Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2014 Part 19-78-Caliphate-Manuals By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence.

In The "War of the Cross, we need a Strategy, our enemy has one." Al-Qaeda’s 20-Year Plan: From 9/11 to Final Victory1

Cees: Al-Qaeda declared war on the United States and its allies two times before the attacks on September 11, 2001. Those two declarations came in the form of fatwas, a type of Islamic religious decree. In August of 1996, Osama bin Laden issued his first fatwa, a 30-page polemic entitled "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," against the United States and Israel, and it was published in a London newspaper called Al Quds al Arabi. The second fatwa was published on February 23, 1998, in Al Quds al Arabi. Unlike the first fatwa, which was issued by Osama bin Laden alone, this fatwa was signed by Osama bin Laden; Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of Jihad group in Egypt and al Qaeda second-in-command; Abu-Yasir Rafa'l Ahmad Taha, leader of the Islamic Group; Sheikh Mir Hamzah, secretary of the Jumiat-ut-Ulema-e-Pakistan; and Fazlul Rahman, leader of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh. The fatwa reasons that "three facts that are known to everyone" compel war against the United States. First, the United States has been "occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places." Second, the "crusader-Zionist alliance" has inflicted great devastation upon the Iraqi people. Third, the United States' goal is "to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there." It concludes with instructions to Muslims everywhere:The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.... [E]very Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.

Remember Winston Churchill: “the longer you can look back, the further you can look forward”.

Cees additional to: text in the box above, Regarding Islamic State strategy POTUS, mentions in his May 27 2014 speech; to "degrade and ultimately destroy," IS. In his speech, regarding the situation in Afghanistan the president clearly articulated two missions for those troops: “training Afghan forces and supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of Al Qaeda.” He further stated three

1 http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/18437

Although American and European intelligence communities are aware of the jihadi texts, the work of these ideologues often reads like a playbook that U.S. policymakers have been slavishly, if inadvertently, following. “The data don’t get to the top, because the decision-makers are not looking for that kind of information,” a policy analyst who works closely with the American intelligence community told me. “They think they know better.” As the writings of Abu Musab al-Suri, Abu Bakr Naji, Fouad Hussein, and others make clear, the tradition of Salafi jihad existed before bin Laden and Al Qaeda and will likely survive them; yet, from the beginning of the war on terror, the strategy of the Administration has been to decapitate Al Qaeda’s leadership. Bruce Hoffman, who is the author of “Inside Terrorism” and a professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, 2006

goals for the continued U.S. presence there: “disrupting threats posed by Al Qaeda; supporting Afghan security forces; and giving the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand on their own.” The first of these goals is the most critical to U.S. national security, and therefore worth examining more closely. In early 2009, the White House released a White Paper on Afghanistan and Pakistan, which stated that the core goal of the U.S. in these countries was to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan” (later in the same document the word “destroy” was used in place of “defeat”). In a speech specifically focused on terrorism that he delivered just over a year ago, the president stated: Today, the core of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the path to defeat. Their remaining operatives spend more time thinking about their own safety than plotting against us. They did not direct the attacks in Benghazi or Boston. They’ve not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11. The president went further with this theme in his recent speech at West Point, saying “today’s principal threat no longer comes from a centralized Al Qaeda leadership. Instead, it comes from decentralized Al Qaeda affiliates and extremists, many with agendas focused in countries where they operate.” On Sep 28, 2014: Deputy National Security Adviser Tony Blinken said that President Obama's preference for building an international coalition to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, or ISIL) allows the U.S. to avoid "the al Qaeda trap of putting tens of thousands of Americans on the ground to be bogged down and bled." "We've been very clear that there will not be U.S. ground invasion of Iraq or Syria. This has to be local forces stepping up and fighting for their own country," Blinken said in an interview on CBS' "Face the Nation" Sunday. "We're not going to repeat what we did before, hundreds of thousands of Americans on the ground in the Middle East, getting bogged down. That's exactly what al Qaeda wants. That's what we're not going to do."

