Journal of Air Transport Management 9 (2003) 267–273

Airport–airline interaction: the impact of low-cost carriers on twoEuropean airports

Graham Francisa, Alessandro Fidatob, Ian Humphreysb,*aDepartment of Accounting, Waikato Management School, Waikato University, Hamilton, New Zealand

b Department of Civil and Building Engineering, Transport Studies Group, Loughborough, Leicestershire, LE11 3TU, UK

Abstract

This paper uses case studies to look at the impact of low-cost airlines on two European airports. Low-cost airlines continue to

exert an influence in air transport markets and small airports face pressures to compete for their business. The low-cost model

motivates airlines to negotiate contracts that significantly reduce aeronautical revenues, leaving airports to compensate by seeking

commercial revenues from the increase in passengers. This has consequences for the airports, their passengers and the relationship

between the airport and its existing operators. It is found that it is important for airport management to see both passengers and

airlines as customers and to understand the resultant revenue streams, before negotiating preferential contracts with low-cost

carriers.

r 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Airport–airline interaction; Low-cost airlines; Airport charges

1. Introduction

Low-cost carriers, some sustaining growth of 25% perannum, have had a dramatic effect on the Europeanmarket. Yet, low-cost carriers carry less than 10% ofEuropean Union (EU) short haul passengers. But ifgrowth rates are as has been forecast, low-cost trafficwill constitute up to 33% of short haul European trafficby 2010 (Campbell and Kingsley-Jones, 2002). The low-cost revolution in Europe has been led by Ireland andthe UK and began from 1995 when the third EUliberalisation package began removing regulations overfares and route entry. In response to the new freedomairlines such as Buzz, easyJet, Go and Ryanairestablished themselves in the low fare sector. Airportmanagers facing increasing commercial pressures sawpotential in this growth area for increasing theirrevenues.

There have been numerous studies on the develop-ment of low-cost airlines but very little written on theimplications for airports. Here a case study approachseeks to address this gap. The extent to which airports

need and can benefit from low-cost airlines is explored,as is the issue of how far airports should go in order toaccommodate low-cost carriers.

2. Airport–airline interaction

Traditionally airports have viewed airlines as theirprimary customers partly because of the legally bindingagreements between the two parties and because airlinespay a variety of charges such as landing fees and chargesper passenger or tonne of freight handled. So far therehas been little vertical integration between the airportsand airlines. Airlines have legally binding agreementswith passengers and see passengers as their primarycustomers. In today’s commercialised and privatisedenvironment, where airports place more emphasis onnon-aeronautical revenues from retail and concessions,the traditional airline–airport-passenger relationship hasbecome more complicated.

Airports are increasingly seeing the importance ofviewing passengers as customers because they generatenon-aeronautical revenue, but depend on the airlines tobring in the passengers and so really are trying to satisfyboth (Francis and Humphreys, 2001; Graham, 2001).This dual role can lead to conflicts of interests such as

*Corresponding author. Tel.: +44-1509-223422; fax: +44-1509-

223981.

E-mail address: i.m.humphreys@lboro.ac.uk (I. Humphreys).

0969-6997/03/$ - see front matter r 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/S0969-6997(03)00004-8

aircraft being delayed on departure through thepassengers spending more time within the airport shopsand not hearing gate announcements because of a lackof loud speakers in shops, something that certainretailers have deemed disruptive to the ideal retailenvironment (Humphreys et al., 2002).

The geographical distribution of passengers betweenairports is unevenly distributed over the 1192 airportswith international scheduled services—the world’s top25 airports handled 32% of traffic (International CivilAviation Organisation, 1999). Airlines’ choices of air-ports have resulted in a few well developed dominantfacilities serving traditional scheduled services andsmaller neighbouring facilities, often struggling to reachcritical mass in terms of passenger throughput.

Airports have relatively large fixed infrastructurecosts but low marginal costs of processing extrapassengers. This is consistent with significant economiesof scale, with costs falling rapidly per passenger handledto around a million passengers, and continuing to fall upto around three million passengers per annum, afterwhich they level out (Graham, 2001). Economists havelong recognised the difficulties of cost recovery in thesecircumstances.

3. The impact of the low-cost model and the

airport–airline relationship

The low-cost airline model can take a number of sub-forms. Cost savings can be achieved in a variety of waysincluding, increased aircraft and crew utilisation, use ofa single aircraft type, single cabin layout, direct internetselling, use of un-congested secondary airports, no freein-flight food or drink, reengineered business processesand changing the basis of the airport–airline relationship(Williams, 2001). The impact on airports of the low-costairlines’ aggressive cost management is the main focushere.

