akg to maneka gandhi - a relook- pratham & rohit anant sahay

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  186 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS VOLUME 1 ISSUE 3 2014 EVOLUTION AND EXPOUNDING OF ARTICLE 21 **Pratham & Rohit Anant Sahay  A. K . G OPALAN  V.  STATE OF M  AD R AS  Article 21 lays down that no person shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. It was this procedure established by law that was first questioned and interpreted by the Supreme Court of India in the case of  A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras 1 . In the case of  A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras 2  the validity of the Preventive Detection Act. 1950 was challenged. The main question was whether Art. 21 envisaged any procedure laid down by a law enacted by the legislature, or the procedure should be fair and reasonable. On behalf of the Appellant, an attempt was made to persuade the Supreme Court to hold that the courts can adjudicate upon the reasonableness of the Preventive Detection Act, 1950, or for that matter any law depriving a person hi personal liberty. Three arguments were  presented from the Appellant side and the argum ents were: (1) The word law in Art. 21 does not mean merely enacted law but incorporates principle of natural justice so that a law to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty cannot  be valid unless it incorporates these principles laid down by i t. (2) The reasonableness of the law of preventive detention ought to be judged under Art. 19. (3) The expression  procedure established by law introduces into India the American concept of  procedural due process which enables the Courts to see whether the law fulfils the requisite elements of a reasonable procedure. Thus, in this case an attempt was made to win for a detenu better procedural safeguards than were available to him under the relevant detention law and Art. 22. But the attempt failed as the Supreme Court rejected all these arguments. 1   A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 2  Supra note 1

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AKG to Maneka Gandhi - A Relook- Pratham & Rohit Anant Sahay

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  • 186

    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

    VOLUME 1 ISSUE 3

    2014

    EVOLUTION AND EXPOUNDING OF ARTICLE 21

    **Pratham & Rohit Anant Sahay

    A.K. GOPALAN V.STATE OF MADRAS

    Article 21 lays down that no person shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty

    except according to the procedure established by law. It was this procedure established by

    law that was first questioned and interpreted by the Supreme Court of India in the case of

    A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras1.

    In the case of A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras2 the validity of the Preventive Detection

    Act. 1950 was challenged. The main question was whether Art. 21 envisaged any procedure

    laid down by a law enacted by the legislature, or the procedure should be fair and reasonable.

    On behalf of the Appellant, an attempt was made to persuade the Supreme Court to hold that

    the courts can adjudicate upon the reasonableness of the Preventive Detection Act, 1950, or

    for that matter any law depriving a person hi personal liberty. Three arguments were

    presented from the Appellant side and the arguments were:

    (1) The word law in Art. 21 does not mean merely enacted law but incorporates principle

    of natural justice so that a law to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty cannot

    be valid unless it incorporates these principles laid down by it.

    (2) The reasonableness of the law of preventive detention ought to be judged under Art.

    19.

    (3) The expression procedure established by law introduces into India the American

    concept of procedural due process which enables the Courts to see whether the law

    fulfils the requisite elements of a reasonable procedure.

    Thus, in this case an attempt was made to win for a detenu better procedural safeguards

    than were available to him under the relevant detention law and Art. 22. But the attempt

    failed as the Supreme Court rejected all these arguments.

    1 A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27

    2 Supra note 1

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    Impact of A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras

    NATURAL JUSTICE

    The majority in this case held that the word law in Art. 21 could not be read as

    meaning rules of natural justice. These rules were vague and indefinite and the Constitution

    could not be read as laying down a vague standard. Nowhere in the Constitution was the

    word law used in the sense of abstract law or natural justice. The word law was used in the

    sense of lex and not jus. The expression procedure established by law would therefore mean

    the procedure as laid down in an enacted law.

    Only Fazl Ali, J. dissented from this opinion and held that the principle of natural

    justice was part of the general law of the land and so it should be read accordingly in Art. 21.

    RELATION BETWEEN ARTICLES 21, 22 AND 19

    The petitioners attempted to establish a link between Article 21, 22 and 19. The

    majority rejected this attempt of the petitioners and pointed out that the word personal liberty

    in Art. 21 in itself had a comprehensive content and, ordinarily, if left alone, would include

    not only freedom various freedoms guaranteed under Art. 19. However, Art. 19 must be held

    to deal with few specific freedoms mentioned. Similarly, Art. 21 should be held as excluding

    freedom dealt with in Art. 19. Thus a law depriving personal liberty had to conform with

    Arts. 20 to 22 and not with Art. 19 and Art. 19 could be invoked only when a law directly

    attempted to control a right mentioned therein.