The Strategy and Objectives of al-Qaida; February 09, 2007 Understanding the objectives does not require the sources an intelligence officer, speaking Arabic, or even knowing where Iraq is on a map. Al-Qaida the other Islamic terrorist organizations almost daily states their objectives through both formal and informal leaders. The strategy of al-Qaida is only slightly more difficult to understand. Again, you do not have to be an intelligence officer, but it does help if you study the mindset of Islamic terrorists. This is what I have done for years. With and without their consent. Al-Qaida is not organized legally as a corporation, but like most multinational enterprises, it has objectives and a strategy to realize them. AQ’s primary objectives are:

• Spread Islam throughout the world (with or without the consent of the occupants). • Destroy Israel and any country it regards as affiliated with her – specifically the United States,

Canada, Britain, Australia, and even France.Al-Qaida has four basic strategies in order to reach their ultimate goal of destroying Israel and America. They are:

• Overwhelm the enemy • Strangle the enemy financially • Have the enemy fight amongst themselves • Stretch the enemy thin

The Fifth Phase of the AQ 2020 plan: This will be the point at which an Islamic state, or caliphate, can be declared. The plan is that by this time, between 2013 and 2016, Western influence in the Islamic world will be so reduced and Israel weakened so much, that resistance will not be feared. Al-Qaida hopes that by then the Islamic state will be able to bring about a new world order.

Researcher Yusuf al-Dini states2 that, in addition to Baghdadi’s intention of proving that he not wounded in the attack, the ISIS leader also used his speech to present his new strategy, which will characterize ISIS from now on. Baghdadi is attempting to build bases all over the Middle East, then the entire world, with his main objectives being Arab regimes and countries – first of all, Saudi Arabia. It seems the effort to capture more territory in Iraq and Syria, which has been blocked for now, will be accompanied by terror attacks in other Arab countries, with the aim of recruiting more and more supporters, who will establish movements

2 http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/.premium-1.629443

that will conquer territories within those countries. According to this analysis, the difference between the strategies of ISIS and Al-Qaida is that Western nations are not at the top of ISIS’ list – at least, not at this stage. Baghdadi is investing large efforts to bring dozens of radical organizations under his wing, including Islamic rebel militias operating in Syria, terrorist organizations in Sinai and North Africa, and Al-Qaida cells in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. In some cases, he has succeeded. Baghdadi addresses3 a section of the speech to jihadis in Saudi Arabia, referred to as the "land of al-Haramayn", meaning the two holy places. Baghdadi makes no mention of Europe or the United States, except insofar as they have forces in the Middle East. He is focused on establishing his Islamic State first in the Middle East. Baghdadi states that the true leader of the global Islamic community has returned, and his assumed title "Caliph of the Muslims" leaves no room for any other religious or political authority. Baghdadi calls on jihadis in Saudi Arabia to attack the Shia "first", followed by the regime, and finally Western forces. He describes jihad as the "best of deeds and the peak of Islam". Baghdadi litters the speech with references to "the Jews" (directing attacks on ISIS), the Crusaders and Rome. These all play into apocalyptic narratives of ISIS as the Muslim army of the end times.

The jihadi guide, named Muaskar Al-Battar -Camp of the Sword; When considering waging jihad, it's important to be well prepared. There's an appropriate diet, a proper way to clean a Kalashnikov, and correct methods for “Swedish exercises,” also known as Pilates. This may not seem like standard fare for a guerrilla manual, but it's actual content from a sort of jihadi manual created by an al Qaeda branch, the Mujahedeen in the Arabian Peninsula (al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula). The jihadi guide, named Muaskar Al-Battar (Camp of the Sword), has been a resource for young jihadi hopefuls for years, but it is now available online. The first 64-page volume made the rounds on extremist-affiliated social media accounts, following a call from the Islamic State group’s leader to “erupt volcanoes of jihad everywhere.” According to Islamic doctrine, jihad is the struggle against nonbelievers and the religious duty of all Muslims. However, “many young Muslims do not know how to carry weapons or how to use them,” so the Mujahedeen in the Arabian Peninsula took it upon themselves to spread their knowledge. And International Business Times obtained a copy of their document.

