bibliography

Air ,\ l inistr y, \X/eekly Intelligence Summaries (unpub­lished)

Craven, W E, and Care, J L, (eds) The A rmy Air Forcesill Irorid n'ar ll, 101 5, The Pacifi c: M auerhorn 10

Nagasaki (Chicago Univers ity Press, USA, 1948)

Glines, Lt Col C V, The Doolittle Raid (Orion Books,USA, 1988)

Jalle ~ All the Irorld ~ Aircraft 1945-1 946 (Sampson Low,Lond on , 1946)

PRO Air 22/203 Bomber Co mmand OperationsStatistics

Richards, Den is, 77,e Royal A ir Force / 939-/ 945, Vol I(HMSO, Lond on 1953)

Sharp, ,\ 1 C & Bowyer, ,\ 1J F, M osquito (Crecy Books,1996)

Il'ilr with Japall, Vol VI (H,\ ISO, Lond on 1995)

Williamson . Murray. Lu fncaffe (G rafton/Collins,London 1988)

The Ar 234C four-cngined B,\IW 003A- I poweredreconnaissance version of the Ar 234B was in produc­tion when hostilities ceased. It had maximum speeds of829km/h (515mph) at sea level and 872km/h (542mph)at 6,00 4m (19,700ft) , a ran ge of 1,480krn (920 miles)and could climb to 9,997 m (32,800ft) in Ilmin 54sec.The Ar 234C-I and -2 were abandoned in favour of thcmu lti-role C-3 . Other versions were to carry a FicsclcrFi 103 flying bomb on a cradl e, thc weap on bcing lift­ed by hydraul ically-operat ed arms to clear the top ofthe aircraft for firing. Nineteen production Ar 234C-3swere completed before the war's end, but Ar 234Bs, ofwhich 2 10 were completed by VE Day, were the only jetbombers to undertake operational missions. \X'hen thc'hot war ' ceased in August 1945 the main ingredientsfor the Cold War were availabl e; the jet bomber, thecruise missile and ' the bomb'. The bomber revolutionwas complete,

125

prio rity types. Deliveries were madc to KG 76, but man ytra ining accident s retarded operational activity until latesummer 1944, when Ar 234s flew a number of rccon­naissance flights over battle areas and, from Norway,over the northern British Isles.

Arado planned many far more advanced versions,one for high-speed research having two B.\ IW 003 A- Itu rbojets and a BM\\' 718 bi-fuel rocket motor to aug­ment thrus t briefly by 2.700lb. Various wings and tailsurfaces, some swept back. were planned, but none werecompleted.

III / 939 a tcell-tcrapped Il"hilley crcu' member ill darknesspushes a load of propaganda leafiets dotcn achille - hope­fu lly /n'er the right place after map reading and dead reck­oning had played their parts. By / 945 sophisticated moor,radio aids and assorted electronic devices u'ere beginning cocakecontrol ofoperations.

came favoured , A second Ar 234 flew on 27 July. Thethird , first flown on 25 August, had a pressure cabin andan ejector seat for the pilot. Flight trials showed the thirdaircraft to haw a t0P spee d of 750km/h (466mph) , ace iling of 12,500m (4 1,000ft) and a range of 1,200krn(750 miles). Early prototypes exceeded the specifi cationin several respects.T he airframe was able 10 accept morepower, and thc aircraft flew much faster before encoun­tering serious compressibility effect s.

Another 'first' followed when two Ar 234 prototypeswere fitted with four lighter 1,760kg (7981b s. t .) BMW003A jet engines, these becoming the world's firstfour-engined jet bombers. One had four turbojets in in­dividual underwing nacelles, while the other had thempaired in two nacelles. The first, ready to begin flighttrials on I February 1944 , was beset by cowling contourproblems and airflow through thc narrow space betweenfuselage and nacelles caused severe shock waves. Bothaircraft flew reconnaissance sorties du ring early summer1944 , Allied fighter pilots often finding them selvesincapable of intercepting the Ar 234s.

T rolley and landing skids were prop osed for somepostwar jets, but those fitted to the Ar 234 showed theirimpracticability. After landi ng , aircraft had to be lifted onto a trolley before rem oval to a dispersal bay for turn­around. Landing areas would becom e cluttered with air­craft, so the Ar 234B had a narrow-track retractablenosewheel undercarriage. Powered by two Jurno 004Btur bojets, it had a pressuri sed cabin and a braking para ­chute (a commo n postwar item) to red uce an emergenc ylandi ng run , Production of the Ar 234B was well underway by autum n 1944, about ISO being delivered before1945, by which time it had become one of four highest-

.\ I R C R A F T OF TIlE SECO:-;D \X·OR!.D \X'AR

The un reliability of jet engines curbed their lise ill bombersduring the fm r.A mdo Ar 234 s fieu:some operational sorties,and the four engined A r 234C version shoum here u'as underextensive detelopment.

with a top speed of 700km/h (435mph) and a range of2,000krn (1,242 miles). Arado's submission was a shoul­de r-wing monop lane powered by two gas tu rbine s underthe wings. Originally the Ar 234 was to haw a iettison ­able three-wheel trolley for take-off and retractable skidsfor landing, saving the weight of an undercarriage. T heextensively glazed pilot 's cockpit was in the fuselagenose.

The first machine was completed before 1942, butdevelopment of the Junkers jurno 109-004 turbojet didnot keep pace with airframe construction, the enginesneeding a year to reach a reasonably reliable state. Notuntil ,\ Iarch 1943 did a pair of pre-production Jumo004As reach Arad o. After troublesome tria ls with thetake-off trolley, the prototype first flew on IS June 1943,from Rheine. Landing on skids was not very successfuleither, and a conventional nosewheel undecarriage be-

/11 less than four years amaz ing progress had been made. The differences betueen this ambling Armst rong Wh icu:orlh IF71illey I'and the A rado jet bomber, uhich fleu: almost fou r limes as fast and ucice as high, provide ample evidence of spectacula r ad­1.Ullces .

5Airmobility

Peter H earn

A IRCRAFT OF T HE SECO:-':D \X'ORLD \X'AR

~\ ..f'A iIf"',......lrli~ &01.. . ..."""".,

Witlz I/ O aircraft designed specifically for transport, at the oil/break of the u'ar the RAF relied 0 1/ convened bombers orrequisitioned airliners, such as this Handley Page H.R 42,for aerial mouement of troops and supplies.

The Douglas C- 47, hnoum as Dakota to the British fo rcesand S ky trail/to the A merican, was derived f rom the DC- 3 airlin­er and became the transport uorh horse of the A llied forces.

126

Fallsch ir m jagerT hey had expected d ive bombers. They had expectedar tillery fire. They had expected the distant rumble ofarmour. But the few lookouts in their emplaceme nts onBelgium 's fort Eben Emael had not expected the se grey,bat-like figures swooping gracefully and silently from adawn sky. Mesmerised , they watched in the half-light asthe flying vehicles plou ghed into the grass amon gstthem; vehicles that bore on their flanks - they realisedtoo late - the black cross of Germany.

from each glider poured nin e close-h elme ted figures,firing as the y came.The few defenders on the surface ofthc fort were overwhelme d by smallarms fire, grenadeand flame , Oth ers fled to join the main body of the fort'sgarr ison in the supposed safety of the undergroundmaze of tunnels, shelters and gun emplaceme nts, thereto be trapped and further stunned as specially preparedhollow charges tore through the six-foo t-thick reinforcedconcrete of the emplacements to destroy the great gunsinte nded to dominate this vital stretch of the border be­tween Belgium and Germany. \Xlithi n min utes, a fortmanned by 1,200 men and considered impregnable hadbeen neutralised by seventy-eight troop s who hadswooped up on it from dawn skies, at the cost of only sixof thei r number.

Thus began the G erman assault on the LowCountr ies on 10 May 1940.

Fu r the r west, other glider-borne troop s were takingthe bridges of Vroenh ofen and Velchrezelt . Paratroop swere spilling from the ir Junkers ju 52s from heights aslow as 100m (300ft) to seize other river crossings atMo crd iik and Dordrecht . In Rott erdam itself, 50 para­troo ps jumped into a spo rts stadium, and 120 men werelanded on the river Maas in 12 Heinkel He 59 seaplanes.A larger forc e of paratroop s seized the airfield atWaalhaven, whi le further north others were dropping onto th ree airfields around The Hague, battlin g to securethem for the airlanding of rein forcements and supplies.

Altho ugh the assault on The Hague was fiercely re­sisted and losses of aircraft were heavy, Rotterdam washeld by German airbo rne troop s until the 9th PanzerDivision entered the city on 14 M ay, having rolled alongthe carpe t of intact bridges and neutralised stro ngpo intslaid for it by the 'Fallschirrniager ' - Ge rma ny's young'hunters from the sky' . Holland surrende red to the in­vaders that even ing . Belgium followed suit two weekslater.

T his assau lt on the Low Co untr ies was the largest

127

and most dr amatic airbo rne ope ration of the SecondWorld War so far , but not the first. In f ebruar y 1939,and aga in in N ovember , sma ll gro ups of Ru ssian para­troop s jumped ncar Summa and Petsarn o to cut com­munication s in suppo rt of the invasion of Finland, On amuch larg er scale, in September 1939 , 4,000 paratroop sand 12,000 airb orne infantrymen had stoo d in readinesson Silesian airfield s for operations against Poland at theoutbreak of the war , but so devastatingly swift had bee nthe advance of Germany's Pan zer division s that therehad been no call for airbo rne assault - altho ug h the 16thRegiment of the 7th Air Division had been airlifted toforward battle position s north of Lod z to fight as ordi­nary infantr y,

In Apri l 1940 over 500 transport aircraft, mostly ju52s, with smaller numbers of heavy ju 90s and Focke­Wulf Fw 200s, had spearheaded and then suppo rtedGermany's invasion of Denmark and N orway. Initia lassa ult from the sky had achieved immediat e results,largely through audacity and surprise rather than byweight of arms, During the brief and victori ou s cam­pa ign that followed, the Germans airlifted 29,280 men,2,376 tons (2,4 14 tonnes) of supplies and 259,300 gal(980,000 litres) of aviation fuel into the combat zone.

This co mbination in 1940 of assault by parach uteand glide r, airlanding by transport aircraft and subse­quent resupply and reinforc ement from the air, was thefirst major demonstration of the concepts of airrn obilityand airborne ope rations co nceived and developed byItaly, Ru ssia, and above all by G ermany during the yearsbetween the two world war s. The support of groundforces from the air had become an integral part of theG erman doctrine of 'Blitzkrieg': surprise assault by fast­moving co lumns of tank s, artill er y and motori sedinfantry to break through or bypa ss the linear defen cestill favoured by tradition al militar y thin king.The role ofair suppo rt in this novel method of warfare was:1 To gain air superiority2 To provide reconnaissance3 To bomb and strafe in close suppo rt of the advance4 To deliver troop s from the air ahead of or on the

flanks of the advancing mech ani sed columns5 To resupply and reinforce the ground assa ult.This doctrine had a vigorou s and far- sighted proponentin Generalleutnant Kurt Student, commander ofG ermany's fledgling airb orne forces. It also had the per­sonal backin g of Hitler , and of Goering as commanderof the Luftwaffe,

A IRCRAFT OF THE SE CO:-:n WORLD WAR A I R .\ \ 0 B I L IT Y

Fw 200B Co ndo r, would provide heavier lift. A smallnumber of Dornier Do 24 and Do 26 flying boats wouldprovide a transport and communication facility, as theyhad done effectively during the Norwegian campaign.Development and production of the promising ju 252Herkules, a thirty-five-seater equipped with a rear load ­ing ramp, would be cancelled in 1944 as Germany's pri ­ority for dwindling resources conc entrated mainly onfighters.

The gliders that swooped wi th such devastating effecton to Eben Emael were DFS 230s, each carrying eighttroop s in the fabric-c overed, steel-tube fuselage. AsGerma ny's most nu merous battle glider, oyer 2,200would be built during the war. Later versions had en­larged doors for the load ing of anti- tank guns andmotorcycles, but the real 'heavy-lift' would be providedby 1,500 vehicle-ca rrying Gotha Go 242s, small num­bers of the 30-seat DFS 330, and the Messerschmitt Me32 1 glider, which deserved its name of Gigant (Giant)by swallowing through its nose-mounted clamshell door sa heavy tank or an 88mm gun, or up to 200 troop s, who

By fa r the mOSI undely used German assault glider was the DFS 230, which could carry eight heav ily-armed troops. II 'U'QSused 10 capture the Belgian fo rt of Eben Emael on 10 ,\lay 19.J0, and took part ill the invasion of C rete in ,\lay 19.J1.

The ju 52/3 m would remain the mainstay of Germanair tran sport throughout the war, but the four-enginedtypes, the ju 90 and stru cturally less reliable Focke-Wulf

The M esserschmiu Ale 321 Gigant glider could deliver amassive load of 130 troops or 26,0001b of'freight; provided itcould be encouraged int o the ai r, Th is could be achieved byIwo or three tugs or by using a Heinkel He 111Z, a compos­ite of nco H e I l l s uiith a fifth engine added.

specifically built for it, and a reliable parachut e. The tri­motor, low-wing ju 52/3m with its distincti ve corrugatedmetal skin had been developed by Erns t Zindel from thesingle-engine Ju 52 of 1930. The Ju 52/3m first flew in1932, intended as a civilian airliner but with its potentialas a bombe r and troop carrier barely disguised .The mil­itar y version produ ced in 1934 found employment inboth roles with Ge rma ny's Co ndor Legion during theSpanish Civil\X'ar. Readily converted to the parachutingrole in 1936, the ju 52 could deliver eighteen fullyequipped men to a range of 620 miles. It was an excel­lent glider tug, and its ruggedness, reliability and short­take-off-and -landing capability commended it for anairlanding role in forward battle areas. Affectionatelyknown to the first generation of Fallschirrnjager as 'Tanteju' , it attracted an alternative nickname of 'Co rrugatedCoffin' , not through any inherent fault, but because ofthe extre me bat tle situations into which it was flown , Ofthe 475 [u 525 committed to the assault on the LowCountries, 170 were lost, mainly during the heavily op­posed airland ings on airfields, roads, fields and beachesaround The Hague.

Germany's startling lise of parat roops in 19.J0 relied upon the J llnkers JII 52, uhich remained the backbone of Germanair mobility th roughout the 'U'a r,. Jllmps 'U'ere made fro m as lou: as .JOOfl , using the RZ-I parachute unth its distincticesingle suspension point.

Student enjoyed the benefits of single command ofthe men and of the aircra ft that were to carry them; thewhole force was part of the Luftwaffe. This centra lisedcommand was an advantage that would not be enjoyedby Student's British and American emulators,

Not only did Student so aptly match his own ideas onairborne support to the overall doctrine of Blitzkrieg; en­couraged by Hitler, he purposely fostered the aura ofelitism that has ever since been the stamp of the para­troope r of all nations. It is a creed that represents thesupreme confidence and audacity of men who are pre­pared and expect to fight against great odds and win. Itwas a mystique reinforced by the assaults on Scandinaviaand the Low Countries, where the pu rely physical blowsdealt by the airborne invasion had been augmented bythe devastati ng psychological impac t on the enemy. Theconfusion and disruption caused by the Fallschirrniagerhad struck at the heart of civilian, political and militar ywillpower.

'10 back a well-defined policy, integrated command,and high-calibre troop s, Kurt Student had the tools forthe job. He had an aircraft well suited to the task, gliders

128 129

AIR CRAFT OF TH E SE C O:"D WORLD W A RAIR .\I 0BILI TY

either Service, they began the training of Britain 's firstparatroops. Instruction was given by a hastily gathe redband of RAF parachute technicians and Army physicaltraining instructor s, with an cleme nt of parachu tingknow-how being provided by two forme r exhibitionjumpers from the travelling flying circuses of the 1930s,Bruce William s and Harry Ward , soon to be joined by athird , Bill Hir e.

The parachute first used for British airborne trainingwas a manu ally operated aircrew train ing type convert edfor 's tatic line' operation. Wh en , on the fourth day oftra ining , one failed to open and a man fell to his death ,the can opy-first deployment was changed to rigging-linefirst, and the pack modified acco rdingly, to crea te the8.5m (28ft) 'X' Type parachute that was to give Britain 'sparatroop s good service throu ghout the war and for al­most twenty years beyond.

The bomber that the Air ,\ linistr y reluctantl y madeavailable for conversion to parachute training was theArmstrong Whi tworth Whitley; six of them. The all­metal Whitley ,\ Ik V first Hew in 1936 but was obso leteas a bombe r by 194 0. Paratrooping gave it a new lease oflife, even though it was un suited to and desperately un­comfortable for the job . A narrow fuselage described byHarry \X'ard as 'a sewer-like passageway connecting thetail to the nose' could accommoda te ten jumpers, whowould shuffle on their botto ms to drop throu gh an aper­ture where the ventra l gun-tu rret had once been, hopingnot to smash their faces on the far side of the 'hole', aninjury known as the 'Whitley Kiss'.

The main drawback to British development of an air­borne force was, and would long remain, this lack of anair transport fleet and the reluctance of the Air Mini stryto provide one. Louis Strange made strenuous but

Br ita in's pioneer pa ratroopers empla ne ill all ArmstrongIFhitu:orth IF71itley ,Ilk I; convened 10 carry lei. paratroop­ers codrop through all aperture ill the fioor.

13 1

aircraft for suc h a task. Althou gh Britain had pioneeredair mob ility throu gh its use of aircraft to transport fre ightand troops, parti cularly in the ,\ Iiddle East, the nationhad entered the war in 1939 with only a few outda tedremnants of that force in the form of sma ll numbers ofHandley Page Har rows, Bristol Bombays and even olde rVickers Valentia biplanes, still operating mostly overseas.T he RAF had no modern , custom-built transport air­craft.The emphasis dur ing the rearmament phase of the1930s had been on air defence, in which air transporthad little part to play.

To fill the tran sport gap in 1939, and also to pro videaircraft for various train ing roles, Britain's airline s werebro ught under govern ment contract. These airlines andcha rter companies tr ied to persuade the Air Mini str ytha t the y sho uld be allowed to maintain their identities,their aircra ft and their personnel to provide an 'Air.\ lerchant Servic e' similar to that given by their seafaringcolleagues. Instead , the private companies and their as­sets were requisitioned and their personnel conscr ipted .Some of the 'assets' found their way to RAF Hendon tobe operated by the RAF's only tra nsport squad ron at thetime, No 24. To the squadron's Avro Ansons and deHa villand Tiger M oth s were add ed impressed D.H.Rapides and Dragons, Armstron g Whitwor th Ensigns,Perc ival Proctors, Airspe ed Envoys, Lockheed Lode­stars, and even three Italian Savoia-Marchetti S.73s.An equally diver se array of airline pilots was welcomedinto the RAF Volunteer Reser ve to fly these aircraft oncommunication flights throughout Britain and AlliedEuro pe. In 1940, as the British Expeditionary Force re­treated in con fusion towards the Channel ports, thismotley collection of unarmed airliners and freight ersflew ammunition and other essential supplies into for­ward airfields and str ips , often un de r the gu ns of theenemy.

T he support of military operations by British airlinesand their mac hines wou ld reach furt her afield whenImperial Airways airliners and Hying boat s were em­ployed to ferry personnel and small-bulk freight , pri­marily to the Middle East, Ind ia and the Far East,followi ng where possible the established routes throu ghcen tral Africa. An alternative to the use of civilian airtransport lay in the conversion of bombers to a passen­ger or freight role. It was to th is resource that the RAFturned when, as a result of C hurchill's d irective, it wastasked with the training of Britain's first paratroope rs.

To establish a Central Landing Sch ool at M anches­ter's Ringway Airp ort in june 1940, came a renownedflyer from the First \\lorld \X'ar and civilian aviation, nowretu rned to uniform in the RAFVR, Sqn Ld r LouisStrange, and a M ajor of the Royal Engineers, john Rock.They had one thin g in common - neither knew anythingabo ut parachuting. Yet within a month of their arrival,and with no great enco urageme nt from thei r superiors in

The British r eactionThe first to copy it were the British. \X' insto n Churchill,ever an admirer of the audacious and the unconvention ­al in warfare, even when at the receiving end of it, wasmu ch impressed by Germany's use of airb orne assault,and on 6 june 1940 had the foresight to ask the jointChie fs of Staff to form 'a co rps of at least 5,000 para­chute troop s'. At a time when they were desperatelypreparing to repel a likely invasion, not laun ch one, theC hiefs cast a sour eye upon this directive. British militarythinking had in any case rejected the concept of para­chute assault when demonstrated to observers by theRussians in 1936. It had neither the knowledge nor thewill to set about it now. Nor did it have any suitable

year s of the war the effective exercise of airpower toachi eve a gro und force objective.

It was a lesson waiting to be copied.

130

W ith the addition oj six engines the M e 321 (top left) became the M e 323 . Its huge lIose doors allotced rapid unloading jar

its cargo of troops.f reight or vehicles.

were to be carried on two decks. The main problem washauling this 24-ton load into the air , which requi red a'troika' of three aircraft before a special five-cngi ncd tugconsi sting of two Heinkel He III s joined togethe r, wasproduced for the task. ,\ Iore than 200 of these M esser­schmitt monsters were converted into six-eng ine aircraftas the Me 323 , also known as the Gigant, Larger still buta failure and not entering service was the junkers ju 322glider, whose suitability was questioned when a tank fellthrough its wooden floor du ring trials.

Germany's RZ- l parachute derived its single-po intsuspension and harn ess from study of Italy's Salvatorepa rachute , and its 8.5m (28ft) circu lar cano py frommeticulous tr ials at the Luftwaffe test site at Rechlin.Theperformanc e of the RZ- l , particularly its stabil ity, was tobe improve d in subsequent models, culminating in 1943in the RZ-36 with a triangular canopy. Thus equipped ,Germany had demonstrated forc ibly during the early

Br itain S jim military glider, the General A ircraf t Hotspur; sho:...'s its elegant lilies. It could carry sevel/ troops, but u'as usedmainly for the training ofpilots and lIever u'em cou'ar,

AIR CRAF T O F T HE S EC O :-: O W ORLD WAR

)

For British airborne forces, the Dakota unth its side-door exitprovided a welcome replacement ill 1942 fo r the crampedand aged 1'(?Ilitley , nearest.

unsuccessful bids for Douglas DC-3s. N ot until Americaentered the war would thi s emi nently suitable aircraft bemade available to Britain's airborne forces (sec ph ot oabove , and also page 126). Meanwhile, Briti sh para­troop s would continue to train and to go to war throughthe dreaded 'hole in the fuselage' of the Whitley andother converted bombers suc h as the Sh ort Stirling,Armstrong Whitworth Albemarle, Handley Page Hali faxand Lockheed Hudson .

For trammg purposes an unusua l ' flying machine'wou ld supplement the \'\'hitleys from mid 1941 , a teth­ered barrage ba lloo n. From a 'cage' suspende d be neaththe ba lloon, trainees would make their firs t two jumpsunder well-co ntrolled but silently ter rifying conditions .The balloo n was not well liked , but it would serve air­borne forces as a basic tra ining vehicle for more thanfifty years.

Soon afte r its formation, the Central Landing Sch oolwas renamed the Central La nding Establishme nt and di­vided into three sec tio ns: par achute trai ning, technicaldevelopment, and gliding .

Early trials of militar y gliding were carried out by ahandful of forme r spo rt flyer s including Robert Fender,Peter D avi s, La urence Wright and Douglas Davi e, Wh enit was conclude d that there was potential in the concept(already well proven by the Germans!) the training ofpilots began , using civilian sailplanes, mostly Kirby Kite s,while production of a military glider was put in hand ,This was the General Aircraft Hotspur. An unnecessaril yelegant glider that reflected its sporting origins, theHotspur could deliver seven troops . Its small capacity wasdetermined by uncertainty at the time as to the type ofaircraft that might be available to tow it. If bombers couldnot be converted to the role, the only other ava ilable air­craft were old biplan e bo mbers such as the Hawker Hart,used during the early trials at Ringway, Alth ou gh some1,000 Hotspurs were built, the y never went to war but

were used solely for tra ining . Other gliders, large r andmore functional, would fill the ope ratio nal role.

Who was to fly the glider into battle? The RAF didno t want to; glid ing was a one-way ticket. T he Arm y, onthe other hand, was keen to do so. N or wou ld it confineits pilots simply to flying othe rs into the combat area . Onlanding, they too would join the battle as infantrym en ,So was born the Parachute Glider Regiment, formallyestablished in Februa ry 1942 as part of the recen tlyformed Army Air Corps, which was also responsible forAir Observation Posts,

Des pite the lack of knowled ge, ina dequacy of eq uip­ment , high-level ind ifference and rivalries, not to men­tion a disturbing cas ua lty rat e, Britain's em bryo airborneforce was created , and went to war in a sma ll way inFebruary 1941. Flying ou t of M alta in six Whitleys, fortyme n of II Sp ecial Air Service Batt alion para chuted atnight into Southern Italy to attac k the Tragin o aqueduct..\ laterial damage was slight and all the men were cap­tured wh en attem pts to recover them by submarinefailed , but Operation Colossus dem on strated Britain'sability to strike deep into enemy territ ory, and Italy wasfrightened into diverting large number s of troops tohome defence. This 'ty ing up' of forces in a defensiverole aga ins t surprise attack has been an often under­estimated function of airbo rne forc es,

In M arch 1941 Winston C hurchill visited Rin gwa y tosec how his brainchild was faring, Instead of the 5,000pa ratroo ps he had asked for, he found fewer than 400drawn up on the parade grou nd for his inspection ,watched a mere forty -four othe rs parachute on to theairfield from their ancient Whitleys, and saw one lonel yHo tspur lookin g ver y un warlike as it swoo ped elegantlyto ear th . Disappointed by the number s, he was, however ,much impressed by the enthusiasm and spirit of the air­bo rn e pioneers , In a testy note to the C hiefs of Staff hesubsequently asked for an immediate expa ns ion of theforc e, In thi s he was also influenced by another aweso mede mo nstration of airrnobi lity and airborne poten tial byGe rmany's Fallschirmiager .

Cr eteOn 20 M ay 1941 , having battered his enemy with almostunopposed bombing and stra fing, Kurt Studentlaunched the first wave of 8,000 airborne soldiers from aforce of 500 ju 52s and 74 DFS 230 gliders against theAllied -held island of C rete. The immediate aim ofO peration M ercu ry was to captu re and hold airfieldsand docks for subsequent reinforcement by airlandedand seabo rne forces.

Once the defender s had recovered from the immedi­ate shock of seeing their skies sudde nly filled with para­chutes and gliders, they fou ght back so viciously that bynightfall of the first day, with non e of their objectivestaken , the G erman s see med to be pinn ed down . But a

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tactical error by the defenders of .\ Ialeme airfie ld let theinvade rs th rough, an d, des pite heavy losses of aircraftfro m arti llery and mo rta r fire, into this base Studentpoured his airlanded rein forcements, The tide of battleturned, and even the destruction of their seaborne forceby the Royal N avy coul d not now stop the Ge rmans, Onthe very day that Ch urchill again urged the expansio n ofhis airborne force upon his C hiefs of Staff, GenFreyburg, com ma nding the Allied forces on Crete,began to evac uate his men fro m the lost island , It was thefirst - and only - major bat tle to be won enti rely by air­bo rne forces .

While C hurchill - and othe r d istant observe rs - wereaga in im pressed, Hitler was not. Alth ou gh he waspleased at the victo ry, he weighed it aga inst the cos t; 56pe r ce nt of his 8, I00 par atr oop s were killed or wounded ,the airlande d .\ lountain Division suffered 34 per centcas ualties , and 258 of the 500 ju 52s were destroyed ,Theprice had been too high , Hitler decid ed , And he need edhis ju 52s to hau l supp lies to his new and grea ter battlearea, his Eastern Front. Furthermor e, he believed thatairbo rn e assault was losing the element of surprise. Hepersonally cancelled a well-planne d airborne invasion of.\ Ialta becau se he feared a rep eat of the heavy losses sus­tain ed in C rete, There would be no more mass assaultsby his beloved Fallsch irmjager.

But he did not disband them, Expa nsio n and train ingof the airbo rn e units con tinued , and their tec hnical ca­pab ility was improved . Ni ght ju mping techniques wereeva luated and practised ; parachutes were im proved; newmeth od s of ca rryi ng weap on s int o war were de velop ed ;and glide r technology was adva nce d with the introd uc­tio n of ' Piggy -back' gliders ca rried aloft by co nvertedfighte r-bombers, and 'dive glide rs' that would spend lesstime in the air provid ing targets for ground fire . Few ofthese innovations went into battl e, however , for neveraga in would Germa n par atr oop s descen d ell masse upona sta rtled foe . Thus an operation that sp urred the devel­opme nt of Allied airbo rne forces spell the end for thevictors themselves.

The AmericansW inston Churchill was not the only one impressed bythe ca ptu re of C rete by airborne forces alone , So werethe Am erican s, During the 1930s the US A had sha redBritain 's indifference to the airbo rn e concept. However ,in 1939 the US Army undertook an ap praisal of 'a irinfantry' which concluded that certain tasks co uld beundertaken by infantrymen landed by aircraft or para­chute, But as Am eric a girded for likely war , the pro jectwas tempor arily shelved in favour o f more pressing re­quirem ents, until the combat use of paratroop s by Ru ssiaand more empha tica lly by Ge rma ny, sp urre d the USAtowards the forma tion of its own airbo rne force.

In early 194 0 the task was given to M a] William Lee,

132 13 3

A IR CRAF T OF T H E SECO:-: D W ORLD W A R

All Americallllu co C G-4A is unced aloft by a C-4 7. lt could accommodate thirteen troops.

A I R .\ \ 0 B I I.I T Y

III Britain, the Waco 1m s kllDU'1I as the Hadrian.

destined to become revered as 'father of the USAirborne '. Like his British counterparts, he had to learnfrom scratch. He had a new parachute mad e - the '1: 4,whose canopy-first opening delivered a severe shock. Hisjumpers, however, had the comfort of a reserve para­chute carried on the chest. He gathered instructors fromthe test-jumpers of the Air Corps, and had no lack ofvolunteers from the Arm y for a Parachute Test Platoon .And he had a highly suitable aircraft.

Early jumps were made from a C-33 (the militar ydesignation for the DC-2 ), but it was the Douglas C-47that was to become the mainstay of air support for theAmericans and their allies. In 1932 the Douglas DC-2had introduced a new breed of sleek, low-wing transportcraft to the world 's airlines, and its development culmin­ated in the DC-3. With a reinforced metal floor, astrengthened undercarriage and a large loading doo r, themilitar y version of the D C-3 entered service with the USArmy Air Corps in 1941 as the C-47 Skytrain , offeringa capacity to carry 6,000lb (2,722kg) of freight or twen­ty-seven troops over a range of 6,000 miles. Like the ju52, its side door provided a far safer, more convenientand quicker mode of exit than the 'holes' throu gh whichBritish pioneer paratroops went to war. Rugged,durable, and with a capacity to well exceed that 6,000lbof freight , as long as the maxim 'shove everything as farforward as it will go' was obeyed, the C-47 became a re­markable workhorse. Over 10,000 would emerge fromAmeri ca's vast manufacturing capacity during the war ,of which 1,900 would go to the RAF und er Lend-Leasearrangements. To the thirty-three RAF squadronsequipped with the C-47 it became the Dakota. As an in­dication of the extent to which Britain had fallen behindin the production of transport aircraft, when the Dakotawas issued to No 31 Squadron in India it replaced theVickers Valentia .

The evaluation of methods and equipment byWilliam Lee's Parachute Test Platoon culminated in the

134

formation of the 50 1st Parachute Infantr y Unit andplan s to form three more airborne battalion s. Theseplans were accelerated and extended following theGerman victo ry in Crete, and within a year of theUSA entering the war in Decemb er 1941 it had twoairborn e divisions, the 82nd and the 101st. These divi­sions included a glider regiment and two parachuteregiments.

The USA did not have a glider policy until early in1941 , and when it did decide that it had a need for sucha force, procurement of an appropri ate aircraft did notrun smoo thly. It was given a low priority, to the extentthat major aircraft manufacturers were not allowed tobid for glider design and construction contracts lest theyinterfere with their more important task of aeroplaneproduction .The small companies who gained the ordersthen subcontracted to a total of 150 other businesses toprovide components. The result was administrativechaos and flawed workmanship - sometimes fatallyflawed.

However, out of this chaos came the \X'aco CG-4A, tobecome the busiest American glider of the war, with aproducti on total of 14,000 . Of these, 700 were suppliedto the British, who called it the Hadrian and did not likeit. 'Burn the bloody gliders and fly the blood y crates;suggested a sergeant-major of the Glider Pilot Regimentas he watched \X'aco machines being uncrated and as­sembled.The C G-4A could carry thirteen troop s or lightvehicles and guns, and had a nose door. It was smallenough for two at a time to be towed by a C-47, usuallyin tandem.

Of a further 2,000 glider s built in Americ a, the largestwas the Waco CG- 13A, with a capacity for fort y troop s.The Douglas CG-17 was a light , cheap and engin elessversion of the C-47.

As in Britain , the US development of airborne forcesout of few resourc es and no pre-knowledge was marredand confused by much apathy, a general lack of und er-

standing of the potential of the new arm , and inter­Service differences of opinion and priority. Even thosededicated to the airborn e concept in principle differedon the implementation of that concept in detail. Therewas, for example, much argument about the relativemerits of glider and parachut e. Each had its particularadvocates. Germ any had pioneered a concept thatfavoured glider assault backed up by parachute troops,as Student had employed at Crete, and before that in theassault on the Corinth Canal. America's doctrine, en­shrined in its 1942 Tactics and Techniques of A irborneTroops, put the paras in first, reinforced by glider land­ings. British planners tend ed to adapt the 'batting order'to specific circumstances.

It was with the exact role of its airborne force un­decided and its potenti al poorly und erstood at higherlevels of command that America first sent its paratroop sinto battle.

The Mi ddle EastElements of America's airborne forces were par achutedinto North Africa in late 1942 in a combined operationwith troops of the British 1st Parachute Battalion, to sup­port the Op eration Torch seaborne invasion. The air­borne operation was poorly conceived and planned , waslargely unopposed, and throu gh no fault of the pa ra­troops, contributed little to the success of the invasion . Ina pure infantry role the airborne soldiers subsequentlyfought with imm ense distinction , justifying the elitismthey had inherited from their Germ an counterpart s andfrom their distinctive meth od of going to war.

T his was not the first use of paratroop s in NorthAfrica, for its deserts had been the birthp lace of DavidStirling's Special Air Service. Self-trained with 'ac quired'parachutes and ancient Vickers Valentia and BristolBombay aircraft, sixty of Stirling's men had beenlaunched against targets in the Tobruk area, at night , onto rocky gro und, in a 45mph sandstorm. The painful

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results decided Stirling to go overland in futu re, but theparachute would later take a much-expanded SAS intoEurope on numerou s cland estine missions.

Later in the North African campaign, groups ofItalian paratroopers of the 'X' Regimenti Arditi would bedropped on similar small-scale sabotage raids againstAllied positions, with varying success.

Also in this theatre of great distances and poor sur facecommunications, air freighting in both a strategic and atactical mode played an increasingly important role.

Suffering losses of almost 40 per cent of seabornesupplies destined for Rommel's Afrika Korps, Germanywas forced in late 1942 to establish a Mediterranean 'airbridge' .This, too, was costly, seventy ju 52s being lost toAllied fighters in November alone. This battered fleet wasreinforced with ju 90s, Focke-Wulf I'll' 200s, twenty six­engined Me 323s and large numbers of gliders. In twomonth s this combined force lifted 9,000 men and 5,000tons of supplies across the Mediterr anean, but all in vain.The aircraft that had supplied the gro und forces werenow called upon to fulfil another role of air support: theevacuation of a defeated army from the battle zone.

For the Allies, air transport provided a strategic linkbetween North Africa and bases in England , Gibraltarand Malta, and tactical support within the combat area,provided largely by Lockheed Hudsons converte d fromtheir bombing and sea-reconnaissance roles, and later bysimilarly adapted B-24 Liberator bombers. An exampleof parti cularly audacious use of air support wasOperation Chocolate, which involved the establishmentand resupply of a desert base, LG 125, for a Wing ofHurricanes fifty miles behind enemy lines and destruc­tively close to the enemy airfields and supply routes thatwere its targets.

The Far EastAir transport both strategic and tactical played animport an t role in the Far East and Pacific, although

AIR CRAF T O F T HE SE C O:"D W ORLD WAR

direct assau lt by paratroops was carried out on a rela­tively sma ll scale; audacious raids rather than the ma ssiveairborne operations of the Euro pea n theatre were thenorm.

japan entered the war with a variety of modern tra ns­port aircraft, some of indigenous desig n (such as thelicence-buil t Slitsubishi Ki- 57 Type 100) , others builtunder licence such as the DC- 3 derivative Showa L2D Iand the Nakaj ima Ki-34 Type 97, inspired by theDou glas DC-2.With these aircraft, j apane se paratroop s,trained by German instr uc tors, captured airfields in theCe lebes and Timor and oilfields in Sumatra in 1942 . Butjapan failed to develop the stre ngth of airlift for larger­scale operations, and loss of air superiority in the laterstages of the conflict deterred any airbo rne assaults at all,apart from two desperate raids launched in thePhilippines in late 1944 .

In Indi a, Britain established a Parachute TrainingSchool manned by instruc tors from Ringwa y to train anIndi an Parachute Brigad e, but the only large-scale oper­ation by elements of this force came in 1945 , with alargely un opposed drop outside Rangoon as part of thereoccupation of Burma.

American paratroops mounted imaginative andlargely successful assaults in the Pacific theatre, notablyto capture airfields along the northern coast of NewGuinea, and most spectac ularly aga inst the islandfor tre ss of Correg ido r, where they com pletely surprisedthe japanese defend ers by parachuting from low-flyingC-47s on to the parade gro und and a nar row str ip ofcrate red land on the very crown of the island , instead ofon to the more obvious but very vu lne rable lowergro und. Shortly afterwards , a classic coup de main by 125paratroo ps resc ued, witho ut loss, 2,000 civilian captivesunder threat of execution in the Los Banos pri son campin the Ph ilippines. These and similar operations mayhave been low in numbers but were high in the basic in­gredient of successful airbo rne assault, audacity and sur­pri se. T he only glider-borne assault in the Pacific camein 194 5, towa rds the end of the war, when seven US glid­ers landed troo ps in northern Luzon to has ten the cap­ture of the island.

It was throu gh resupply and reinforcem ent that thetransport aeroplane best served the gro und forces in theFar East and Pacific. In retrospect it can be argued thatno t enough use was made of airrnobi lity in a militarytheatre of vast distances, most of them scattered over thesea or rugged terra in. However , limited resources and insome cases an uncertainty of vita l air superio rity un­dou btedly influenced air transport operations in theseareas .

\,<Iith few hospitable airfields, the seaplane came intoits own as a means of communication in this zone .Across the Pacific (and across the Atlantic) Pan-Am 'sgiant Boeing 3 14 Clippers pro vide d a lon g-r ange rnili-

J apan developed an airborne capability based on Gerlnanmethods, bill made only limiced use ojgliders, mainly ouiingco a lack ojtozcingaircraft.The Koku sai Ku-7, seen here,zmsthe largest assault glider built in Japan and could hold thir­cy-cu'o troops or an eight-ton tank. By the time of its firstflight, in August J944, Japan was losing the war,and it didnot progress beyond the experimental stage.

tar y passe nge r service for the Allies similar to that pro­vide d by Imp erial Airways flying boats via the Africanroutes.Within the war zone, US Army Air Force and USN avy flying boats such as the M artin PB2M-I M ars andthe smaller Ca talina and M arin er were used for supplyand communications. Britain 's Short Sunderland flyingboats provided both stra tegic and in-theatre support.

The C hina-Burma- Ind ia theatre saw two outstandingexamples of air transport support . From 194 2 to 194 5US and Chinese forces operating out of southe rn C hinawere sustained by massive airlift from bases in Indi a andBurma. Pu shed westward s by threat of japanese fighters,th is route had to surmount the Himalayas; 'Crossing theHump' it was called . The operation began with C-47s,each carrying three Ions of supplies. As the C-47s wereprogr essively replaced by Cur tiss C-46 Co mma ndosand smaller numbers of Douglas C-54s andCo nsolida ted C-109s, the monthly airlift rose from2,800 tons (2,840 tonnes) in February 1943 to 7,000tons (7,110 tonnes) by December of that year, then to12,000 Ion s (12,200 tonnes) in early 1944.

A more direct use of air support was provided inBurma for Orde Win gate's 'Chindits' in their lon g-r angepene tratio ns of japanese-h eld terri tor y east of theC hindwin river. Win gate had previously employed RAFtranspo rt support in a successful campaign against theItalians in Ethiopia. Now, this 'ge nius for un orthodoxand novel warfare' as his comma nder, Gen \'<'ayell, calledhim, inspired an ope ratio n that presaged modern con­cep ts of air mobility with its tota l integration of air andground forces employing an ingen ious variety of tech­niques and airbo rne operations . His first infiltration ofjapanese territor y in 194 2 involved 3,000 men in eightseparate 'columns' movin g by foot throu gh hazard ousterrain where their success and very su rvival depend ed

136

The 'Chindit' campaigns in Burma saw the Second IfiJrldIf" r 's best example oj air transport in support oj a groundcampaign, including the early I/se oj helicopters for comlm/­nications and casualty eoacuation. A Sikorsky R-4 isseen here.

upon supply from the air by RAF C-47 Dakotas andLockheed Hu dsons.\'<'ingate's more ambitious operatio nin 1944 was more generously supported by an integrat­ed USAAF force of bombers and fighters, glide rs,Stinson L-1 and L-5 light aircraft, and seven squadronsof C-47s, all under the comma nd of the equally inspi ra­tional Lt Co l Phillip Cochran, USAAF. His force of sup­po rt aircraft bec ame the 1st Air Comma ndo G roup,whose successors have continued to give dedicated airsupport to clandesti ne operations to this day.

Of the 12,000 C hindi ts committed to OperationT hur sday in 1944 , 10,000 were airlifted (with 1,300mules) into rough airstrips and jungle clearings that hadbeen seized by glide r-borne assault troops then preparedby glider-borne engine ers. T he troop s who struck outfrom these forward bases were furthe r supplied by air-

---Designed for army co-operation, the If",stlalld Ly sander pro­vided an air-drop capability for ground Jorces and air-seareSClle, and a clandestine delivery and retrieval system fo rA llied agents, usually under cover oj darkness.

137

A I R ,\\ 0 B I LITY

dr op and glider, and at the end of the operation weremostly airlifted out of the battl e zone. An increasinglyvalued aspect of air support, the recove ry of the wound­ed, was demonstrated in the Bur ma campaign. Mostlythey were flown out of the forward areas by light aircraft.Some were actua lly returned by glider, for among the in­genious innovations in concept and technique born ofthis campaign was a system whereby Waco glide rs thathad delivered their load could subsequently be'snatched' from the gro und by a low-flying C-47. T hehelicopter also made an appea rance in support of theC hindi ts, the Sikorsky R-4 and later the R-5 being usedfor communications and casualty evacuation .

Orde Win gate died in an air crash before the end ofhis campaign, bu t not befo re his vision, well support edby colleagues and by senior comma nde rs, had inspired amajor adva nce in the conce pt of airrnobi lity,

Special operationsBritain's second airbo rne ope ration had been more suc­cessful tha n its ill-fated attac k on the Tragino aqued uct .On 27 Feb rua ry 1942 120 men of the 2nd ParachuteBattalion made a daring night drop from their Wh itleyson to the Frenc h coas t at Bruneval, near Le Havre, toovercome the defe nces of a Ge rma n radar installation ,not to destroy it but to enable a rada r expert spec iallytra ined for the mission to examine, dismantle, and takeparts from it. T he force was recovered from a nearbybeach by a naval flotilla. It was a classic COI/p de main; aclandestine raid rather than a full airborne assault.

T hroughout the war and in most of its theatres thesupport of cover t operations was an important butunderstand ably less apparent func tion of air transport,ranging from the droppi ng or air landing of single'agents' to the delivery of 'special forces ' in groups ofvarious stre ngths. A total of 420 men and women ofSp ecial Operations Exec utive (SO E) alone enteredFrance during the war, mostly by parachu te or air­landing. For the latter , the Westland Lysa nder was wellsuited. Evolved as a two-seat army co-o peration aero­plane, it found wider use during the war for air-sea res­cue and for the tra nsport of agents into and out of hosti leterritory. Fou r suc h passe ngers cou ld be crammed intoits fuselage, and its sho rt - take-off-and-landing capabilitymade it ideal for the small fields, roads and rough moor­land that it used for missions in occupied Europe.

An aircraft offered the obvio us advantage of liftingpeople out of as well as into hostile terri tor y. A fine ex­ample of a ' lift-out ' was Ge rma ny's rescu e in 1943 of thedeposed Benito Mussolini from impri sonment in whatwas thou ght to be an impregnable hotel 9,000ft up in theAbruzzi mountains, serve d only by a funicular railway.Led by self-sty led 'ai r comman do' O tto Skorzeny, eightymen were land ed in twe lve DFS gliders on a nar row out­crop of rock alongside the hotel, while others dropped by

AIR CR AFT OF T HE SE CO:-;D \' · O R !. D W A RA I R .\ 10 II I I. I T Y

If'he1I British gliderborne troops did go co u'ar, it u'as primarily in the Airspeed Horsa, uhich could carry tuienty -eight troopsor a hozcitzer unth a light truck.

On the night of 9 July 1943 British and American air­born e troops were lifted from bases in Tunisia to spear­head the invasion , Of 147 Waco and Horsa gliderscarrying Britain's 1st Airlanding Brigade, only twelvereached their landing zones. Sixty-nine were releasedearly and landed in the sea, drowning 600 men. Onelanded in Malta, one in Sard inia .The remaind er were lit­tered about southe rn Sicily.The first wave of paratroopsfared no better. Of 3,400 Ame rican troop s delivered intosouthe rn Sicily that night, only some 200 were droppedon target; some landed as far as sixty miles from theirdrop zones.The following night an attempt to reinforcethe Americans with a further 2,000 men came under in­tense fire from 'friendly' naval guns which killed 20 percent of the paratroop s. On 13 July the British 1stParachute Brigade joined the battle and suffered thesame treatment. Of their 116 aircraft, twenty-nine failedto drop at all, and only thirty-nine dropped their men onor within half a mile of the ir drop zones.

Det ermined fighting and plenty of 'a irborne initiative'helped to retr ieve the situa tion, but the imme nse short­comings in planning and delivery thr ew the whole futureof airborne force s into que stion. Gen Eisenhower or­dered an inquiry which only narrowly concluded thatairborne forces did have a part to play, provided theywere given realistic tasks, adequate support , and propertraining, parti cu larly of aircre ws,

The Allied invasion of EuropeDoubts and differen ces of opinion about the effective­ness and the purpose of airb orn e operations still lingeredat high levels of command as the Allies prepared for theinvasion of mainland Euro pe in Jun e 1944.The enthusi­asts favoure d a deep pen etration by four airborne divi­sions to establish an airhead midwa y between theNormandy beach es and Paris. At the other extreme, AirChief Marshal Leigh-Mallor y, as Gen Eisenh ower's AirCo mma nder, forecast 80 per cent casualties and advised

Heavy lift fo r British airborne fo rceswas provided by the General Aircraft Hamilca r,capable ofcarrying six ty troops or a tanhspecially designed fo r it, which u'as III/loaded through the hinged I/ose door.

General Aircraft Hamilcar, which could carry sixtytroops or a light tank (specially built for it) into battle. Ithad c1amshcll doors in the nose for ease of loading andunloading. Over 400 were built. A handful of fifteen-seatSlingsby Hengist paratroop- carrying gliders had beenproduced, but changing Ser vice requirements renderedthem obsolete.

This force of powered aircraft and gliders would neverbe enough to lift the whole of British airborne forces intobattIe, and reliance would have to be placed on additi on­al American airlift resources, which were vast.

The advan ce of the status and strength of air tran s­port during the Second World War was most apparent inthe USA, where it was supporte d by a manufacturingcapacity well beyond that of its Allies - and its enemies.By 1943 the USA had over 1,900 transport aircraft,more than all the rest of the world 's transport aeroplanescombined . Furthermore , these aircraft were designed astransport s, not convert ed from bombers, and were oper­ated by an appropriate command structure. In July 1942Air Transport Command was formed as part of theUSAAF; with the US Navy and Ma rin e Co rps retainingtheir own independent transport force s, and their ownairborne un its. In March 1943 USAAF T roop CarrierCommand was also formed, to give spec ialist supportfor airborne operations and for airlift of troops betweenma jor theatres and battle zones.

The first large-scale airborne operation mounted bythe Allies, combi ning assault by glider and parachute,came close to total disaster .The planning of the invasionof Sicily by sea and air had been notable for disagree­ments between most of the commanders, poor commu­nications at all levels, and inadequate trainin g of theAmerican aircrews who were to deliver the airb orneforces. Most were former airline pilots, accustomed toflying fixed routes with beacons to guide them, not to de­livering troop s across seas at night into unknown terrainagainst enemy guns.

Allied exp ansionChurchill's hector ing of his Chiefs of Staff in 1941 led toimmediate plans to expa nd the airborne force to a fullbrigade of four batt alions, and to put the train ing ofparatroop s entirely in RAF hands, instead of it continu­ing as a joint task.To the overall command of British air­bor ne forces Churc hill personally appointed General'Boy' Browning . Unde r his elegant and forceful leader­ship and against considerable oppos ition, parti cularlyfrom the Air Mini str y, the force was to expand into twodivisions. To operate the British transport support forthese division s, RAF Transport Co mmand was formedin March 194 3. Operational control of its fleet of con­verted bo mbers, C-47 Dakotas and gliders was vested in38 and (later) 46 Group s.

T he British glider force now had a less attrac tive butmore workma nlike vehicle than the Hotspur; theAirspeed Horsa, of which 700 were built during the war.This all-wooden machine could carry twenty-eighttroops or a gun crew with howitzer and light truck. Tounload the latter, many Horsas were equip ped withcordite charges known as 'surcingles' to blow off theirtailplanes, or with a system of quick-release nut s andwire cutte rs to achieve the same result . A larger versionand a powered vers ion of the Horsa were projected butnot prod uced . The heavier lift was provided by the

for exampic, 700 men of the French SAS dropped infifty separate parti es to disrupt German communica­tions in north-east Holland .

T he dro pping of Allied agent s and 'special force'grou ps was largely vested in RAF Spec ial Duty Flightsor US Air Co mma ndo units, using the full range of avail­able aircraft.

parachute into the valley below to secure the fun icular.T he stu nned defend ers offered little resistance. A smallFieseler Storch communications aero plane landed, andflew out Mussolini and Skorzeny by simply trundling offthe ledge and picking up flying speed as it dived into thevalley,

Britain 's first use of gliders to mount a covert opera­tion ended in tragedy. In Nove mber 1942 , Op erationFreshma n sought to land thirty airbo rne engineers intwo Horsa gliders in southern Norway, to sabotage ahydro-electric plant that was providing Germany with'heavy water ' , an essential eleme nt for atom ic research,At nigh t and in a snowstorm, and un able to locate theradio beacon set up on the gro und by four members ofthe SOE who had previou sly pa rachuted into the area,both gliders crash-Iandcd. Eleven men were killed out­righ t, and the remainder were captured by Germantroop s and summa rily executed. One of the Halifax glid­er tugs crashed into a mountainside, killing the wholecrew.

T he parachute provided a more certa in and usuallymore covert means of c1and estinc infiltration than theglider, and was used for the purpose by most of the war­ring nations. For the Allies it provided a de livery ser vicefor SOE in Europe; for Force 133 operating inYugoslavia; for Force 136 in the Far East; for the ir UScounterparts of the Office of Strategic Servi ces (OSS) ;and of course for the Sp ecial Air Servi ce (SAS) , whichincluded not only British troop s but strong elementsfrom Fra nce, Belgium and other Europe an allies. SASmissions in Western Europ e reached their peak in themonths before and after the Allied invasion of the main­land in June 1944, and again du ring the 'mopping-up'operations toward s the close of the war. In April 1945 ,

138139

Halifax tug aircraft and their Hamilcar gliders are marshalled al Tarrant Rushton ill prepration fo r the airborne inoasion ofNormandy 0 11 D-Day

AI R CRAF T OF THE SE C O:>:D WORLD WAR

against an airborne assault at all. Eisenhower chose themiddle path , with plans to protect the flanks of theseaborne invasion with airborne landings in strength .The US 82nd and 10Ist Divisions were to create a de­fensive block on the right flank; the British 6th AirborneDivision to seize vital bridges and destroy selected strongpoints on the left.

The drops took place in darkness on 5 June. TheAmerica ns were again poorly dropped, being spreadover an area twenty miles wide instead of being concen­trated on their intended drop zones. But, fighting nu­merous isolated battles in small groups , they createdeven more confusion amongst a surprised enemy thanthey experienced themselves, and by dawn were on theirway to achieving their objectives.

With some exceptions, the British were dropped withgreater accuracy by their more experienced crews.Glider-borne troops caprured vital bridges over theCaen Canal and the River Orn e and held them until re­inforced by ground troops advancing from the beaches.Paratroops destroyed other bridges then fought a hold­ing action against German forces trying to launch acounterattack against the beach landin gs. A classic CO/IP

de main by only 150 men out of a very scattered 750dropp ed by glider and para chute silenced the heavy gunsof the ,\ ierville battery.

Despite the scattered dropping of the Americans, theairborne assault was fully justified, and the troops thenremained in position and fought on the flanks throughmuch of the battle to consolidate the beach-head.

Supply of the beach-head by air became crucial. Assoon as a toehold on the coast had been achieved,Airfield Constructi on Companies hacked out roughairstrips known as Temporary Staging Posts (TSPs) intowhich poured essential supplies, and out of whichpoured the wounded - over 50,000 of them from Britishstrips alone during the first three months of the battle forEurope.The great force of Allied C-47 Dakotas was themainstay of this mighty airlift.

After the breakout from the beach-head, supply linesbecame critically stretched by the rapid Allied advancethrough France and into Belgium . Before the Channelports could be taken and repaired, the aeroplane was avital link between sup ply bases in Normand y and theforward positions, particularly when the road supply ofthe British armies suffered from the wi thdrawal of 1,400lorr ies to which wrong gearbox components had beenfitted.The TSPs and the Dakotas kept hard on the heelsof the advancing armies. Louis Strange, now command­ing a \X'ing of TSPs in Europe, remembered watching435 Dakotas land at Evcrc, offload, then take off again inthe space of six hour s.

ArnhemThe epic struggle for the bridge at Arnhem is perhap sthe best-known of all airborne battles, purely through theheroic narure of the fight against great odds that is thehallmark of the paratrooper.

Operation Market Garden, of which Arnhem was buta part, was a bold concept, tragically flawed in its de-

Heau ily -laden troops of Britain S l SI Airborne Division 0 11

board a Dakota heading for the drop zones Oil/sideAmhem,and the brave but poorly planned 'Bailie for the Bridge'.

tailed planning. Just as Kurt Srudent had laid a 'ca rpet'to Rotterdam for Hitler's Panzers in 1941, the Alliessought to lay a seventy-mile carpet of neutral ised de­fences and captured bridges across the Low Countries,along which would roll the British 2nd Army to gain afoothold beyond the lower Rhine at Arnhem, then wheelright and strike into the heart of Germany. But if it hadSrudent 's vision, Market Garden scorne d the basic in­gredients of successfu l airborne operation as pioneeredby him: boldness, surprise and concentration of forceupon the target.

The Americans, after their painful experiences ofnight dropping, insisted on a daylight assault eventhough it would lessen surp rise. Surprise at Arnhem dis­appeared altogethe r in tactical terms when the RAF thendecided that if the assault was to be in daylight, it wouldnot fly against the flak barrage that would surely protectthe bridge; instead it would deliver the troops to suitab ledropping zones seven miles to the west of the town.Concentration of strength even in the wrong place mighthave compensated for the lack of surprise, but such con­centration was denied by spreadi ng the delivery of thetotal force over three days. 'To these major faults wereadded differences of opinion at high level, an inadequateplan for close air support, poor communications, under­estimation of the time that it would take the groundforces to reach Arnhem, and an intelligence report thatcompletely failed to acknowledge the presence inArnhem of heavily armed Panzer units. All stemmedfrom a gross underestimation of the enemy, written offby some as already defeated.

T he outcome was the military disaster known to theworld. The airborne delivery on 17 September 1944went well. The US 101st Airborne Divi sion took thesouthernmost river and canal crossings in the Eindhovenarea. The 82nd Airborne Division cap tured the bridge

AIR.\l OIlILI TY

over the Waal at Niimegen , but only after some delay, AtArnhern , although well delivered outside the town, the1st British Airborne Division soon met unexpected andfully alerted opposition, and only one battalion was ableto fight its way to the bridge. Its northern end was heldby 750 men of John Frost 's 2nd Battalion for over threedays, a day longer than ordered; a day longer than itshould have taken the British 2nd Army to reach and re­lieve them. The rest of the division were pressed backagainst the Rhine by far heavier enemy forces. Badweather delayed resupply and reinforcement by the 1stPolish Parachute Brigade, and the British 2nd Armyfailed to appear until after the battle was over. Of the10,095 men who had landed at Arnhe m, only 3,000came back over the Rhine.

It was not the airborne soldiers nor the aircrews whoflew them into battle who failed at Arnhem. It was theplanners. The solution? \'>;' ith not too much hindsight , adirect assault on the bridge by gliders backed by para­troops, preferably at night, reinforced when local de­fences had been wiped out, might have been costly inimmediate term s, but it would not have cost 7,000 men.

The unforeseenTowards the end of 1944 an operation was forced uponAllied airborne forces that was to presage one of theirmore modern roles: rapid reaction to the unforeseen.T he unforeseen in this case was an unexpected attack byeight Panzer divisions on weakly held positions in theArdennes, in an attempt to break through Allied linesand strike in 'Blitzkrieg' style for Antwerp. As part of thisbid, Hitler ordered his Fallschirmjager into battle oncemore . Fewer than 700 paratroops could be mustered insixty-seven Ju 52s, flown by inexperienced pilots in poorvisibility and 30kt winds .The drop was widely scatteredand the airborne operati on a complete failure. However,in what was to be called 'T he Battle of the Bulge', thePanzers broke through the American lines and slammedthe defenders back upon the town of Bastogne, there tobe reinforced by the US 82nd and IOlst AirborneDivisions, truc ked into battle only two weeks out of thefighting in Holland. At Bastogne they were immediatelysur rounded by the Germans and cut off from groundsupply. A group of Pathfinders parachuted into thebattleground to guide in an airdrop by C-47 Dakotasfrom British bases. Essential fuel and artillery ammuni­tion could only be carried by glider, so in a series offlights, fifty Waco gliders manned by US crews werelaunched into the area. Thirty-five of them landed with­in the perimeter; fifteen were destroyed by ground fire,as were thirteen of the tow aircraft. The losses wereheavy,but the supplies, and the volunteer surgical teams,that they brought to beleaguered Bastogne played an im­portant part in the eventual Allied defeat of Hitler's lastbold attempt to rurn the tide of the battle for Europe.

140 141

A I R C RAFT OF T ilE SE CO:-;D \X'ORLD \X'ARA I R .\ 1 0 B I L I T Y

From 1943 unt il 1945 the Cu rtiss C-46 Commando provided valuable airlift of f ue! and other suppliesacross the Himalayanranges from India 10 Southern China. II proved vulnerable tchen used during Operation varsity, the crossing of the Rhine.

The Rhine - the last great airbo r n e assaultStill reeling from the defeat at Arnhem , the planners gotit right to the point of over-caution for the last great air­borne operation of the war, Operation Varsity. The in­tention was to use airborne troops to support thecrossing of the Rhine by seizing high ground beyond theriver and blocking possible counterattacks. On 25 March1945 21 ,680 airborne tro ops of the British 6th and theAmerican 17th Airborne Divisions were carried over theRhine near Wessell in 1,696 transport aircraft and 1,348gliders, flying in three columns each of nine aircraftacross, with escorting fighter s above and fighter­bombers on the flanks to suppress anti -aircraft fire.There may have been some in that aeri al armada whorecollected the six ancient Whitleys and the singleHotspur glider that dem onstrated the full might ofBritish airborne force s to Churchill in 1941 .

The paratroops went first, satu rating the target areain less than twenty minutes. Then came the glider s, tak­ing longer to land yet still concent rating the whole one­lift assault into less than two hours.The main ingredientsfor success were there: concentration of forc e in theshortest possible time , on top of the targets, with air su­peri ority and close air support. Success it was, with allobjectives achieved, and a link-up with ground forceswithin twenty-four hours.

But the cost of Varsity was high . M ost losses werefrom anti-aircraft fire on the approach and ground firefrom German troops on the landing zones, 25 per cent

142

of the airborne troop s bein g killed or wounded, and 240troop -carrying aircraft shot down . Particularly vulner­able was the C-46 Commando, used for the first time incombat. It proved to be a fire-trap. \, ' ith fuel runningdown the fuse lage from ruptured tanks, the machinewould explode in flame if hit by tracer. Twenty-four ofthe seventy-two that flew across the Rhine that daycrashed in flames. The Hor sa and Hamilcar glide rssuffered heavily, too. Released as high as 2,500ft (750m) ,they lingered far too long in the sky as choice targets forGerman gunners. The \'«aco gliders, released as low as500ft (150m) for their more shallow approach, faredslightly better.

There were those who said that the costs were too high,and the achievements of the airborne assault too small tojustify such massive application of effort and material.Even at this late stage of the war the arguments over theeffectiveness of massive airborne assault went on.

But if Varsity lacked boldness, other operationsplanned for the closing months of the war certainly didnot. Operation Arena envisaged the delivery of six air­borne divisions (the USA now had four) and four air­landed infantry divi sion s to create an 'island' strongholdand airhead midway between the Rhine and Berlin , andit was no coincidence that this concept echoed OrdeWingate's long-range massive-penetration theories, forhis Air Commander, Col Phil Cochran, was now on theplanning staff for airborne operations in Europe .Operation Eclip se was a planned assault on Berlin itself.

One of the final air-supply operations of the war wasOperalion ,lianna, the dropping of food 10 starving Dutchcioilia ns by a uariety of British aeroplanes, includingLancaster and M osquito bombers.

Neither plan was implemented; Varsity remains the lastof the great airbo rne battl es in Europe .

Som e of the final airrno bility operations of the warin Euro pe were of a more humane nature. SAS parti eswere parachuted in to prote ct prisoners of war and someof the inm ates were airlifted from their camps. And

--'

Although Russia pioneered the concept of assault gliders dur­ing the 1930s, it made lill ie operational use of the AlllonovA-7 during the ,mr.

143

essential supplies of food were d ropped to starv ingcivilian populations, as a prece dent for a modern func­tion of air supply. ,\ Iost notable was Operation M anna,in whic h Allied aircraft flew to the relief of the popula­tion of northern Holland , starved by Ge rma n deni al offood and the flooding of their polder-lands. During tendays in April 1945 the RAF alone mounted 3,156 sor tiesby 145 de Havilland M osqu ito light bombers and 300Avro Lancasters to drop 6,685 tons of food , mostlv bvfree d rop. . .

With the ending of the war in Europe, attentio nturned to the movem en t of aircraft and men to reinforceAllied operations in the Far East and the ant icipated in­vas ion of japan , in which airborne forces were expectedto feature. T he atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshimaand Na gasaki ca ncelled such moves,

Concl usionsThe Second \\'orld \\'ar prompted immense advances inthe usc of air transport in support of grou nd force s, no­tably in the deliver y of troo ps into battl e from the air,and in the reinforcement and supply of combat areas.

1\ listakes were made, particularly among the Allies,who suffered throu ghou t the war from having begun itwithout a clear air transport policy, and then continued itwithout resolvin g differences of opinion over the role ofair tran sport in general and airborne forces in particular.

Of the major combatants , only Ge rma ny entered thewar with a well-prepared transport force and an agreeddoctr ine for its use.The USA was able eventually to pro­vide the mat erial resources, but suffered from lack of anagreed policy as to how those resources might best beemployed . Britain, too, failed to integ rate adequately itscomma nd and contro l of the air and gro und forces.

Techni cal imp rovements to the transport fleets con­tinued throu ghout the war, thou gh not as fast as dcvel­opment of the fighter and bom ber, and generally with alower priority in construction. The tendency was to relyupon the junkers ju 52 and the C-47 Dakota as well­tried workhorses, and to supplement them with neweraircraft with increased payload. Throu ghout the warBritain relied on civilian air transport, convertedbombers, and American aircraft.

\\'h at of Russia, that great pioneer of airbo rne as­sault? Small groups of paratroops jumped into Finlandin 1939, and later parachuted behin d the advancingGe rma n armies to act in a parti san role. G lide rs wereused on a few occasions in similar small-scale actions.The only Russian airborne operation of any size mount­cd during the war failed dism ally when 5,000 men wered ropped on the western side of the River Dn eiper tohamper the retreatin g Germa ns, but were so widely scat­tered that they fought only in defensive pockets and werevirtually wiped out. The 'Locust \\'arri or s' who had onceprom ised so mu ch, now suffered from lack of lead ership,

AIR CR A FT OF T H E S E C O~D \X' ORLD WAR A I R .\ \ 0 B I L IT Y

A WQ1'e of C-4 7s drops Allied troops beyond the Rhine during the last of the great airborne assaults of the Second Iforld Ifa r..lIore than 20,000 1IIen u'ere landed by parachute and glider ill less than m'o hours.

2,09 0kg (4.630lb)209km!h (130mph)21.98m (72ft lin)11.24 m (36ft lOin)9 troops or1,236kg (2,750lb) of freight.

39,404kg (86,860lb)218km!h (13 7mph) withHe III Z tow55m (180ft 5in)28.15m (92ft -tin)130 troops or up to12,196kg (26,8~6 Ib) of freight.

7,296kg (16,094Ib)209km!h (130mph)24.36m (80ft -tin)15.76m (51ft lOin)22 troops or2,72 1kg (6,000lb) of freight.

175km!h (109mph)385km (240 miles)14.25m (46ft 9in)9.9m (32ft 6in)2 passengers.

3 x 750 hp Alfa- Rorneo RC35radials

,lI axi1ll1ll1l speedRangeSpallLengthLoad

Loaded ueightMaxinnon IOU' speedSpallLengthLoad

Loaded ueightM aximum lOU' speed

ITALY

Gotha Go 242 (glider)A min-boom freight glider well suited to the carriage ofguns, small vehicles or light tanks. Introduced in early1942 and used mainly for supply missions on theRussian Front. Twi n engines were added to create theunsuccessful Gotha Go 244 .

Engines

,\ Icsscr schrn it t ,\ Ie 321 (glider)Heavy tra nspo rt glider, one of the largest aircraft of theSecond World War. Used rocket-assisted take-off andspec ial rug aircraft.

DFS 230 (glider )Germany's main tactical assault glider. Later versionsused a braking parachute to shorten the landing run, andhad a forward-firing machine-gun to keep defenders 'heads down .

Loaded uieight

,lIaxi1ll111ll IOU' speedSpallLengthLoad

SPallLengthLiJad

Savoia-March etti SM,81 and SM.82Milit ar y development of the tri-rnotor SM .73 civil trans­port, and Italy's predominant paratrooping, troop trans­port and freighting aircraft.

(272mph)(2,473 miles)(111ft lOin)(82ft 4in )

( 12,500lb) of freight .

3 x 830hp B.\ IW 132A-3 radials276km!h (172 mp h)998km (620 miles)29.26m (95ft Ilin)18.90m (62ft)18 paratroops or4,536kg ( IO,OOOlb) of freight .

I x 240 hp Argus AS IOC-3 in-line

3 x 1,000hp Eramo 323 R-2radials437km!h3,9 70km34.05m25.ll m35 troops or5,670kg

6 x 990 hp G nome-Rho ne 14N48/49 radials214km!h (137mph)1,121km (696 miles)55.15m (18 1ft)28.35 m (93ft -lin )130 troop s or9,752kg (21,500lb) of freight.

Engines.lIaxi1ll111ll speedRangeSpallLengthLoad

Maximum speedRangeSpallLengthLoad

Engines

Junkers Ju 352An all-wooden vers ion of the cancelled ju 252 project,pro duced only in sma ll numbers as a freighte r with rearloading doors. Not usually emp loyed in an assault role,but used for reinforcement and supply.

Ju nkers Ju 52/3rnThe mainstay of Germany's air transport fleet, derivedfrom early Junkers civil airliners. Rugged performancemade it an ideal front-line support aircraft for freighti ng ,para trooping, and troop-landing roles.

P ri ncipal Transp ort Aircraft and Gliders

GER.\IANY

Engines

.lI ax i1ll111ll speedRangeSpallLengthLoad

Engine

Appendix:

.\ Iesser schrn itt M e 323High-winged, six-engine monoplane, Germa ny's mainheavy-lift aircraft, valuable on thc Eastern Front but aneasy prey to fighters elsewhere. Later versions mounteddefensive 20mm cannon in four power -operated rurrets .

Fiescler Fi 156 StorchA communications and liaison aircraft with outstandingSTOL performance, ideal for clandesti ne support .

.~. . '

.. ' . : ."

. . ..

...-- -

....

----;~ -, : ..

o

. '

.. :- .

, -.. .. .. '"..

: ": .." ..". ....

.-----

•.:»

.-...... .

.... . ... 0-, .'

.. "."

Whether these pointers wou ld be followed remained tobe seen.

3 The massive airb orne assaults against a preparedenemy had become increasingly costly. Would furtheradvances in ground-to-air defences sweep thcm fromthe sky altogether? On thc other hand, smaller-scaleoperations making full use of boldness and surprisehad general ly been morc successful and less expe n­sive in men and material.

4 Transport aircraft designed for the job, with goodload/range ratio, ru gged perfor ma nce and prefe rab lywide-door loading, now had a definite place in the airforce inventory.

5 The op timu m use of air transport in support ofground force s requ ired integrated comma nd andcontrol of air and ground eleme nts and an agreeddoctrin e of usage; ra rely were eithe r ach ieved by theAllies during thc Seco nd \'.;'orld War.

,"

,-

o.o

'.-.

..

"

.~

•

lack of a doctrine, lack of an adequate transport fleetand, for much of the war against Germany, lack of airsuperiority. It is also likely that , in a tota litarian societythat encouraged a belief that all are equal and no manbetter than another, the Russian paratroops themselveslacked that spa rk of elitism without which a paratrooperis not fully armed.

From the developments, from the mistakes and fromthc successes, derived several pointers towards the po­tcntia l for air rnob ility in support of the gro und forces :1 The aeroplane now had thc 'reach' and the reliability

for strategic deployment of men and material, asshown by the airlift over the Him alayas into Ch inaand the estab lishme nt of an 'Atlantic bridge' for thefer rying of aircraft to Britain.

2 The conventional tran sport aircraft had established atactical ro le within the battle area, and the newly in­trod uccd helicopter prom ised to extend and ultimate­ly alter this role imme nsely.