    This approach of the judiciary meant that Art. 21 and 19 are exclusive freedoms and

    one cannot overlap others ambit. On the other hand the minority held that Art. 19(d) did

    control Arts. 21 and 22, and, therefore, the reasonableness of the Act should be justifiable

    under Art. 19(5).

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    DUE PROCESS OF LAW

    The U.S. Constitution lays down inter alia that no person shall be deprived of his life,

    liberty or property, without due process of law.3

    It was contended in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras4 that the expression procedure

    established by law in Art. 21 was synonymous with the American concept procedural due

    process and, therefore, the reasonableness of any law affecting any persons life or personal

    liberty, should be justiciable in order to assess whether the person affected was given a right

    of fair hearing. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this contention stating that absence of

    words due process of law is itself evident to prove difference in view of constitution-makers

    with that of American view.

    However, Faiz Ali, J., disagreed with the majority view on this point as well. He

    interpreted the phrase procedure established by law in Art. 21 as implying procedural due

    process, meaning thereby that no person could be condemned unheard.

    Thus, the Supreme Court ruling meant to deprive a person of his life or his personal liberty:

    (1) there must be a law;

    (2) it should law down a procedure; and

    (3) the executive should follow this procedure while depriving a person of his life or

    personal liberty.

    This judgement was highly criticized and K. Subba Rao, former Chief Justice of India,

    said about this case that, The preponderance of view among the jurists is that it is wrongly

    decided. It has in effect destroyed one of the greatest of the fundamental rights, i.e., personal

    liberty.5

    Fazl Ali, J., in his minority opinion has taken a much more liberal view of Art. 21. It took

    nearly three decades for his view to be vindicated in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India.6

    3 V Amendment, The U.S. Constitution

    4 Supra note 1

    5 K. Subba Rao, Some Constitutional Problems, 115, (Bombay: University of Bombay, 1970)

    6 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597

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    Journey from Gopalan to Maneka: 1950 1977

    A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras7 held the field for almost three decades, i.e., 1950 to

    1977. This case settled two major in points in relation to Art. 21. One, Arts. 19, 21 and 22 are

    mutually exclusive and independent of each other. Two, a law affecting life or personal

    liberty of a person could not be declared unconstitutional merely because it lacked natural

    justice or due process. The legislature was free to lay down any procedure for this purpose.

    As interpreted in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras8, Art. 21 provided no protection or

    immunity against competent legislative action. Art. 21 gave a carte blanche to a legislature to

    enact a law or to provide for arrest of a person without much procedural safeguards. It gave

    final say to the legislature to determine what was going to be procedure to curtail the personal

    liberty of a person in a given situation and what procedural safeguards he would enjoy.

    EFFECT ON ARTICLES 19, 21 AND 22

    In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras9 , the Supreme Court delinked Art. 19 from Arts.

    21 and 22. This view led to anomalous decision at times. It was because of this view that the

    court refused to view the validity of detection of the Appellant under Preventive Detention

    Act, 1950 in the case of Ram Singh v. Delhi10

    . Though, in course of time this view softened

    and in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India11

    , also popularly known as Bank Nationalization case,

    the Supreme Court applied Art. 19(1)(f)12

    to a law enacted under Art. 31(2), to view the

    validity of the law. Before this case these two articles where considered mutually exclusive of

    each other. This case had such an impact on the view of the Supreme Court regarding the

    mutually exclusiveness of fundamental rights that in the case of Sambhu Nath Sarkar v. State

    of West Bengal13

    that the bench said that the majority view of Bank Nationalization14

    case

    impliedly held the majority view of A.K. Gopalan15

    case incorrect.

    7 Supra note 1

    8 Id.

    9 Ibid.

    10 Ram Singh v. Delhi, AIR 1951 SC 270

    11 R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564

    12 Omitted by the Constitution (Forty-forth Amendment) Act, 1978

    13 Sambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1973 SC 1425

    14 Supra note 11

    15 Supra note 1

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    In Bannett Coleman Co. v. Union of India16

    the Supreme Court declared that if a law

    affected freedom of speech, its reasonableness becomes assessable with reference to Art.

