Airport Security Conference Vienna, 13 September 2017

Session 1: International Framework and Respective Regulatory Approaches 

International Legal Framework for Nuclear Security09:40‐10:20am

Anthony WetherallSenior Research Fellow, Centre for International Law, 

National University of Singapore

Safety Security

Safeguards                        

Liability                        

Int’l Legal Frameworks

Defintion of nuclear security 

“Nuclear security focuses on the prevention of, detection of and response to, criminal or 

intentional unauthorised acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities.”

Nuclear Security FundamentalsNSS No. 20 (2012)

Some Nuclear Security Roles and Responsibilities 

• Responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State 

….. it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled 

• Prime responsibility of licensee

Statute

IAEA’s Nuclear Security Mandate

Int’l InstrumentsPolicymaking Organs

Functions PartyBoard of Governors

General Conference

Depositary

Objectives Functions RecognisedRole

..of the IAEA

eg. Nuclear Security Plans,Fundamentals, Recommendations 

(INFCIRC/225)

eg. CPPNMAmendment 

No explicit reference to nuclear security in the Statute. Mandate and activities inherent in the mandate to contribute to peace, health & prosperity

throughout the world, as derived from Art. II & confirmed by the policymaking organs

eg. PSAseg. ICSANT

eg. CPPNM Amendment 

IAEA’s acknowledged central & leading roles  

Strengthening the int’l framework 

Supporting States in fulfilling their responsibilities

Facilitating & coordinating int’l coop. 

incld. info. exchange meetings among various int’l institutions & initiatives with nuclear security mandates 

(17th meeting, 2017)

Nuclear Security

IAEA activities: assistance & cooperation

• Facilitating adherence & implementation: International legal instruments 

• Developing: Technical guidance ‐ Nuclear Security Series (2006)

• MSs development (with relevant IGOs), MSs comments (120 days)

• NSGC (2012): Relevant IGOs/ NGOs may be invited to attend meetings as observers 

• Carrying out on‐request: Peer reviews & advisory services eg. IPPAS, INSServ

• Concluding: National support plans ‐ Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans

• Education & training

• Major public events

• Risk reduction

Nuclear Security Evolution• The Cold War & post Cold War dynamics: Changing actors,different motives and evolving challenges and threat

Focus on physical protectioneg. CPPNM & INFCIRC/225

Concerns re. security of NWs, NFs, RM

unaccounted for & unsecured, illicit trafficking

First comprehensive IAEA programme to combat nuclear terrorism

New/amendment of int’l legal instrumentseg. CPPNM Amendment

Multiple initiatives eg. GICNT, GTRI

1970s 1980-90s Post 9/11 terrorist attacks

Evolving nuclear terrorist threat

Threat to int’l peace & security

Focus beyond physical protectioneg. nuclear forensics, cyber-security

Rise in terrorism, hijackings, nuclear commerce

www.ola.iaea.org

2011

Int’l legal framework for nuclear security

Legally Binding

Legally Non-binding

IAEA IMOUN IAEAICAO

GA UNSC

CPPNMAmend.

CPPNM

Terrorist Bombings Conv.

IMO - SUA Conv.& Protocols

Nuclear Terrorism Conv.

ICAO -Beijing SUA Convention

Int’l legal framework for nuclear security

INFCIRC/225/Rev.5

Code of Conduct - rad. sources

(2003)

Disused Rad. Sources Guidance

(2017)

Import/export Guidance

(2004) (2011)

UNSCR 1373 (2001)

UNSCR 1540 (2004)

Nuclear Security Nuclear Safety Safeguards/ non‐proliferation

Role of the IAEA Significant but advisory, on request “watchdog” (Statute & NPT)

IAEA mandatory reviews Non‐mandatory (but de facto) Mandatory 

SGs inspections

IAEA binding technical standards

Non‐binding (but quasi) Non‐binding guidance

Review by others such as States

• Rad. sources code• [Art 16 ACPPNM ‐2021 conf.]