Southwest Airlines is attributed with pioneering thesuccessful low-cost model (Calder, 2002). The airlinecaused passenger numbers to rise and fares to fall onroutes where it introduces new services—the ‘Southwesteffect’ (Vowles, 2001; Windle and Dressner, 1995).European low-cost carriers have tried to adopt theSouthwest model, although as Guild (1995) indicates,there are difficulties associated with trying to implement itin Europe because of less flexible labour markets and highair traffic control, landing and ground handling fees.1

Many start up deals have seen low-cost carriersnegotiating reduced landing fees and handling charges

from airports, but how sustainable these are in the longterm is unclear. Little work has been done other than tosuggest that for low-cost airlines airport charges makeup around 12% of their costs compared to about 6%for conventional airlines (Doganis, 2001). The overallsignificance of airport fees to the low-cost operation of aroute has been questioned by Doganis (2002) who notesthat some low-cost carriers operate services from larger,more expensive airports. It has been suggested that somelow-cost operators have sought to rewrite airport–airlineeconomic relations with airports paying airlines tooperate, instead of the conventional model whereby anairline pays to use an airport. Indeed, the agreementbetween Ryanair and Charleroi Airport, Belgium isunder investigation by the European Commission on thegrounds that the commercial assistance given to Ryanairby the airport could constitute an illegal state subsidy(Pilling, 2003).

Graham (2001) recognises the pressure on secondaryand smaller airports, ‘y relationships between low-costcarriers and airports are getting tougher and tougher,especially at secondary and smaller airports, whereaeronautical related revenues represent typically morethan 64% of the total revenues’. But as traffic growscommercial revenue from expansion of retail, cateringand car-parking facilities builds up forming an increas-ing share of total revenues. Airports have responded invarious ways to these opportunities presented by low-cost operations. Some actively encourage low-costtraffic, for example Frankfurt Hahn has abolishedlanding fees for all Boeing 737 weight aircraft, whereas airports such as Coventry have refused to accom-modate services unless the price is right (Dixon, 2002b).

Low-cost carriers offer the potential of commercialviability to some smaller airports because they fre-quently seek locations away from major, congestedhubs. Low-cost airlines have stimulated rapid growthat such airports, for example, Ryanair at Stansted,Prestwick, and Charleroi, easyJet at Liverpool andLuton, and Bmibaby at East Midlands. In 2000 Stanstedwas the world’s fastest growing major internationalairport with an annual passenger growth of 25.6%(Airports Council International, 2000). Liverpool Air-port was the UK’s fastest growing regional airport, andone of the fastest growing in Europe, with passengergrowth from 1.3 million passengers per annum in 1999to 2 million passengers per annum by 2001. In contrast,a number of airports such as Dublin, Luton andManchester have experienced a reduction in low-costservices as a result of initial low airport charges beingrevised after initial agreements have expired (Barrett,2000; Civil Aviation Authority, 2000, 2001).

Ryanair, operates to a distinct business modelspecifically to achieve a low-cost base. A large propor-tion of its flights are between secondary airports, andeven military bases, generally some distance away from

1Lawton (1999) argues that attempts have been made to overcome

these ‘competitive impediments through negotiating deals on fees with

airport authorities y particularly those seeking to increase their rate

of air traffic’.

G. Francis et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 9 (2003) 267–273268

the main city—Charleroi used to access Brussels is some45 km from the city centre.2 Other low-cost airlines usesecondary points but also serve a number of mainairports at one end of a route—easyJet serves Barcelona,Amsterdam and Gatwick. There are relatively fewairports or routes with more than one low-cost carrierin Europe. It could be that there are significant firstmover advantages, making it difficult for new low-costairlines to enter established markets.

Consolidation appears to have begun with easyJet’spurchase of Go and Deutsche BA, putting it ahead ofRyanair in size. As the low-cost players seek to expandthis is likely to have impacts on the airports competingfor their business. One low-cost carrier is quoted astalking to 40 or so airports which were seeking theirservices and therefore was in the position of being ableto play one off against another.3

4. Case studies of airport–airline interaction in two small

EU airports

In this section the impact of low-cost carriers on theairport–airline relationship at two EU airports with lessthan one million passengers per annum is examined.These airports are classified by the European Commis-sion as local airports—there are around 100 airports inthe EU falling in this category representing about half ofthe airports offering scheduled services (Graham, 1998).Most are losing money, publicly owned and subsidisedby central or regional Government (Scheers, 2001). Theairports were selected because both had introduced low-cost operations but, although in the same country, theyhave contrasting operating contexts. One is in theshadow of a major hub and owned by a larger airportgroup, whereas the other is primarily a locally ownedregional facility in a more isolated location.