    19(2) even though it was not enacted directly to control the freedom of speech. Therefore, the

    view of the Supreme Court in Gopalan case17

    that only laws which directly fall within the

    ambit of Art. 19 will be questioned for reasonableness under restrictions laid down in Art. 19

    was no longer tenable.

    Finally, in the case of West Bengal v. Ashok Dey18

    Supreme Court linked Arts. 19, 21

    and 22. Other cases before Maneka Gandhi19

    case in which the Supreme Court linked Arts.

    19, 21 and 22 under different situations are Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal20

    , John

    Martin v. State of West Bengal21

    and P.L. Lakhanpal v. Union of India22

    .

    MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION OF INDIA: THE NEW APPROACH

    Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,23

    is a land mark case of the post emergency period.

    This case shows how liberal tendencies have influenced the Supreme Court in interpreting

    Fundamental Rights, particularly, Art. 21. This case showed that Art. 21 as interpreted in

    Gopalan24

    case could not play any role in providing any protection against any harsh law

    seeking to deprive a person of his life and personal liberty. In fact this case has acted as a

    catalytic agent for the transformation of the judicial view on Art.21.

    The court has reinterpreted Art.21 and practically overruled Gopalan case which can

    be regarded as highly creative judicial pronouncement on the part of Supreme Court. Since

    Maneka Gandhi case the Supreme Court has given Art. 21, broader and broader interpretation

    so as to imply many more fundamental rights. In course of time, Art.21 has proved to be very

    fruitful source of rights of the people.

    16

    Bannett Coleman Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106 17

    Supra note 1 18

    West Bengal v. Ashok Dey, AIR 1972 SC 1660 19

    Supra note 6 20

    Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 2154 21

    John Martin v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 775 22

    P.L. Lakhanpal v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1507 23

    Supra note 6 24 Supra note 1

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    In Maneka Gandhi case, order under S. 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act which authorizes

    the passport authority to impound passport if it deems it necessary to do so in the interest of

    the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of India, friendly relations of India with any

    foreign country, or in the interest of general public was challenged. Maneka Gandhis

    passport was impounded by the Central Government under Passport Act in the interest of

    general public. She filed a writ petition challenging the order on the ground of violation of

    her fundamental rights under Art.21. One of the major grounds of challenge was that the

    order impounding the passport was null and void as it had been made without affording her

    an opportunity of being heard in her defence. The leading opinion in Maneka Gandhi case

    was pronounced by Justice Bhagwati.

    The Court reiterated the proposition that Art. 14, 19, and 21 are not mutually

    exclusive. This means that a law prescribing a procedure for depriving a person of personal

    liberty has to meet the requirement of Art. 19. Also, the procedure established by law in Art.

    21 must answer the requirement of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India.

    The expression personal liberty in Art. 21 was given an expansive interpretation. The

    court emphasized that the expression personal liberty is of widest amplitude covering a

    variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man. The expression ought not

    to be read in a narrow and restricted sense so as to exclude those attributes of personal liberty

    which are specifically dealt with in Art. 19. The attempt of the Court should be to expand the

    reach and ambit of the fundamental rights rather than attenuate their meaning and content by

    the process of judicial construction, and hence right to travel abroad falls under Art. 21.

    The most significant aspect of the case is the reinterpretation of the expression

    procedure established by law used in Art. 21. Art. 21 would no longer mean that law could

    prescribe some semblance of procedure, however arbitrary or fanciful, to deprive a person of

    his personal liberty. It now means that a procedure must satisfy certain requisites in the sense

    of being just, fair and reasonable. The process cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable.

    Thus, the procedure in art.21 must be right and just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful and

    oppressive. The Court reached it decision by holding that Arts. 21, 19 and 14 are mutually

    inclusive.

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    IMPACT OF MANEKA GANDHI

    The reincarnation of Art.21 which Maneka Gandhi25

    case brought has been exerting a

    deep impact on contemporary constitutional jurisprudence. Maneka Gandhi case completely

    overrides the Gopalans view which had held the field for nearly three decades. Since

    Maneka Gandhi case, the Supreme Court has again underlined the theme that Arts. 14, 19 and

    21 are not mutually exclusive, but they sustain, strengthen and nourish each other.26

    It has

    brought the Fundamental right of life and personal liberty into prominence which is now

    regarded as the heart Fundamental Rights.