Safety procedures when dealing with a Kalashnikov, according to a jihad preparation guide released online Mujahedeen in the Arabian Peninsula The first part includes a detailed exercise and diet regimen, an in-depth explanation of “military science,” information about the “crusade,” and “security and intelligence. ”Following an introduction about the importance of jihad, the guide introduces

different types of assault weapons, with photos and descriptions of their parts, detailed instructions on what to call them, how to assemble and clean them, and a short history. A Kalashnikov, considered a “light weapon,” is “one of the best weapons mechanism in terms of strength and endurance, so I find it is used in more than 40 regular armies in the world, and most revolutionary and jihadist movements used this weapon due to its efficiency and durability,” according to the jihadi guide. Aside from a well-stocked arms arsenal, every good

3 http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/religion-geopolitics/commentaries/glance/briefing-note-nine-points-baghdadis-speech

jihadi needs to be physically fit. Sports are “one of the most important means of jihad,” the guide says, highlighting the other benefits of physical activity, including being a “cure for diabetes.” The best kinds of sports for jihadis are running, swimming and bicycle riding. One must exercise five times a week and try to keep Friday as a day of rest, the guide said. The other day of rest can be taken at one's leisure. After beginning the weekly fitness regimen, one must try to avoid “stimulants” such as coffee, tea and soft drinks, red meat and carbohydrates. The good jihadi must also drink a lot of water. The guide devotes an entire section to what AQAP writers referred to as “Swedish Exercises.” Judging by the description and a quick Google image search, the exercise bears a striking resemblance to the workout preferred by celebrities and stay-at-home moms the world over: Pilates. The author wisely notes that in Pilates “speed in the exercise is not important, but the correct application is important.” The Pilates motto is in keeping with AQAP’s advice to young recruits: It’s not important how fast you can start your jihadi journey, it’s important that you do it right.

In peace prepare for war, in war prepare for peace. The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence under no circumstances can it be neglected. Sun Tzu

Jihadi kidnap and murder handbook... and plan to infiltrate British Army and police • The 268-page manual is called The Management Of Savagery• Template for terrorism was written by influential jihadi Abu Bakr Naji• It has been carefully studied by the terrorist commanders in Syria and Iraq• Reveals IS's intention to target tourists at locations across Islamic world• Suggests method to kill hostages should maximise shock value in the West

11 October 2014 | We must make this battle very violent, such that death is a heartbeat away, so that the two groups will realise that entering this battle will frequently lead to death The Management Of Savagery; Islamic fanatics are planning to infiltrate Britain’s Army and police forces to carry out brutal attacks, a chilling manifesto for terror used by Islamic State (IS) reveals.The jihadi manual explains how the atrocities committed in the Middle East – including the

brutal murders of British hostages David Haines and Alan Henning – are part of a wider strategy that includes plans to wreak mayhem in the UK.The development comes after security sources revealed yesterday that thousands of terror suspects are being monitored in the UK. The Association of Chief Police Officers has also warned police officers about their personal safety in light of the threat from IS.Author of atrocities: Influential Abu Bakr Naji, right, wrote the guide that acts as a template for terrorismNeither the Metropolitan Police nor the Ministry of Defence were willing last night to discuss the security procedures in place.The 268-page terrorism guide called The Management Of Savagery reveals IS’s intention to:

• Target tourists at locations across the Islamic world• Exploit the propaganda value of targeting Western journalists, and to try to capture oil

workers

• Strike the same strategic targets repeatedly in a bid to expose weaknesses in Western security.