The two cases offer insight into the various implica-tions for airports of dealing with low-cost airlines. Thefirst case has two aspects, the setting of charges for low-cost carriers and the importance of considering passen-gers as customers if non-aeronautical revenues are tocompensate for reduced aeronautical revenues. Thesecond focuses on issues surrounding the relationshipbetween an airport and a low-cost airline. Given thesensitivity of the information in these cases a necessaryprecursor to getting the participants co-operation was topreserve their anonymity. Therefore, airports and air-lines will not be named but referred to as Airport A

(the secondary airport) and as Airport B (the regionalairport).

Data was gathered via a series of semi-structuredinterviews with airport managers in February and May2001. Those interviewed included the business andcustomer manager at Airport A, the operations anddevelopment manager at airport B, and the personresponsible for airport finance and accounting at airportA. Further data was made available from a databaseused by airport A to monitor passenger expenditure andtype of goods purchased in airport owned retail outlets.All statistics quoted come from the airport authoritiesand from published government statistics.

4.1. Case 1: Airport A—a secondary airport in the

shadow of a major hub

Airport A is located only a few kilometres from amajor European city and in 2000 handled around800,000 passengers from a mixture of charter andscheduled services. It is owned by a large privatisedairport group. Several low-cost carriers previouslyoperated from the airport, with some ceasing operationsdue to bankruptcy or relocating to the nearby hub. Thelow-cost airline at the focus of this case startedoperating from Airport A in 1999, and in 2000 recordeda 77% load factor on its three daily flights to asecondary airport in a European capital and one to aregional European airport.

The airport’s 2000 pre tax-profit of h7.5 millionswas up 20% from the previous year. A 17% rise inpassengers, expansion of concessions, particularly retailoutlets, lower staff and operational costs, and anincrease in airport charges drove this. The airport istypical of many other small facilities in that it is heavilydependent on revenue from aeronautical related activity(72%) (Table 1). Of the revenue from aeronauticalsources, handling and apron services are the mostsignificant, and it is these that the airport has the powerto negotiate on.

According to the business manager the only way toattract a low-cost airline was to offer, ‘a very attractivedeal’. As airport charges are fixed by the governmentand designed to recoup long-run average costs ofterminal capacity provision, the only way to reduceairline operating costs was to reduce the charge perflight for handling services delivered by the airport tothe airline. In theory, the operating company is notsupposed to give discounts to airlines, even on handlingcharges. With the use of the so-called ‘marketing tools’,the handling cost per flight was reduced in relation tothe number of daily flights. The low-cost airline’shandling cost per flight, including check-in, passengerhandling, apron bus transportation, baggage handlingand load control was around h770, so the discount onhandling fees of one-third for the 4th daily flight

2As Lawton (1999) says Ryanair’s use of secondary airports leads to

both ‘lower charges and less congestion [which] means airline can

increase its punctuality rate and gate turn around times’.3According to Ryanair’s, O’Leary, ‘there is a queue of them

[airports] out there: there are possibilities in Germany, Austria, Italy,

France, Spain, Portugal, Scandinavia’ (Dixon, 2002a).

G. Francis et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 9 (2003) 267–273 269

amounted to a 14% reduction in the cost per flight(Table 2).

The deal that the low-cost airline achieved comparesfavourably with charter carriers which pay almost twicethe handling fee for flying similar aircraft and routes,but only four times per week. The charging structure isseen to be a win–win situation. The low-cost airlinereceives a handling cost discount for the volume offlights operated beyond 2 per day, but at the same timegenerates revenue for the airport that contributes to thelong-term costs of operation and development. This actsas an incentive from which the airport also benefitsthrough increased utilisation of facilities that bring inthe landing fee, passenger charge, retail revenue and areduced handling charge, but at relatively little extramarginal cost to the airport.4 The airport sees non-aeronautical sources of revenue as the key to its businesspartnership. In quantitative terms, the low-cost carriermakes a significant contribution to the airport’s trafficand in 2000 accounted for 64% of international move-ments, 38% of total movements and importantly, 62%of passengers, all of which have access to the dual taxshop (Shop 2 in Table 3).