    In quite a few cases in the post-Maneka era, the Supreme Court has given content to

    the concept of procedural fairness in relation to personal liberty. By establishing a nexus

    between Art. 14, 19 and 21, it is now clearly established that the procedure contemplated by

    the Art. 21 must answer the test of reasonableness. Thus, Art. 21 emerged as the Indian

    version of the American concept of due process of law and has come to the source of many

    substantive rights and procedural safeguards to the people.

    The Court has observed that Art.21, though couched in negative language, confers the

    Fundamental Rights to life and personal liberty and has also deeply influenced the

    administration of criminal justice and prison administration. In a number of cases the

    Supreme Court has expounded several propositions with a view to humanize the

    administration of criminal justice in all its aspect. Art.21 has also proved to be a very

    productive source of several fundamental rights over and above those mentioned in the

    Constitution in Arts. 14 to 31.

    PRESENT VIEW OF ARTICLE 21

    Art.21 assures every person right to life and personal liberty. The term life has been

    given a very expansive meaning. The term personal liberty has been given very wide

    amplitude covering a variety of rights which go to constitute personal liberty of citizens. Its

    deprivation shall be only being as per the procedure prescribed in the relevant law, but the

    procedure has to be fair just and reasonable.

    25

    Supra note 6 26 T.V. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1983 SC 361(2)

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    LIFE

    The expression life in Art.21 has been interpreted by Supreme Court rather liberally

    and broadly. Over time, the court has been giving an expansive interpretation to it.

    In Francis Coralie,27

    the Supreme Court has held that the expression life in Art.21

    does not connote merely physical or animal existence but embraces something more. It

    include right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, the bare necessity of

    live such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter over their head.

    The Supreme Court in Shantisar Builders v. Narayanan Khimalal Totame, 28

    held that

    right to life would include right to food, clothing, decent environment and reasonable

    accommodation to live in. Therefore, the concept of life has been expansively interpreted in

    recent years implying a host of Fundamental Rights there from.

    PERSONAL LIBERTY

    This expression is of widest amplitude and it includes various kinds of rights like

    Right to locomotion, Right to travel abroad, Rights of a prisoner to speedy trail,29

    Rights to

    defence before Advisory Board to take legal aid where the employer is represented by a

    lawyer.30

    In the light of decisions of the Supreme Court, the word life and personal liberty are

    liberally interpreted and now being invoked almost as a residuary right. On account of

    expanding interpretation, now the right to pollution free water air, right to food clothing,

    environment, protection of cultural heritage, right to every child to a full development, right

    of person to reside in hilly areas to have access to road31

    and right to education,32

    have all

    found their way into this Article.

    PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY LAW

    The court emphasized that a procedure must be right and just and fair and not

    arbitrary, fanciful and oppressive otherwise it will be no procedure at all and the requirement

    27

    Francis Coralie v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 746 28

    Shantisar Builders v. Narayanan Khimalal Totame, AIR 1990 SC 630 29

    Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, AIR 1979 SC 1360 30

    A.K. Roy v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 710 31

    State of Himachal Pradesh v. Umed Ram, AIR 1986 SC 847 32 MohiniJain v. State of Karnataka, AIR1992 SC 1858

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    of Art. 21 would not be satisfied. Accordingly the Court suggested certain modifications in

    the Special Court Bill 1978. The Court suggested that there should be provision for

    transferring case from one Special Court to another which is necessary to avoid trail of an

    accused by a judge who may be biased against him.

    The Court further emphasised that there is a duty of the State to preserve law and

    order. It is the duty of the state to see that the rule of law enunciated by the Art.21 is available

    to the greatest number. In Olga Tellis case,33

    the Supreme Court has again emphasised that

    the procedure prescribed by the law for the deprivation of rights conferred by Art.21 must be

    fair, just and reasonable. It must conform to the norms of justice and fair play. Procedure

    which is unfair or unjust or attracts the vice of unreasonableness, there by vitiating the law

    which prescribe that procedure and consequently, the action taken under it.

    CRIMINAL JUSTICE AFTER MANEKA GANDHI

    Maneka Gandhi34

    case is having a profound but beneficial impact on the

    administration of criminal justice in India. Administration of Criminal Justice is a State

    matter. Fortunately by reinterpreting Art. 21 in Maneka Gandhi case and by giving up the

    sterile approach of Gopalans35 case, the Supreme Court has found a potent tool to seek

    improve matters, and to fill the vacuum arising from governmental inaction and apathy to

    undertake reform, in the area of criminal justice.