• Art. 14 ACPPNM• UNSCR 1540 (2001)

• CNS/ JC peer review• Rad. sources code

eg. NPT Review Conf.(may also touch on nuclear  security)Reporting on 

national impl.

Compliance & enforcement mechanisms

No Yes

Int’l Legal Frameworks Comparison

• Int’l framework significantly strengthened post 9/11

• Multiplicity of int’l instruments (binding/ non‐binding) and initiatives incld. the high‐levelNuclear Security Summit process (2010‐16 (end))

• Limited mandatory treaty based peer reviews and reporting on national implementation[BUT….]

• IAEA’s first (physical protection) activities in the 70s. Since the mid‐00s, theIAEA has widely accepted and recognised central roles in nuclear security ‐albeit essentially of an advisory nature (as in nuclear safety)

• Non‐binding security guidance and non‐mandatory IAEA peer reviews [BUT….]

Observations and future perspectives

Observations and future perspectives contd.

• The nuclear terrorist threat is a recognised real threat to int’l peace andsecurity

• In the absence of a nuclear security ‘watershed’ event, positive andprogressive developments continue, driven by this evolving threat

• To‐date, the result inclds. increasing levels of int’l coop and assistance and,strengthened national nuclear security regimes etc

• Still, a critical review continues to reveal fundamental constraints andlimitations incld. issues of State sovereignty and national security and,national sensitivities

• Continued calls in different fora for a more robust int’l framework

• The 2021 review conference of the amended CPPNM may provide a limitedopportunity for re‐evaluation

• Even so, in matters of nuclear security there continues to remain a clear linethat many states are not yet willing and able to cross: the role of the IAEA,standards, peer reviews etc

• What is needed to change the mindset, if that is what is indeed required?

Observations and future perspectives contd.

1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s

1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s

9/11 (01)

(03) Final report on proposed amend. (79)

CPPNM

(03) Rad. Sources Code

ICSANT (05)IMO SUA insts. (05)

ICAO SUA (10)

(97) UN Terrorist Bombings Conv.

Suppl. Guidance (04)

(89) Rev. 2 Rev. 3 (93) (99) Rev. 4

INSPs (06)

IAEA

Int’l

Leg

al In

stru

men

ts

& ot

her t

exts

etc.

(96) IPPAS

Nuclear Security Summits (10, 12, 14 & 16)

[IRRS (05)]

NUCLEAR SECURITY TIMELINE

(57) IAEA

CPPNM Amend. (05)

(06) Nuclear Security Series

UNSCR1373 (01)

UNSCR(04) 1540

NS Fundamentals (12)

(03) INServ

IMDG Code (02 & 04)

(03) PSI (16) Contact Group

Chernobyl (86)[safety event]

UN, IM

O,

ICAO

etc.

Nucle

ar

powe

rTe

chni

cal g

uida

nce,

revie

ws/

advis

ory s

ervic

es

Fukushima (11)Pelindaba nuclear facility,

South Africa - break‐in (07)

(14) INFCIRC/869 initiative

(13) Division of Nuclear Security

(08) WINS

(03) EU WMD Strategy GTRI (04) GICNT (06)

NTI (01)

Global Partnership (02)

UN Global CounterTerrorism Strategy (06)

UN High level meeting (12)

EifCPPNM (87)CP

PNM

& Am

end.

IEC (05)

NISGS(16)

(16) IAEA Summit Action Plan

IPPAS int’l seminars(13) & (16)

(GOV/2017/4 (17)) Disused Radioactive Sources Guidance

Early Notification & Assistance Convs. (86)

[Practical arrangements e.g. RANET(13), IEComm (12), J-Plan (17) etc.]