144 145

AIR CR AFT OF TIlE SE C O:-;D WORLD WARA I R MO B I LITY

Handley Pa ge Hali faxA converte d bomber used extensively as a glide r tug aswell as for dropping paratroops, agents and supplies.Specification for Mk II.

Sho r t Sti r lingFirst of RAF's new generation of four-engine bom bers,converte d to troop carry ing, parachuting and supplydropping from its retained bomb cells.

Armstrong Whitwor th AlbemarleCo nceived as a fast bomber, it serve d almost exclusivelyas a glider tu g and specia l transport, fitted with under­wing panniers for drop pin g supplies. Paratroops exitedthrou gh a floor aper ture.

Armstrong Whit worth Whitl ey ,\ Ik VConverted from its origi nal bomb ing role for parachutetrainin g and operations by replacing the ventra l gun tur­ret with an aperture for troops to drop throu gh. Tu g forHotspur glider on ly.

9, 150lb (4, 15 Ikg)125mph (20 Ikm/h)83ft 8in (25A8m)48ft 4in (14.74m)13 troops or4,0001b ( I ,8 14kg) of freight.

2 x 2,000hp Pratt & WhitneyR-2800-51 Do ub le Wasp radials269mp h (433km/h)1,200 miles (1,93 1km)108ft (32.9m)76ft olin (23.3m)30 paratroopers, 40 passenge rs, or10,000lb (4,536kg) of fre ight.

M ax imu m speedRangeSpanLengthLoad

Engines

Loaded uieightM ax imum tow speedS panLengthLoad

Heydte, Von Der, Daedelus Returned (Hut chinson,London , 1958) . Per sonal account of experienceswith Ge rmany 's Fallschirmjager , including an evoca­tive account of the battle for C rete.

Wa co CG-4A (glider)Onl y glide r used in any number by US airbo rne forces,for troops and freight, including light guns and vehicles,load ed throu gh hinged nose door. Also used by British asthe Hadri an . Other vers ions produced in small numbers,such as the CG-13A, capable of lifting 30 troop s.

Hearn, l~ Flying Rebel (HM SO, London , 1994) .Biography of Louis Strange, who in the Second\X'orld War was heavily involved in the trainin g ofBritish airbo rne forces, air resupply and the planni ngof airborne operations.

Hickey, M , 0 11/ of the Sky (M ills & Boon , London ,1979). Comprehens ive histor y of air tran sport insupport of ground forces, with emphasis on devel­opment of airbo rne forces.

Hart, I., History of the Second World \rur (Cassell,London , 1970). Puts airborne opera tions into awider per sp ecti ve.

Kuhn, V, Gerillarl Parat roopers ill lrbr ld War Two (IanAllan , London , 1978) . Concise and autho ritativetreatment of the histor y of the Fallschirrniager untilthe end of the war.

Middlebrook, M , A rnhem 1944 (Viking, London , 1994) .A recent examination of the Arnhem battl e, addingnoth ing new but concisely gathering in the previousmat erial.

2 x 1,200h p Pratt & WhitneyR-1 830 Twin Wasp rad ials230 mph (433km/h)1,600 miles (2,575km)64ft 5in (19 .65m)95 ft (28.96m)27 troops, or6,000lb (2,72 1kg) of freight.

Maximum speedRangeSpanLengthLoad

Eng ines

Douglas C-47 Skytrain (D akota)'Skytrain ' to the Am er icans, 'Da kota' to the British, themost widely produced transport aircraft of the war, de­rived from the D C-3 airliner.

UN IT ED STATES

Cur tiss C-46 CommandoMil itary versio n of the comme rcial airliner, used primar­ily for fre ighting in the Far East and Pacific, and occa ­sionally for paratrooping, for which it provide d the firstinsta nce of simultaneo us jum ping from door s on bo thsides.

Bib liography

Arthur, M , ,\fm of the Red Beret (H utchinson, London ,1990). A chronicl e of personal experiences narratedby men of Britain 's airb orne forces. Low in technol­ogy.

Co le, C and Grant R, BI/r Nor III Anger (Ian Allan ,Londo n, 1979). Subtitled 'T he RAF in theT ransport Role' , this is a selection of illustrativeepisodes rath er than a comprehensive history of thesubject.

Devlin, G ,\ 1. Paratrooper (Robson Books, London,1979). The story of American parachute and glidercombat troo ps during the Second World War.

Farrar-Hockley, A, HIe A rlllY in the Air (Alan SuttonPubli shing, Stroud, 1994).The histor y of the BritishArmy Air Corps , including the Glider PilotRegiment.

Gavin, J M , A irborne m llf are (Infantr y Journal Press,New York , 194 7) . Review of airborne opera tions andpolicies during the Sec ond World War by comma n­der of the US 82nd Division.

G regory, 13 and Batchelor.], A irbornelrb ljare 1918-1 941and Airborne lrbljare 1941-1 945 (PhoebusPublishing, London , 1978). Illustrated treatment,with selective technical details of aircraft andweapons.

(1,948kg)( I93km/h)(18.90m)(11.08m)

(16,326kg)(24 Ikm/h)(35.52m)(20.72m)(10,337kg) freight or

36,000lb150mph110ft68ft25,0001bvehicles.

4 ,300lb120m ph62ft36ft 3in8 troop s.

15,500lb (7,028kg)150mph (24 1km/h88ft (26.8m)67ft (20A m)25 troops or7,200lb (3,259kg) of freight.

4 x 1,600h p Bristol Hercules XVIradia ls280mph (449km/h)3,000 miles (4,8 23km)99ft (30.17m)87ft 3in (23.92m)40 troo ps as passengers, or 24paratroopers.

I x 870hp Bristol M ercury 30radial212mph (342km/h)500 miles (805km)50ft (15.24m)30ft 6in (10.69m)4 passengers.

Engines

M aximum speedRangeSpallLengtltLoad

M ax imu m speedRangeSpallLengthLoad

Loaded tceightM ax imum It,.", speedSpanLengthLoad

Ge neral Aircraft Hotspur (glid er)T he first British glide r built to a militar y specification,but used onlv as a trainer. A twin-fuselage versio n wasprodu ced bu t difficult to fly and did not ente r service.

Loaded weightM ax illlulII tow speedSpallLengthLoad

West land LysanderThe ,\ Iark IlIA was used for clandestine landing ofagents in enemy ter ritory.

Ge neral Aircraft Hamilcar (glider)Designed to carry a variety of loads including the light"Tetrarch' tank or two Bren Ca rriers; loaded and un­loaded throu gh hinged nose door.

Airs peed H or sa (glider)Britain's main battle glide r, carryi ng troo ps or freight,

Loaded weight,\fax illlr/lll un o speedSpallLength

Load

326km/h ( l 96 mph)1,3 11km (932 miles)22.96m (78ft 9in)18.33m (60ft I in)16 paratroops or4,76I kg (10,500lb) of freight,

2 x I ,I45hp Rolls-R oyce ,\ Ierlin Xin-lines230 mph (370km/h)2,400 miles (3,863km)84ft (25.58m)69ft 3in (21.17m)10 paratroops.

2 x 1,590hp Bristol Hercul esrad ials250 mph (403km/h)1,300 miles (2,092 km)77ft (23A 5m)60ft (18 .29m)10 paratroops.

4 x 1,390hp Rolls-R oyce M erlinin-lines285 mph (458km/h)3,000 miles (4,823km)98 ft l Oin (30.09m)71ft 7in (21.83m)16 paratroops

,\fax illllllll speedRangeSpallLengthLoad

G REAT BRITAIN

Engines

,\ lax illll/ll1speedRangeSpallLengthLoad

M aximun: speedRangeSpallLengthLoad

Engines

Engines

Maximum speedRangeSpanLengthLoad

14614 7

N orman Friedman

6Naval Aircraft in the Second World War

AIR CR A F T OF T H E SE CO :-:D \X' ORLD WAR

,\ Irazek, J E, The Glider Ifar (Robert Hale, London,1975). Wrinen by one who was there; expresses thespirit of the glider men as well as the history.

Tugwell, ,\ 1, A irborne to Baule (\X'illiam Kimber,Lond on, 1971) . Well-presented history of airbornewarfare from 1918 to 1971.

Whiting, C, Slaughter Over Sicily (Leo Cooper, Lond on,1992). No-punches-pulled examination of the Sicilyoperation.

Wigan, R, Operation Freshman (\X'illiam Kimber,Lond on, 1986) . An account of Britain's ill-fated glid­er raid into Norway in 19~2 .

Wragg, D, A irlift (Airlife, Shrewsbury, 1986) . A com­prehensive history of military air transport.

Wright, L, The If00den S uord (Elek, Lond on , 1967).Personal account of author's involvement with gliderdevelopm ent and training during the Second WorldWar.

As in all other spheres, aircra ft enormously affected thecourse of the Second World War at sea.T hree countries,Britain. japan and the United State of America, opera tedlarge aircraft carrier forces; Germany and Italy beganwork on carriers but did not complete them during thewar. All the major combatants operated land-based air­craft and seaplanes assigned to maritime operati ons, andmost banJeships and cruisers operated floatplanes orseaplanes.

The roles of these aircraft reflected some importantdifferences between land and sea warfare. Surely the sin­gle greatest fact of naval warfare is mobility. A ship, how­ever large, is a very small speck even on a relatively smallsea such as the Mediterranean. Except for the importantcase of an attack on a fixed base (such asTaranto or PearlHarbor), naval warfare begins with, indeed is almostdominated by, reconn aissance.

Aircraft originally entered into naval warfare becausethey offered far bener coverage of the sea around a rnov­ing fleet than any combination of surface ships. Indeed,initially the only real issue was the extent to which airscouti ng could be made available in bad weather. Theadvent of true carrie rs launching wheeled aircraft solvedthat problem. However, the carrier s soon became strikeplatforms, supporting torped o and then level and divebombers. Strike warfare, particularly against ships butalso against shore targets, was the main Second \X'orld\X'ar carrie r role, although the fighter defence of a fleet orconvoy was also extremely important.

Scou ting did not disappear, however, and radar madescouts much more effective , T hat was particularly thecase in the British and US navies, For example, from1 9~3 on Grumman TBM Avengers were normallyequipped with simple anti-ship radars. Beginning in

148

Na val aircraft design must aluiays be adapted to limits imposed by carriers. Seafire NF627 on the lift of HMS Ravager hasits uiings double-folded to fi t scithin a limited hangar deck height. US -bl/ilt Hellcat M k I J V2 J5, visible on deck, U'as designedfor carrier operations, with wings folding backwards specifically to limit folded height .

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AIR CRAF T O F TilE S E C O:-:D WORLD W AR

1942, the US Navy worked on an extension of thistheme, Project Cadillac, in which a high-poweredmicrowave radar on boa rd a modified bomber couldtra nsmit a good -resolution rada r picture down to a shipfrom well beyond the horizon . In 1944 Project Cadillacwas reor iented towards detecting and tracking low-flyingenemy aircraft. It resul ted in both carrie r- and land­based forms of airbo rne early warn ing, a very importantpostwa r theme.

Many navies placed their scouting aircraft on boardbattleships and cruise rs. By the Second World War suchaircraft were typically launched by catapults developi ngan end speed of about 60kt. Catapult-launched aircraftwere also important for spotting the fall of shot fromlarge-calibre guns. Naval guns only rarely scored hitswith the first salvo. More usually they missed , and thesecond and later salvoes were corrected by 'spotting' theposition of the splashes (the misses) relative to the rnov­ing target. Aircraft clear ly offered advantages in spotting,since observers on board could see well beyond a ship'shorizon , and clearly see by how much shells had missed .This role faded as radar came into service during thewar. Radar could measure range quit e acc urately, and itsbeam s even pen etrated beyond a ship 's horizon. Thatwas a relief, since catapult-launched aircraft could bedifficult and cumberso me to recover, and catapults wereoften subject to dam age by the blast from a ship's guns.In the Royal Navy, space origi nally provided for cata­pul ts was often filled with ligh t anti-ai rcraft weapon s.

Ca rrier (and land based) anti-subma rine warfare wasalso an importa nt theme throu ghout the war. Second\'('orld \'\'ar submari nes were essentially surface ships ca­pable of diving to hide. A sub merged sub ma rine cou ldremain down for up to abo ut 48 hours, but only by mov­ing extremely slowly; endurance at high speed was limit­ed to abo ut an hour. M erely by appearing, then, anaero plane could in effect immobilise a submarine byforcing it down. If the aeroplane caught the submarineon the surface, it could drop a depth bomb as the boatdived , with a very fair chance of causing serious or evenfatal dam age.

For example, only a surfaced submarine cou ld closewith a convoy or a naval formatio n. Air patrols aroundthat formation could keep submarines down and thusprevent them from attacking. Initially, subma rine com­manders were relatively safe at night , and had to lie lowonly during daytime, or beyond the ship 's or formation 'shor izon . The effect of warti me aircraft radar in Britainand in the USA was to keep submarines down durin g thenight , limiting the m to lying in wait ahead of their tar­gets. One German counter was the sno rkel, which al­lowed a submarine to run diesels while sub merged andthu s largely restored mobility. The Allied counter washigher-frequency rad ar capable of detecting a snorkel.

Thus the mere presence of aircraft near a convoy

150

could drastica lly reduce the effectiveness of sub mari nes.Hence the intense interest in adapting long-rangebombers to the convoy escort (maritime pa trol) role, andalso the conversion of many mercha nt ships to escortcarriers.

Aircraft were not always the answer. Land -basedbombers enjoyed enormous endurance and considerablecapacity, but once on statio n they could not easily be re­inforced or relieved before the sched uled time . For ex­ample, a Cons olidated B-24 Liberator assigned to aMarch 1943 Atlantic convoy spotted a gro up of U-boatsclosing in . Unfortu nately a series of attacks on the U­boats failed. The bombe r ran out of depth bombs longbefore it was time for anothe r bombe r to appear, so itbegan to make dummy attacks , to force down the U­boats. For a time the dummies worked .Then the U'-boatcomma nders realised that the bomber had run out ofbombs.They closed in, and the bombe r crew could onlywatch in horror as the attack progressed .

In contras t, an esco rt carr ier would have been able to

rearm aircraft for repeated attac ks. Clearly she, too,would have suffered from limited magazine capacity, butthat would not have been nearly so limited as the bombload of the hapless Liberator.

Submarin es could generally expect to be safe onceunderwater. However, in the very clear waters of theMedit erranean submerged subma rines were some timesso visible as to be quit e vulnera ble to air attack. After sev­eral losses of boats to Italian seapla nes , the Royal Navyhad to repaint Mediter ranean subma rines for better con­cealme nt.

Until 1943 the aircraft could attack the sub ma rinesonly when they were surfaced or when they were divi ng.Then the Allies introduced a hom ing torp edo, the Mk 24(Fido), which could be drop ped as the subma rine divedand could follow it down . Abou t this time the y also in­trodu ced the first sonobuoys, which permitted an aero­plane to estimate a submarine 's course once underwater(the search began at the point at which the subma rinedived).

There was also magnetic anomaly detection (MAD).It proved useful in the Strait of Gibraltar, where flowsbetween the Atlantic and the Medit erranean rend eredconventio nal sonar nearly useless. Co nsolidated PBYCatalin as flying over the Straits could, however, detectthe meta l mass of a subma rine, and the y could dropbombs (actually retro-bombs, whose rockets cancelledout the aeroplane 's forward motion) as they passed .

The othe r side of mobility is the need to shift forcesto meet unexpected demands.The navies of the Second\Vorld War favoured flying boat s for long-range patrolbecause those aircraft requ ired so little in the way ofpreparation for their bases; often no more than shelteredcoves, The US and Japanese navies bu ilt spec ialisedseapla ne tend ers specifica lly to support very mobile

:-:A" A L A I R CRAFT 1:-: T ilE SE CO :-:D W O R L D W AR

The sea is vast; even the largest ship is a small speck IIpOIl it. Almost all naual operations begin txith finding the eIIemy, andfrom the oil/set aircraft offeredan important means of reconnaissance. For the US Navy, long-range sea-based aircraft like thisCatalina U'ere a key to locating the Japanesefleet. The great perceived advantage oj sea-basing was that the flying boats couldmove rapidly 10 allY sheltered-seater area, tchere they uo uld be serviced by tenders. One oj the surprisesoj the Pacific u'ar U'QSthat airstrips could be built so rapidly that this sort of mobility proved less tntal than had been imagined.

The way ill tchich maritime air power developed ill different countries during the period leading up to the war depended0 11 politics. In Britain, the RAF sought 10 replace the other Ser vices almost completely. aile consequence was that it thoughtoj its big flying boats as maritime attack aircraft rather than SCOII/S. The Short Sunderland shoum here u'as a lateexpression of this concept.

151

AIR CRAFT OF THE S E CO:-:D \X'OR lD XX'AR :-: A \'A l A I RC RAF T 1:-: T HE S E C O:-: D XX' ORLD WAR

Aerial mining could deny all enemy key ,mters, During the Second Irvrld Ira r a B ritish pressure-mille campaign destroyedmallY Usboats 011 training mils ill the Baltic, killing off mllllerous creu's before they could become operational. The US aerialmining campaign of 1945, prosecuted largely by heavy bombers, contributed significantly to the strangulation ofJapall , Herea British Hampden, operating as a land-based torpedo bomber, is loaded tcith all aerial mille (of tchich the parachute retarderis visible), ill 1941 ,

Throughout the Second Irbrld Ira r, shore-based ami-shipaircraft had a considerable effect 011 natal operations with ­ill their range limits, The Italia n air force achieved someconsiderable successes with S" I1,79-11 torpedo bombers likethis olle

but the technique severely limited bomb weight, as theaeroplane had to be able to manoeuvre violently whilecarr ying its load, Thus a dive bomber could wreck theupp er works of a capital ship, but probably could not ex­pect to inflict fatal dam age, The sort of bomb whichcould do the job could not be dropp ed in a dive, andmost likely would not hit. Of course, dive bombers couldand did sink anything short of a battleship,

Part of the problem was thc bomb had to be droppedfrom a great height to gain sufficient momentum to pen­etrate armour, yet in that case hits were quite unlikely,Bombs dropped from hitting altitudes tended not to ar­rive at sufficient speed, Thus, for example, it seems un­likely that any of the converted battleship shells droppedby Japanese aircra ft at Pearl Harbor actua lly penetrateddeck armour, This problem was only solved in 1943,with the advent of guided bombs , one of which was usedby the Germans to sink the Italian battleship Roma thatSepte mber. In the Pacific, the japanese kamikazesachieved similar accuracy, but not deck penetratio n; thecombination of bomb and aeroplane could not attainanything like the terminal velocity required,

On the other hand, dive bombers proved extre melydifficult to shoot down because they moved so fast.Conventional anti-aircraft fire control techn iques, inwhich the motion of the air target was measured andprojected ahead, could not deal with them, The onlysolution seemed to be light automatic weapons (typical­ly 20mm and 40mm in Allied navies, 25mm in theJapanese Navy) which could , in effect, fill with fire thearea through which the bomber had to dive,

Wartime developm ents included the adoption of glidebombing (in effect, shallow dive bombing) by aircraftnot stressed for full, near-vertical dives, and also the in­vention of skip-bombing, in which a very low-flying air­craft dropped a bomb to skip along the surface of thewater and hit a ship almost horizontally, In Britain a

Dive bombing, developed by seueral natnes bettceen the ,mrs,dramatically improved a carrier 's ability to attack enemyscarships because the dive bomber could ill effect be aimed ata mooing ship, US Na vy Dauntlesses like this Olle, shoumwith dive brakes ex tended, U'OIl the Battles of the Coral Seaand M iduay, the first ill history ill uhich the ships imolcednecer came tcithin visual contact.

dominant, The Luftwaffe controlled all land-based air­craft and seaplanes, and only grudgingly helped the navywith such essential services as reconn aissance in sup portof U'-boats. The Italian navy did operate aircraft basedon board its battleships and cruisers, but it could notcontrol the much more important land-based reconn ais­sance and strike aircraft. Nor could it force the Italian airforce to provide strike aircraft (the land-based A ero­silu rantey in sufficient num bers,

The Soviet Navy did control its own land-based air­craft, whose assigned roles included attacks on enemynaval bases as well as on enemy ships, Thus the naval airarm included conventional land-based bombers whichwere expected to carry mines and torpedoes; they wereorganised in mine-torpedo regiments, The later missile­carrying regiments were their direct descendants.

Some important facts of lifc limited the effectivenessof aircraft at sea, Bombing was of limited value against amanoeuvring ship, The developm ent of dive bombin gfrom the 1920s onwards made it possible to hit manoeu­vring ships (essentially by pointing the aircraft at them),

In the USA, an important agreement with the armylimited the navy to carrier aircraft and water-ba sed air­craft (floatplanes and seaplanes), to the point that in1941 the navy planned to buy small seaplanes (to bebased in coastal coves and bays) to provide anti­submarine patrols off the US coast. Then the navy waspermined to buy a few rwin-engined maritime patrol air­craft (Lockheed Hud sons), of a type already beingbought for the RAE For a time it competed with armyanti-submarine units, then. in 1942, the decision wastaken to transfer all maritime patrol aircraft, whetherland- or water-based, to the navy, By that time theMarine Corps, an arm of the navy, was already operat­ing land-based bombers in the Pacific,

Japan was very different. In most wartime spheres thealmost absolute separation of army and navy had disas­trous consequences, However, in this one case the navywas able to operate whatever types of aircraft it liked, in­cluding land-based bombers and even the land-basedfighters which defended its bases.T hat made for consid­erable duplication of effort, which strained the weakJapanese indu strial base,

In Germany and Italy the land -based air arm s were

operations, One of the surprises of the Pacific war wasthe ease with which airfields could be built on island s asthey were seized, That surpr ise largely explains theadoption of large numbers of land -based patrol aircraft,such as Consolidated PB4Y Privateers, by the US N avy,

Every country except Japan was much affected by thepolitics of air control. In Britain, the Royal Air Force wasestablished in 1918 as the single air service, In practice,the Royal N avy continued to control carrier-based air­craft (although the RAF tried to limit their num bers),The RAF controlled all land- based aircraft, includingthose assigned to maritime missions, One consequencewas a rivalry between the two Services for the role of de­fending import ant bases such as Singapore, the RAFexaggerating the prowess of its land-based torp edobombers as alternatives to coastal fortifications andships, Another was that, instead of providing a rccon­naissance service to the fleet, RAF flying boats were con­ceived as an alternative to the fleet, with parallel anti-shipresponsibilities, A third was that the Royal Navy was notallowed to develop its naval aircraft for land attack, ex­ccpt in the exceptional circum stances of raids on enemynaval bases.

152 153

AIR CRAFT O F T H E SE CO~D \X·ORl.D WAR~A\'AL AIR CRAF T r x THE SE CO~D \X·ORl.D W AR

Before the wa r mosllf"slem designers appare ntly believed that the combination of long range and relat iuely low stalling speeddeman ded ofcarrier fighters limited their performance compared tcith contemporary land-based aircraft . The M itsubishi A 6,\1Zero (a designation taken from its year of service elllry, 2600 [zero] in the J apanese calendar} represented an alternative, inuihicli structural (including armour) ueight was drastically pared 10 achieve high performance and range. This is a late-tearA6.\l5. By the lime it had entered service, the adient of higher-pouiered engines had allouied US designers to combine perfor­mance, range and a heavy structure in aircraft such as the Helical and Wildcal.

variety of bouncing anti-ship bombs were developedduring 1943--44, but they were not used operationally.

Capital ships certai nly could be stopped and sunk bytorpedo attack. However, to deliver torpedoes seemed torequ ire a low, relatively slow approach which was itselfqui te hazard ous. Any violent pre-launch manoeuvrewou ld throw off the delicate mechanism of the torpedo.T here were various attempts to solve the problem, thebest probably being the British 'monoplane air tail'(MAT) , in effect a gyro-controlled glider which carriedthe torpedo through the air, and thus allowed launch ata greater range. The US Navy tried spoilers whichslowed the torp edo both in the air and once it hit thewater , in theor y allowing launching at higher speed .TheRussians developed a generally unsuccessful techniqueof high-altitude laun ches of patterns of torpedoes.

Throughout the war, battleships sunk by aircraftgenerally fell victim to torpedoes, even though in manycases they also suffered serious bomb damage. The ex­ceptions were the Italian Roma (see above), USS Ariz01Ia(which seems to have exploded after a fire touched off bya bomb penetrated a hatch in the arm our deck and setoff black powder inside a magazine), and the GermanTirpitz (sunk by several very heavy bomb s while atanchor) .

The main addition to Allied air-launched anti-shipweaponr y was the rocket, initially adopted to attac k sur­faced submarines (it could penetrate the submarine'spressure hull from a distance, thus precludin g diving) ,By about 1944 rockets were commonly being used

against surface ships, and the US Navy had adopted an11.75in weapon alongside its more conventional Sinrockets.These unguided missiles were effective, but theyalso added to the amount of explosive on a carrier'shangar deck, as the US Navy found to its cost when car­riers were hit by kamikazes in 1945.

Carrier operation imposed stiff limitatio ns on aircraft.Although deck catapu lts existed well before 1939, air­craft were generally expec ted to make rolling take-offs.Thus they had to be able to take off within a few hun­dred feet into, say, a 20kt wind generated by the ship'smotion . Landing into arresting gear limited allowablestalling speed and thus wing load ing. Aircraft also had tobe able to coyer distances greater than those comm on onland .The Royal Navy believed that really long range re­quired specialist navigators, so it generally used two-seataircraft.

There were other limits.The carrier deck has a finitestrength; it can accommodate only so much weight.Much the same goes for the lift, which also limits overallairframe dimensions, at least when the wings are folded.Arresting gear is rated for a given maximum aircraftspeed and weight.

On the other hand , existing aircraft could operatefrom relatively small decks. Catapults could make up forlimited deck length and low ship speed. Arresting gearcould be installed on small decks. It even turned out thatstandard land-based fighters could be launched bycatapult, for delivery directly into combat. Merchantships could therefore be converted into simple low-

performa nce escort carriers (in two important cases, theUS Casablanca and Commel/cemelll Bay classes, shipswere built intentionally as carriers, but they were basedon standard mercha nt hulls) . Numerically, escort car­riers formed the bulk of wartime fleets. They did not ,however, carry the bulk of wartime carrier aircraft, since(on a ton-for-ton basis) they were quite inefficient (mostof their hulls were filled with ballast).

\"'ith in the limits set by carriers, aircraft performancedepended on engine performance . A typical fighter en­gine of the late 1930s, such as the British Rolls-RoyceMerlin or the US Pratt & Whimey R- 1830, generatedabout 1,000 to I,200hp.The designer had to choose be­tween speed and range, which was why the sparklingSupermarine Spitfire (navalised as the Seafire) had veryshort legs, whereas the US Grumman F4F Wildcat hadrelatively poor speed. The japanese choice was to cutstructural weight to achieve both speed and range, in thefamous Mitsubishi A6M 'Zero' .

At this time, engines were developing extremely fast.T hus a typical fighter engine of about 1942, such as thelater Merlins or the Griffon , or the US R-2800, devel­oped something closer to 2,000hp. Although piston­engine fighter speed was ultimately limited (byaerodynamics) to about 400 or 450mph, the extra powerallowed a much heavier aeroplane to attain that speed,and thu s allowed naval aircraft the combination of highspeed and long range. Ultimately they were quite theequals of land-based piston fighters which did not needanything like their range.

Not all navies could enjoy that combination. Muchdepended on industria l capacity. Britain mobilised in thelate 1930s. That froze many designs. Although new de­signs were developed continuously during the war, it wasdifficult to place them in production, and some aircraft,such as the Fairey Firefly, conceived as early as 1939, didnot see service un til 1943. Blessed wi th much greater in­dustria l capacity, the USA did not mobilise un til about194 1, and such new aircraft as the Grumman F6FHellcat could progress very quickly from design to ser­vice (in this case, between 194 1 and 1943). The RoyalNavy was fortunate in being able to exploit this US ca­pability.

As for japan, limited indu str ial capacity made a shiftfrom prewar designs extremely difficult . The A6M wasstill in produ ction at the end of the war, although by thattime it was clearly outclassed. New carrier bombers hadbeen introdu ced, but not new carrier fighters. To someextent, the fighter-making capacity which might havebeen important during the decisive 1944 Battle of thePhilippine Sea seems to have gone instead into land­based naval fighters, a type inspired by the success of UScarrier raids conducted from 1942 onwards.

A fourth factor was the perceived ability of naval air­craft to protect carriers and other ships. About 1930 it

seemed obvious that obse rvers on surface ships couldspot approaching enemy aircraft early enough to warn acar rier to launc h intercepto rs. Then the situationchanged dramatically as bomber speed increased .Withinabout five years, interception seemed hopeless. Not onlywould warning time be too short, but bombers couldspend much of their time above cloud. It could not, ofcourse, be assumed that an enemy would fail to launchfighters. That seemed to leave bomber escort as the mainvalid naval fighter role; the fighters might also strafeenemy air defence weapons to help the bombers.

The fleet would have to rely on its anti -aircraft gunsand its armour for protection in the face of enemy air at­tack. Hence, for example, the British choice in 1936 tobuild carriers with armoured hangars, whose aircraftwould be struck below (and thu s protected) at theapproac h of enemy bombers.

Ironically, just as it seemed that the naval fighter wasmore or less finished , radar was invented simultaneouslyin Britain and in the USA. Suddenly there was a realprospect of gaining sufficient warnin g time to reacteffectively, and indeed of vectoring fighters out to attackincoming bomb ers.

It is not clear to what extent the Imperial japan eseN avy ever accepted these ideas. Certainly it lacked radarin 1941, but equally cert ainly the radar-less japanese car­riers put up a fighter defence at battles such as Midwayin 1942. It appe ars that by concen trating multiple shipstogether the japanese were able to maintain a standingpatrol of fighters over their force, without haying to relyon warning. US and British thinking was much morewedded 10 single-carrier operations, in which limitednumbers would have proh ibited standing patrols. Thejapanese may also have believed that their underwatersound equipment would provide sufficient early warn ingof the approach of large groups of aircraft (sound fromaerop lanes travels into and through the water).

In any case, it was generally agreed that a carrierloaded with aviation fuel and bombs was an accidentwaiting to happ en.Thus, at least at the outset of war, itwas assumed that whichever carrier force located theothe r first would enjoy a decisive advantage, the ability togain air superiority by wiping out the opposing carrie rforce.

T hat made the situation in narrow Europea n seasradically different from that in the central Pacific, wherethe USA and japan expected to fight. British carrierforces operating either in the North Sea or in theMediterranean faced land-based rather than carrier­based aircraft. It was likely that no str ike they could makewould suffice to wipe out the opposing air arm.

Prewar treaties limited the size and number of car­riers. just how those limits affected aircraft numbersvaried from navy to navy, British operating practice wasapparently formed after 1918, when the land-oriented

154155

A I RC R A F T OF THE SE CO~D WORLD \X' AR ~AVAL A I RC RA F T l ~ T HE SECO~ D WO RL D W AR

Although the prewar Lufttcaffe showed little interest ill maritime tcarfare, wartime A llied cOllvoys ill both the Arctic and theMediterranean were badly damaged by Germall aircraft, both torpedo- and dive-bombers.They u'ere all importan t reasoll forthe deoelopment of B ritish escort carriers. This Heinkel He JII carries a pair ofaeria l torpedoes.

RAF imagined a carrier as literally a floating airfield. Anaeroplane had to be struck below into the hangar beforethe next one was allowed to land . Carrier aircraft capac­ity was therefore equated to hangar capacity. Moreover,the standard British operating practice made for alengthy inte rval between landings.Japanese carrier oper­ating practice seems generally to have followed Britishpractice, probably because of the enormous influence ofa 192 1 British official mission.

British practice had an interesti ng indirec t effect.When the British naval staff calculated the number ofaircraft the fleet needed, it far exceeded the capac ity ofthe carriers. Interwar economics preclude d large-scalecarrie r rep lacement. One alternative was to place combataircraft on boa rd battleship s and cru isers.They would belaun ched with full combat loads (e.g., torpedoes ), andwould crash-land on their retu rn . The requirement thatall aircraft be suita ble for catapult launching (at an endspeed of 60kt) fur ther constrained aircraft design .

Limited carrier capacity also encouraged the RoyalNavy to demand mul ti-purpose designs, in hopes that acarrier's aircraft cou ld swing from role to role in thecourse of a battle . That in turn limited performance, aswill be seen below.

T he Imperial Japanese Na vy made similar assump­tions but was less limited , largely because it had largercarriers. That was partl y a matter of luck. T he key 1922Na val Arms Limitation Treaty allowed each signatory toconvert two existing capital ships to carriers. Largely be­cause Britain had laid down almost no such ships du ringthe First \'(Torld \'\'ar, the ships she chose were tworelatively small battlecr uisers, HM S Courageous andGlorious . The other British carriers of the interwarperiod were ships conceived durin g the First World War ,when the key imp ortance of large hangars was not yetunderstood .Thus they carried few aircraft per ton com­pared with postwar designs.

Because Japan started later, in 1921 she had only asingle small carrier under construction. However, shealso had a very large capital ship construc tion pro­gramme. T he two ships selected for carrier conversion,Akagi and Kaga, were much' larger than the two Britishships. Successors had large hangars.

T he US Navy benefited from a very different carrie ropera ting practice . Early studies at the US Naval WarCollege showed that very large numbers of aircraftwould be needed to secure vital tactical advantages . Toaccommodate large numbe rs on boa rd even small carri­ers, a barrier was installed , Instead of striking an aero­plane below after it land ed, it was pushed forwardbeyond the barrier. The next aircraft, landing into ar­resting gear, stopped well short of the barrier (whichprotected the parked aircraft stowed forward). Oncethe whole air group had landed , all the aircraft weremoved aft, into position to fly-off again. T his practice

156

was clearly dangerous (a pilot might well be killed whilehitting the barrier), but on the other hand it allowed arelatively small carrier to accom modate a very large airgro up.

One peculiarity of US practice was that it wasdifficult to fly small numbers of aircraft, e.g. for patr ols,since one or the other end of the flight deck was gener­ally full of aeroplanes. To solve that problem, jus t beforethe Second World War US carriers were provided witharresti ng gear at the forward end of the flight deck.T heirmachinery was designed for high astern speed. In theo­ry, then , a single aeroplane on patrol could take off overthe forward end of the flight deck and then, at the end ofits patrol, land back over the same part of the deck.Alternatively, if all the aircraft were parked forward, thesame aircraft could be launched using an athwartshipscatapult, then land over the usual arresting gear. Theserather exotic capabilities were little-used during the war,and the hangar cata pults were removed abo ut 1943.

Unlike the Royal Navy and the Japanese N avy, theUS Navy did not build its hangars integral with itscarr ier hulls. They were ope n-sided, often with rollingdoors to close them in rough weather. One conseq uencewas tha t aircraft engines could be run up while aircraftwere still in the hangar. Aircraft could then be broughtup to deck warmed up, ready for take-off. T he alterna ­tive, as in British practice , was not to warm up any air­craft befo re they had been 'ra nged' at the after end of theflight deck; the area of that afte r end , leaving enoug hlength for a rolling take-off, in effect decided how manyaircraft a carr ier could launch at one time.

Large US carriers of the standard wartime Essex classhad one other peculiarity; the deck-edge elevator justforward of amidshi ps.They also had the usua l centrelinelifts at the ends of the hangar. For much of the time theselifts were covered, by aircraft pa rked aft ready for takeoff, or by aircraft parked forward having landed . Usingthe deck-edge lift, a damage d aeroplane could be struckbelow after landing without disturbing the parked air­craft in the bow. Alternative ly, an aeroplane could bebrought up from below and fed to the take-o ff zone for­ward without disturbing parked aircraft aft.

GermanyGermany entere d the Second World War with aLuftwaffe high command firmly convinced that all navalope rations were peripheral. On the other hand, the largetactica l bombe r force proved quite adaptable.T he majortheatres of maritime air operations were the No rwegianSea (the convoy routes to Russia), the Mediterranean ,and the Eastern Atlantic.

Except for the Focke-Wulf Fw 200 , a four-engineconverted airliner, the Germans mainly used conven­tional level bombers (lunkers ju 88s, Do rnier Do 217sand Heinkel He Il ls ) and dive bombers au87s) against

surface ships. T heir main contribution to anti-shipweapo nry was a series of guided bombs (Fx- 1400) andmissiles (mainly Henschel Hs 293). The former was usedin the Mediterranean in 1943-44, the latter initially inthe Bay of Biscay. Although Allied jamming is sometimescredited with ending the Fx-14 00 problem, appa rentlythe destruction (by bombing) of the specialist squadro ninvolved was more important (the Luftwaffe high com­mand was unwilling to replace it).

Both in the Norwegian Sea (against convoys toRussia) and in the M editerranean German dive andlevel/torpedo bombers sank numerous Allied merchantships and some warships. Ironically, this contribution toAllied losses was relatively little appreciated, to the pointwhere, after 1945, shipping protection seemed often tomean pro tection against submarines but not against airattack.

At the outbreak of war the Germ an navy had a smallforce of floatplanes and flying boats, some of which wereequipped with aerial torpedoes . They came under theauthority of Fuhrer der Luftsrreitkrafte (FdL) within theLuftwaffe. During 1940-43 FdL un its graduallychanged over to conventional land-based bomb ers.

T he main anti-shipping force of Fliegerkorps X com-

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prised KG 26 and KG 30 (the first unit to be equippedwith the ju 88 bomb er).These unit s specialised, respec­tively, in level and dive bomb ing. As the Germans con­quered Euro pe, Fliegerkorps X was moved to N orwayfor anti-shipping work (although it was active on a widerscale during the Battle of Britain) . In Janu ar y 1941 it wasmoved to the M editerranean specifically to attack war­ships such as aircraft carriers. For example, FliegerkorpsX aircraft hit and disabled HMS Illustrious. In Norway,Luftfl otte 5 retained a residual anti-ship role.

When Germany invaded Russia, Fliegerkorps Xmoved to the Eastern Mediter ranean and changed into amore conventional air unit. However, its sub-co mmandcontinued to specialise to some extent . T hus KG 26(He 111s) converted partly to a torpedo-bomb er un it,ultimately using torpedoes develop ed with Italian help(the FdL torpedoes, which were of Norwegian origin,had to be dropped at low speed and low altitude). KG 26also contributed pathfinders using sophisticated radionavigational aids, presumably as an outgrowth of its ex­perience navigating over the sea. Part s of KG 30specialised in anti-ship bombing.

Meanwhile, in March 1941 a new command,Fliegerfuhrer Atlantik, was formed to help fight the

air groups consisted of 27 A6.\ ls , 27Yokosuka D4Y divebombers, 18 Nakaji ma B6N torpedo bombers, and 3D4Y scouts. Light carriers had on board the same 27A6Ms (9 of the m fighter bombers) and 6 B6Ns.

The prewar treaties left japan with only 60 per centof the carrier tonnage of the USA or Britain. Althoughjapan renounced the treaties in 1934 (effective at the endof 1936), the Japanese Navy was well aware that it couldnot win an arms race with its most likely enemy, theUSA. It therefore sought equalisers.

One was the long-range land-based bomber. In theo­ry such an aircraft could attack the approaching US fleetlong before it came within attacki ng ran ge of japanesefleet units, and long before it expected any sort of attack.T hese bombers were first used to attack Chinese citiesduring the war which began in 1937 - indeed , their needfor long-range fighter esco rts inspired some of the re­quirem ent s for the Zero fighter.The first operational air­cra ft of this type was the Mitsubi shi G 3M, which helpedsink HMS Prince of ll"illes and HMS Repulse off Malayain December 194 1 in company with its successor, theMi tsubi shi G4 M . The latter was used thr oughout thewar against US ships, often in lone night attacks. In 1945

..-."

j apanThe Imperial japanese Navy designated its aircraft bymission , sequence number, and manufactur er number.Thus the Zero was A6.\ I; A for fighte r, 6 for the sixthfighter, and ,\ 1 for Mitsubishi, the maker.The main mis­sion letters were: A for carr ier fighte r, B for torpe dobomber, C for carrier reconn aissance, D for divebomber, E for floatplane reconn aissance, F for floatplan eobservation (spotting), G for land-based bomber, H forflying boa t, and j for land-based fight er.

Ca rrier air group compos ition emphasised attack, onthe theory that numerical inferiority could be overturnedonly by agg ressiveness at the outb reak of war. Thus in1936 the large Kaga acco mmoda ted 72 aircraft: 24 divebombers, 36 torpedo bombers, and only 12 fighters. Atabout the same time the new Shokaku was designed tocarry 27 dive bombers , 27 torpe do bom ber s, and 18fighters. At this time the japanese Navy also operatedlight carriers such as Soryu (18 of eac h type of bomberplus 9 fighters) . Like the US Na vy, by 1944 the japaneseNavy needed ma ny more fight ers, and it tried to main­tain its str iking power by using fighter-bombers, in thiscase modified A6Ms . Typical (May 1944) large-carrier

Like the preuar US Na uy, the preuar Imperial J apanese Navy needed long-range reconnaissance and attack aircraft , Unlik eits US counterpart, the J apanese IIavy u'as not hampered by allY requirement that all its aircraft be sea-based.A dm iral IsorokuYamamolO, then chief of the J apanese Bu reau ofAeronautics, saw this as an opportunity: it might be possible 10 build long­rallge land-based bomber/reconnaissance aircraft, capable even of scouting over the major US base at Pearl Harbor. 71,eMitsubishi G3.1f U'QS the first successful aeroplane of this type. Thanks 10 its long range it was used to bomb distant Chinesecities during the war beginning in 193 7. It lIIT11ed out 10 need escorts of similar rallge; hence the developm ent of its stablemate,theA6,1f Z ero.Again, thanks 10 long range, G3,lfs u'ere able to locate, attack, and sink the British capital ships Prin ce of Walesand Repulse uhen the commanders of the lauer might quire reasonably have thought themselves Oil/side air attack range,

159

~ A \· .-\L AI R CRAF T I~ T HE SE CO ~D W ORI. D W AR

The Italian N avy operated all sea-based Italian aircraft. In1940 the Calli 2.506B A irone (Heron) u'as its long-rangebomber,capable ofcarrying a torpedo or tu'O 1, 1OOlb bombs.Initially the Service's Airones operated mainly as bombers,but after mid- 194 1 all A irones u'ere switched 10 reconnais­sallee, including C01/t·oy escort and AS lf,

ItalyUnder a 1923 law, Italian militar y aviano n was cen ­tralised under an air force. Like othe r air forc es, the pre­war Italian service had little inte rest in naval operations,and it resisted the forma tion of land-based attack unit s(A erosilurantey. At the outbreak of war the standard tor­pedo bomb er was the three-engine Savoia-M archettiS.79 Spar viero, It was successfully tested with torpedoesin 1938, and the first torpedo-bomber , the S.79-1I,carrying two 45cm torpedoes, was delivered inSeptember 1939. At the Italian declaration of war in1940 there were 200 Aerosiluranti aircraft. By the Italiancapitulation in September 1943 they had been reducedto 6 1, in 5 Aerosilura nte G ruppi (2 squadrons each)wi th a stre ngth of 9 to 14 aircraft eac h.

Naval units were equipped wi th Ca nt Z.50 I s(reconnaissance flying boats) , Z. 506s (tr i-rnotorreconnaissance-bomber floatplanes) , and Fiat RS.14s(bomber floatplanes, including AS\\').

Like Germany, Italy flirted with aircraft carrie r con­struction, but the two ships, Aguila and Sparuiero, werenever completed .

158

The Fu: 200 Condor, a converted airline r, U'QS used for both reconnaissance and ami-ship attack at lou' letel.

The uartime Italia n Navy used the fou r- or five-seat CalliZ .501 Gabbiano (Gull) for patrol, including ASW

Battle of the Atlantic. Its Fw 200s provided some recon­naissance in support of U-boats; for th at matter, U '-boatssometimes provided targeting support for the aircraft,which dropped the ir bombs at low altitude .

Elements of KG 26 and KG 30 moved back toNorway to atta ck convoys to Russia. Others operated inthe Mediter ranean.

KG 100, the pathfinder unit in the Battle of Britain ,beca me a specialist anti-ship missile unit; III./K G 100was responsible for attacks using the Fx-14 00 guid edarmo ur- piercing bo mb; and II./K G 100 used the Hs 293missile. The first successes wi th these weapons were,respectively, against th e Italian battleship Roma on 9September 1943 and against the British sloop Egret (inthe Bay of Biscay) on 28 Augu st 1943. Toge ther thesetwo weapons claimed 68 victi ms up to 15 Augu st 1944.

The German s launched a carrier, Graf Zeppelin, anddeveloped plans for numerous conversions of crui sersand merchant ships. They also developed carrier ver­sions of the Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighter and thejunkers ju 87 dive bomber. However , no carrier everentered service; after the war the Soviets seized theincomplete Graf Z eppelin, expending the hull inweapons tests.

AI R C RAFT OF T H E SE CO~D \X'ORLD WAR

A I R C R AFT OF T HE SE C O ~[) W OR L D W ARx A v A I. A I R C R A FT I ~ THE SEC 0 x D \X' 0 R I. D XX· A R

The M itsubishi G4M superseded the G3M during theS ecolld lfbrld ll'ar, and u:as used throughout the confiict. Lateill the u'ar these aircraft were used to launch rocket-propelledSIl icide aircraft ('Bakas') at US tcarships.

G4Ms carried rocke t-po wered kamikaze bombs(' Bakas' ) , As in the case of the Zero tighter, these aircraftachieved their extre me ly long ranges largely thro ugh theuse of ver y lightweight structure, i.e., by avoidingarmour of any kind .

Another equaliser was the long-range flying-boatbomber. In 1942 japan had the best in the world, thefour-engined Kawanishi H8K. That year H8K s raidedPearl Harbor, using submarines to refuel them etI rOllte.

To some extent the Zero tighter was also an equaliser ,It was the tirst japanese naval tighter to have an enclosedcockpit and retractable landi ng gear. In most equivalenttighters high speed was achieved partly by shrinking thewings, and hence accepting high wing loadings andsharply reduced manoeuvrability. japanese pilots appar­ently demanded manoeuvrability, which the Zero's de­signer, jiro Horikoshi , supplied using special combatflaps. The result was a unique combination of speed,range , and manoeuvrability - at a cost in structu ralstre ngth, particularly armour . Apparently the Zero alsocould not dive with contemporary US tighters (which itcould outrun in level flight) ,

Perhaps the most important equaliser was the veryhigh level of training accorded naval pilots and other air­crew. \'('henever confronted by the obvious disparity insheer weight of numbers and material between japanand the \X'estern powers, the japanese answer was thathuman differences, both in training and in sheer tighti ngspirit, would overcome them. Unfortunately for japan,once large numbers of pilots had bee n lost at M idwayand in the Solom ons campaign which followed , it wasimp ossible to train their successors to anything like thepre-war standard, The combi nation of obsolescent air­craft (which a limited japanese industrial base could notreplace with more modern types available in prototype

160

The ua rtime Imperial Japallese Navy also used fiying boats.Its Kauanishi H8K is usually considered the best of allSecond Ifbrld Ifar flying boats.

form) and less-trained pilots proved fatal at the Battle ofthe Philippine Sea in june 1944 , Withou t trained pilots ,the carriers which survived that battle cou ld functiononly as dec oys at the Battle of Leyte Gu lf that October.

By that time it was clear to the j apanese high com ­mand that conventional air tactics were largely pointless ,The solution adopted at the time was suicide warfare, theultimate exploitation of the supposed superiority ofjapanese tighting spirit. As it happened, the kamikazesfared bener than their conventional counterparts partlybecause they did not fly tight formations, and hencecould not be tracked and intercepted as easily by thefleet's radars and tighters. Allied countermea sures in­cluded adding tighters to air groups and ana ekingjapanese aircraft on the ground, before they could belaunched,The laner tactic expla ins the intense US inter­est in tighter-bombers at the end of the war ,

At the outbreak of war in 1941 the standard japanesestrike aircraft were the Nakajima B5N and Aichi D3A,the latter having won a 1936 competition . They wereroughly parallel to, but somewhat later than, the USTBD and SBD. The corresponding tighter was theMitsubi shi A5.\!, which was no longer in large-scaleservice by 1941 .

A 1937 competition for a new trio of carrier aircraftproduced the Zero , the Yokosuka D4Y Suisei divebomber, which appeared in small numbers at Midway,and the Nakajima B6N torpedo bomber, which did notenter service un til 1943. The new dive bomber was in­tended to equal the new tighte r in speed, exceed itsrange , and carry the standard japanese 250kg (550lb)bomb. By 194 1 the Imperial N avy had decided to unitethe dive and torpedo bombe r categories; the winner ofthis last pre -war competition was the Aichi B7A, whichdid not enter production until 1944 and had little effectup on the war,

III 1941 the standard Japallese carrier-based torpedobomber u'as the Nakaj ima B5S2.

III 193 7 the Japallese S avy introduced the tcorld's firs tmodem monoplane carrier figh ter, M itsubishi's A5.1I, acabout the same time that it issued a specificationfo r the aero­plane's much more modern successor, uhich became theA6.1I. Like its predecessors, the A5.1I ,ms light ly-loaded forex treme malloellt.rability ill dogfightillg. The faster A 6.1Icould 1I0t beas handy, but it u'as accepted Oil the theory thateery-highly- trained Japallese pilots could make lip for thedifference ill performa nce. The slaughter of many of those pi­lots at ,lIidu'ay and ill the S olomons eliminated allY suchadvantage at just the time the A llies ,<'erefielding milch morepotcerful aircraft, such as the Hellcat,

japan also developed a superb specialised carrierscout, the Nakajima C6 :-JSa iun, but it ap pea red too latefor the major carrier battles of 1944 . As in the US Navy,the standa rd wartime scout was a d ive bom ber, the D4Y.

Soviet UnionT he pre-1 941 Soviet Union flirted with the idea ofbuilding one or more aircraft carriers, but none was everlaid down . Both during and after the war, Soviet navalaviation was almost entirely shore-based, the only excep­tion being a few floarplan es flying from battleships andcru isers.They saw very little action .

All Soviet aircraft were unit ed in a single air force in1920. but on 5 .\ Iay 1935 naval aircraft were placed

161

Th e standard Japallese carrier-based dice bomber ill 1941,ms the A ichi D3A.

Th e fast D4} ' Suisei (Comet) U'aS one ofnco lieu' attack air­craft intended to replace the pair wi th zchich J apall began thePacific If ar. There zcereboth radial- and in-line-engined t'er­sions. In effect the D·n' u'as equivalent to (and probably moresuccessful tha n) the L'S S B2C Helldicer.A f eu' D·n's f ollghtat ,lIid,my ill 1942.

Xahajima 's B6N 2 Tenza n u'as intended as the standardtiartimc torpedo bomber, replacing the earlier B5N2. It ell­tered service ill 1943.

under naval control as an arm of the navy (they werebriefly returned to a unitary air force between 23 july1937 and 1 januar y 1938). It appears that initially onlyfloatplan es and seaplanes of various types were takenover by the navy, but certainly by 194 1 there were alsosubstantial num bers of land-based bom bers. including

AI R CRAFT OF THE SE C O:-:Il W'ORLIl \\ 'AR :-:A\' A L A I RC RA FT 1:-: T ilE S E C O:-:D \\ ' OR L D \\ 'AR

Ilyushin 's DB-3 was a standard tcartime Soviet land-based torpedo bomber,

Lim ited ill the total number ofaircraft its carriers could ac­commodate, the Royal S at) , sought 10 combine multiplefunct ions ill each of its aeroplane types. The FaireyS uordfish, olle of uhich is shotcn landing aboard the ',I lAC'ca rrier Empire ,\ \cAlpine ill J/Ille J943, typified the com­promises adopted. The relatively slou: biplane design u'as ac­cepted because it offered the sknc landing and take-offspeedsrequired of aircraft uihich might hare 10 be catapulted frombattleships and cruisers zcith full combat loads, and uihichwould land 011 board carriers unthout arrester gear, Lawspeed u'as also the price of long scouting range, uhich ,easv ital 10 a fleet tchicli could 1101 benefit from sea-based scouts.Long endu rance u'as vital ill the gu nfire spotting role tchichthe Roy al Navy hoped zcould help assure it victory in the de­cisive bailie it sought. The torpedo role ",as also oital, sinceonly torpedo hits could sIO'1'- a fast enemy fleet enough for theB ritish bailie fieet to catch it . IIIdeed, the compromises madeill the S tcordfish design slun c just hOU' mallY different air re­quiremcnts the Royal ,Vavy had, rather than (as is oftcII sug­gested) hou: lillie it understood aircraft.

tion of this thinking was the dra matic attack which crip­pled the Italian fleet at Taranto in November 19-10, B\'tha t time the balance had worsened because Fra nce hadbeen knocked out of the war ,Thus, despite considerablesuccess in the ,\ lcd itcrranean, the re cou ld be no questi onof sending the fleet east the following year: all that couldbe spa red was a pair of capital ships (the accompanyingcarrier grounded in the \X'est Indies, and cou ld not bescm ),

The lesson drawn from the loss of Prince of Irilles andRepulse was that henceforth battleships could not oper­ate free ly witho ut acco mpanying carriers, Unfortunatelxthe Royal Na\1' carrier force suffered bad ly during th~first thr ee years of war, and the large carrier constructionprogramme begun prewar (six ships, the largest of anyconte mporary navy) took some considerable time tocomplete,

United Kin gdomThe Royal N avy of 1939 had been desig ned mainly tofight japan , Fro m about 1919 , the British feared thatthei r Far Eastern ally might turn on the m to seize theriches of the Eastern part of the Em pire, There was ini­tially some hope that the alliance could be maintained(the British actually scm a mission to japan in 1921 tohelp the japanese establis h their naval air arm ), but mostBritish naval stra tegic thinking seems to have gone intosolving the problem of a major fleet action in the FarEast. The conce pt was that the base at Singapore wouldbe held until the fleet arrived. Resources on hand wouldinclude submarines and land-based RAF torpedobombers, To deal with the arriving British fleet, theja panese would have to steam so far south as to be out ofthe cover of their own shore -based aircraft. A decisivefleet engage ment would leave japan open to a fatalblockade,

From an aviation point of view, this outlook meanttha t British naval aircraft procurement concentra ted onthe probl ems of the decisive fleet battle , For example, theBritish fleet would have to locate and to shadow the op­posing fleet. For that purpose, special low-speed carr ieraircraft were designed in the late 1930s (they neverentered service, however). Given the limitations of diveand level bombing, the British assumed thr ough the in­terwa r period that their aircraft could not sink theenemy's capital ships; that would have to be left to bat­tleship gunfire, However, the enemy's fleet would prob­ably be a good deal faster, partl y because the Royal N avyhad never had enough mon ey to rebuild its elderlybattles hips, Aircraft would . therefore, be essentia l to slowdown the enemy's fleet. They would ach ieve that withtorpedoes ,

The British fleet could not be based at Singapore forseveral reasons, On e was fear of uncovering homewaters; another was the sheer cost of keeping so large aforce so far from hom e, The compromise adopted be­tween wars was to keep a large fleet in the Mediter­ranean, from where it could swing either north or east ,thro ugh the Suez Ca nal.

The late 1930s bro ught a series of unpl easant sur­prises, \X'ithout any redu ction in the japanese threat, twoEuro pean threats emerged, Ge rmany and Italy, It soonbecame obvious that Ge rma ny was rebuildin g a U-boatarm, and both countries were buildin g battleships,Theywere outnumbered by the Royal Na\1' (par ticularly sinceFrance was a British ally) , but to face them down theRoyal N avy would have to abandon its plan to fight thede cisive battle in the East.

In parti cular, man y British officers recal led that theGerma ns had tied down the British fleet during the FirstWorld War simply by refusing to give battle, Aircraftoffered a solution, since the y alone could penetrate anene my's harbour to attack the ships inside,The culmina-

more on the land battle,Modern isation began in 1943, with Ilyushin Il-4 and

Douglas A-20G (Boston) torpedo bombers, Pe-2 divebombers, Ilyushin Il-2s and Yakovlev- and La vochkin­series fighters coming to pr edominate , In 1943 the BalticFleet air component began to attack German sea lanes ofcommunication.

At the beginning of 1944 stre ngths were 298 aircraftin the Northern Fleet, 313 in the Baltic, and 429 in theBlack Sea, As the general offe nsive against Ge rma nyaccelerated , the Baltic Fleet air component grew; by theend of the war it alone of the three Western fleet air com­ponents was heavily engaged in land operations, and ithad 787 aircraft.

In August 19-15 the Pacific Fleet was part of the forcewhich crushed japanese forces in ,\ Ianchuria, At thattime its air compo nent amo unted to six air di visions(torpedo, bombe r, two mixed , two fighter) , ten sepa rateair regiments and fourteen separate squadrons; about1,500 aircraft in all, By way of comparison, in 19-11 therewere no air di visions at all, The Northern Fleet had tworegiments and a separa te squadron; the Baltic Fleet hadthree brigades , three separate air regiments and seve nsepa rate squadro ns: and the Black Sea Fleet had IWO

brigades, two separate air regiment s, thirteen sepa ratesquadrons and two air detachments,

No new spec ialised naval aircraft were developedduring the war, altho ugh it appears that the Soviet navywas the sole user of the hybrid piston-j et fighters mad ein 19-1 5, At tha t time a new torpedo bomber, theTupolcvTu-21~ was being tested , Produ ction began in 19-17, andthis aero plane was standard until jets replaced it in the1950s,

• According to a history published in 198.t. at this time seaplanes (scouts) amounted to 25 per cem of total strength. fighters to .t5.3 per cent.bombers to I-t per cent. and torpedo aeroplanes to 9.3 per cent of effective combat strength. Standard types were the Ilyushin DB -3 torpedobomber : the Tupolev SB-2/Arkhangd !lkii Ar-2 and Tu polev T B-3 bom bers: the Polikarpov 1- 15bis. 1-16 and 1-153. Yakovlev Yak-l and ,\li koyan andG urvevich .\ liG-3 fighters; and the Beriev .\lBR-2. Tupolc\· .\t DR-2 and .\ lT8-2. Amtorg GST (Catalina) and Chyctverikov Chye-2 flying boats.

versions of the Ilyushin DB- 3 (Il-4) and the T upolevSB-2 med ium bomber, and thc Pctl yakov l' e-2 lightbomber. Fighters defending ports and naval bases werealso und er naval control.

Of thc bombers, the DB-3T was a specialised torpc­do bomber produced in 1937-38 spec ifically for thenavy, and thu s probably the first fruit of the return tonaval control. It could carry a sing le 45cm torpedo(which could be dropped by parachute from a consider­able altitude ) or a conventional bomb or mine, and itcou ld also bc used for long-range reconnaissance, As thefirst mass-produ ced Soviet torpedo bo mber, it formedthe initial strength of the new mine-torpedo formationsraised in I 939-l0, One minno-torpednye aciapolki(,\ ITAP) was assigned to each of the Baltic, Black Sea,and Pacific Fleets, A floatpla ne version , thc DB- 3PT,was develope d for the Northern and Pacific Fleets,which had limited airfield facilities, but it was never pro­du ced in quan tity, Instead , additional airfields were built.Baltic Fleet DB- 3Ts were the first Soviet aircraft tobomb Berlin , on the night of 7-8 August 1941 ,

In june 1941 a total of 2,58 1 aircra ft were repor ted innaval service, of which 1,44 5 were in the three \X'esternfleets (N orthern, Baltic and Black Sea) facing theGerma n attack, Of these aircraft, about half (763) werefighters,•

The Nor thern F1ect air component was particularlyimp ortant because it helped defend the convoy terminus,Thus in july 1941 it received a regiment of TupolevSB-2 bombers from the Baltic Fleet , at the end of theyear a regiment of Hurricanes, and in january 1942 aregiment of Petl yakov Pe-2 light bombers. Baltic andBlack Sea air components seem to have concentra ted

16 2 163

AIRC RAFT OF THE SE CO:-;D \X· O R !. D \X'AR x A v A!. A I R C R A FT 1:-; T HE SEC 0 x D \\. 0 R !. D \\' A R

aeroplane associated with this shift was the FaireyAlbacore, conceived as a T BR, a torp edo- and dive­bomber.

By 1938 , however, the Royal Navy was again inter ­ested in carrier-based fighters. Although no survivingrecords suggest as much, it seems likely that by this timeradar and radar fighter control were clearly in sight.Radar would also eventually make it very difficult forlow-performance reconnaissance aircraft to approach anenemy fleet. In addition , a new engine, the Rolls-Royce.\ Ierlin, was now available. A new pair of carrier aircraft,the two-seat Fairey Fulmar fighter and the FaireyBarracuda bomber, were designed . As it turned out, only

Wilh the dice -bombing role shifted from fig hter 10 torpedo bomber, the Royal Nat'y could buy a fig hter uhose structure u'as 1101

stressed fo r dice bombing, the Fairey Fulma r.

altogether clear that spotting was worth the load it placedon the Swordfish. The Royal Navy began the SecondWorld War with the combination of Skua and Sword fish,and in 1940 Skuas sank the German cruiser Konigsbergin i'JOTway.

In 1936 the arm oured -deck carriers were designed. Itwas no longer so clear that fighters were worthwhile; thewhole point of the deck was to help the ship absorb theinevi table bomb hits when the enemy bombers arrived,Although nothing in the records suggests as mu ch, itseems reasonable to associate this shift with the crisiswith Italy in 1935-36, when it became obvious that thefleet might well have to fight in the Mediterranean.The

Like the S wordfish and A lbacore, the uiartime Fairey Barracuda had 10 satisfy several conflic ting demandsc including bothtorpedo bombing and dive bomb ing (1I01e the dive-brake fla ps). The dema nd fo r observation capability led /0 the adopt ion ofahigh uiing scith tcindozcs beneath it. The someuhat azekuard result is represented by this aircraft of 8 14 Squadron 0 11 boardH.IIS Venerable ill 19.J5.

shore-based aircraft, rernammg surfaced and mobileuntil they sighted their targets.The extension of air CO\ '­

erage to the central Atlantic became an important themeof wartime Allied air policy.

The Royal Navy needed several different carri er orcatapult aircraft capabilities: dive bomb er (B), fighter(F) . reconn aissance (R), spo tting (S) , and torpedobomber (T) . Given limited carrier capacity, it had tocombine them in multi-purpose aircraft. Dive bomb ingfirst became important about 1934 . At that time theplann ed combination was a fighter/dive bomber (FB),the Blackburn Skua, and a torpedo/spotter/reconnai s­sance aeroplane (T SR) , the Fairey Swordfish. Neitherhad a parti cularly sparkling performance, and the Skuacould not carry a heavy enough bomb , Nor was it

Th e Fairey A lbacore u'as much Illore than a cleaned-up and modernised Stcordfish; it u'as a heavy dice -bomber, /00, and thedema nds entailed ill dice -bombing badly retarded its development.

Aircraft also promised to help solve the V-boat prob­lem, As long as the Allies controlled the exits from theNorth Sea (the English Channel and the route aroundScotland), U'-boats had to travel carefully to their patrolareas west of the British Isles, submerging during theday. Since a V-boat could spend only so many days atsea, any such limitation (imposed mainly by air patrols)would drastically reduce the extent of its operating area,and hence the area through which the Royal Navy wouldhave to convoy ships . Thus the Royal Navy couldeconomise on escorts, building ships intended to operatewi thin about 500 miles of their bases. This logic col­lapsed with the loss of the French and Norwegian coasts,which placed the V-boats much closer to the centralAtlantic. Once there, they could operate out of range of

Like other navies of the intencar period, the Roy al S at ) ' U'as fascina ted by the potential ofdire bombing. ,lIally initially calledthis for m ofauack strafing, so it is 1/01 altogether surprising that the Roy al Sat~\, $ firs t dice bomber, the B lackburn Skua, ,msalso considered a fighter. Th e US Naryflirted scith much the same concept al about the same lime, ordering prototype nco-seat

fighte rs uhich SOOIl became scows and then scow -bombers.

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commo date five eight een-aircraft squadrons: one ofscouts, to find the enemy before being found; one of divebombers; one of torpedo bombers; and two of fighters.Thc number of fighters had only recentl y been doubled,probably with radar fighter control in mind . Earl ier four­squadro n ca rriers had their fighter squadrons enlargedto twenty-seven aircraft. By 19~3 it was clear thatfighters would be needed in much larger numbers, andthe new Independence-cress light carriers operated two rc­du ccd fighter squadrons plus a torpedo squadron.

At th e end of the war man y m ore fighters were need­ed to cou nter kamikazes, Thus in 1 9~5 an Essex-cla sscarrier normally acc ommodated a fighter squadron, afighter-bomber squadron. and reduced (fifteen-a ircraft)dive- and torpedo-bombers had made it possible to gainfighte r strength at a minimum cost in str ike power. Evenso. it can bc argued that a pilot cannot be trainedeffec tively for both roles,

Aircraft development was shaped by engine develop­rncnt, new engines ap pearing at roughly two-yearintcrml s up to 1 9~0 . Typically latcr vcrsions of an cngincfirst uscd in largc aircraft gaincd powcr (i.c. , had bcttcrpowcr- to-wcight ratios) and wcrc uscd in smallcr oncs.In thc USA engincs wcrc ratcd in cubic inchc s of dis­placcmcnt, c.g. R-2800 or R-3350, thc R standing for ra­dial (air-coolcd) , thc na\ 'y's prcfcrrcd typc. In 1932 thclatcst powcrplants fittcd into multi-cngined typc s wcrcthe Wright R-1820 and thc Pratt & \'.;'h itncy R-1 830(which was uscd in the ncw PBY Catalina) . Suchengine s wcre ratcd at 700 or 800hp. A fcw wcrc uscd infightcrs, but cngincs such as thc Wri ght R-151O or thcPratt & Whitncy R-1 535 wcrc morc commo n in singlc­cnginc aircra ft. Thcy powcred the bombers of thc 1 93~

compctitions and thc fightcrs of thc 1936 compctition.By 1938 thc R-1820 and R-1830 werc approaching1.000hp output, and thcy wcrc uscd in a ncw gcncration

Sot all the aircraf t bought ill the pretcar Br itish mobilisation proved successf ill. Th e Saunders-Roe Lerunck failed so badly thatit ,,'as cancelled, despite the desperate need for ai rcraft. Ecen so, it seems fair to say that the production decisions taken ill 1936­3 9 determined most of tchat the Roy al "'m~l' and the RAF had acailable to them as late as / 944 .

United StatcsAt thc outbrcak of war thc US Navy bought thrcc kindsof carricr aircraft: fightcr (VF) , scout/divc bombcrs(VSB), and torpedo/level bombcrs (VT B). In cach cascthc initial 'V ' stood for hca\'icr-than- air, in contras t to Z(for airship s) and latcr H (for hclicoptcrs). T hc V isdro ppcd in actual dcsignations. Battlcship s and crui scrscarricd scout/o bscn'ation aircraft (VSO and vas, thcordcr indicating pri orit y). I-lying boa ts wcrc VPB, thcbombing rolc ha\;ng bcc n addcd owing to thc pcrccivcdhigh pcrform ancc of thc prc-war Catalina (pBY). T herewcrc also utility aircraft (VJ) . gcncrally floatplancs.

In 1 9~ I thc ncw carricrs wcre bcing dcsigncd to ac-

way. In the Hawker Sea Fury th e Royal N avy finally hada high-performance naval interceptor with adequate en­durance. The new Firebrand and Fairey Sp earfishseemed to offer adequate strike performance. Howe ver ,none of these aircraft was available in time for the war.

For its part, the RAF had specia list torpedo bombers.albeit obso lete Vickers Vildebc ests, at the outbreak ofwar. They were soon superseded by torpedo-armedBristol Bcauforts and Bcaufighters. both of whichenjoyed much high er pe rfo rmance and were used exten­sively,

On the othe r hand. th e RAF seerns to haw had littl eprewar interest in maritime patrol It planned to usc acombination of small landplancs (AHo Anson s) andlIying boats (big Short Sundcrlands as well as th e newbut un su ccessful rwin-engined Saunders-Roe Lerwick) ,Unfortu nately, the Anglo-Iri sh ag ree me nt of 1938 de­nicd Irish bases to both the RAF and the Royal N avy, sothe re was no continuous air cover in much of the EasternAtlantic. A Royal Navy attempt to fill this gap using car­ricr aircraft Icd to thc loss of H,\IS COllrageolls in 1939,and thc attcmpt was not rcpeatcd .

UlIlil the advelll of radar, the Royal S avy had litt le use fo rshort-rallge sillgle-seat illlerceptors, so 1I0lle u'as adoptcd.71,CII the sill/atioll challged dramatica/~\'. Ullfortlll/atc~\', thehigh-performallce B ritish type adopted ill u'artimc, theSupermarille Seafirc, had bcclI desiglled at a time u'hmrallge alld ruggedlless had to be traded off to gaill pcrfor­mallcc. Herc, a M ark III is SIIlY.!'1I ill Pacific ma rkillgs.

very high wing loadings. However, th ey both lack edran ge, and the Scafire was clearly quite fragil e.

None of the Gritfon- or Sabre-en gined aircraft wasavailable in 19~2-U . Fortunately for the Royal Navy,US aircraft powered by equivalent en gines were provid­ed in large numbers: Hellcats, Corsa irs. and Avenger tor­pedo bombers. Becau se so much power was available,th ey could be quite sturdy without sacrificing perfor­mance (fortunately the Royal N avy never go t the largenumber of Curtiss Hclldivers it want ed) .

By the lan er part of the war, Britain had large air­cooled radial engines quite equal to the big US en gines,and a very new generation of naval aircraft was on its

the Fulmar soon entered service , Its performance was in­deed limited, but when guided by radar it could beat offbomber attacks quite effectively.

Pending the availability of the Fulmar , the navyplaced a few cx-RAF Gl oster Gladiator s on board,\ Icditerranean Fleet carri ers. The ships carrying themlacked radar, so they cannot have been of very great uscin combat.

Bv this time several new engines in the 2,000hp classwerein prospect, notably the Rolls-Royce Griffon andthc Napier Sabre. A follow-on Griffon FR specification,which produced the Fairey Firefly, was issued .Eventually a Griffon-engined version of the Barracudawould also be built. For the moment, thc Barracuda wasconde mned to low performance becau se other types ofaircraft claimed much higher priori tics for the newengines ,

There was much grumbling in British aeronauticalcircles atthc low performance of cxisting aircraft. !\Ianyfclt that thc second-scat requirement was to blamc . As aconscquencc, a spccification was issucd for a Sabrc­cngined singlc-scat fighter. As expectcd, it could notoffer a really impressi\ 'e pcrformancc bccause, like theothcr naval aircraft, it still had to land and take off at lim­itcd spccd s. Ultim atcly it becamc a single-seat torpedobomber (officially a torpedo fightcr) , thc BlackburnFircbrand.

Thcn the war began, and radar made its immcnse im­pact on carricr operations. Suddenly carricr-bascd inter­ceptors were c1carly worthwhile. Expericnce in Norwayshowed that Hurricancs could be acco mmo dated onboard carricrs, and somcwhat later Scafircs alsooperated from British carriers. It may be objectcd thatthesc fighters had exactly the sort of performancc theRoyal Na\'y thought, in 1939, it could not ha\'c, with

A s ill the USA, the adient of engines ill the 2,OOOhp class solved lllally problems. Houeuer, it was mu ch more difficult fo r theB ritish aircraf t industry to stcitch to IIC'".!' ty pes ill sca rtime. A s a result , aircraft trhich should hare entered service about 1941 ,

like th is Fairey Fircfiy I, did not appear ill numbers until the end of the u'ar.