The handbook also revealed that infiltration operations have been going on for years – meaning that a sleeper cell may already have get inside the MoD or a police force.Written by influential jihadi Abu Bakr Naji, the guide has been carefully studied by the terrorist commanders in Syria and Iraq, who he tells: ‘Our battle is long and still in its beginning… However, its length provides an opportunity for infiltrating the adversaries. [We] should infiltrate the police forces, the armies, private security companies, sensitive civil institutions.’ Step-by-step jihad: Extracts from The Management Of Savagery, studied by commanders in Syria and Iraq He added that there were ‘exuberant youth in large numbers seeking jihad. Their desire for martyrdom indicates a proper condition of faith; all that is required is instructional polishing within the movement. It is possible to divert some of them to work in the security apparatus for infiltrating institutions.’The template for terrorism states that the method chosen to kill hostages should maximise shock value in the West. In a section titled Blazing Battle, Bakr Naji writes: ‘We must make this battle very violent, such that death is a heartbeat away, so that the two groups will realise that entering this battle will frequently lead to death. 'The increase in savagery is not the worst thing that can happen now. Rather, the most abominable of the levels of savagery is [still] less than stability under the order of unbelief. Our enemies will not be merciful to us if they seize us. Thus, it behoves us to make them think one thousand times before attacking us. ‘The policy of violence must also be followed such that if the demands are not met, the hostages should be liquidated in a terrifying manner, which will send fear into the hearts of the enemy and his supporters.’ Experts said last night that the Management Of Savagery, which was apparently first published in 2004, is a ‘relevant document’ and that the actions it expects jihadis to follow are realistic. ‘Everything in the book is possible,’ said Afzal Ashraf, an IS expert at the Royal United Services Institute in London. ‘But obviously they would find it more difficult to infiltrate the Army and police in Britain than they found in Iraq, where much of these institutions simply morphed into IS. ‘The Management Of Savagery is a book for IS’s thinkers but less so the doers. Islamic State has also miscalculated – it thought that extreme violence would deter the West. In fact IS’s enemies have been emboldened to take action.’ The Management Of Savagery claims that the overwhelming military superiority of the United States and the UK has no value without the cohesion of each society and the support for action in the region. As IS are convinced that this cohesion does not exist, they believe they can persuade Western powers to retreat if they show how they are prepared to use the most gruesome tactics. The book says: ‘If the number of Americans killed is one tenth of the number of Russians killed in Afghanistan [around 14,000 during its occupation in the 1980s], they will flee... They have reached a stage of effeminacy which made them unable to sustain battles for a long period of time and they compensate for this with a deceptive media halo.’ Bakr Naji asks also jihadis to target oilfields, sea and airports, tourist facilities and banking and financial services. He envisages ‘a very long war,’ advising commanders to

spread small numbers of their forces across a large area of the world. Bakr mocks the West’s use of air strikes given the mobility of IS and the likelihood that these attacks will inspire local uprisings. He identifies other Muslim countries that should be the next to be conquered by fundamentalists, including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Yemen, Turkey, Jordan, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco.

Shaikh Ayman al-Zawahiri's The Terrorists' Handbook Published on Monday, 21 July 2014

Let us look back to a document that was released by Shaikh Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's former right hand man and al-Qaeda's current leader, to educate his followers and those of other groups involved in the global Islamic jihad. In September 2013, As-Sahab Media, an al-Qaeda media outlet, publicly released Zawahiri's "General Guidelines for Jihad" in both Arabic and English. Generally, these sorts of communications within the Islamic community were released by way of secure communications but in this case, the concept of "keeping it within the family" was ignored. In this document, it appears that Zawahiri's guidelines suggest that he is not speaking of a grand vision of the goals of terrorism, rather, he is speaking directly to holy warriors who are attached to organizations marginally connected or completely disconnected from al-Qaeda as we can see in this paragraph: "We call upon the heads of all groups and organizations that work under Qaidatul Jihad Organization (Al Qaida) and all our supporters and sympathizers to spread these guidelines amongst their followers, whether in positions of responsibility or ordinary individuals; for this document contains no hidden secrets, rather it is a general policy