AdSec (02)

(03) Cat. of rad. sources

[(99) EPREV]

Boom to decline - Western Europe and USA with limited

exception e.g. France

Stagnation for newbuilds -Western Europe and USA, even

more so post-ChernobylRenewed interest, continued growth in Asia

e.g. China, RofK, nuclear newcomers

INF Code (01) ISPS Code (02 & 04)

Continued interest post-Fukushima, continued expansion in Asia, nuclear newcomers e.g. UAE, Belarus, Bangladesh, Turkey

03

03 04 05

0596 9995

Initi

ative

s

[(09) INIR]

1614

Expansion in Asia e.g. Japan, RofK, China, India

PP recomms. (72)

72

86 97 10

Info. Exchange Meetings [13th meeting (17)] ‘20/20’ review (08)

(68)NPT

NPP Vendor Principles (11)

(78) NSGGuidelines INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)

(97)INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) (72 )

(96 Pelindaba & (06) CANWFZeif

9692

93 08

Commercialization -optimism, reality,

expansion

Optimism -Atoms for

Peace

57

68 72

8975

78 01

06

09 16 17

13

1st Review Conf. NPT

(75)

(78) RERTR [Research reactor HEU minimization –

subsumed into GTRI]

NSS. No. 14 & NSS No. 15 (11)

Atoms for Peace Speech & Program (53) [export of NPPs & HEU for research reactors]

Evolving nuclear terrorist threat; broad acceptance & recognition of IAEA’s central roles; evolution from physical protection to a broad range of subjects

incd. forensics and cyber-security; high-level political attention (to 16) – nuclear security summit

process; post-summit developments

Evolving terrorist threat; post-9/11 strengthening; new/amendment instruments; strengthened IAEA mandate; new initiatives; rejection of binding standards & mandatory IAEA &

treaty based peer review (03)

Concern re. PP of RM, NIs, NWs; illicit trafficking increase (95)

3S synergies [IAEA GC resolution] (03)Office of Physical

Protection & Material Security,

(99) Dept. of SGs

Increasing no. of terrorism/ hijackingsNewbuild; int’l nuclear transports; internationalization

(89) Fall of the Berlin wall

Non-state actors - Low density, Low intensity, Malicious, Higher probability, Diversification of risks, Unpredictable

Cold War int’l security concern: fear of nuclear war & spread of NWs End of the Cold War (91)

[Nuclear security definition(state focused)]

[Nuclear security working definition ((03) IAEA programmatic)]

Limited scopeScope expanded to incld. domestic use, storage & transport & NFsRejected proposals – negative list

Calls for mandatory standards/reviews

75

Rad.

sour

ces

AQ Khan network (04)

Draft

1: A

. Weth

erall

, Sing

apor

e (Se

pt. 20

17)

Rev. 5 (NSS No. 13) (11)

CTIFT (05)

NAM Summit (12)

(16) UNGA A/RES/71/38[terrorists & WMD]

(14) UNGA A/RES/69/50[terrorists & rad. sources]

14

(15) & (16) Points of Contact meetings (16) Eif CPPNM Amend.

Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction Program (91)

UNGA A/RES/51/210 (96) &A/RES/49/60 [int’l terrorism] (94)

94

Review Conf. (92)

Nation states, Bio-polar, High intensity, High density, Lower probability, Geopolitical, Predictable

Y-12 National Security Complex, USA - security breach (12)

NNSA Megaports Initiative,USA (03)

CBP Container Security Initiative, USA (02)

GC resolution RES/15 (94) [measures against illicit trafficking]

1st “Security of Material” Programme(97-98)

Board endorsed protection prog.

(95)

(95) ITDB

94 97

Physical protection objectives & fundamental principles (01) NSGC (12)

NSPs (02-05, 06-09, 10-13, 14-17 & 18–21)[Nuclear Security Fund (01); Dept. of Nuclear Safety and Security & Office of Nuclear Security (01)]

Rad. sources tripartite initiative (02)

17

INSEN (10)

Rev. 1 (77)

INFCIRC/225(75)

Formalized info exchange process (06)

1211

TMI(79)[safety event]

Thank you for your attention

Anthony Wetherall

Email: anthony.wetherall@nus.edu.sg 

ESI‐CIL Nuclear Governance Project

www.nucleargovernance.sg