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The USA mobilised in 1941, freezing designs forproducti on (the Hellcat nearly missed its chance).Producti on of the existing 1'41' was switched 10

General J\ lo tors (Eastern Aircraft ), the fighter beingredesignated 1'.\1, The Corsair was licence-producedby Goodyear as the FG. Late in thc war, when thekamikazes became a major threat, Goodyear produceda much more powerful redesigned Corsair , the F2G ,using the new R-436 0 engine, It was never producedin numbers,

Grumman's other wartime design, the 1'81' Bearcat ,seems 10 have originated as a private prop osal to build afighter particularly suited 10 small carri ers, which werelimited 10 advanced versions of the Wildcat. It was alsoan interceptor, with much better climb than a Hellcat orCorsair. The 1'81' just missed war service, Small-carrierrequirements probably also led 10 the design of the RyanFireball (FR), which combined a small piston enginewith a jet in the tail. This also just missed war service,and unlike the 1'81' it was not produced in any numberspostwar. Cur tiss also produced a mixed-power fighter,the F14 C.

There were also a variety of experimental projects,perhaps most notably the Vought F5U 'Pancake' , whichwas shaped almost like a flying saucer and which wasexpected 10 have a very low stalling speed. It never flew,

The loug/a F4 U Corsair t('on the next US N avy fig hter contest, in 1938, bill initially seemed poorly suited CO ca rriers,Fortunately the Roy al N avy found it ex tremely effective . By 1945 it u'as clearly the best US N avy fighte r, and it was retain edill production postscar. This is a M arine Co rps AU-I, all attach version of the fi lial fighter cersion.

not, as many writers have suggested, connected with the.11idu'ay-class carriers, which had not yet been designed,T his time Grumman won with a radical twin-engine de­sign, the F7FTigercat. Grumman 's argument was thatcareful streamlining of the fuselage would reduce dragdramatically, allowing the aeroplane 10 make full usc ofits doubled horsepower (two R-2800s). As it happened,the F7F was only rarely used aboard carrier s, It missedthe war.

Du ring the S econd Il'brld 11'6r the L'S N avy commissionedmllllerous sma ll escort carrie rs, III 1943 Leroy Grum manproposed a stripped-dozen interceptor specially suited cothem. It becam e the F8F Bearcat, shoum here.

A s in the case of the 1935 compe titio n, Grumman u'as ableco recoup irs 1938 loss. Il'brk on a Corsa ir alternative beganin 194 0, and the result, the H ellcat, entered combat in 1943.This example is in B ritish markings, Despite its tcartime suc­cess the Hellcat did I /OC offer perfo rmance matching tha t ofthe Co rsai r, and it u'as icithdraum f rom us combat serv iceafte r 1945, It did , hozceuer, fig /a in Indo-China ill Frenchservice. Probably its last L'S combat role u'as as a drone,at tacking ta rgets ill K orea in 1952 .

of fighters and bombers (Grumman 1'41' Wildcat,Douglas SBD Dauntless, and Douglas T BD Devas­tator). However, a further new generation was inprospect , the Wright R-2600 and the Pratt & Whitne y2800, offering about twice the output of the earlier en­gines, They powered the aeroplanes which entered ser­vice from 1942 on. By that time a further new generationwas represented by the \'hight R-335 0 and Pratt &Whitney R-4360, They were incorporated in wartimedesigns, including the Douglas 13T2D, which becamethe postwar AD Skyraider,

The main prewar fighter competiti on (1935) pro­duced the Grumman Wildcat and the unsucce ssfulBrewster F2A Buffalo, Although outperformed by theJapanese Zero , and hence replaced in first-line units bythe next-generati on Grumman Hellcat and VoughtCorsair, the \X'ildcat survived in production for use onboard escort carri ers, A heavily redesigned version, the1'2,\1, was developed for this important duty..

A 1938 competition for a higher-p erformance fighterpowered by the new R-280 0 engine produced theVought F4U Corsair, Grumman failing to convince thenavy to buy its alternative. However, after the fall ofFrance in June 1940 the company managed 10 convincethe navy to buy a redesigned, uprated version of the 1'41',powered by the new R-2600 engine. Shifted to the R­2800, it became the very successful 1'61' Hellcat. Itsappearance was fortunate, because by 1942 the Corsairwas not yet considered entirely acceptable for carrieroperations, By 1944 both the Hellcat and Corsair were inservice in very large numbers, and both proved quitesuccessful. Both were modified in wartime as single-seatnightfighters, at a time when all other Allied nightfightershad a separate radar operator.

A further fighter competition was held in 1940, It was

Through the intencar period, like ocher air arms, the USNavy ran competit ions co choose the aircraft it scould buy,The B reuister Buffalo (sluncn ill B ritish markings as aBuffalo I) beat a G rumman biplan e design in 1935 ,Fortunately Grumman was perm itted CO offer a rath er differ­ent monoplane, uhich became the Iflildcac; the Buffalo u'asless than successful ill service.

Like the R oy al Navy, the US N at'Y of 1941 paid a perfo r­mali ce penalty for carrier operation. These early GrummanF4F Iflildcats shoui all imp ortant US Navy fea ture; lightbomb racks bought so that aircraft could support landing op­erations. Th e crosses under the wings indicate participationin preuiar exercises. Th e red circles in the scars of the nat ion­al insignia u'ere eliminated du ring 1942 fo r fear of beingmistaken fo r theJapallese rising SlIII 'meatball' . For the samereason, many British and Commomcealth aircraft operacingill the Pacifi c Theat re had the red celllres of their roundelselimina ted, and later had US-scyle horizontal uihite barsadded.Although quite outclassed by the Z eros, W ildcacs wereretained through the tcar because they could operate fro msmall escort carriers, (Oddly, the R oyal ,Y avy managed cooperate H ellcat s and Co rsai rs f rom much the same decks acchis tim e.)

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Tile Gmmmall TBI' Auenger u'as the higher-performance successor 10 the 1'80.; these aircraft are probably General M otors­built T8,l1s, li ke the TBD, they ,,'ere lete! bombers, 1101 stressed fo r dice bombing, but they could make shallozcglide attacks.

The new elass of aircraft was designated VWI:Eventually it produced the Douglas Skyraider, initiallydesignated IlT2D but then redesignated AD (A for at­tack) ,

Patrol airc raft were extremely important to the USNavy of 19~ 1. Given the vast spaces of the Pacific, theywere needed to provide thc fleet with early knowledge ofenemy movements, Quite aside from thc agreement withthe army, such scouts had to be seaplanes because so fewairfields existed, The main typc in scn'ice in 1 9~ I , theConsolidatcd PBY Catalina , arose out of a 1932 designcompctition , which the company won with an aeroplancdcsignated XP3Y, i.c" a pure patrol aircraft. The Bureauof Aeronautics was sutlicientiy imprcssed with its per­formance to add a bomber role, redesignating a modifiedvcrsion of the XP 3Y thc PBY.This servcd vcry success­fully through the Sccond World War , and was also givento US Allics, including Britain and thc SO\'ict Union,

Thc PBY scrvcd in the Sccond World War at leastpartiy bccausc attcmpts to dcvclop a new gcncra tion ofscouts took much lon ger than expected , In 1935 theBurcau of Acro nautics let a contract which it hopedwould produce an aeroplanc carry ing twicc thebombload of the PIlY over twice its combat ran ge,The result was an unsuccessful Sikorsky fou r-eng ine

lack of japanese radar, as a radar-equipped force wouldhave bee n aware of the th reat represented by thc ap­proaching SBDs,

Grumman had already won a 1939 competition for areplacement V'I'B, producing the verv successfulAvenger (T BF) , The same competition producedVought's Seawolf (T IlO), Although technically superiorto the TBI~ the Seawolf was dropped so tha t Voug htcould concentrate on the more ,ital Corsair fightcr ,although a few were produccd by Cons olidated asTBYs,Production of the Till' shifted to Eastcrn Aircraft so thatG rumman could concentratc on Hcllcats (the aircraftwcre dcsignatcd 'I'll"') ,

A varicty of follow-on attack aircraft were deve lope dduring the war. It turned out that multi-seaters had unin­spiring performance, and many of the m seemed tooheavy for casy carricr opcrations . About 1 9~4 thc USNa,'y's Ilurcau of Acron au tics bccam e inte rcstcd insinglc-scatcrs with ncar-fi ghtcr pcr formance, capablc ofattacking and then fighting their way hom e, Ily this timc,too , it seemed Icss and less attrac tive to separate attackaircraft into dive and torpcdo bombers, The new, verypowcrful cng incs allowcd both rolcs to bc combined ,There was also pressurc to do so, as carriers necdedmore fightcr s on board to copc \\i th kamikazes ,

lon gitudinal stability. It also turned out to be overweight.In service, thc Helld ivcr also proved to be too weakstructu rally, many losing their tails when stressed. Aftera weak debut in November 19~3, thc fleet asked to keepthe reliable SIlD, Howe ver , by that time only theHelldivcr was in production , and it cndcd the war as thcstanda rd US dive bomber.

A further competition in 19~ I resulted in two moredesigns, the C urtiss SB3C and the Douglas SB2D, butthe former was never built and the lane I' was soondroppcd as too largc and too complex,Thc failure of thcSIl2D led Dougl as to dc, 'clop the vcry succcssful post­war Skyraidcr,

The othcr maior bomber at the outbrcak of war wasthe Dc,'asta tor (T BD) , which was also thc result of a193~ dcsign compctition , It had bccn thc first US :--':avymonoplanc, and by 1941 was considcrcd datcd . How­cwr, Dc ,'astator s pcrfor mcd wcll as Icvcl bombcrs dur­ing thc carricr raids conductcd early in 194 2. At.\ l idway, work ing as torpcdo bombers, they wcrc m assa­crcd , It is only fair to say that plans had callcd for a jointattack by divc and torpcdo bombcrs scrccncd byfightcrs, but that the diffcrcnt elcmc nts of thc attackfailcd to arrive simultancously, Thc appcarance of thcT BD s pullcd dcfcnding Japancsc fighte rs down to thcsur face, leaving thc highc r-altitude approach of thcSIlDs unchallcngcd, Onc might ascribc the disastcr to a

III the early I 930s the L'S .\'at~\' almos t abandoned torpedobombing altogether, 011 the theory that aeroplanes capable oflift ing torpedoes uwe far 100 heavy 10 achicre sufficient per­fo rmancc 10survive enemyfighters.H Ie torpedo bombing role",as sated by the advent of the lIavy s firs t modem mOIlO­plane, the Douglas THD-I Devastator. shmcn here 01/ theL'SS Saratoga ill Jal/I/ ary 1938, Ironically. this same high­performance aeroplane <ms massacred al .Hid<m y ill JI/ll e1942,To a large extent the problem "'as 1I01 lhe aeroplane butthe difficulty inherent ill its tactics, <chich called for torpedoand dive bombers awl supporting fig /mrs (all tcith differentcruising speeds) 10 come together at the target, A s it happenedthe torpedo bombers arrived first , but by their sacri fice thedefending fig hters ,,'ere draum 10 the surface, letting the dn:cbombers attack unhindered.

altho ugh a low-powered , piloted scale mod el, the Vou ghtV-I 73, d id.

The bureau held its first post-19~O fighter cornpeti­tion in 1 9~~ , For the first time, aircraft cou ld be de signedpri marily to be catapulted, so their stalling speeds couldexceed 90 mph, All were to be intercept ors, Out of thiscom petition camc the first postwar U naval iet fighter s,thc Grumman F9F Panther and Cou gar , NorthAmerican F] Fury (which evolved into the Sabre), the,\ IcDonnell Phantom (FH) , and thc Vought Pirate(1'6U) ,

In 193~ the Bureau of Aeronautics held competitionsfor new scout bombers (5,OOOlb aeroplanes to carry500lb bombs) and heavy d ive bombers (6,OOOlb aero­planes to carry I ,OOOlb bombs), N orthrop proposed asingle aircraft to do both jobs, the BT, and it dcvelopedinto thc SBD Dauntless, The following ycar the othcrtwo compctitors, the Curtiss SBC and thc Vought SB2U,wcrc also modificd for thc dual -purposc role, and thchca,'y divc bombcr disappcarcd. Both thc SB2 U andSIlC were used in small nu mbcr s at thc outbrcak of war.Brewstcr 's SBA was produced in sma ll numbcrs but didnot scc action ,

Ily that time thc dom inant scout bombcr was theDou glas SIlD Daun tlcss, ,\ lorc than any other acro­planc, it was rcspon siblc for thc decisivc victo ry at.\ lidway, Ily 1 9~ I, howcvcr , thc Daun tlcss sccmcd datcd ,A 1938 compctitio n had pro duccd a succcssor, thcCurtiss SIl2C Helldiver (as wcll as thc abortivc BrcwsterSB2A), Onc imp ortant requircm cnt had bcc n that twoHclldi,'crs fit a sta nda rd carricr elc,'ator. That provcdunfortunatc, thc Hclldivcr bcing too sho rt for su tlicicnt

The Curtiss SH2C Helldiucr ,,'as the planned successor 10the preua r Dauntless. A side f rom higher performa nce, itcould carry a torpedo instead of a bomb, That attracted theRoy al ,\ 'avy , uith its strong interest in mu ltipu rpose aircraft,Unfo rtunately, probably due 10 IIcccssary compromises ill irsdesign, the Helldire r lacked lateral stability and also struc­tural strength. III the US N avy it suroiccd alm ost by default,as there ,,'as 110 <m y 10 reinstate the early SHD. Perhaps for­tunately for the Roy al Na vy , production 1/C'Z'er sufficed formallY 10be transferred.

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Experience uiith fiying boats in rough Northern zmters convinced the US Navy to renegotiate its agreement not to operate land­based aircraft , It began to buy Lockheed bombers, ultimately Lockheed PV-ll h lluras (shoum here) and PI 7.. 2 Ha rpoons, Quitesuccessful during the war, they inspired the postwar developm ent of the P2 V N eptune (later P- 2) and then of the Orion (P3 1{changed to P- 3),

1938, when Boeing B-17s intercepted the Italian linerRex well out to sea. One consequence was that the stan­dard US medium bomb ers, the North American B-25and ,\ lartin B-26, could carry torpedoes , \\ 'artime armyaircraft in the South Pacific conducted numerous anti­shipping attacks, generally skip-bo mbing rath er thanusing torpedoes,\X'h cn the navy took over the Liberatorsat the end of 1942, they were redesignated PB4Ys (aPB3 flying boat flew in 1943, but was unsuccessful) . Aheavily modified version with a single tail appea red latein the war as the PB4Y-2 Privateer, and contin ued in USservice postwar. Although the RAF used Boeing B- J7sfor coasta l operations, the US Navy did not. The PBstaken over late in the war were used for initial expe ri­ments with airborne early warning, und er ProjectCadillac,

T he PVs were clearly interim aircraft. In December1941 Lockheed began, work on a follow-on, which

in the war, into the PV-2 Harpoon (first delivered inAugust 1944).

Although these aircraft were bought for ASW, theywere soon valued for general anti-shipping patro l work,and the Pacific forces demanded them, T he firstsquadron arrived in the summer of 1943. At sea level theVentura was faster than many conte mporary fighters, soit could be used aggressively in daylight sweeps intoenemy terr itory, Many Venturas were used in theAleutians where , as in Iceland and elsewhere in theNo rth Atlantic, seaplane operatio ns were hazardous atbest.

At th is time the US Army Air Force operated heavybombers, mainly B-24 Liberators, on an ti-submarinepat rol.T he pre-war Army Air Co rps had claimed a coastdefence respons ibility, hence a need for anti-ship capa­bility, This was actually an RAF-style attem pt to super­sede the navy, It was most spectacularly manifested in

. ~

Th e wart ime US Na vy needed high-endurance aircraft, It received B- 24 Liberators, uhich it designated PB4 }'s, Late i ll thewar a special single-tailcersion, the PB4}:2 Prirateer, seen here, appeared, Th ese aircraft It'ere used during and after the warfo r electronic reconnaissance (hence the mlmerous small radomes fo rzca rd), and carried the US Na vy's first air-launched guid­ed missile, the Bat,

expec ted, but by 1941 the ,\ lartin Mariner was inservice, along with the Ca talina .

T he new four -engine flying boat became the huge,\ Iarti n PB2,\1 Mars; it was soon redesigned as a long­range transport, Like most Coronados, the Mars wasalso used as transport rather than a patrol bomber.

T he most striking wartime patrol bomb er develop­ment was the shift towards land -based aircraft. T he USNavy flew its first Second \'(Torld War ASW patrols outof Iceland in the summer of 1940, using PBYs. Thatautumn and winter it became obvious that such aircraftcould not operate reliably, and in October 1941 the navyreceived 20 Lockheed Hud sons, essentially small airlin­ers converted to maritime patrol aircra ft for the RAEOne of them sank the first U-boat credited to a US air­craft. In US service the PBO Hud son developed into thePV-I Ventura (first delivered December 1942) and, late

flying boat, the XPBS; the bureau almos t immediatelylet a contract to Co nsolidated for an alternative, thePB2Y, which became the wartime Coro nado. It flewin 1938, These aero planes used developm ent s of theR-1830 engine; the PBY was powered by earlierversions.

As in the single-engine aircraft, the next step was dueto the appearance of new engines, in this case the R­2600,The bureau ann ounced competitions for four- andtwin-engine seaplanes in the autumn of 1936, Martinwon the 4,000-mile twin-engine competition with itsPBM Mariner, which served alongside the Catalinathroughout the war, By 1937 the bureau had three aero­planes und er development, the PBS, PB2Y, and PBM. Itimmediately ordered the PBM , on the basis that it wouldbe easiest to maintain and offered the best performance,Development proved more difficult than had been

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AIR CRAFT O F T IlE S E CO:-;lJ \\ 'ORLlJ W AR :-;A \'AL A IRCRAF T 1:-; T H E SECO :-;O \\ ' ORL lJ WAR

Ir{>/I before carrier aircraft could expect 10 do milch damage 10 major enemy zcarships, spott er aircraft offered a potentially de­cisive degree of improcement in heavy-gun fi re control. Carrier fighters SOO1/ follozced, as it um essentia l to protect friendly spot­ters and drive off those ofa1/ enemy . By 1939 most ofthe world's battleships carried catapult-lau nched spotters (cruisers carriedsimilar aircraft, which served as scouts). 0 1/e problem, 1/everfully resolved, u'as how to reco'ver spotters during a bailie so thatthey could be refuelled (the only realistic allswer, 10 move them 10 aircraft carriers, 01/ 10 tchich they could land, u'as generallyimpractica l.gioen the other carrier roles). This is a US IfJllgill OS2U- l K ingfisher, the standa rd uartime ty pe, on floats.

became the P2V Neptune, the pr incipal postwar patrolbomber through the mid-1 960s .

There were also battleship and cru iser floatplanes . In1941 the standard was the Curtiss SO C biplan e, theprototype of which had been orde red in 1932 . It was pri­marily an observation aircraft, its original designationhaving been 0 3C. The combination designationreflected a decision to combine the scouting role (forcru iser aircraft) and the gunnery observation role (forbartieship aircraft). Vought designed the monoplaneOS2U Kingfisher as a replacement , and it proved qu itesuccessful. Its intended successor, the Cur tiss S03CScarncw, was, however , a failure, and some were replacedby SO Cs reinstated into service. In 1942, as the S03Cwas entering service, the navy circulated a specificationfor a much faster catapult-l aun ched scout. Cur tiss wonthis competition with its single-scat SC Seahawk, whichentered service in 1944 .

Finally, the US Navy seems to have been unique inusing airships for anti-submarine patrol. Prewar interestin very- long-range rigid airship scouts lapsed after a dis­astrous crash, but the non-ri gid 'blimps' sur vived, andindeed were retained in service for more than a decadeafter the war. Compared with co nventiona l aircraft, theywere very attrac tive because they could slow down tosomething like co nvoy speed, and they enjoyed some­thing approac hing surface ship endura nce.

174

Select Bibli ography

(Standard books on aircraft of this period arc not listedhere.) There arc no full-length accounts of several im­port ant Allied aircraft: the Barracud a, Helldiver , and theVentura/Harp oon series. Apart from the Zero fighter,there arc also no book-length English-language accountsof the ma jor Japanese aircraft. Many of these aircraftwere, however, covered by Profiles and/or by booklets inthe Squ adron/Signal 'In Action' series.

Abrams, R, F4U Corsair at Irar (London and New York,1981).

Belote, J H and \X' M, Titans of the Seas (New York,1975) .

Bowyer, C, Coastal Command at lrar (London, 1979) .

Brown, E, Willgs of the Navy (London and Ann apolis,1987). Evaluations of sixteen wartime carrier air­craft; includ es large keyed cut-away drawin gs,

Brown, E, Duels ill the Sky: Irbrld lrar lJ Naval A ircraf t inCombat (London and Ann apolis, 1988). An attemptto compare aircraft in each major category.

Brown, J D, A llied Carrier Fighters of Irb rld mzr lJ(London, 1975) .

Brown, J D, Carrier Operations ill \I'brld Irar lJ (2 vols.,London, 1974).

Brown, J D, The S eafire: The Spitfire that Weill to Sea(London and Annap olis, 1989 [second edition]).

Brown, J D, A ircraft Carriers of \I'brld lIu r lJ (London,1977).

Chesneau, R, Aircraft Carriers of the Irbrld (London andAnnap olis, 1984).

Creed, R R, PB)': 771C Catalina Flyillg Boat (Annapolis,1985) .

Friedman, N, Carrier Air Pouer (London, 1981).

Friedman, N, US Aircraft Carriers:All Illustrated DesignHistory (Annapolis, (983).

Friedman, N, British Carrier Airpozcer (London andAnnapolis, 1988). T reats the aircraft as well as theships, giving design and ope rational rationales.

Fuchida, M and Okumiya, .\ \, M idway, The Bailie thatDoomed J apall (Annapolis, 1955, revised edition1992) . The story of the key Pacific naval air battle,told from the Japanese point of view.

Hanso n, N, Carrier Pilot (Cambridge, 1979).

Harrison,W, Fairey Firefly (Shrewsbury, 1992).

Hend ry, A, Flying Cats : The Catalina in Irb rld Irar lJ(Annapolis, 1988) .

Hezlet, VADM Sir Arthur, Aircraft and S ea Pouer(London and New York, 1970). On e of a trilogy onmajor influences on modern sea power; the othervolume s concern submarines and electron ics.

Ikuhiko, H, Japa1/ese Naval A ces and Fighter Unit s inIrb rld lI'a r lJ (Annapolis, 1989) .

Inoguchi, R and Pineau, R, The Diuine Willd (Annapolis,1958) .The first full account of the kamikazes.

Lundstrom, J, The First Team (Annapolis, 1984). USnaval fighters from Pearl Harbor to Guadalca nal.

Lundstrom, J, The First Team and the GuadalcanalCampaign (Annapolis, 1994). US naval fighters incombat, August through November, 1942.

Mikesh, R C, Zero (Osceola, 1992) .

Mi ller, N , 771e Na val Air IraI', 1939-45 (Annapolis,(991).

175

Nesbit, R C, '171e Strike Willgs: Special Anti-ShippingSquadrons 1942- 45 (London, 1984). RAF land­based anti-ship units formed from Novembe r 1942onwards, using Beaufighters and Mosquitos.

Poolrnan, K, The Ca tafig htcrs and M erchant A ircraftCarriers (London, 1970). Describes two wartimeBritish exped ients to bring aircraft to sea, catapultsfor one-way fighter missions and semi-conversionsof merchant ships which retained their freighter ortanker capabilities.

Poolman, K, Allied Escort Carriers (London andAnnap olis, 1988) .

Price, A, A ircraft vs. Submarine (London and Annapol is,1973).

Reynolds, G, The Fast Ca rriers (New York, 1968; secondedition: Annapolis, 1992).

Smith, P C, Dive Bomber! (Ashbourne and Annapo lis,1982).

Sturtivant, R H eel A ir Arm al ll'ar (London, 1982).

Stu rtivant, R, The S tcordfi sh Story (London, 1993) .

Till , G, A ir Pozcer and the Royal Navy 1914-194 5(London, 1979).

Tillman, 13, Wildcal : the F4F ill \I'brld \I'a r Two(Annapolis, 1983; second edition 1990) .

T illman, B, Hellcar (Annapolis, 1979).

T illman, B, The Daun tless Dive Bomber ill Irbrld Irar Two(Annapolis, (976).

T illman, B, A venger at Irur (Londo n, 1979 and NewYork, 1980) .

T illman, B, Corsair (Annapolis, 1979) .

Vaeth,J G, Blimps and U-Boars (Annapolis, 1992).

Warn er, D and I~ The Sacred llurriors (NewYork, 1982).T he kamikaze story, includ ing a score card of shipshit and sunk in 1944--45. T his book also includesother Japanese suicide weapo ns.

; "Blood. W 'C Red Sun S etting (Annapolis, 1981). TheBattle of the Philippine Sea, in which the Japanesenaval air arm was destroyed.

; "mood. W T, H IIlller-Killer (Annapolis, 1983). T hestory of US escort carriers in the Battle of theAtlantic.

; " Blood. \X' T, The Li llie Giants (Annapolis, 1987) .Escort carriers against Japan .

7The Helicopter's First War

Elfan ap Rees

AIRCRAFT OF THE SE CO:-:D W'ORLD \X'AR

Tell Cierca G.30A Rota I Autogiros ,fere delivered to the RAP ill the mid-1 930s fo r evaluation by the army co-operationsquadrons. The survivors u'ere integrated into ,,"0 5 Radio S ervicing Section ill 1940 for radar calibrat ion uo rk, Th is exam ple,K4235, is seen coded as KX-B of S o 529 Squadron.

A lmost rejected by the RAP ill its intended role as all aerial observation pOSI, the G.30A proved indispensable during the u'aras the only accurate means of calibrating the then -secret defence radar chain.

176

At the outbreak of the Second \X'orld \'\'ar only threecountries, France, Germ any and Great Britain , couldclaim to have successfully flown a controllable heli­copter, and even these machines were still very much ex­perimental. Co nsequently it was the helicopter 'spredecessor, the autogyro, to which the warrin g nationsfirst looked for militar y potenti al, This slow moving,short take-off / vertical landin g machine seemed ideal forreconnaissance and artillery-spotting, replacing the ex­isting fixed-wing aerial observation posts (AOPs) sup­port ing the army, and introducing a similar role aboardlarger ships where space for a flight deck might be pos­sible, Beyond that the autogyro seemed limited in its ca­pabilities,

In the 1930s the Cierva C.30A Autogiro and its vari­ants were dominant ,The Spanish Navy was actually thefirst service to use a rotary-wing aircraft on military op­erations, using a C. 30A in Asturias during a rebellion inOctober 1934 , Over the next five years a small numberof C.30As were supplied to the French Air Force andNavy, Britain 's Royal Air Force and the Soviet govern­ment , whilst in the USA derivatives built by Kellett weredelivered to the US Army Air Co rps and to the japaneseArmy, A second US licensee, Pitcairn , worked with theUS Navy, In Germany the local licensee, Focke-Wulf,built about thirty C.30As out of a plann ed productionrun of forty, Single C.30As were also delivered for mili­tary evaluation to several other governments, which didnot progrcss their use fur ther , Despite this apparentwide interest, September 1939 saw only the British,French and German services using the autogyro oper­ationally, although the Soviet Army and Japanese mili­tary were to use thcm later in thc war.

In France, the delivery of twenty-five military CiervaC.30 A Autogiros, mostly built und er licence by Lion': etOlivier (Lea) , began in October 1935 with the hand­over of the first of four aircraft to the Aeronavale.Deliveries to l'Arrnee de l'Air (AdA) followed betweenJanuary and July 1936,The AdA later received a furtherthirty-four LcO-buil t C .30As, The prim ary role envis­aged by the French generals for the Autogiro wasartillery observation along the expected front of the,\ Iaginot and Siegfried lines.The plan was to equip up tothirty AdA Flights, each with three C.30As, to work inconjunction with front-line army artillery unit s, TheAeronavale was less ambitious, seeing the Autogiromainly of value in tracking torpedoes during peacetimetraining exercises .

177

By the beginning of September 1939, immediatelybefore the outbreak of war, eight AdA units wereequipped with a total of twenty-eight C,30As, with a fur­ther twenty-one in storage or und er repair and three op­erating at Somm esous in a training role,T hc Acronavalewas opera ting six aircra ft, divided between 3S-2 FJotilleat Cuers-Pierrefeu and the training school at Hyeres,Two more Autogiros were in storage, Over the next ninemonths, as the 'phoney' war period gradu ally deterior­ated, the French Autogiro force changed relatively little,with forty-seve n C.30As still on AdA charge at the be­ginning of May 1940 and thirteen in service with theAeronavale, More than thirty art illery observation pilotshad been trained during the intervening period, alongwith a small number of naval pilots,

However, when the long-expected German attack onFrance and the neighbouring Low Co untries began inMay 1940, the French generals were taken by surprise,T he 'Blitzkrieg' assault rapidly saw the Maginot andSiegfried lines and their fixed artillery mad e redundant,and the intended role of the autog iro unit s changed , Asthe Ge rman advance continued, the surviving AdAC.30As were forced to retreat to Tonn eins, and by earlyJun e 1940 had been redu ced to eighteen aircraft, Wh ilereconn aissance missions to report on the positions ofGe rman forces continued for a short while, by 24 Junethe last survivors had finally been withdrawn to Biard,near Poitiers, and their crews disper sed,

Meanwhile, the Aeronavale 3S-2 Flotille had re­located to Le Havre at the beginn ing of April 1940 to pa­trol the harbour approaches, and this was followed bypatrols of the Seine estuary from a base at Cherbourgduring ,\ Iay, On 3 June the seven remaining aircraftretreated to Lanveoc-Poulrnic where, with the Germanadvance coming closer, they were burned on 18 Jun e,T he crews escaped by sea,

Following the French surrender on 25 Jun e 1940,seven C.30As remained on strength in Vichy, but six ofthese were taken over by Italian forces when the Axis in­vadcd the region in November 1942, All remained scr­viceable for only a very short period , The seventhremained hidd en until the end of the war, and is now dis­played at the Mu see d I'Air. Although there is no evi­den ce of German forces using any of the French C. 30Asdu ring their occupation, it has bcen suggested that twoaircraft were later resurrected by the AdA and operatedby French forces in Germany during the latter month s ofthc war, However, this has not been positively

AIR CR AFT O F T H E S E CO SD \X' ORLD \\'AR T HE H ELI C OPTER 'S FIR S T " 'AR

At the outbreak of 'war ill 193 9 the French Services had some sixty LeO- built C-30A Autogiros available, mostly for artilleryspotting. Seen here are C,30s of French Navy Escadrille 352 at Deauuille, Normandy, ill 1940. M achine number 6 is a LeOG.301, the developed cersion distinguished by its dihedral tailplane and revised fill surfaces,

171e Focke-Achgelis Fa 330 u'as a remarkably simple gyroglider, designed as all ouer-the-horizon surveillance platform for theGerman Na vy's U'-boatfleet. Th is aile is undergoing full -scale unndtunnel tests at Chalais-M eudon, Paris,

favour of develop ing the more versatile helicopter , al­though non e of the latt er ente red serv ice until the post­war period,

In G ermany few, if any, of the thirt y C.30s bu ilt byFockc-Wulf entered military serv ice, although some mayhave bee n requisitione d for second-line ope rations fol­lowin g the out break of war. Instead , the Luftwaffe reliedon the highly efficient and slow-flying Fieseler Storchfixed-wing rec onnaissance aircraft for artillery obse rva ­tion, while Pro fessor Fockc and othe rs successfu lly pur­sue d the developmen t of practical helicopters,

However, Focke did not en tire ly aba ndo n the auto­gyro, developing in 1942 the Focke-Ach gelis Fa 330Bach stel ze (Water Wagtail) . This easily dism antl ed , one ­man gyroglide r was specifically des igned for use by theGerma n navy U-boat fleet. Capable of bein g sto wedbe low decks when the subma rine was subme rged, thevarious components of the Fa 330 cou ld be brought upth rough the conning tower hatch when the vessel wasope rating on the sur face and qu ickly asse mbled on deck,the machine then being flown as a towed kite behind theU-boat. By thus extending the visible hori zon , theFa 330 was expected to offer a un iqu e obse rva tion

In Ru ssia, autogyro development had adva nce d froma stra ightforward cop y of the early Cierva C-8 byKarnov and Skrzhinskii in 192 9 to the T sAGI A-7 in1934, wh ich copied features from the Cierva C-19, Atwo-seat autogyro, powered by a 480hp M-22 rad ialengine and with a distinctive stee ra ble nosewheel under­carriage, the A-7 retain ed sho rt win gs and a tail uni t withco nventional aileron and elevato r contro l surfaces andwas much larger than the C - 19 or later C -30 . Develop­me nt of the A-7 co ntinued into mid-1 938, wh en fiveA-7-3 a production aircraft were orde red . T hese werebui lt in a fac tory at Smolen sk in 1939 and delivered tothe Soviet Air Force earl y in 1940, Armed with one fixedand two movable ma chine-guns, the A-7-3a was usedoperationally for reconnaissance mission s aga inst theadvanc ing G erman forces on the Smolen sk front latertha t year.

Further autogyro development in the Soviet Union,now being led by Karnov at the Smolen sk works, wasinte rrupte d in mid-1941 wh en the factor y had to be re­loca ted eas t to a new site in the Lake Baikal area, out ofreac h of the Luftwaffe, However, all Ru ssian autogyrodeve lopme nt had bee n aba ndo ned by the end of 194 3 in

IA .'I\\'o Ka-l s were built, in late 194 2, but engine over­heating probl em s delayed flight tri als until mid- 1943 .

In the mean time an order for 300 Ka-l A prod uctionaircraft was placed by the jap anese Army, with the firstsixty du e to be produced by M arch 1944. The first wascompleted by Kayaba in june 1943 but, in the event, onlyabout thirty-five were built , and at least ten of th ese weredestroyed in an Am erican air raid before delivery. In mid­1944 the first Ka- 2 vari an t was produ ced , with a licen ce­bu ilt jacob s radial eng ine, and production begunalongs ide the Ka-I A. Engine sho rtages hind ered comple­tion, however, and fewer than sixty Ka-2 s were d elivered ,

O f the estima ted ninety-five Ka-I A and Ka- 2 auto­gyros delivered to the jap an ese military, abo ut fifty en­tered service before the war en ded, Some of th ese wereope ra ted by art illery uni ts, although th ere is no record ofany fro nt -line service . O thers were given th e ca pabilityto carry depth cha rges to com bat the growing thr eat ofAllied subma rines in japanese coastal waters. Operatingfro m about six coastal bases, they cove red the Kor ean,Tsuga ra and Eas tern C ha nnels and o ther vu lnerableareas , All suc h au togyro operations ended with thejap an ese defeat in Augus t 194 5,

Helicopter development in jap an progressed no fur ­ther than some brief expe rime ntal flights in mid-1944,altho ugh low-prior ity research conti nued until th e cnd ofthe war.

co nfirme d. Som e 5,000 flight hours had been accum u­lated by the AdA and Aero nava lc C.30 fleet by the endof ope rations ,

French manufacture of the C.30A was du e to be fol­lowed by the modi fied LeO C.30 I which intro duce dseve ra l improvements, including irreversible co ntro lsand era dicatio n of the longitudinal stability that made in­stru me nt flying in the C.30A ver y risky. In the event,G erman bombing of the LeO fac tory, and the subse ­quent occ u pation, saw C.30 I p roduct ion ende d aft erco mpletion of only five aircraft. One of these was flownat M ari gnan e for thc benefit of a Ge rma n arma me ntsdelegation in Octob er 1940, bu t no further manufactu reor service opera tion was under taken .

O n the far side of the world, in japan, militar y inter­est in rotar y-wing aircraft was sha rpe ned during inci­dent s along the M anchurian /x lon golian border in 1939,when a large numbcr of captive artillery observa tion bal­loon s were shot down, As a resu lt, in late 1939 - early1940, an imported Kellett KD-lA Au togiro was eva luat­ed by the Army Air Force, and this was followed by a de­cision to develop a local variant for the art illeryobservation and liaiso n role, \'{'ith th e deelaration of waraga ins t thc USA and thc forming of a partner ship withGerma ny, the first jap an ese autogyro, the Kayab a Ka-I ,introduced the Argu s inver ted- vee powerpl ant ratherthan the jacob s radial engi ne which powered the KD-

178 179

A IR CRAFT OF T HE SE CO:-:D \\ ' O R L D \\'AR

The Cierca C AO int roduced a side-by-side nco-seat cockpit and a jump take-off capability, but yt'aSonly a limited operationalsuccess. Th is one, L7589, yt'as the first of three originally intended for the Royal N avy ,

T HE H E L I COPT ER 'S F I RS T \\'AR

Secen Pitcairn PA-39 Autogiros yt'ere man ufactured ill the USA during 1941 fo r radar calibration dill ies ill the UK, but ' /Olleentered operational serv ice, BW834, seell here, being one of only tU'o to reach England.

platform, and could even be used to carry a rad io aerialto enhance communications, Some 200 Fa 330s werebuilt by Focke-Achgelis from 1942 onwards , and an un­known number were embarked operationally on U­boats, However, they were not universally popular withthe U-boat commanders, who felt that the hovering aut­ogyro betrayed the presenc e of the submarine and de­layed the ability to escap e when detected ,

Having been closely involved with development ofthe Cierva Aut ogiro from the mid 1920s, the British Air,\ Iinistr y had eventually ordered ten C,30A s for armyco-operation duties as the Rota Mk I. Built by Avro in1934 , these aircraft were mostly delivered to the RAFSch ool of Army Co-operation at Old Sarum, where theywere used for artillery observation, reconnaissance andliaison operations,

By 1939 , however , the RAF had concluded that theAutogiro was less effective in the se roles than light , fixed­wing aircraft and, with the outbreak of war , the survivingRotas were withdrawn from the army co-operation role,Instead, successful trial s with a single C.30A, which wasused to help calibrate the new and secret British defenceradar chain along the east and Channel coasts, led to allavailable Rotas and civil C. 30As being pressed into ser­vice in July 1940 to equip eight radi o servicing units,Subsequently amalgamated into No 1448 Flight, with upto seventeen Aut ogiros on strength and based at Dux­ford, Hendon and Odiham, the unit continued in theradar calibration role into june 1943 , when the Flight be­came No 529 Squadron, with bases at Halton andHenley-on-Thames,The squadron finally disbanded on20 Octobe r 1945 , after accum ulating over 9,000 opera-tional flight hours, .

Following deck landing demonstrations with a C ,30 in

180

September 1935, the Royal Navy also showed someinterest in the Aut ogiro , seeing a possible role for fleetspo tting and 'night shadowing', In 1937 five examples ofthc CAO Aut ogiro, a new side-by-side two-seat Ciervadesign with a jump take-off capability, were ordered bythe Air 1\ linistr y. Three of thcsc were intended for theRoyal Navy and two for the Sch ool of Army Co­operation, In the event only two C.40s entered naval ser­vice, and the se only for evalua tion at Lec-on-S olentbetween December 1939 and April 1940. These trialshelped confirm the unsuitability of the Aut ogiro in theroles envisaged , and the aircraft were transferred to theRAF where they were issued to the radar calibrati on unit.

,\ Icanwhile, three other C AOs were flown to Francein October 1939 to support the sho rt-lived BritishExpeditionary Force . \X' ith the fall of France , two man­aged to escape back to England, where they served outtheir days with No 1448 Flight and later No 529Squadron,The third was de stroyed in France to preventit being captured by the advancing German force s,

By late 1940 it was evident that the importance of therad ar defence network was such that the procurement offurther autogyros needed to be considered to counterany losses am ong the radar calibration fleet. \'{Iith almostall rotary-wing manufacturing in Great Britain at astands till, the only alternative was to go to the USA, andin particular to thc Pitcairn Autogiro Co mpany, whichhad become a Cierva licensee in 1929 . Pitcairn had bee nresponsible for ma nufacturing a series of Autogi ro vari ­ants, some of which had been succ essfully sold on theAmerican market. 10 mect the British requ est the com­pan y bought back seven civilian PA-18 Aut ogirosand remanufactured them as the PA-39, with themorc modern direct-control jump take-off rotor system,

incorpo rating irreversible controls, Seven PA-39s wereconstructed, the first being flown in February 1941 andall being completed by the year end , In January 1942 fiveof the PA-39 s were shipped to Canada for onward trans­po rtation, but only two were to arrive intact in the UK,the others being sabotaged on the Ca nadian dockside,

In the meantime, and despite previ ous pessimism,Royal Navy interest in the use of autogyros suddenlyrevived following the successes being recorded by the U­boat fleet against Allied shipping convoys, Accordingly itwas decided to evaluate the PA-39 for shipb oard opera­tions and investigate the development of a more power­ful variant for anti -submarine operations. The PA-39had already demonstrated an ab ility to carry out a verti ­cal jump take-off of 25ft (7,6m) and almost-ve rticallandings, making it much more suited to small-deck op­crations tha n earlier Aut ogiros. 10 follow up the appar­ent potential, two PA-39s were retai ned with Pitca irn fordevelopment tria ls, to include actual shipboard flying atsea, Initial tria ls took place aboard the escort carrierHMS A venger, sailing in Chesapeake Bay in April 194 2,using a dummy landing platfor m marked out on theflight deck, complete with arre ster wire , The PA-39 ,fittcd with an arrester hook, completed the tests satisfac­torily and repeated them in ,\ Iay 1942, flying on and offa sho rt flight deck built over the stern of a requisitionedBritish merchant ship Empire il Jersey , No further trialstook place, and British interest in the PA-39 and autogy­ros in gene rallapscd .

In part this was due to a mechanical weakn ess foundin the rotor drive system of the two PA-39 s actuallydelivered , during their evaluati on in Great Britain, Thisresulted in further use being abandoned, However, thelack of operational success acc orded to the PA-39 and

181

the variou s other Cierva derivative Autogiros during thewar was not entirely due to the limitati ons in perfor ­mance and control associated with autogyro design,T hefact was that , by the early I940s, the main warring fac­tions were each beginning to recognise the advantages ofthe helicopter, and deve lopment of this had finallyeclipsed the aut ogyro in militar y minds.

The helicopter arrives\X' hile the aut ogyro had entered service in a number ofcountries by September 1939, the impact of the Second\X'orld \'{Iar was to both accelerate and retard the devel­opment and entry into service of the aut ogyro's succes­sor, the vertically-capable helicopter.

Pre-wa r France was the first to see a successfu l con ­trollable helicop ter, with deve lopment centred aroundthe single-seat Breguet-D orand Laboratory Gyroplane,first flown in June 1935 and featuring a coaxial, contra­rotati ng rotor layout. By 1938 this helicopter wasdemonstrati ng speeds of 105km/h (65mph) at altitudesup to 158m (5 18ft) , and even autorotative landings withthe engine at idle, It continued to fly almost right up tothe outbreak of war, when development was shelved toconcentrate on the prod ucti on of fixed-wing airc raft.The aircraft itself was destroyed during an Alliedbomber raid on the Breguet factory at Villacoublay, andfurther original French helicopter deve lopment was notrevived until the end of hostilities. However, the Breguetmanu facturing facilities did bec ome involved in the con­struction of the uncompleted German Focke-AchgelisFa 284 crane helicop ter in 1944-45 .

In Great Britain the pattern of domestic develop­mcnt was similar. Initially Cie rva and the pa rent WeirGroup co-operated with Dr Focke in G ermany, with a

AIR CRAFT OF TilE SE CO:"D WORLD WAR TH E II E LI C O P T E R -s 1'1 R S T W' A R

III } ulle / 943 all Fa 223E carried alii a series of externalload lifting trials, including this carriage of a 900kg engine.ro demonstrate the helicopter's potential for army support.

on 5 Oc tobe r, but un expectedly all fu rther testin g of theFa 223 was forb idden a few days later and the Focke­Achgelis staff were all orde red to the ,\ Iesserschmitt fac­tory, This order was reve rsed soon afte rwards and theorganisation was sent to Berlin Tempe lhof with a co n­tract to manufacture Fa 223s at a rate of 400 per mon th ,Needless to say, the requirement was imposs ible 10 meetat such a late stage in the co nflict.

At this time. towards the end of 1944 . there were onlyfive Fa 223 helicop ters operationa l. the VI 2 havin g beenlost in thc Alps wh ile attempting to rescue seventeenpeopl e trapped in snow on ,\ lont Blanc, A mechan icalfailur e result ed in a disintegr atin g rotor and the crewwere killed in the ensuing cras h , Earl y in 194 5 three ofthe five surviving Draches wer e allocated to Luft­Transportstaffel 40, the first dedicatcd Luftwaffe heli­co pter unit, sct up at ,\ Iuhldo rf in Ba\'aria ,The other twohelicopters \\'ere retained for de\'elopment \\'ork withFockc-A ch gelis at its ne\\' Tempelhof site,

In late FebruaryWr Nr 0005 1. the first Fa 223 1' fromthe Tempelhof linc, \\'as acce pted and immcdiatelyassigncd 'by orde r of the Fuhrer' 10 fly 10 Danzig on asecret rcscuc mission , Ru ssian ad\'ances mad e it

of up 10 1.100kg (2.245Ib) . altho ugh 800kg (I .760lb)was more usual. The helicop ter was capable of achievingspeeds of 185kmlh ( I l Srnph ). despite high vibrationlevels which normally kep t it down 10 a mo re sensible120kmlh (75mph) ,

Initially the Lu ftwaffe ordered a batch of thi rty pre­prod uction Fa 2231's for service evaluation, and thesewere laid down at the Focke-Achgelis Delmcnh or st fac­tor y, However, an Allied bo mber attack in june 194 2des troyed the produ ction line and the two survivingprototypes befo re any airc raft could be co mpleted.bring ing all flight testing to a halt.The line was moved toLauphcim, where product ion resumed in early 194 3,Service tria ls. origina lly planned for the spring of 194 3.had 10 be delayed until new aircra ft were available.

In june 194 3 the first Fa 2231' completed at

La upheim, the V II , carried out a series of externa l load­ing and lifting trials 10 demon strate the typ e's potential,including the ca rriage of a 900 kg (I ,984Ib) engine a dis­tance of some 32km (20miles), Later that year the sec­ond aircraft built at Lauphcim, the V 12. was earmarkedto rescue ,\ lussolini from imprisonment in Italy atop the1,700m (5,600ft) G ran Sasso ,\ Iassif northeast of Rom e,In the even t the helicopter became un servi ceable at thelast moment and the opera tion was carried ou t using aFiese ler Storch, The Fa 223 V II was subsequently writ ­ten off in a crash near O snabruck in the spring of 1944.while tr ying 10 re c o ver the major co mpo nents of adown ed Dornier Do 2 17 from the Vehnier ,\ loor. To re­cover bo th the Do 2 17 and the Fa 223E. a seco nd heli­copte r. the V14. was flown 10 the site in ,\ Iay 1944 andsuccessfully recovered all the major parts of both aircraftin a two-day ope ration which provided a very practicalde mo nstration of the D rachc's capabilities,

Cont inuing produ ction dis ru ptions meant that bymid -19 44 on ly seven Fa 223Es had bee n co mpleted at

Lau pheim before the prod uction line was agai n des­troyed in a seco nd Allied bomber raid in july, Ind eed. asa result of thc Allied attacks. only a very small num ber ofFa 223 s entered service, and thcn mostly on a tria ls basisand flown by Fockc-Ach gclis test pilots,

In Sept ember 1944 the Fa 22 3 VI 6 (with the VI4 asa bac k-up). was flown to the Alpin e town of .\ li tten­walde, north of lnnsb ruck, for trials with the ,\ Iountai n\\ 'arfare School. where the he licopter carried out a seriesof general transport and external load tests in the nearbymountains. These included moving the ammunition andsupplies for a complete Germa n mountain bri gade, atask normally carried out by forty or fifty mules. and car­rying a 75cm (30in) mountain infantry gun and ammu­nition in a ca rgo net , from a mountain \'alley 10 a sitesome 1,800m (5,900ft) bclo\\' the Wornergr ant peak ,Using a 16m (52ft) cable the Fa 2231' then lifted the bat­tery e\'en higher. to a position \\'here a landing \\'as im­pos sible,These successful series of tr ials " 'ere co mpleted

copter flights from 1940 onwards. Although British de­sign development continued at a ver y low level of prior­ity throughout the war, it was 10 be many year s before aBriti sh-designed helicopter entered military service.

German helicopter development was more adva ncedthan that of any of the other co untr ies involved in suchresearch by September 1939 , From the original and verysuccessful single-scat Focke-A chgelis Fa 61 of 1936.using the C ierva cyclic/collective pit ch control hubs,Profe ssor Foc ke had gone on 10 design the larger Focke­Achgelis Fa 266, which retained the same side-by-sideroto r configuration but with a six-passenger cabin layoutfor potential commercial ope rations with Lufthansa. Aprototype Fa 266 was built at Dclrnenhor st-Hoyen campin September 1939. but was almost immed iately co m­mandeered for military development. Powered by an800hp B,\IWI 32 rad ial en gine, and with a design grossweight of 3.200 kg (7 .055Ib) . it was red esignated Fa 223and used for a series of teth ered ground tests to iron outvarious co ntrol problems before making its first freeflight in August 1940 , ' (\\'0 months later this aircraft, theVI , reach ed an altitu de of 7, IOOm (23.300ft) , far ex­ceeding the previ ou s height record achieved by any heli­copter, but it was written off in February 1941 in a heavyautorotative landing,

Two more prototypes followed in 1941 , by whichtime the type had already been ordered into productionfor the Luftwaffc as thc Fa 223E Drache (Kite) po\\'crcdby the uprated 1,000hp Bramo 323 radial cnginc \\'hichallo\\'ed an incrcascd gross \\'eight of 4,300kg (9, 500lb),The Luftwaffc sa\\' a rcquircmcnt for up to 121 Fa 223s,in rolcs including anti-submarine operations armed \\'ithtwo 250kg (550lb) bombs or depth charges, externalload carriage and rccovery, and rescue , The increascdpo\\'er made the Fa 223 E capable oflifting external load s

J

--,

77/C second Focke-Achgelis Fa 223, f)-OeElf; u'as one of IU'O airframes originally laid dozen unth commercial operations inmind, bill completed instead 10 a milita ry specification.

cross -licens ing agreement that saw Focke being able 10

usc the patented Cierva cyclic/collective pitch hub co n­trol system in return for the production of Focke-derivedhelicopters in Great Britain, This liaison obviously be­came impossible as Nazi intention s became clearer, and\X'eir was forced 10 go it alon e. Followin g the first sue­ccss ful flights with the Wcir W5 in 1938, the companywent on to develop the larger two- seat \'\' 6, Flown inOctober 1939. this used the same side-by-side lateralrotor layout as the W5 and Fockc d esign, and was sue­ceeded by a sca led -up design project in 1940, intended10 meet the Royal Navy requirement for a ' fleet shadow­cr' . Further development was shelved in july 194 0 as aresult of the deteri orating war situation. and the \\'6 wasdismantl ed , Essenti al design data was subseque ntlypassed to the USA where, together with patented C iervawork, it was 10 con tribute to the firs t successful US hc li-

The If."ir \fI6, Ihe U'orld's firs l helicopler 10 carry a passenger,u'as imen ded 10 acr as a prolOlype for a scaled-up amisub­mariue varia m for Ihe Royal Navy , The delerioralillg u'arsiwarioll forced aballdollmem of Ihe projecl in / 940,

182 183

--A I RC RAFT OF T H E S E C O :\D \X' ORLD \X'AR T HE H ELI C OP T ER ' S F I R ST W AR

4Top : First fioum 0 11 30 October 194 1, this is the secondprototyp e Flenn er Fl 282,fitted tcith a fully glazed cockpit.This machine u'as later cannibalised to provide spares, TheFI 282 Kolibri (above and below), undencent sea trials asearly as 1942, operating f rom a platform built 0 11 theTracemiinde airfield safety ship based ill Lubeck Bay , Its ill­termeshing rotor system U'QS unique among wartime heli­copter designs. The Kolibri 's great potential as the firs tshipborne antisubma rine helicopter u'as frus trated only byAllied bombing attacks 0 11 the production plant ill 1942-43.

..

rudi me ntary sea tria ls in the Baltic, with a Kolibr i oper­ating from a 4 x 4m (13 x l Bft) platform built over a gunturret.

Production was initiated at the Flenner factory in theBerlin suburb of johannisthal and a new facility at BadTolz, but was frustrated by the Allied bombin g raids . By1943 only about twenty FI 282s had bee n comp leted ,and probably not more than twenty -four in total werede livered by the end of hostilities, This was despite anorder placed with BM \'\/ in 1944 for a further 1,000 air­craft, none of which were completed . De spite this, earlyFI 282s entered service in 1943, cleared for evaluativeshipborne operations to protect German convoys in theBaltic, Aegean and Mediterranean.

Meanwhile, Flenner bega n work on a larger variant ,the FI 339 , for army co-operation and gun-spotting!reconnaissance , One FI 282 was modified with an ob­server's cockpit behi nd the powerplant, but furtherdevelopment was largely overtaken by events, Neverthe­less, three FI 282s did enter service in 1944 with Luft­Transportstaffel 40 for artillery spotting. In February

The Fl 265 carried out trials aboard the German cruiserKoln during the early day s of the war,operatingf rom a plat ­form built en'er a gun tIIrret,

While Focke had been developing his lateral-rotorconfiguration , a second designer, Ant on Flenner, wasworkin g with the German Navy to produce a helicopterable to operate from ships in the anti- submarine and re­conn aissance roles, Flenner had originally built his first,un successful, helicopter in 1932 before developing in1936 his own cabin autogyro, the FI 184 with cyclic­pitch contr ol, for naval evaluation , This was written offwi thin a few weeks of its maiden flight, but Flettner fol­lowed it with a second var iant , the Fl 185 , incorporatinga powered rotor , before aba ndoning this avenue of de­velopme nt and concentrating on a new helicopter vari­ant, the Fl 265 . This retained the nose-mounted engi neposition and the familiar aut ogyro tail surfaces, but in­trodu ced a unique int ermeshing rotor system, with twocounter-rotating two-bladed rotors mounted close lO­

gether side-by-side, synchronised to avoid collision ,Six single-scat FI 265 pr ototypes were ordered for

naval evaluation in 1938, and the first of these was com ­pleted in May 1939, although it crashed on its first flightwhen the synchronisation gear failed and the rotorsstruck each other. Nevertheless, the basic conceptproved successful and the type was operated in 1939-40aboard cru isers in the Baltic.

Flenner followed this with the much improved FI 282Kolibri (Humming Bird) , with the powerplant relocatedunder the main rotors and greatly enhanced forwardvisibility, In 1940 forty- five prototype and thirty pre­production 1-1 282s were ordered for trials and evalua­tion , and some pr iority was given lO deve lopmen t asGerman military ambitions grew. The first prototypeswere completed in 1941 , with both open and enclosedcockpi ts, and a year later the cruiser Kalil was used for

Six prototype Flen ner FI 265s were built, retaining the nose mounted engine installation of their autogyro forebears bitt int ro­ducing the intermeshing rotors uihich became the Flenner trademark ,

imp ossible lO ac hieve the obiective, but the crew suc­cessfully rescued a wounded Bf 109 pilot instead and ,having flown him back lO base , rerurned over the sea toSwinernunde in a three-hour operation which includedmanu al refuelling in flight from a 200 litre (44 gal) drumstowed in the cabin.The helicopter eventually reached itsassigned destination at Werder after an epic thre e-dayflight and 16 hours 25 minutes flying time, having cov­ered a total dista nce of 1,675krn (1,04 1 miles) with nomechanical problems, By Apr il 1945 only three Fa 223sappear to have been still airworthy, and Wr Nr 0005 1and the VI 4 were assigned for the training of pilots withLuft-Transportstaffel 40, now based at Aiming, to sup­port the planned 'Defence of the Alpine Stronghold'. O n30 April the squadron personnel left for Aigen inAustria, the two Fa 223s following on 2 Slay.Then, withthe war rapidly ending , the two Fa 223 crews decided tofly the helicopters away from the advancing Russiansand towards the Allies, whom they met at Aiming on 9May, Subsequently the two Fa 223s were tra nsferred lO

British and Ame rican ownership for testing in the re­spective cou ntrie s. A third aircraft, the V16 , was mean­while destroyed by Focke atTempelhof, and about fifteenmore in vari ou s stages of assembly were captured by theRussians when they ma rched into Berlin,

In total about eleven Fa 223s, includ ing the proto­types, were actually completed and flown, and theselogged some 400 hours flight time and about 9,654krn(6,000 miles) of cross-country flying before the endcame. Another thirty- seven Draches reached advancedstages of assembl y, and compone nt pans for a furthertwenty were manufacrured at the thr ee production sitesbetwee n 1940 and 1945.

184 18 5

AIR CRAF T O F Til E S E CO~D \'·ORl.lJ \, 'AR

Despite the popula r myth, S ikorsky u-as IlOt the first to }ly a practical helicopter. Indeed, his early efforts with the 1'5.300 u'erefrus trated by COlli rol problems. Only after mallY modifications u'as lie able, ill December 19o1l , to begin serious flight testing.

Til E II ELI C OP TER ' S F I R ST W AR

Deck landing trials icith the Sikorsky XR-ol equipped unth P OIII OOII floa ts u'ere carried 0111 by the VS A rmy early ill thedevelopment programme, encouraged by the Royal N avy , uhich Safe the R-ol as the alls<eer to the Ui-boat threat ill the Atlantic.

1 9~5 Fl 282s operating on the Russian Front spo tted theSoviet adva nce in Far Pomerania, and subsequently atleast three FJ 282s based at Bcrlin-R angsdor f were usedin support of artillery un its in the final defence of Bcrlin .,\lost were shot down by Russian an ti-aircraft units andfighte rs , Two other FI 282s survived with L uft­Transportstaffel ~O at Aigen in early .\Iay 1 9~5 but, withonly one pilot available and the Russians just 30 km (18miles) away, an atte m pt was made to destroy one air ­frame before taking the survivor to Aiming and theadva ncing US forces . A second airworthy FJ 282 wassurrendered to the Americans at ,\ lu nich on 13 .\ lay,and both were later shipped to the USA for tria ls. At leastone other serviceable example was captured by theRussians, and a fourth, non-flying, exampic was taken tothe UK.

In the USA the p rewa r deve lop me nt carried out byCic ryal\\'cir an d Focke was closely studied by Kellettand Pitcairn , who recognised tha t, had it no t bee n for theNazi leader ship in Ge rma ny, Focke and the British com­panies would have almos t cer tainly gone ahead with thcircross -licensing ag reement to develop and build theFockc-Achgelis helicop ter designs, using the Ciervacyc lic/collective-pi tch hub contro l system ,

In 1938 Kellett chief engineer Lawre nce LcPagc hadvisited Dr Foc ke to study the Fa 61 and, following his re­turn to the USA he developed the similar but un success­ful lateral-r otor Platt IcPage XR-I , which first flew injune 1 9~ i .In the m eantime Pitcairn, which as the Cierva

186

licensee in the Uni ted tates held the patent right s tothe cyclic/co llective-pi tch hub mechanism, mistakenlystayed with the Au togiro.

The patents he ld by Pitcairn made it very d ifficu lt forany other Am erican desig ner to develop a contro llablehelicopter, and this was certa inly the problem facing IgorSikorsky when he returned to rota ry-wing developmentin the immediate prewar period . Initially his VS-300 pro­totype went through a varie ty of major changes involvingthe number and layout of rotors, blade design, power­plants and fuselage structu re before he finally admitteddefeat and used a hub control system tha t infringed thePitcairn -h eld patent. T he VS-300 was first flown unteth ­ered in ,\ lay 19~0, but not un til December 1 9~ I wasfinal success achieved .

In part Sikorsky was d riven by the US Army AirCorps, which was beginni ng to show great inte rest in thehelicopter but insisted that only a single-motorconfiguration was prac tical. The experimental VS-300was therefore followed by the VS-316, which used thesame main roto r/an ti-to rque tail roto r configuration andthe pat ent ed hub contro l but introduced a two-scat coc k­pit and a fabri c-covered fuselage. Development of thisnew model , designated the XR-~ by the USAAI~ was ap­proved on 17 Decem ber 1 9~0 . Thc first prototype wasrolled out in December 1 9~ I , the month the USA de­clarcd war on japan , and three days before Germany andItaly declared war on the USA.

First flown on 1~ janu ary 1 9~ 2 , the XR-~ soon

demonstra ted real potenti al as a practical helicopter , andVought-Sikorsky began to negotiate a licenc e agreementwith Pitcairn for the production and sale of the hub con­tro l mechan ism. In july 1 9~3 Pitcairn agreed, and in apatriotic ges ture asked for only a negligible roya lty on allhelicopters manufactured for the US government for theduration of the hostilities. (T his patriotism was later re­warded by the government reneging on the agreementand pu rchasing postwar large numbers of Bell, Hil ler,Piasecki and other helicopters which infringed thepatent . Pitcairn sued, and in 1977 was awa rde d com­pcnsation amounti ng to mo re than 32 million .)

In April 1 9~2 the XR-~ was demonstrated at theVought-Sikorsky facto ry in Stratford , Co nnecticut, be­fore a gathering of US and British military officials, andthis was followed a month later by a 760-mile ( I ,223km)delivery flight from Stratford to Dayton , Ohio, where thehelicopter was to undergo official USAAF evalua tion,Oye r the next seve ral months tests were carried out toesta blish the value of the XR-~ for bombing sub marines,pilot training, and all-terrain opera tions with large rub­bcriscd floats. By janu ar y 1 9~3 the tr ials had been com­pleted and the Army had decided to orde r thirtypre-production YR-~ models for fur the r Service evalua­tion . The first three of these, designated YR-~A, werebas ically similar to the XR-~ but had a more powerful ,180hp engine. The rem ainin g twent y-seven were YR­~Bs with an enlarged cabin. Subsequ en tly seven YR-~Bs

were tran sferred to the RAF as the H over fly I, and three

18 7

to the US Coast G uard as the HNS-I , all for evalua tionand training.

Initially the US Navy had showed no interest at all inthe XR-~ or any othe r kind of helicopter , on the gro undsthat 'no rotary-wing aircraft had yet been able to carry~ 53kg (l ,OOOlb) useful load, and was never likely to doso'. (They were obvio usly unaware of Focke's success.)T hc Coast Guard and the British Royal Navy were moreopt imistic, and now saw co nsiderable value in hcli­cop ters for anti-su bmarine convoy protection. By early19~3 continuing Ge rman U-boat successes agains tAtlantic co nvoys reinforced British and American inte r­est in the helicopter's potential for convoy protection,and in ,\ Iay 1 9~3 the XR-~ was used for a two-daydemonstration of its shipbornc abi lity, flying on and offa rud imentar y 50ft (15m) square slatted woode n plat­form aboard a tanker , the 55 Bunker Hill, moored inLon g Island Sound.

,\ lay 1 9~3 also marked the de livery of the first USArmy YR-~ (~2 - 1 0723~) which, acco mpanied by theXR-~, was flown from Stratford to Fort ,\ Ionmouth,New jer sey, for tests with th e Signal Co rps , followed bythe first publi c demonstration of the helicopter in frontof the Capitol in Washin gton D.C.

In july 1 9~3 a seco nd series of deck-landing testswere carried out, this time on a wooden platform overthe stern of a troopship, the 55 James Parker. On this oc­casio n take-offs and landings were carried out by boththe XR-~ and YR-~ while the vessel was unde r way in

,\ I R C R A F T OF T HE S E C O:-; O \X' OR L O \X'AR

The R-4 became the firs! Americall helicopter co enter production tchen it u'as ordered ill quantity by the US Army ill early1943, Operational seruice fo lloued a year later.

T H E HEL I C OP TE R 'S F I R ST \X' A R

71,e S ikorsky S R-5 u'as built ill 1943, tcith the Royal Na vy very much ill mind as the future customer. Lack of interest fromthe CS N avy and other u'ar priorities conspired CO delay decelopment, and the u'ar u'as C>t-er before it could enter serv ice,

open seas off Long Islan d , D uri ng the second day oftrials the ship was rolling at up to 10°, and the wind overthe deck was reaching 40mph (64km/h) , Noneth elessboth helicopters, one with a wheeled un dercarriage andthe other with pontoo n floats, were operated on and offthe deck with little trouble,

Desp ite the success of the trials, the US Navy stilltoo k little int erest, althoug h the Coast Guard received itsfirst HNS- I varia nt in October 194 3,This was de liveredto Floyd Bennett F ield , wh ere the USCG began expe ri­menting with rescu e techniques and equipment , and on3 januar y 1944 a helicopter fro m thi s base was used todeliver blood plas ma fro m lower ,\ Ianhattan Island toSan dy Hook, N ew York, where su rvivors of an explosio naboard the destroyer uss Turner were being treated , Laterthat same month a helicopter p ilot training operationwas set up at Floyd Bennett Field, to be equipped withtwenty HNS- Is transferred from an Army order for 100full-production R-4Bs being manufactured during 1944,

In November 1943 a new YR-4B (4 2- 107240) washa nded over to the Army at Stratford and immediatelydismantled at nearby Bridgeport for shipment by CurtissC -46 transport to Alaska for cold-weather trials, T heseincluded tests with a litter (str etcher) capsule on th e po rtside and practice 'casevac' rescu e operations , Alth ou ghthe helicopter carried out no real rescue mission s inAlaska, the experience was to p rove useful five m on th slater, when an urgent request was received to use theR-4 to carry out a casevac operation in the CBI theatre,

On 20 April 1944 a Vultee L-I B light aircraft of the

188

I st Air Commando G roup, supporting C hindit opera­tions against the japanese in Burma, was flying threeBritish soldiers, two wounded and one with malaria, tohospital when its engine failed and the pilot was forcedto land in the jungle some 100 miles (I60km ) behindenemy lines , All four men survived the crash, but the rewas nowhere nearby where an aeroplane could land toeffect a rescue, Following a req ues t fro m th e loca l Armycommande rs, five early Sikor sky YR-4B helicopters hadjust bee n airlifted to th e G roup base at Hailakandi inIndia, altho ug h three were almost immediately wr ittenoff in acc idents, leaving just two for operational use bymid-April.T hese were based at La la Ghat in eas t Bengal,and a message was sent to the unit, whic h ag reed to at ­tempt a rescue,

On 21 April a single YR-4B (43-2822 3) , piloted by1st Lt Carter Harm an. took off from Lala Ghat andstaged north-west to jorhat, crossing a 6,000ft ( I ,800m)mountain range ell route. Refuelling stops were necessaryapproximately every 160km (I OO miles), After an over­night stay , Harman continued the flight to Ledo, andthen to Taro, where an extra fuel tank was roped to theroof of the cabin for the last leg over more mountains toa Chindit strong poi nt code named 'Aberd een ' , Thehelicop ter arrived on the afternoon of 23 April an d wasimmediately refue lled and sent on the rescu e m ission ,In itially Harm an flew the YR-4B some 20 miles (32km)to a light-aeroplane strip on a sandbar, whi le the strand ­ed group was told by a dropped note to descend fromthe ridge where they were hiding and hea d for a paddy

field about five miles (8km) from the str ip, Harman thenma de two flights to the paddy field , returning to theairstrip each time with one of the wounded, who wererecovered to 'Aberdeen' by light aeroplane, Aft er the se­cond flight the underpowered YR-4B went unserviceableowi ng to the engine overheating in the high tempera­tures, but on the followi ng morning Har m an was able torescue the remaining two me n before returning to'Aberdeen' later the sa me day,

This was the firs t rescu e operati on performed by ahelico pter. Ove r the next ten days Harm an carr ied outfour more missions from 'Aberdeen', including one intoa 3,00 0ft (900m) -high clearing close to j apan ese forces,where two wounded soldiers (one clinging to the under­carriage str uts) were successfully lifted out in one flight.Harman was subsequently awarded the DFC, havingcompleted eighteen successful rescues before the surviv­ing YR-4B s succu mbed to a lack of spare parts and theha rsh operating conditions,

In the final stages of the war R-4s were used in thePhilip pines by the 38th Infantr y Divi sion to evacuate ca­sualties from mountain positi ons,

Despite the successes achieved with the R-4 , it hadnever really been intended as much more than an exper­imental and training helicopter. As early as Feb ruary1942, therefore , Sikorsky was planning a large r airc raft,the VS-32 7, capable of carrying a more realistic payloadand with greater range and performance, Designated theXR-5, the new helicopter was originally intended for thesho rt -range reconnaissance and liaison role but, al-

189

th ough this was later broadened to include rescue and airambulance role s, senior Army officials showed littleinterest. However, intense interest from the British AirCommission (BAC) in the XR-5 for the anti-submarinerole finally won the day, Initially four prototypes were or­dered, two for the USAAC and two for the British, de­spite continuing and considerable opposition from theUS N avy, The first XR -5 flew in August 194 3, and wasfollowed by contracts for a total of 4 50 airc raft, 200 forthe USAAF and the remainder for the BAC. T he firsttwenty -six , design ated YR-5A, were to include fourteenfor Great Bri tain, a total of sixty- nine British deliver iesbeing included in the first 104 o ff the line , In the event,ma nufacturing delays and war pri orities saw the produc­tion schedule slip to a point where the war was over be­fore the R-5A entered service. The British order wascancelled outr ight and substantial cutbacks were made inthe USAAF contracts, Postwar, the basic de sign was suc­cessfully reworked as the S-51 /H-5 series,

\'\'hile Sikor sky was developing the entirely new R-5,the company was also refining the basic R-4 with the in­tention of increasing the payload and performance, Tobegin with the plan was simply to mod ify a YR-4, but inSeptember 1942 the recommendation was mad e to buildfour new helicopt er s, design ated R-6, Subseque ntly acontract was placed for five XR-6s, including three forArmy trials and two for the US Navy, The first XR-6flew in October 1943, but it was several months beforevari ou s control and vibration problems were overcomeand the prototype delivered to the Army for official

A I R C RAFT OF T ilE SE CO:-;D W' O RL D \,'AR T ilE II ELI COPT ER 'S FIRST W AR

•

British lise of the R-6 U'aS restr icted to postwar eva lua tion /0 determine futu re uses for the helicopter tcith all th ree S ervices,

Luftwaffe Profi le Series No 6, Flenner 282, SchifferPublishing (Atglen, Pennsylvania , 1996)

Nowarra, H J, German Helicopters 1928-45. Schiffe rPublishing (\X'est Chester, Pennsylvania, 1990)

*British Air Co mmission papers, 19-10-19-15

*Focke-Achgc1is Fa 223 pap ers

*Weir Helicopter Development, 193 5-19-11

*Sikorsky R--I to R-6 historical files

Items marked * are held ill the Helicop ter Internationalarchives

Bibliog ra phy

Brooks, I' \XI, Cierca Autogiros, Smithsonian Instituti onPress (Washington DC, USA, 1988)

British and French decisions virtua lly to freezehelicopter development at the beginning of the conflict,and the comp lete destruction of the Ge rman productioncapability toward s thc cnd of the war, effectively hand edleadership over to the USA - an advantage that has beenheld ever since.