Market research plays an important role for airportmanagement. It has proved useful in enabling manage-ment to understand the needs of different customers.Market segmentation of passengers, and analysis oftheir needs and preferences has, according to thoseinterviewed been central to the airport’s business plan.Data collection revealed that the low-cost airline’spassengers typically arrived at the airport between 1

and 2 hours before departure time. Airport managementrealised that in order to maximise retail and concessionrevenue they needed to process passengers swiftly andcreate more opportunities for passengers to spendmoney. In 2001 the terminal was extended in order tocreate new retailing areas (two restaurants, a bar, anewsagents and a gift shop), from which it receivesconcession fees and royalties. The inclusion of bar andrestaurant facilities was seen as a priority because of thedemand for these services from low-cost passengers whoreceive no in-flight meal.

Data for the shops run by the airport company andpassenger numbers eligible to shop in particular outletsare given in Table 3. There are other concessions too forwhich data is not presented, but which provideadditional revenue to the airport.

According to the business manager, the averageexpenditure for a low-cost airline’s passenger is approxi-mately h8, a figure that compares favourably with thatfor all the shops of h5.5, and the revenue generated inthe shop to which the passengers had access (Shop 2).The average expenditure per transaction by a low-costairline passenger was approximately h26 with a penetra-tion index (number of passengers engaging in atransaction) of approximately 30%. Although this dataapplied to just the shops owned by the airport company,the manager saw no reason why this pattern should notbe typical across the other airport concessions. Inparticular, the restaurants and bars were thought toreceive significantly more business from the low-costairline’s passengers than other passengers.

Airport management has also tried to understandcosts of future expansion so that it is aware of theimplications of long-term contracts with airlines. Toassess the revenues required from airlines, managementhas assessed the financial consequences of differentgrowth scenarios. One such scenario concluded thatexpansion to 3 million passengers per annum would costsome h4 million—data useful in negotiations withairlines.

Airport management and a potential new low-costairline abandoned negotiations for the start of a newservice in 2000/1. The airline wanted a discount on feesconsidered too large by management. The low-costairline also wanted the airport company to sign anagreement to give reduced charges for 25 years, aposition considered unacceptable because of the needfor the airport to consider long run costs.

4.2. Case 2: Airport B. The regional airport

Airport B is a regional airport, majority owned by acombination of the local and regional public authorities.Passenger numbers during 2000 were approximately800,000, split 75% scheduled and 25% charter traffic.The main scheduled airline is the country’s major flag

Table 1

Airport A’s revenues

Percentage

Aeronautical (traffic) revenues—2000

Landing, departure and parking fees 15

Passenger charges 18

Freight charges 2

Apron services and aircraft handling 65

Total aeronautical revenues 100

Non-aeronautical (commercial) revenues—2000

Direct sales (duty free shop/duty paid) 29

Royalties 14

Concessions (rentals) 37

Advertising 2

Other non-aeronautical 1

Car park (no. 524 places) 5

Recharges 12

Total non-aeronautical revenues 100

Source: Airport A.

4According to the business and customer development manager, the

relationship with the low-cost airline is good. ‘[The airline] is a good

client and the deal which has been agreed is a mutually beneficial one.’

G. Francis et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 9 (2003) 267–273270

carrier with 9 daily domestic flights, although during thesummer, there are several charter airlines bringingtourists from Europe and North America. The companyhas adopted a business plan with the aim of increasingdemand for tourist passengers. In 2000/1 the airportregistered a pre tax-loss of h1 million, the split betweenits aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues is shownin Table 4.

In summer 2000, Airport B entered into a 10 yearagreement with a low-cost airline for a minimum of onedaily international flight to a secondary airport near aEuropean capital. The operations manager indicatedthat the airport was asked to provide financial assistanceto the airline in the form of ‘marketing support’, as acondition of the carrier beginning operations. Commu-nications to management at Airport B from otherairport managers in the EU suggest that this approachto airport charges was wide-spread.

The low-cost airline and the airport agreed that thecarrier would receive free handling but had to payairport charges. The airport also paid for the airline’sadvertising costs inside and outside of the terminal, andthe cost of a bus to the local town. Further commercialsupport of h350,000 was given for the first 2 years andh300,000 for the following 8 years, for a link on theairline’s web site. The region’s tourist office funded theweb link for the first 2 years on the grounds thatthe locality would receive economic benefits from extratourists.