    The key to this judicial activism is the phrase procedure established by law in Art.21

    which does not mean any procedure laid down in the statute but just, fair and reasonable

    procedure and that the term law in Art.21 envisages not any law but a law which is right, just,

    fair, and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive.

    33

    Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp., AIR 1986 SC 180 34

    Supra note 6 35 Supra note 1

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    FAIR TRAIL

    Conducting a fair trial for those who are accused of criminal offences is cornerstone

    of democracy. It is beneficial for both to the accused and as well as to the society. A

    conviction resulting from an unfair trail is contrary to our concept of Justice.36

    EXPANDING HORIZON OF ARTICLE 21 POST-MANEKA GANDHI JUDGEMENT

    A very interesting development in the Indian Constitution jurisprudence is the

    extended dimension given to Art. 21 by the Supreme Court in the post-Maneka era.

    The Supreme Court has asserted that in order to treat a right as a Fundamental Right,

    it is not necessary that it should be expressly stated in the Constitution as a Fundamental

    Right. Political, social and economic changes in the country entail the recognition of new

    rights. The law in its eternal youth grows to meet the demand of the society.37

    Since Maneka Gandhi38

    case, Art. 21 has proved to be multi-dimensional. The aspect

    of Art. 21 is brought out by the following judicial pronouncements. This extension in the

    dimensions of Art. 21 has been made possible by giving an extended meaning to the word life

    and liberty in Art. 21. These two words in Art. 21 are not to be read narrowly. These are

    organic terms which are be construed meaningfully.

    The right to life enshrined in Art. 21 has been liberally interpreted so as to mean

    something more than survival and mere animal existence or animal existence. It therefore

    includes all those aspects of life which go to make a mans life meaningful, complete and

    worth living. Art. 21 is to be read not only with directive principles but also fundamental

    duties.

    QUALITY OF LIFE

    A grand step was taken by the Supreme Court in expanding the scope of Art. 21, when it

    argued that life in Art. 21 does not mean merely animal existence but living with human

    dignity.39

    The Supreme Court has thus given very extensive parameters to Art. 21. In

    36

    State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, AIR 1999 SC 2378 37

    Professor M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, p. 1225 (Ruma Pal, J. & S. Pal, eds., ed. 6, Gurgaon: LexisNexis, 2012) 38

    Supra note 6 39 Supra note 27

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    Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India40

    the Supreme Court expanded the horizon of Art.

    21 and held that right to life includes right to live with human dignity, free from exploitation

    and to have equal opportunity. The judicial approach with time thus has led to two very

    important results, viz:

    (1) Many Directive Principles which, as such, are not enforceable have been activated

    and has become enforceable.

    (2) The Supreme Court has implied a number of fundamental rights from Art. 21.

    In course of time, Art. 21 has come to be regarded as the heart of Fundamental Right.41

    Art. 21 has enough of positive content in it and it is not merely negative in its reach.42

    Over

    time, since Maneka Gandhi43

    , the Supreme Court has been able to imply several Fundamental

    Rights out of Art. 21. This has been possible by reading Art. 21 along with some Directive

    Principles. Art. 21 has thus emerged into a multi-dimensional Fundamental Right.

    RIGHT TO LIVELIHOOD

    In the beginning the Supreme Court was of the view that the right to life in rt. 21

    would not include livelihood. In re Sant Ram44

    , a case in pre-Maneka era, the Supreme Court

    ruled that right to livelihood would not fall within the expression life in Art. 21.

    The Supreme Court reiterated this this proposition in several cases even in post-

    Maneka era. The cases in which re Sant Ram45

    case was reiterated in post-Maneka era are

    A.V. Nachane v. Union of India46

    and Begulla Bapi Raju v. State of Andhra Pradesh47

    .

    But then the view of the Supreme Court underwent a change. With the defining of the

    word life in Art. 21 in a broad and expansive manner, the Court came to hold that the right o

    life guaranteed by Art. 21 includes the right to livelihood.48

    The Supreme Court has argued in

    40

    Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802 41

    Unni Krishna v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1993 SC 2178 42

    P. Rathinam v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC SC 1844 43

    Supra note 6 44

    Re Sant Ram, AIR 1960 SC 932 45

    Id. 46

    A.V. Nachane v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1126 47

    Begulla Bapi Raju v. Stae of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1073 48 Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar R. Nandkarni, AIR 1983 SC 109

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    the Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp.49

    that the right to livelihood is born out of the

    right to life, as no person can live without the means of living, i.e., the means of livelihood.