Co ast Guard pilots began to evaluate and tra in on thcR--I at Floyd Bennett Field and. belatedly joined by anow enthusiastic US Navy, carried out combined trialson a British cargo ship, ,\IV Daghestan, in US waters du r­ing November 19-13,

At thc beginning of 19-1-1 a joint service helicopterun it was established in the UK at Hanworth, ,\ Iiddlescx.coinciding with an ongoing ocean trial in which twoYR--IBs sailed aboa rd the ,\ IV Daghestan with a transat­lantic convoy to thc UK, Atrocious weather during thcsixteen-day voyage limited flying to just three days andless than two hours total flight time, and even thcn thcship was rolling at up to 200 with a flight deck rise andfall of some 30ft (9m) and windspeeds of up to -I6mph(7-1km1h), Although more flying could probably havetaken place had the vessel been permitted to alter courseto minimise some of the ship's motion. it was concludedthat the YR--IB was not suitable for empl oyment as ananti-submarine weapon , and that such operations wouldhave to await thc advent of a more capable design , Thetwo YR--IBs were 110wn off the ship on its arrival inLiverpo ol and dispat ched to Feltham in Middlesex foroverhaul, one flying direct and the second going by road,since only onc set of the fabric -covered main rotorblades had survived the Atlantic crossing , A third YR--IBwas crated and shipped to the UK in February 19-14,Deliveries of furthcr YR--IBs and production of R-4Bsagainst British orders continued throughout 19-1-1 andinto 19-15, the aircraft being divided between thc RoyalNavy and the RAE

In Augu st 19-1-1 one R--I was issued to No 529Squadron for evaluation in the radar calibrati on role,marking the first usc of thc helicopter by an operationalRAF unit , and in Februar y 19-15 No -13 Op erationalTraining Unit was formed at RAF And over as aHelicoptcrTraining Flight, equipped with ninc R--Is andcharged with converting thc No 529 Squ adron Aut ogiropilots and Arm y Auster AOP pilots, Plans to dispatchR--IBs to mainland Europc for artillery spotting and liai­son during the final stages of the war did not materialise.

In February 19-15 thc Royal Navy issued severalR--IBs to a Fleet Requ irements Unit. 771 Squadron atHatston in thc Orkn cys, for evaluatio n in thc air-searescue , gunnery calibration and other roles, The flight sincluded deck landin gs on warships, both at anchor andunder way, but thc war endcd before thc training and ex­pcricncc could be put to any real usc,

Deliveries of thc later R-6 to thc UK began after theGerman surrender and just before the [apanese capitula­tion, Conseque ntly nonc entered service un til the post­war period , and even thcn only in small numbers,

T hus it was that the helicopter's first war carne to anend, It was an unu sual period which, had things turnedout differently, might easily have sccn Europe dominat­ing developm ent and postwar production, Instead . the

J

Intended as a mu ch-improued decelopm ent of the R-.J, theS ikorsky R-6 arrived 100 late 10 see wa rtime serv ice and, asa result , was produ ced ill relatively sma ll numbers.

evaluation, .\ Ieanwhile, the type had already been or­dcrcd into production for both the US and British mili­tary, Thc latter received no R-6s until afte r thc war, butthe US Army did take delivery of a few for evaluation.

British interest in thc Sikorsky helicopter develop­ment programme had begun to cr ystallise in 19-11, fol­lowing a dem onstration of the VS-300 before keymembers of the BAC, and was confirmcd with thc fail­urc of thc PA-39 Autogiro to come up to expectations.Thcnccforth thc BAC put its full weight bchind trials ofthc Sikorsky R--I, to assess thc suitability of the heli­copter for convoy protection and the use of the R--I itselfas a training machine, At the same time the Co mmissionput pressure on the US Defen se Department to proceedwith de velopment of thc R-5, placing an order for thir­tccn YR--Is and 250 R-5s in July 19-12 to show encour­agemcnt.This was bitterl y opposed at the time by the USNavy, which nccded the Vought-Sikorsky plant for moreurgent fixed-wing aircraft orders and. as recounted car­lier, thc British R-5 order was eventu ally cancelled be­forc deliveries could begin.

1\ lcanwhilc, British deck-landing trials with thc YR--Ihad been planncd for July 19-13 , but were set back whenthc first British YR--IA was badly damaged at Bridgcportin an accident on the -Ith. when a tail-rotor blade carneadrift during a 10ft (3m) hover and thc helicoptercras hed , It was rep laced by an early YR--IB, which wasoffi cially delivered to thc Royal Navy at Bridgeport on22 September and was itself badly damaged five dayslater in a landing accident during pilot trainin g, Despitethcsc mishaps a small team of RAF. Royal Navy and US

190 191

---

future adversary, These were the weapons which wouldtake the lives of so many eager young airmen.

17/C Hispano-Suiza H5404 20mm cannon.first used by theFrench A ir force, «·as adopted by the RA F ill J940, andmanufactured if/ the UK. 71/C Hispano «-as later modified byG F irilllace and proved 10 be a reliable hard-hitting aircrafticeapon. Here it is mounted if/ its intended position bettceenthe cylinder blocks of the Hispano HS 12} ' Aero engine.

BritainAfter protracted trials in the 1920s the Air Staff had con­cluded that, although there was a need for a large-calibregun to counter the expected usc of armour protection,the new aircraft types should be armed with fast-firing,rifle-calibre weapons. The American Browning (Colt)model ~0/2 recoil-operated gun was chosen followingcomparative trials with other weapons in 193~. Afterbeing modified by .\ lajThompson of the RAF gun sec­tion 10 take 0.303in (7.7mm) cordite ammunition, itproved to be an excellent air weapon, armin g most RAFaircraft by 1939. The belt-fed Browning was not , how­ever, an ideal free-mounted observer's gun, and the newVickers Class K gas-operated weapon was adopted to re­place the then-obsolescent Lewi s, The Air Staff saw theneed for hea vi ly armed 'bomber destroyers' . Several de­signs armed with the ponderous 37mm CoventryOrdnance Works (COW) gun had been mercifully re­jected in the early 1930s, but a specification issued in1935 called for a twin-engine fighter armed with four20mm Oerlikon cannon. Westland Aircraft submitted itsdesign (later named Whirlwind) and received an order to

193

8Armament Diversifies

R Wallace Clarke

Aircraft GunsAfter the carnage of the First \,'orld \\'ar it seemed un­thinkable that another confrontation could occur inEurope. Yet fifteen years after the Armistice had beensigned there were ominous signs that the GermanChancellor was intent on retrieving German land an­nexed by the Treaty of Versailles. By 1935 Gen eralFcldmarshall Milch , under the guise of Director ofDeutsche Lufthan sa, had covertly built up the Germanair force to a state where interna tional protests could beshrugged aside. Intelligence report s reaching France andBritain confirmed their worst fears; it was revealed thatthe prototype bombers being tested at the Luftwaffe re­search centre at Rechlin were all designed for tactical usein offensive warfare. Reports of a similar build-up ofnaval and army forces confirmed the fact thai war withGermany was a distinct possibility.

Consequently, the issue of specifications for newequipment assumed a new urgency.The new aircraft de­signs would need armament systems far in advance ofthe vintage equipment fitted to the obsolescent biplanesthen in service. The major powers realised that the airweapons dating back to the First World War had reachedthe limit of improvement . •\Iore reliable and faster-firingguns were needed which would keep them abreast of any

The Brouming ,Ilk ll O.JOJill-calibre machine-gun «-as thestandard fixed figh ter and turret gun aI the Oil/break ofhos­tilities. It is scm here ill a IeSI rig.

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The A ir ' ll'7/illey FX4A tail turret of 19J8 «-asa «wid leader ill bomber defence (see page 207). !I posed a serious threat toallY attaching fighter, delivering a lethal cone of fire from its four B rozcning grills.

AIR CR AF T O F Til E SE C O~ D W ORI.D \'· A R

194

A R .\l A .\ IE :-: T DIVERSIFIES

3 Free-moun ted ,\lGFF 20mm canno n, mainly used fo r air-to-ground attacks

4 M G 151 /20 20mm cannon, sighted and fi red by the pilot5 ,\IG 13 1 ill 10"<1:er rear defence position, movable mou nting6 Layo ut ofammunition magazine stouagc

7 Reoi 12D rbouom), and Lofte Itop) sights fo rfixed cannonand dire bombing respectirely.

1933 Rheinm etall commissioned a talented des igner,Louis Strange, to des ign a 13mm automatic gu n suitablefor air usc.T his gun, the Rheinm etall-Borsig ,\ Iodel 131,was ado pted by the Luftwaffe as the ,\ IG 131. It was inmass production by 1939, and was widely used onfighters and as a bomber defence weapon . Electri callyfired, it was chambered for a special round fired at750m/sec.

It was generally agreed that the ideal fighte r gu nwou ld be a 20mm shell-firing weap on , and all theEuro pean powers ado pted guns of this calibre for air­cra ft usc. All such guns in usc at the outbreak of warwere descend ed from the Ge rma n Becker cannon of1916.T he Swi ss Oerlikon conce rn produced three auto­matic 20mm gu ns in 1935, all based on the Becker. Oneof these, the Type I~ was adopted by the Luftwaffe in1935 as the ,\ IG FE It was manufactured unde r licenceby Rheinm etall-Borsig, being used as a fixed fighter gu n

A typical Lufttcaffe bomber armament layout 011 theDornier Do 2 17E3.Key:

1 ,\lG15 7.62mm machine -gun fed by 75-rolllld saddle­type magazine

2 ,\IG131 13mm-calibre machine-gun mounted ill 011 EDLturret, pouered in rotation only

19 5

their Allied opponents .Wh en the Armistice was signed inNovember 1918 the re were several new typ es of aircraftguns abo ut to come into service, On e of these was therevolutionary G ast gun, firing 1.600 rounds a minute;ano ther was the STB Szakats 20mm aircraft cannon.T he Dreyse model 19 18 was an advanced rifle-calibregu n which was covertly developed after the war ; it was tohave a great influence on the design of later aircraft andground service guns, the most important being the M G15 and the ,\ IG 17 of 1934 . These weapon s, producedby Rheinm etall-Borsig, were recoil-operated , ritle­calibre guns, the free-m ounted MG 15 being fed by a75-round saddle-type magazin e. The fixed ,\ IG 17 wasbelt fed and was fired electrically by a solenoid . Designedin 1932 , these gu ns were to be fitted to most Luftwaffeaircraft in 1939.

The general tre nd of aviation arma me nt was towa rdslarger-calibre gu ns with more striking power. As early as

RussiaT he armed forces of the USSR and Germa ny were ab leto develop and produce their military equipment withoutthe constant calls for financial cutbacks which plaguedthe defence departments of democracies. In the SovietUnion any pro mising design of military equipment wasgiven Se rvice trials. A number of gun designers were alsogiven facilities to develop a series of aircraft guns whichwere probably the best in the world at that time.The firstto be accepted for use was the ShKAS, des igned by B GShpital'n yi. This was a fast-firing 7.62mm calibre gasoperated gun used in the 1930s an d throughou t the war .The same designer was responsible for the ShVAK20mm cannon, a very adva nced gun which also sawwidespread use in the war.The standard Russian heavy­calibre machin e-gun was the Beresin BS 12.7mm, whichcompared favourably in some respects with the 0.50 cal­ibre Browning and was gas-assis ted recoil operated. Itwas introduced in 1941. Another formidable gun was the23mm Volkov-Yar tsyev (VYa) , which was also broughtinto service in 1941. It fired a 200g (7.070z) shell at aphenomenal 920 m (3,020ft) per second, and was usedwith grea t success aga inst the Ge rma n Panzer units.TheSovi et Air Force also used some Vickers and other for­eign designed aircraft guns, but the foregoing were themain weapons used by the airme n of the uSSR in theinitia l stages of the war.

GermanyThe strength and ingenuity of the German armament in­dustry since the turn of the centu ry has provi d ed itsar med forces with weapons which often seemed onejump ahead of the opposition. In the First World War theaircraft, guns , and synchronising gea r supp lied toGerman aviators often gave them an adva ntage over

FranceThe Arrnee de l'Air introduced two new ritle-ca libreguns for use in the mid-1 930s, the fast-firing Dame gunand the ,\ IAC, both designed and produced in 7.5mmcalibre. The Hispano type 404 20mm gun was thestanda rd cannon fitted to French aircraft. It hadoriginally been designed to be mounted between thecvlindc rs of the Hispano HS 12X aero engine, to firethrou gh the hollow prop eller shaft and consequentlybeing known as the .Ilotellr call1loll . The first fighter soarme d was the low-wing Dewoitine D.5 IO, bu t it waslater fitted to the 0.520, which had a single 404 firingthrou gh the prop eller hub, plus two ,\ lAC machin e-gunsin the wings.

proceed with production. Anoth er spec ificat ion, P9/35,was issued for a single-engine fighter armed with a four­gu n powered tu rret. It was envisaged tha t it would inter­cep t bom ber formations and proceed to deci mate the m.u nfortunately the bombers did not come fromGe rma ny, but ar rived from France with a fighter escort.The un fortunate crews of the Boult on Paul Dcfiantspa id dearly for this mistaken theor y. \X'hen the SwissOe rlikon was rejected for airc raft usc by the RAF gunsection there was an urgent need for a 20mm shell-firinggu n. After receiving reports from the Air Attache in Par isof a new Hispano-Sui za 20mm aircraft cannon, mem­ber s of the Air Staff and ,\ Iaj Thompson visited theworks in Par is to evaluate the weap on . They found tha tthe gun, the Hispano-Suiza 404 , wou ld be an idea l shell­firing gun for service usc, and an agreement was eventu­ally signed for licensed production in the UK. Aftersome early production problem s the Hispano providedthe RAF with a hard-hit ting gun which gave exce llentservice throu ghout the contlict.

AIR CRAFT OF T HE SE CO:-:D \X·OR!.D WAR

Russian air txeapons ill 19-10. Top: the ShKAS machine-gun : Designed by B G Shpitalnyi, this belt-fed 7.62mm-calibre gun",as the fast est firing (l,800rpm ) air tceapon used in the Secolldll'orld ll·ar. Bott om : the Beresin L'B U'QS the standard heavy­calibre machine-gun used by the L'SSR. It compared[atorably icith the CS Brouming 'Point Fifty '.

A I R C R A FT OF TH E SECO >:O \X' OR L O " 'ARA R .\ \ A .\ \ E x T 0 I v E R S I I' I E S

The O.SOill-calibre Brozcning, used illll/osl US aircraft ill the S ecolld ll'vrld ll'ar,Th e gun slun cn is fi ued 0111 fo r turret mount­

ing (top),The clllau'ay dratoing shouis the lIIa ill fea tures of the recoil-operated action.

and as a movable weapon for bom ber defence, It wasoperated by a blow-back action and fed by a 60-ro unddrum,

USAIn 1918 Ge n John Pershing convinced Washington thatthere was a need for a heavy-calibre machine-gunfor ground and air use, Consequently an O,50in(12.7mm)-calibre automatic gun designed by the greatJohn Browning was adopted for service use, beingmanufactured by the Colt firearm s company in sevenversions, The air-cooled model was modified in 1932by a Dr S G Gree n, and became the famou s model,v\2 'Fifty Caliber' which, with minor modifications,arme d most US aircraft throug hout the Second \'.;'orld\Var. Although, as \\;11 be seen later, other weaponswere used by the USAAF, the policy of standardisingthe M 2 Browning resulted in long production runs ofthe gun and ammunition. The rounds, based on aGe rman anti- tank bullet of 1917, were fired at avelocity of 2,750ft (836m) per second, giving aneffective range of 1,100 yards (1,005m). The model40/2 0.30in (7.62mm) Browning gun had beendropped as an air weapon by 1941, its only usebeing as a nose gun on some early versions ofbombers.

It alyIn the mid-1930s SAFAT, the arm s division of Fiat, de­veloped a series of machine -guns for the Italian army.After trials the .\ \inistry for Air ordered thr ee versionsfor aviation use, to be made by the Breda concern,Designated the Breda -SAFAT 1935, they were pro ­du ced in three bores, 7.7mm (0.303in), 7,92mm and12.7 (O,50in) . These were the standard gun s in use bythe Regia Aeronautica when war was declared on theAllies.

H ostiliti es commenceWhen UK Prime Minister Chamberlain declared war inSept ember 1939 the theories and planning of the previ­ous years were put to the test , In the first month of thewar a force of Handley Page Hampden bom bers attack­ing German destroyers off Heligoland were interceptedbv Mcsscrschmin Bf 109s and lost half their number.Thc Ha mpden 's defensive gun s were all hand -aimedVickers on rudimentar y mountings, and proved to be to­tally inadequate.T he Luftwaffe nailed the operation as avictor y, On 18 December a force of twenty-fourWcllingtons was sent on an arm ed reconnaissance to\Vilhelmsha\'cn, This sortie revealed armament short­comings on both sides, Prewarn ed by radar, Germanfighter s were waiting, and attacked the formation from

196 (

the beams, where the \Vellingtons' multi-gun turrets wereleast effective. Ten were shot down, and one.\ \esserschmin dived into the harbour. Although thiswas, from the German viewpoint, a successful operation.reports showed that the ,\ IG FF 20mm cannon in theBf 109 was less effective than hoped, Ammunition wassoon exhausted , and the shells detonated immediately oncontact with the airframes of the Wellingtons,

T he RAF Air Staff had hoped that the combined firefrom powered gun turrets would fend off anackingfighters, but after the attr ition of the Wilhelmshaven op­eration it was reluctantly decided that such losses couldnor be sustained, and the coming strategic bombingcampaign against Germany would have to be carried outunder the cover of darkness. T his decision was to pro vedisastrous for the civilian pop ulation of Germany,Another painful lesson was also to be learned by theBritish, It had been presumed that German bombing at­tacks would come from distant airfields, and fighter tac­tics con sisted of squadron anacks in tight formationsagainst slow groups of bombers. After Fra nce was over­run the short distance from French airfields enabledLuftwaffe bombers to come with 'little friend s' who pro­ceeded to bounce the tightly grouped formations fromabove. The RAF soon adopted the loose line-abreast' finger four' tactics of the German fighter gro ups, inspite of resistance from the ' textboo k' fraternity.

The decision to arm RAF fighters with eight rifle­calibre guns was more successful than the 'cannon lobby'had forecast; it had been feared that the longer-range20mm gun s of German fighters would give them an ad­vantage. It was soon realised, however, that very fewpilots could hit anything at a range of more than200-300 yards , and while the pilot of a Bf 109E couldfire only thirty -five 20mm and seventy- three 7.92mmrounds in a two-second bur st, British pilots got off 320bullets from their Browning gun s, This partly made upfor the generally low standard of mark sman ship,

The Air Staff had realised that their decision to rushthe French 20mm Hispano imo production was going tobe vitally important in view of report s that new andfaster firing heavy guns were soon to be installed inGerman fighter aircraft. Tactics and equipment devel­oped by the Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War gave theirpilots an initial advantage over the British, but the hecticair battles over southern England and France gave RAFFighter Command valuable experience, and the scenewas set for the fight for air superiority, which neither sidewas to achieve comp letely unti l the closing month s of thewar, when fuel and pilot shortage seriously affectedLuftwaffe operations.

The introduction of the Hispan o gave the RAF amuch harder hitting fighter gun , but surprisingly testsproved that ball (solid steel) shells were more destructivethan high-explosive (HE) projectiles, though the most

197

effective rounds were semi-armour-piercing incendi ar yand composite explosive/incendiary types, From 1942these were the standard 20mm shells used by the RAETwo other shell-firing guns used by specialist squadronswere the VickersType 'S ' 40mm, used mainly by gro und­attac k Hawker Hurricane li Ds, and the M olins 57mmgun used to great effect by the de Havilland ,\ IosquitoXVllI s of Coastal Command . The American ,\ 12Brownin g was the only large-calibre machin e-gun usedby the RAF and FAA, although Rolls-Royce submittedtwo alternative designs, but the availability of theAmerican gun saved tooling-up for the British weapons.The M 2 was of cou rse fined to US aircraft used byBritain, and tail turrets fined to Bomber Co mmand air­craft in the later war years also carried them, Four newfactories were built to produce the Hispano, and pro­duction at Vickers and BSA was at full stre tch through­out the war; consequently there was no thought ofprodu cing new types of aircraft gun , Spe ed of produc­tion , reliability and commonality of ammunition wasthought to be more important tha n any possible increasein firepower.

Germ any, on the other hand, had greater arms pro­ducing capacity, and constantly upgraded its airweapons, her indu str y produ cing an unbelievable num­ber of new and often revolutionary aircraft guns, Thefirst new wartim e gun was the ,\lG 8 1, developed bythe ,\ \auser company. Based on the 1\ \G 34 infantryweapon , it was adopted in 1940 as a fast firing fighterand bomber defence gun. Probably the most importantnew weapon was the I\ \auser ,\ \G 151/20 20mm can­non, developed from the earlier 15mm .\lG 151.Introdu ced in 1940, it featured electr ical firing, andwas used in large numbers on fighter and bom ber air­cra ft. Mauser made 29,500 examples, and both Britainand America considered producing it for their own usc,

The first 30mm gun used by the Luftwaffe was theI\ \K 10l. which was prim arily used on the Eastern Frontas a gro und-anack weapon but was the first of a num berof heavy-calibre guns to be used against Allied airattacks,The ,\ \K 10 1 was followed by the MK 103, an­other 30mm gun made at the same Solithurn plant ofRheinrnetall.This was used against the early US 8th AirForce formations with some effect, the big 30mm shellscausing ma jor damage. Rhcinmetall then produced ashort-ba rrelled 30mm gun. the MK 108, which used asimple blowback, action and, being made mainly of steelpressings. was cheap to manu facture. It was designedspecifically as an anti-bombe r weapon, with a fairly lowmuzzle velocity and firing high-c apacity HE shells,German nightfighters using the gun accounted for manyRAF night bombe rs. It was also used against Americanday bombers, but its heavy weight affected fighter per­formance against US escort fighters. Rheinrnetall alsoprodu ced a novel anti-bomber weapon , the SG 117.

A I RC R AFT OF T ilE SECO~D \~· OR I. D \X".~ R A R ,\\ A .\\ E x 'I' D I v E R S I FIE S

198

The Japanese Army M odel H O-5. This U'QS a scaled-lip B rouming O.50in -calibre glln, the parts shozrn here being identical tothe American uieapon , Ironically , Colt B rouming tried 10 do the same thing scithoin success.

USS RAfter the German advance into Russia the tide was grad­ually turned , and Soviet forces' equipment was updatedand imp roved, After initial defeats, new type s of aircraftand guns were introduced which enabled Russian air­men to fight on equal terms. In 1942 the Nudel 'rn an­Su ran ov NS-37 anti-tank aircraft gun was issued to theStorrnovik elose-support unit s. This was a 37mm recoilopera ted gun firing projectiles which could penetrate40mm armo ur from an angle of 40°. In 1944 it was re­designed to fire 45m m rounds which could pierce 58m marmour. Another anti -armour air weap on was the OKB­16, which fired 57mm AI' shells at a velocity of 980m(2,789ft) per second. The Beresin VB 12.7mm heavvmachine-gun was improved in 1944, and in the sameyear the B-20 20mm cannon was issued . The lattergradually replac ed the tru sty ShVAK weapon , beingused in fighter s and in the multi-gun turrets of theTupolev Tu-4 heavy bomber. In the last year of the warthe Nudel' rnan-Suranov [cam produced a 23m m versionof their 37mm gun ; this was the progenitor of a series ofguns designed by A Rikhter which have remained in ser­vice until the pre sent day.

ItalyThe Regia Aeronautics fought with the same weap onsas were in service in 1939 with the exception of theMauser .\ IG 151/20, which was supplied by theirGerman partners.

and both Services ado pted weap ons of different typesand calibres.•Most of the machin e-gun s were copies of\X'estern designs, and the heavy-ca libre guns were most­ly based on the 0.50 .\ 12 V S Brownin g gun. This was be­cause a large number of Brown ings captured in theinvasion of the Ph ilippin es were found to be superior totheir own designs.

The army used the Type 98. which was a German.\ IG 15 copy. the Type 89 .\ Iodel 2. based on theVickers .\ Ik II 0.303in. and the Ho I03. a copy of the.\ 12 Browning. The Type 97 20mm gas operated can­non was used as both an observer's and fixed gun, theType 1 H05 was a Browning scaled up to 20mm, andthe Ho 105 was a 30mm cannon . Also used was theType 98 . based on the 1916 model 37mm Hotchkiss.T he Navy also used the Vicker s, but called it the Type97, the Type I was their vers ion of the German .\ IG 15.The Type 2 was an observer's gun copied from the .\ IG131. T he Navy did standardise its 20mm weapon; thiswas the Type 99 .\ Iks I and 2. based on the OerlikonFF&FFL. T he same gun was also scaled up to 30mmand was known as the Type 5. T here were otherwea po ns used. but the only j apan ese design was theH030 I. a 40mm gun which fired shells with an in-builtrocket propellent, discharged through 12 holes in thebase. It had a very low velocity and was only a short ­range weapon . In 1944400 German ,\ IG I51 /20s weretaken to japan by U'-bo at, some being fitted toKawasaki Ki-6 1 fighters.

.\ Ia in Aircraft Guns Used by the .\ Ia jor Powers in the Second World War

Wea po n Bore Weight Amm Feed Action .\IIV Rounds(m m) (kg) (.\ lts/S) per min

Gr eat BritainLewis xIk III 7.7 8.3 97rd drum Ga s operated 744 600-1 ,000Vickers .\ Ik III 7.7 10.9 Disll belt Short recoil 744 850-900Vickers K (VGO) 7.7 9.3 97rd drum Gas operated 744 950-1,000Browning .\ Ik II 7.7 9.9 Di s/l belt Short recoil 744 1,150Hispano .\ Iks II & V 20 49/38 Drum/belt Delayed blowback 878/8 20 650/850Vicke rs Class S 40 134 15rd drum Long recoil 615 125xlolins 6 Pdr 57 8 16 23rd mag Recoil 79 1 60Browning 0.50in 12.7 29 Disll belt Short recoil 838 750-950

Am ericaColt Browni ng ,\ 12 12 29 Disll belt Sho rt recoil 838 750-950AN/.\ 12 Hispano 20 49 Dr um/belt Delayed blowbac k 878 650.\ 14 Field gun 75 408 21rd mag Recoil 580 .\ Ianually loadedCo lt Browning .\ 14 37 112 30rd drum Short recoil 580 150

Ger many.\ IG 15 7.9 2 7.1 75rd mag Short recoil 800 1,100

19 9

American developments\X'hen the VSAAF bega n operations in the Far East andEurope the main aircraft gun was the Browning 0.50incalibre machine-gun. It p roved to be a hard hitting.trouble-free weapon , being used on both bomber andfighter aircraft. and as mentioned earlier. the usc of onestandard gun simplified production and maintenance.As the war progressed. however, other weapons wereadopted for relatively minor roles. The first was anAmerican-made vers ion of the 20mm Hispano, desig­nated the Gun Aut omatic, 20mm AN-.\ 12 (Aircraft)..\ Iade by the Intern ational Har vester Co and Olds­mobile, it was used on the Lockheed 1'-38 Lightning,later VS N avy Vought Cors airs, and in the tail positionof the Boeing B-29. The Bell 1'-39 Airacobra had aBrowning (Co lt) 37mm .\ 19 auto matic gun firingthrough the airscrew boss. This weapon was alsospecified for a number of exp erim ental fighter s. but itsslow rate of fire was not really suitable for aircraft usc.A gun with an even slower rate of fire was the massive,\ 14 75mm field gun, which fired huge 151b (6.7kg)shells. T his was installed in the Nor th American B-25Gand H .\ Iitchell medium bomber for ground-attack op­erations, being mounted in a cradle under the pilot'sscat and loaded by a 'cannoneer' from a 2 I -round box.Together with the B-25G. 1,000 H models were built,and used in North Africa and the Far East. The weaponwas not a resounding success. and was generally dis­continued in favour of a multiple battery of ' Point Fifty'Brownings.

japanIf America and Britain fitted very few different type s ofguns and ammunition in the intere st of production andcommonality of aircraft weapons, the japanese did theopposi te.The Arm y used different weapons to the Navy,

consisti ng of seve n short .\ IK 108 barrels weldedtogether and mounted vertically in the fuselage of Focke­Wulf Fw 190 fighters. It was intend ed to be ripp le-firedwhen a photo -cell operated as the aircraft flew beneath abomber.

By the time the SG 117 was brought into service in1945, howe ver , few fighters were penetrating the fighterscreens. This weapon was one of many unique ideas totry to stem the Allied bomber offens ive. Another was tousc longer- range gun s to enable fighter s to stand off theformations and pump shells into the American bombe rs.One of these was the FLAK 18 37mm anti-a ircraft (AA)gun, which was car ried by a number of types. As will beseen later, rockets were also used, and an atte mpt wasmade to bomb the Amer icans from above.

The most significant aircraft gun to be produced dur­ing the Second World War was the .\ IG 213C, built bythe Mauser concern of Oberndorf. This was a gas-oper­ated weapon in which the rounds were fed into arevolver-type housing in stages .This syste m enabled it tofire at a very high speed without overheating or excessivewear. The first model, tested at Oberndorf in 1943, wasbored for 20mm rounds, but the final model was the30mm .\ IG 2 13. Although development was given highpriority, none of the new guns saw service. However ,after the war it was ad opted (under many differentnam es) by every major air force . Variants rem ain in ser­vice to this day, one of the latest being the 27mm gunarmi ng the Panavia Tornado; made in the Oberndorf fac­tory where the design originated. Because the Luftwaffeused many guns, as one type superseded anothe r the ar­mourers on the airfields had to cope with a bewilder ingarray of manuals and ammunition types . This often ledto confusi on, but it has to be said that the German armsindustry pr ovided its airmen with the most inno vativeweapons of the war.

AIR CR AF T O F TilE SE CO:-:D \\'ORLD \\'A R

.\ IG Ii i .92 12.2 D is/1 belt Short recoil 800 1,100

.\ IG FF 20 28 60rd mag Blowback 585 520

.\ IG 81 i.92 6.3 Dis/1 belt hort recoil 800 1.300

.\ IG 131 13 16.8 Dis/1 belt Short recoi l 710-750 850-960

.\ IG 151/20 20 180 D is/1 belt Short recoil 710-800 700

.\ 11' 101 30 180 30rd mag G as operate d 960 250

.\ 11' 103 30 141 Bclt Ga s operated 790-960 420

.\ 11' 108 30 60 Dis/1 belt Blowback 505 600

13K37 3i 295 6rd mag Recoil 820-914 160

13K 5 50 530 22rd belt Rccoil 835- 930 50

.\ IG 151 15 42 D is/1 belt Short recoil 850-960 700

USSRShKAS 7.62 10 Bclt G as operated 825 1,800

Bcrcsin UBS 12.i 21.5 Bclt Gas operated 85 5 1,000

VYa 23 68 Bclt G as operated 920 600

Sh VAK 20 40 Bclt Gas operated i90 800

NS-3i 37 146 Belt Recoil 900 250

B-20 20 25 Bclt G as opera ted 800 800

Francc.\ IAC 7.5 9.2 Bclt Recoil 8 10 1,000

Darnc 7.5 9.2 Bclt G as opera ted 820 1,700

Hispano-Suiza 404 20 49 Drum/belt Delayed blowback 878 65 0

JapanArmy Type 98 7.92 7. 1 75rd mag Short recoil 800 1,100

Type 89 mod 2 7.i II Bclt Short recoil 744 850-900

Type Ho- I03 12.7 22 Bclt Short recoil i80 750-950

Typc 9i(Ho- l /Ho-3) 20 32/43 15/50rd mag G as opcratcd 840 400

'IYpc I (Ho-5) 20 32.5 Bclt Short recoil 750 85 0/96 0

'IYpc Ho- 105 30 44 Bclt Short rccoil 716 450

Typc Ho-301 40 132 .\ Iag . Rockct propcllcnt 232 450

T ypc 89 mod I 7.7 9.0 69rd drum Ga s opcratcd 744 750

.\ IG 151/20 20 42 Belt Short rccoil 710-800 800

Ho-2 03 37 89 25rd mag Rccoil 576 120

Navy Typc 92 7.i 8.4 47-94 drum Ga s opcratcd 744 600

Typc 97 i .7 10.9 Belt Short rccoil 723 850

Typc I i .92 i. 1 75rd mag Short rccoil 800 1,100

Ty pc 2 13 17 Belt Short rccoil 720 900

Typc 3 13.2 30 Belt Gas opcra ted i90 800

Typc 99/1&2 20 23-37 .\ Iag/bc lt Blowback 600-760 490-750

T ypc 5 30 70 42rd mag Dclaycd blowback 750 400

It al yBrcd a SAFAT i .7 12.5 Belt Short rccoil 730 800

Brcda SAFAT 12.7 28 Bclt Short rccoil 723 800

MG 151/20 (G crman) 20 180 Bclt Short rccoil 710-800 700

200

Air cr aft Gunsigh t ingIt is difficult enough to hit a ru nning rabbit with a shot ­gun, but the airbo rne marksm an faces a situation inwhich both he and his quarry arc cavorting arou nd thesky at high spee ds , Air firing is by far the most difficultform of shoo ting. There arc three main problems. Thefirst is judging the angle of deflection ; the guns mu st beaimed at a point in space where the bullets and target willmeet. The second is range estima tion; without any fixedreference it is difficult to assess distance, and many pilotswasted valuable ammunition by firing when out of range;gravity influences projectiles eno ugh to affect accuracywhen firing at targets at ran ges of 200 yards (180m) ormore. Thirdly, air gunners also had to allow for the im­PClUS imparte d to the bu llets by the speed of their air­craft, and pilots had to ensure an accurate linearapproach when firing.Tracer ammunition helped assess­mcnt of these allowan ces, but was notor iously mislead­ing.

Top-scoring pilots and air gunners were usually nat­ura l marksm en with an instinct for the various al­lowances, but it was generally agreed by both sides thatfiring was usually very inaccurate. Indeed, an officialLuftwa ffe report stated that only three rounds of every1,000 fired hit the target. Ever y air force establishedgunn ery training schoo ls to teach the finer points ofmarksmanship, but in the heart-thumping heat of battlethe ru les of correc t allowan ces were often ignored .

By 1939 all the ma jor air forces had adopted thereflector sight for fighter usc. This gave the firer an ilIu­mina tcd aiming mark , or rcticlc, pro jcctcd on to a glassscrccn in thc pilot's line of sight. It usually consistcd of acirclc bisect cd with ycrt ical and horizontal lincs. T hcrcflcctor sight was im'cnted by Sir Howard Grubb in1900, but was not uscd for aircraft gunncry until 1918,whcn somc Albatros D.Va aircraft wcrc fillCd with a sightproduccd by Optische Antal Oige c of Bcrlin. Vickcrssubmillcd a design to the British War Officc in 1915, bu t

The principle of the reflector sigh,

201

A R.\ \ A.\ \E :-: T DI\' ER SIFI ES

it was not accepted for Service usc . Thc circular reticlewas designed to give a rough estimation of range anddeflection anglc . Gunnery schools stressed the irnpor­tance of learning how to compare the target with the cir­c1c for various ranges, and a rough deflection allowancecould be given by placing the target on the edge of thering , flying toward s the centre . G unners in poweredturrets also used reflector sights, bUI in general the free­mounted guns of bombers at th is time used ring-and­bea d sights. As will bc seen, the major breakthrough inair-to-a ir gunne ry carne when the gyro sigh t was intro­duccd .T his presented the firer with an aiming mark (ret­iclc) in which all the vario us allowances had beenauto matically computed . The developmen t of gu nsight­ing by the major powers throu ghou t the 1939-15conflict can now be followed.

Great Br it a inThe first reflector sight submitted for trials by the RAFwas produced by Barr & Stroud of Gl asgow in 1926.This company was renowned for its single-o peratorrangcfindcrs and peri scopes for military usc, and in theearly 1920s dec ided to deve lop reflec tor sights for theServices. They produced several designs in the follow­ing years , bu t it was not until the RAF expansionschemes of the late 1930s that the Air Staff issued con­tracts for series production of reflector sights forsquadro n aircraft. By 1939 two types were in usc, theBarr & Stroud type G.\12 (RAF ,\ Ik II pilot 's sight) anda compact turret sight, the Barr & Stroud typcGJ3(RAF .\ Ik III) . Thc .\ Ik II was fillCd with a uniqucrangc finding dc\·icc. Thc horizontal bar of thc rct iclcwas brokcn in thc ccntrc, thc gap bcing adjusta blc bytwo knurl cd rings. A pointcr on thc top ring was sct torangc rcquircd in yard s, thc bOllom ring 's pointcr bcingsct to wingspan of thc targct aircraft. Whcn thc largctwas thc samc sizc as thc gap, it was at thc rangcindic atcd .

A crisis arosc in 1938, whcn Barr & Stroud had to

ad\'isc thc Air .\ linistr y that it cou ld not pro ducc thc ,\ IkII in sufficicnt quantity for thc ncw Sp itfircs and Hurri­cancs, and to O\'crcomc thc shortagc a contract wassigncd with Gocrz of Vicnna for 700 sights madc to Barr& Stroud drawings. In spitc of thc An chluss pact withGc rma ny, these sights wcrc del iycrcd, bcing prod uccd inparallcl with RC\'i sights for thc Luftwaffc' Soon aftc r thclast dcliycr y war was dcclarcd , and thcy wcrc uscd inFightcr Command aircraft.

Thc Mk III lUrrct sight was uscd in \'irtually C\wyBritish turrct until thc ad\'cnt of thc gyro sight in 1944.It was a compact sight with a built-in rhcostat fordimming, and a hood oYcr thc rcflcctor glass to minimiscscarchlight dazzlc. A dimming scrccn could bc raiscd torcdu cc sun and cloud glarc, and thc circular ora ngc rct­iclc could bc uscd for rangcfinding and dcflcction for a

A IRe R AFT 0 F T HE SE C 0:-; J) \X'0 R I. J) \X' A R A R ,\ t A ,\ t E:-; T J) I v E R S I FIE S

In the first years of the war Germ an bombers weredefend ed mainly by free-mounted 1\ IG 15 and 1\ IG 18son ball mountings fined into cabin windows, and thesewere aimed by ring-and -bead sights, Rear defence posi­tions were fitted with the 'VE' ring-and-bead systemmounted on a sight bar which was compensated fordeflection , .\ Iany cock-a-h oop fighter pilots closing infor the killwere lost to gunners using this sight. Designedprimarily for tactical blitzkrieg operations, Luftwaffebombers were fitted with forward-firing armament, theseweapons being aimed by Revi 120 reflector sights, SomeOorn ier Do 217 bombers had four MG 8 1s in theextreme tail which were sighted and fired by thepilot using an RF2A peri scopic sight mounted in thecabin roof.

Identifying a distant aircraft as friend or foe was oftendifficult, and Ge rma ny was alone in producing areflector sight wi th a built-in telescope , There were twomodels, the Zielfernrohres ZFR3 and ZFR4A, withmagnifications of 2,5X and 3,8X respectively, The up­ward-firing guns of nightfighter s were aimed with Revi16 sights aligned to 20· from vertical with the two l\ IGFF cannon , Although other specialised sights were used,these were the main types used by the Luftwaffe ,

America\'\Then America entered the war, US aircraft were fittedwith a wide variety of gunsights, The N3A reflectorsight was used on the early turrets of B-24s and B-17s,but the main tur ret sight was the N6 and 6A, Sperryball turrets used K4 computing sights which compen­sated for deflection and range, Another turret sight wasthe N8 series of retiflector sights in which the reticle wasprojected upwards to a mirror under the hood , whichreflected it down on to the gunner's sight screen, USfighters also used a number of different reflector sights,Lockheed P-38s were fitted with the N3A (early) andL3 (late), and Republic P-47 Thunderbolts used the:-.l3A, and an American-made version of the British .\ IkII without the ranging facility, designated the US .\ Ik 8.The P-51 .\ Iustang used the N3B sight initially, butlater marks had the type N9 with a standby ring andbead . Many .\ Iustang pilots also used the British .\ Ik IIpilot's sight. When the British gyro sight was adopted asstandard it was fitted to most US fighters, The SperryK9 computing sight gave the gunners in .\ Iartin turret sa point of impact allowing for deflection , using the rate­by-time system, measurin g angular velocities of the tar­get with respect to own aircraft motion, They wereaccurate if level flight was maintained, but any move­ment caused errors, The side-hatch guns of B-17s andB-24s were mostly sighted by B13 ring-and-bead sights,but these hand -operated guns were renowned forinaccurate shooting, and from November 1944 manyGroups installed K13 computing sights which worked

German turrets used the Reui 16B gunsight, t'ery similar tothe Br itish ,Ilk lilA , Th e 16B U'OS also used for someLuftwaffe fixed-iccapon installations.

The Ret'; CI12D U'OS the standa rd Lu fucaffe fixed gunsight.It U'OS fitted zcith a built-ill rheostat and standby ring-and­bead sight , There u'ere carious subtypes; Olle, the C112F,hada radar input angled mirror behind the reflector screen, TheRAF ,Ilk II sight (opposite) is included ill the backgroundfor scale,

The Barr & Stro ud GJ3 (RAP M k III Series) wrretsights, The .Ilk lllA.: (left) u'as fi tted to all RAJ' turretsuntil the advent of the gyro sight, 771e reflector screen ,,'ascovered by all anti-dazzle hood; a smoked-glass screen couldbe raised at the rea r,and the reticle brilliance was adjustableby the side knob. The .IIK III S (right) ,cas used by Coasta lCommand and 011 daylight operations for quick alignment .

Germ anyAfter the First \'\'orld \,\'ar Ge rmany was forbidden toprodu ce military equipment bu t, as with air weapons,gunsights were developed in secret. The Carl Ziess com­pany of lena produced the Rexexvifier Revi series ofreflector sights for the Luftwaffe, early models beingused in aircraft of the Co ndor Legion in the SpanishCivilWar.The main pilots' sights were the Rcvi 12D and12E the F with a suitably revised aiming reticle alsobeing used for rocket sighting, After injuries to pilots inhard land ings, the brightn ess control knob was movedfrom the front of the sight bod y to the right side, a thickrubber pad being fixed to the front , The Escania andLeitz comp anies were also engaged in sight producti on,and many specialised sights were made in addi tion toRed models by these concerns, However, the main pro­ducer was Zicss,

This company also produced the Rcvi 16 series,which were similar to the British Mk III turret sightsin size and operation, Germ an reflector sights were fittedwith standby blade sights in case of electrical failure,

target crossing at a relative speed of 50mph, The free­mounted Vickers gas operated gun s used in side-hatchand cabin window positions were sighted mainly with2in (50mm) ring-and-bead sights, larger rings beingused by naval airmen , Under-defence turrets usedoptical per iscop ic sights, but gunners using these hadgreat troub le acquiring an attacking fighter. As will beseen later , more-sophisticated sighting systems were de­velopcd later in the war.

\.)JJ)

3 " , •, I , \ItAJIGI IIOOT.IJlDS

/ ';'({(

The Barr & Stroud GM2 pilot's sight (RAP pilot's sightMkl/) , 771e origina l model had a circular reflector screen andStill screen, This model, the ,Ilk III~ was fi tted zcith a teet­angular reflector schich could be adju sted to suit the trajecto­ry of rocket projectiles by mealls of the knob marked illdegrees,The ranging procedure is shoum ill the diagram, tcith(bottom) the appearance of the target ill the reticle,

202 203

AIR CRAFT OF T HE SE CO:-;D \" O R !. D " ' AR

A Typical US compensating sight, the Sperry K 13 was filled10 L'S Bth Air Force uaist guns from Nocember 1944, Thegil/mer set airspeed and height and u'as presented txith apoin t ofaim allouing fo r buller drop and the effect ofhis air ­craft's fo ncard mocement 011 the trajectory of the bullets.

A Russia n ASP gunsight fiued 10 a Polikarpou 1-153 fighte rill 1943, USS R ai rcraft sights were similar to the Rev i series,and u'ere usua lly equipped zcith ring-and-bead standbysights.

204

on the same principle as the K9, T he British ,\ Ik III wasalso used by some grou ps in this position .

RussiaFighter aircraft of the USSR used ASP series reflectorsights, which were similar in some respects to theGerman Revi, They were fitted with blade standbysights , and the earliest known use was on Polikarp ov I-I Sfighters used in the Spanish Civil War. They were up­rated in 1940 and remained in use, with various modifi­cations, throughout the war, Free-mounted bomberdefence guns used large ring-and-bead sights, During1944 late-version Petlyakov T B-7 bombers were armedwith multigun turrets sighted by ASP reflector sights.

FranceThe French air arm was ill-equipped when war was de­clared. Political decisions had held back production ofpromising aircraft types, but the few that were availablegave a good account of them selves, The only fighteravailable in any numbers was the ,\ lorane SaulnierMSA06, which was outclassed by German opponents .T he reflector sight used by French interceptors was theBailie Larnare, bomber aircraft being fitted with ring­and-bead sights,

JapanThe Imperial Japan ese Air Force import ed someGerman Revi fighter gunsights in 1938, and used somefeatures from these in the Japanese Type 98 pilot 's sight.This was adopted as standard, and incorporated a built­in dimming rheostat, sun screen and standby ring- and ­bead unit. Bomber defence guns and some naval fightersused ring-and-bead sights of various dimensions,

All pilot's reflector sights were a hazard in a crash orheavy land ing, being mounted in a position where thepilot's head was thrown forward, ,\ Iost were fitted withrubber pads to lessen facial injury, bu t man y pilotssuffered from cuts and brui ses known in some squad­rons as 'sight face' ,

The G}TO SightThe invention of the gyro sight solved most of the prob­lems of air gunnery; it was found to improve the averagefighter pilot's accuracy by 50 per cent, and air gunnersbecame magically accurate. Most of the maier powersfunded development contracts for a gunsight whichwould auto matically compute the various deflection al­lowances needed for air-to-air gunnery, The first compa­nies to produ ce such sights were Sperry and Fairchild inthe USA, But although these gunsights certainly predict­ed deflection and were programmed for altitude , theywere very bulky and were not always accurate when theaircraft was not flying straight and level.They were usedquite effectively in US turrets, but were not suitable

The .11k II C gyro sight . Designed ar Farnborouglt and pro­duced by Ferranti fro m 1944, the gyro sight gave thepilotlgunner a point of aim allozcing for rallge, buller drop,and, most importantly, deflection. This sight transformedaerial gunnery 10 the pointtchere, ollce the ring-of-diamondsreticle reas 011 the target, the larger would be hit. Theprinciple reas adopted by most of the uorld's air forces,

either in size or specificatio n for fighter usc, As will beseen later, Germany produced such a gunsigh t, but fartoo late for it to have any significant effect. It was theBritish who finally solved the pro blem with a relativelysimple system based on the properties of the gyrosco pe,In 1938 an exercise was carried out by the RAF to assessthe standa rd of gunnery of fighter squadro ns equippedwith Spitfires and Hurricanes, using camera guns , It wasproved that deflection shooting was so bad that if thecombats had been in earnes t the enemy would have es­caped almost unscathed. At a symposium at the RoyalAircraft Estab lishment (RAE) at Farnbo roug h, atten dedby the Air Staff and leading scientists, it was decided toproceed wi th an urgent programme to produ ce a predic­tor gunsight based on a theor y propound ed by Wg CdrL J Wackett and Capt (later Professor Sir) M elvill e JonesRFC in 1917. It was based on the fact that a gyrosco pewill resist any rotation of its axis, Such a sight would pre­sent the marksman with an aiming mark held back by thegyro. This prin ciple is also used on rate-of-turninstruments, and the Ferranti company was asked to par­ticipate in the project, codenamed the Type 6 Mech­anism, A team was form ed at the RAE, and by October1939 two types of experimental sights had been com­pleted, one for fighters the other for use in turrets ,Although both types predicted the corre ct lead angle,they were found to be unsuitable for squadro n use. A

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modified sight was then produced in which a revolvingmirror was influenced by the gyro mechanism, Thisturned out to be an unqualified success, Ferranti settingup a factory in Edinburgh and beginning series produc­tion in November 1943,

Looking into his reflector screen, the marksman sawa ring of six diamonds , He adjusted the ring to fit the tar­get, set the type of enemy aircraft on a dial, lined up thetarget, and opened fire. A delegation from the USAAFwere so impressed with the new mechanism that it wasordered into produ ction in America immediately. TheBritish designations were the Mk lIC GGS (turret) andMk lID (fighter) , the US versions being Mk 18 (Navy),and ,\ Ik K14 (USAAF), Early scepticism vanished oncepilots and gunners gained experience, and results borewitness to the system's effectiveness. The basic mecha­nism devised at Farnborough was to be used by most airforces for the following three decades.

In Germ any the Eskania company produ ced theEskania EZ42 Eagle gyro sight, in which two gyros con­trolled servo motors which moved a mirror to give therequir ed lead angle, This project was considered to betop priority by the Lu ftwaffe, but it was not ready forsquadron use until 1945, and very few saw service withfighter units,

Radar sightingOn ce airborne radar had been developed for night­fighters, a team was set up in the UK und er Dr P I Deeto develop a device with which gunners could locate andfire at an incoming fighter before seeing it. T he designleader was Dr Alan Hodgkin and the project wascodenamed 'Village Inn'. At this time (1943) Ge rmannightfighters were beginning to take a significant toll ofRAF bombers, and tail defence tur rets equi pped withsuch a device would be much more effective. Given theofficial title of Airborne Gunlaying Turret (AG IT) thesystem consisted of a small rotating radar scannermount ed und er the turret from which radio signals weretransmitted and where the echoes were received fromany aircraft approac hing from the rear. Black boxes re­mote from the turret then processed the signals andtra nsferred the resulting 'blip' to the gunner's gyro sightscreen by way of a small cathode ray tube at the side ofthe sight, and a prism.To overcome the serious problemof friendly aircraft being detect ed and fired at, a systemwas devised in which infrared lamp s would be installedin the nose of bomber aircraft which would project 'codeof the day' signals, Infrared detec tor s mounted at theside of the gunner's sight would identi fy these tran smis­sions,Testing was carried out at the TelecommunicationResearch establishment at Defford , and in 1944 No 101Squ adron became the first to have Lancaster turrets withAG LT installed , T hree more uni ts were equipped, andsome success was reported , but trouble with the scanner

AIR CRAFT O F T i l E S E C OSD \X' ORI.D " 'AR

,.- "=::::-- - - - - - -.:..-J

77" top sighting station and upper turret of the Boeing B 29R C T defence sys tem . Designed by the General ElectricCompany; this ",as the most advanced bomber defence systemof the Second Il'brld I\'"r, Signals from the gunner's sightsxure processed ill a computer uhich automatically alignedthe turret guns 011 the target,

dr ive, and modification of the system, delayed further in­stallations and the project lost its priority status.Meanwhile the war was drawing to a close, and furtherconversion of turrets ceased.

Rem ot ely sighted turretsIn May the British Air ,\ Iinistry placed an order for com­prehensive remotely controlled turret systems forBombe r Co mmand aircraft. The main contractors wereBoulton Paul, British Thompson Houston and Vickers,Vickers-Arrnstrongs worked on a system in which can­non armed ba rbertes in the rear of engine nacelles werecontrolled by means of their ,\ Ietadyne all-electric sys­tem.T he gunner was to be seated in a tail sighting cabin,with an unimpeded' field of view, Trials of the systemrevealed that distor tions set up in the wing structuresseriously affected gun alignment. An additional require­ment for AG IT delayed the project further. and al­though it was showing great promise it was eventuallycancelled with the end of hostilities, Boulton Paul and13TH were also near ing completion of the parallel projectwhen the war ended. This comprised mid-upper andventral turr ets armed with twin Hispano cannon, sightedand controlled by a gunne r in a remote tail position .Boulton Paul completed the two turr ets, and the BTHcontrol system, using an electric Arnplidyne layout

206

linked with computers which calculated the deflectionand angular difference s of the barbettes and sight, wasremarkably effective in preliminary trials. However, fur­ther development ceased when the war in Europe cameto an end.

The General Electric Rem ote Control Turretsystem (RCT)The Boeing 13-29 was the ultimate bomber of theSecond \'('orld War, and its defence system was also themost advanced to sec service during this period, As men­tioned in the turret section , this system cons isted of low­drag turrets armed with 0.50 calibre Brownings whichwere remotely controlled by gun ners from sighting sta­tions, the tail turre t being manually controlled, Eachgunner had a fire controller incor porating a reflector­type sight. As he aligned the sight on to a target. a cen­tral fire control computer ana lysed the signals and sentelectrical impulses to the turret concerned ,These signalswere amplified and fed into an Arnplidync generator,which energised the turret drive motors to the requiredaiming point directed by the gunner. If the target movedout of his line of sight, the gunner could pass the targeton to another gunner. Looking into his screen, the gun­ner saw a circle of red dots, and adjusted these to fit thesize of the target. He then tracked the target , keeping acentre dot on target. As in the gyro sight, he would al­ready have set the target's wingspan on dial. Althoughthis system was very effective, japanese fighters account­ed for quite a few B-29s during the attacks on thejapanese homeland, and as with all gun nery frombomber formations there was a high risk of hitting otheraircraft in the group.

The Development of Powered Gun Turrets

HistoryAs higher-performance bombers came into service inthe 1930s. it was soon realised that defensive gunnerswould have to be protected against the stronger slip­stream forces and freezing tempera tures encountered athigher altitudes . Some manu facturers provided elabora tewindscreens, while others fitted trans parent cupo lasmounted on circular rings which could be manually ro­tated by the gunner, who elevated his gun by hand . Someof these enclosures, such as the Bristol 'parrot cage' tur­ret on the BristolType 120 aircraft of 1932, were mount­ed on the revolving ring of a Scarff ring moun ting,Therewere some ingenious variations, Armstrong \'('hitworthpatenting a linkage which balanced the weight of thegunner with his gun, giving effortless elevation.

Although these manually operated turre ts shelteredthe gunner from the elements . slipstream forces on thebarrel when firing to the beams made gun alignment

difficult. The obvious solution was to provide somemeans of powered control, and although many countriesset up design teams to investigate such systems, it wasthe British who did most of the pioneering work. TheBristol Aeroplan e Co mpany produced a hydraulicallypowered pillar mounting in 193~, and in the same yearBarnes W'allis designed a slipstream-powered turret forthe Vickers GA /31 biplane and Westland designed a reardefence turret. operated by a 2~V motor, for its taillessPterodactyl V fighter. However, the most promisingturre ts were produced by two concerns who were tobecome world leader s in turret development, BoultonPaul and Fraze r-Nash . W'hen Boulton Paul ann ouncedthat their new Overstrand bomber was fitted with a fullypowered front turret, the world aviation press hailed it asa breakth rough in aircraft armament, In practice, how­ever, the comp ressed air bottles of the pne umatic powersystem cou ld not be maintained for a sufficient time tobe practical.

In 1932 Archibald Frazer-Nash and his partner,Gratton Thompson, submitted a half-scale model of ahydraulically powered gun turret for evaluation at the AirArmament School at Eastchurch. It was seen to give ac­curate control, and the partners were given a contract fora tur ret to be fitted into the new Hawker Demon two­seat fighter. The develop men t period of the Dem on tur­ret was rather protracted, but with the help of a team oftalented engineers the system was improved, being usedin the enclosed power tur rets which armed Avro, Shortand Vickers-Arrnstrongs bombers during the 1939-45

Although it u'as the most aduanced turret of its hind al theoutbreak of u-ar, the Armstrong II"hilU'Orlh In zil ley 's FN4Atail turret of 1938 proved 10 be t'ery cold and uncomfortable0 11 long night operations Qt'er Germany. (See also page192 .)

207

A R ,\ \ A ,\ t EST D I v E R S I F IE S

war. Frazer-Nash carried out developmental work atTolworth in Surrey. and the Parn all Aircraft works atYatc, ncar Bristol, was purchased for turret production .Output from Yate during the Second \'('orld War amount­ed to over 60,000 turrets; 219 different designs are list­ed, of which 27 were fined to RAF aircraft.

After the problems with the Ovcrstrand turret,Boulton Paul, under the dynamic john North, signed anagreement with French designer j 13 A de Boyson tomanufacture a turret control system for the company'snew two-seat Defiant fighter ,The concept of a two-seatfighter, dating back to the successful Bristol Fighter ofthe First W'orld W'ar, proved to be a costly failure, but thenew four-gun turret was a success, The control systemconsisted of a self-contained hydraulic power unit insidethe turret, the only requirement from the aircraft systemsbeing electrical power and oxygen, After the success ofthe Defiant turret (theType A), the company went on toproduce other designs for Bomber Command aircraftusing the same power unit. Hand ley Page used Boulton

aile of the mOSI effective mid-upper turrets u'as the BOlll101IPaul Type A. This company used all electro-hydraulic potterunit contained ill the turret, requiring 110 uulnerable oil pip ­ing ill the fus elage,Th e Iype A was used 0 11 lIlallY RAF andLe nd-Lease US aircraft.

AI R CR AFT OF THE SE CO~D \X'ORLD W AR A R .\IA ,\IE~T DI V E R SI FI E S

One of the first of a lieU' generation of American turrets.the M artin 250 mid-upper turret. The armament of this and allAmerican turrets u'as IU'O O.SOill-calibre Brouming guns. Bendix , Emerson and M a rl i ll turrets were pouered by Amplidyneelectrical SYSleIllS; Consolidated and Bell used hydraulics. This illustration is taken from a /94 / manual.

Paul turrets in its Halifax, and many Am erican bombersused by the RAF were fitted with Boulton Paul turrets onarrival in the U K. S iany cannon-armed designs weresub mitted by Boult on Paul and Frazer-Nash for RAFusc but not accepted, as were a ser ies of designs for tur­rets armed with 0.50 calibre Brownin g gu ns.The reasonthese tur rets were not accep ted was an edict from theMini str y of Aircra ft Production , which state d that theupheava l of production involved could not be justified inthose critica l early years of the war.

Another pioneer turret produ cer was the BristolAeroplane Co mpa ny, which intr oduced a semi­retra ctable turret for its twin engi ned Blenh eim bomberof 1937. The turret, designated the type B I , was fullypowered by a hydrau lic system based on the company'spowered pillar gun mounting of 1934 .The arma ment ofa single Lewis gun was progressively increased after warwas declared , bu t the Blenh eim was by then obsolescentand very vulnerable to fighter attack. As will be seenlater , Bristol produce d the most effective British turretlater in the war.

American turret sAfter studying early reports of the war in Europ e, theUSAAF's planning sta ff soon realised that the ir existingand planned bomber aircraft were woefully under­armed. A rapid bomber rearmament programme wasorganised , and the major manufacturers were told tosubmit designs for power operated turrets armed with0.50 calibre Browning guns. An urge nt requ est was sentto the British Air l\ linistry to send current power turretsto Wright Field , where they could be used eithe r as pat­tern s for possible licensed production , or for assess mentby US designers and eng ineers from prospective manu­facturers .The British were only too pleased to ob lige, asvital Lend -Lease material was grea tly assisting the wareffort .The genera l layou t and controls of the British de­signs were used on some of the resulting Am erican tur­rets, but in general, given the huge manufacturing anddesign capacity of the US industry, they were originaland highly efficient, using the latest power and contro ltechnology. As the Brown ing M 2 0.50 calibre gun wasado pted as sta nda rd, all ammunition and associatedequipme nt was commo n to the different turret types.

As in Britain , the power source varied . Bendi x,M artin Emerson and Gru mman used an electr icalArnplidyne system which gave a very accura te response.This system was free from the oil leaks associated withhydraulics, and it was also simpler to fit with gunfiresafety cut-o ff equipment . Sperry, M otor Products andCo nso lida ted opte d for hydraul ic power un its, in whichan electr ically dri ven pump provid ed pressuri sed oil in­depend ent of the aircraft hydraulic system. T he gunswere cocke d by hydraulic ram s on these turrets, whilegun ners in the electrically powered turrets were provid-

208

771e BOIlIIOII Paul 7} pe I' turret tcith O.SOill-calibre gunsu'as sent 10 Alllerica ill / 94/ 10 assist US designersformulate lieu' designs.The simila rity 10 Sp erry and Bendixdesigns is notable.

ed with gea red cable-operated chargers. Guns on all USturrets were fired by means of heavy-duty soleno ids con­trolled from trigge rs in the turret cont rol handles. Theheavy ammunition belts were drawn into the guns bypowered am munition feed assisters, which fed the beltsfrom replaceable ammunition cans.

Am erican gu nners were also protected by extensivearmo ur plate and bulletproof glass pa nels, and provisionwas made for oxygen, intercom , and heated cloth ing out ­lets. All the new turret designs were extensively testedand modified where necessar y. As in Britain , the manu­facturers were expected to wor k closely with the aircraftmake rs to co-ordina te the various str uc tural and powerrequirements.

Althou gh they were late starters, the US manufactur­ers carried throu gh the rearma ment of their bomber air­craft in record time, and when the 8th Air Force

SIGHT

launched its bomber offens ive from East Anglia their air­craft were equipped with defe nsive armament second tonone.

Fr a nceFrench bomber aircraft of the 1930s were mostly armedwith rifle-calibre guns in manu ally operated tu rre ts, or

209

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had gun ners in open cockpits. Although the SAMM andHispano companies had de veloped powered turret de­signs, only one heavy bomber, the Far man 1'223, wasfitted with two SAMM type 109 turrets armed with sin­gle Hispano 404 20mm cannon at the ou tbreak of war.T he Armee de l'Air had planned to usc mostly twin­engined attack bombers, but political machinations had

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held back produ ction, and American aircraft ordered tobuild up the strength of the bomber squadrons had notbeen delivered by 1939.The only modern bomber avail­able in any numbers was the Liore et Olivier 451. whichwas fitted with a retractable SA..\L\ I dorsal turret similarto that in the E223. Unfortunately this did not prevent avery hea vy loss rate against German fighters in 1940.

ItalyItaly's air force was at its peak in the mid-1 930s, when itwas the stro ngest in Europe. but by the time Italy de­clared war on the Allies most of its aircraft were obsoles­cent. However , the famo us CRDA CANT Z,I 007bisAlcione and Savoia-Xlar chetti S,\ I. 79 torpedo bombe rswere very effective.T he Alcione was armed with a BredaSAFAT dorsal turret powered in rotation only andarmed with a 12,7 gun by the same manufacturer. T hedefe nsive guns of the SJ\1. 79 were hand operated.

Ger m a nyGe rmany entered the war with bombers designed pri­marily for tactical operations, Although plans were for­mulated in 1936 for a strategic bomber force. they werenot carried thr ough, The tr iumphant progress of theCondor Legion in Sp ain and the subsequent all­conquering blitzkrieg seemed to confirm the decision toconcentrate on medium bombers. and the hand operat­ed. rifle-ca libre guns seemed qu ite adequate against thelight oppos ition enco unte red , However, it soon beca meobvi ous that the defensive arma ment of these aircraftwould have to be up grad ed , and the failure to carrythro ugh the plan for heavy strategic bombers was a mis­take. Heavy-calibre ,\ IG 131 machine-gun s were in­stalled in medium bombe rs. and powered turrets weredesigned. a pr ior ity programme being rushed thro ugh toreintroduce Project 1041 of 1937. the Heinkel He 177heavy bomber, Like the Americans. the Lu ftwaffe hadnot serious ly considered defe nsive turrets. but after itsaircraft had been mauled by British fighters, develop­ment contracts were issued to Rheinmetall-Borsig,,\ lauser, and Focke- \'('ulf for powered turrets armed with13mm ,\ IG 131 machin e-gun s and ,\ IG 151/20 20mmcan non, T he first turret to sec servic e was the hydrauli­cally powered HDL. An upper turret armed with eithe ran ,\ IG 151 15mm or ,\ IG 151/20 20mm cannon, it wasvery roomy and was used mainly on Blohm und Vossand Foc ke-Wulf Fw 200 aircraft, It was also used onother type s including the Junkers ju 188. The EDL wasan electrically powered mid-upper turret armed with asingle .\lG 131 13mm machine-gun and powered in ro­tation only, the gunner elevating his gun manually. It wasfirst used on the Dorni er Do 217, and later on the He177 and Ju 188, The HL/131 V tail turret, armed withfou r ,\ IG 131 guns. was hydrauli cally powered from themain aircraft system, and the gunner was protected by

211

The German Hydraulische D rehringlafeue HDLJ 5J Z<'aS

hydraulically pozcered, and armed unth single J5111m or20111111 CQllIIOIl . It ycas t 'eT)' rOOIlt'~', and made all ideal look­0111 position 011 the Fu: 200 maritime strike aircraft.

thick armour plate. Although it was pressuri sed and pro­vide d with warm- air heating, it could only be ope ratedby very small gunners. and weighed 453kg (997Ib) ,T hisadvanced turret was designed for the He 177 and largeflying boa ts, but it is doubtful wheth er it was ever usedoperationally,T hese turrets were designed and producedby the Rheinrnetall-Bor sig company, one of the mostprolific producers of air weapons in the Second WorldWar.

The Focke-Wutf concern produced the 'Fe rn­gerichtete Drchringlafette' (FDL) remotely controlledtu rret. This was electrically powered, and was ope ratedby a gunner in an adjacent sighting station. It was usedopera tionally on the He 177 and was specified for the ju290 series. This was a low-profi le turret armed with two,\ IG 131 guns. and its remote sighting and power systemwas report ed to be quite successful. The gunner had twocontrol handl es; one was used for elevation, and theother rotated the sighting statio n and the turret. Therewere other Germ an turret designs. suc h as the LB204bow turre t of the Blohm und Voss Bv 138. but they weremainly un successful in service usc.

USSRThe Soviet Air Force was known for its huge bomber air­cra ft in the 1930s, but when Germa ny invad ed theUSSR only one. the Petlyakov '1'13-7 series, could becompared with contemporary heavy bombers, The de­fensive arma ment of these four-engi ncd bombers, which

AIR CRAFT OF TH E S E CO>;1l W ORLD W AR A R .' IA .\IE >; T I1IV ERSIFI E S

The General Electric Remote Control Turret sy stem (R C T) ",as filled co US B- 29s. Each of the remotely com rolled turrets u'erearmed uiith twill O.SOill-calibre B rouming guns .

bombed Berlin in 1941 , consisted of nose and tail turretsarmed with single 20mm ShVAK cannon. In 1944 tur­rets filled with four Beresin B20 guns of the same cali­bre were installed on the latest variant of this design .Another importan t Russian bomber was the Ilyushin11-4, originally armed with 7.62mm ShKAS guns inmanu ally operated tur rets. In 1942 these enclosures weremodified to take 12.7mm UBS guns.

JapanOne of the most rudimentary turrets to see service wasfilled to the japanese Mitsubishi Ki-21 Type 97 bomber,which had a large conical turret powered by bicycle ped­als driving a chain-and-sprocket mechanism and mount­ing a heavy 12.7 machin e-gun aligned in elevation byhand . However, this was not typical of japanese equip­ment . Although the nation's guns and other equipmentwere often copies of western designs, japanese aircraftarmament was genera lly equal to the other major pow­ers. T he Mitsubishi G4,\ \ bomb er was filled with thefirst fully powered japanese turr et, which was hydrauli­cally powered and armed with aType 19 (Oerlikon) can­non. T he Mitsubishi Ki-67 had an electrically powereddorsal turret armed with an Ho5 20mm cannon, twoheavy-calibre machine-guns in the nose and tail, andsimilar guns mounted in side-hatch positions. This wasthe most efficient japanese bomber, having a fighter-likeper form ance. Apart from these aircraft, all other japan­ese bombers were defend ed by manu ally aimed guns,protected by cupolas or mounted in open cockpits.

Later Turret sIn the later war years the RAF introdu ced rear defenceturrets armed with 0.50 calibre Browning guns. (Asmentioned earlier, heavy-calibre gun turrets were de­signed in 1939-10 but were not accepted for use.) T heselater designs gave the gunner more room and added ar­mour protection ; they were also fitted with gyro sights,and in some cases radar blind tracking.T he main advan­tage, however, was the replacement of rifle-calibre gunswith the hard-hitting Brownings. The smaller weaponswere adequate un til the advent of armoured fighters.Thefirst of the second-generation turrets was the BoultonPaul type D, powered by an upgraded 131' electro­hydraulic system. The type D was fitted to late-seriesHandl ey Page Halifaxes, the guns being moun ted lowand to either side of the gun ner and fed by ammuni tionboxes back in the fuselage via ducts and feed assisters tothe base of the tur ret. The Frazer-Nash FN82 was madeto a similar specification with the exception of the powersystem, which was a beefed-up FN hydraulic uni t pow­ered from pumps filled to one of the aircraft's engines.T he third heavy-calibre tu rret was a private-venture de­sign produ ced by Rose Bros of Ga insborough. Designedby K H Nickells, the principle designer of the STAAG

212

The B ristol B1 7, armed tcith tunn H ispano i\fk l' guns, u'asused 011 the Avro Li ncoln. It rms pouered by the B ristol 'AllElectric' System, giuing very quick and accurate responses.

radar-cont rolled naval AA system, it was controlled bythe gunner manipul ating his gunsight, which was con­nected to hydraulic valves. As he aimed the sight at thetarget the guns automatically followed. It was armed with0.50 calibre Brownings, and was so roomy that two gun­ners could be accommoda ted for training purposes.Mention must be made of the Vickers-Arm strongs heavydor sal turr et , in which a huge 40mm gun was mounted.The Wellington prototype was used for firing trials ofthis big mushroom-shaped turret, which was specifiedfor a Wellington 'heavy fighter' .The concept of a heavybomber destroyer was proved to be mistaken and theproject was dro pped . Mu ch more successful was theBristol type 13 I7 dorsal turr et , by far the most advancedturret produced in the UK Powered by the Bristol 'a llelectr ic' system, it was similar to the US Mar tin andEmerson turrets, and was armed with two 20mmHispano Mk V cannon, aimed with a gyro sight. It wasnot used opera tionally as its scheduled host, the AvroLincoln, did not see wartime service . As mentioned in

the sighting section, Boulton Paul produ ced two remote­ly controlled turr ets for the Lancaster remote control de­fence system, comprising dorsal and ventral turretscontrolled from a tail sighting position. Filled with twinHispa nos, these turrets were controlled by a computerlinked with Amplidyne generato rs and a Ward Leonardsystem. The gunner could select either or both turrets,his gunsight being controlled by servo-motors linked tothe computer.The scheme was initiated as early as 1942,but various problems prevented its introducti on intosquadron service.

The General Elec tr ic Rem ot e Co ntro l TurretsystemT his system is described in the sighting section. It wasremarkably similar to the British system describedabove, but with the advantage of American techn ical re­sources and production facilities it was completed intime for operations in the Far East . The turrets of theBoeing B-29s were compact unit s armed with twin0.50s, each tur ret carrying 1,000 rounds of ammunition.T he guns were re-cocked by a built-in pneumati c charg­er which operated aut omatically after firing ceased, thecharger also released the firing pin of the gun when firewas opened. The tail turret was arm ed with twinBrownings and a 20mm Hispano in the first productionB-29s , but the Hispano was not fitted in later versions of

213

the aircraft. This turret was not part of the RCT system,being operated and controlled by the gunner. T he RCTturrets were all electrically powered , Selsyn generators inthe turr et housing powering the drive motors in responseto signals from the sighting stations.