guideline. Its purpose is only to secure the interests established by the Shariah and avert harm in this stage of the Islamic Jihadi work by interpretive judgment (Ijtihad) that does not oppose the rulings of the Shariah and conforms to its principles." In Islam, this is known as "da'wa" or "da'wah" which means "to invite" or "to summon", in particular, calling others to Islam (or your particular brand of Islam). The document gives us a clear idea of where the global jihad will be waged: "As far as targeting the proxies of America is concerned, it differs from place to place. The basic principle is to avoid entering in any conflict with them, except in the countries where confronting them becomes inevitable. For example, in Afghanistan, the struggle against them is a part of the fight against Americans. In Pakistan, the struggle against them complements the fight for the liberation of Afghanistan from American occupation; then it aims at creating a safe haven for the Mujahideen in Pakistan, which can then be used as a launching pad for the struggle of establishing an Islamic system in Pakistan. In Iraq, the struggle against them aims to liberate the Sunni territories from the Safavid (Shiite) successors of America. In Algeria, where American presence is negligible and obscure, the struggle against the system aims to weaken it and spread Jihadi influence in the Islamic Maghreb, the West African coastal region and the countries of the southern Sahara. Recently, the prospects of a clash with America and its allies are also becoming evident in this region. In the Arabian Peninsula, the struggle against them is because of their being proxies of America. In Somalia, the struggle against them is because of their being the spearhead of the Crusader occupation. In Syria, the struggle against them is based on the fact that the rulers of Syria do not allow the mere existence of any Islamic entity, let alone a Jihadi one, and their bloody history of trying to uproot Islam is a well-known fact. In the environs of Jerusalem, the foremost and primary battle is against the Jews, and patience must be exercised, as much as it is possible, with the local rulers who have assumed power under the Oslo arrangement." Note that the Shaikh emphasizes the need for the creation of a safe haven for holy warriors in what is now the United States' nominal ally in the region, Pakistan. In case other parts of the world think that they are free and clear of terrorist threats: "This being said, it should remain clear that the policy of focusing on the head of disbelief (America) does not conflict with the right of the Muslim masses to wage Jihad with their tongues or by taking up arms against those who oppress them. Hence it is right of our Muslim brothers in the Caucuses to perform Jihad against the Russian aggressor and its allies. It is a right of our brothers in Kashmir to engage in Jihad against the criminal Hindus. It is equally a right of our brothers in Eastern Turkistan to engage in Jihad against the Chinese oppressors. Likewise, it is a right of our brothers in the Philippines, Burma, and in every land where the Muslims are subjected to repression to engage in Jihad against those who oppress them." "The military work firstly targets the head of (international) disbelief, America and its ally Israel, and secondly its local allies that rule our countries. "The purpose of targeting America is to exhaust her and bleed her to death, so that it meets the fate of the former Soviet Union and collapses under its own weight as a result of its military, human, and financial losses. Consequently, its grip on our lands will weaken and its allies will begin to fall one after another." Here's a phrase that is particularly pertinent after the so-called Arab Spring: "What transpired during the revolutions in the Arab world is a proof of waning American influence. After receiving relentless blows at the hands of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and Iraq and facing constant threat to its national security since September 2001, America decided to create some outlet to allow the release of public pressure in Muslim countries. However,

the situation blew up in the face of its proxies. By the permission of Allah, the coming stage will witness further decrease in American influence on world affairs and further retreat of America into its own shell, which will also weaken the governments of its allies an proxies." In light of the "failure to launch" democracy in Egypt, the Shaikh is not far off on his assessment. Shaikh Zawahiri goes on to be more specific about jihadi behaviours that are allowed and those which are not: "Focus on spreading awareness amongst the general public so as to mobilize it. Similarly, focus on spreading a greater level of awareness and understanding amongst the Mujahid vanguard to create an organized, united, ideological, and aware Jihadi force that strongly believes in the Islamic faith, adheres to its rulings, shows humbleness to the believers and deals with the disbelievers with firmness." "In the military sector, focus should be maintained on constantly weakening the head of international disbelief (America) until it bleeds to death both militarily and financially, its human resources are drained and it withdraws to its own shell after reaching a stage of retreat and seclusion, (sooner rather than later, with the permission of Allah)." "Avoid entering into an armed clash with the local regimes, except if forced to do so, for example when the local regime is a part of the American forces, as in Afghanistan; or where it wages war against the Mujahideen on behalf of the Americans, as in Somalia and the Arabian Peninsula; or where it does not tolerate the mere presence of Mujahideen, as in the Islamic Maghreb, Syria, and Iraq. However, entering into an armed conflict against them must be avoided whenever it is possible." "Avoid meddling with Christian, Sikh and Hindu communities living in Muslim lands. If they transgress, then a response proportionate to the transgression should suffice. This response should be accompanied with a statement that we do not seek to initiate a fight against them, since we are engaged in fighting the head of disbelief (America); and that we are keen to live with them in a peaceful manner after an Islamic state is established in the near future, Allah willing." "Refrain from killing and fighting against non-combatant women and children, and even if they are families of those who are fighting against us, refrain from targeting them as much as possible." "Refrain from harming Muslims by explosions, killing, kidnapping or destroying their wealth or property." "Refrain from targeting enemies in mosques, markets and gatherings where they mix with Muslims or with those who do not fight us." Most critically, Zawahiri goes on to note that any confrontation should not be a Muslim - Muslim battle over religious disagreements (i.e. inter-sect violence), rather, it should be against those who are the enemies of Islam. It is most interesting to see that now, terrorists have a handbook of do's and don'ts. Apparently, certain acts of terrorism now fall outside of what is acceptable behaviour.