    SLUM DWELLERS

    In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp.50

    , the Supreme Court has made a

    significant pronouncement on the impact of Art. 21 on urbanization. In this case the Supreme

    Court accepted the plea that the right to life guaranteed by Art. 21 includes the right to

    livelihood. The Supreme Court ruled that the eviction of persons from pavement or a slum

    not only results in deprivation of shelter but would also inevitably lead to deprivation of their

    means of livelihood which means deprivation of their life.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that the Constitution does not put an absolute

    embargo on the deprivation of life or personal liberty but such a deprivation must be

    according to the procedure, in the given circumstances, just, fair and reasonable.

    RIGHT TO SHELTER

    In Shantisar Builders v. Narayan Khimlal Totame51

    the Supreme Court has ruled that

    the right to life is guaranteed in any civilized society. That would take within its scope the

    right to food, the right to clothing, the right to decent environment and a reasonable

    accommodation to live in. The difference between the need of an animal and a human being

    for shelter has to be kept in view. For an animal, it is the bare protection of the body; for a

    human being it has to be a suitable accommodation which would allow his to grow in all

    aspect physical, mental and intellectual.

    This concept was further expounded in the case of Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar

    Pradesh52

    . In the case of U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad53

    case the Supreme Court stated

    that the right to shelter is a Fundamental Right, which springs from the right to residence

    assured in Art. 19(1)(e) and right to life under Art. 21 of the Constitution.

    49

    Supra note 32 50

    Id. 51

    Supra note 28 52

    Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 1051 53 U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Friends Co-op. Housing Society Ltd., AIR 1996 SC 114

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    RIGHT TO ENVIRONMENT

    Apart from several personal rights, the Supreme Court has made a signal contribution

    to the welfare of the people by using Art.21 for the improvement of the environment. In

    Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar,54

    the Apex Court held that enjoyment of pollution free

    environment is included in the right to life under Art.21. Also in the case of A.P. Pollution

    Control Board v. M.V.Nayudu,55

    the Supreme Court has made very valuable suggestions for

    the improvement of adjudicatory machinery under the various environmental laws.

    The Supreme Court has accepted the doctrine of public trust which rests on the

    premise that certain natural resources like air, sea, water are means for general use and cannot

    be restricted to private ownership. The state is a trustee, and general public is a beneficiary to

    such resources. These resources are gift of nature and State as a trustee is duty bound to

    protect them.56

    RIGHT AGAINST NOISE POLLUTION

    The Supreme Court has recognized that the noise constitute a real and present danger

    to peoples health and laid down certain tests for permissible limits. The Court ruled that no

    one shall sound any instrument or use any amplifier in night between 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. except

    in public emergencies. The peripheral noise level of privately owned sound system should not

    exceed by more than 5dB (A) the ambient air quality standard specified for the area in which

    they are used. No horn should be allowed to be used at night in residential areas except in

    exceptional circumstances. The state shall make provision for seizure and confiscation of

    loudspeakers, amplifiers, and other such equipments as are found to be creating noise beyond

    the permissible limits. The Supreme Court also stated that these words would remain in force

    until modified by Supreme Court itself or superseded by appropriate legislation.57

    The Supreme Court observed that noise pollution often takes shelter behind Art.

    19(1)(a) pleading freedom of speech and expression. The Court held that nobody can claim

    Fundamental Right to create noise by amplification of sound of his speech by using

    54

    Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 420 55

    A.P.Pollution Control Board v. M.V.Nayudu,AIR 1999 SC 812 56

    M.C.Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 SCC 388 57 Noise Plooution (V) In Re, AIR 2005 SC 316

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    loudspeakers. By amplifying ones speech with aid of artificial devices, a person cannot

    expose an unwilling listeners free life guaranteed under Art.21. Art.19(1)(a) cannot be

    pressed into service for defeating the Fundamental Right guaranteed under Art.21.58

    RIGHT TO MEDICAL CARE

    In Parmananda Katara v. Union of India59

    the Supreme Court pronounced that

    preservation of life is of paramount importance. Once life is lost, status quo ante cannot be

    restored. It is the duty of the doctors to preserve the life without any discrimination.