While 13-29 gunners were seated in pressurised andheated sighting stations, RAF and 8th Air Force gunnershad to endure hour s in freezing conditions, flyingthrough shell splinters and fighter attack. RAF gunnerscould not even see fighters climbing into position frombelow, hidd en in the land mass. It has been suggestedthat the turrets should have been taken out to improvebomber perform ance, but many Ge rman fighters werelost to the fire of their rifle-calibre guns. T he fact thatthey were there, especially in daylight operations, was adeterrent to attacking fighter pilots, who often brokeaway prematur ely, It must be said, however, that thefighter always had the advantage of a relatively stable tar­get, and could choose his approach. T he gunner had tomanipulate his turret in the few seconds of an attack and,before the advent of the gyro sight, make the necessaryallowances to hit his fleeting attacker.

It could be argued that, had the production ofM osquito bombers been vastly increased, they couldhave replaced the Lancasters and Halifaxes and savedthousand s of lives, but this would not have been possiblein the time available.

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Section of lite 21Ocm aircraft rocket, developed from liteground-service 190c/1/ Xebeluerfer assault proj ectile.

campaign against Germany , Nebclwerfer projectileswere up graded to 21Omm and adapted for air use, finedwith timed fuses. T hese were first introduced in 1941 ,being launc hed from tubes slung beneath the wings offighters, which fired them from the rear of the forma­tions, out of range of the defending gun ners .The launchtubes adversely affected the performance of these air­craft, and the appearance of long-range US fighter es­corts put an end to these operations.

Rheinmetall-Bor sig produced the Fohn series of air­craft rocket missiles which were issued in three calibres:65mm, 73mm and 100mm (FZ 65, FZ 73 and Fz 100) .

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215

GermanyGerman scientist s carried out extensive work on big liq­uid fuelled rockets in the 1930s, and some devel opmentalso took place with multiple projectors for tacticalground use. The famous Nebc1werfer proved to be re­markably accurate, the screaming 190mm projectilesdoing nothing for the morale of enemy troops .When theAllied bomber fleets began their massive bombing

rockets used powde r propellent and explosive, withimpact fuses and small stab ilising fins. T hey were sight­ed by specia lly graduated reflector sights.

A M esscrschmitt Bf 110 of ZG26 unth ncin launchers for 21Om m ll'g r 21 air -to-air rockets. One hit usually prored fa tal, butthey u'ere inaccurate and the launch tubes affected the aircraft 's perfo rma nce.

USS RIn 1929 a team under B S Petrpavlovskii at theLenin grad Gas Dynamic Laborator y produced a spin­stabilised rocket missile with an explosive warhead whichcould be launched from rails for gro und use, or fromaero planes. Research facilities were increased and thr eetypes of rocket missiles were develop ed in the 1930swhich were to play a major role in the war againstGerm any. These were designated RS-75, RS-82 andRS- 132 (the nu mbe rs indicating the diamete r of thewarhead).These weapons were used mainly on ground­attack operations, but were also fired against enemyaircraft. Some 11-2 units specialised in close-support op­erations using RS-82 rockets. Launching tu bes wereprodu ced for the three rocket types, and could could bequickly fined to the underside of fighter and bomber air­craft. The advantage of the rockets was that, as opposedto large-calibre anti -tank guns, once the rounds werefired there was little loss of performance of the aircraft.T he big RS-1 32 proved to be a potent anti-tank weapon.With a warh ead of 23. lkg (50.9Ib) it could immobiliseTiger tanks. The smaller RS-82 was also extensivelyused, production amou nting to 2Y2 million . Soviet

Du ring the uneasy peace afte r the Armistice, Russia,Ge rmany and Britain saw the possibilities of these mis­siles, and formed design teams to develop rocket typesand launchers which could be used in any future hosti l­ities.

2 14

Aircraft Rocket Weapons\,\'hen a state of war exists, the combatants proceed todrop or project missiles and explosives at eac h other tocause death and destru ction .The means of de livery havevaried over the years, but have mainly been guns or aero ­planes. However, as the Chinese discovered in AD 1200,rockets can be used. The advantage of rockets is that theyneed no heavy launch or firing mechanism, a simple railor tube being all that is requ ired .

The first air- launched rockets were invented by aFrenchman , Lt Y P G Lel'rieur, who fined electricallyignited firework-type rockets into tub es fixed to the in­terplane stru ts of biplanes in 1916. With experience,pilots were able to set fire to enemy observation balloons.

Le Prieur rocket installation 011 a Sopicith PI/P al Eastchurch ill October 1916.

RS-82 rocket rails mounted under the txings ofa Polika rpou1-153 on the Eastern From ill early 1942.

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A "ear-miss by a" R·M! air-launched rocket 0" a B-1 7 of 482" d BG. /1 appears thai the photograph, taken from the sidehatch ofanother B-1 7, captures the moment of bomb release.

The trials Hurricane, shouiing the first B ritish airbornerocket installation. The first air launch took place overChichester harbour 0" 25 October 1941.

7 April 194 1 a Heinkel was brought down in flames, butthe spent rocket tubes posed a conside rable threat toproperty on their return to earth. By December theHome Guard were ma nning nine ty-one batteries,

In Oct ober 1941 an urgent call was sent to Crowe todrop all other work and adapt the AA rocket as an airlaunched anti-tank projectile. The war in North Africahad shown tha t Arm y tan k and anti-tank guns were use­less against Ge rman armour. Once the proiect started itmoved swiftly. Four laun ching rails were mounted undereach wing of Hurricane fighters, and armour pierc ingwarheads were fitted . The first air launch took place on25 October 1941 , and during the following trials it wasfound that 4in ( IOOmm) of armo ur could be pierced; thethickness of Ge rma n .\ Ik IV tan k armour. In threemonths rocket-firing Hurricanes were in action againstthe Afrika Korps, but Ti ger tanks had appeared whichwere immune to the new weapon .

In the meantime anti- ship rockets with HE warheadshad been developed at Aherporth, but it was found thatthey entered the ship's plating and did little dama gewhen the y exploded inside. Production facilities hadbeen built up for round-the-clock produ ction , but thewhole project was now in doubt. The solution camewhen a howitzer unit rep orted it had sto pped T igertanks, hits and ncar misses having blown off their tu rre tsand tracks.The howitzer shells relied on HE blast, and itwas soon realised that the HE anti-ship rockets werealmos t ide ntical in operation . Rockets with 601b (27kg)HE warh ead s were quickly dispatched to Africa, andwere found to be just as effective as the howitzer. By acoincidence it was found that if armour pierci ng projec­tiles str uck the water short of the target when firedagainst ships and subma rines, they curved up wards andente red the target below the waterline. Against sub ­marin es they entered the hull and flailed aro und inside,causi ng major damage.

Great BritainIn 1934 His Majesty's ,\ laster of Ordnance, Sir HughElles, called a meeting at the War Office to ' Review ourpre sent knowledge of the rocket as an offensive weap on ' .Two year s later a workin g part y had prepared a rep ortrecommending four possible uses. These were anti­aircraft defence, long-range offence, recoilless armamentfor aircraft and assisted take-off for aircraft. Co nsideringlater developments, this proved to be qui te a propheticsummary of future use of the rocket. Dr (later SirAlwyn) Crowe was appointed to lead the rocket weapondevelopment team at the newly construc ted ProjectileDevelopment Establishm ent (POE) at Aberporth on thecoast of Card iganshire. It was decided tha t cordite wouldbe used as a propellent , extruded into blocks , or 'grai ns'which were packed into a steel tub e, the warhead beingscrewed on to the forward end, and small stabilising finsattached to the rear end of the rube.The rocket motor swere ignited electro nically. Wh en the first test roundswere fired they proved to be reasonably accura te, havinga burning time of 1.5sec and reaching a speed of1,200mph.

After the Munich crises of 1938 Crowe was told toconcentrate on an anti-aircraft missile to protect citiesand production centres from the expected hostilebomber formations. Multiple projecto rs were designcd,and a trials team was sent to Jamaica to test the timin gmechanisms in the clear air. It was found that the accu ­racy of the spoiler operated timer s did not compare withAA shells, but the project went ahead. Batte ries of theprojector s were set up round several cities. Known as Zprojectors, they could rippl e-fire a volley of 128 29lb(13kg) shells, eac h with a leth al radius of 70ft (21m). On

Probably the most significant guided air weapon sys­tem introduced during the Second \X'orld War was theHenschel Hs 293 series of guided air-to -ground missiles.T he first model, produced in 1940, was a SC 500kgbomb fitted with wings and aero foils controlled by radiosignals during its glide to the target. The later Hs 293Ahad a purpose-made airframe with an un derslung \X'alterliquid-fuelled rocket and a built-in 500 kg warh ead . Therocket motor propelled it forward to a position where theopera tor could obse rve its pa th, and he then controlledits glide by radio link on to the target. The Hs 293A wasfirst used by II./KG 100 aircraft in the .\ l iddle East in thesummer of 1943 , when the sloop H,\IS Egret was sunkby a missile launched from a Dorni er Do 217. This wasthe first of many successful attacks; another was to dis­able the battleship \lim pile.The design leader of the pro­ject was Dr Herbert Wagner, who went on to design aTV-guided version .The success of these missiles and theVI and V2 projects was acknowledged by the majorpowers, and the design teams were highly sought after byAmerica and the USSR after the war.

fed by belted rounds from a magazine in the fuse lage orwing. The missiles were 8 1Omm (32in) long and had alaunch velocity of 500 m/sec ( I ,640ft/sec). After launch ,stabilising fins extended outwards, giving a relativelystable trajector y.The Mauser laun chers fired the roundsat a cyclic rate of 300 rounds per minute, but they werenever used operationally, the only R4Ms fired in angerbeing launched from ,\ Iesserschmitt ,\ Ie 262A-I a jetfighters fitted with simple wooden racks under eachwing, from which twelve rounds were ripple-fired . TheAmericans saw the advantages of the R4M system andused it as a basis for their postwar .\ Iight)' Mouse air-to­air missile system.

The weakness of the R4.\1 rocket was its short range.A mu ch less dema nd ing missile for pilots attacking USbomber formations was the longer-range RheinrnetallRI OOBS, which had an effective range of 1.2 miles(1.8km) , well outside the reach of US mach ine-guns. Itdelivered a hefty 40kg (88Ib) warh ead consisting of ahigh-capacity bursting charge and 460 small incendi ar ybullets into the centre of a bom ber formatio n where itwas detonated by a time fuse linked with a radar rangingdevice. T his rocket was about to be issued when the warended.

German Guided MissilcsIt had long been realised that the ideal weap on tocounter bombers and hit ground target s was a missilewhich could be guided to the target from a position be­yond the reach of intercepting fighter s. The first guidedair-to-air missile was the Kramer X4.This consi sted of a20kg (44Ib) warh ead fitted to a small airframe withcruciform wings, which was prope lled by a BMW liquid­fuel rocket motor . Tail mounted control surfaces wereoperated by 0.2mm wires trailing from the launch air­craft. It had a range of 1.8 miles (2.9km) and was aboutto becom e operational when hostilities ceased .

77,e Rheinmetall R4.11 rocket discharge unit .\lodel 2. Themissiles u-erestored in the aircraft Sfuselage or zcings and fedinto the tscin discharge tubes via a belt system and feedpawls. ll'7lm fired, each round activatedthe feed poul for thenext, and capacity u'as limited only by arailable storagespace.

T hey were similar in cons tructio n to the earlier 21ernmissile, with the warhead and powder propellent in anelongated shell-shaped body. •Multiple-rube laun cherswere designcd from which the missiles were rippIc fired.However, compared with heavy-calibre guns, the rangeand accuracy lcft much to be desired , and there are veryfew' report s of operational use othe r than by some unitson the Eastern Fro nt .

Toward s the end of hostilities a rocket similar to theBritish 3in missile, the Panzer Blitz, was used , but themost promi sing was the R4M rocke t system. These55mm (2.17in) air-to-air missiles were designed byRhcinmetall. T he ,\ lauscr company produced two typesof automatic low-drag firing systems, one a nine- roundauto matic laun cher, and the other a pod with twin rubes

216 217

A IC\! A ,\! E x T [) I v E R S I F IE S

release system was not ready until 1945 and the projectwas terminated after further trials,

After the cnd of the war in Europe , the British fleetwas threatened by Japanese suicide bomb ers in thePacific Theatre.The Fairey company produced a missileto counter these attacks . Called the Stooge, it was pro­duccd in record time, and was a radio con trollcd vehicleof conventi onal aircraft configuration with a 500lb(226kg) warhead. Four 3in rocket s powered thc launchpha se: these were then jettisoned and four 5in rocketspowered the final radio controlled phase to the target.The Stooge did not see action becau se, by the time themissile was ready for production, any kamikaze pilotsstill living had taken up safer occupations.

AmericaAlthough experiments were carried out by individualgroups in the USA during the 1930s. no serious attemptwas made to develop rocket weapons, After reports ofthc British work in this field, three visits were made toAbcrporth and propellent manufacturers in England. Asa result of thesc visits a complete pilot cordite extrusionplant was shipped to America for appraisal by norninat­cd contractors. By late 1942 cordite rocket motors werebeing produced for army usc. and in 1943 thc USAAFadopted the army infantry rocket for aircraft usc . ' Ib is4.5in (114mm) calibre weapon was 34in (86mm) longand wcighcd 3841b (17Akg) , It was ignitcd e1cctrically.and was air-Iaunchcd from twin or triple 10ft (3m)-long

The 'St ooge', produced by Fairey A viat ion 10COIIII/erJapallese Silicide auocks Oil the fleet ill the Far East. Th e four primaryrockets ,eere jettisoned after launclu four Sill then CII/ ill fo r the fi lial radio COli/rolled phase,

Hawker Typhoons of the 2nd Tactical Air Force , Thisaircraft had developed from a less-than-ideal fighter intoone of the most formidable close-support aircraft of thewar. Operating from forward airstrips in Normandy,Typhoons fired millions of cannon shells and rockets insuppo rt of ground troop s, They were particularlyrenowned for accurate rocket attacks. and when a strongforce of Panzcrs was set to escape from an encirclingmovement at Falaisc, Typhoons with bombs and rocketsdestroyed most of thc Tiger tanks and vehicles in aclassic attack . 175 tanks being immobilised by blast in asingle day. The ultimate development of the 3in rocketwas the double 60lb missile. giving thc Typhoon an evengreater punch, Oncc per fected, it was found that doubleRPs could bc carried at speeds of up to 450mph(720krn/h) provided no violent manoeuvres took place.

In 1943 research staff at Abcrporth were directed tobegin work on a large air-launched anti-ship missile withsome means of automati c release. Codcnamed 'U ncleTom', the project was given prior ity status, A specifi­cation was issued for the radar ranging system. and aspecial sight was designcd by Barr & Stroud which co­ordinated thc approach Iinc with the radar imput. A war­head of 350lb (158kg) of torpcx was to be propelled bythrcc 3in rocket motors stabilised by six rectangular fins.A double impact fuse was to be armed by the heat of therocket motor s. and a 3scc sclf-destruct de\'icc was dc­signcd to gi\'c a near miss a chancc of damaging the tar­gct. Thc missile was rcad y for trials in mid-1944. but thc

As they were laun ched from short und erwing proicc­tor rails. these weapo ns were naturally not as accurate asguns. bu t a salvo of eight 60lb warheads hittin g a smallarea at superso nic speed had a devastating effect. \,'hcnused against ships or submari nes, two rounds were usu­ally fired to keep AA gunners' heads down. followed bythe remain ing six fircd from closer range, a hit from anyone of which often proved decisive.

T here followed a programme in which many types ofCoas tal Co mmand aircraft were fitted with projectorrails for maritime operations. The first successful sub­marine strike occurred on 14 .\ lay 1942 when a FaireySwordfi sh from thc escort carrier H.\ IS Archer sank U­572 in thc Atlantic. British rockets were longer and moreunwield y to store and fit than the equivalent Germanround. owing to the nature of the cordite propellent. buta salvo from an aircraft's eight projectiles had the de­structive power of a naval cruiser's broadside. Aftermany fatal accidents thc electr ical firing circuits werewired through a multiple socket at the rear of the projec­tor. the plug connecting it to the aircraft firing systemnot being inserted until shortly before take-off As thctraject ory of the rockets was different to that of thc gunsof the aircraft. a j\ Ik II reflector sight was designed inwhich the rcllcctor glass could be tilted to the correctangle for rocket firing. This was done by means of acalibrated knurled knob. which could return thc reflectorto gun alignment after thc rocket had been fired, Thcpilot could select pairs or full salvo from a firing panel,which also contained a master switch and firing button.

Probably the most important installation was on the

IGN ITER

CORDITE

INH IBITO RSTRIP

°1

SHOT. 25 LB. S.A.P.M K I

A section of the B ritish Sin rocket, tcith the shell (SA P ,mr­head shoum here) scretced into the shell ring, and the fi llsslotted into the base,

A Ha wk er 7}p/100/1u:ith double 60lb SAP rockels. Ihe maximum /ll1II /ber ca rried 0 11 lactical aircraft of the RAF.

218 219

9The Well-equipped Warplane

L F E Coombs

A IR CRAFT OF THE SE CO:-:n WO R l.D W A R

A Douglas Skyraider with the US 'TillY Tim ' JJ .75ill(298mm) assailIt rocket, intended for lise against Japallesebunkers. The smaller projectiles are 3.Sill (89mm) ami­ship Folding Fill Aircraft Rockets.

underwing tubes, usually from fighter s. A heavierdevelopment of this weapon, specially developed for airuse, had a 50lb (22kg) warh ead , but was not accepted .

The US Navy and Ma rine Corps soon saw thepotential of the air-launched rocket as an anti-shipweapon, and adopted the 3.5in (89mm) Folding FinAircraft Rocket (FFAR) for use against]apanese vessels.Following British exp erience, the warhead was a solidarm our-piercing typ e for maximum penetration. In1944 the warhead was replaced by a 5in HE head con­tainin g 50lb (22.7kg) of torp cx. US rocket developmentwas now making up for lost time, and the Navy nextadopted the 5in High Velocity Aircraft Rocket (HVAR) .Known as the ' Ho ly Moses' , it weighed 1341b (60kg). Itwas used by all US services for anti-ship and close­suppo rt operations.

As American forces started to recapture jap an ese-

22 0

held islands, pill boxes and bunkers were skilfully usedby the defenders, and a requ est was made for a suitablerocket to pierce these emplaceme nts . A massive rocket,10ft 3in (3, 124mm) long with an 11.75in (298mm) ­diameter warhead was quickly produced and tested.Known as the 'T iny Tim', it packed the punch of a 12inNavy shell. Primarily designed for the final assault on theJapanese mainland, it was put to use in the later stages ofthe island war by ,\ Iarine PB] Mitchells. They carriedtwo Tiny Tims, and a few were used in action before theend . In March 1944 the M cD onnell Aircraft Co mpanyfitted its Gargoyle glide bomb with an acid/analinerocket motor. Known as the KSD/I, this missile wastested, but the proposed guid anc e system was not per­fected until after the end of hostilities.

Rocket-powered missiles, guided or otherwise, arenow the main weap ons used by the world 's air forc es, butcompared with the spectacular advance of rocket tech­nology during the war years, deve lopment has naturallybeen more leisurely.

Bibli ography

Chinn, George M , The A/achille Glln (US Bureau ofOrdnance, 1951).

Clarke, R Wallace, British A ircraft Armament IVI 1, RAFGun Turrets f rom 1914 to the Present Day (PatrickStephens, Sparkford, 1993).

Clarke , R \,(Iallace, British A ircraft A rmamem rill 2, RAFGillIS and Gunsiglus from 1914 to the Present Day(Patrick Stephens, Sparkford , 1994) .

Gunston, Bill, Encyclopaedia of A ircraft Armamem(Salamander Books, London, 1987).

Hoffschmidt, E], German A ircraft Guns and Cannons(W E Inc., Greenwich , Conn. )

Wallace, G F, The Guns of the Royal Air Force 1939-45(William Kimber, London , 1972).

US Air Forces Information File Manual No 20 (UnitedStates Air Force).

IntroductionA well-equipped warpl ane in the 1940s, as with presentaircraft, was one intend ed to complete all the specifiedoperational requirement s. Som e aircraft were wellequipped, others less so.

Failures on the part of designers and manu facturersto provide aircraft capable of matching the operationalrequirements laid down by the Air Staff were often theresult of frequent changes of mind. In turn, apparentlyper verse rewriting of spec ifications arose because ofsudden changes in air war tactics. It was extreme lydifficult for an air staff or any other organisation con­cerned with air defenc e or offence to foresee future tac­tical and strategic changes.

The initial European war of 1939 eventually spreadto all part s of the globe. But in the 1930s air stra tegiesand consequ ent design decisions were very mu ch aimedat Northern Europ e, the Mediterranean and the MiddleEast. British, French, German and Italian aircraft wereequipped for those potential theatres of operation rath erthan for more remote part s. In America aircraft systemsand equipment reflected long-range operations related tothe Pacific.

The extent to which the aircraft that went to war in1939 were well-equipped depended very mu ch on thelength of their gestation. It has been suggested that theSecond World \Var started one or perhaps two years toosoon. In 1930 the curve of technological achievementhad only started to raise a little up from that of 1918. By1935 it had risen much further but for a number of rea­sons manufacturers and air forces were not always ableto take adva ntage of all the possible developments in sys­tems and equipment . At this point it is important todifferentiate clearly between experime nta l ideas and pr o­du ction equipme nt.

Few, if any, type s of aircraft at the end of the 1930scould claim to be well-equipped . It might be thoughtthat to be 'well-equipped' meant numerous guns oflarge calibre or the ability to carry a great weight ofbombs. There were aircraft that met those criteria butthere were far more that were not well-equipped be­cause they were not, within our present meaning,'weapo ns systems' . The modern weapons system con­cept was virtually unknown in the 1930s when the air­craft of the 1940s were on the drawing board. Systemsand equipme nt were usually separate 'stand-alone 'items. Aircra ft manufacturers figuratively shoppedaround for equipment from outside compa nies; a com-

22 1

pass here, an undercarri age leg there, a generator there,and so on.

This reliance on outs ide suppliers was common tothe majority of aircraft compani es in the principal 'avia­tion ' countries, i.e Fran ce, Italy, Ge rmany, 13ritain,]apanand the USA. The state control of everyth ing from arivet to a complete aircraft in Russia was an entirelydifferent approach . However , the similarities in the typesand number of systems and accessories among the prin­cipal countries were more imp ortant than the differ­ences.Therefore, for exampl e the re was, to some extent ,a common invent or y of equipment among American,Germ an and British fight ers.

A single-seat fighter of the late 1930s' generationsuch as a Bf 109 can be compared with a Hawk 75A ora Spitfir e. Setting aside the obvious str uctural andconfigura tion similarities, each might have had the fol­lowing equipment in commo n:

Co ckpit instruments including reflector gun sight.Multiple gun installations, including arming circuitsand ammunition magazines.Radio, both aircraft-to-a ircraft and air-t o-ground.Electri cal generator and circuit s for operating otherequipme nt.Hydraulic system.Undercarr iage operating system.

Co mparable invent ories for two bombers of the samegeneratio n, the Vickers Wellington and the He 111, in­clud ed, in addition to a pilot 's cockpit and equipment,the following:

Space for a navigator and his spec ialised equipment.A radio-operator 's position and equipment .Bomb-aiming equipment and associated arming andrelease circuits. Som e of these were duplicated so thatthe y could be operated eithe r by the bomb-aimer orby the pilot.Protective armour plating for critical areas and crewpositions.This was not provided for the earlier marksof Wellington . In the He 111 the racks of verticallystowed bombs provided some protection for the pilotand navigator .M ovable guns for defence and in the Wellingtonpower-operated , enclosed gun turrets.

The last item will be discussed fur ther because itreflected an approach by the RAF air staff to defencethat , at the time, differed significantly from that of otherair forces . In turn it affected the systems and equipmentof American and British aircraft.

A IRCRAFT OF T ilE SE CO:-:D \X' O R L D \\ ' A R TilE \\ 'ELL-EQlJll'I'ED \\'ARI'LA:-:E

A Luf cu:affe Bf J09G, shounng the ready access 10 the engine procided by the large hinged anding panels. S Ole that some ofthe ground crer,' are pushing on the uiing by placing their hands behind the au toma tic leading-edge slats.

Anoth er facto r that delayed the introduction of newtechnologies for systems was unc ert ain specificationwriting; parti cularl y by an air staff, In the second half ofthe 1930s none of the world 's air forces had experienc eda full-scale, all-out, air war since 1918; albeit theLuftwaffe had gained some experience from the SpanishCivil War, the Japanese from its invasion of China andthe RAF from 'tribal' wars and policing mandated terri­tories in the .\ Iiddle East. However, neither the Frenchnor the air services of the USA, or for that matter theItalians, had other than limited experience of large- scale,inten sive air warfare ,

Onl y after many months of intensive air operations,with frequent changes of tactics to counter enemy initia­tives and the need to keep aircraft airworthy when oper­ating from othe r than well-equ ipp ed bases, could anaircraft's systems be proved and refined . Ge rmanycapit alised on involvement in Sp ain by building an airforce dedicated to close support of the army, In doing soit made sure that its aircraft cou ld be maintained in thefield whatever the environmental conditions. In contrastthe RAF suffered from a lack of certainty over the typeof air war in which it might be involved. By 1938 theRAF had evolved essentially into three major com­mands: defensive fighter, offensive bom ber, and mar­itime, Each of these commands operated aircraft types

A Lockh eed P-381.igll/ll ing tcith turbosupercharged Allisolll'-/2 engines. The turbosupercharger IIIlilS can be seen 011 the uppersurface ofeach tail boom, Th is melhod of maintaining pouier al high altitude rms a feature ofmany American aircraft , bill U'as

1101 used 10 all)' exten t by other nations.

sta rting the engines, Should an aircraft have sufficient in­ternal battery power to start an engine, or would com­plete reliance be placed up on mobile accumulatortrolleys, with hand cranking as the last resort?

Du ring the Second \'<'orld \Var 'new' systems cameinto ope rational use that had been expe rimented withduring the previous ten years. Turbosup crcharger s, air­borne radar and UHF radio, to name a few, were aroundin the 1930s but they were not fully developed . Manyideas were delayed either because of productiondifficulties or because other systems had not beenbrought up to the same technical standard, An exampl eis the airb orne rad ar that was installed in Blenheimnightfighters of the RAF at the end of 1939, Itseffectiveness as a contributor to the well-equipp ednightfighter had to wait until a big powerful twin- engineaircraft, having a sufficient speed margin over its victim,became operational. Anoth er example is that of oxygensystems for high-a ltitude flight. Had the 13-17 been op­crational in 1935 it may not have been fully effective bc­cause of an inadeq uate oxygen system. It may also havesuffered losses from fighter attacks because power-opcr­ated gun mountings were not available, Again, using the13-1 7 as an example, navigational equipment and tech­niques at the time were not developed sufficiently to en­sure operational success,

extreme example of the choice between simplicity andcomplexity was the undercarriage.The systems des ignerwould favour a fixed undercarriage because it relievedhim of much concern over arranging a suitable powersystem, On the other hand the aerodynarnicist obviouslywanted the wheels out of the way once the mac hine wasairbo rne , T he design problem was exace rbate d in themid- 1930s because of the general lack of reliable power­operated systems, be they hydraulic, pneumatic orelectric,

Furthermore, would a hand-operated hydraulicpump suffice for raising the undercarriage or shouldthere be an engine-driven pump and a far more complex'plumbing' system? The forme r would keep downweight, simplify maintenance in the field and reducecost, The latter , however, would take up more room inthe cockpit and burden the pilot with physical exerti onand the dedication of one hand to the task when he need­ed both hand s on the controls during take-off,

An important factor related to aircraft systems andequipment in general is the degree to which a part icularaircraft type was intende d to be serviced and maintainedaway from hangars, hard standings and second- andthird -echelon support services. Both the Luftwaffe andthe RAF exercised their aircra ft support services awayfrom established bases. A simple example of self­sufficiency or dependency in design is the meth od of

Throughout the history of warplane developmentdesigner s have had to chose between simplicity andcomplexity when atte mpting to comply with thespecification issued by an air staff, In the mid- I930s an

Airmen hand-crank the R olls-Roy ce M erlin engin e of all

RAP H ur ricane M k I in early / 940, The pilot does 1101 ap­pear 10 be equipped icith fly illg clothing or parachu te, or 10 beconcent rating 0 11 the sta rt-u p procedure, This is more thanlikely one of the numerolls 'photo opportunity ' posed shotsuhich characterised press activities of the lime,

222 223

AIR CRAFT OF T HE SE CO~D WORLD WAR T ilE W E LL - E Q t.:II'I' E D W;\RI'I. ;\~ E

III the absence ojsufficient internal electric pincer, trolley-accumulators were a feature oj mallY ai r forces ill the late J930s andI 940s, This is a 'short -nose"Blenheim ,Ilk I of 1938, 77/C trolley -uccumu lator is seen uncard the tail oj the aircraft.

Radio and radio navigationRadio communication sets usually covered VHH HF and,\ 110 bands with direction finding (DF) loops, a commonfeature of all medium and large aircraft types irrespectiveof nationality. An example of a well-equipped aircraft, inthe radio sense, was the junkers ju 88G nightfightcr, Inaddition to its SN- 2 Lichtenstein AI radar and standardLuftwaffe radio equ ipment there was the FuBl 2 blindapproac h receiver, the FuG 120a Bernadine whichprodded a visual record on a chart of bearings fromradio beacons and the PeGe 6 radio compass , An im­porta ru item of radio equipment found in Allied aircraft

simplified and reduced the weight of wiring it causedinterference with electronic equipment, such as remotelylocated repeater compass systems,There were these andother differences among Ge rman, Amcrican and Britishaircraft. T he larger types ofAmerican aircraft might havea petrol (gasolincj -drivcn engine auxiliary power unit tosupply electric , hydraulic and compressed power. Smalltwo-stoke petrol engines were used in some Ger man air­craft for engine starting .

Throughout the Second \X'orld \X'ar the choice be­tween electric or hydra ulic operation of equipment wasoften a difficult one to make. Each had its advantagesand disadvantages. However, when pressurised crewcompartments became necessary, designers preferredelectrical systems because it was less difficult to passwiring through a pressure bulkhead than pipes . Electricaloperation was also preferred 10 having to arra nge satis­factory pressure resistant seals for moving mechanicalcomponents such as rods and shafts.

transformed and rectified to supply the I,000 V or moreneeded by electronic systems such as radar.

In some respects the three major players in theEuropean air war exhibited marked individualistic 'na­tional' characteristics for electrica l systems: they includ­ed alternato rs, direct cu rrent generators, twin-wiresystems or earthed (grounded) systems using the air­frame for DC current return . American aircraft usuallyhad single-wire electrical circuits , with earth (ground)return thro ugh the aircraft's structure. Although this

A ,lIesserschmiu Bf II OG. Once the radar scientists <cere al­kneed to specify external antennae for LllJt<caJJe aircraft , theylose 110 lime ill coming up uiith some drag-inducing arrays.These arc the ant ennae fo r the l ichtenstein nightfighterradar.

A simplified diagram oj the electrical system ill a B ristolB eaufighter. No te tha t only one DC generator is provided.The introduction oj airborne interception radar tchen theBeaufighter entered service tcith RAF Fighter Command atthe end of J940 required additional generating capacity.

Electrical power sys tems and actua torsIn the 1930s those charged with developing techn ologyand equipment in anticipa tion that war was fairly certai nto engulf Europe at the end of the 1930s sometimesfailed 10 foresee the demand s of war. A notable exampleis the growth of electronic equ ipment. Radio systems forcommunication and navigation, and radar for detectionand weapon systems and for navi gation required asignificant advance in electrical generating capacity. Atthe outb reak of war a typica l RAF min-engine aircrafthad limited electrical power available.There were usuallytwo 40 or 60 arnp/hr 12V accumulators in series and anengine-driven generator for the 28V (nominally 24 V)system. Among the warr ing air forces, the aircraft of theLuftwaffe gene rally had electrical systems which were farbetter than those in the aircraft of other countries,However, in the second half of the war there were con­siderable imp rovements in the electrical systems fined toAmerican and British aircra ft.T his was one consequenceof the increase in electronic systems, such as radar.

Generators in the 1930s were small in output com­pared with those at the end of the war. By the middl e ofthe conflict electrical systems were coming into use withinverters for providing AC power that could be

ser.--wm~

--"""-W> CM-fS

J ,8 ..u<T'O't eaxES

requiring specialised systems and equipment. After thefirst year of the Second \Vorld War fighters wereconver ted 10 the bombing role and bombers und errookmaritime patrols. These conversions requ ired corre­sponding changes and additions 10 their systems andequipment.The Luftwaffe had to und ergo a similar con­version . To some extent the changes were even greaterthan those of the RAF because it had 10 metamorp hosefrom a mostly tactical force to being a strategic weaponand, in the second half of the war, a defence force agains theavy and sustained day and night bombing.

T he development of aircraft systems in general dur­ing the second half of the 1930s owed much to militaryand civil developments in the USA, High-altitud e flightand turb osuperchargers, along with long-range bomberdevelopment, required considerable research and devel­oprncnt of systems and equipment. American all-meta lmonocoque construction was well advanced by the timethe other aviation nations started to go 'all-metal', By1939 and the start of the Second World War the majori­ty of Ameri can, German and japanese first-line aircraftwere of all-metal construction. In contrast the RAF 'sorder-o f-bat tle in that year included the mainly fabric­covered \Vellington and Hurricane .

224 225

A IR CRAFT O F T HE SE CO ~D \\ ' OR L D \\ ' A R T i l E " 'ELL- EQ UIPP ED \\'ARPLA~ E

Hie side-by -side cockpit ofall RAP niglufighter. This is a M osquito II equipped with 200M Hz air interception (A I) radar. Theca thode ray tube with uieuiing hood is 011 the right, zcith the controls below. Positioning the radar operator alongside the pilotand 1I0t, as ill the Bristol Blenheim and Beaufighter, at a remote locat ion ill the fus elage, signifi cantly imp roued the 'teanncors'

vital for a successful interception.

Hie distinc tive dipole radar antennae 011 the 1I0se and tcingtips of RAP M osqllito II nightfighter DD 737, e. / 942. The evell­tual development ofcentimetric rada r replaced the external arrays with a streamlined radome ill the 1I0se of the M osquito andproduced all ct'ell 1II0re successfu l destroyer ofnight intruders.

used by RAF Fighter Command in 1939 and 19~0 . Onemajor advantage was the ability to discriminate betwee ngro und features, thereby enabling the display of an ac­cura te representation of a target area.

In parallel with the deve lopment of a defence radarchain of stations aro und Britain, the Ge rma n air forceand navy encouraged the development of surveillancerada r sets to guard the sea frontiers and of vessel-to­vessel search and gun nery radar. The Luftwaffe in par­ticula r demanded radar equipme nt that was accurateenough to lay searchlights directly onto a target, Furthcradvances in radar technology in Germany provided thcLuftwaffe with improved gunlaying sets, These pro jectstended to divert thin king away from airborne intercep­tion radars (AIs) , but when it was realised that the RAFwas increas ing its night bombing sort ies, airbo rnenigh tfightcr sets were introd uced .

Airborne radar for German aircraft evolved from pre­war radio altimeters. In 19~0, nearly a year afte r thcBritish , the Luftwaffe started to expe riment seriou slywith radar for both inte rception and air-to-surface vessel(ASV) . Develop men t was delayed becau se the Luftwaffeinsisted on buried antennae on its aircraft. Not until19~ I were externa lly mounted antennae permitted, Bycontrast, in Britain the drag of the Yagi type rada r antcn­nae was acce pted as a necessar y evil unt il centi metricradar, with its single ante nnae in a rad omc (d ielectr icradar dome), carne into full production ,

The first German nightfighter radar was the' Lichtenstein' , opera tionally tested in a Do 215 , Thisused parts from the ground-based defence 'Freya'

it was not until the autumn of 19~0 that thc firstsuccessful night interception was made by an RAFnightfighter,

In 1939 and 1 9~0 RAF Blenh eim fighte r crews hadto use rada r equipment that was bulky, unre liable andneeded a specially tra ined operator to interpret the ca th­ode ray tube (CRT ) display. By the end of thc Second\X'orld \X'ar radar intercep tion sets were more compactand reliable, with displays that could be read directly bythe pilot and were able to 'see' wi th far grea ter range anddiscrimination,

The imp ortance of these early developments is the irimpact on thc overall equipment of aircraft in general. Asthe war pr og ressed airborne radar was rapid ly improvedin terms of compactness, lower weight, target discrimi­na tion and range.

In 1939 the most importa nt deve lop ment target washigh transmitted power at centimetric as opposed (0

metric wavelengths, Sir Henr y Tizard, the British scien­tist charged with the co-ordination and devel opment ofmeans to detect aircraft, stated tha t: 'T he side that de­velops the radar with thc greater transmitter power willwin the war'. High power in a compact uni t with operat­ing frequencies highe r than 500 ,\ 1Hz (60cm) was need­cd for night fighter equipment . The race was won forBritain by scientists at Birmingham University (Randalland Boot) who successfully developed the resonant cav­ity magnetron capable of producing high power at centi­metric wavelengths. This breakthrough led to the sharpor 'narrow' bcam radar which had many advantagescompared with the 1.5m 'floodlight' type radars being

well-known phenomena that radi o waves are reflected inways anal ogous (0 the reflection of waves in water, airand light.

By force of circu mstances, Britain and Ge rmany inpar ticular advanced radar from its experime ntal status toa prac ticable method of detectin g aircraft and ships at

distances grea ter than that of human vision and hearin g.In Britain in the first half of the 1930s it was realisedtha t, in thc event of war, sta nding patrols of fighte rs forintercepting attacking bombers would require far toomany fighters and would have little chance of success.This spurred the devel op ment of a radar 'barrie r' aroundthc sho res of Britain. As the defensive Chain Hom e wasdeveloped and stations erected it was also realised thatalthough the system could be used to di rec t figh ters towith in visual range of attacki ng for mations in daylight, atnight they would more tha n likely escape inte rception .Therefore airborne radar equipment had to be devel­oped, Airborne radar was ready by September 1939,although the sets were still in the experimental stage and

operating from aircraft carriers were the radio homingbeacons without which crews would have been lost, be­cause while the y were away their carrier might havemoved far from its orig inal position.

Ra da rBy the middle of the Second \X'orld War airborne radarequipment of one type or ano ther was to be found inGerman, japanese, American and British aircraft. Therecord s do not indi cate that production standard air­borne radar was fined to Russian airc raft.

The principle of reflected radi o waves had beendemonstrated by scientis ts in the nine teenth century.In thc first decade of the twentieth century M arconiof Italy and Hulsrneycr of Ge rmany des igned someof thc earlie st syste ms for the detection of objec ts overuseful distances and not just confined withi n a lab­oratory.

In the 1930s scientists in many countries developed anumber of object-de tecting techniques based on thc

226 227

AIR CRAFT OF TilE SE COSlJ \\ 'ORI.lJ " 'AR TilE " 'EI.I., EQ UIPI'ElJ WARI'LASE

AlI RA F Consolidated Liberator I equipped icith the amell/we arrays ojair-to-surface rcssel (A S I/ radar,

However, thc RAF had to wait until the ccntimctrictech nique had been perfected befo re H,S with its plan­positi on ind icato r (1'1'1) display could bc developed . Soit was not until 30 January 1943 that H,S was used op ­crationally, This was fourteen months afte r thc first10cm radar tests in a Blenh eim had proved thc pr incip leof a terra in-mapping radar. At the time Am er ican clec­troni cs exper ts were sceptical of H,S and acc used thcBritish of wasting resources, It took mu ch persuasion bythe T RE to convince the USAAF of thc adva ntages of

The picture of the It- day invasion craft approaching thebeaches 011 the plan position indicator (PPI) ofall H,S radar,The line indicates the aircraft's heading.

extent to which British and Am erican cavity magnetrontechno logy and pro duction capac ity had advanced,

A notable difference between Ge rman rada r deve l­oped in thc Sccond \Vorld \Var and that of American andBritish achievements was the H,S rada r developed byscientists at the Telecommunications Research Establish­ment (T RE) in the UK. It had been observed by thosedeveloping the early 1.5m AI equipment for the RAFthat prominent , that is in the electronic sense, gro undfeatu res cou ld bc distinguished on thc CRT display,

The US "'avy 's single-seat Gru nnnan F6F- 3.\' Hellcat ,msequipped scith a pilot-operated 3cm interception radar 73..pcA PS-6, The set ,cas installed ill the fuselage behind the cock­pit and connected to the antennae ;11 a radome Oil the star­board icing, scm here, by a 101lg uxnxguide.

based svstc rns tha t thc tech no logy took off at theRadi atio~ Laboratory of thc ,\ Iassachu sctt s Institu te ofTechn ology, From 1941 onward the Allies were rarelysho rt of ideas and production facilities for all types ofradar. On the other side , altho ugh Ge rma n scientists ex­hibited correspondi ng innovation and in the last twovears of war were beg inning to match system-by-systemthe rada rs arrayed against thc Luftwaffe's aircraft andguns, the y were handi capped by three non- scientific as­pccts of their work , Firstly. Hitler decided that all rc­search. including radar. be restricted to projec ts whichcou ld be put into operation without delay, Secondly, theLuftwaffe high command failed to appreciate the po tcn ­tial of radar,Thirdly. Gcrman scientists. altho ugh awareof the need for ccntimc tric equi pment, d id not realise the

svstem, Like the earlv British equipment it was heavya'nd bulkv, Rcscarch ' into air-to- surface vessel (ASV)radar went on in parallel with nightfightcr rada r devel­op rncnt. By July 1941 an ASV radar ('Atlas') was in­stalled in a Fw 200, To indicate thc difference inprior ities between thc two oppos ing air forces the RAFhad bv thcn been supplied with over 6.000 ASV(200,\ iHz) sets, which proved invaluable to CoastalCommand despite a high percentage of failures and fre­qucnt damage to thc projecting Yagi type ant ennae,

Althou gh radar had been experimented with in theUSA before 1941 and expe rimental sets had been eval­uatcd in both ships and aircraft. it was not un til Britishscientists visited the USA in October 1940 and disclosedthe progress madc with centirnctric, cavity magnetron-

I I II

AlI RAF trellillgtoll Vlll equipped tcith 200,I /H:: ASI: zcith the cha racteristic ammllae arrays along the copand sides of the

fuselage and under the icing.

71,e radomc under this Austin-built La ncaster bomber housed the ame/mae for the H,S system tchich prorided the navigatorunth a 'radar' map of the terrain and targets,

228 229

Thirty-four-gallon jettisonablc long-range fuel Wilks under the u'illg ofa .1I0squilO ,Il k 34. Like the M osquito'sfu selage, thesetanhs ,,,ere made of moulded plytcood.

AIR CRAFT OF TilE SECO~lJ \X·ORI.D XX'AR

the radar. Even the 10 cm H,S was unable to provideeno ugh discri mination for large inland targets, such asBerlin, and a rapid modification programme had to bestarted to change to a 3cm system ( IOG Hz),

Not until an RAF Stirling bomber crashed in theNetherlands did German scientists appreciate theeffectiveness of a resonant cavity magnetron in produc­ing high powers at centimetric wavelengths. They werethen able to develop a cor responding system . This wasFuG 224 'Berlin'; one of a family of radars with 1'1'1disp lays.

In parallel with ASV,AI and H,S British scientists de­veloped a number of radar-based navigation and blind­bombi ng systems. T hese were Gee and Oboe. In 1940the Luftwaffe had made effective usc of a radio beam toensure the accurate location of import ant targets inBritain, This encouraged scientists of the Tele­communications Research Establishment , later the RoyalRadar Establishment , to devise a radio beam guidancesystem for the RAE At the time the standard of naviga­tion, target finding and bomb-aiming was so low thatmost of the RAF's night bomber sort ies were ineffectual.However, by 1942 RAF Bomber Co mmand aircraftwere equipped with the electronic navigation systemGee , Op eratin g in the 22-85 ,\ 1Hz band , this was one ofthe first radio-lattice systems, There was also Oboe, inwhich radar stations tracked an aircra ft and issued guid­ance instru ctions for steering it across a targe t and re­leasing marker flares, Oboe led to G-H, a system whichenabled aircraft to interroga te the gro und stations andobta in very accurate positional inform ation.

One of the keys to radar success in the UK was thedevelopment of electro nic displays, using CRTs, whoseinformatio n was easy to interp ret. For example Gee onlyrequired the operator in an aircraft to align two 'blips'(echoes) on two sets of time bases and refer the readingsto a Gee chart from which an instantaneous and very ac­cura te indication of position was obtained, By the end of1942 the RAF's previously poo r navigation , target­finding and bomb-aiming performance was being re­placed by advanced electronic aids that providedhitherto undreamed-of accuracy and discrimination,Without Oboe and G-H for the target-making aircraftand Gee and H,S for the main bombe r force, it wouldhave been impracticable and unsafe to dispatch hun­dreds of aircraft, but with these new electronic aids theystreamed across a target in a short period , thereby satu­rating the defences, Independently of weather and visi­bility, targets were attacked with great certa inty becausethe bombers of 1942 onward were tru ly 'well-equipped',

As the war progressed first one side then the othergained the technical advantage , The electronic war wasfought hard throughout the six years from 1939:lb e re­sults can be seen in the wide range of electronic equip­ment fitted to all types of aircraft: radar for air

III the last year of the war, gunlaying radar fo r the reartu rrets of RAF bombers u'as developed, This is olle of the'Village Inn ' experimental radar installations 0 11 the rearturret of a Halifax bomber.

interception (AI), air-to-s urface vessel (ASV), plan­position (1'1'1) and tail-defence. A significant radar de­velopmen t, in addi tion to more compact installations,was the growth of radar sets for direct usc by the pilot. Anotable examp le is the AI'S-6 pilot-operated intercep­tion radar installed in Grumman 1'61' Hellcats of the USN avy.

In additio n to rada r for navigation, target finding andattacking, each air force developed a range of electronicwarfare devices intended to eliminate and confuse theenemy's radar. They also had to develop equipmentwhich would mod ify the reflected radar signals from anaircraft so as to indicate that it was friendly, this beingtermed 'Identification Friend or Foe' (IFF).

Overall the approach to rada r develop ment was gov­emcd to a large extent by the stra tegic and tactical posi­tion of each air force in relation to its opponent , T heBritish were forced to develop a defensive radar in ahurry in the mid-1930s with the result that airborneradar had to be given lower priority. One consequencetherefore was the sparsity of aircraft electronic systems,In the beginnin g the Lu ftwaffe had no need for airborneradar. Its targets were within reach and easily identifiablein daylight. For night bombing there was a satisfactoryradio beam system which was difficult to interfere with.Radar development was concentrated on long-range sur­veillance and flak control. Britain , and later the USA,eventually had 10 develop radar systems to cover a widerange of tasks. In doing so they literally swamped theefforts of Ge rman scientists as well as the Luftwaffe'sab ility both to attack and defend ,

Fuel and oil systemsA typical arrangement of a fuel system consisted of anumbe r of separate fuel tanks, The main tanks would bein the wings, arranged as inner and outer sets with elec­trically powered booster pumps to ensure that there wasno interruption of the supply to the engines during crit ­ical stages of flight such as take-off.This applied usuallyto multi-engi ne aircraft. Single-engine aircraft such asfighters often carried the major part of their fuel in fuse­lage mounted tanks: either between the engine and thecockpit or under the cockpit: and in some aircraft, suchas the Fw 190, both under and behind the pilot. In multi­engine aircraft the auxiliary or overload tanks might bcin the fuselage, the bomb compa rtment or as jettisonabletanks und er the wings.

Although the conce pt of the auxiliary tank carriedunder an aircraft had emerged before the Second \,'orldW'ar the pr incipal protago nists were slow to consider theuse of such tanks. However, by the third year of war boththe Ge rmans and the British had adopted non-d efensivefighter tactics, Aggressive fighter sweeps deep intoenemy airspace required significant extensions to the op­erating range of fighters, Hence the adoption of the ex­ternal jettisonable tanks, In the USA designer s learntfrom the experience of the war in Europe so that beforewar was joined with japan, American aircraft had fuelsystems designed from the start to permit both high­altitude and extreme-range operatio ns,

The extended range and higher operating altitudes ofboth bombers and fighters required that the fuel tanks bepressurised to amid fuel being lost through vaporisationat high altitudes , The use of auxiliary tanks often re­quired the installation of immersed electrically drivenpumps to ensure that the fuel was fed positively into the

Til E xx ' E 1. 1. - E QU I I' I' E D xx·A R I' L A x E

main fuel system collector tanks, from which the supplywas taken to individual engine s. Electrically operatedbooster pumps were used for take-off and landingphases of flight in order to ensu re an uninterrupted sup­ply of fuel to the engines, even though there were usual­ly engine-driven pumps, They were also switched on athigh altitudes, Incidentally, when fuel tanks had vents toatmosphere, to prevent a vacuum above the fuel, thevents had to be carefully designed and positioned, othe r­wise when the tanks were full the low aerodynamic pres­sure over the upper surface of the wing sometimescaused the fuel to siphon out through the vents. An im­portant detail was the fuel straine rs and drain cocks usedto separate water from the fuel in the tanks. T he water­drain cock for each tank system was a vital item, Thedenser water would separate out from the fuel and be atthe lowest level so that it could be drained off beforeflight. Also of importance was the distinctive dye addedto the fuel to indicate its octane rating; this generally pre­vented the wrong fuel being used for the type of enginefilled.

Although Ge rman, British, japanese and Ameri canaircraft fuel systems were basically similar, there weresome significant differences in detail. For exampleBritish engines were usually pr imed by means of aKiGas plunger-type hand pump. This was mounted inthe cockpit of single-engine aircraft. In multi-engine air­craft the KiGas pumps were mounted on the undersideof each engine nacelle,The technicalities of engine start­ing arc often ignored by writers of fictional accounts offlying. They imply that wartime RAF pilots merely hadto press the equivalent of a car's starter switch to get aninstant start . American aircraft in contrast were usuallyequipped wi th electrically operated priming pumps that

230 231

AIR CRAFT OF THE SE CO:-:D \X'ORI.D \X'ART ilE \X' E I. I. - E Q u I I' I' E () \X' A R I' I. A x E

Th e interior ofa trellillglOlI bomber, Equ ipment 011 uieu: includes: CU'O rem's ofoxygen bottles aboce the nav igator's head, the ar­moured bulkhead foncard, the main unngspar scith the fuel system management controls and sy stem diagram, the creu' restbunk, and at the lOp the astrodome and the stoued padded supports for the navigator tchen using a sex tant . Unusually the creware 1101tcearing lifejackets (,\lae lresls), parachute harness or helmets.

rubber and fabric so as to build up a thick self-scalinglayer . similar to the composition of a car tyrc, Some air­craft types. notably Russian. had a protection systemwhich filled the m id above the fuel in the tanks with aninert gas such as nitrogen , Others systems used the en­gine exhaust as a source of inert gas.

The subtle variati ons among the many ditTerent air­craft fuel systems mean that only a generalised desc rip­tion can be given.

~. . .- CASING C!' W. LCANISED !lUBBER.

~- : _... ~SEVERAl LAYER.S C!' PARA IlU8&R

SELF- SCAU":; RUBBER."'-----CHROME LEATHER."-- FIBR£ TANK

H ydraulic sys te msIn the absence or impracticability of manual ope ration ofequipment the aircraft designe r could choose amongelectric. compressed air . pre-compressed sp ring. explo­sive, dynamic air pressure or hydraulic operation, T helast. along with electr ic operation, was the most usualmethod of power ing equipme nt, suc h as retractable un­dercarriages, lift and drag surfaces, suc h as flap s anddive brakes, as well as gun mountings.

A typical hydraulic system of the mid-war period em­phasised the gro wth in the number of separa te systemsand in conseque nce the growth in aircraft complexity,Each engine drove a hydraulic pump. Hydraulic lines ledfrom the pum ps to selector valves in the cockpit wherethere was usually an eme rgency hand -pump. In someaircraft the selecto r valves were positioned close to therelevant system to be operated , These valves would be

Construction details of the self-scaling fuel tank s used ill the.ll1l1kersJII 88, 111 the erent ofa bullet orJlak fragment pierc­ing the tanh, leaking fu el caused the synthetic rubber 10 be­come plus lie and seal the hole.

fuel cocks were often positioned in a gro up located re­motely from the cockpit. In the Vickers \X 'ellington. withits early 1930s technology. fuel pipes and cocks weremounted on the aft face of the main spar where it passedthrough the fuselage . A mimic diag ram of the fuel sys­tem was engraved on metal plates to remind the crewmember sent aft which cock to open and which to elosein order to effect a change in the fuel system. Anotherarchaic featu re of the \X'ellington 's fuel system was thepull -wires which led from the fuselage out to the 60gal(276-litre) reserve fuel tank in each engine nacelle . It isa matter of debate whether the complexity of an electri­cal circuit and electrical actuator was better than thesimplicity of the mechanical syste m in a multi-crewaircraft.

So far this survey of fuel systems has concentrated onpetrol (gasoline) -powered engines , However, we mu stno t forget tha t the Ge rma n aircraft industr y develo ped anu mbe r of diesel eng ines for aircraft use . Examples werethe eng ines of the Blohm und Voss Bv 222 and the 1\\ '138 . The latt er had three jurno 205 -D diesel eng ines,T here was a 760-litre (16 7gal) fuel tank for eac h engi nealong with rese rve tanks, All the tank and cross-feedselector cocks were located in the night eng ineer's sta­tion. T here was also a hand pump for transferr ing fuelfrom the reserve to the individual eng ine tanks.Ind icative of the avoidance of too muc h comp lexity. inthe shape of remotely contro lled valves and poweredpumps. was the requ irement when sta rti ng engines forboth the pilot and the flight engineer to usc hand pu mpsto raise sufficient pressure in the fuel lines.

There was no international standard of design andmaterials used to prevent damage to fuel tanks from lIakfragments and the bullets of fighter s and to provide aself-scaling action. A nu mbe r of different techniqueswere applied: these included layers of vulcanised spongerubber covering: another method was to apply layers of

A .lllIslallg II ,";11z experimental early- type long-range 11/1­

dencing fuel tanks.JII£V 19.J3,

Fu el selector cocks could be manually or electri callyoperated, In the Consolida ted B-24 of the USAAF thefuel system's principal selector cocks were locat ed in thebom b compartme nt. The conte nts ind ica tor s were of theboiler gauge-glass direct read ing type in which the fuellevel was observed in ver tical glass tub es. Of course therewere shut-off cocks for isolatin g the gauge glasses whennot in usc , In British mu lti-e ngine aircraft the various

could be selected by the pilot in the cockpit. German fuelpriming meth ods were similar to Americ an .

In general it can be recorded that as the warprogressed fuel systems becam e more adaptable to oper­ating requirements, and in consequence more compli­cate d, The compa ratively simple fuel systems ofthe 1930s were replaced by far more sophisticatedequipment,

232 233

A IR e R AFT 0 F TilE S E C 0 x [) \X' 0 R I. [) XX ·A R

HIe interior oja BOlll101I Paul ncin 12.7mm tail gun turret,equipped with ,Ilk II gyro gunsight, ill a Halifax bomber.Theturret used all electrically ptncered hydraulic system forrotation andJor gun eleration.

controlled remotely from the cockpit throu gh electricalcircuits and electric actua tors. Hydraulic actuatorswould be used for a wide range of functi ons. This in­clud ed : gun cocking (arming) , undercarriag e operation,bomb bay door opening and closing, wing flap and divebrakes, engine cowling flaps and, in naval aircraft, wingfold ing and arrester hook opera tion. Some British air­craft, notably the \X' hirlwind and the Stirling, hadExac tor hydraulic engine controls which obviated theneed for long and complex rod or cable controls betweenthe cockpit and the engines.

The biggest load on a hydrau lic system was often thatof the flaps and undercarriage: in par ticu lar the largearea of flap that had to be forced down into the airflowcould impose a severe demand on the system. This wasemphasised by the considerab le number of hand-pumpactions needed to lower the flaps or undercarriage in theevent of pump failure. •

The basic hydraulic system of pump or pumps, se­lector valves and actuating cylinders was comparativelysimple. However, in practice there had to be many addi­tion al items to ensure satisfactory ope ration. These in­cluded check valves to prevent reverse flow, relief valvesto protect against excessive pressure, flow equalisers ,filters and pressure indicators. Also, in some aircraftthere was a certa in amo unt of redundancy designed intothe system to enab le it to withs tand battle dama ge.

In some aircraft, hydrauli c operation of equipmentwould be combined with electric power. An electricmotor operated a hydraulic pump connec ted to a hy­draulic jack. This arrangement was sometimes adopted

234

A typical undercarriage assembly, with hydraulic actuatorjack (lOP cent re)Jor retraction and ex tension. 771is is the star­board undercarriage leg ofa IlHlillglOlI, c.1940.

to eliminate the weight and vulnerability of longhydraulic pipe runs. It also avoided bringing hydraulicpip es and valves into the coc kpit or the weight of me­chanical linkages between the cockpit and a remotely lo­cated valve. An example was to be found in the RussianPe-2 light bomber. An electrically powered hydraulicpump was provided in some aircraft for both eme rgencyusc and to ena ble hydraulic actuators of equip ment to beoperated pr ior to starting the engines. An example is thesystem in the Co nsolida ted B-24. In the absence of anexternal starter acc umulator or electrical power genera­tor and with depleted aircraft batteries , the B-24 cou ld

be 'brought to life' by hand sta rting a small petrol(gasoline) , lawnrnower-size engine which providedelectrical power. In turn the hydraulic system could thenbe used .

An unusual application of hydraulic power could befound in some Russian aircraft, in which a hvdraulicengine-driven pump supplied rem ote power to a hv­draulic vane-m otor which in turn drove a fuel pump..

Vac uum sys temsIn Ame rican and British aircraft some instr uments andcamera equipment were ope rated by vacuum from en­gine- mounted pumps. Still visible on the exter ior ofBritish aircraft in the early year s of the Second WorldWar were the 1930s-vintage venturi tubes which provid­ed vacuum power for the instrument s. Three instru­ments in particular were operated by vacuum: ar tificialhor izon , directional gyro and turn and bank (slip).

Pneumatic sys temsA representative pneumatic system is that of the deHavilland Mosqui to. Its components and functions werealso appl icable to othe r aircraft types. An engine- drivencompressor charged air bottl es from which supply pipeswere fed to the radiator flap jacks, to the gun trigger unit sand to the wheel brake cylinders.

Under car r iag es, ali ghting a nd other a ir craft/ te r raininterfaci ng equipmentT he usc of tricycle undercarriages in the Second WorldWar was confined largely to American aircraft. Althoughthere were isolated examples of 'p rop eller' aircraft withtricycle gear outside the USA before 1940, it was notuntil the adven t of jet prop ulsion that British andGerma n designers considered the nosewheel arra nge­ment to be essenti al. T he choice of a nosewheel lavoutwas often dictated by aerodynamic considerati·ons.Incidentally, it is a misnom er to refer to a nosewheelundercarri age as 'tricycle' because the tailwheel, ' taildra gger ' , arrangement is also a tricycle. By the start ofthe Second World War the nosewheel type undercar riagewas being referred to as a ' tricycle' to distinguish it fromthe then-conventional thr ee-unit undercarriage, the tail­wheel typ e.

In the USA the nosewheel underc arri age, often steer­able, was being specified before 1939 and eventually itwas considered essential for the future generation ofmedi um and large bombers. Examples are the B-24,B-25, B-26, and B-29. It was also applied to the twin­eng ine P-38 and the P-61. The Co nso lidated B-24reflects the change in 'undercarriage' thinkin g since theadvent of the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress in 1935. USNavy aircraft in general and single-engine fighters of theUSM F, with the exce ption of the P-3 9 Airacobra andP-6 3 Kingcobra, had a tailwheel.

235

Til E W ELL ·EQ UtPP ED XX' ARPLA ~E

To achieve a soft 'footprint ', Arado provided its Ar 232Tausendfiissler with a multiplicity oj tcheels. Altogetherthere were 25 uheels, including the conventional tricyclenoseuheel retractable landing gear.

T he Ge rma n air force's range of aircraft types in­elud ed only a few with a nosewhcel undercarriage: not­ably the Me 262, Do 335, the Arado 232 and 234 andthe He 162 and 219. The Arado 232 Tausendfussler(M illipede) had altoge ther 25 wheels. T hree were in thetr icycle noscwheel retractable landing gear. T he othe rs,in eleven pairs along the underside of the fuselage, en­abled the aircraft to be taxied over soft or uneven gro undonce the main wheels were partly retracted . The Arado232's multi-wheeled undercarriage anticipa ted those ofmodern militar y transport aircraft such as the C-130.

A version of the Bf 109, the G-2/R 1, was equippedwith a ' tr icycle' undercarriage in which an extra, ietti­sonable oleo leg was fitted, long enough to keep the fuse­lage level. This was devised so that a i, 120Ib(500kg)bom b could be carr ied under the fuselage. However ,none of the pr incipal types of Ge rman prop eller­dri ven bombers had a nosewheel undercarriage. TheDo 335 fighter was rwin-engined, with one propellerpu shing and one pulling; it had to have a nosewheel

An experimental version oj the M esserschmiu BJ 109equipped with all auxiliary undercarriage wheel 10 provideground clearancefor exceptionally large items carried underthe centre section, such as this 500kg bomb.Aft er take-off theauxiliary wheel and leg were jettisoned and descended byparachute.

AIR CRAFT OF TilE SE CO:-:D \X' O R I. IJ \X'AR THE \X'EI.I. - EQ UIPPED \X' A R I' L A :-: E

A Spitfire Vc scith the 'tropical 'nype air intake designed 10 keep dust and sand pa rticles 0111 of the engine . This ",as a less ele­gam solution than that adopted for the DB 600 series engine of the Bf 10 9 and the Italia n Re 2000, The long-range, drop­pable, slipper-type tank holding 170gal and WI exira 29gallallk ill the rear of the fuse lage increased the total fue l arailable forfe rryillg a Spitfi re V 10 284gal,

A North American B-25 of the US'MF ill Alaska. The engines are pre-healed by a sma ll petrol engine un it tchich feeds hOI airthrough trunhing 10 the engine nacelles.

lee prevention and removalOperational dem and s meant that pilots had to take theiraircraft throu gh air conditions in which ice would formon wings and empenn age; it might even form on thepropeller blades.Variou s method s were in use to prevent(anti-ice) or disperse (de-ice) ice suc h as: fluid pumped

intervals to prevent them being dam aged and to ensurethat they could be started without delay, Another remedyfor difficult star ting in extreme cold was the dilution ofan engine's lubrication system with fuel. Setting con­tained fires in the induction system was a regular prac­tice on the Eastern Front.

Between the extremes of the Arctic and the desert en­vironrncnts were the trop ical monsoon conditions thatturned airfields into lakes. Aircr aft and engines often hadto be serviced in the open and with no special equipmentto alleviate the probl ems of the mechanics,This appliedparticularly to the RAF and the Japanese air force s oper­ating in South East Asia and to the USAAI; USN andUSMC in the Pacific campa igns. De Havilland Mos­quitoes used in that part of the wor ld were lost becausethe adhesive used to join the compos ite wood structurefailed under effects of high humidity and temperature,This is an example of where there was no specialisedequipment available either to detect, other than by visu­al means, or rem edy structu ral failure.

The leading edge of the icing of this Boeing B- 17 is formedby infia table rubber de-icing 'boots' that tcere cycled bycompressed air 10 prevent a build-up of ice,

Starting engines in extremely low temperatures re­qu ired the provision of mobile hot- air sup ply un its,T hese fed hot air through flexible trunking connected tothe covers placed over the engine. In the absence of heat­ing systems the mecha nics had to run the engines at

made contact with the gro und, Those pilots who usedthis method found the tran sition to landing a nosewheelaircraft fairly easy,

Extreme environmentsWith the exception of Russia, the pr incipal air force s ofthe late 1930s and early 1940s paid only slight attentionto the needs of operating aircraft in extreme conditionsof temperature, humidity, du st and mud, However, eventhe Russian air force found itself in difficulty in heavysnow and extrem ely low temperatures during the Russo­Finnish war in the winter of 1939-10, and an RAFBlenh eim squadron sent to help Finland was un able tocope with the winter conditions. The Lu ftwaffe wasfaced with the probl em of excessive engine wear fromdust ingestion when operating from unprepared run­ways in Sp ain prior to 1939 . The RAJ; which exercisedmilitar y control over the north western parts of theIndian sub-continent and ,\ lesopotamia, had long expe­rience of clogged radiator core s and engine lives reducedby ingested sand, However, in general, it was not until airforces were forced by circumstances in the war to con­tinue air operations in extreme environm ents and notwait for more favourable conditions, that extraordinarysteps had to be taken to mitigate adverse effects,

Additi onal filters, designed to reduce sand and du stingestion , were added to engine air intakes.The fine noselines of Spitfires and Hurricanes were spoilt by the bulkyfilters fitted for use in North Africa and other 'dusty'areas, In contras t the DB 60 1 engine in the Bf 109 andthe Italian Macch i C, 202 had a comparatively compactfilter alongside the engine on the left of the cowling.

undercarri age in order to keep the fuselage level when onthe gro und becau se of the tail-mo unted pu sherpropeller.

British designers were constra ined by a combinationof tradition and the pre ssures of war to stick to the tail­wheel layou t. Onl y when the RAF began to acquireAmerican aircra ft such as the Boston , Marauder,Liberator and B-25 Mitchell did the merits of the nose­wheel undercarriage become so apparent that the Air,\ Iinistry enco uraged its use. At the same time it has tobe noted that many of the aircr aft designs submitted byindividual companies competing for Air ,\ linistry con­tracts would have had noscwhcel undercarriages, Som ecompa nies, however, such as Handle y Page and AHo inthe UK, tend ed to specify a conventional tailwhcclarrangement ,

As far as the mechanism and 'plumbing' were con­cerned the noscwheel undercarriage presented no ser­ious design and construction problems. However, therewere sometimes difficultie s with avoiding nosewheel'shimmy' (a rap id oscillation from side to side). An es­sential accessory was an anti- shimmy hydraulic damper.It also required a strengthe ned forward section of thefuselage and room in which to house the noscwhc el andleg when retracted ,

The noscwheel undercarriage intro duced a differentlandi ng technique compared with tailwheel aircraft,which were often set down on all three 'points', Thistechnique could not always be used safely with a nose­wheel, althoug h by the mid point of the war ' tail dra g­gers' were usually landed in what was term ed a 'wheeler' ,with the tailwhecl held off until the main wheels had

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AIR C RAFT OF TilE SE CO:-':D WORLD WAR

This Focke-ll'i/ifFw 190A-3 cockpit emphasises the comparat ively high standard of'finis h and details applied to Germall cock ­pits, including the prouision ofa floor. To the left of the Revi refl ector gunsight are the round COllllters fo r the arma ment; a de­tail 1I0t provided ill B ritish fighters.

238

out thro ugh holes along the leading edge or through aporous wick: rubber 'boots' fixed along leading edgesthat could be inflated and de flated by the cyclic ap plica­tion of compressed air, hot air ductcd from the engineexhaust or from a combustio n heater and electrica llyheated eleme nts on critical surfaces. T he last methodplaced a heavy load on an aircraft's electrica l system,

Co ckp its a nd th eir equip ment

IntroductionBefore describing the pr incipal characteristics of thecockpits of Second \X/orld War aircraft it is importantto consider the relationship of the coc kpit and its equip­ment to the aircraft as a whole.

At the end of the 20th centu ry we have become usedto the concep t of the man-machine inte rface and tointegrated systems thro ughout an aircraft. \X/e now ex­pect that avionic systems will have built-in intelligence sothat they can per form their functi ons without human in­tervention . In 1939 the idea of built-in test (BIT) andself-mo nitoring were virtu ally unkn own within the pre­sent meanin g of those terms, '1\\'0 aspects of the SecondWorld War cockpit illustrate these conce pts: First, someinstrume nts had to be interpreted by the pilot in order toobtain the required information , This interpretatio n in­cluded app lying correcti ng facto rs in order to ob tain a'true' reading. Second, engine contro l and monitoringwas often witho ut the benefit of auto matic systems, Forexample American engines were not, in genera l,equipped with automatic boost and mixture con trols,This meant that the pilot had to watch carefully the en­gine instrument s when making large throttle movement s.In contras t British and German engines were given morecomprehensive automatic controls. These relieved thepilot of the need constantly to monit or engine indica­tions, parti cularly when concentrating on a target orevading the attentions of ene my fighters during an aerialbattle.

German cockpits had equipment , including instru­ments which made them insta ntly distingu ishable fromAmerican British, Italian and Japanese types. In gene ralGe rma n cockpits were equipped, both in detail and over­all, to a very high standard compared with those ofBritish aircraft. Switches, selector levers, instru me ntsand the minutiae, such as labels, were carefully designed.Wiring was confined to conduits.T he cockpit equipmentreflected the generally high qu ality of Germa n designand manufacture. American cockpits, compared withBritish, were in general far more comfortable for thecrew. There was extensive padded lining to isolate thecrew from externa l noise. Ash trays were often provided.

French cockpits prior to 1940, as a man-machin einterface, were a mixture of Ge rma n and British ideas ,With only six mon ths in which to perfect better cockpits,

TilE W E L L - E Q UIP P E D W A RP L A :-': E

based on air war experience, the French were unable tomake any contribution to design in general.

FenestrationIn the 1930s and 1940s cockpit fenestration design formulti-engine aircraft cou ld be divided into two basicprofiles: the trad itional stepped nose, as commo n in civiltransports, and the unbroken nose line favoured formany German aircraft; and, later in the war, adopted byBoeing for the B-29, Although the semi-sp herical arrayof sma ll windows was intended to give wide fields ofview forward, up ward, below and on both bows it ex­posed the crew to intense sunlight. At night, particularlyin rain, the mu ltiple reflections of lights on the ground,such as when landing, gave the pilot a dangerously dis­torted view,

Perhaps one of the most significant changes in cock­pit fenestration that occurred at the end of the 1930sconce rned the design of canop ies on single-seal airc raft.Pilots of 1930s biplane fighters d isliked a completely en­closed cockpit because it added to the difficulties of visu­ally searching for the enemy, "Ib is pilot 's view upw ard ,downward and to the sides was already ham pered by thewings, the inte rplane struts and rigging wires, The in­crease in performance of the monoplane fighters predi­cated an enclosed cockpit. Each of the three pr incipa lfighte rs in the Battle of Britain in 1940 had a distinctivecockpit windscreen and canopy.The Bf 109 canopy andwindscreen had an angular shape made up of individualflat pa nels.The canopy was hinged on the right to allowaccess to the cockpit. However this had the disadvantagethat the aircraft cou ld not be taxied with it ope n. T heAmerican Bell Airacobra had a car-type door, as did theearly mark of the Hawker Typh oon : the door had to beclosed once the engine was started ,The Bf 109 cockpitclosely confined the pilot: its dim ensions seemed to havebeen related to the average shoulder width and seate d

The cockpit ofa Bf 109E; shounng the hinged canopy tchichhad to be closed before taxying. A section of the armourplating fo r the pilot's seat ,cas fixed to the caIlOPY.