Abu Musab al-Suri The Return of Al-Qaedas Mastermind

By Francis McLoughlin 14 Aug 2013. Abu Musab al-Suri, who also occasionally goes by his birth-name, Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, was at one point al-Qaeda’s most able and cold-blooded strategist. He once served as the Qaeda operations chief in Europe, networking throughout the 1990s with jihadis in the Maghreb and the Mashriq, the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, South and East Asia. In this dual-capacity—theoretician and organiser—Mr. Suri presided over the planning for the 2005 London bombings, in which four British-born terrorists exploded three bombs on the Underground and another on a bus,

claiming the lives of 52 people in all, with another 700 slashed and mangled, their bones snapped like crackling and their blood splashed about the scenes. Such vistas of violence rarely bear themselves to the actual line of sight of Mr. Suri, however; for the man operates in the shadows, directing from afar, often by the light of his laptop screen. His major contribution to the praxis of what we may still think of as ‘the Bin Laden network’ has been his attempt to render the group’s name—al-Qaeda, Arabic for ‘the base’—but a free-floating franchise available to any lone wolf who should wish to shroud himself in it.

Architect of the New Al Qaeda; Al-Qaeda Military Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri's (born Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Nasar4 ) Teachings5 on Fourth-Generation Warfare (4GW), Individual Jihad and the Future of Al-Qaeda6

In his efforts to ‘decentralise’ al-Qaeda, Mr. Suri has proven remarkably successful. Mohamed Merah, for example, the 23-year-old sadist who filmed his torture and slaughter of three Jewish children and a rabbi after murdering three French paratroopers in Toulouse last year, was nothing if not an adherent of Mr. Suri’s program. In his journey from the banlieues of his childhood to the Qaeda training camps of Afghanistan and Pakistan, Mr. Merah was a perfect illustration of Mr. Suri’s transmutation of the Qaeda threat from that of a handful of hand-lopping tribal-militias dotted around the globe to that of a nebulous, Deleuze-and-Guattari-stylised urban guerrilla warfare, in which ordinary citizens go about their daily business on what amounts to the front line of a world-wide war, and become victims of the fire-shows and sharp metallic-rain which isolated and previously-anonymous jihadi operatives step forward to inflict on their long-time neighbours and co-workers. The Tsarnaev brothers are perhaps the latest instance (at least in the West) of this nefarious doctrine at work.

Now, al-Qaeda’s brain is ‘free’. Mr. Suri was released in December 2011 by President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, to whose regime he had been entrusted by the United States after being apprehended by the CIA in 2005. Within only a few months of his liberation, ‘[h]is videos [were] already being reuploaded… [h]is audios, reposted’, according to Jarret Brachman, a former CIA analyst and director of West Point’s Centre for Combating Terrorism. The habitual incompetence of the U.S. intelligence community was once again there for all to see in this piece of extreme stupidity; for Mr. Suri, this enemy of civil society, had been allowed 4 http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Documents/AbuMusabalSuriArchitectoftheNewAlQaeda.pdf5 Nasar's best known work is the 1600-page book The Global Islamic Resistance Call (Da'wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-'alamiyyah) which appeared on the Internet in December 2004 or January 2005.6 http://www.memri.org/report/en/print5395.htm

to return to the streets as a ‘warning’ to the United States not to mess with the Iranian-backed Alawi elite in Damascus as it fended off the Syrian rebels in the wake of the Arab Spring of 2011. This ‘warning’ would grow into a full-fledged irony for President Assad, given that al-Qaeda—under the rubric of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant—currently dominates the armed opposition against his regime. Then again, perhaps the battle-lines in the Islamic world are more opaque than would be suggested by a simple Sunni v. Shia reading of events. Qaeda operatives have long been allowed, by the Mullahs in Tehran, to set up shop in the Islamic Republic of Iran and traverse the country at will since their ejection from Afghanistan in 2001.

Mr. Suri was one such Qaeda operative, by chance. (After fleeing U.S. precision strikes in Afghanistan in 2002, he found a safe-haven in the land of men whom Wahhabis regard as heretics ready for the slaughter!). Born in Aleppo, Syria, in 1958 to a middle class family, the red-haired adolescent, still going by the name of Mustafa, took a degree in mechanical engineering at the University of Aleppo before leaving for Jordan, where he would join the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Returning to his Ba’athist-run homeland, he reportedly took part in the 1982 uprising of Hama, a Brotherhood-stronghold, in which tens of thousands were killed by the Hafez al-Assad regime. After the failure of the small revolution that gave him his first taste of battle, Mr. Suri fled Syria and eventually wound up in Spain, where he lived as an official citizen after taking a Spanish wife. Still radicalised and craving jihad, in 1987 he departed Spain for Peshawar, where he came into contact with Abdullah Azzam, a commander and financier of the Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion beginning 1979. Mr. Azzam is better known perhaps as Osama bin Laden’s mentor, and so it wasn’t long before Mr. Suri fell in with that crowd. In 1992, he returned to Spain and set up a terrorist cell which would play a part in planning 9/11. In 1995, he went to London and established himself as a columnist of renown for Al Ansar magazine, a radical Islamist publication which supported jihad.