    In Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samiti v. State of West Bengal60

    the Supreme Court

    ruled that the Constitution envisages establishment of a welfare state, and in a welfare state,

    the primary duty of the government is to provide to provide adequate medical facilities for

    the people. The Supreme Court has insisted that government hospitals and the medical

    officers employed therein are duty bound to extend medical assistance for preserving human

    life. Failure, by a government hospital to provide timely medical treatment to a needy person

    violates his right to life guaranteed by Art. 21.

    RIGHT AGAINST SEXUAL HARASSMENT

    The Supreme Court ensured that the female workers are not sexually harassed by their

    male co-workers at their work places. In Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan61

    the Supreme Court

    has declared sexual harassment of a working woman at her place of work as amounting to

    violation of rights of gender equality and right to life and liberty which is a clear violation of

    Arts. 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.

    Rape has been held to be a violation of a persons fundamental rights guaranteed

    under Art. 21. The Supreme Court held that rape is a crime against basic human rights and is

    also violative of the victims right to life contained in Art. 21.62

    58

    Forum, Prevention of Envn. & Sound Pollution v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3136 59

    Parmananda Katara v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 2039 60

    Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samiti v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1996 SC 2426 61

    Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011 62 Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das, AIR 2000 SC 988

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    RIGHT TO REPUTATION

    The Supreme Court held that right to reputation is a facet of the right to life of a

    citizen under Art. 21.63

    It has been reiterated that since right to reputation is a persons

    valuable asset and is a facet of his right under Art. 21 that the court has inherit power to grant

    interim bail pending the disposal of the regular bail.64

    RIGHT TO DIE

    Life is not mere living but living in health. Health is not the absence of illness but a

    glowing vitality.65

    Every human is being born into this world has a "right to life," it logically

    follows that every human being has a right to end their life or a "right to die". Because death

    is a part of life, a person's right to life logically assumes a right to not have that life. Thus,

    any law upholding a person's right to life has inherent within that same law a person's right to

    die, otherwise it would not be a right to life in the true sense of the term.

    The Court has demonstrated, while interpreting Article 21 of the Constitution, that

    every person is entitled to a quality of life consistent with his human personality. The right to

    live with human dignity is the fundamental right of every Indian citizen.66

    The right to life

    including the right to live with human dignity would mean the existence of such a right up to

    the end of natural life. This also includes the right to a dignified life up to the point of death

    including a dignified procedure of death. In other words, this may include the right of a dying

    man to also die with dignity when his life is ebbing out.

    RIGHT TO PRIVACY

    The Constitution does not grant in specific and express terms any right to privacy as

    such, right to privacy is not enumerated as a fundamental right in the Constitution. However,

    such right has been culled by the Supreme Court from Art. 21 and several other provisions of

    the Constitution read with the Directive Principles of State Policy.67

    In Govind v. State of

    Madhya Pradesh68

    the Supreme Court accepted a limited fundamental right to privacy as an

    63

    State of Bihar v. Lal Krishna Advani, AIR 2003 SC 3357 64

    Sukhwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 7 SCC 559 65

    P.Rathinam v. Union of India, 1994 AIR 1844 66

    Vikram Deo Singh Tomar v. State of Bihar, [1988] 1 SCC 734 67

    Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1295 68 Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1378

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    emanation from Arts. 19(a), 19(d) and 21. In R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu69

    for the

    first time the Supreme Court stated that the right to privacy has acquired a constitutional

    status with time. Finally, in the case of PUCL v. Union of India70

    the Supreme Court

    accepted that right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined under Art. 21 of the

    Constitution and it can be curtailed only under just, fair and reasonable condition.

    Also, in another case of PUCL v. Union of India71

    the Supreme Court held that

    tapping of a persons telephone without any reasonable cause is infringement of a persons

    right to privacy under right to life and liberty under Art. 21.

    RIGHT OF MEDICAL CONFIDENTIALITY

    IN X. v. Hospital Z72

    the Supreme Court argued that a lady proposing to marry a

    person is entitled to all the human rights which are available to humans. The right to life

    guaranteed under Art. 21 would positively include the right to be told that a person, with

    whom she was proposed to be married, was the victim of a deadly disease, which was

    sexually communicable. Moreover, when two fundamental rights clash, viz., right to privacy

    and right to live a healthy life, the right which would advance the public morality or public

    interests, would alone be enforced through the process.

    RIGHT OF LEGAL AID

    In Madhav Hayawandanrao Haskot v. State of Maharashtra73

    the Supreme Court

    held that an accused who cannot afford legal action is entitled for legal aid at the cost of the

    State. Also, held in the case of Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar74

    the Supreme Court

    held that a prisoner shall not be imprisoned for a period longer than the sentence pronounced

    by the court else it will led to deprivation of the prisoners right to life to life and liberty

    under Art. 21.