239

,\ IR e R.-\ F T 0 F TilE SE C 0 S J) \X' 0 R L D \X'.-\ R

Bef ore the 'bubble' stype canopy became COl/m IOI/, rariousmethods of improving a pilot's all -round v iL''it, !"aL' tr ied.aile !m s the .\lalcolm hood, here SL'm f illed 10 XorthAmerican ,Ilustallg III 1-:'\88 9,

height of pilots an d therefore made no allowance for thelarge man , The Spitfire starte d life with a wind screenand cano py that proved un suitable for air comba t. Thecurved pan els di storted the pilot 's view and he co uld no tturn his head sufficiently [0 sec astern , The demands ofair fighting prompted major changes to the sha pe of thecoc kpit canopy.The Hurricane's canopy was made up ofman y sma ll flat panels an d. unli ke the Spitfi re. the typenever acq uired a bu bble canopy.

During the Second \X'orld \, 'ar thcrc were few depar­tures from the exce pte d posi tion for the pilot or pilots.T his was close [0 the nose in multi-engine aircraft andbehind the engi ne in single - and tandem-scat aircraft.Othe r crew positions could eithe r be concentrated closeto the pilot. as in man y German aircraft. or dispersed in

rem otel y located gun. bomb-aiming and navigation posi­tions . An example of a unique attempt to be different wasthe 1\\' I·H 13. This was an asymmetric single -enginemonopl ane with the crew in a nacelle [0 sta rboa rd of theengine, The latter was extended aft [0 carry the empen­nage. the tailplane of which extended to port. Thisarrangement of crew and engine provided excellentfields of vision in most directions except [0 the left.

Single- and tandem-scat cockpits world -wide wereusually built to a standard arrangement. \\ 'hereas multi ­engine crew postions exhibited significant differencesam ong the 'airwar' nations. For example and as men­tioned, German designers favou red concentration of thecrew members in a forward locati on as in the Do 2 17and j u 88 and their subsequent variants.There was usu­ally only one set of pilot's controls and this was to the leftof the centre line . A basic set of flight controls might beprovided for a seati ng position on the right.

American multi-en gine aircraft coc kpits oftenreflec ted the civil fligh t deck arrange ment with two pilotssitt ing side by side and with the copilot on the righ t re­spo nsib le for managing the engines and syste ms. Thislayou t was also used in Japanese bo mbe rs, However thecockpit layou t of the Douglas A-2 6/H-26 Invader was adeparture from the usual American two- pilot side -by­side seating beca use the re was on ly one pilot 's position .T he pilot sat to the left o f the gangway. T he engi ne con­tro ls pedestal was on the centre line, T he Invad er pilotalso benefited from advances made in the forming oflarge one-p iece cockpit windows : there was only onecentre pillar to obs truct the forward view. whe reas inearlier aircraft types there was a multiplicity of smallwind ows. In contrast British medium and heavy

T ilE xx' E L L - E Q UI I' I' E D xx ' A R I' LAS E

The nauigator's, v..ireless operator's and flight engineer's stations ill a Saunders-Roe Lencick flyillg boat of 1939. This is asplendid example of a non-ergonomic layout of the instruments and controls. Apart fr om the haphazard j uxta position of indi­v idual items, the confusion u'as added to by the fact that the controls f or the starboard engine u'Cre 10 the flight engineer 's leftuhen he faced the cont rols. 71/e large disc all sxhich are mounted 17 selector lerers is the control panel for the comp licated fu elsystem. Although intended as a companion 10 the RAF's Short Sunderland, the Lencick U'as 1I0ta success.

11/L' ae-", posit ions ill the B lohm und l oss Bv 141 wa e housed ill a tring-mounted 'fusclage ' ro the right of the single engine,ichich u'as mounted ill W/ extended nacelle that carried the empennage . Th is !"as all attempt 10 prov ide «ide arcs of viet" for­wa rd and aft f or the erett' of a single-engine aircraft .

240

bo mbers usually only had one pilot's scat. T his was onthe left in order to leave room for a gangway on the rightleading to the navigator/bo rnb-a imer's pos ition in thenose. Examp les were the Blenheim , \\'ellington , Whitleyand Hud son. Although the last type was a Lockh eed de­sign the crew pos itions were arranged [0 meet the RAf"sspecification. British airc raft with ' two-pilot' cock pits in­cluded the Stirling and the Sunderlan d .

Alth ou gh a number of ste reotype arra nge ments havebee n described there were also many exceptions to anyapp arent rules abo ut coc kpit design and eq uipment ,Perhap s one of the grea test variations of design in multi­engine aircra ft were [0 be found among the throttl es andothe r en gine control levers. There were examples ofthrottl es to the left and examples [0 the right of the pilot.In Ge rma n aircraft the engine controls were more often[0 found [0 the left of the pilot. Some types of Bri tish air­craft had them to the left and ot hers on a central co ntrols

24 1

pedestal as in a civi l airline r. Ame rica n bombers also ex­hibited differences. The 13-17 and the 13-24 had thethrottles on a central pedestal. whereas each of the IWO

pilots in a 13-29 had a set of engine control levers to hisou tboard side . (T he th rottle-like levers close to thecentreline of a 13-29 flight deck were the brake contro llevers.)

On the subject of th rottl e levers, it is inte res ting tonote the French and Italian preferen ce for the th rottl emovement of pull back for increased power. French andItalian pilot s were acc us tomed to this arra nge ment ,However it could have fata l consequences when pilot s ofother nation s attempted [0 fly French and Italian aircraft.It so happened that in 194 0 a number of American air­craft. such as DB-7s (Bostons) and C urtiss Hawk 75s.originally intended for the French air force . were ac­quired for the RAE An important modi fication was thereversal of the throttle moveme nt ,

A I R e R AFT 0 F T ilE SE C 0 x D \, ' 0 R I. D \, ' A R T ilE \,' E L L - E Q UIP P E D \\'ARI'I.A:\E

711e cockpit oj all RAF lF1u'tley bomber, This emphasises the preference for hoeing only one set oj pilot's controls ill themajority of British and German multi-engine aircraft. III contrast, the majority oj Americall multi-engine types had m 'Osets oj controls.

A characteristic ofAmerican nco-pilot bomber cockpits uoas the concentration ojengine and system instruments ill front oj thesecond pilot. This is all early mark oj the B-24 Liberator as operated by RAP Coastal Command, and is 1I0t equipped unth theturbosuperchargers and their master electronic control box fi lled to l 'SAAP 8-245;hence the boost control levers to the left ojthe pedestal.

Auto matic flight system co ntrolsT he autopilots in use at this time were selected and pro­gra mmed thro ugh a con trol and display unit in the cock­pit,Typical of the wartime generation of automatic flight

Instrument d esign differ en cesEngine instruments in American multi -engi ne aircraftwere usually of the type in which one instrument casehoused two mechanisms, thereby giving two pointer-on­dial presentations; one for each of two engines. Thisarrangement economised in space on the instrumentpanel. T he British also had some twin read -out instru­ments, such as rpm indicato rs. The American twin­disp lay instruments, for examp le, when set in a rowcovering four engines and two different sets of param­eters, had to be scanned carefully to make sure that aparticular readin g applied to the correct engine.

was usually positioned between the pilot 's feet. Afterabout 19-11 the RAF mad e increasing use of the gyromagnetic distant-reading compass system based on amagnetic flux gate detector un it mounted remotely fromthe pilot 's and navigator 's positions.

The P Type aperiodic magnetic compass, louer right, ill thecockpit oja lf~lIillgtoll /c. 71';5 u'as the principal heading ill­strument ill RAP aircraft until superseded by the remotereading gyro-magnetic compass system as used ill Americalland German aircraft.

second pilot could monitor the engines and systems.This meant that the captain had few instruments on hispart of the panel. The flight instruments were concen­trated on the centre of the main panel. Being an earlieraircraft, the cockpit of the B-17 had fewer electrical sys­tems switches and controls compared with the B-2-1. Onthe controls pedestal between the pilots there were throt­tle, propeller and mixture control levers for each eng inealong with a master contro l unit for all four exhaust­turbine superchargers. A Boeing ' trademark' was thearrangement of the four engine throttle levers.These hadhorizontal grip s so that the pilot could, with one hand,move all fou r together or select either pairs of engines orindividual engines,

In the first two years of the war there was one partic­ular item of equipment which set British cockpits apa rtfrom those of other nations. This was the prin cipalcompa ss display. American and German aircraft had re­motely located master compass units with repeater in­strument s in front of the pilot and navigator.T he cockpitof an RAF aircraft of the Second \'\'arld War could not bemistaken for any other beca use of the large-diameteraperi odic magnetic compass with rotatable grid ringwhich took up a lot of space. In single-engine aircraft it

Instruments

Instrum ent panels also exhibited national characteristics.A notable example was the RAF s Basic Six 'blind flying'panel. This was an orderly arrangement of the airspeed,artificial horizon , altime ter, ver tical speed, directi onalgyro and the tum and bank (slip) instruments, In theUnited Slates generations of pilots had learn I to fly usingan entirely different instrument scanning technique.Theresult was an apparently confu sed arrangement of theinstruments on the panel in front of the pilot; sometimeswith the eng ine instruments mixed in with the flight in­struments, However, the arrangement suited Americanpilots having originated with the instrument layout inprimary trainers. A seemingly haphazard arra ngement ofthe instrument panel was used in German aircraft. Oftenthis could not be avoided becau se the characteristicexten sive fenest ration forward, with views from thepilot' s scat downward, upward and to the sides, militatedagainst a neat athwa rtships panel. In the He III , for ex­ample, many of the flight instruments were above thepilot's eye level.

T he two principal Amer ican heavy bombe rs in ser­vice before the advent of the B-29, the B-17 and B-2-1,had their main instrument panel s arranged so that the

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A I R C RA FT O F Til E S E C O:-:D W OR L D WA R

711e cre«' ofall RAP Vickers IVellillgtoll bomber about embark for a sortie ill 194 I . They are treating Irv in parachute harnessand carrying their clip-oil parachute packs. Th is photograph emphasises the RAF's policy , established ill the mid- I 930 s, offi t­ting pouer-operated gun turrets.

T HE \\ ' E L L - E Q UIP P E D \\ ' A R P L A :-: E

Br istol Beaufighter VIF Iligillfigiller 1'8526 display s external equipment including the nose and uiing ant ennae of its .lIk I VA I radar, 'checse-grater' fl ame-damping exhaust pipes, and the access hatches uhich formed icindshields to facilitate emergencyexit by parachute .

control systems (AFCS) was the Honeywell system withits distinctive control and selector unit and two rows ofsmall lamps to ind icate when the pilot could engage thesystem. In the B-24s the un it was mounted on the leftside of the central control pedestal. In contrast Britishmulti-engine aircraft were equipped with the less sophis­ticated Smiths pneumatic autopilot that had been dev­eloped in the early 1930s.

An early example of the modern side-s tick controllerwas to be found on some B-24s. A small control columnor joystick was mou nted alongside the left leg of the air­craft captain. This enabled him to control the aircraftdirectly through the autopi lot when flying in formation.It was an exte nsion of the system whereby the bomb­airner exercised control of the airc raft in yaw when ap­proaching a target.

Crew Safety

ParachutesFashions in parac hutes varied among the air forces of theSecon d World War. T here were harn ess fasteningsfavoured by the British whereby one turn and a bangwith the hand released all four pa rts of the harness.American harness in contrast had four individual release

hooks . An innovation adopted for some RAF squadronswas the Irvin suit, which combined a flying coverall withintegral harness to which a chest type parachute packcould be faste ned . This type of personal safety equip­ment had the advantage that there were few projection sand hooks for catching on equipment when movingabou t in the cramped conditions of RAF bombers.Luftwaffe aircrew sometimes wore a back type para ­chute as oppos ed to the seat type favoured by Ame rica nand British pilots flying single-seat aircraft. Crews ofB-1 7s and B-24s were fur ther encu mbered by having to

A typical S econd l\'brld IVar inflatable dinghy carr ied byRAP multi-engine aircraft.

244

wear armoured jackets (flak jackets) and steel helm etswhe n flying through inte nse German flak and fighte r at­tacks.

Inflatable liferafts, along with inflatable lifeiackets('.\ lae Wests') , pro vided airc rcw with extra assurancethat even if the worst were to happen and the aircraft hadto d itch, then they stood a second chance of survival,Because liferafts were usually insta lled in the wings orfuselage there was always the risk that they migh t in­adver tently inflate in flight and da mage or obstruct thetail controls.

Armol/r platingIn the first year of war few aircraft were equi pped witharmo ur prot ection for their crews. As the air war becam emore intense, pilots in parti cular were given armo uredseats or bulkh eads and armour added to protect othervital parts of the aircraft. For example the He III had an8mm armoured bulkh ead aba ft the rad io position ; 8mmarmo ur also for med the back of the pilot's seat in theBf 109. The dam age inflicted by Bf 109s on WellingtonIs in December 1939 operations highlighted their vul­nera bility to both 7.7 and 20mm bullets. An armoure dbulkhead was installed abaft the navigator 's position insubsequent versions of the \Vellington . The armoured

glass windscreen fitted to the nightfightcr version of theBf 110 was 60mm thic k. On the Bf 109G the windscreenwas 90mm thick .

Ejection seatsAth ough the jet aircraft of the last year of war high­lighted the difficu lties of escaping by parachute, ejectionseats were only fitted to some. ' Ibe .\leteor and Vampirewere designed with a conventional pilot 's seat. The ,\Ie262 , despite its performance, did not have an eicctionscat for the pilot.

The test pilot in the He 280V 1 who found that sud­denly he had no control of the aircraft made history by

This is the Dornier Do 335 Pfeil of 1943, with one engine'pulling ' and the other 'pushing '. All ea rly example of apiston-engine aircraft witlt all ejection seat.

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A IRCR AFT OF T ilE SE CO:-:D W O R L D \X' AR TilE " ' E L L - E Q U I P P E D WARPLA:-:E

The high-alti tude version of the ubiquitous Vickers \I'k/linglon bomber. Th is is a .Ilk VI unth M erlin 60 engines. Th e crew lurelocated inside a pressurised cylinder unth a transpa rent dome for the pilot's head and shoulders.

The final years in the cockpitIn thc chapter covering armament reference is madc tothc introduction of the lead-computing gyro gun androcket sights fitted to AlIicd aircraft from 1942 onward ,In contrast Gc rman aircraft retained thc simpler Revitype reflector sights until thc end of the war. T hesignificance of this differen ce in equipment standa rds isthe effect the gyro sights had on the look of fighter cock­pits, The gyro sights were very much larger than thenon-gyro reflector sights and therefore filled much of thcspace behind thc windscreen .

The introdu ction of the gas turbine and rocketpropuls ion systems did not have an imm ediate effect onthe design and equipment of cockpits in general, apa rtfrom turbine temperature indicators reading up toI ,ooooe and rpm indicators graduated from 0 to10,000rpm, However, the need for ejection scats re­qu ircd some major struc tural changes to provide roomfor thc mechanism ,

Few of the aircraft design offices in the Second World

Germany's illistel (ill istlctoe) composite used its piloted fig /Iter upper component to gilide a" unman ned explosirc-laden bomberon to its target, 771is is an S3A trainer using a" F,,' 190A- 3 and a JII 88A -6,

B-17, 'Ib is was the B-29 in which thc crew could opcr­ate in a virtual shirt -sleeve environment except when at­tacked or over the target. 1\\'0 sections of the cylindricalhull were comp letely pressurised. These were connectedby a tunncl equipped with a small trolley so tha t a crewmember could propel himself from one section to theother. The techn ology applied to the structure of the B­29 showed the way 10 the prcssuri sation of civil aircraftafter the war.

Emergency flight controlsSome aircraft in thc Second World \\'ar with only a one­pilot cockpit were equipped with an emergenc y set ofcontrols at another crew position , Examp les are the,\Iartin ,\ Iaryland and the Douglas DB-7 Boston. Asimilar arrangement was provided in thc ,\ lartinBaltimore. The emergency controls of the .\ Iarylandwere located in thc navigator 's isolated position in thcnose, In the DB-7 thc emergency flight and engine con­trols were in thc wireless-operator 's position aft.

regulated supply of oxygen, were in heated cockpit s orwore electrically heated suits and did not have to moveabout too much or exert them selves, they could retaintheir effectiveness even when flying at 30,000fl. At thataltitude the air pressure had dr opped to 4Apsi and theoutside air temperature was down to around minu s44°C.

As the air war developed each of the combatant airforces tried to gain the ascendancy by a number of tech­nological advances in order to achieve , in additi on tohigher combat speeds, extreme cruising altitudes. T hisplaced an aircraft out of reach of accurate flak. It also en­ablcd it to get above the worst of the weather, Import ­antly it also madc it difficult for interceptor fighters togCI into an attacking position ,

' Ib e Luftwaffe introduced a pressuriscd crew com­partrnent for the ju 86, a bomber conversion used forphoto-rec onnai ssance. The presence of these aircraftover the UK prompted the developm ent of high-altitudefighter s for the RAF , such as thc \'\'estland Welkin, TheWcllington V and VI were attempts to develop a high­altitude bomber for thc RAF. T he crew were sealed in apressurised cylinder with limited externa l vision and adifficult exit in the event of trouble. Including proto­types, 67 high-altitude Wellingtons were bu ilt, but only afew went into squadro n service, primarily for early trialswith Oboe,

None of the British and German meth ods of provid­ing an acceptable working environment for the crew wasentirely satisfactory and in no way were they a precursorof the modern pressuriscd airliner. However, in theUnited Sta tes Boeing, which had introduced the civilpressuriscd Stratoliner, developed a successor to thc

•

,,--,Th e Junkers Ju 861> txith pressurised crcr,' compa rtment.Th e appearance of these photo-reconnaissance aircraft lit'"the UK in 1942 prompted the decelopment of the IreSlland\I"i:lkin and of a high-altitude uersion of the de HavillandM osquito; the .lIk XV equipped with A l .Ilk VIII intercep­lion radar,

being the first to usc an ejection seat 'in anger' .This wason 13 Augu st 1942 , The compressed air-ope rated seatwas the first of a number developed for the Luftwaffe 'sfinal generati on of aircraft: the He 162 and Do 335 Pfeilfor example.The latte r had an ejection seat even thoughit was a piston-engin ed/propeller type .

Pressurised ercrl.' compartmentsAbove abo ut 10,000ft the crew of an aircraft experi­enced increasing discomfort with every add itiona l1,000fl. However, provided they were supplied with a

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.-\ IR e R .-\ F T 0 F Til E SE C 0 :-; D \X ' 0 R L D \X·.-\ R

\X'ar had the resources or time to allow in-depth studiesof what we now call human factors or ergonomics in thecontrol interface such as the cockpit. Attempts weremade by some designers to improve the control inter­face. There were many cockpit layouts pro posed bypilots who. afte r all. were in the best pos ition to commentbased on the experience of sitting for many hou rs in dis­comfort. unable to obtain accura te instrument rcadingsor emp loy safe instru me nt scanning techniques, unableto sec ahead clearly in preci pita tion and so on. Onedesig ner in pa rtic ular made a big effor t in this respect .This was ,\ Iartin-Baker. whose ,\ I.B. 5 was not only oneof the most adva nced of all piston-engined aircraft buthad a cock pit in which ergo nomic conside ra tions hadbeen applied.

STO L, VSTOL. jATOThe ro tary-wing aircraft only just made it in time for thewar. However, its imp act on operational effectivenesswas small. Design offices in Germa ny, japan. Italy,Britain and the USA were aware of the potential of therotary wing but realised that for high speed and for largeaircraft there were bo th drawbacks and limitations. Evenat this early stage of development the helicopter was lim­ited in its usc to specialised funct ions.The rotati ng wingwas not ready to give fighter and bomber type aircraftthe abi lity to take-off and land in a short distance or tohover. Neither was it going to help with over-the­norm al-load take-offs .

T herefore recour se had to be made to in-flight re­fuelling, rocket ass isted take-off (RAT O) and to com­posites suc h as the ju 88 carry ing a fighter on its bac k.Other methods of enabling take-off weight to be abovethe normal or to extend the range included the usc of ad­dit ional lifting surfaces that could be jetti soncd once theaircraft was airb orne.

Bibliography

The Aeroplane journal, vario us, London , 1939-l0.

AI' 1565: M anual for the Spitfire.

AI' 201 9: ,\ Ianual for the ,\ Iosqu ito.

Aircraft Engineering journa l. various, London. 1939--45.

Bekker, C. Die Rada r Story (Stalling, 1964) . An imp or­tant survey of the histor y of G erma n radar develop­ment and operational usc.

Bowen , E G, Rada r Day s (Hilger, Bristol, 1987) . The'fa ther' of airborne radar for intercepti on covers allthe important British and Am erican war time devel­opments .

Brown. E. Wil/gs of the Wierd and Il'imderflll (Airlifc,

248

Sh rewsbury. 1983 ) . Includes detailed descriptions ofaircraft equipment.

Coombs. L F E. Cockpits of the RAF (Ser ies in A eroplane•vtonthly, London . 1983.

Coombs. I. F E. The A ircraf t Cockpit (Patr ick Step hens,Wellingborou gh . 1990) . T he chapte rs on militarycockpits provide a comprehensive survey of devel­opments and problems.

Flight journa l. vario us, London. 1939-1945.

Grover, j H H. Radio Aids to Air Xarigation (Heywood,London . 1956) . Out-of-print descr iptons ofwartime navigational systems.

G unston. W T , Avionics (Patr ick Steve ns,\\'ellingborou gh , 1990) . Ver y useful clearly set outdescriptions of how wartime rada r and other clcc­tronic syste ms operated.

Hartcup, G , 77" Challenge of n'ur (Da\'id & C harles.Newton Abb ot , 1970) . Includes details of aircraftequipment such as gunsights, bomb sights and radar.

Her ,\ laiesty's Statio nary O ffice, La boratory of the Air(London. 1948) . An out-of-print insight into thedevelopment of airc raft equipment by the RAE .

j ewell. j. Engineering for l..zfe (M artin-Baker. Denham ,1979) . Cove rs safety equipment, ejectio n scats andcable cutlers.

Lovell, Sir Bern ard , Echoes ofll'ur (Hilger, Bristol. 1991) .As the 'fa ther' of plan pos ition rada r, suc h as H,S.Sir Bern ard covers the complete development of sys­terns which enabled the RAF to navigate and bombwith dea dly accuracy.

Miller & Sawcrs, 77" Technical Detclopment of M odemAviation (Routledge & Keegan Paul. London , 1968) .An essential source of dates and technologies,Cove rs bo th civil and militar y applications.

Price, A. Aircraft Iersus S ubmarine (Kimber. London.1973) .

Price, A. Instruments of Darkness (.\ Iacdonald & jancs.London . 1977 edn) , Price's two books provide cleardescriptions of aircraft operational equipme nt.

Pri tchard , D, The Rada r Irur (Patr ick Stevens,Wcllingborou gh , 1989) . A semi-technica l review ofG erman radar development. It covers all the princi­pal airbo rne radar systems used by the Luftwaffe.

Reuter, I; Fu nh mess (Wcstdeutschcr, Op ladcn, 1971) .The histor y and development of G erman radar .

Robinson , D H, The Dangerous Sky (Foulis, Ox ford ,19 73) . A valuable source of referen ce to aircrew lifesupport and safety equipment in the aircraft of theworld 's principal air forces .

Saward. D. Group Captain. 'Bomber' Harris (Buchan &Enright. London, 1984) .

Saward, D. Group Captain. The Bomber's Eye (Cassell,London. 1959) . As radar advise r to ' Bomber' Harris•Saward was close to the 'sharp end' of airborne radardevelopment in the RAE

Trenkle, 1; Bordfun kgerate der deutschen Lufucaffe1935-45 (Dusseldorf, 1958). One of the top radar

249

Til E \\ · Et.I. - E Q liI I'I' ED \\ ·.-\RI'I..-\:-;E

scientists. His book is a detailed study of the differentradar systems used by the Luftwaffe.

Williams. T 1. A History of Technology l iJl I'll Part II(OUI~ Oxford, 1978) . A useful sou rce of referencesto technical developments in aviation,

Zeffert, H, Aircraft Electrical Engineering (N ewnes,London . 1960) . A standa rd work whose imp ortanc eis its description of electro nic technologies that owedmu ch to wartime developments.

10PropulsionAndrew Nahum

AIR CRAF T O F Til E S E COSD \X'OR!.D \X',-\.R

Curtiss P-40 production, The cy linder banks and cam-boxes of the Allison 1 ~ 1 2 cylinder liquid-cooled engines are dearlycisible.

250

IntroductionThe aero engine has always bccn one of the most de­manding products of engineering science, and it isimportant, for an understand ing of the air war, to und er­stand that in 1939 the piston engine was as much avirtuoso example of engineering developm ent and manu­facture as a modern fan-jet engine is today,

Because of the nature of high-power engine manu­facture, few countries could design and produce militar yengines of thc first rank, This effectively meant, at theoutbreak of war in 1939, the ability to produce a reliableengine capable of some 1,000hp and weighing approxi­mately 600kg (1 ,300lb),This was an extremely demand ­ing target, and implied that any indu strial nation whichsought to attempt it needed a whole suite of supportingtechn ologies. There was the requirement to forge diffi­cult shapes and components, such as crankshafts, to thehighest strength factors then available, a need for metal­lurgical expertise in the development of continually irn­proving alloys, and the application of aerodynamicanalysis to supercharger performance,

T hese demands meant that in 1939 only Britain andGerm any had engines in the very front rank. and it isboth significant and surprising to note that the Battle ofBritain, a year later, was in part a struggle between twoof the oldest and most respected names in the autorno­tivc indu str y; Rolls-Royce and Daimler Benz,The initialpre-eminence of these two nations was partl y a conse­quence of German rearmament and the British responseto it.There is no doubt, for examp le, that the USA couldhave produ ced an engine in the samc league at that time,but the requir ements for its air force seemed Icss press­ing than for Euro pean powers, and engines had been op­timised more for the emerging airline network than forshort -term combat power.

At the outbreak of the Second \'\'orld War the power­plants available for aviation were all piston engines.Developm ent star ting in the First \'\'orld \\'ar and contin­uing through the interwar years had produced two well­defined types. Firstly, for front-line combat usc, therewas the liquid-cooled in-line engine. The other majortype was the air-cooled radial, which had found a nicheas the favoured type for airlines.

Liquid-cooled en gin esSince the First \'\'orld \'\'ar various numbers of cylindersand different configuratio ns had been tried .Thus, in thatconflict . Ge rman manufacturers had produced in-line

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six- and eight-cylinder engines, while the British NapierLion had been one of thc pioneers of the 'broad-arrow'engine, with twelve cylinders in three banks of four.Thisconfiguration was also pro moted by Lorraine-Dietr ich inFrance and Isotta-Fraschini in Italy during the interwaryears, A Napier-powered Superm arinc S,5 seaplane wonthe Schn eider Trophy contest in 1927 with a Lion tun edto the limit of its endura nce at 875hp, althoug h thc lay­out was by thcn becoming outmoded,

The problem for the aero engine designer was partlythe eternal onc of creating a motor at the limit of attain­able power-to-weight ratio, However, there was the otherimportant consideration, from the point of view of air­craft design , of 'p ower density' - providing the mostpower possible for the smallest cubic volume , and mak­ing an enginc that was slim enough to allow a finelystreamlined nose or engine nacelle, For all these reasonsthe V-12 engine with two banks of six cylinders at anangle of 60° emerged as the best compromise, It was rca­sonably short, without too much wasted airspace bc­tween the cylinder banks, and also had the virtue ofexcellent mechanical balance and freedom from vibra­tion , That was the reason that this configura tion hadbeen adop ted by a few top-quality makers such as Rolls­Royce, Packard and Cadillac for some of their most ex­elusive cars, However, the mechanical balance of a V-12was not simply a luxury in thc aviation application,Unbalanced forces and vibration arc much more de­structivc in an engine built to min imum weight, com­pared with a substantial car engine, and the adopti on ofthe V-12 configuration allowed thc engines and mount­ings to be lighter and more reliable than they mightotherwise have been.

T he prime examples of this technology could be seenin thc Rolls-Royce ,\ Ierlin and the Daimler BcnzDB 60 1 engines which respectively powered British andGe rman fighters at the outbreak of war. However, therewas a cer tain difference in thc design philosophy behindthem, for while the Ge rman engine had a capac ity of33,93 litres, the ,\ Ierlin was a mere 26 litres.The reasonthat the ,\ lerlin was directly comparable in power lay inits much greater reliance on supercharging, a techn ologyin which Rolls-Royce had become adept. This techno­logical choice proved to have been a wise or a lucky one,for Rolls-Royce was able to continue to improve thepower of the Mcrlin throughou t the war, taking it fromapproximately 1,000bhp to 2.300bhp without changingthe basic geometrical form of thc engine itself, T he

A IRCRAFT OF TilE SECO:-:D \X'ORLD \\"AR I'ROI'ULSIO:-:

The M essersctnnin Bf 109G began to reach squadrons ill 1942. This pre-production example is fitted scith a 33.9-lirre liquidcooled I ~I 2 Daimler Benz DB 60 1 engine rated or a take-off pouer of I,270hp. Hozcerer, the production series received theenlarged 1,475hp DB 605A engine, tchich had been deceloped from the earlier type by increasing capacity to 35.7 litres. Theside-mounted centrifugal superchargercall be seen at the rear of the engine.

A Rolls-Roy ce M erlin 65 ill North American 1'-51 ,lIl1stallg I A L9 75G, October 1942.Although the ,IIIIStGllg "'as originallyequipped icith the Allison V«l2, the suntch to the ,lIer lill produced the outsta nding Allied fighte r of the latter part of the ,,'ar,combining the speed to meet CIlemy fighters tcith the rallge 10 escort bombers Of'er Germany.

pattern of development throughout the war was that su­percha rger and gas flow research at Derby would revealfurther potential for power, and this would then be test­ed mechanically.T he up rated engines would be run forhours on thc test beds to estab lish at which point mech­anica l components migh t start to fail at the new rating,The 'Derby hum' of engines on test lay over thc citynight and day throughout the war.

Other liquid-cooled V-l2s did exist. From 1933, inFrance, Hispano-Suiza produced the 121' series, ratedbetween 800 and 900hp and used in fight ers suc h as the,\ Iorane-Saulnier ,\ IS.406 and the Dewoitine D.510, butit had not benefited from the same degree of develop­ment as the Merlin and it is significant that, from themid- 1930s , there were continuing moves to establ ish aMerlin assembly plant in Franc e. In Italy Fiat also pro­du ced a series of well-engineered V-12 engine s, althoughthese, too, were rather low on power output. The otherV-12 worthy of menti on was the Allison V-1750, pro­du ced in the USA.This was similar to the Merlin in gen-

252

eral architecture but again had not had the benefit ofsuch intensive development, and in a well-knownepisode was displaced by the Rolls-Royce ,\ Ierlin in theNorth American ,\ lustang fighter , to make it a far morecapable aircraft. In a turbosupcrcharged form, theAllison did become extremely effective, particular ly in itsappl ication for the twin-engined 1'-38 Lightning,

Ai r-cooled enginesThe other important class of piston engine was the air­cooled radial, which also dated back to the First \'{/orld\\/ar but had mad e amazing advances in the interwaryears. Air-cooled in-line engines were also tried, butfailed to succeed in the highest power classes owing tothe difficulty of providing an even supply of cooling airto the cylinders, Thus the radia l, with its star-likearrangement of cylinders around a compact and lightdrum-shaped central cra nkcase, became the only high­power air-coo led type. Its advoca tes claimed that it hadthe advantage over liquid-c ooled engines both on the

One of the mysteries of French aero engine development is that the Gnome-Rhona company, uhich had pioneered the innoca­tire rotary ill the years beforethe Firstlrorldll'ur,failed to follozc-up tcith IlCU' products of its ml'lI and took a licencefor Br istolradial engines. Hozcerer, it did do considerable derelopmcnt 011 the basic B ristol designs and marketed a successful runge ofengines. This 18.98 litre 14.11, seen here ill a Henschel Hs 129, ,eas rated at 710hpfor take-off.

253

A IR e R AF T 0 F T Jj ESE C 0 :-; lJ \X' 0 R I. n \X ' A R I'R OI' UI. SI O :-;

A Boeing B-1 7 Flying Fortress ill the M idd le Fast, shounng its ai r-cooled IFrigl1l Cyclone radials icith couilings remoied forserv icing. Th e nine-cylinder R-/ 820 11.szst«, 29.88 IiIres) gave 1,OOOhp for take -off

Left: Th e Bristol company m15 the pre-eminent Britishmaker ojair-cooled radial engines. 111 1932 it introduced thesleere-ua lre 10 en'ercome problems scith the 10"<l' octane rat ingof contemporary fuel and 10 replace the ma intenance­intensive pushrod-operated Jour-valve cylinder heads illtheir previous range.The 24 .9-lilre Perseus, seen here ill a deHavilland Flamingo, could give 890hp and proved ex tremelyreliable, bill it depended all high-grade hand assembly andfi tting. Th e subsequent challenge for the Bristol company "'as10 transfer this technology 10 quantity production Jar theexpanding Roy al A ir Force after 193 5.

arrangement of camshafts, pu shrod s and rockers forfour valves per cylinder became almost 'an impossibilityto contemplate' .

,\ Iany regard ed the purs uit of the sleeve-valve eng ineas a chimera, for it required advances in both materialsand machining technique . The difficulty is that the fit ofpiston in thc sleeve mu st be right , at all conditions fromcold start to high tempe rature at max imum power. So,too , mu st be the fit of the ou ter diamete r of the sleeve inthe outer finned cylinde r barrel. T he problem can notsimply be solved by making these fits rather loose, be­cause an intimate contac t is essentia l betwee n sleeve andbarrel to allow heat to flow to the cool ing fins. EvenDavid Pye, Deputy Direc tor of Scientific Research at theAir ,\ Iinistry, was sceptical, rem arkin g: 'T he single­sleeve-va lve eng ine has been a sickly child ever since itwas brought to birth' and querying whether it might bea case of 'infant mortality' . It was a serious criticism thatno-one had made a success of it, and he felt that therewould be little interest in it if it were not the only way outof the ' impasse of the red -hot exhaust valve' . Theprogramme, with hindsight , might have been a huge

there was also ano ther attraction. Bristol eng ines hadaimed at a higher output pe r litre than its competitors,and in consequence used four valves per cylinde r ratherthan two.This had bee n possible to arrange in the single­row eng ines, but as power requ irements rose and two­row eng ines becam e necessar y, Fedd en reflected that the

A Bristol Blenheim nacelle.sluncing the nine-cylinder ,IferCli ry engine. 17,e 24.9-lilre engine had the sam e int ernal dimensionsas the Perseus bill used the earlier fo ur- ca lce cylinder head. 77/C calces, tcith springs and rockers, call be seen ill this view.

guns. As the war progressed the Japan ese engine indus­try was un able to spare the resources to develop andbuild the more powerful uni ts which would have allowedthe aircraft to meet the newer, heavily armed Am ericanaircraft on equal terms.

The major di fference betwee n Amer ican radials andthose by Bristol, the pre-eminen t British make, was thatfrom 1927 onwards Roy Fedden at Bristol steered thecompany to developm ent of the sing le-sleeve-valveengine. In these eng ines the task of arrang ing inlet andexha ust ope ning is done by a sliding inner cylinde r liner ,the sleeve, with specially sha ped ports cut in a band ncarthe top. As the sleeve rises and falls with a circular mo­tion, the ports linc up in tu rn with inlet and exhaust pas­sages . This layou t was active ly promoted at high level inthe Air Mini str y by Harry Ricardo, thc note d British in­ternal combustion consultant , on the basis of his experi­mental work. The attraction was tha t it abolished theconvent ional poppet exhaust valve with its red-ho t head,which was a potential sou rce of both pre-ignition and'knock'. With the cur rent fuel of low octa ne rati ng thismea nt that the eng ine cou ld bc designed for asignificantly higher compression ratio, giving a majorimprovement in powe r output and economy, For Fedde n

score of lower installed weight (no water jackets, coo lantand radiator) and reliability. Certa inly airline experiencepoint ed to the undesirability of water joints in aircraft re­quired to perform reliably over long distances and totime tables. Thus Imperial Airways made pa rticular useof air-cooled Bristol rad ials developed by the single­minded engineer A H Roy Fed den . In the USA theemerg ing airline network used radials from the Wri ghtand Pratt & Whitney companies.

Mention should also be made of the Japane se rad ials,made prin cipally by Na kajima and Mi tsubi shi. Licencesfor Bristol and Pratt & \X' hitney engines had been takenout in Japan , and altho ugh these undoubtedly con­tribu ted to the learning cur ve, the Japanese enginesshowed originality. Particular features were the usc ofvery fine cy linde r fins, fan cool ing and close-fittingcowls.These features were clearly intend ed to redu ce thedrag of the radial installation , bu t a penalty was the ten­dency of the fine-pitched fins to fill with oil and dust.Altho ugh Japanese radials were good at the beginning ofthe Pacific war , they were barely powerful enough, andthe superio rity enjoyed by the Mi tsubishi Zero fighterfor a period was obtained at the sacrifice of both protec­tive armour for the pilot and the number and calibre of

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AIR CRAFT OF TIlE SE CO:-:D WORLD \\ ' ,\R I'ROP liLSIO:-:

771e RIIIF 80 / U'<lS normally supplied as a complete exchange unit or 'potcer egg' scith all accessoriesand coatings fitted, al­kncing rapid engine changes ill service conditions. Th is is a captured example from all F,,' / 90 undergoing examination ill theLX ill / 943,

The ncin-rotc Hercules rms the mainstay of Bristol engineproduction during the Second Irbrld I\'ar, S een here tcithoutits normal cooling shrouds 10 direct the air around the cylin­ders.the l-l-cylinder 38, 74-litre slcerc-ralce Hercules decel­oped I/P 10 t ,725hp and rms used ill the Lancaster, Halifaxand Stirling bombers, as tcell as ill Ir, llillglOlls andBeaufighters.

diversi on of effort. and it is noteworthy that Bristol radi ­als cost about twice as much per horsepower in theSecond \, 'orld \\ 'ar as the Rolls-Royce .\I erlin, It issignificant that no other engine ma nufacturer brought anair-cooled sleeve-valve into production , altho ugh it wastried, as we shall sec. in some liquid-cooled in-line mo­tors which were scarcely less problematical. A combina­tion of the improvement of gaso line to 100 octa ne andthe liquid-sodium-eooled exhaus t valve s en 'ed to post­pone deton ation in high-power engines by the early war.and even Harry Ricard o, as 'godfather' of the singlesleeve valve, came to wonder if the effort had beenworthwhile. regretting that :

so many years .. , elapsed between .. , the research.. , and its practica l development .. , since the ad­vantages of the sleeve valve were most ap parent inthe early days when we were using relatively lowoctane fuels,

Liquid or air cooling for fighters?During the 1930s there was considerable discussionabout the most suitable power unit for high-performanceaircra ft. On commonsense gro unds it appeared that theradial was obviously going to cause more drag. but cowl­ing experiments , such as those with the Towncnd ring inBritain and the NACA cowl in the USA. showed that thedra g cou ld be hugely redu ced, Nevertheless, it was

generally considered that the drag of a liquid -cooled en­gine, even with a radiator, was less than tha t of the bluntradial and its cowling, T his advantage was not necessar­ily permanently in favour of the liquid-coo led engine. aswas shown by the temporary superiority of the Focke­Wulf Fw 190 with its R\ IW 803 rad ial engine. whichalarmed British pilots when it appeared in mid-1941.The impressive performance of the big Americanfight ers powered by powerful two-row radial enginesthat appeared later in the war was also a power ful argu­ment for the radial.

However, in the early part of the war the problem ofthe temperature control of cylinder and head in radialsmeant that the liquid -cooled engines had the edge in per­forma nce , At this time, and with the fuel available, thecooling of radi als at full power was marginal, and the ad­vantage given by liqu id cooling allowed a greater output.as well as a leaner cru ising mixture and more economy,As noted below. liquid cooling also allowed charge cool­ing to improve the efficiency of the supercharger.However, the argument about the advantage between thetwo types was never finally resolved, and was still a mat­ter for debate as the new jet engines began to sweep awayall high-power piston engines in the postwar era,

Hi gh-octane fuelsT he high-power piston engine is un iquel y dependent onthe qu ality of its fuel. Before the First World \X'ar, engineresearchers had begun to pu zzle over the phenom enonof 'knoc k' - a ringing noise sometimes encounteredwhen an engine was running at high power, as if thecylinder had been struck with a light hammer. If the en­gine was kept running at the same power this soundoften heralded a feed-back cycle of knock and eventua lself-destruction,

Det onation was a concern in all the combatantcountries in the First \\'orld \X'ar. but in Britain Harr yRicard o, then a student at Cambridge, was am ong thefirst to set up a systematic study, He begun to appreci­ate that. although raising the compression ratio of a par­ticular engine design would produce more power, it alsomade the occur rence of knock more likely, Ricardo re­searched the problem by using an experime nta l engineof his own design with a variable supe rcharger ratio, Asthe supercharge pressure was increased with a givenfuel, knock would begin to occur, giving for the firsttime an objective method of comparing fuel quality,One of the first interesting results that Ricard o obtainedwas that gasolines originating from different source s ofcrude oil differed in their propensity to knock, At thetime the usual test for gasoline was its volatility, but al­though this would indicate wheth er the fuel would allowgood cold starting performance and reasonable mixturedistributi on between cylinders. it was not a reliable pre­dictor of knock, In fact, Ricard o found that a fuel with

excellent anti-knock properties was being burnt towaste in Borneo because it d id not meet the volatilityspec ifications that were the n in place for Britishforces,

It was genera lly sup posed at the time that pre-ignitionand knock were the same, since both could lead to de­struction of the engine in the same way, In pre-ignition aspecific point in the engine, which might be the tip of asparking plug or part of a component, such as an exhaustvalve, becomes incand escent during running and itselffunctions as the initiator of combustion, in advance of thetimed spark, Since this combustion occurs early, moreheat is released to the combustion chamber walls and thehot spot becomes hon er.T he ignition point thu s automat­ically advances, leading to 'runaway pre- ignition'. furtherheat build-up and probable seizure, A cure for pre-igni­tion therefore lay in better design of the surface geometrywithin the combustion chamber, attention to cooling andthe heat path. and sparking plug design,

However , Ricardo glimpsed that knock was a differ­ent phenomenon , Co mbustion caused by pre-ign itionstill consisted of a normal nam e front passing throughthe compressed air/fuel gas, and studies showed the nor­mal rate of pressure rise in the cylinder. A 'knocking'combustion. by contras t, started normally, but part ofthe way thr ough the remaining unburnt gas deton atedabruptly, If the knocking continued, rapid heat build-upocc urred, since the shock wave scoured the insulatingboundary layer gas off combustion chamber surfacesand failure, usually of the piston crown, soon followed ,

Immediately after the First World War Ricard o.begana programme with Henry Ti zard and David Pye to sur­vey all possible fuels for spark ignition engines, Theirwork showed that ' the best fuel was the one that showedthe least tendency to knock' , In fact, knock was an aspectof chemical stability of the fuel under the specific condi­tions in a gasoline engine , A good fuel would withstandcompression and high temperature, waiting , as it were,for the timed spark and the arrival of the name front , Apoor fuel, heated by radiati on from the advancing flamefront, would reach a point where it spontaneously deto­nated , Ring cha in 'aromatic' hydrocarbons seemed ofte nto be more stable than stra ight chains, and some im­proverncnt could be had by selecting the crude oil sourcefor gasoline refining, But ap art from that it seemed thatlittle could be done and the gasoline engine would haveto put up with this inherent fuel limit. In fact, as a resultof their research, Pye, who became Director of ScientificResearch at the Air Ministry, and Tizard, who becamecha irma n of the Aero nautical Research Committee andan imp ortant figure in defence science, expected gaso­line engines to reach a natu ral power limit imposed bythe knock rating of fuel.T hrou ghout the 1920s and early1930s both men spe nt much effort in encourag ingdevelopment of the aircraft diesel engine, which they

256 257

A IR CRA FT OF T il E SE CO :-: n \X' O R L D W AR PR OI' ULS I O:-:

The M erlin 61 shozcs the poetic quality of Rolls-Roy ce engineering, ut terly refilled by necessity and by func tion. The clas­sic and sound Iq2 cylinder ocerhead camshaft engine is supplemented by a nco-stage supercharger, d rascing mixture fromthe updraught carburettor and passing it, v ia the charge cooler radiator (ill the box-like structure) to the cylinders. The su­perchargers are also equipped with " co-speed drive to mabie supercharger Oll/PII/ 10 keep pace tcith fa lling atmosphericpressure as the aircraft climbs, Using detelopments of this layout the M erlin U'QS able, by the end of the S econd \\'vrld I\'"rill 1945, to develop 2,000hp at 15,000f t (4,580m), compared with 1,000hp fro m the Bailie of Britain M k III ill 1940.

expected to overtake the gasoline engin e owing to itsimm unity to knock and tolerance of fuel quality,

However, in the USA, a more pragmatic approachwas adopted to the knock problem , Again it had beennoted that gasolines from different sources varied inknock qua lity, and Thomas Midgley and C F Kettering,then studying fuels for the Liberty engine progra mme,realised that Californ ia gasolincs were superior to manyothers and also developed a synthetic exper imentalblended fuel containing benzi ne and cyclohexane whichallowed the engine to run at high compression on test.The fact that specia lly selected blends of organic chem­icals could dem onstrate knock resistance was theoretical­ly intere sting and useful , bur it did not really help the

258

practical problem of providing good fuel in quantity,The discover y of anti-knock additives by Midgley, ofwhich the most important was tetra ethyl lead, and theirexperimental use by the US Army from 1922, paved theway for the mass production of high-octane aviationspirit. By the Second World \Var, using both tetra ethyllead as an add itive, selecting crude oil stocks and refiningtechnique, allowed the production of sufficient 100 oc­tane fuel for Allied air forces ,

SuperchargingThroughout the interwar per iod supercharging devel­oped as a technology to improve the power of aero en­gines, and by the outbreak of war all the imp ortant

engines had some form of forced indu ction , Part of theimpetus for this derived from the car racing world , wherethe potential of a supercharger for forcing in a greaterweight of mixture per stroke than a cylinder could aspirenaturally pushed up the power output dramatically,Bugarti , Alfa Rome o and the German 'State' Grand Prixdesigns by Auto-Union and Mercedes all made extensiveuse of the technique, It was also used in aviation for theSchneider T rophy contests, the best-kn own examplebeing the Rolls-Royce R engine used in 1929 and 1931in the winning Su pcrmarine S.6 and S,6B seaplanes,With a supe rcharger designed by J E Ellor, a formerRAE Farnborough enginc expert, the R engine pro ­duced 2,330hp on a special fuel containing gasoline,benz ol, methanol and tetra ethyl lead,The developmentwork for the 1931 eng ine gained Rolls-Royce, accordingto company lore, the equivalent of five years' experienceat the normal pace of development.

However, the attraction of supercharging for militaryengin es was not so much to increase the ground -levelpower of the engine, since that usually was already set atthe maximum that the engine could stand continuouslywithout beginning to suffer mechanically or through det­onation. Rather, the supercharger was added to allow theengine to maintai n its rated power at altitude, for other­wise the power of a piston engine decreases directl y asthe aircraft climbs and the air becomes thinner. Thuscombat in the Battle of Britain could frequently takeplace at IS,OOOft, and the aircraft of eithe r side could nothave fought at these altitudes wi thout superchargers tomaintain an artificially dense atm osphere in their inletmani folds. As the war prog ressed the struggle in the airbecame, to a certai n extent, a competition for altitude toescape the enemy, leading to incre asingly powerful andbetter designed superchargers and culminating, as in the,\ Ierlin, in a two-stage, two-speed superchargingarrangement with intercooler .

The competition for power, which ruled combat en­gine developm ent , was also a competition for height.TheFirst World War had proved that the aircraft with higheraltitude capa bility had the option of avoiding intercep­tion, or had the advantage if combat occurred. However,as piston-engined aircraft climb they enter thinn er airand the engine receives less fuel/air mixture at eachpower stroke.

Aero-engine superchargers were almost invariab ly ofthe centrifugal type , spinning at very high speed (around20,000 rpm) , This was driven by a step-up gear trainfrom the engine, although the rotational inertia of thespinning rotor was so enor mous that it had to be driventhro ugh a slipping clutch system to protect the gear drivetrain and shaft from destruction if the engine itselfchanged speed too quickly,

Supercharging, however, was not a simple way togain altitude performance, The efficiency of the com-

259

pressor was vital, since wasted energy appeared in thecompressed charge as excess heat , redu cing engin eefficiency and also making detonation more likely, Thedownside can be seen by the illustration that if a super­charger is fitted to give an engine the same power at, say,10,000ft that the normall y aspirated version would haveat ground level, there is a penalty in take-off power in thesupercharged engine owing to the charge heating, Onesolution was to arrange a two-speed supercharger withtwo different gear ratios, controlled by clutches, Theother strategy was to arra nge for charge cooling; passingthe comp ressed mixture through its own radiator befo relead ing it into the inlet port s,T his was another argu men tfor the liquid-c ooled engine , since a supply of coolantwas available for the intercooler matrix.

In the USA the mech anically driven superchargergradually gave way to the turbosupercharger, a centri­fugal compressor driven by an exhau st turbine. TheGeneral Electric company had pionee red this develop­merit, and during the war exhaust turbocha rgers were toap pear increasingly on American engines,

New eng ines and prob lematic en ginesAs might be expected in a complex and highly stresseddevice like an aero engine, novelty inevitably implies ex­pen se and trouble ,Virtually all the new engines that wereund er development at the beginning of the Second\Vorld War posed development problems, Some nevercame through the process, while even those that didenter service sometimes came close to cancellation,

Firstly, developm ents of the standard piston engineshould be considered. By the late 1930s defence plan­ners were looking beyond the 1,000hp level of the en­gines coming into service to 2,000hp for new aircraftbecause the weapon load , whether gun s and cannon ona fighter or bombs and defensive armament in a bomber,is directly related to the installed power, Long -rangeplanning also looked forward to a new generati on of pis­ton engines of 3,000hp and more.

T he major constraint on design was to achieve thisincrease without a large increa se in fronta l area and drag ,which would partly defeat the purpose of the powergained , One interesting example of an ingenious attemptto overcome this was in the Napier Sabre, Colonel FrankHalford , who had designed the practical de HavillandGipsy light aero engines, devised for the Napiercompany a twenty-four-cylinder 'H' engine , The Sabrewas, in effect, two flat (i.e, horizontally opposed 'boxer')twelve-cylinder engines each with its own crankshaft ,joined through coupling gears, T his arrangement cer­tainly ensured the tightest possible packaging of the en­gine cylinders, but the project had enorm ous problems.In addition to the unc onventi onal layout , which broughtproblems of torsional vibration in the coupling gear trainand crankshafts, the engine used single sleeve valves, as

AIRCRAFT OF THE SECO~IJ \\ 'ORI.IJ \\'AR I'ROI'UI.SIO~

".,..771e Rolls-Roy ce Crecy petrol-injection. supercharged sleece-calce nco-stroke. It was hoped that this 26 -litre I '-12-cl'/illder en­gine trould be all ideal interceptor unit tcith ncice the poicer ofa four-stroke ofequicalent size and iceight, but its dC'/.'e/opmell/lIC'/.'er oterhauled the Merlin. Th us ill J9-l4 it U'aS bench tested at 1,600bhp,bll/ by this date the M ertin had been icorkcd lip to2,34 0bhp, Postica r tests promised hugr potcer outputs of liP 10 3,500hp from the Crccy, but the gas turbine made furtherdevelopment unattractive.

The Napier Sabre was the single greatest problem encountered ill B ritish engine procurement in the Secolld lrorld ll'ar, 171e com­plexity of the untried, geared 2-l-cylillder layout u'as compounded by the 11t?'W technology of liquid-cooled single-sleeve calres.Since a lI/?1I' generation ofhigh -pouer fighters, the Hatcker 7} p11001land Tempest, had been ordered, it U'aS essential to crack thedevelopment problem, and the Sabre crentually entered service at a rated Oil/Pitt of 2,200hp, H ozcete r, it alzcays consumed afar higher proportion of maintenance and service effort than other engines .

recen tly brought to a state of reliabilitv bv Bristol.However, thc Sabre was to be liquid coo led , in~oducinganothe r new element to complicate deve lopme nt , Theprogramme was cxtraordinarilv troubled , and a ,\ Iinistrvof Aircra ft Production official ~allcd the Sab re in 1 9~5 'amiserable failure', noting that in thc developm ent pro­gramme ' two incompatibles were brou gh t together - anunusually poor prod uce r and an unusu allv int ricatearti cle', '

Another interes ting project, whi ch has been little d is­cussed until recently, was the development of a two ­stro ke fighter eng ine, The de sign emanated from HarrvRicardo in late 1935, and derived fro m his attempts toforce up thc power outp ut o f the dies el to suit it for avi­ation , T he impending war, and the realisation tha t thepossession of early warning from rad ar would cha nge airdefence strategy, direc ted the attention of British AirMinistr y planner s to the use of en gines of very highpower to give interceptor s a rapid climb, This proi cctalso used a single sleeve valve, so that unlike the co m mo npiston-ported two- stroke, where some mixing of fresh

cha rge and exhaust is inevitable, the gas path was'uniflow' with inlet ports at the head and exhaust portsin a belt at the bo tto m of thc piston stroke, The engine,known as the Crecy, was developed by Rolls-Royce as aV-12 of similar p ropo rtio ns to the Merlin. but althoughits suppo rte rs believed it would give d ouble or more thepower of the four-s troke eq uivalent, it was neve r farenough ahea d of the ,\ Icrl in to justify a decisive commit­ment of reso urces .

Pratt & Whitncy in the USA also experimented withthe coupled double-cr ank shaft ' H ' liqu id-cooled enginein the int erest of high power and maximum power den­sity, Like the N apier Sabre and the Rolls- Royce Eagle(see pa ge 262) , which sha red the same layout, theseeng ines all used the single sleeve valve, partly to reducethe overall size of the en gin e by removing the need forrocker boxes or overhead camshafts, Another importantattraction of the sleeve valve was the permanen ce of ad ­justment of the valve gea r. With four valves per cylinde ron high-performan ce eng ines , the adjustment of tappetson a twe nty-four-cy linde r eng ine at manufacture and

d ur ing maint enan ce mu stha\'e see med intirnidating.Thcother mu ch-vaunted featu re of the sleeve valve, its rcla­tive immunity to 'knock', was ce rtai nly an attraction atthe outset of these p rogrammes, but by the late 1930s theavailability of 100 octane had made thi s the oretical ad­van tage less impo rta nt. T he Pratt & \'{'h itney H- 3130reach ed 2,650hp but the co mpa ny, in discussion with theUSMC, decided tha t development effort was best con­centrated on the com pa ny's stu rdy twin-row air-cooledradials, and it was ca nce lled,

Other high- power p rojects with unusu al con forma­tion s included thc Rolls-Royce ' X' engine, the Vulture,which had four banks of six cylinders in X forma tion,working on a single cra nkshaft and giving a capacity of2,592in' ,The A\TOM anchester bomber was designed totake a pa ir, but the engine proved troublesome and waswithdrawn , The red esigned ,\ Ianc hester, ada p ted forfour ,\ Ierlins, was rechri sten ed the Lancaster and bc­ca me extreme ly successful.

There were also double eng ines made by couplingtwo existin g en gines together, Allison 's V-3~20 was one

17,e expe rimental Fairey Pr ince represented one of the gal­lant atte mp ts by aircraft manufactu rer S ir R ichard Fairey 10

break into the 'family'ofaero engine companies supported bythe Air M inistry through cont racts. 17,e Prince, like theNapier Sabre and Rolls-Roy ce Eagle, consisted of twoopposed ncelue-cylinder 1I11its sandtcichcd together. Unlikethe other tWO, houeier. the cylinder banks ,,'ere 1I0t geared 10­

gcther. but each drore olle halfofa contrarotating airscrezc.

260 26 1

AIR CRAFT O F TilE SE C O~[) \X' ORI.D \,'AR I'R OI' UI. SI O ~

The 46-litre 3,500hp Rolls-Roy ce Eagle sluncs the double-layer 'H' configuration of tn ·o horizontally opposed banks of tueloecylinders with crankshafts geared together, Although the liquid-cooled sleeue-rahx Eagle seems to have avoided the troublesuhich plagued the architecturally sim ilar Napier Sabre, it arri..ed to late for military use ill the S econd lI'l,rld Il'ur, and high­potcer piston engines tcere rapidly displaced by the gas turb ine ill the postwar era,

such, comprising two V-1750s geared together. This wasstarted in 1937, but the requirement for it was dropped ,A similar stratagem was also adopt ed by Daimler Benzin the DB 606, which consisted of two DB 60 Is. On thesubject of unusual piston engines the LycomingXR-7755 should also be noted, This had nine banks offour cylinders each arranged radially around a centralcrank, and was intended to give 7,000hp,

In fact almos t all of the new generation of unu sualpiston engines which departed from the classic liquid­cooled V-12 or air-cooled radial pattern proved excep­tionally troub lesome and played almost no significantpart in the war , although it could be argued that theNapier Sabre was strategically important as the powerunit for the Hawker Typhoon , This proved useful forground and tank attack in co-operation with the Anglo­American armies after the Norm and y land ing, although

designed turboprop of 1,000hp, but this achieveme nt isalmost unknown ,

A major problem in the way of developing a gas tur­bine was that of materials technology; in particular, thechallenge of developing alloys for the turbine blades thatcould retain strength to cope with the enorm ous centri­fugal stress while approaching red heat. Other problemswere obtaining even and rapid combustion in the high­velocity airstream in the combustion chamber, and mak­ing the compressor efficient enough for the overallefficiency of the engine to be worthwhile,There were, ofcourse, more difficulties, including dynamic balance,harm onic and vibration effects from the interaction ofairflow wi th compressor blades, and a new area of aero­dynamic behaviou r, to analyse,

The growing complexity of the piston engines re­viewed earlier certa inly suggests that the gas turbinewould have eome about in time, However, the effect ofthe war was to accelerate this process, \X'hat would havebeen accomplished eventually as the various enablingtechnologies caught up was done in half the time, atenormous expense and effort .

In Britain, Frank Whittle, as an RAF cadet in 1928,also argued that a gas turbine would be better than apiston engine for the coming generation of high-altitude,high-speed aircraft he envisaged, It was two years laterthat he realised that much complication could be amid­ed in the design if the engine did not dr ive a pro peller,but was used to produ ce a high-speed jet direc tly, Thismeant that the energy in the exhaust did not need to beextracted by a series of turbine stages , as in a propellerturbine, coupled to a shaft which will drive the airscrew,Instead, a single turbine stage would be matched to thepower requirement of the comp ressor, which maintainedthe cycle, while the excess energy in the exhaust wasused to produce a high-speed jet strea m in the enginenozzle, It was this simplifying variation which persuadedbackers to support Whittle, for it made the engine moreattainable with the technology of the time, His compa ny,Power Jets, was founded in 1935 with private capitalraised in the City of London, while the Air Min istr y con­tributed Whittle himself.

In Germany the initial idea for a jet engine came fromthe young physics student Pabst von Ohain, who dcvel­oped from 1934 an engine with a centrifugal compres­sor. Oh ain 's idea was taken up by aircraft manu facturerErn st Heinkel, and the engine first ran in 1937.T hus inboth countries the jet engine was initially promoted byyoung men who were not in the mainstream aero-enginebusiness. From there the pattern diverged . In Britain, inspite of the frequent suggestion that Whittle was ignoredand badly treated , his company became the main gov­ernment focus for the development of the jet, and hisproto type flight engine, the W.I , first flew in the Gloster­Whit tle E,28/39 in May 194 1.

scientist working at RAE Farnborough, proposed aturb ine based on his new theory for produ cing a moreefficient aerodynamic flow in compressors and turbines.Stanford Moss in the USA also believed a practical tur­bine was atta inable, but his hopes were premature and hesubsequently became the champion and developer of theturb osupercharger for the General Electric compa ny, Itis an interesting comment on the selectivity of histor y,too, that in 1937 a 100hp gas turbine test uni t was run inBudapest by the Hungarian engineer Gyo rgy jendrassik,who created in the same year a practical and beautifully

The Heinkel He 178, tchich made the firsr jet flight illAugust 1939, Th e engine is a centrifugal compressor turbojetof 450kg (l ,OOOlb) thrust, designed by young physicist andincentor Hans-f oachim Pabst <'Olr ahaill and built by theHeinkel company. Although the project had a pozcerfu l pro­paganda effect ill aviation circles.the Heinkel unit was 1I0r adirect progenitor of allY of the German wartime jet enginesuhich enured service,

The Whil/le lE IX engine that was shipped to the USA illOctober 1941, along unth fu ll draicings GIld technical infor­motion. The WI X u'as a bench-test engine made of second­line parts, bill to the same design as the lE I uihich made thefirst A llied jet fl ight 011 15 M ay 1941, The II?1 gave I,OOOlb(450kg) thrust at special rating and propelled the Gloster­IFhil/le £ ,28 /39 at 370mph (595km/hj,

CYLINDERS CAST INTWO BLOCKS OFTWELVE

REDUCTION GEAR FORCONTRA- ROTATING PROPEllERS

the Sabre always took a dispropor tionate share of repairand maintenance capacity.

T he Rolls-Royce Eagle was also an exception, since itapp ears to have been the only engine in this categorywhich proved mechanically sound, It was a flat-H sleeve­valve twin-cra nkshaft engine, and could produ ce3,500hp , but it arrived too late to see action,

JetsThe other class of engine which was both new and prob­lematical was of course the jet, although the developmentof the gas turb ine is also usually considered as one of thetechn ological landm arks of the Second World War.

The idea of a gas turbine is quite ancient , but by the1920s there were num erous inventors and scientists, inseveral countr ies, who believed that the time was nowright to develop it. In Britain, A A Griffith , a government

HEADER TANK. •MAIN COOLINGSYSTEM

FUEL INJECTIONPUMP

AFTER· COOLER-4

2SPEED-2 STAGESUPEI/CHARGER

FUEL INJECTIONTO S'CHAllGER

262 263

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AIR CRA F T O F T ilE S E C O:-:D W ORLD WAR

In Germany almos t the opposite happened. Althoughvon Oh ain continued to work throughout the war on gasturbine projects, the RL,\ I encouraged the mainstreammanufa cturers Junkers and BM\, ' to start work on thenew engine, while the AVA aerodynamic institu te atGottingcn , equivalent in some respects to RAEFarnborough, contributed its research on axial comp res­sor design to the companies. The first flight of the.\ lesserschm itt .\ Ie 262 with jet engines took place inJuly 1942 . However, the development programme didnot take acco unt of the enormous potential of the air­craft, and too few were finally deployed to affect the finalair war over Germany.

In Britain, the major concentration of effort wasplaced on Whittle's Power Jets team, and RAE personn elwere also seconded to work there.To produce the enginein quan tity the Rover automobile company was broughtinto the scheme as manufacturer, wi th Power Jets as thedesign authori ty, but the impre ssive behaviour of the firstWhittle W.1 experimental flight engine did not translateinto a similarly trouble-free produ ction unit. Neith er didthe hoped-for collaboration between Power Jets andRover occur. The question of whether the fault lay withRover has always been contentious, and some have citedthe car company's lack of experience and its 'unneces­sary' design changes, per haps intended to 'Roverise' thedesign and safeguard a commercial position for the newturb ine after the war. On the other hand , it has been sug­gested that the Power Jets W.2B engine was being putinto produ ction prem aturely when design was far fromsettled.

Certai nly the fighter planned for the engine, theE9/40 or Gloster Meteor, teetered on the verge of can­cellation, and the RAF view was that by the mid-warperiod, with the thrust then prom ised from the Rover/\X'h ittle units, it would scarcely be a useful fighter at all.On e incident which must have sapped official confi­dence was the propensity for the W.2H's impeller to bur stat full speed. For a while reliable development engineswere built up with imported impellers from Genera lElectr ic in the USA. This was a curious state of affairs,since Ge neral Electric had started in jets when furnishedwith drawings for the Wh ittle design by the UK inOctober 1941 and , in one year, had made airwor thyengines which flew in the Bell P-59A eight months be­fore the British \\'. 2B was flown in a ,\ tercer prototype.Fortunately the programm e was rescued by being placedin the hand s of Rolls-Royce for developm ent and pro­duction, and Gloster Meteors entered service with theRAF in July 1944. Although the j\ leteor was usefulagainst VI flying bombs, it was never deployed againstthe ,\ Ie 262 over Ge rmany. Indeed, it is perhaps fortu­nate that the two fighters never met, as the ,\ letcor had aspeed disadvantage of some 100mp h at 20,000ft to theGe rman type.

264

Neverthe less, the interesting fact remains that , al­though the jet engine was too late and produced ininsufficient quantit ies to be of strategic significance - inthe widest sense - during the war , it has proved to be oneof the most significant inventions to come out of theSecond \X'orld War.

Bibliography

Banks, F R, I Kept .\'0 Dia ry (Airlifc, Shrewsbury, 1978).Engaging personal account from an engineer whohelped prom ote l Ofl-oc tanc fuel and tetra- ethyl leadin the interwar period . During the war he ran engineprogramm es at the ,\ linistry of Aircraft Produ ction .

Go llcy, J, IF7,illle, the True Story (Airlife, Shrewsbury,1987). Essentia lly an expanded version of Whittle'sown 1953 account, developed by the autho r in asso­ciation with Whittle.

Gunston, B, By J upiter! 77,e life ofSir Roy FeddCII (RoyalAeronaut ical Society, Londo n, 1978). A readableaccount of the life of the Bristol chief designer. Anenlarged and reprinted version is in preparation byRolls-Royce Heritage.

Gunston, H, Rolls-R oy ceAero Engines (Patrick Stephens,Sparkford , 1989).

Gunston, H, Irorld Encyclopaedia ofAero Engines (PatrickStephens, Sparkford, 1986).

Harvey-Bailey, A, 77,e M erlin ill Practice (Rolls-RoyceHeritage Trust, Derb y, 1981). A personal memoirfrom one of the great team of ,\ 1erlin engineers.

Hooker, Sir Stanley, Not M ilch of all Engineer (Airlife,Shrewsbur y, 1984). Hooker was one of the great fig­ures in the British aero-engine indus try. Mu ch of thcbook deals with his postwar work in Bristol, but hejoined Rolls-Royce in 1938 and worked during thewar mainly on the ,\ lerlin supercharge rs.

Lloyd, Ian , 77,e M erlin at Ir il r (Macmillan, London ,1978). Lloyd had unique access to Rolls-Roycerecord s in thc postwar period .

Nahum, A, Foster-Pegg, R, and Birch, D, The Rolls­Roy ce Crccy (Rolls-Royce Heritage T rus t, Derby,1994). A very complete account of this aero engine .

Postan, .\ 1 "I, Hay, D, and Scott , J 0 , Design andDevelopment of Ireapolls (H.\ ISO, Lond on. 1968) .One of the series of official histor ies commissionedafter the war. It contains a good histor y of British gasturbine developm ent based on the 'government side'of the story.

Ricardo, Sir Harr y, The High-speed Internal CombustionEngine (B1ackie & Son, London. 1953). Ricardo wasthe pre-eminent independent internal combustion

engine expert in Britain in the interwar period, witha powerful influence on national aero-engi ne policy.

Schlaifer, R. and Heron . S D, The Development ofAircraftEngin es and Fuels (Harvard University. Boston,1950). '(b e best work of history on aero engineswritten to date .

Setright, L K J, The Pozcer to Ny (George Allen &

265

I' RO PlJLS IO :-:

Unwin , Lond on, 1971). An eclectic but stimu latinglook at aero engines.

Smith, H, Aircraft Piston Engines (McG raw-Hill, NewYork, 1981) . Its best sections are those on Americanair-cooled radia ls.

Whittle, Sir Frank , J et (Frederick ,\ Iuller, London,1953) . Indispensible reading.

AIR CRAF T O F Til E S E C O~D \X' ORLD WAR

11Testing and Ferrying

C apt Eric B r own and P a trick H assell

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Comparative v iews of the Curtiss X SB2C- J Helldicer prototyp e and a production S B2C- J illustrate the drastic changes made

to the design ill all effort to rectify its faults and shortcomings.

266

Fli ght Testing in Wa r timeThe threat of war ,,;11 inevitably speed up the rate ofprogress in national aviation techn ology, but when war isactually declared such progress will accelerate to a toppriority. The aggressor will always start with the advan­tage of intent, but those he attacks may well have super­ior assets such as industrial capacity, strategic mineralresources, and so forth, and will seek to develop thesewith all possible speed . Therefore to both combata ntstime is of the essence.

In aviation, the areas of techn ological development inthe Second World War were largely dictated by the typeof enemy threat, and concerned both attack and defence.Geography was a prime factor in determining the para­meters for dealing with the threat. For example, Britain 'sproximity to Germany was totally different from that ofthe USA to japan, while the Soviet Union had the uniquesituatio n of virtually bordering her major enemies.

Experimental flight testing plays a prim e role in ad­vancing aviation technology, and this was realised by allthe major combatants, who had remarkably similar con­cep ts of how to conduct such activity. Each had centralgovernment combined military/civilian bodies withoverall control of all aviation techno logical resourcesand aircraft produ ction. Rig ht testing, both experimen­tal and production, was und ertaken by aircraft manu­facturin g companies, but experimental research nighttesting was mainly confined to specialist centres staffedby scientists and professional test pilots. In GreatBritain these centres were located at the Royal AircraftEstablishment (RAE) at Farnborough , the Aeroplan eand Armament Experimental Establishment (A&AEE)at Boscombe Down and the Marine AircraftExperimental Establishment (MAEE) at Felixstowe; inGermany at Rechlin (Neubrandenburg), Peenemiinde(Karlshagen) and Trave miinde (Liibeck); in the USA at\'h ight Field, Ohio, the US Naval Air lest Center,Patuxent River, Maryland, and the USAAF Test Cente rat Muroc, California. In japan, the Soviet Union andItaly, more reliance was placed on the manufacturingcom panies, wi th only limited test facilities outside theirspheres.

The role of the aircraft manufacturers was obviouslycrucial in all of these national systems, but since suchcompanies concentrated their resources on their ownproducts, it was vital for the research establishments to

keep them informed of techn ological advances by distri­bution of scientific repo rts . On the other hand, the

manufacturers could turn to those establishments forhelp as troubleshooters if their products ran intodifficulties, so liaison between the respective test pilotsand scientific staffs was of the utmost importance.

Operational requirem entsT he design of any military aircraft is normally initiatedas the result of an Operational Requirement (OR) issuedby the Air, Naval or Army Staff as relevant, That ORthen becomes the focal point for manu facturers' inter­ested in competing for the design contract. It is thereforeessential that the military staffs have close liaison withthe research centres, so that they are aware of the lateststate of the aviation art known to these founts of know­ledge. Thus both the pilots working for manufa cturersand those attached to research centres are made fullyaware of the OR in all its aspects .