For around 6 months a daily flight was operated, yetdespite the success of the service (with average loadfactor above 80%), the airline decided to cease itsservice because the airport wanted to renegotiate a morefavourable agreement over handling charges. The newposition stemmed from a change in the commercialoutlook of the airport management, and a realisation

Table 2

Airport A’s charges for additional flights

Number of flights

per day

Return flights

per year (1)

Handling cost

per flight (h)

Aircraft charge for

a landing and

departure (h)

Charge per

passenger (h)

Average number

of passengers per

departure (2)

Total charge

per flight (h)

First flight 350 770 230 8 114 1912

Second flight 350 770 230 8 114 1912

Third flight 350 720 230 8 114 1862

Fourth flight 350 500 230 8 114 1642

Notes: (1) Flight=one arrival and one departure and (2) Number of passengers=148� load factor (Boeing 737=77%)=h1912.

Table 3

Airport A’s retail data for shops directly operated by the airport company

Duty free/duty paid shops Shop 1 domestic Shop 2 duty paid Shop 2 duty free extra EU Total

Passenger number 117,355 168,197 96,713 382,265

Transactions 13,491 50,036 24,181 87,708

Penetration index % 11.5 29.7 24.6 22.9

Revenues—gross (h) 184,892 1,148,084 709,612 2,042,588

Average gross revenue per transaction (h) 13.70 22.94 29.34 23.29

Average gross revenue per passenger (h) 1.57 6.82 7.34 5.34

Average margin per passenger (h) 0.63 2.73 8.32 4.30

Source: Airport A’s company information system.

Table 4

Airport B’s revenues

Percentage

Aeronautical (traffic) revenues—2000–2001

Landing, departure and parking fees 11

Passenger charges 27

Freight charges 0

Security charges 6

Apron services and aircraft handling 56

Total aeronautical revenues 100

Non-aeronautical (commercial) revenues—2000–2001

Royalties 15

Concessions (rentals) 26

Advertising 13

Catering 3

Car park 17

Ticket sales 6

Recharges 1

Other non-aeronautical 19

Total non-aeronautical revenues 100

Source: Airport B’s Company Report on Operations and Financial

Statements as of March 31, 2001.

G. Francis et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 9 (2003) 267–273 271

that tourists were not spending money in the localeconomy but were making onward surface journeys toan alternative tourist destination outside the region.

A fundamental problem for Airport B was, like manysmall airports, it survives largely on the contribution ofairport charges and handling activity. Commercialactivities represent only 21% of revenues. In fact, theairport was not in a position to fully benefit fromcommercial revenues because it only had 7 retail outlets,all of which were inaccessible to passengers who hadcleared security. Increased commercial revenue wouldrequire new terminal investment. Based on a dailyBoeing 737 operation the ‘low-cost’ flight, was set tocost the airport h520,000 a year (h620,000 for freehandling services plus h350,000 in ‘commercial support’less h450,000 in airport charges paid). To cover therevenue shortfall the airport would need to extract h6.50from each of the forecast 80,000 passengers, a marginimpossible to obtain given the current limited range ofland side shops.

In response to this situation, in late 2001 a commer-cial manager was appointed and provision for commer-cial activity was made a priority in plans to expand theterminal, financed by money from regional government.Management is more aware that it needs to understandthe airport–airline relationship in terms of costs andrevenues before negotiating with low-cost airlines.

5. Discussion

The case studies have illustrated that airport man-agers perceive that future development at their second-ary and regional airports can depend on the incentivesthey can offer low-cost airlines. If one airport doesnot agree to the preferred terms, then an airline hasthe option to move elsewhere. In the case of Airport A,the relationship between the airport company and theairline seems to be successful and mutually beneficial,illustrating it is possible for airport and airline to achievegoal congruence. In particular it seems at least partlybecause airport management understood the necessity toweigh the benefits from both aeronautical and non-aeronautical activities.

At the heart of Airport A’s relationship with the low-cost carrier was understanding the revenue streams fromthe airline and the needs, wants and revenue opportu-nities of the airline’s passengers from extensive marketresearch. A data base and systems to measure suchbehaviour as passenger spending patterns and arrivaltimes prior to departure, helps airport management tohave a picture of costs and revenues associated withdifferent flights. The case illustrated the relative benefitsof international passengers over domestic passengers interms of retail spending. In contrast, the second caseshowed that increases in passenger numbers alone are

not enough to guarantee profitability. If reducedaeronautical charges are to be offered then there is aneed to ensure adequate retail facilities are in place togenerate commercial revenue.