    69

    R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1995 SC 264 70

    PUCL v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 207 71

    PUCL v. Union of Inida, AIR 1997 SC 568 72

    X. v. Hospital Z, AIR 1999 SC 495 73

    Madhav Hayawandanrao Haskot v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 1548 74 Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1369

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    RIGHT AGAINST CUSTODIAL VIOLENCE

    In the case of Anil Yadav v. State of Bihar75

    , popularly known as Bhagalpur Blinding

    case, the Supreme Court held that the prisoners also have right to life with human dignity and

    no violence can be inflicted on them else it will be infringement of their rights under Art. 21

    of the Constitution.

    Also, the Supreme Court pronounced that monetary or pecuniary compensation is an

    appropriate and indeed an effective and sometime perhaps the only suitable remedy for

    redressal of the established infringement of the fundamental right to life of a citizen by the

    public servants and the State is victoriously liable for their acts.76

    Also, in D.K. Basu v. State

    of West Bengal77

    the Supreme Court laid down detailed guidelines to be followed by the

    central and the state investigating and securities agencies an all cases of arrest and detention.

    RIGHT TO APPEAL

    It was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Dilip S. Dahanukar v. Kotak

    Mahindra Co. Ltd.78

    that Right to prefer an appeal being a constitutional right in terms of

    Article 21 of the Constitution of India, no condition could have been imposed in respect

    therefore or for suspension of sentence.

    RIGHT AGAINST PUBLIC HANGING

    In Attorney General of India v. Lachman Devi79

    , it has been held that the execution of

    death sentence by public hanging is barbaric and violative of Article 21. It may be true that

    the crime of which the accused have been found to be guilty is barbaric, but a barbaric crime

    does not have to be visited with a barbaric penalty such as public hanging.

    75

    Anil Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1982) 2 SCC 195 76

    D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416 77

    Id. 78

    Dilip S. Dahanukar v. Kotak Mahindra Co. Ltd., 2006 CriLJ 3653 79 Attorney General of India v. Lachma Devi, (1989) SCC (CRI) 413

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    CONCLUSION

    Article 21 of the Constitution says, No person shall be deprived of his life or

    personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.

    Maneka Gandhis case is not only a landmark case for the interpretation of Article 21

    but it also gave an entirely new viewpoint to look at the Chapter III of the Constitution. Prior

    to Maneka Gandhis decision, Article 21 guaranteed the right to life and personal liberty only

    against the arbitrary action of the executive and not from the legislative action. Broadly

    speaking, what this case did was extend this protection against legislative action too.

    In Maneka Gandhis case, the meaning and content of the words personal liberty

    again came up for the consideration of the Supreme Court. In this case the Supreme Court not

    only overruled A.K. Gopalans case but also widened the scope of words personal liberty

    considerably. Bhagwati, J. observed:

    The expression personal liberty in Article 21 is of widest amplitude and it covers a

    variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man and some of them have

    raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights and given additional protection under

    Article 19.

    With respect to the relationship between Art. 19 and Art. 21, the Court held that Art. 21 is

    controlled by Art. 19, i.e., it must satisfy the requirement of Art. 19. The Court observed:

    The law must therefore now be settled that Article 21 does not exclude Article 19 and

    that even if there is a law prescribing a procedure for depriving a person of personal liberty,

    and there is consequently no infringement of the fundamental right conferred by Article 21

    such a law in so far as it abridges or takes away any fundamental right under Article 19

    would have to meet the challenges of that Article.

    Thus a law depriving a person of personal liberty has not only to stand the test of

    Article 21 but it must stand the test of Art. 19 and Art. 14 of the Constitution.

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    Thus with the above brief preview of article 21 it is clear that it has a

    multidimensional interpretation. Any arbitrary, whimsical and fanciful act of the part of any

    state depriving the life or personal liberty would be against article 21 of the Indian

    constitution.

    Hence to conclude, it may be said that Maneka Gandhis case, gave the term personal

    liberty widest possible interpretation and gave effect to the intention of the drafters of the

    Constitution. This case, while adding a whole new dimension to the concept of personal

    liberty, extended the protection of Art. 14 to the personal liberty of every person and

    additional protection of Art. 19 to the personal liberty of every citizen.