In the matter of design there were differing nationalcriteria to be observed, parti cularly in structural stress­ing, where Britain, for example, set the most exactingstanda rds. It was also important for all concerned tostudy any intelligence reports on enemy aircraft con­struction and perform ance , equipment and tactics, andalso to keep abreast of reports that would throw light onpolitical thinking that might affect strategic decisions.For example, the japanese accent on attac k at all costsmeant saerificing defensive measures such as armourplating protection, bullet-p roof windscree ns and self­sealing fuel tanks in fighters such as the ubiquitousMitsubishi AMvl Zero (see page 268).

On e of the meth ods employed to keep test pilots allfait with what was going on 'a t the sharp end' , was to givethem short operational attachments in front- linesquadro ns, or at least extended vi sits to such units.

Test pilo t trainingAt the outb reak of the Second \X'orld War the selection oftest pilots was a haphazard affair, being mainly by rec­ommendation from superior officers in the military field,who recognised outstanding flying ability and an equabletemperament. This military source of supply was virtu ­ally the only one that could provide the experience forsuch a career. In 1943 Britain sought to regularise theselection and training of test pilots by setting up a train­ing school, open to military and civilian pilots sponsoredby aircraft manufactu ring companies. The courses en­compassed both ground school and flying instruction,and the concept was copied by the other leading aviation

267

AIR CRAFT OF T H E SE CO~D \\ ·ORI.IJ ,,'AR

A captured M itsubishi Z ero uearing American markings undergoes eraluation. J apanese aircraft lacked the defensive armollrand self-sealing tanks oj their Allied counterparts.trading protection for speed. The Z ero ruled the Pacific skies for the fi rst three

years oj ,mr.

TE S T I ~G A~D F ERRYI~ G

Both Britain and Germany sought to investigate the aerodynamics oj nN" large aircraft by building piloted.flying scale repli­cas. The Short S .3 J, a half-scale Stirling bomber pozcered by Pobjoy radial engines, U'as small enough to be tested in the RAE 's24JI zcindtunnel in / 940, as seen here, as scel! as being jiozm on manufacturer's trials.

nations. although most did not achieve this until after thewar ended.

An immediate benefit from this system was that grad­uates of such a school knew each other well and keptcontact after they dispersed. so that a mu ch closer liaisondeveloped between the test pilots at the various researchcentres and aircraft companies.

.\ la nufa ctu r er ex pe rimental flight test in gAircraft and engine manufacturers were usually only in­volved in experime nta l test flying of their own pro ducts,although they were occasionally given contracts to testequipment that would be compatible with their products.

The testing of prototype aircraft included the initialnight and subsequent refinement of the handling charac­teristics by both aer odynami c and engineerin g changesto a standard tha t would make the aircraft suitable toundert ake its acceptance trials by the militar y.This couldbe a relatively straightforward procedure, as in the caseof the superb Supermarine Spitfire , or a long, exaspe rat­ing process. as with the Curtiss Helldivcr, which in

eightee n mo nths of development suffered 899 major de­sign cha nges .These in turn necessitated many thousand sof minor changes. yet still the end result was aninefficient aeroplane.

Ge nerally, the gesta tion time for an aero plane is dic­tated by its size.T he tiny Heinkel He 162 jet inte rceptorfighter made its first flight a mere ninety days after theissue of the O R, whereas the Heinkel He 177 four­engined bo mber took almost two years to achieve asimilar mileston e.

The flight testing of new-design piston engines wasonly undertaken after considerable bench running, fol­lowing which the engine was matched with an alreadyproven airframe. The flight tests mainly concerned re­liability, perform ance in terms of power output, fuelconsumption and flexibility of response to thr ottle move­ments and to aerial manoeuvre s likely to be met in oper­ational conditions.These tests then had to be repeated ineither actua l or simulated extremes of climate and cnvir­onme nt likelv to be encountered.

The design time for a piston engine was, as for

268

aeroplanes, generally dicta ted by size, and was of theorder of one-and-a-half to three years. However, suc hengines were more likely to be subjec ted to contin uousdevelo pment during their lifetime than the aero planesthey powered. as the militar y stro ve to keep ahead or atleast abreas t of contemporary enemy aircraft.

The warti me ratio of aircraft manu factur ers to enginemanufactur ers was generally in the regio n of 3.5 :1, andmost had a multiple number of facto ries but concentrat­ed the experimenta l fligh t test facilities at one or twosites.

Experimental research flight testingThe core of a nation 's technological effort in avi ationlies in its pure research centre, which is usually civiliancontrolled, with a large scientific staff and a cadre ofmilitary test pilots, although some also have their ownpermanent civilian test pilots. In particular such centreswere normall y equipped with low-speed and high- speedwind tunnels. Examples of pure research centres in theSecond World \'\'ar were the RAE in Britain, the

National Advisory Co mmittee for Aeronautics (NACA)Aero nautical Labora tor y at Langley Field, Virginia . inthe u SA. and the Aerodynarnische Versuc hsansta lt(Aerodynamic Test Estab lishme nt) at Go ttingcn inGe rma ny.

In war time, the programmes of night testing at thoseestablishments were necessari ly very flexible, to meet thevaried and unpredictable de mands that poured in fromthe military, but apa rt from the ad hoc element there wasa steady flow of pure research going on. the guidelinesfor which ema nated from governme nt-appointed bodie sof eminent scientis ts. In Britain that body was theAeronautical Research Co uncil (ARC) , in the USA itwas NACA, and in Germany the Technisches Amt(Technical Otlice) of the Reichsluftfahrtrnini stcrium(RLM or Air Ministr y).

The general pattern of research being undertakenwas remarkably similar in these thr ee countries, whileJap an, the Soviet Union and Italy were some rungs loweron the ladd er of sophistication. This becom es appa rentwhen the pattern is examined in detail.

269

A I RC RAFT OF T HE SECO:-:D W OR L D "" AR TESTI:-:C A:-:D FE RRY I :-:C

Another pair undergoing comparison: M esserschmiu ,lie 4 / 0A -3 TF2 09 and a de Hauilland M osquito NF X VII.

particular for compressibility to be expressed in terms ofMach number (a fraction indicating the speed of an air­craft divided by the speed of sound) rather than indicat­ed airspeed.

The .\ lachmeter is a standard fit in modern high­performance aircraft, but it was only fitted to experi­mental aircraft in the Second \X'orld War, and not in anyoperational aircraft. T his did not present any difficultie~

while aer ial combat remain ed predominantly at low andmedium altitudes, bu t the advent of the Boeing B-17Flying Fortress in European skies, operating at altitudesof about 30,000ft , brou ght a host of problems for thelong-range esco rt fighter s, espec ially those which had tofly above the bomber stream as top cover and then divedown on the enemy fighter s climb ing up to attack theFortresses. In these dives, Lockhe ed 1'-38 Lightnings,Republic 1'-47 Thunderbolts and North American1'-51 .\ lustangs occasionally got into serious con troldifficultie s, and some suffered fatal consequences in un­controllable 'g raveyard dives '.

Already in 1943 an intensive programme of tra nsonictesting had bee n initiated at the RAE, involving theSp itfire and the three American fighter s. It revealedgrave shortcomings in the 1'-38 and 1'-47, whose critical,\ Iach numbers were only 0.70 and 0.74 respectively,while those of the i\ lerlin-engined 1'-51 and Spitfi re were0.80 and 0.88 .The shock stall, a breakaway of the airflowfrom the top of the wi ng causing loss of lift and increaseof dra g, usually evidenced itself by a nose-down cha ngeof trim requ iring increasingly heavy stick forces to coun­teract it until these forces taxed thc pilot to his physicallimit, which thu s determined the critical Mach number.For operational pilots the risk of getting into compress­ibility trouble was exacerbated by the absence of a,\ lachmeter. Their only alternative was to do some quickmental computing of height against indicated airspeed- hardl y possible in the heat of battle.

This type of research flight testing involved muchprobin g of the unknown , and it was also done underpre ssure to get data on both critic al and tactical ,\ lachnumbers (the latter being the maximum Mach numberat which the aircraft could be safely manoeu vred ), sothat these could be passed on to front-line units. It washigh-risk flying, and casualties were commensuratelvhigh, but so, too, were the stakes in this gamble. .

The Germans had made a significant breakthroughin the region of transon ic flight by using sweptbackwings to delay the onset of the shock stall, with highlysuccessful results. Why the Allies missed out on this ad­vance is a myster y, because the German acr odynarnicistProfessor Busemann gave a lecture on the subject at aconference in Rom e in 1935, attended by scientists fromBritain and America. Postwar testing by the RAE of theMesserschmitt Me 262 fighter with only 28° of sweep­back showed that it had a critical Mach number of 0.86

difficulty keeping his aim straight, as there was no rud­der trimmer ' fitted to the aircraft, and there would con­sequently be a strong tend enc y to skid. On the plus side,the Bf 109 had an unusually steep angle of climb , whichmad e it almost imposs ible for an attacker to follow.

At about this same period a similar routine wasbeing conducted at Rechlin , where the German testingof a Spitfire IIA gave rise to two criticisms of note,namel y the heaviness of the lateral control, which re­sulted in an inferior rate of roll, especially in compari­son with the Focke-Wulf Fw 190 fighter, and secondlythe proneness of the Merlin engine to cut when buntedinto a steep dive. RAE pilots had already noted thisshort com ing during mock dogfights with the Bf 109,whose Daimler Benz direct fuel injection engine contin­ued to run smoothly under all conditions of man­oeuvring flight ,

As the war progressed, the scope of this type of workbroadened considerably, as it was realised how effectiveit was not only in helping one's own combat pilots, butalso as a valuab le inte lligence pointer to the ene rnvstechnological state-of-the-art with regard to aerodynarn­ic development s, engineering construction meth od s, theuse of strategic meta ls and minerals, and armament andengine developments.

Up to the end of 1942 it seemed that Allied and Axisaviation techn ologies were running neck-and-neck, butthis false surm ise was soon to become apparent whenphoto-reconnaissanc e pictures of Peenernunde-West,taken in early 1943, showed long scorch marks on thegrass, and then later the shape of a tiny sweptback taillessaircraft - the first clues to the existence of the sensa­tional rocket-powered .\ Iesserschmitt ,\ Ie 163 inter­ceptor fighter. It might be asked whether British lack ofknowledge of this development was eviden ce of a failurein Allied inte lligence work, but subsequent events haveshown that German security was generally incred iblytight under its repressive political regime.

Trans onic flight testingThe phenomenon of compressibility of airflow over awing at high speeds was well known to aer odynamicistsin the 1930s, but the extent of its effects on the contro l­lability of an aircraft was still largely unknown at the out­break of the Second World War. However, the problembecame urgent as aircraft performance increased andthey flew faste r and higher.

Compressibility effects occur when the airflow pastan aircraft reaches the speed of sound, but it is not nec­essary for the aircraft to be travelling at that speed, be­cause the space it occupies causes the air to acce lerateslightly in order to get past. The spee d of sound in airvaries wi th temperature, and is about 760mph(1,222km/h ) at sea level and only 680mph (1,094km/h)at 30,000ft (9, 150m) , so it is of help to pilots in

Performan ce comparisons of Axis and Allied aircraft yieldeddata that could be of great calue 10 combat pilots. Here aRepublic P-4 7D Thunderbolt leads captured Focke- IY'r/1f Fw/90A-4 1',\/679 ill a fiypast during eoaluation.

A

so that they could capitalise on them.A classic example of this was the RAE's testing of the

German Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighter, which revealedthat if lured into a really tight turn whilst attacking aHurricane or Sp itfire, its wing slats would sna tch openunevenly and ru in the pilot's gunne ry aim. Also itshowed that, if dived to 440mph, the Bf 109's elevatorsvirtually froze solid, and at low level this would cause itto dive into the sea or the ground. It was apparent, too,that in a dive attack the German pilot would have

M essersclnniu Bf 109E-3 '1\7/zile /' of JG 76 forced-landedat IYverlh ill the Bas-Rhin Department of France 0 11 22N ovem ber /939. Restored 10 airuort hiness, it u'as tested byboth the French and British, and is seen here under lesl illEngland as AE4 79 ill / 940.

Assessment of enemy a irc raftEncmy aircraft fell into both Allied and Axis hands as aresult of combat dam age or malfunction causing aforced landing, navigational errors leading to an un­scheduled landing on enemy territor y, or, in rare cases,defection by the crew. Su ch aircraft were given a fulltech nical examination whilst being made flyable in readi ­ness for handing over to the research test pilots, whowould 'wr ing them out' as a matter of urgency to assessthe strong and the weak points in handling. These wereimmediately commu nicated to the front-line squadrons

270 271

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AIR CRAFT OF TilE SE CO:-:D \\ ·OR!.D \\"AR

and a tactical ~Iach number of 0.83. compared with theSpitfire's 0 .80 tactical limit.

Stability and contro l were of course the main work­load of pure research flight testing. and wartime endeav­ou rs were aimed at producing perfect harmony ofcontrol and three-axis stabi lity particularly suited to theduty of the aircraft type . Above all. determined effor tswere made to ligh tenthe con tro ls on airc raft capable oftra nso nic flight. Hydraulically powered controls gave theopti mum answer. but care had to be taken that pilot 'feel'was not lost and that stability was not compromised; alsoin the event of hydraul ic failure it was essential that amanageable ma nua l reversion system was available.

Bv the end of the war it was clear that the so-called'sound barrier' was capable of being bro ken. but not bypiston-engined airc raft because of the excessive drageffect of the propeller.

The advent of [et a nd rocket pro pulsio nThe bir th of practical iet propulsion can be dated withcertai nty to 1930, when Frank Whittle patent ed hisspec ification for a gas turbine jet engine. \'('hcn theor ywas tra nslated into realitv and the Gloster E.28/39 madeits first flight, on 15 ,\ la): I9-l1. it was believed in Britainthat th is was th e world's first iet aircraft. However ,Ge rma n security had managed to hide from the worldtha t they had knowledge of the Wh ittle patent and hadforged ahead with their own developm ent to get the irfirst jet aeroplane, the Heinkel He 178, into the air on 27August 1939.That success was followed on 2 April 19-11by the first flight of the Heinkel He 280, the world's firsttwin- engine jet aerop lane.

In Britain, the deve lop me nt of the Whittlc jet enginewas painfully slow owing to lack of official support, andthe E.28/39 did not get to the RAE until early 19-13. Upto that point all flight testing had bcc n undert akcn by thcG lostcr Aircraft Company. which uscd this cxperience to

Although the British believed that the Gloster £'28/39, scmhere at RAE Farnborough, U'aS the tcorld's first jet aircraft,the Germans had beaten them into the air zcith their Heinkel

He / 78.

produce the ,\\cteor twin-jet fighter. examples of whichreac hed RAE in late 19-13.

The \Vhittle engine was of the cent rifuga l compresso rtype, a choice largely d ictated by the simp licity of the de­sign and the need for reliability at that stage in the stateof the art . The first Germa n jet engines were likewise ofthe centrifuga l type, but they changed rapidly to themore complicated but more streamlined axial-flow type,Britain eventually did in the postwar years.

In the USA, whith er a Whittle eng ine had been sent .development then starte d on a twin- engine fighter pow­ered by Ge neral Electri c Company-built Whittlc I-Aturboie ts.The first flight of the Bell 1'-59 Airacornct wasmade at .\ luroc on I Oc tobe r 19-12, and an example wasreceived at the RAE on 5 November 19-13.T he RAE jetstable was completed in early 19-1-l by a de HavillandSpider C rab (later to be renamed Vampire) , powered bya singlc de Havilland Goblin turbojct.

Th e A rado A r 234 V5 takes offfrom a trolley in / 943. Thisreconnaissance-bomber suffered from its short -life Jllllkersaxial-fknc jet engines.

Jet flight testing at the RAE mainly covered engineperformance and aircraft behaviour in high- speed flight.At that stage of ict engine deve lop ment, the main prob­lcrns were connected with fuel flow and cons umption,and engine acceleration response to throttle movem ents.Erratic fuel flow or rapid throttle movements couldcause the engine to 'flame out'. and so a considerab leeffort was d irec ted to prod ucing a reliable in- flight re­light syste m.

The jet engine had of course stepped up aircraft per­forma nce dramatically, so the emphasis was on transon icflight behaviour , The characteristics rem ained basicallymuch the same as for piston-e ng ine aircraft. except tha tthey tended to happen more readily because of thegrea ter accelera tion of the streamlined air fram e and thefact that the ict engine was at its most efficient at high al­titude. •\ Iachmeters thus became a mand ator y fit to allAllied jets. Furthermo re it was discovered that one of thepilotin g problems on the E.28/39 was slowing down the

TESTI:-:G A:>;D FERRYI:-:G

aircraft in flight, particularly for landing, owing to its lackof drag, so airbrakes beca me a necessity for future de­signs.

At Rechlin the Germans were concentrating theirefforts on the Arado Ar 23-l reconnaissance-bomber andthe .\ lesscrschmitt .\ Ie 262 fighter. Both had twin axial­flow ict engines ofJunkers design .These engines provedto have very sho rt lives because of lack of suitable heat­resista nt strategic metals in Germa ny, and they had a lowsafety factor in the event of a crash as they used 87 oc­tane gasoline with a 5 per cent mix of lubricatin g oil asfuel.

In their haste to get their icts into operational servicethe Ge rmans did not explore the tra nsonic flight regionas thorou ghly as they might otherwise have do ne, and asa result their jets had neither ,\ Iachrneters nor airbrakesfitted . However, at thc end of the day they were start­lingly innovator y aircraft. and in the .\ Ie 262 they hadpoten tially the most formidable aircraft of the SecondWorld War.

Experime nts with rocket-powered aircraft were pre­dominantl y carried ou t by Ge rma ny from as early as1928. using at first solid-fuel rocke ts and then progess­ing to the liquid-fuel type. As an outcome of this wor k,the first operational rocket fighter in the world was de­veloped in Germany, the end result being the taillessMcsserscbmin M c 163 with 23° of sweepbac k to itswings. The airfra me owed mu ch to the experiments un­de rtaken in the late 1930s by the Deutsches Forschungs­institu t fur Segelflug (D FS) (German G liding ResearchInstitu te) at Darmstadt, bUI the rocket flight testin g tookplace at Peencmiinde-West by ex-DFS test pilots servingin the Luftwaffe.

The .\ Ie 163 represents a landmark in aviation tech­nology, altho ugh it was more of a threat to its own pilots

-

Fritz Schafer makes the first pou'ered take -offof the u'or/d~ jirst twin -mgine jet aircraft, the Heinkel He 280 V / , at ,1lar ienehe

on 2 April/ 94 J. Sotc the IIIlCowled HeS 8 tIIrbojet engines.

272

H,e 'startlingly illllovatory' Me 262 U'as probably the most formidable aircraft of the Second Iforld Il'a r, ct'en If it did lacka ,\lac/mletcr and airbrakes. H lis ,\ Ie 262A - /a u'as s/lrrendered on its maidCll fligh t by a defecting company tcst pilot on3/ ,\larch / 945.

273

Sup ermarine Seafire Il C MB1 41, unth a tropicalfilter, makes a rocket-assisted take-offat RA E Farnboroughin 1943. It Iratl­spired that there was lillie need for assistance, as the Seafire needed atl into-teind deck speed ofonly Smph to become airborne.

Obviously a large num ber of production test pilotswas needed to meet this task, but because of the type offlying required, recruitment from the ranks of civilianpilots was possible. T he permanent core of produ ction

Numbersbuilt36, 16333,000 +22,75919,20310,938

Ilyushin 11-2Messerschm in Bf 109Spitfire/SeafireB-24 LiberatorMitsubishi Zero

Aircraft type

TES T ING AN D F ERRYI N G

During the Second World War the landing speeds andweights of naval aircraft cond ucted at NATe Patu xentRiver in the USA and RAE Farnborough in the UK wasclosely co-ord inated, since cross-operation of Americanand British aircraft carrie rs was essentia l in war.Innovatory naval aviation developments include d theBritish scheme for merchant shipborne catap ult fightersfor convoy protection, and the American system ofsingle-point catapulting from carrier decks, which elimi­nated the weighty cradle and fuselage spools of the oldsystem.

japan was very active in naval aviation and produ ceda particularly successfu l shipbo rne naval fighter in theZero. The japanese Navy's flight testing infrastructureclosely resembled that of Great Britain, maybe becauseboth are island nations.

Ge rmany and Italy both showed an initial interest innaval aviation and each built an aircraft carr ier thatnever went into service. Neithe r power attemp ted to de­sign a specialist carrier aircraft, but intended to adaptair force aeroplanes for carrier work. Naval aviationflight testing was therefore virtua lly non-existent inthese countries.

T he Soviet Union, with a huge coastline spanninghalf the world, had decided it could defend its territor ywith land-based aircraft, and showed no active intere st incarrier aviation until the postwar era.

P roduction flight testi ngHundreds of thousands of aircraft of hundreds ofdifferent types were built in the Second World War, andthough it might be imagined that factories produc ing aparti cular type would make them all perfect copies of theoriginal, this was far from the case. Discrepancies be­tween handmade compo nents, and rigging differences inboth engine and airframe manu facture, made it a neces­sity to check each aircraft to a set of standards whichultimately had to be verified by flight testing before ac­ceptance. The immensity of the task of such wartimetesting can be gauged from the following maximum pro­duction runs of the main comba tant nations:

COIIll/ry

Soviet UnionGermanyGreat BritainUSAjapan

A Seafire is launched f rom Farnborough's rocket catapult .The tuio-colour quartered circles Oil the nose and rear fuse­lage were for calibration and film analysis purposes. ABr istol Buckingham dominates the foreground.

flight tested from appropriate marine establishmentswith sheltered mooring areas and long stretches of openwater for taxiing, take-off and landin g trials.

The critical factors in marine testing are ascerta iningthe take-off and land ing characteristics. These tests de­termine the limitations of sea states and wind conditionsfor both take-off and landin g, during which the mainbugbear is the risk of porp oising, a dangerous motionwhich can lead to loss of the aircraft.

Specialist flight testingSome areas of flight testing require the pilots to have in­depth experience of the special aspects involved, partic­ularly aircraft carrier operations, which played key rolesin the Pacific war and significant ones in the Europeantheatre. Landin g an aeroplane on the flight deck of anaircraft carrier is probably the most demanding task apilot is called on to undertake as a matter of routin e, soassessment of a naval aircraft's flying qualities require anexperienced deck landing pilot. In consequence theAmerican , British and japanese navies had their owncadres of test pilots.

Naval aircraft requir e their own very special features:excellent view ahead in the land ing attitude, a robust andenergy absorbing und ercarri age, effective controls atvery low speeds, innocuous stall characteristics, highdrag in the landin g configuration, high lift in the take-offconfiguration and good ditching qualities.

Experimental research flight testing of naval aircraftincluded their initial deck landin gs and take-offs, cata­pult and rocket-assisted take-offs, low windspeed land­ings (for escort carrier operations) and crash barr ierengagement. So importa nt were these tests that theRoyal Navy in 1943 assigned HM S Pretoria Castle as adedicated carrier for trials of aircraft and equipment,with training as a secondary function. T his vesselcontinued to operate in these roles until late 1945.

Marine flight test ingAll of the Second World War combatants operated ma­rine aircraft, but the percentage number of these wasvery small in comparison to the large forces of land­planes. Seaplanes and flying boats natur ally have to be

from the dive. Again much flight testing was requir ed todetermine the optimum flap position and prove the con­cept.

A different kind of troubleshooting consisted of coun­tering some unexpected enemy innovations that present­ed a dire threat. Such a device was the Ge rman VIpulse-jet pilotless flying bomb laun ched against Englandin the summer of 1944 from coastal laun ch ramp s on theEuropean mainland.

T he VI norm ally flew at about 1,000-2,000ft(30D-600m) above ground level at 400mph (640krnlh) .Since no contemporary Allied fighters could match thisperform ance, some drastic action was required.The en­gine manu facturers proposed boosting their engines to amuch higher power for short 3min bur sts, using 150 oc­tane aromatic fuel instead of the norm al 100 octane.Four fighters, the Mu stan g III, Spit fire XIV, Tempest Vand Mosquito IV, were then tested at RAE with highlysatisfactory results, and the VI was effectively countered,1,771 being destroyed in the air.

In troubleshooting, the aviation doctors played asignificant role, particularly in the matter of developin gpressure cabins for high-altitude flying, anti- tg' suits forcombat flying, and ejection seats. The flight testing ofsuch equipment was mainly done by experimenta l re­search test pilots, often with the doctors acting as testobservers, and in some cases even as the test pilots them­selves.

AIR CRA FT OF T ilE S E C O:-;n WORLD \\ ' AR

than to the enemy, mainly due to the highly volatile rock­et fuels and the difficulties inhere nt in having to make afast deadstick landing on a skid after every sortie.

Troub leshootingA considerable amount of wartime flight testing con­cerned sorting out problems that degraded an aircraft'soperational perform ance, and these usually involvedpanic remedies. A typical case was the cutting of theMerlin engine in the early Spitfires when they were bunt ­ed into a dive, and this put the British fighter at a disad­vantage against the Bf 109 with its direct-fuel-injectionDaimler Benz DB 600 series engines. On receiving thefield repo rts , RAE Farnborough immediately went topanic stations and a brilliant female scientist, MissBeatr ice Shilling, very rapidly came up with a simple so­lution in the form of a small metal disc with a hole in themiddle. When this orifice plate was brazed into theSpitfire's fuel pipe it enab led fuel to flow in norm al con­ditions, but if acceleration was applied to the fuel in anaxial directio n the disc prevented the fuel surging awayfrom one end and thus starving the engine even mo­mentarily of fuel. Some urgent flight testing was neces­sary to get the disc hole size right and prove the system.In the event the effect of 'Miss Shilling's Orifice' on RAFmorale was electrifying.

Another such panic fix, by the America ns, was thefitting of underwing dive recovery flaps to their earlywartime fighters, the Lightning and Thunderbolt, whichboth exhibited dangerous compressibility characteristicsresulting in loss of control in even shallow dives at highaltitude .T hese flaps were carefully positioned at a pointon the wing und ersurface so that, when activated, theyimparted a nose-up pitch to the aircraft, aiding recovery

274 275

AIR CR A F T O F T ilE SE CO ~D \\ ' OR L D " ' ARTE ST I ~G A~() F ERRY t~ G

Although the A t'ro Ali son ! uw operationally obsolete al the outbreak of U'c1 r, it proved invaluable ill mallY secondary roles,All sons like .\'9946, seen here ill 1944 , ",ere the main stayof the A'Irt's air-taxificet, distributi ng ferry pilots 10 airfields acrossBritain and collecting lip 10 eight of them fo r the tr ip back 10 base a t the end ofa long day ,

c1uding Loc kheed Hudsons, which theoreti cally hadsufficient range to reach Britain from Newfoundland ,But the North Atlantic weath er was still a grea t un­known , parti cularly in winter. In two decade s it had bee nflown less than 100 times, and altho ugh Pan Americanhad carried the first passe ngers across in 1939, a reliableyear-round service was tho ugh t to be ten years away, ButBeavcrb rook wanted aircraft, not reliability, and flyingthem over might red uce the delivery time by threemonths, Som e air marshals said that half the aircraftwou ld be lost in winte r, bu t Ge orge Woods-H umphery,ex-ma naging director of Imper ial Airways, and his pilotswith Atlantic expe rience, such as \Vilcockson andBennett" believed it was possible , Beaverbrook bac kedthem, and unde r the wing of Ca nadian Pacific Railwaysthey set up the small Atlantic Fer ry Organisat ion(AT FERO) in M ontreal. T hey recru ited pilots and rad iooperators. mos tly civilians from Canada and the USA ,and when the first seven long- range Hudson IIIs reachedCanada (towed across the border by horses to circum­vent the letter of the US Neutrality Act) the crews wereready for the ' Big T rip' , Led by Bennett, they leftGander, Newfoundland, on the cold clear evening of 10

1\,

Lockheed Hudson patrol bombers comprised almost 70 per cent of the 593 ai rcraf t safely delivered ill the fi rst yea r of theAtlantic ferry serv ice, Here all early batch of .Ilk,! Hudsons is prepared fo r the Big Trip; the crudely-blanked rear-fuselageC11lOms are for the Boulton Paul turrets, uhich u'ere installed upon the aeroplanes' arrival in Britain.

like the men , were expec ted to handl e any aircraft of theClasses for which they had qu alified ,Thus pilots used toHurricanes and Tomahawks migh t be sent to collectTyphoons without eyer havin g seen one, with only theATA's Pilot's No tes to warn them of handlin g problemsand guide them round the contro ls' ecce ntric ities' ,Theyflew witho ut radio or navigation aids in all but the worstweather, and sometimes in aircraft classe d 'NEA' (NotEssentially Airworthy), Yet the pilot-error accident rate ,including the minor mishap s, was only 0,25 per cent,Inevitably there were some fatal accid ents,The ATA lost153 aircrew over its six-yea r existence, about 10 per centof those who served. M any accidents were caused by theweather closing in, as hap pened to Amy Johnson, whodrowned in the Thames , the first of fourteen ATAwom en to die flying,

Lord Beaverbrook, who took over responsibility forairc raft production in M ay 194 0, ens ured that the ATAexpa nde d rap idly to release RAF pilots for opera tionalflying , In that crucial summer Beavcrbrook adopted an­other idea for ferryi ng which had far greater long-termconsequences, M any American-built airc raft shippedacross the Atlantic were being lost to the Usboats. in-

Auxiliaries' employed by British Airways, \" 'ithin tendays the first resp ondents had been flight tested, andafter a brief conversion course twenty pilots were sent toreinforce the RAF's two sma ll 'ferry pools', All weremen, but under pre ssure from experienced women pilotskeen to 'do their bit' the Air ,\ Iinistry allowed PaulineGower to form a small, fema le ferry pool at Hatfield withthe mundane job of flying de Havilland T iger ,\ Ioths tostorage uni ts,This un it attracted pu blicity and chauvin­ist criticism, but by months of reliable work the wome novercame most prejudices and were allowed to fly moreadvanced types,

In February 1940 Air Transport Auxi liary (ATA)pilots were withdrawn from the RAF units to form a newferrv pool, administered by BOAC' , As the ATA'sCommandant, d'Erlanger then had forty-th ree men andnine women pilots working for him, In the short days oftha t first winter they delivered about 100 aircraft a week,By 1944 there were fourtee n pools, together averaging1,500 de liveries weekly, But that figure ma sks the grea tpeaks of demand, as in the month before D-day or afterlon g spells of imp ossible wint er weath er , Then therecould be over 500 deliveries a day, some pilots flying fiveor six aircraft, with a taxi flight in an Avro Anson be­tween each collection, In the ATA's six-yea r life its air­crew made over 308 ,000 de liveries of machines rangingfrom ancie nt Hawker Hart biplanes to Handl ey PageHalifax bombers and Gloster ,\ Ieteor jets,

The 'Ancient Tattered Airmen' and 'Always Ter rifiedAirwornen' came from many backg rounds and includedstockbrokers. grocers, farmers, journalists and even aconjuror. ,\ lost were from Britain and the Common­wealth, but there were many Amer icans, and rcp rcscn ta­rives of two dozen other nations, Pauline Gower finallyachieved com plete equality for the wom en pilots, who,

test pilots could be expanded by the secondment ofservice pilots, and indeed this was a widely used option,since aircraft production rates fluctuated with the for­runes of war,

The pressures on production test pilots were high inwart ime beca use of the constant demand for aircraftnecessarv to make goo d operational losses and to buildup new squadrons , Such testing also had its own kind ofdangers, as can be seen from the record of the chief pro­du ction test pilot at Vickers-Supcrrnarinc's factor y atCas tle Brornwich (Birmingham) , who had 127 forcedland ings in SI X years of production flight testing ofSp itfires,

Aircraft Ferrying in the Second World WarFro m the earliest days of military aviation there has beena need for ' ferrying' , the unglamorous task of delive ringaircraft from thei r ma nufacrurers or rerurning them todepots for overha ul. But the vast numbers of aircraftused in the Second World War and the thousands ofmiles which frequently separate d the Allies' facto riesfrom the theatr es of operatio ns made ferrying an un ­precedent ed logistical task, T his led to the crea tion ofspecialist ferry ing organisatio ns, all of which relied hcav­ily on civilian experience, By 194 5 they had made a re­markable contribution to the war effort , with over600,000 delivery flights, and in the process they inadver­tently transformed the air tra nsport scene ,

The first of these new organisations was born asHitler's troops prepared to invade Poland, Gerardd 'Erlanger , a director of British Airways, had been pro­moting a scheme to usc older private pilots like himselffor communications flying in warti me, and at the end ofAugust 1939 the Air ,\ Iinistry agreed that d 'E rlange rsho uld invite suitable pilots to becom e 'Air Transport

276 277

AIRCRAFT OF THE SECO:-:D \X'ORLO WAR TESTI:-:G .vx n FERRYI:-:G

17,e promising D.H.95 Flamingo ",as just entering production al the outbreak of U'<1r, and de Havilla nd ,cas alloued 10

complete only sixteen of its fi rst all-metal airliners. Eight ,ure operated by BOAC from its Egyptian base al Almaza, billby 1944, unth American transports more readily available, shortage of spares led 10 their retirement, Here,G-AFYF King Alfred of BOA C is seen in the M iddle East . Delivered 10 Cairo in A ugust 194 0, it U'<1S shipped back 10

Br ita in in 1945.

November 1940, flying by night in loose formation,Despite a towering Atlantic weath er from and someother problems, all seven reached Northern Ireland safe­ly. Beavcrbrook was delighted . \Vhen the second andthird groups also arrived safely, ATFERO's futu re ex­pansi on was assured.

Before those first tran satlantic deliveries, anoth erequall y urgent ferry operation had begun, in a verydifferent clima te. After the fall of France, aircraft for the}'Iiddle East had 10 be shipped around the Cape. By off­loading the aircraft at Takoradi in the Gold Coast (nowGhana), assembling them, and flying them acro ss Africa

In spring 1941 BOAC received nine ne", Lockheed M odel 18 Lodestars 10 supplement its smaller M odel 14s on the oitalTakoradi-Egypt ferry route. A s the crucial role of air transport at last becam e apprecia ted, more of these fas t aircraft ",ereobtained f rom US ou'ners. Stripped O/ll and fi ned zcith bench seats for eighteen passengers, they formed the backbone ofBOAC~

African operations throughout the tear. This exa mple, G-AGC,\I Lake ,\ lariuI, previously N C3361 7 on the US civil register,is seen m:er Cairo.

In ea rly 1941 the Consolidated B-24 Liberator bomber ,cas the only landplane able 10 }Iy the Atlantic regularly in bothdirections. 17,e early production aircraft u'ere used 10 start the Return Ferry Service taking ATFERO creu's back 10 Canadain considerable discomfort . Th eir many I 'I? passengers fared I/O better on the freezing seventeen-hour trips, but u'ere safef rom the Usboats beknc. Th is .Ilk.I "'as brought across by an Anglo-Canadian-American crct". making landfall in just

over eight hours.

278

in stages, demand on shipping was dramatically redu ced .This route had been opened by Imp erial Airways in1936, bUI conditions were still extre mely primitive, andfor the Hurrican e pilots, led in small formations by oneor IwO Blenh eims with navigator s, the great stre tches ofempty desert mUSI have seemed as daunting as theAtlantic. Nonethele ss, by Jun e 1941 oyer 150 aircraft amonth were being sent 'up the line' 10 Egypt , and by thelime Axis force s were expelled from Africa in M ay 1943the RAF had ferried more than 5.300 aircraft acro ss thecontinen!.

A major obstacle 10 expansion had been returningferr y crews 10 Takoradi , Transport aircraft had beenlargely neglected in the RAF's prewar expa nsion. andthough BOAC's D.H .95 Flam ingos and Lockheed 14sshuttle d across the continent laking vital spa res and VIP s

279

10 Ca iro and retur ning with ferr y crew, they had 100 fewmachines. So in mid-1941 Pan American Airways wascontrac ted 10 operate a trans-African airline service, andlater to deliver lend-lease tran spor ts and bombe rs directfrom the USA 10 EgYPI using the chain of airfields theywere buildin g (with US government financ e) throughthe Ca ribbean and Brazil.

There was a similar problem in returning ATFEROcrews 10 Canada unti l the arrival of the first sixCo nsolidated LB-30A Liberat ors in the sp ring of 1941.These aircraft had unprecedented range , often flying di­rect from Scotland 10 '\\onlTeal. They tran sformed air­crew turnaround limes, but for men huddled in sleepingbags for seventeen hours in the freezing draughts of theplywood-floored bom b bay, the flights were no picnic.COnlTaCI pilots claimed that they were nOI paid 10 deliver

AIR CR AFT OF Til E SE CO~J) \X'ORI.J) " 'AR T E STI ~ G A ~ J) FE R R Y I ~G

Tuienty Boeing B-1 7 Flying Fo rtress Is, of zchich AN529 ",as typical, u'ere delivered 10 the RAF by ATFERO ill spring1941, bill these early models proued ineffective 011 operations. Ir u'as not until 1 Jllly 1942 that a USMF B-1 7 flew intoPresncick, the first of thousands for the Sth Air Force, ,I/o sl u'ere f lO"<I)1I by cre'ws uiho had lIever crossed uuter wider thanthe Great Lakes,

C-5 4, ente red service only four months after its firstflight. The USAAF found that demand for air transportto the operational theatres was insatiable. Vital spares,ammunition, blood plasma , spec ialist technicia ns andgenerals were all needed yesterday, and there was nevereno ugh capacity.

In December 1941 the ent ire USAAF lon g-r angetransport fleet comprised just eleven B-24s. Like theBritish, they turned to the civilians . The airlines' four­cngi ned flying boats (only eleven aircraft) and someninety DC- 3s were purchased and their previous ownerscont racte d to operate them . T hus in June 194 2 Ge neralHarold George had 130 aircraft to support ATe'sworldwide operations, but only fifteen of them had airforce crews. The AT C also relied on the airlines to sup­ply trained personnel at all levels; Ge orge's deputy wasCy rus R Smith, boss of Amer ican Airlines. Unlike RAFFerry Comma nd, AT C policy was that directl y­employed civilian pilots were commissioned. This mayhave imp eded greate r use of wom en pilots, for thoughseveral women's auxiliary ferr ying squadro ns wereformed, and received great pu blicity for their work, theair force would no t recruit them and they were disba nd­ed in December 1944 when sufficient male pilots wereava ilable,

Wilh its effic ient. long-span 'Davis ising' and great range, the B- 24 Liberator proved invaluable as a transport aircraft, tchetherflJ'illg Wills1011 Churchill to Russia or ant i-tank shells 10 EgYPl, 7 ' ''0 fre ight er cariants of the famou s bomber ",ere built, theC-87 seen here and the C-109, a specialised tanker mainly used 10 carry [uel touer the Hump ' into China.

struc tu re, However, real war exposed the logisticdifficulties facing the USAAF even in its sma ll initial de­ployments,There were no overseas fucl dumps, mainte­nan ce crews or spares stocks, no weath er service and fewexperienced aircrew, Bombers to reinforce the Philip ­pin es had to be sent 'the wron g way', via the trans­African route and Indi a, and afte r two months onlvforty-o ne of the sixty-five dispa tched had reach ed theSou thwest Pacific , But the USAAF learned quickly, andthe first deployment of 13-24 bom ber squadro ns to theMiddle East in June 194 2 went like clockwork, By thenthe route across Africa had also been used bv C urtissP-4 0E fight ers on their way to C hina and by Lc~d-Lease- -13-25 Mitchells going on to Tehran, where their PanAm erican crews hand ed them oyer to the Russians.Later Russian deliveries would be mostly via Alaska,leaving the recipients with the long trans-Siberian tr ip tothe front line.

June 1942 saw three other significant events : the firstEighth Air Force B-1 7s flew to England from Presqu eIsle, M aine, beginning the biggest ferry task of the war;USAAF Ferr ying Comma nd beca me Air TransportComma nd (AT C), responsible for both ferrying andstra tegic air transport, and the aircraft which wouldallow AT C prop erly to fulfil the latter role, the Douglas

Presiden t Roosevelt realised that the USA would have tosupport the ir de livery, Thc formation of the USAAFFerrying Command on 29 M ay 194 1 was the first step,relieving AT FERO crews by flying aircraft from the fac­tories to their US 'points of depar ture' , where Rooseveltwanted them to be handed oyer dire ctly to the RAEConsequent ly ATFERO becam e RAF Ferry Comma ndin July 1941 und er Air Chief M arshal Bowhill , who theyear before had been a pessimistic opponent of Atlanticferryi ng , Bowhill fully recognised AT FE RO's rem ark­able achievements, however , and made few changes;Ferry Comma nd' rem ained a primarily civilian organi­sation under RAF leadership, By the time it disbandedon 16 Februar y 1946 it had delivered some 10,000 air­craft across the oceans, T he final loss rate was only 2 percent, but even this meant that over 500 aircrew had died ,

In spring 1941 the American s proposed buildingmorc airfields in Canada, G reenland and Iceland,Besides handling the projected exp ansion, they wouldallow medium-range aircraft to be ferri ed without extrafuel tanks, Survey flight s by Ca pt Elliot Roosevelt, thePresident's son, and by ATFERO, resulted in the selec­tion of sites at Goose Bay in Labrador and theG reenland fjord locations later famous as Bluie WestOne and Bluie West Eight. The pace was rem arkable,T he Ca nadia ns' firs t ship reached remote G oose Bay inSept ember 1941 ; the first aircra ft land ed on 9December,

That au tumn Roosevelt bent the US neutrality lawsfurth er, autho rising Ferrying Co mmand deliveries to theMiddle East along the Pan Am erican route, where morenew airfields were being construct ed , Thus before PearlHarbor a start had been made on the new global infra-

aircraft but to take the trip back. BOAC took rcsponsi­bility for this Return Ferry Servic e (RFS) in Septem ber1941 and operate d it until the end of the war, makingover 2,000 cross ings, This was thc first year-round air­line service across thc No rth Atlanti c , but those endur­ing the discomforts of the bomb bay (including manyVIPs) might haw disputed the term 'se rvice ' .

The Lend-Lease Bill of March 1941 pre saged a rap idincrease in the flow of bombers for the RAF, and

The Bell P-63 Kingcobra and its predecessor, the P-39Airacobra, ",ere unu sual ill havillg theAllison 17..1 710 enginebehind the cochpit, allouiing the installation ofa 37mm call­non firing through the propeller hub. Nearly three-quarters ofthe 3,303 Kingcobras built ",ere supplied 10 the SouietUnion, most being ferried via A laska, This machine bears theUSA 's interpretation of the Souiet national markings ituould SOOIl carry,

280 281

A I RC RAFT OF T ilE SECO:-:D \X'O RLD \X' ARTEST I:-:G A SD FE RR Y I :-:G

In /ile the Douglas C-47 Dakota u'as the pre-eminent transport aircraft of the <<'O r, its smaller predecessor, the DC-2, alsoserved, Britain purchased ncenty-fice of them f rom L'S ai rlines ill 1941 fo r use ill India and the M iddle East, and af ter PearlHarbor nccnty-four more u-ere impressed by the L'SAAF as the C-32A, though they u-ere still mostly floum by their old airlinecr",,'s, One of the DC- 2s operaled by N o 31 Squadron, RAT; is seen here ill the Holy 1~lIId ill the ea rly <car period, (The air­craf t ill the left distance is a Hincher Audas .

Typical of the civil aircraft impressed into RAF servicefor connnunications u'ork u'as the Percival Q,6, designed ill 193 7 as arelatively fast four-passenger business aircraft , Tu'O of the eleven impressed, including this rare retractable-undercarriage t'er­SiOIl, HK838/G-A FM I{ ft'cre used ill the M iddle East, zchere the A ir Csin-Cotir .\farshaI 7i?dder, u'as lllcky to be rescued afte rhis Q,6 forced landed uith a fai led engine.

Bibliogra phy

Barnato Walkcr, Diana, Spreading M y Wings (PatrickStephens, Yeovil , 199ol) , An entertaining per sonalmem oir of flying with the ATA by an inexpe riencedpilot who survived more than her share of awkwardmoment s, A daughter of 'Bentley Boy' WoolfBarnato, she also gives interesting sidelights on sev­eral aviation and estab lishment figures and a briefaccount of her family's astonishing rise to wealth andfame,

Bennett, Air Vice-Marshal D C T, Pathfi nder - A Ifu rAutobiography (Frederick Mullcr, London , 1958, andSphere Books, 1972) also covers his remarkable pre­war flying career and is more interesting than laterbiographies, He describes the early days ofAT FEROand his pioneering trips in some detail and from avery personal (and typically opinionated) viewpoint ,

Bcrgel, Hugh C, Flying Wartime Aircraft (David &Charles, Newton Abbot, 1972), repr ints the ATAPilots ' Notes for seven types, including the

ol Ferry Command became ol5 Group, RAF TransportCommand, when the latter was formed in M arch19o13, but the earlier name seems to have remainedin colloquial use,

hard -runway airfields with beacons and rada r provided aworldwide network of facilities barely conceivable fiveyears before, and if they spelled the end for the much­loved flying boats, they promised far greater regularityand safety, There were now thousands of aircrew withtransoceanic experience and surplus aircraft to equipnew operators, \Vartime ferrying had changed air trans­port decisively, from an adventure for a tiny elite into areal travel industry,

Xotes

British Airways and Imperial Airways were inte­grated into the new. nationalised British OverseasAirways Corp oration (BOAC) thro ugh the winter of1939-40, although the merger was not officiallycomple ted until 1 Apr il [ 9~O ,

2 Ergono mics seems then to have been unknown tomany designers, A typical example is that the air­brake control in Mcrlin-engincd Beaufighters oper­ated in the reverse sense from that in theHercules-engined variants,

3 Australian Don Benn ett was already well known forhis record-breaking flights in the Shor t/Mayo sea­plane M ercury , but after leaving ATFERO in june19o11 would become still more famous as the creatorand leader of the RAF's Pathfinde r Force,

in Canada could, with a little extra training, become suc­cessful 'one-trippers ', the Atlantic crossing being theirfirst long-distance flight , The USAAF followed this ex­ample , They were prepared for a 10 per cent loss rate,but of 920 aircraft despatched across the Atlantic in19o12, 882 arrived safely, With new and larger airfields,improved navigation beacons, better weather foreca stingand the introduction of ground controlled app roachradar, the loss rate fell as the numbers grew, and by 19o1oleven ferrying single-engined fighters across an oceanwhich for so long had been the preserve of heroic ad­venturers seemed almos t routine,

The ATC still had to ferry the many replacem ent air­craft overseas, but this and its RFS operations were nowovershadowed by its strategic transport role, It was thiswhich drove the expan sion from 130 aircraft in june19o12 to over 3,000 when japan surrendered, including839 C-5ol Skymastcrs.The ATC was effectively runningthe biggest airline the world had seen, or would see formany years to come , able to fly 275,000 passengers amonth, 50,000 of them tran satlantic, plus over 100,000tons of freight, most of it going 'over the Hum p' intoChina, Under the ATC umbrella its contract airlines,Pan Amer ican, T\\ 'A, Northwest and others, were alsoexpanding, gaining invaluable experie nce of flyingacross new oceans and continents while operating thelatest airliner, for the C-5~ was only a DC-ol in uniform,

In 1 9~~ US airlines were still undertaking a third ofATe's operations and were well set to dominate postwarair transport , Air ferrying, which in 1939 had seemed ahumdrum domestic task which might be delegated toamateurs, had grown through this mass-production warinto a vast global operation, American investment in new

The growth of the ferrying task paralleled theAmerican 'production miracle', In 19~~ US manu fac­turcrs built 96,3 18 aircraft. In total weight, they in­creased production by a factor of twelve in just th reeyears, In March 19o1ol alone they built more aircraft thanGermany had in the whole of 1939, All of these aircrafthad to be ferried from the factories, and the bombersand many of the fighters were then flown overseas.Fortunately for the ATC the majority of these flightswere made by the aircraft's own combat crews, In 19o11ATFERO had shown that aircrew who had learned to fly

Whm Pearl Harbor was attacked, Douglas <cas sta rting toassemble the first DC-4 airliner. Pili into production as theC-5 4 Skymaster, it entered service ill the sununer of 1942 ,By the end of the U'Or I,OOO-pIIlS Air Force, Navy andairline Skymasters had transform ed long- range logistic SIlP­port, carrying passengers and freight around the globe all allunprecedented scale and pacing the u'ay for posncar ai rtransport. S kymaster 4 1-37284 is seen here dur ing eralua ­tion ill the UK ..

282 283

12Training: a Vital Command

Joh n Galley

AI R C R A FT OF TIlE SE CO:';D \\ 'ORLD \\ ' A R

Hurrican e, \'(Tellington and Liberator , with com­ments by the author , who comma nded No 9 Ferr yPool. This brings home the extrao rdinary variety inaircraft handling and systems, some qui te eccentric,which ATA pilots faced daily, Hugh Bergel has alsowritt en a personal mem oir, Fly and Deliver - AFerry Pilot' s Diary (Airlife Publi shing, Shrewsbury,1982) ,

Chandler, Robert, Off The Beam (Robert Chandler,1969), An interesting per spective on Ferry Co m­mand by a radio operator, this memoir also coversthe author' s fascinating prewar career at Croydo nand postwar with BSAA and with de Havilland onCo met proving flight s,

Christie, Ca rl A, Ocean B ridge - The History of RAPFerry Command (University of Toronto Press,Toronto, 1995 , and ,\ lid land Publishing Ltd,Leicester, 1995) .This 'academic' history is splendid­ly research ed and scrupulously annotated yet re­mains very readable and fully aware of the humanrealities. Parti cularl y interesting is the pro perCa nadian perspecti ve it gives to the origins and con­tinuing operations of ATFERO and Ferr y/Transpor tComma nds . It is unlikely to be bettere d.

Cra ven, \'\' I; and Cate, J L (Eds), The Army Air Forces inIl'brldll'u r l/ (University of Chicago Press, 1948-58,reprinted 1983) . The seven-volume Official Histor yis not only comprehensive but rema rkably readablean d candid. T here are two main sections relevant tothe topi c, and man y useful det ails elsewhe re. VolumeI (,Plans and Early Op erations') Chap ter 9, 'T heEarly Development of Air Transport and Ferrying'by John D Ca rter, covers the or igins of FerryingComma nd, the involvement of the airlines, and op­erations up to mid-1 942 . Volume VII ('Sen 'icesaround the World '), Chapter I 'Air Transport' byCarte r and F H Heck briefly recap itulates the earlierwork and continues the story of Air TransportCo mmand thr ough its great period of expa nsion.Essenti al reading for anyone interested wartime airtransport or the origins of the modern age.

Curtis, Lettice, The Forgotten Pilots (Eastern Press Ltd,Lond on , 1971, 1982). Easily the best acco unt of theATA, combining a carefully researched history witha well-writt en personal mem oir which evokes thepleasure, anxiety, excitement and tedium of wartimeferr y flying. Lettice Cur tis joined the ATA in July

284

1941 and was one of only eleven wom en to converton to heavy bombers. T here arc tables, maps andtwenty-two appendices .

Gann, Ernest K, Fate is the H I/Iller (Hodder andStoughto n, Lond on, 1961) . T his auto biograp hicalwork by the well known write r-pilot covers his pre­and postwar airline experience but includes wartimestor ies of flying DC- 3s, C-54s and C-87s over theAtlanti c, the Pacific and ' the Hump' into China oncontract work for USAAF Air Transpo rt Comma nd.It con firms how mu ch the ATC owed to airline staffand how the airlines sought to benefit from their op­portunity. Garin's style now seems rather too self­conscious, but the content is still fascinating.

Luff, David, M ollison - 17,e Flying Scotsman (LidunPubli shing, Lyth am St Ann es, 1983) . This sympa­thetic and thorou gh biography of the pioneer long­distanc e flyer has interesting chapters on his, andAmy John son 's, time with ATA.

,\ IcVicar, Don, Ferry Command (Airlife Publi shing,Shrewsbury, 1981) .The first of this Ca nadian pilot'str ilogy of wartime memoirs, covering the rigours offerryi ng on both North and South Atlantic, with aremarkable account of his arctic survey flights inFebru ary/M arch 1942. Brash and opinionate d, withinte resting details on flying types like the No rsemanand Martin B-26, and the state of Brazilian broth els.The sequels are N orth Atlantic Cat and Change ofWings.

Powell, Air Comm odore G riffith, Ferryman (AirlifePubli shing, Shrewsbury, 1982 ). 'Ta ffy' Powell re­placed Don Benn ett when ATFERO beca me RAFFerry Co mmand, and ran its operations until July1945. His aviation autobiography gives a reada bleand considered acco unt of the organisation, itsachievements and some of its personalities. It alsocovers his postwar career with Silver City Airwaysand BOAC.

Pudn ey, John (writing anonymous ly), A tlantic Bridge(HM SO, Lond on 1945). Written during the warwith help from Air Commodore Powell, this officialaccount of ATFERO/Fe rry Comma nd activities, aslim nincpenny paperb ack, is still worth readin g. Itcontains severa l first-hand accounts of early cross­ings, including the experimenta l trip by WacoCG-4a glider, towed from ,\ \o ntrealto Prcsrwick bya Dakota.

Durin g the Second World \'(Tar aircrew training and air­craft production were the key factors in operating anefficient air force. They were also prim e ingredient s re­quired to achieve comma nd of the air. As the war un­folded the 'numbers game' in men and mach ines beganto make its impa ct. Training systems had to acco mmo ­date advanced technology and supply incre asing de­mand s for aircrew, not simply to match losses but toservice the rapid growth in aircraft production to meetoperational requirem ent s. The emergence of the four­engined bomber, for example, coupled with the growingEuro pean bombing offensive, began to suck in aircrewlike a vacuum cleaner. Hence aircrew had to be trainedon a 'm ass production ' basis, and output had to begeared to meet the growing needs of the air forces con­cerne d,

Luftwaffe trai ni ngIn September 1939 the Luftwaffe was in many respectsthe most powerful and efficient air force in the world ,possessing some 4,300 aircr aft mann ed by highly trainedcrews, some with battle experience (in Spain) and highmorale,This was no mean achievement, as the air clausesof the 1919 Treaty of Versailles had stipulated thatGermany was no longer to maintain or develop militar yor naval forces.

In the mid-1 930s one of Hermann Goe ring 's first pri­orities had been to overhaul the existing system of flyingtraining provided by the comme rcial and sporting flyingorganisations. In 1936 these had been pu t on a war foot­ing and a special training inspec torate created to cen­tralise control and ensure the highest possible standardsin all flying training schoo ls. Before hostilities began theLuftwaffe had about fifty basic training schools acrossSaxony, the Rhin eland, Bavaria, Silesia, East Pru ssia,

A typical Lufttiaffe primary trainer, the A rado Ar 66G.

285

and Pom erania, plus facilities in Russia. As the war pro­gressed, basic train ing schools were set up in Poland andCzechoslovakia, and advanced flying schools in Fran ce,Belgium, G reece , No rway, Denmark, and Italy, making atotal of 75 to 100 schoo ls. At the outbreak of war theLuftwaffe training scheme was turning out between10,000 and 15,00 pilots a year. In 1940 it had a surplusof pilots, and operational and reser ve training unit s werecreated to re-absorb them.

Initial Lu ftwaffe training - broadly correspo nding tothe RAF Initial Training Wing (IT W) stage - was quitedifferent to that in Britain . Germa n recruits, includingofficer candidates , spent from six to twelve months pri­marily on an infantry regimental course.There they weregiven a strong dose of Pru ssian discipline, taught togoose -step and usc sma ll-arms, and generally toughenedup on the parade ground. This was somewhat akin to theAmerican system for training air force officers (breakthem down first and build them up as you want them),Lectu res on the basic principles of radio telephony andmap reading comprised the only aviation aspect. Later,under the pressure of war, this course was reduced induration to two or three months.

O n passing out from the recruit depot, aircrew spenttwo months at a pool known as the 'Fluganwaer ter­kompa nie' , learning general-aviation subjects beforebeing posted for ab initio training. Luftwaffe pupil s ar­riving for this training were therefore highly disciplinedin tru e Teutonic tradition and politically motivated. TheGe rma ns called it an AB school, which was a combina­tion of the RAF's Elementary Flying T raining School(EFT S) and Service Flying T rainin g School (SI'TS),The first 'N course consisted of about thirty hours ofdu al and solo flying, comprising circuits and bumps,take-offs, simple bankin g turn s and thr ee-point landings.Aircraft which the student might fly included the Focke­Wulf Fw 44, Heinkel He 72, Goth a Go 145 and AradoAr 66 or poss ibly the Bucker Bu 131. These light bi­planes had a top speed of between 110 and 130mph(177 and 209km/h) and a landing speed of between 45and 55mph (72 and 88 km/h). The course was consider­ably shorte r than that of an EFTS, and so was the ' B'course, during which the German pilot would do aboutseventy hours. He flew slightly more powerful aircraft ,such as the Arado Ar 96 or Fockc-Wulf Fw 56 mono­planes, both filled with Argus engines of about 240hp,

The Lu ftwaffe trainee was given his wings after some100 to 150 hours' flying, whereas an RAF cadet would

AIRCRAFT OF TilE SECOSD WORLD \X'ARTRAISISG : A VITAL C O.\\ .\ \ A S D

TileArgus engined Arado Ar 96 U'<lS Olle of the Lufucaffe 's 'B ' course aeroplanes.

Council. In September 1939 there were only fourteenService Training Schools, including one at Abu Su eir inEgypt. These esta blishments were being fed by thecivilian schoo ls, but the tota l output was very sma llwhen measured against squadron need s. The creationof the RAF Volunteer Reserve in 1936 had enabled'weekend flyers' to be trained at existing airfields neartown s in various parts of the country. However, by1940 5,300 pilots were being trained annually (lessthan half of the Luftwaffe's output) again st an averageof 300 in 193 5.

At this stage most Service training schoo ls were op­erating with aircraft long since obso lete. Hawker Hart s,Hinds and Furies, together with other Hart variants,were standa rd, as was the Armstrong \X'hitworth Atlas.All were open-coc kpit biplanes equipped with "cry lim­ited navigational instruments. Rad io was unheard of onsuch aircraft, and the consequ ent lack of communicationwas a severe handicap. The introduction of the convert ­ed Fairey Battle proved successful on a short -term basis,as it provid ed the characteristics of the low-wing mono­plane , togeth er with Sp erry gyro instruments, radio,flap s and the var iable-p itch airscrew.

G radually the M iles Master and North Am ericanHarvard traine r became more readily available, bothbeing excellent low-wing monop lanes for the trai ning offighter pilots, while the old workhorse Avro Anson , to­gether with the Airspeed Oxford , proved invaluable forthe tuition of twin- and multi-engined aircrew,

Such was the shor tage of pilots during the Battle ofBritain that an extre mely risky, and in the event unprofit ­able experime nt took place. Descr ibed as 'X ' courses,

The Fairey Bail ie Trainer, a variant of the early U'<l r period bomber. Under the Commontcealth A ir Training Plan, 800 wereshipped to Canada and 400 to Australia.

The Royal Air Force, 1939-11At the outbreak of war flying training in the RAF hadno command struc ture or representation on the Air

were explained on the ground first and then performedin the air by the instructor. Having acquitted him self sat­isfacto rily in the jungmann, 'Ki smet' was allowed to flythe BO 133 Jungmeister - a more powerful single-sea tbiplane train er which all fighter pilots learnt to handl e.Aerobatic training consisted ofloops, half-loops followedby a roll, looping while gliding, inverte d flying, slow rollsright and left , continuous rolls in right- or left-h androtati on , spinning, inverted spins, knife-edge flight andvertical slip-over wing - in that order. All of these acro­batics were first performed dual in the Jungmann.

T he 'A' and 'B' training courses were funda mental,and on comp letion the instructor s dec ided whether thecandidate was most suitable to be a fighter or bomberpilot , an observer, or a reconnaissance pilot . Bomber orreconnaissance pilots were drafted to 'C' schools andtrain ed on twin-engined aircraft on a course lastin g fromthree to six months. ' Ib is involved some sixty hours'flying, including night and cross -co untry blind flying.The RAF had inco rpo rated most of this as part of SFTStrainin g. Prospective German fighter pilots would flysome fifty hou rs at a specialist schoo l on aircraft includ­ing the Arado Ar 68 and the Heinkel He 51, which wereold operational biplane fighters. Lat er they flew earlyversions of the Messersc hmitt Bf 109 . Finally the y wouldfly a further twenty hours at an operational trai ning unit,where they handled the latest variants of the Bf 109 andthe Focke-Wulf Fw 190.

All use of controls, their functions and objectives

I headed into win d and took 0 V as carefully as possible,it being the \'("r51 time that I had Xown an aircraft wi th

duplicate ailerons . In spite of my care, the take-o'V was

bad, and the controls were pulled sharply from myhands. After a few seconds the instructor waved both his

hands above his head in token of having quit the con­

trols, and I again took over. Climbing with plenty ofspee d in hand failed to please him , and a series of violent

upw ard jerks with his extended right arm made me

steepen the angle until the earth had disappeared alto­gether, and I was convinced we were going to stall; but

we did not.A downward stroke of the right arm, and I eased the

stick forward for straight and level Xying, The left armexte nded with \Xrngers pointing left; I turned left, but not

steeply enough, as ex tra pressure is put on the stick and

we are turning vertically, or rather the machine is turn­ing itself vertically, as there are the instructor's hands

above his head again, and mine are gripping the seat!

see how aircraft were construc ted and stu dy the designfeatures which determined flying charac teristics.

The writ er was taken up in a Bucker BO 131jungmann , and his first big surprise was to find that therewas no teleph onic communication between instructorand pupil; instead, the instructor used hand signals orsharply pu lled the controls to take command. T heGe rma n onlookers had laughed at 'der Englander's' hel­met, with its novel ear fittings, and even more so when'Kismet' did a smart ground loop when taxiing out - theJungmann was fitted with a tailwheel rather than the ac­customed skid. However, after that slight setback, hewrote:

log between 200 and 300 hours, depending where hetrained, before he gained his wings.

O ne Eng lishman managed to arrange some flyinghours at a large Luftwaffe flying school and wro te abo uthis experience in the magazine Flight under the pseudo­nym ' Kismet' in January 1940. The writer had beenflying for some time , so he received rather more ad­"anced instruction than an absolute beginner. Naturallyhe was interested in comparing the basic flying trainingcurricula of both countries. He said that German manu­facturers often ran their own flying schoo ls, under thecontrol of the German air mini stry. In England therewere only two such instances he could recall .The advan­tages were obvious. Ease of maintenance by the factoryitself, spare parts on the shelf, and oppo rtunities fortechnical experts to see daily how their machinesperformed. In addition, pupi ls could visit the factory to

Another machine used by the Luftuaffe for 'A ' course train ­ing U'<lS the Bucker B" J3J JUllgmaml. This is the Japalleseversion, the Koku sai Ki-86a, codenamed 'Cypress' by theA llies.

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A I RC R A F T OF THE S E CO :->D \X' ORLIJ W' AR

A vro Ansons from 10 F 1'S, Tern Hill, S hropshire, The AIlSOII «'as used 10 train all types ofaircreu: ill the UK and throughoutthe Commonzcealth.

TRAI:-> I:-I G : A V ITAL C O M M A N D

A M iles M agister, M iles M asler 11and A irspeed Oxford of the Central Flying School, photographed ill September 1942, TheM agister «'as a light monoplane used for primary training, the illasler 11was all aduanced trainer for those concerting 0 11 10

operational fighte rs, and the Oxford play ed a major role ill the training of multi-engine pilots.

selected pupils were taken dire ct from Elementa ryFlying Schools and sent to Operatio nal T raining Un its(OT Us) , At this stage they had done barely fifty hours'flying, of which only a little less than half had been solo,and all on elementa ry tra iners, Some were sent to RAFAbingdon to til' \,(Ihitley bombers and others to RAFBicestcr for conve rsion to Bristol Blcnhcims,The courselasted twelve weeks and involved over 120 hours' flying,a third of which was at night. However the loss rate, bothduring trainin g and subsequently on squadrons, made itimpracticable and the scheme was abo lished,

ClimateThe variab le British elimate disrupted flying tra ining, es­pecially as the majori ty of Training Co mmand aero­drom es were grass and prolonged periods of rainfrequently made them unser viceable. Every hour avail­able had to be used and dawn- to-du sk day flying was amatter of routine, followed by nigh t instruction. Underblackout condi tions on the darkest of nigh ts, often in lowcloud and with no discerni ble horizon , circuits werecompleted on instru ments alone. Sperry gyro compass ­es would be set at zero and the take-off climb would be

288

to 500ft (150m), followed by a climbin g turn on to 270°to 1,000ft (300m). The pilot would turn to 180°, whenthe flarcpath cou ld be vaguely visible on his left-h andside , He would then turn across wind on to 90° andbegin his turn towards the flarepath and his final de­scent.

Du ring the winter of 1940/41 enemy air attac ks onaerodromes were frequent, especially at night. Nightflying was therefore carried out at satellite airfields whereflarepa ths were hooded, making them invisible from3,000ft (900m) . T he intr odu ction of a primitive glidepath indicator and, later , the generator-operated Chanceligh t (which provided a flood beam only at the momentof landing and was then switched oft) , gave some fur therrelief, but night instructi ng contin ued to be a very dan­gerous business . Originally night flying ceased on the re­ceipt of an air raid warn ing, but in Oc tobe r 1940 FlyingTraining Co mma nd was ordered to continue flying, irre­spective of any form of attac k. It is difficult to imagine,and for those who took par t, to recapture, the dangerousand difficult circums tances facing instru ctor s and pupil salike at this time. T he result was that courses had to beshortened, and consequently standa rds dete riorated.

Canada - the big dealMeanwhile, the Empire Flying Training Sch eme had be­come a reality, providin g an opportunity for the RAF todecentralise flying training. Hard pressed by Ca nada andother Dominions, Britain had been forced to increaseher commitme nt. Sh e prop osed the tran sfer of entireflying schools, but Canada went further and insisted ona supply of aircraft as a condition of acceptance. Some3,500 training aircraft were required to laun ch the pro­ject in Ca nada . However, there was a problem with thetype of aircraft. T he vast projected expansion of BomberCommand swung the balance heavily in favour of multi­engine pilots (about five or six being needed to eachsingle-engine pilot ) , and sufficient Oxford s and Ansonscould not be provided. Co nsequently, man y potenti albomber pilots had to be trained on single-enginedHar vards,

By the end of 1940 four SFTSs had been transferredto Ca nada and were in operation, as were thirty-sixEmpire Schools; 520 aircrew were train ed, of which 240were pilots, In early 1941 all RAF pupils going toCa nada had comp leted EFTS training in the UK, As theelimination factor was high during primary training, this

289

ensured that cadets making the long journey to Canadahad proved their aptitude in the air. It was also morecost-effective, although the value of 'all-thro ugh' trainingin a stable background at adjacent airfields far out­weighed the disadvant ages, Co nsequently, gradingschoo ls were established in the UK to deal with the apti ­tud e problem , and in the summe r of 1941 the RAFbegan opening EFTSs in Ca nada , These foundationsprovided a basis for rapid development during the fol­lowing year, when the output rose to 16,653 aircrew, in­eluding 9,63 7 pilots,

1941 - global expansionIn May 1940, with the need for aircrew becoming evenmore urgent, the British government held tentative talkswith the US governme nt regarding pilot training in theUSA.They were told that all military flying schools therewere fully occupied with America's own needs, It wasthen sugges ted that prim ar y trainin g could take place inAmerican civilian schools, but the autho rities in \X'ash­ington expressed the view that pupil s would be bettertra ined in Ca nada, using American aircraft andinstru ctors. Unders tandably, the US government did not

AIR CRA f T O F THE S ECO :-; O \,' OR l.D \, 'AR T RA 1:-; I:-; G : A v I TA l. C O M ~I A :-; D

771e Consolidated PBY Catalina, employed as an adtanced trainer WIder the Tozcers Scheme in the USA, U'OS the only fully

operational machine fiozcn during training,

was conduc ive to aerobatics , The American system ofpilot training inelud ed three phases: primary, basic andadvanced. Basic trainin g constitu ted an intermediatestage between primary and advanced trainin g, TheBT-13A Valiant was used by the BITS and Arno ld andTowers schemes for this inter mediate stage ,

The aircraft for advanced training were the CurtissAT-9 and the Cessna Kf-l 7 Bobcat, two tota lly differenttwin-engined machines. While the Curtiss had a glidingangle like a brick, the Cess na AT- I 7 was more of agentleman's aircraft, mad e of steel tube, wood and fab­ric, with the air and gentility of a more advanc ed Anson,The different flying characteristics of the two machinescerta inly made a pilot more adaptable, which was a con­siderable asset, Asymmetric flying, general handling,instru ment, formation and night flying plus ten days atanother school for ground and aerial gunnery, made upthe course ,

The Towers Scheme was operated by the US Navyfor training naval flying personnel , its pr imary objectbeing to train aircrew for service with RAF CoastalCo mmand and the Fleet Air Arm . Na val cadets, how­ever, received more flexible, and in most cases longer,training than their counterpa rts. At primary level thebasic trainer was the Naval Aircraft Factor y N3 N, nick­named 'Canary', an unclunered , du al-controlled biplane

mean ing 'to punish with unnecessary work '. This train­ing was designed to break a man down and rebuild himthe way the USMC wanted him.

The Stearman used for primary training was a con­siderab ly larger and more powerful machine than the deHavilland T iger Moth. It requ ired firmer and more pos­itive handl ing than the Moth , and its additional power

771e Boeing Stearman P T-J7 Kaydet U'OS a widely usedAmerican elementary or primary pilot trainer,

Rea r Admiral Jolm Henry Tozcers USN, originator of theTouers Scheme, uhich play ed a major role in train ingBritish natal cadets in the USA.

headquart ers at Maxwell Field, Alabama, and the' lowers Scheme, named afte r Admiral Towers, USNavy, and operated within the US Navy organisation.The Arnold Scheme was named after Gen Henr y ' Hap'Arnold, Chief of Staff of the US Army Air Co rps, as itwas in 1941.

During the initial stages of the Arno ld scheme theUSA was a neutral country, and to circumvent the TaftAct British cadets were issued visas in Ca nada and en­tered the country in grey flann el suits and wore KD un i­forms on the stations. This was almost history repeatingitself, beca use Ge rmany had circumvented the VersaillesT reaty in building the Luftwaffe. Ge rman pilots hadposed as South Tyrolean tou rists and secretly crossed theborder into Italy to train with the Regia Aeronautica, andhad worn Italian Air Force uni form s. The Ge rmans hadbeen accepted as students in Italy: the British cade tswere officially civilians off-station, but came und er AirCorps disciplinar y rules and regulations at all times.