Experience at the case study airports raises questionsabout the sustainability of relationships with airlines.The success of many low-cost airlines can largely explainthe rapid growth in passenger volumes at airports wherethey operate. Yet many low-cost airlines in the US havefailed. Given the proliferation of new low-cost carriersappearing across Europe, airports need to assess whichcarriers are likely to sustain long-term operations and toensure the airline-airport agreement reflects the degreeof risk and the cost implications of the airline eithergoing bankrupt or withdrawing services. Whether it issustainable for airport operators to offer ‘marketingsupport’ to counterbalance airport charges and handlingfees incurred by the airline is still unclear. In the US,Southwest has built positive relationships with airportsthat has not involved pushing price reduction to thesame extent as in Europe. However, there is evidence ofSouthwest ‘shopping around’, and, for example, theirchoice not to operate at Denver International Airportbecause of it ‘having a cost structure that is notconducive for a low-cost producer’ (Solon, 1999).

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to all those managers whoassisted with this project.

References

Airports Council International, 2001. Airport Data: 2000. Airports

Council International Europe, Geneva.

Barrett, S.D., 2000. Airport competition in the deregulated European

aviation market. Journal of Air Transport Management 6 (1),

13–27.

Calder, S., 2002. No Frills: The Truth behind the Low-cost Revolution

in the Skies. Virgin Books, London.

Campbell, A., Kingsley-Jones, M., 2002. Rebel skies: is there any

stopping the low-cost carriers? Flight International 161 (4825),

29–37.

Civil Aviation Authority, 2000. UK Airports Annual Statement of

Movements, Passengers and Cargo 1999. CAA, Cheltenham.

Civil Aviation Authority, 2001. UK Airports Annual Statement of

Movements, Passengers and Cargo 2000. CAA, Cheltenham.

Dixon, T., 2002a. Easyjet announces go and Deutshe BA acquisition

plans. Airliner World 9 (7), 4.

Dixon, T., 2002b. Atlantic airlines. Airliner World 9 (8), 28–35.

Doganis, R., 2001. The Airline Business in the 21st Century.

Routledge, London.

Doganis, R., 2002. Consultancy advice on aviation issues for the

Department of Taoiseach. Department of Public Enterprise,

Dublin.

Francis, G., Humphreys, I., 2001. Airport regulation: reflecting

on lessons from BAA. Public Money and Management 21 (1),

49–52.

G. Francis et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 9 (2003) 267–273272

Graham, A., 2001. Managing Airports: An International Perspective.

Butterworths, Heinemann, Oxford.

Graham, B., 1998. Liberalization, regional economic development and

the geography of demand for air transport in the European union.

Journal of Transport Geography 7 (4), 285–289.

Guild, S., 1995. Not so easy. Airline Business 11 (6), 68–73.

Humphreys, I., Francis, G., Fry, J., 2002. Performance measurement

in airports. Public Works Management and Policy 6 (4), 265–276.

International Civil Aviation Organisation, 1999. The World of Civil

Aviation 1999–2002. International Civil Aviation Organisation,

Montreal.

Lawton, T.C., 1999. The limits of price leadership: needs-based

positioning strategy and the long-term competitiveness of Europe’s

low fare airlines. Long Range Planning 32 (6), 573–586.

Pilling, M., 2003. EC investigates Ryanair/Charleroi deal. Airline

Business 19 (1), 18.

Scheers, J., 2001. Attracting investors to European regional airports.

What are the prerequisites? International Airport Review 5 (4),

55–63.

Solon, D., 1999. Southwest Airlines a formula for profitability? The

Aumark Aviation Economist 16 (2), 11–14.

Vowles, T., 2001. The southwest effect in multi airport regions. Journal

of Air Transport Management 7 (4), 251–258.

Williams, G., 2001. Will Europe’s charter carriers be replaced by ‘no-

frills’ scheduled airlines? Journal of Air Transport Management 7

(5), 277–286.

Windle, R., Dresner, M., 1995. The short and long run effects of entry

on us domestic air routes. Transportation Journal 35 (2), 14–25.

G. Francis et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 9 (2003) 267–273 273