In their early stages of tra ining RAF cadets found thediscipline imposed on them by the Army Air Corps frus ­trati ng and somewhat crude. It took the form of a svstemknown as 'hazing', which derives from the word 'haze' ,

This was described by BillWilliams, who also trained at

Ponca, as a 's itting by Nellie' tech nique!Apart from the BITS operation, there were two

other sche mes : the Arno ld Scheme, ope rated within theSou th-cast Army Air Co rps T raini ng Center, with its

The quality of instruction is a diYcult one to assess.Generally the Xying instructi on was good. in that the in­

struct ors sure co uld Xy. But they were , for the most part.

unable to expla in in the air or on the ground why an air­

craft didcertain things, or what one had to do to Xy cor­

rectly. From the student's point of view it was largely aque stion of copying.

wish to compromise its neutrality, and although theCa nad ian offer was accepted, only very few US aircraftand instructors were prodded,

T he project was reopened in August 1940, when theBritish government was despe rately anxious to exploreany possibility of additional training .'Ibis time it was pro ­posed to set up civilian schools in the USA to train Britishpilots under direct, paid contract. The problem of neu­trality was again a stumbling block because of the TaftAct, but was circumnaviga ted by proposing to sell non­military training on a commercial basis.The solution didnot, however, dispel all the difficulties, the main two beingthe enormous dollar cost to the UK and a lack of suitabletraining aircraft in the USA for civilian school usc.

Nevertheless, the scheme was put into ope ration inJuly 1941, sho rtly after Germany had invaded the SovietUnion. T he aircraft shortage was grea tly alleviated by theintroduction of the Lend-Lease Act ear lier in the vearenabling the USA not only to provide the aircraft s~urgently needed, but also to build six British FlyingT raining Schools (BFT Ss) and bear a large proportionof the costs themselves. It was typical of US efficiencythat the six schoo ls were operating within a matter ofweeks.

A novel feature of the BFT S scheme was that it pro ­vided a complete training course from primary to grad­uation at the same station: a continuous production lineprocess, Furthe rmore, the RAF had taken a firm handto ensure that the syllabus covered all aspects of EI---rSand SFTS training. All of the instructors were civilians,most of whom had a great deal of flying and instru ct­ing experience. The schools took 200 cadets for a 20­week course , of which about 20 per cent wereAmerican cadets. They tlew Stearm an PT-17s orFairchild P'I: I9s at primary level and North AmericanAT-6 Texans (Harvards) or Vultee BT-13A Valiants atbasic and advanced level. Thus the BI---rSs could onlvprovide graduates who had been trained on single-en'­gined aircraft,

Phillip Murton (later Sqn Ldr ), who trained at No 6School at Ponca City, Oklahoma, comments :

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AI R C R A FT OF T H E SE CO:':D WORLD \\'AR T R A I :': I :':G : A VI T AL C O.\ I.\ I A :': D

Popularly known as the 'Vibralor', the Vultee BT-13laliam was extensively used as a basic trainer in the USA,

administered from one base in Ottawa. All SFrSs wereto be expanded, and RAF EFrSs brought under civilianoperation. This agreement made for greater efficiency,and laid the foundations for greater expansi on. It alsoprovided an invaluable forum for representatives of hostcountries who were providing overseas training at acrucial time during the expansion of their own air forces .

\X'hen the conference was taking place there weresixty-eight EAT schools and twenty-seven RAFtransferre d schools. By the end of 194 2 these had in­creased to ninety-two BCATP schools supported bysixty-two ancillary units.T he basic methods and systemsof RAF flying training evolved oyer the years were,broadly speaking, adopted thro ughout. The Canadianexperie nce of Bob Stanford , an RAF cadet, is typical ofthousand s of his contemporaries . He completed gradingschool in the UK at IS EFTS Carlisle, flying MilesMagistcrs. The 'Magg ie' was a low-wing monoplanepowered by a 130hp de Havilland Gipsy Major I engine.It had a leisurely landing speed of only 45mph (72km/h),was fully acrobatic and introdu ced fledgeling pilots tothe novelty of trailing-edge split flaps at an early stage. AtI5 EFr S cadets had to solo before transferrin g toCanada, where Stanford was posted to 34 EFrS atAssiniboia in Saskatchewan.The EFTS occupied a grassairfield, with newly constructed hut accommodation.The aircraft type was the de Havilland D.H.82C, astanda rd T iger Moth equipped with a sliding Pcrspcxcanopy. T he station was, in fact, a standard RAF EFrSplonked down in the middle of the Canadian prairies,

One multi-engined pilot trainer used on theAdvanced coursein the USA uus the Curtiss AT-9, known as the 1eep'.

built by the US Navy, Pupil s then went on to fly moreadvanced machines, the Vought 03U Co rsair andVought OS2U Kingfisher, a monoplane alternativelyfitted with floats. In addition courses were run by PanAmerican Airways to train British navigator s,

The Ottawa Co nference, convened by the Canadianson 6 June 1942, re-evaluated all systems of flying train­ing in an attempt to standardise and co-ordinate themthroughout the North American continent . This agree­ment embodied major changes, not least a change ofname, from the Empire Air Training Plan to theCommonwealth Air Training Plan. Under the control ofthe Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) , all schools andsupplementary units, togethe r with resources, were

Bombing and gunnery training in the USAAF uus carried ow in the Beechcraft AT-II Kamas, a uariant of the company'subiquitous M odel 18,

De Havilland 's D.H.82A Tiger Afollz uus one of the most famous and widely used primary trainers of the Second IfiJrld lfa r.Tizis is a Canadian example, designated D.H,82C, unth its Perspex canopy removed, leaving only the from unndshield.

292 293

AIR CR AF T OF T HE S E C O:-: D W OR L D W AR

The North American Harvard advanced trainer U'<2S unicersally employed throughout the overseas air training projects. Here,three RCAF Harr ards pose in v ic formation in 194/ .

Air~p~ed Oxfords from 24 Air School SAAF, Nigel, Transuaal. The original Oxford Mk.ls were used for all aspects ofaircreuitrauung, and the ,l1k.lls extensively for pilot training overseas.

294

with RAF flying instructor s and Servi ce back-up. Flyingconditions were ideal, and cadets were able to have fouror five lessons in a full day 's flying .

Learning to fly was far easier than in the U K.N avigation was simple because road and rail lines randirectly east and west. south and north in symmetr icalfashion. Grain elevators displayed their location and theair was clear. with visibility of fifty miles or more. Therewas little turbulence and none of the complexities of acongested land scape. All of these factors helped toengender confidence. enabling the pupil to ma ster hismachine in the wide open spaces.

The Tiger ,\ Ioth Stanford flew was the ,\Ik II versionof the D.H.60T with staggered and swcptback wings(the latter to allow ease of exit by parachute from thefront cockpit) . Powered by a 130hp Gipsy Maior engine,this light , fully aerobatic, sen sitive machine was a delightto fly. It demanded perfect co-ordination and a gentletouch, but could cope with the ham-fisted while allowingthe uninitiated a great deal of licence. It is fair to say thatmost people should have been able to fly a Tiger" loth ,but few could fly it accurately.

Stanford logged 78 hr 50min at 34 EFTS on a courselasting three months.Then he was posted to 32 SFTS atM oose Jaw flying the Harvard IIA, similar to the US A"I:6C. Its qualities as an advanced training machine weresuch that over 20.0 00 Harvards were built in variouscountries. Stepping out of a Tiger Moth into the cockpitof a Harvard could come as quite a shock. Sitting uphigh in the 'office', facing a mass of instruments and thebig Pratt & \\'hitney radial engine and feeling the stickand the toe brakes. could made one wary of touching anylever in case the undercarriage folded!

The SFTS course lasted for three and a half months.during which Stanford logged 122hr 55min, includingtwenty hours' night flying. despite the approach of theCanadian "inter. when temperatures fell to minus 60· .His grand to tal of flying hours when he was awarded hiswings amounted to 203hr 5min. He had start ed hisflying training on 29 June, shortly after the OttawaAgreement had been signed and the Commonwealth AirTraining had become fully operational.

Meanwhile, global flying training had gathered mo­mentum. Southern Rhode sia. now Zimbabwe. hadopened 25 EI~rSs at Belvedere, near Salisbury, in May1940, as part of the Rhode sian Air Training Group.South Africa followed under the Joint Air Training Plan.New Zealand and Australia were already totally commit­ted, and apart from local training, were feeding trainingschools in Canada.

The Lu ftwaffeThe losses sustained by the Luftwaffe during the battle sof France and Britain were substant ially increased whenGermany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941. By

T R A I :-: I :-: G : A v I T A I. C O .' 1 .\ 1A:-: D

1942 . in spite of the territorial expansion of theLuftwaffe training organisation throu ghout Europe, itbegan to fragment. The major train ing schemes of 1940,1941 and 1942 were being clipped or cancelled. Co urseshad to be short ened in order to replace combat losses,and there was a shortage of flying instructor s and oftwi n-cngi ned aircraft. such as the Focke -Wulf Fw 58Weihe . The Lu ftwaffe training organisation was sho rtnot only of pupils, but also of ground staff. who werebeing diverted to infantry regiments to fight, mainly onthe Russian front.

By 1942 the Luftwaffe was fighting on three fronts;the Soviet Union. the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.The manpower difficulty and sho rtened courses had toaffect the quality of aircrews, In contrast, by courtesy ofthe global training scheme and accelerating aircraft pro­duction , the RAF was undergoing the biggest expansionof its history. During this peri od the USA had enteredthe war , and the USAAF was using the UK virtually asan unsinkable aircraft carrier. Thus, the 'numbers game'in men and machines began to mak e its impact on theair war.

The planning and timing of the CommonwealthScheme was perfect, because it began to peak at the par­ticular time that Luftwaffe training began to fragment . In1942 the scheme produced 44.338 trained aircrew, andin 1943 this increased to 58.601. Germany, by compari­son, was totally unable to compete with this vast trainingorganisatio n which, at its peak, had three times the num­ber of training establishments serving the Empire AirForce s. With a population of some 88 million. Germanyhad about double the number of potential UK pupils(healthy, educated youths born in the years 1922--4). butthe global scheme was able to draw upon members ofthese age groups throughout the Commonwealth, andthe USA with a population of 188 million .The US ArmyAir Forces alone graduated 193,440 pilots during theSecond World War.

German ace AdolfGalland (left) calking co General M olders.

295

A IR CRAFT OF THE SECO:-:D WORLD \\ 'AR

Ge neralleutna nt Adolf Galland 's concise commentspostwar reflect the Luftwaffe's situation from 1942onwards :

Pilot train ing has never been sufficient.We had notenoug h training schoo ls, not enough instructors,not enough aircra ft, not enough time and finallynot enough fuel. I have been twice to Winnipeg forthe Co mmonwealth Aircrew Tra ining reunions. Ihave admired your training organisation whichwas owned by a rich Air Force .

T he UKBy the end of 1941 it became obvious that the globaltraining scheme would be producing far more aircrewtha n OTUs and squadrons could absorb. Furtherm ore,pilots and navigators trained overseas were totally with­out experience of British weather conditions, the black­out and map reading. During 1942 Advanced flyingUnits (AFUs) were established to solve these problems.These courses were not merely designed to keep pilots inflying practice as a stopgap, but as a definite stage intraining policy.

Single-engine pilots comp leted forty hours' flying in­cluding day, night , and advanced flying in Miles Masters.Twin-engine pilots completed eighty hour s includ ingday, night , beam approach training, and advanced dayflying with simulated night flying in O xfords. Alongsidethis intensive training was a comprehensive gro und pro­gra mme involving navigation , signals and bomb ing. T heAFUs continued to operate until the end of theEuropean war, and were gradually phased out in 1946.

It is quite rem arkable that over 88,000 aircrcw weretra ined and graduated in the UK, despite the climate andothe r detractions. This is roughly half the total outputfrom Ca nada, the mainspring of the global scheme.Furthermore, the UK provided the specialist courses en­abling the graduate to go to war well able to master thetechnological developments in aircraft and systems asthese became more complex.

SummaryAny flying trainin g system which enables a graduate toprogress on to more advanced machin es and take pa rt inaerial warfare justifies itself. T he training schemes de­scribed above reflect , to a certa in extent , the character­istics of the country concerne d. Both Germany andAme rica employed rigid military discipline combinedwith a 'copy the instru ctor 'technique.T here was no suchdisciplin e in RAF tra ining, and instructors explained thebehaviour of the aircraft in varying conditions of flight.

In early 1946 the author was an instructor at 17SFTS at Spitalgate, outside G rantha m, Lincolnshir e,flying Harvard s. There was an intake of Turkish andDutch pupils and this bro ught considerable language

296

difficulties, espec ially with the Turks. Instructors wereforced to adopt the 'copying' techn ique, and it workedwell beca use the countries concerned paid large sums tothe T reasury as part of the dea l!

T he global schemes outlined above had man y otherattr ibutes apart from flying training. British cadets post­ed across the world , for example, found the mselves act­ing as unofficial ambassadors for the 'Moth er Country ' .People want ed to know about the Battle of Britain andhow the 'Old Co untry ' was coping with the bombing.Blood ties linking Britain to her Dom inions andCo mmo nwealth were strengthened by the advent of war.T his large-scale invasion , comprising the prime ofBritish youth, did much to forge stro nger links whichwere invaluable,

T he schemes also provided the basis for the develop­ment of Co mmo nwealth and Dominion air forces, andin so doing gave the impetus for the regeneration and de­velop rnent of the aviation industries within the cou ntrie sconcerne d. The American schemes generated a close li­aison between the RAF and the Fleet Air Arm and theUS Army Air Force and the US Navy which proved in­valuable dur ing the course of the war.

T he end product of the ente rp rise was the mass out­put of trained aircrcw, and flying was the powerful mag­net which attracted youth from all over the world. Flyingprovided the ' icing on the cake' during months of in­tensive training, and the ultimate challenge for all thoseinvolved. T he Luftwaffe, whose flying training organisa­tion was spread across the countries Germany had con­quered , was un able to tap the reservoir of youth fromwithin.

A cadet 's ambition was to win his wings and then flythe aircraft of his dream s, but the war is riddled withunforeseen circumstances. Many of those who gainedtheir wings in the summer of 1944 were hop ing that thewar would last long enough for them 'to have a go' inEurope, the only alterna tive being the Far East. Waitingfor a posting was fru strating , with the Allies advancingswiftly through Belgium and into Holland . Event s weremoving fast and many felt that the end of the war wasin sight.

Then, on 17 September, some 10,000 paratroop ers,including glider pilots, 'hit the deck' at Arn hem, andonly about 3,000 came out. Co nsequently the army be­came desperately short of glider pilots - so much sothat Brig George Chan erton (a prewar RAF pilot)talked to his contacts in high places at the Air M inistr yand succeeded in 'borrowing' 1,500 RAF pilots for con­version on to gliders, T his was an incredibly large num­ber of highly tra ined men , by any standard, to haveavailable 'at the drop of a hat' , It dem onstrated that thereser voir of talent created by overseas flying trainingpro ved invaluable in an entirely un foreseen context.T he newly trained RAF glide r pilots were then split into

T RA IK I :-:G : A V ITA L CO M M A :-: D

Output of pilots and other aircrew - Dominion sources

SouthernType and year of output Ca nada Australia New Zealand South Africa Rhodesia Total

1940Pilots 240 60 318 110 728

Navigators 112 39 lSI

WOP/AGs and AGs 168 54 222Total 520 153 318 110 I , I01

1941Pilots 9,637 1,367 1,292 34 1 1,284 13,921

Navigators 2,884 681 629 23 4,217

WOP/AGs and AG s 4,132 1,296 110 5,5 38Total 16,653 3,344 1,292 970 1,4 17 23,6~

1942Pilots 14,13 5 3,033 943 1,529 1,666 21,306

Navigators 7,404 1,375 2,54 1 237 11,557

Air bombers 1,742 170 1,912

WO P/AGs and AGs 6,896 2,280 387 9,563Total 30,177 6,688 943 4,240 2,290 44,338

1943Pilots 15,894 3,869 836 2,309 2,083 24,991

Navi gators 8,144 1,662 3,250 239 13,295

Air bombe rs 6,445 9 18 7,363

WOP/AGs and AGs 8,695 3,838 4 19 12,952

l otal 39 ,178 9,369 836 6,477 2,741 58,6 01

1944 (to 30 Sep tember)Pilots 8,807 1,684 502 2,025 1,188 14,206

Nav igators 7,953 696 2,403 180 11,232

Air bomber s 5,13 1 742 5,873

WOP/AGs and AGs 7,998 1,328 309 9 ,63~

Total 29,889 3,708 502 5,170 1,677 40,946

Grand total 116,417 23,262 3,89 1 16,857 8,235 168,662

SummaryPilots 75,152Navigator s 40,4 52Air bombers 15,148WOP/AGs 37,9 10G RAND TOTAL 168,662 to September 1944

Remarks1 T he country is that in which the training was carried out and does not indicate the trainees' nationality.2 T he figures are those for outputs from the SFTS or its equivalent , i.e. an Australian trainee who did his EF'TS

training in Australia and his SFTS in Ca nada would be shown under Ca nada ,3 T he figures include trainees retained to meet the Domin ion s' own local requ irements.

297

A IRCRAF T OF T HE SE COSD W O R l. D W'AR

two groups; about half of them were posted 10 UKairfields for the Rhine cross ing. and the remainder wereearmarked for India 10 lake part in airborne operationsin South East Asia. II was the luck of thc draw for manycadets who had trained at a specific time during thecourse of the war . Sometimes courses had to be short­ened, while later in the war they were extended. Therewere so many variables for training organisations 10

cope with, not least the eyer-increasing targets for man­power to fly and operate the machines. Hence, 'FlyingT raining' was a Vital Command , and a key piece on theoperational chessboard .

298

Bibliography

Golley.jo hn, Aircreu: Unlimited (Patrick Stephens.Yeovil,1993) .

Lee, Asher, The German Air Force (Duckworth , Lond on.1946) .

Lee, Asher, Goering Air Leader (Duckworth, London1972),

Tanturn IV, \XI H. and Hotfschmidt, E J, The Rise and Fallof the German Air Force (\XI E Inc, Old Greenwich,Connec ticut, USA, 1969) ,

Page references in italics referto illustration s,and those in bold to tables and diagrams .Aircraft types and engine types arc groupedunder theirmanufacturers. Colons (:] separateaircraft type numbers from page numbers .

Abyssinia (Etho pia) 19. 97. 136Agu ila (It) 158Aichi B7A: 160Aichi DI Al : 28Aichi D 3A: 28, 29.160.161

D3AI : 118Aichi EIOAI : 31Aic hi EII A I: 31Aichi E13A : 30aircrew 8

conditions 7. 107, 2~Osafety 1-l. 2·U-S. 277training 10. H . 18. ~3 . 87. 99. 101.139. 160.

267- 8. 285- 98airmobiliry 9. 18. 1274 8

seealso 'OlderBritain. Germany, Italy.japan,USA

Airspeed AS .6 Envoy 13 1Airspeed AS.I 0 Oxford 287, 289. 289. 29~Airspccd AS.5 1/58 Horsa 138.138.139. 1~2.

U 6Air Transport Auxiliary (ATA) 10.276-7Alwgi (japan) 156Albatros D \ '.A 20 IAlfa Romeo 126 RC engine 20Allison V- 17 10 engine 36 . 38, ·0AUisonV-1 75 0 engine 252. 261-2Allison \'-3~20 engine 261 -2Amur. H.\\S 118Amiot 351/35~: 3-1-5Ant on ov A-7 : J.l3Anton ov Ant-42 /06Arado Ar 66: 285

Ar66C: 285Arad o Ar 68: 287Arad o Ar % : 285. 286Arado Ar 196: 12. 13Arado Ar 232 "Tausend tusslcr' 235. 235Arado Ar 23~ : 123-5,235.273.273

Ar 23~B : 9. 123-5Ar 23~C : IN. 125

Arado Ar 2~0: 18AO'<IIC'. II.\ IS 218Ardennes 141Argus engine 285An"zo,w , USS 154armament 9-10,193-22 1

cannon 12. 35. ~8-9. 69. 77.78. 8 1. 107,110. 193. 1 9~ . 195. 197. 199. 208-9.211-13

machine-guns 12-15. 17, 2~22. 25. 49 , 55,107. 193. 1 9~ . 19-1-5. 196-9. 208, 211- 13.216

sec also gunsig hts, rocket weapons. turretsarmour plating 12. 14. 208. 22 1. 245Armstrong \\:llitworth Atlas 28 7Armstrong 'Xllitworth A.\'I,, ~2 7 Ensign 131Armstro ng \\:llitworth A, \'I,,'.38 \'I"llitley 50. 50.

133. 137.2~ 1 .2~2.288

xu v. 12~.125. 131. 131. 1~6

Index

Arm strong \Xllitworth A"\'1,,'..1 1 Albemarle 132,1 ~6

Arnhem 9. I~D--lI . 296Atlantic Ferry Organi sation (Al 1=ERO)

277-80.282Australia ~3. 103. 295 . 297Au stralia, HMS 119autogyros 9.1 77-81. 186 , 190

seealso ind ividual type numbersAu""gtT, H.\ \S 181Avr o 652A Anson 131 . 167.276.287.288.

289Avro 679 .\ \anchester 7, 16.47.52.52. 110,

111.112. H3. 26 1Avro 683 Lancaster 16. 53, 52. 105. I J1.

112- 13. 118, 1 ~3, 143.213.229.256Avro 69 4 Lincoln 212 . 212Balbo . Air .\\arshalltalo 20-2 1Barr & Stroud 201,202Hartle of Britain 45-9, -15. 53 , 79. 97-9. 158.

239.259,287-8.295-6Beaverbroo k, Lord 46 , 277-8Bcechcraft A'f- 11 Kansas 292Belgium 9. 21. 2~. 33-5. 37. 77. 96.110.127.

138. I~O. 177BeU1'-39 Airacobra 7. 36. 36-8. 55. 198. 235.

239.280Bell P- 59 Airacom ct 272BeU1'-63 Kingcobra 235 . 280Hennen . Air Vice-M arshal D CT 45Berlin 107.110.115.11 7.1~2-3.18~.212

Sf type numbers see ~ tesscrschminbiplanes 7. 12.21.31 .33.5-1-5.99. 131. 1 7~.

239.291.293Blackburn Firebrand 166Blackburn Skua 164. /64. 165Bloch 152: 3~Bloch 1 7~11 75 : 35. 36Bloch . .\tarcel 35Blohm und Voss Bv 138 : 17. 233Blohm und Voss B\"141 : 240. 2-10Blohm unJ VossB\"222 : 233B.\\ 'X. engines 264B~ IW- 132: 18. 182;B~ IW- 132A:2~;B~ IW'

132H: 110B~ IW·801 :67,82.256

B.\ IW 803 : 257Boc k. Captain F 123Boe ing B- 17 Fl yi ng Fortress 7. 36. 4()-.42 . 54.

101.101-6.105.120. 173.203.216.223.235. 237. 2~ 1-2. 2~-I-7. 25~. 271. 280

B-17B: ~ I . 102B-17C: ~ I . ~ I . 101-2B- l7 E: ~1-2 . 103. 105B-171': 105B-17G : 105. 105

Boein g B-29 Supcrfortrcss 9. 55 , 55. 114-15,120-23.121.198. 213. 235. 239. 2~ 1. 2~7

Boeing 314 Clipper 136Boeing Stearman IYI:'17 Kaydct 290-9 1, 291bomber role secalso dive-bomber role and

under Britain. France. Germay. Italy. Japan,Russia. USA

bombsig hts 15.221Boulton Paul Defiant 7~. 76. 194Boulto n Paul Overstrand 207

299

Bowhill , Air Chief .\larshal 28 0Bramo 323 engine 182Breda Ba 64 : 22Breda Sa 65 : 22

Ba 65bis: 22Breda Ba 88 ' Lince ' 22Breguet-Dorand Gyroplanc 181Bremen / 12Brewster F2A Buffalo 7. 36-7. 3 7. 168. / 68Brewster SB2A 170Bristol Type 130 Bombay 13 1Bristol Type 142M Blenheim 45,48. 93. 95,

96.96.115. 118.208. 223. 22~6. 227, 229.236.2~D--l I.255.279.288

Mk IV: 96. 96BristolT ype 152 Beaufort 167Bristol Type 156 Beaufighter / 2. -ss.49-50,

75. 75-6. 76, 1 66.22~ . 226. 256

.\Ik X: 153Bristol E2B l-ighter 18. 20 7Bristol Type 120: 206Bristol engines 253. 254-5. 25~6, 260

Hercules ~8. ~9-50. 51. 75. 256.\ Iercur y 255Pegasus 5 1. 94. 97

Britain 20. 5~. 54aircrew 14, 43 . 244 . 285-96. 298airmobiliry 9. 128. 1 3~3~ , 136-44 , 146annamenl 10. 19 3-4. 197. 199 , 2 17- 20Army 9~-5. 133.1 ~1. 180. 190bomber role 8-9. 16. 19, ~D--l3 . ~5-6. 50-53.

91-6. 99. 1~5.11O. 1I2.1I~18. 120.131.16-1-5. 197. 20~7. 207. 208 . 2 12-13.223-1.2~D--l1

engines 8. 37. ~6-9. 251. 25.J.-8. 26<>--64ferryi ng 10. ~4-5 . 10-l . 276-8, 282fighter-bombers 79. 81fighter role 8. 17-18.33-5. 37-8. ~3-50.

59-65.69. 71. 71. 71-9.89-90. 16-1-5.193-1. 197. 207. 211, 223-1. 231. 256-7,260

flight testing 267-76jets 5~-5 . 83-9. 8 90. 118. 263naval air warfare 9.11. 38-9.1 49-56.159.

163-7. 171.180.182.187.1 90.196.21 7.223-1.275

night -fighters 8. 75-9 . 113. 197 . 20 5production and strength 7-8, 45-7. 112. 118,

275radar and radio 14. -18. 49 . 50, 9 7.190,

205-6.226-30rotary-winged aircraft 9.177,180-82. 186-7.189-91.2~8

systems and instrumen ts 20 1-2. 202. 20-+-5,22 1-5.23 1 -7.239-4~

seealso SAS . SOE and individual aircraft typesBritish Guiana 45Browning. Ge neral 'Boy' 138Bruneval 137Bucker Bu 13 1 '[ ungmeister ' 285-6, 286, 28 7Budapest II 24Bunker Hill (US) 187Burma 37. 37. 136-7. 188Buscmann, Professor 271Canada ~3-5 . 18 1. 277. 279-80

training 288-90. 293 . 295-6. 297

I:-:DEX TR I AL

Cam Z.501 Gabbiano 23,1 58 ,158Cant 2 .506 Aironc 23 , 158

Z .506R: 158Cam Z.1007: 23

Z.1007bis Aldon e 19. 19-20, 211Caproni Bcrgamaschi API 22Caproni Ca 133: 23, 23Caproni Ca 135: 23

Ca 135bis: 23Capron i Ca 309 G hibli 23Ca p ron! Ca 3 10 Libcrccio 23, 23Caproni Ca 3 11: 23Caproni Ca 335 .\lacstrale 24CaproniVizzola E5: 22Ca sablanca. USS 155Caudron C- Il : 18Celebes 136Cess na XI : 17 Bobcat 29 1Chakulia 122Chamberlain, Neville 196Chance -Vought V-156F Chesapeake 36C ha rmer, Sqn Ldr 116-17Chatterton, Brigadier George 296Chi na 24-5,27, 103 , II~, 122, 136, I ~~, 159,

2 1~,223,281-2

Chindits 136-7, 188Churchill. Sir \Xrinston 85 , 110, 131, 133, 138,

1 ~2

Cic rva C-8: 179CiCfV3 C- 19: 179Cierva C .30A Rota I: 176, 177- 8, 180, 186C ierva CAD Autogiro 180, 180Cic rva co mpany 181-2, 186Cochra n, Co l Phillip 137, 1~2

coc kpits 22 1,226,238-243. 239-Bfenes tration 239-40, 242see also systems and instruments under

Britain, France, Germany, Italy, japan,Russia, USA

Commencement, USS 155composites 247, 248Condor Legion 12, 128, 202, 2 11Co nsolidated B-24 Liberator 7, 36, 40-B, 42,

5~ , 103--5, 105, 135, 150, 173 , 173,203,229,232,23~-5,2~ 1-2,243,2~4-5,275,

278,28 1,281R-2~A: IO~

B-2~C: I~

1l-2~D: IO~

1l-2~M : 106LB-30A : 279-S0M k II: 104-5xn-z-. IO~

Conso lidated C- l09: 136Conso lidated PST 150, 151Conso lidated PllY Catalina 36, 136, 166,

171- 2, 291Consolidated PB2Y Coronado 172Co nsolidated PB4Y Privateer 152PIl~Y-2 173 , 173

Consolidated THY Corsair 171convoys 9 ,150,158, 164, 187Coral Sea, battle of 153'Corps Aeroplanes' 11,11 -1 2, 2 1- 2, 26Corregidor 136Courageous. HMS 156, 166Crete 133-5Crowe, Sir Alwyn 2 17Curtiss A"I: 9: 29 1, 293Curtiss C- 46 Commando 136, 142, H2, 146,

IS8Curtiss F I4C: 169Curtiss 1'-36 Hawk 75 36. 24 1

75A .\lohawk 7, 37, 37, 38Curtiss 1'-40 Kitryhawk 55, 250

I'-~OE: 281

Curtiss SHC 170S1l2C Helldiver 166, 170 , 170, 266. 268

XSB2C-I: 266SR3C: 170

Curtiss SC Sea hawk 17..Curtiss SOC 174

S03C Sca mew 174Curtiss 1'-40 To mah awk 36-8. 37. ·n.56. 277

Warhawk 36Czechoslovakia 24, 109. 285Daghestan (GB) 190Daimler Benz engines 25 1, 253, 271

DR 600: 27~D1l 600G : 28D1l 601 : 16, 76, 25 1, 253DB 60 1A: I ~ , 22011 601 :-1: 590 11 606: 16, 261 , 262D B 6 lOA: 110

Davi e, Douglas 131Davi s, Peter 131D-D ay landings 113, 139-tO, 219, 229 , 262 ,

276Dec, Dr I' I 205de Havilland D.H .9: 115de Havilland D.H.60T : 295de Havilland DJI.82 T iger Moth 13 1. 29 1,

293 ,293,295llf1.82C: 293

de Havilland D.H.84 Dragon 131de H avilland D.H.88 Comet 115de Havilland D.H.89 Dragon Rapide 131de Havill and D.H .91 Albatross 115de Havilland D.H.95 Flamingo 255, 278, 279de Havilland D.H.98l\10squito 8-9, 50. 52,

76,78, 112- 13, 115- 16, 118, 1~ 3, 2 13, 237Mk II : 76, 77, 226Mk IV: 115-1 6, JI 6, 117, 27~M kV: 116-1 7Mk IX: 117-1 8Mk XVI: 117. 1/ 7Mk XVII: 270.\ Ik XVIII : 197Mk XXX: 76, 77, 78.\ lk XXXIV: 23 1

de Havilland D,H.I OOVampire 8, 88-90, 89,90, 2~ 5 , 2 72-3

de Havilland Gipsy engine 259 , 293Denmark 33, 46, 77,1 27, 285d 'Erl angcr , Gerard 276Dcwoirinc 0.5 10: 194 . 252Dcwoitine D.520: 34. 34DFS 230 glide r 129,129,1 33, 137, 1 ~5

diesel fue l 13, 17, 233 , 25 7-8dive-bomber role 8-9. 12,15- 16.20,80-8 1,

153,1 56-7,1 59, IM-5, 167, 170Doolittle, Cdr james 103D orm er Do 11: 14, 15, 18Dom ier Do 13: H , 15Dom ier Do 17: 13, 17-1 8, 9 1. 97, 99.109-10

Do 17EiM : 17Do 171'/1': 17Do 17Z : 13, 1 ~,99

Domicr Do 18: 17D or n ier Do 19: 109Domier Do 23: 14, 15Dornicr Do 24: 129Domier Do 26: 129Dom ier Do 127: 15Dorni er Do 215 : 14Dornier Do 217 : 16, 106, 110, 113, 183, 2 11,

2 17,240Do 217E : 16, 195

Dorme r Do 335 Pfeil 235-6, 245, 246Douglas A-20 Boston 7, 39,100-10 1

A-20C : 100

300

A-20G: 162Douglas A-26/H-26 Invader 240Douglas AD Skyraider 168, 17 1D ouglas RT 2D : 168Douglas C-33: 13~

Douglas C-47 Da kota /Sky train 9. 126.132.134, 13~-8, 1 ~Q--l I , HI, 1~3, 144, 146,282

Douglas C-5 4 Skymasrcr 136.281-2,282Douglas CG-I7: 135Do uglas DB-3: 107Do uglas D R-7: 39,100-10 1,107

D B-7A Havoc 36,39,50,101DR -7B Boston 36 , 39--l0, 39, 56, 10 1, 2~ 1

Douglas DC-2: 13~, 136 , 282Douglas DC-3: 13 1, 13~, 136Douglas DC-4: 28 , 282, 282Douglas SRn Dauntless 153, 168, 170-71

SR2D 170Douglas SD Skyrai dcr 170Doug las T BD Devastator 160, 168. 170. 170Doubet, General Giulio 19-20, 24Dowding , Air Chief .\tarshal Sir Hugh 99EK'fI, HM S 158,21 7Egypt 278-9, 287Eisenhower, General Dwight 1) 139-40electo r scats 245- 7.274electrical power 22 1-5Ellcs, Sir Hugh 2 17Embry, \X'g Cdr Basil 96Empire .\tersey (GR) 181Empress of Britain, SS 110engines 7- 8 , 10,222-3,25 1-65

air-cooled 167, 252- 7, 262environme nta l damage 236-9jet 8, 10, 5 ~ , 55 , 8:H> , 2~7 , 272--1'knoc k' 257liquid-coo led 24, 37, 25 1-2 , 256-7, 260, 262sleeve-valve 255-6, 256, 259-6 1V-12 rypc 25 1-2, 260 , 262see also individual engine types and under

Britain. France, Ge rmany, Italy, japan,Russia, USA

environmental damage 237 , 246Eritrea 97Essen raid 112, 112Essex class (US) 166Ethiopia 19. 97, 136Fairchild P1: 19: 290Fairey Albacore 164, 165Fairey Barracuda 165, 165Fairey Battle 7, 33, 50 . 9~, 94,96,287Fairey Firefly 155Fairey Fulmar 165, 165, 166Fairey Hendon 53Fairey Prince engine 261Fairey Spearfish 166Fairey Swordfish 163, 164-5,2 18Farman F223 : 209 , 2 11Fedden, A H Roy 254-5Fender, Robert 13 1ferrying 10. 276-84Fiat BR.20 Cicogna 19-20, 24-5Fiat C R.25 : 22, 22Fiat CR.32b is: 2 1Fiat CR.~2 Falco 2 1, 21, 33Fiat G.50 Frecchia 21-2,22,24Fiat R.S .I~ : 158Fiat engines 252

A.30 RA: 22A. 7~ RC 38 : 22A.80 RC ~I : 18 20

Ficscler Fi 103 seeV- IFiesclcr Fi 156 Storch US, 179fighter-bombe r role 8, 50-52, 159-60

secalso individual aircraft t)'f'€S

fighter role 12-13,59-89see also ind ividual aircraft types arid under

Britain , France. Italy. Germany, japan,Russia, USA

Finland 107. 127,236First \'\'orid War 11-12, 17- 18.24, 115.1 56.

163,193--1, 196,207,25 1,253,257,259Flenner FI 18·k 184Flenner FI 185: 184Flen ner F1265 : 18~ , 18-1-185Flenner 1'1 282 Kolib ri 184-5, 185, 186Flenner 1'1 339 : 185flight control systems 24.3-4flight testing 10, 124,267-74

training 26 7-8transonic 271-2

floarplan cs II, 13, 17,23, 152, 157,16 1, 166 ,1 7~

filing boats 17, 23, 30, 129,136,1 50 ,1 57-8,160,1 66 ,1 73, 241, 274-5

Fcckc-A ch gclis company 9. 179, 181-2Focke-Achgelis Fa 6 1: 182Focke-Ach gelis Fa 223 : 182, 182, 184

Fa 223 E Drachc 182-3, 183, I S~

V14 : 183-4V16: 183--1

Fockc-Achgclis Fa 266 : 182Fockc-Achgc lis Fa 284: 181Focke-A chgelis Fa 330 Hach stclze 179, 179-80Focke-Wulf 181- 2

autogyros 177, 179Focke-Wulf C.30: 179

C .30A: 180Focke-Wulf Fw 44 : 285Focke-Wulf Fw 56: 285Focke-Wulf Fw 58 Weihe 295Focke-Wulf Fw 109: 69, 270Fock e-Wulf F" 189 : 12

189 C: 12\'3: 12Vlb: 12

Focke-WulfFw 190: 18, 18, 6~-5, 65, 66,6 7,67-8,68,83,238,24 7,257,27 1,287

Fw 190A-3: 70, 74Fw 190A-8 'Sturmbock' 69 , 69, 70Fw 1901': 82, 82, 83

Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor 20, 104, 110, 112,135,1 56, 158, 158, 211 , 228

Fw 2001l: 16, 110, 129Fw 200C: 110

Fokker D.XXI: 33 , 33Fokker G .I: 12, 33--1r" rmidubk , HMS 118-11 9France 33,38, 47, 49 , 77,94,96-7,99,

109-10,123, 137--10, 163, 168 ,1 77 ,193,223

armament 35, 49, 191, 194, 197,200, 209bomber role 34-5,99,209-1 1engines 252fighter role 18, 2~, 3~, 37, 39 , ~3production and strength 21rotary-winged aircraft 9 , 177-8, 18D-8I , 191systems and instruments 204, 22 1, 239 , 24 1training 285Vichy 34, 177-8sec also individual aircraft types

Frazer-Nash, Archibald 20 7-8, 2 12Freeman, Sir Wilfrid 50, 116Freybu rg, General 133fue l 225, 23 1-5 , 232,273--1

high-octane 10, 257-8see also diesel

FujitaYuzo, Captain 25,27,27Galland, Gcncralleu tnan t Adolf 295 ,296General Aircraft Hamilcar 139, 139-40, 142,

1~6

General Aircraft Hotspur 132, 132-3. 138,1 ~ 2 , 1 ~6

Geo rge. Ge neral Harold 28 1Germany 3~, ~5 , 5 ~ , 106-7, 117, 1 ~1-2,

162- 3, 211 , 290aircrcw 10, 15, 18-19 , 197, 2~0, 285-7, 290,29~

airmobiliry 9, 18-19, 127-30. 133-4, 136-8,I~I , 1~3 , 1 ~5 , 2~~

armament 8,10, 12.48, 19 1, 194-9, 195,199- 200, 2 15- 17

bomber role 8, 12-1 7, 19, 28. 53, 5 ~, 56, 75 ,9 1, 9~, 96-9, 102, IO~, 108-13, 123--5,156-7,193,197,2 11

dive-bombers 8,12-16,109,156engines 8, 22, 240, 25 1, 257, 259fighter-bombers 8, 79-82, 87-8, 97-8fighter role 8, 12, 17- 18,59-60, 62-H,

71- 75 , 76-9, 93,1 96-8, 205, 2 13, 231 ,2 56-7, 26~ , 271 --1

flight testing 267 , 269 , 271-5guided missiles 10, 123jets 8, 83--90 , 88, 118, 123--5, 263, 263--1naval air warfare 8-9, 11, 13. 20, 149-50,

152- 3,1 56-8,1 6 5,1 84,1 96 stt'lllso U­boats

production and strength 7-8, 11, 45, 54, 193.275,282

radar and radio 14, 77,92-3, 137, 196,225-30

rotary-winged aircraft 9. 177- 9, 181-6, 19 1,2~8

systems and instruments 20 1-3 , 203, 205,22 1 -5,23 1 -3,233,23~,239-42,2~6-7

see also indiridual aircraft typesGibraltar U S, 150gliders 9, 127-30, 132-3, 135--13, 1 ~6, 179Glorious, HMS 156Gloster Gl adiator 32, 33, 166Gloster Meteor 8, 55, 83. 83. 84-7, 245 . 264 .

276G loste r-W hittle E.28 /39 : 54-5, 55, 263 , 263,

272-3,2 73Grieme-Rhone engines 34-5, 253

I ~K: 2~

K I~ II C32: 23I~:-I : ~9 35

Goering, Hermann 16,1 10,1 27, 285Goodyear FG 169Goodyear F2G 169Gotha Go I~5 : 285Gotha Go 2~2 : 129, 145Gowe r, Pauline 276Graf Zeppelin (G er) 158Greece 35, 39 , 135, 285

see also CreteGreenland 280G rim m, A A 262-3Grubb, Sir Howard 20 IGrumman Cougar 170Grumman F4FWildcatlMartlet 36, 38, 39,

149, 155, 168-9 , 169Grumman F6F Hellcat 64, 68 , 69, ISS, 166,

168-9,169, 170 ,2301'61'-5: 7~-75

1'61'-3:-1: 229T BM 171

Grumman F8F Bcarcat 169, 170Grumman F9F Panther 170Grumman G-36A M artlet 38, 38, 39Grumman G-36B: 39Grumman TB F Avenger 166, 171, 171Grumman TBM Avenger 149guided missiles 9-10, 157,2 16-17gu nsights 9-10, 201,201-6

gyro 20~-5 , 205, 2~7

301

radar 205-6remote 206, 211

gyroglide rs 179Halford, Colonel Frank 259Handley Page H.I~4 2: 126Handley Page H.I~ 50 Heyford 53Handley Page H.I~ 52 Hampden 51, 92.93.

I I~, 152, 196Handley Page H.I~ 54 Harrow 131Handley Page Halifax 16, 51- 2, 53,1 12. 132,

138,140, 146 , 207- 8, 2 12- 13, 230, 256,276

Harman, Lt Carter 188-9Hawker Demon 20 7Hawker Fury 28 7Hawker Hart 132, 276, 287Hawker Hind 287Hawker Hurricane 7, 33. 45, 45, 47, 56, 75-6,

135, 162, 166,201,205,2/ 7,222, 236, 2~0,270 ,277,279

Mk 110 : 81,81, 197Hawker Sea Fury 166Hawker Temp est 64, 65

Tempest V: 274Hawker To mado 47Hawker Typhoon 7, 18, 47,49, 65,65, 72- 3,

8 1,82,218,239,262,277' Hayabusa t see Ki- BHein kel lI e ~5 : I 1,1 2-13Heinkel He 46 : ll , 12Heinkel He 5 1: 12. 287Heinkel He 59: 17, 127Heinkel He 60 : 12, 13Heinkel He 66: 28Ilcinkel He 70: 28 , 29Heinkel He 72: 285Heinkel He III : 1 3--1~ , 18, 91 , 97, 99, 106,

109-10, 112, 123,130, 157, 15 7, 221 , 2~2,2~5

IIIH: 17, 9111111-2: I~

III H- 22: 123IIIP-I : 1 3--1 ~

IIIP-~ : I~

III V3: J3Heinkel He 115: 17Heinkel He 118: 28Heinkel He 162: 235 , 246 , 268Heinkel He 177: 8,15-16,20,109-10,113,

2 11, 268I77A : 109, 110, 112I 77A-3: 113I77A -5: 112-1 3177 Greif 110

Heinkel He 178 : 5~ , 263, 273Heinkel He 219: 235Heinkel He 274: 113Heinkcllle 277: 113Heinkel He 280 : 5~ , 272

2S0 VI: 2~5-6, 273Heinkel engine s 263lleja 24helicopters 9, 79, 137, 144, 177- 9 1

crew training 189engines 178-9, 182testing 190

Henschel Hs 123: 12, 15Hen sch el Hs 126: JI , 11- 12Henschel Hs 129: 12- 13,253Henschel Hs 293 : 10, 157, 2 17Hen shaw, Alex 6 1-2Hertel, Dipl Ing Heinrich 16Hess, Rudolf 18Hire, Bill 131Hiroshima 122, 143Hisp ano- Suiza engines 3 1, 34 . 45, 252

A IR CR A F T OF T HE SECO XD \X' O R L D W ARI X D E X

Hitler, Adolf 8.33,87-9, 110. 127-8. 133.1~ 1. 228

Hod gkin. Dr Alan 205Holland 9. 33-1. 77. 96. 110. 117. 123. 127-8.

138. I ~I . 1~3, 177. 296Horikoshi, Jiro 160Horne t, USS 103Hungar y 21. 21. 234, 107hydraulic power 22 1-2. 225 . 233-5IAR 37: 2~. 2~

JAR 38: 2~. Z4JAR 39: 2~IAR 80 : 2~icc 237- 9Iceland 173 . 280Illustrious, H.\\S 157Ilyushin D B-3 ( II -~): 107, 162. /62.212

Ilyushin DB 3-PT: 162Ilyushin 11-2 (Ilyu sha/Shrurm ovi k) 12. 56.56.

/ 07. 107- 8. 162. 21 ~ . 275Ilyushin 11-10: 108Imperial Airways 25"ItJ.J~nJmu class (US) 166India 7. 37. 37, 13 1, 1 3~ , 136, 188,236, 28 1,

298ins truments 242- 3. 2-t7Ireland I to. 166Italy 1 9-2~, 99 ,133, 13S--<;, 163, 165, 173.

177 , 1 83 , 2 23, 2~8

airc rew tra ining 285. 290airmobility 9, 145-6arma ment 22. 191 , 196, 199 ,200bomber role 16. 19-20,22-4, 97, 211engines 19-22. 24. 252. 259fighter role 20-22. 2-tflight testing 269 . 275naval air warfare 20. 23. 149. 152-3. 157-8production and strength 7. 19, 21. 2 1tsystems and instrum ents 221 ,236.239, 2-tIsecalso i"Jindual aircraft ty pes

Iwo jirna 119J.m" P.,*" (US) 187-8Japan 37, ~9. 103, 105, 122- 3, 1~3, 160 . 282

airmobilitv 136arma me ni 8.10. 26 . 191, / 98. 198-9.200Ann)"9. 2~. 2&-7. 11~, 162. 177-8. 188-9.

198-9bo mbe r role 8-9. 16. 24-5.27- 3 1, 110.

113-15.118-20.1 60 . 212. 2~0

engines 8, 25 , II ~, 25~

fighter role 2ol-7. 6+-5. 66. 67-9. 155. 160flight testing 267 . 269. 275naval air warfare 9, 27-31 , 99. 103 . 149-50.

152-3, 15S--<;. 159-61, 163.1 7()"'7 1. 198-9,275

prod uction and strength 7, 27-8. 155.275rota ry- wing aircra ft 9. 177-8. 248systems and ins tru me nts 155. 20·t 221 . 223.226.231. 237.23~0

U~ also kamikaze and inJit1Juu/ aircraf t typesj ene 117jendrassik, G yorgy 263jeschonnek. Oberst Hans IS, 110ier propu lsion 7-10. 54, 5-1, 115. 123-5.2 16.

262-1,272-1Jim Hor ikosh i 67Johnson. Amy 277Jon es, Capt M elville 205Junkers Ju 52 : 1-1, 15, 18, 127, 128, 133- 5,

1~3, 1 ~ 5

Ju 52/3m: 18, 128-9Junkers Ju 86: 13, 17- 18, 2~6

Ju 8611: 17Ju 861': 17. 146

JunkersJu 87: 15,9&-7.99Ju 87B: 15,9 1,97

ju 87 B-2: 91ju 87C: 15ju 87R: 15Ju 87 \ '3 : 14

Jun kers j u 88 : 15-1 6. 20. ~9. 78. 98. 99. 106.110. 113. 15&-7. 233. 2~O, 2~8

Iu 88A: I,j u 88A-6 : 2~7Ju 88G: 78, 78, 225j u 88G-7: 78ju 88\'3: 15, / 5

j unkers j u 89 : 109 . 112j unkcrs ju 188: 110.113. 211Junkers Ju 252 Herkules 129Junkers ju 290 : 112Junker s Ju 322: 130Junkers Ju 35 2: 145Junkers engines 2iM, 273

jumo 205 : 17Jumo 205C: I ~j um o 211: / 5,20

Nlg<l (japa n) 156, 159ka", ikau flights 9. 118-20, 15.3--4. 160 , 166,

219Kawa mshi E7K: 30Kawa nishi E I5K: 30Kawanishi H6K : 30, 30Kawani shi H8K : 30. 160, 160Kawani shi ~IK I-J : 64Kawa nish i ~IK2: 66

Kawanishi N IK2-]: 66Kawasaki Ki-l : 25Kawasaki Ki-3: 2~Kawasaki Ki-~: 27Kawasaki Ki-I O: 25Kawasaki Ki·1 5: 27

Ki-15-I1: 27Kawasaki Ki-20: 25Kawasaki Ki· 21: 25, 25, 11+-15

Ki-21-I1 I I ~

Kawasaki Ki-27: 25-6. 26Kawasaki Ki-30: 24Kawasaki Ki-32: 2~Kawasaki Ki-36: 26. 27Kawasaki Ki-B: 25-6, 26, 27, 27Kawasaki Ki-45 : 26Kawasaki Ki-l6: 27 . 27

Ki-l6-I1: 27Kawasaki Ki-48: 25, 113-14. 11-1Kawasaki Ki-l9: 25Kawasaki Ki-51 : 25. 27Kawasaki Ki-55: 26Kawasaki Ki-61 : 199Kawasaki Type 99 ' Lily' 118Kawasaki engine Ha-9: 25Kayaba Ka-I : 178Kayaba Ka-2: 178Kellet KD I-A : 178Kesselring. General Alben 109-1 0Kettering, C F 258Kirby Kite 131Kolle 103. 122Kokusai Ki-86A: 286Kokusai Ku-7: 136KOI" (G er) 1 8~-5

K o" igsba g (Ger) 165Korea 24. 178Kurile Islands 103La Chamb re, Gu y 3~

/ .",g/,y. IlSS 115Lavochkin LA-5FN : 70Lavochkin LaGG -3: 56Lee. Major William 13.3--4l .cigh-,\ tailor ).. Air Chief ,\ \arshal 139-t0l.e.\\ay, .\ \aj-G en C urtis E 122Lend-Lease 39. ~~ . 1 3~. 208. 280-8 1. 290

302

LeO ~5 1 : 3~. 35, 211LeOC.30 1: 178L" O C .30A: 178, / 78I.e Pr ieur, UY P G 214Le l'a ge, Lawrence 186Leyte Gulf. battle of 118-1 9, 160Liore et Olivie r (LeO) company 177Loc kheed .\ Iodel I~ : 279Lockheed H-3~IB-37 Lexington ~3

Lockheed Hudson 7, 36, ~3-I . 99, 132, 135.137, 152, 172, 2~ I , 277,277

Lockheed M od el 18 Lodes tar 131, 279Lockheed 1'-3 Orion / 72Lockh eed 1'-38 Lightni ng 12. ~3. 43. ~5 , ~ 7,

198, 223.235.252.271 .27~

P-38L ~~

Loc kheed 1'''-1 Ventura 43, 172, 172Loc kheed 1'\'-2 Harpoon 172, 172-3Lockheed P2V Neptune 173-1Lorenz landing systems 14Luzon 136Lycoming XR-7755 engine 261-2.\1- 22 engine (Rus) 179M -I OO engine (Rus) 107.\ 1-105R eng ine (Rus) 55, 108Macch i C 202 236M acchi M C.200 Sactta 22. 24machmcters 271-3M AD (magnetic anomaly detection) 150M alaya 37Malta 133, 135, 139,\lanchuria 162. 178Mariana Islands 115, 122xtershett Island s 115." ' an in-Baker .\\8 5 248M artin 187 Baltimore ~O, 99 . 99. 100 . 100,' \ar tin B-26 ,\larauder 40, 41,1 00 . 10.3--4.

/ O~. 173, 235Martin 167 Mar yland 36, 40. -10. 99

1671' 99.\lartin PBM .\ ta riner 136, 172M artin P8 2M Mars 136, 172McDonneU Phantom 170.\ tecozzi, Co lonel Amed ee 22Meridionali Ro 37: 22, 23

Ro 37bis: 22.\1e ridionali Ro ~3 : 23M eridionali Ro ~~ : 23M esserschm in , Prof \X'illi 17-18, 59.\lesserschmitt Hf 109: 7-8, 17- 18, 18.33, 34,

37.62, 63, 69 , 79. 83, 102, 1 8~, 1%. 23S--<;,23~0.2~5 , 27o-7 1, 274-5, 287

Bf I09D: 17- 18Bfl 09 E: 17, / 7,22,2~.197,270

Bf 1091': 18, 59, 59, 60 ,62.239IIf 109G: 62-3, ~, 6-1,66 , 7~, 222, 2~5 . 253IIf I09 K: 63, 63Bf 109'1': 18G-2/R 1: 235

.\1esserschm itt Bf 110: 16. 18, 78-9. 97, 98.99 , 1 1~, 2/5 . H 5

Bf I IOC : / 6. 17IIf 1101': 7&-7IIf I I OF~ : 78Bf I lOG: 77. 225

Mcsscrschrnitt Me 163: 8. 10. 85, 85. 86. 86.88, 27 1,273-1

.\1es serschmitt .\1e 209: 62M esserschmitt M e 210: 18, 110.\\esserschmitt Me 23 1: 129•\1esscrsch min Me 262 : 8, 83 , 83, 8+-5, 87.

87-90, 2 1 6.235 . 2~ 5 , 2~, 27 1 ,273, 27~

•\1esscrschmitt ,\1c 309: 62Messerschmitt .\1e 321: 129-30, 130, 145Messcrschmitt .\1e 323 : 130,135, 145.\ \esserschmitt .\ \e 41OA: 270

.\1 idgley. T homas 258

.\1 idwav. battle of 104 . 153. 155, 160 , 170

.lIlduu~ class (I,;S) 169

.\1 ikO\·~n & G urevich xuc.i . 54

.\1 iko~·an & G urevich .\1iG-3: 54. 70

.\1 ileh. GeneraJ-Feldmarshall Eberhard 1.1.17-18.193

.\1i les .\1agister 289, 293

.\1 iles .\1aster 287, 289. 296

.\lususi!,p;. CSS 119

.\liste! compos ite 2-17

.\1 itchell. Reginald 59. 62

.\1 itsubishi A5M : 29. 29. 160, 161

.\1 itsubishi A6.\1 Zero 29, 118, 155. 159-60.168, / 68. 25~ , 269 , 275

A6.\l2: 29A6M3: ~, 66, 67-9A6M5 : 67, 7~-3 . / 5~

.\ \ itsubishi B5.\ \ : 28

.\\itsu bishi C 5.\1 : 27

.\\itsubishi F l .\ \ : 30M itsu bisbi G3 M : 27. 28, 159, 159Mitsubishi G4 M Rikko 28, 114,1 14, lI S,

159-60, / 60, 212G~M2 : 115G~M2E: 120

,\ \itsuhishi J2J\1 Raiden 29-30J2M3:~ , 66

Mitsubi shi Ki-21: 114, 118, 212Mit subishi Ki-57: 136,\ \ itsubishi Ki-67 Hir yu 115, 115,11 8. 212M itsubishi engines 254M ohn e Dam raid 112Mol odch y, Captain Alexand r 107.\1o rane-Saulnier .\1SA06 : 34, 3-1, 252x torcc co 18Moss, Stan ford 263M urt on, Sdn Ldr Phillip 290.\1 ussolini. Benito 23. 137-8. 183Nagasaki 123. 143N agoya 103Xakaiima B5~: 28. 160

B5N I : 28B5N2 : 118, /6 /

X akaiima B6:-1: 159-60B6X2 Tenz an 118. / 6/~akajima C6~ Saiun 161X akajima E8X: 30, 30X akaiima G5 K Sh inzan 28Nakaiima j l N: 29, 118Xakaiima Ki-3~ : 136Xakaiima Ki-B: 6-1. 118

liB : 68Naka jima Ki-84 : 64, 68Ki-8~F: 68

N aka jim a engines 254Napier engines 65, 25 1

l...ion 251Sabre 166, 259-60, 260, 262

naval air warfare 9. 149-75seealso under Britain. France, Ge rma ny, Italy,Japan. Russia. USA

New Guinea 115, 136New Zealand ~3 . 295, 297~ickolls , K H 212nigh tfigh tcrs 8, ~8, 75- 9, 197. 205. 223. 225.

22 7, 2~5, 288N orth. John 207N or th Afriea 83, 105, 135. 198. 217North American A"1: 6 Texan/H arvard 36. ~4•

~4, 287, 289-90, 29~, 295-6

North Am erk-an B-25 M itchell 7. -lQ.--t 1. 100 •103, 173,220, 235, 23 7. 281

11-25C : / 02, 103B-25 G : 19811-25H : 198

Xorth American F-86 Sabre 170North American I'J Fury 170North Ame rican NA-16: 36. 4~Nor th American ~A-37 : 38North American S'A-40: ~OXorth American :-':A-62 : ~ON or th American 1'-5 1 .\1 ustang 7. 36-8. 38.

~6. 6+-5, 69. 69. 7~ , 118.203.252.252.271

~Ik II: 233.\lk III : 240. 27~P-51A: 6-1. 661'· 5 180 66

Xorwav 35,96.102.110.112. 117. 125. 127,129: 138. 15&-7. 1~-6. 285

Nowotny, .\ lajo r Walter 88Ohain. Pabst von 26.3--4Okinawa 115, 119Onish i ·la kjiro. Admiral 27Osaka 122OS S 138pa rachuting 9,127- 8. 128. 13~1. 133-5,

13~~, 2~~-5

training 131-3. 136Pearl Harbor ros.105, 153, 160. 178Percival Proc tor 13 1Percival Q .6: 283Pershing. G eneral John 196Pctlyakov l'e-2: 55, 55, 107-8, / 08, 162, 23~Petlvakov Pe-8: 8, 107. 20~ . 21 1- 12Pctrp avlovskii, 8 S 214Philippi nes 120, 136. 155, 160, 189 .281Piaggio 1'23: 20Piaggto t~ 50 : 20Piaggio t~ 108 : 20, 20Piaggio 1' 123: 20Piaggio engines 2~24

Pitcairn company 1 8~7

Pitcairn PA-18: 180Pitcairn PA-39: 180-8 1. 181. 190Platt lel' age XR-I : 186Ploesti raid 105pneumati c systems 235Pobioy eng ines 269Poland / 6. 2~ . 33. 91,1 07,1 10.1 27.2,6.285Polikarpov 1- 152: 5~Polikarpov 1- 153: 5~, 2 NPotez 63: 107Perez 63 1: 29Potez 637: 12Pra n & \\rutney engines ~4 . 65, 25~. 260

R- 1535: 167R-1690 : 10 1R-1830: ~2 . I~. 167- 8R-2800: 121. 168-9R-~36O: 168R-2800-I OW: 67\X'asp 37, ~O, H, 66, 9~ . 100-101, 103

pressurisation 117, 117, 124, 223, 24~7, 274Pr~IOriJ. emu, H.\\S 275Prince of Ira Te, . H,\\S I I~, 159, 163Pye, D avi d 255, 257-8I'lL I'll C: 33I'll. 1~ 2~E: 2~

I'll. 1~ 3 7 Los 32,33radar 7-8. 17. ~3-5 . ~9-50. 75-8. 92- 3. 97.

117, /25, 137, 1 ~9-50. 155, 165. 171, 196,223. 225-3 1. 226

counterme asures 77-8. 78. 160radio 12, I ~ , 157, 180, 22 1, 22S--<;, 285, 287reconnaissance role 9,1 1- 12, 1 ~1 7, 24.

29-3 1. ~3 . ~ 7, 99, 110, 116, 123-5. 158.I~, 1 7~ , 177, 179-80, 1 8~, 186. 196 . 2~6.

273Reggiane Re 2000: 23. 24Rcnard 38: 33, 33

303

Repu blic P-l7 Thundc:rbolt 64. 6-1.65.203.270.27 1. 274

P-4i C 65-7. 66Repulse, H.\1S 11.1. 159. 163Return Ferry Service 10Rex (It) 173Rhin e crossings 9. 142-3. 1-12.298Ricardo. Harrv 254. 25~7. 260Richthofen. Obe rst \X·olfram von 12. U. 15Rock••\ Iaior Joh n 131rocket weapons 10. 65. 65, 8 1. 123, 154.

21ol-20, 215 , 218. 2~7

rocket-assisted take-off (RAT O) 248rocket-propelled aircraft 8-9, 85-6, 119-20.

2~7. 273-1Rolls-Royce engines 65. 251-2. 260 . 264

Crecy 260 . 261Eagle 260, 262. 262G riffon 9~. 155, 166M erlin 8, ~&-9, 5 1-2 . 60. 9~. 115, 155,25 1-2,252.256. 258. 259-60,271 . 27~

Peregrine 48, 5 1R 259Vulture 46. 26~1

Rom" (It) 153-1. 158Romania 2.3--4 . 105Roosevelt. Captain Elliot 280Roosevelt. President Franklin D 44 , 280rotar y-wing aircraft 9. 248

seealso autogyros, helicop ters, (m J underBritain. Fra nce , Germany. Italy, Jap an.Russia. USA

Rotterdam 97, 127, 141Royal H ying Co rps 11Russia 33, 36, 75, 83. 103, 112-13, 133,

157- 8, 162.183-1.1 86. 290. 295airc rew 285airmobihtv 9,1 8, 127,130. 14.3--4arma me nt 8. 107. 19 1, 1 9~ , 19-1.199 . 200.21 ~-1 5

bo mber role 8. sa-s, 106-8. 153. 161- 2,21 1-12

engin es 8, 70ferr ying 28 1fighter role 2~. 37. sa-s. 6+-5, 70,162flight testing 26 7, 269, 275ground attack 12,37, 55naval air warfare 1534. 161- 2. 171production and strength 7-8, 11.5+-5, 162.

275rotary-wing aircraft 9. 79, 177systems and instruments 204 , 2iN, 22 1, 226 ,

233-1.236see also inJiu'dIMJ/ type num bers

Rvan Fireball 169SABC A SA7 2~s"roIOg<l, USS 119Sardinia 139SAS 135, 138. IHSaunders- Roe Lerwick 166. 166.2-11Savoia company 20, 131Savoia-Ma rchetti S.\ \. 79 Spa rviero 19-20. 23,

158, 211S.\ 1. 79-11: / 53JRS.7911: 23

Savoia-M archetti S.\\. 8 1: '''4-I-lSSavoia-M archetti S.\\.82: I" S-U6Savoia S.55: 23Savoia 5 .84 : 20Savoia S.85: 2~1 , 21Savoia S.8 1 Pipistrello 19. 19Sayer. P E 53'Schlacht' role 12-13Schweinfurt 105SD2 bom bs 80 . 80, 8 1S,./, H.\ IS /2

A IRCRAFT OF T HE SECO:-:D \\'ORLD WAR

seaplanes 9. 29. 3 1.127.1 50.152.161.251,259.27~-5

Shill ing. Beatrice 274ShoJwku (japan) 159Short S. I : 269Short Stirling 7. 53-t . 5 -1. 110. 112. 118. 132.

1 ~6 , 230.23~.2~1,256

Sho rt Su nderla nd 136 , 151. 166. 2·UShowa L201 136Sic ily 139Sikorsky company 9Sikorsky HN S-I : 187-8Sikorsky 1: 187Siko rsky R-~ (Hoverfly) 137,137, 187,188,

1 8~90

R-lll: 188Sikorsky R-5: 137 , 190Sikorsky R-6 : 18~90, 19(}-91Sikorsky S-5 1/1l-5 : 189Sikorsky VS-300: 186 , 186, 190SikorskyVS-316: 186Sikors ky VS-327 : 189Sikorsky XPIl S: 171- 2Sikorsky XR-~ : 18&-7, 18 7,1 88Sikorsky X R- 5: 189. 189Sikorsky XR-6: 189-90SikorskyYR-4: 187-90

YR-lA: 190YR-lll: 188-90

Sikors kyY R-5A: 189Singapore 37, 152. 163Skorzc ny, Otto t 37-8Slingsby Hengist 139Smith. Cyrus R 281SOE 137-8Solomon Islands 115. 160SomaJiJand 97Sopwith Pup 21-1South Africa ·n. 295. 29 7South ern Rhodesia -l4 , 295, 29 7Spain 12, 177Spanish Civil War 7, 12-13, H , 15. 18- 19. 22.

56 , 110, 128, 197, 202 , 2~, 2 11, 223 , 236,285

Stalingrad, battle of 112Stan for d, R 293, 295Stinson LIt : 137Stinso n L- 5: 137Stirling, D avid 135'Stooge' missile 2 19, 2 19Strange, Sdn Ldr Lo uis 13 1-2, 140Student, Generalleutnant Kurt 127-8, 133,

135, I ~I

Stukagruppcn 8, 12, N , 9 1, 97Sumatra 136supe rchargers sec rurbosup crchargcrsSu permarine S.5: 25 1Supermarine S.6: 259Supe rmarine S.6 8: 259Supc rmarine Seafire J.J. 9, 155, 166 , 2 7-1-, 27 5,

275Su permarine Spi tfire 8,17, 46, -16, -17, 6 1, 65,

79, 115- 16, 1 5 5, 201 . 205 , 2 36, 2~0, 268,

270,272,27-1-6.\ \k 1: -/6Mk II: 62 , 27 1, 27-/Mk IV: ~7..\ lk V: 4 7, -17, 59 , 59, 60 , 67-8, 70 , 236M k IX: 60,62, 62,66,68-9, 79Mk XII : 60Mk XIV: 8 , 58. 6(}-1, 61-2, 63 , 6~, 6-/,68,

70,89. 89-90, 2 7~

Mk 21: 8-1--5

Sus sex, IIM S 118Sweden 21 ,96Swint on. Lord 46Sw itzerland 33. 19+-5systems concept 10, 125. 221-49

secalso systems and instruments underBritain. France. Italy. Japan. Ge rmany,Russia. USA

Taranto 99 . 16 3Thom pson . ..Maler 193-4Ti bbets, Co l Paul 122T iger ..\ loth 295Timor 136Tirpite (G er) 154Tizard, Sir Henry 227 , 257-8"lbio Hideki, Lr-G cn 24Tokyo 103 , 122Towers , Rear Adm iralJohn 290, 290Tragino ope ration 133. 137training sec under aircrewtransport sec a irmobility, ferryi ngT sAGI A-7: 179Tuni sia 139Tupolcv SIl-2: 106, 107, 162

.\ 1100 25Tu polev Tu -2 : 108. J08

'1\12-1' 162tur bosupcrchargcrs 7. 10, 101- 2. 117, 223-4.

257-62Turkey 296Turner, US S 188turrets 10,20,22,40,43.53,93-4, 103, 105,

105.10&-7, lI S, 120. 131 , 192, 19&-7,203-6, 22 1, 23-/

powered 9, 206-13remotely sighted 206, 2 13. 2 13

U-boats ~3, ~5 , 8 1, 110. ISO, 158. 163-4, 172.179-80.187,2 18,277

Udet , Gc ncra llcutna nt Ernst 15- 18. 109unde rca rriages 2 1, 124 ,22 1-2 ,23-1.235-7

fixed 22-3, 28-9, 33retractable 19 , 23, 222

US A 20. 3 1, 33 , 55 , 64 , 295aircre w 10, 139, 277 , 285 , 289-93, 295--6airmobi lity 9, 128, 132-43, 146, 188- 9. 24 4armament 8,10, 193,196, 196-8, 199,213,2 17,21~20

bomber role 8, 39-1~, 53-4. 65 , 69 , 85, 88 ,9~106, 120-23, 137. 152, 160, 16&-7,172-1,1 78, 198. 208-9. 208-9, 210-1 1,2 1 3 , 2~2

eng ines 8, 17 1,239, 25 1-2, 25~, 25rH;0,263 -1

ferrying 279-83fighte r role 18, 35-10. ~3-4, 64-7, 69 , 7 ~-75,

118, 137,1 60, 16&-72 , 203, 220, 25&-7flight testing 267, 26 9 , 27 1-2, 27+-5naval air warfare 9, 28 , 37, 43, 64, 67, 68 ,

8 1, 105, 115, 136, 139, 1~~52, 15-1-6,159-61 , 1 67-7~ , 18 7, 198. 237, 275, 293,296

production and strength 7, 275 , 282rad ar 1 ~9,226,228-30

rotary-wing aircraft 9, 177, 180,1 82, 186-9 1,2~8

sys tems and instrum ents 203-6, 20-1, 206,22 1,223,225,23 1-2,23-1--5,237,239-13,2~6,2~8,258,26Q-6 1

USSR sec Russiavacuum systems 235l" lal.IIMS 118Vickcrs-Armstrongs \X'ellcsley 97. 97Vickers-Armstr ongs \'('ellington 8,45, 50. 50 .

304

91-1.93.112. 19&-7.212.221. 232. 233.23-/.2~1.2-/+-2-/5.256

.\ \k IC : 92.2-13

.\ \k II: 9~,\ \k V: 2~6,\ \k \'L 2~6. 2-/6Mk \'1lI: 229

Vickers GA/3 1 biplane 20 7Vicke rs-Supcrmarine sa SupermarineVickers Valentia 13 1. 134- 5Vicke rs Vildcbccst 166Vladivostok 103V- I flying bomb 9, 87,1 13. 2 17. 26~. 2 7~

V-2 missiles 113 , 123,217Vought F4 U Co rsair 58 . 64 , 166 . 168-9 , 170.

171. 198Vought F4U-I D : 74

Vought F5U 'Pancake' 169-70Vought F6U Pirate 170Vought OS2U Kingfisher 1 7~, 17-/.293Vou ght 03U Corsai r 293Vought SIl2U: 170VoughtTBU Scawolf 171Vought V-173 : 170Vultee 8"f-13 Valiant 290-9 1, 292Vult ce I.-Ill: 188Vultee Vengeance 36\\'aekeu. Wg Cdr LJ 205Waco CG-~A lI adrian 13-/, 135. 137. 139 ,

1 ~1 -2, 1 ~6

Wagner, D r Herbert 217Wallis, Sir Barnes 20 7Ward, Harry 131Irarspilc, HM S 21 7Watanabe E9W l : 3 1\X'avell. Ge neral 136Weir co mpany 9. 18 1-2. 186\\ 'e irW5: 18 2\'('eirW6: 18 2,1 82\'('cstland Lysander 137, 137, 1-$6\X'estland Pterodactyl 20 7'X'estland Welkin 246\'('cstJand Whirlwind 7, -l7- 8. 48, 193-t. 234Wever, Ge neralleutnant W 13, 109-1 0\-.;.'hittle, Air Cd re Sir Frank 53-4, 26 3, 272\\7hittle W.l jet engine 263, 26 3--4\\'21l: 264

Wilhelmshaven 102- 3, 196-7Williams. Bill 290Williams, Bruce 131Wingate, Orde 136-7. 142Wood, Sir Kingsley 46Woods·l lu mphery, George 277Wright , Laur ence 131Wright eng ines 25 -lCyclone37 , ~ I ,~3, 101, 121, 167-8, 25-/Dou ble Cyclone 100

X4 missiles (G er) 10'X-Vchrfahren' bo mbing sys tems 14,1 8Yakovlev fighters 162Yakc le.... Yak-I : 54Yako lcv Yak-9: 70, 70Yamamoto Isoroku, Admiral 27, -13Yokohama 103Yokosuka 83'.1': 28Yokosuka B~Y: 28Yokosuka D4Y Susei 29 , 159-6 1, 16 1

Yokusaka D~Y2 : 118Yokosu ka E I ~Y1 : 31Yokosuka H 5Y: 30Yokosuka MXY7 Ohka 9, 119-20. 120Yokosuka 1'1Y l: 118Yugoslavia 14, 138

PUTNAM'S HISTORY OF AIRCRAFT