Mr. Suri’s subsequent career includes a gig as the spokesman for the Algerian Groupe Islamique Armé, and another as the London-based press attaché for Bin Laden himself. At another point he was an adviser to Mullah Omar in Kabul; and from a high-powered thinker for the Taliban, he went to sit on al-Qaeda’s Shura council. By the late 1990s, Bin Laden having ridden out the U.S. airstrikes on the would-be state of Afghanistan, Mr. Suri’s leaderless brand of al-Qaeda came to define the organisation. The spectacular exporting of jihad to American shores in September 2001 made al-Qaeda’s name known to all, along with that of its CEO. But when I say Mr. Suri’s vision for his cause prevailed over predecessors, I should add that it was more the necessity of survival than the sheer sway of its intellectual case which made it so. Mr. Suri even mocked his boss for failing to heed the direction al-Qaeda was headed, jeering that ‘our brother has caught the disease of screens, flashes, fans and applause’. Despite his days acting as a go-between for Bin Laden and the press, personality-driven holy war wasn’t Mr. Suri’s style. As I mentioned earlier, al-Qaeda is Arabic for ‘the base’, and that is precisely how one ought to think of it: as a foundation. You can kill as many figureheads as you like, but there will still be jihadis in Nigeria, Mauritania, Libya, Algeria, Somalia, Yemen, Iraq—everywhere around the world—who could step forward and replace them. Bin Laden, in Mr. Suri’s eyes, though he deserved some initial acclaim, had become immaterial, eye-candy. It is for this reason, however, from our point-of-view, that drone-strikes are only good for so much. In this perverse game of whack-a-mole—with one jihadi cell rearing its ugly head in Syria today, another in Mali tomorrow—it is foolishness to think that the movement jihad can be wiped out by knocking off one of its heads in Abbottabad, as the Obama administration seemed to think would suffice—until

recent events in Benghazi, at least. Counter-insurgency by military means must be a constant feature of the War on Terror if the jihadi network is to be actually defeated and humiliated once and for all. Mr. Suri was delusional if he thought his men could make the U.S. superpower crumble, but still, his ‘leaderless’ tactics for the jihadi cause warded off al-Qaeda’s otherwise guaranteed obliteration. And if Mr. Suri was ingenious in his manoeuvring to spread fear in the hearts of metropolitan infidels, the George W. Bush administration deserves credit for undertaking the right strategy for countering the movement jihad: first, take out its hosts in Afghanistan, who are clearly in league—even operationally—with al-Qaeda; and second, deprive them of the patronage of a shaky dictatorship in rogue-state-Iraq.

The persistence of al-Qaeda, after all, draws sustenance from that dark nexus between the foot-soldiers and canon-fodder of the bigwigs hiding out somewhere in Waziristan, on the one hand, and the rogue-states and Saudi financiers for whom virgin-thirsty Wahhabi warriors are useful clients, on the other. Thus, it stands to reason that contemporary jihad cannot be defeated unless this symbiotic arrangement is disrupted. The Pentagon was quick to realise this, as was the White House. Saddam Hussein had been paying $25,000 to families of suicide-murderers in Palestine and sheltering the Qaeda agent who mixed the chemicals in the bombing of the World Trade Centre in 1993. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, founder of the Qaeda branch in Iraq, also thrived under the Ba’athists, who sent him off to fight the Kurds—a people who would otherwise have been low-down on his list of priorities—until the Americans toppled Saddam. If anything, President Bush could have gone further, to wit, he could have targeted Iran and Pakistan, too—but the antiwar muppets would not have approved, and the U.S. military at the time was only designed to fight no more than two wars at once. Nevertheless, the targets were well-advised: Afghanistan was the massive training-ground for jihad which Syria is becoming today; and Iraq, as Sartre would say, was a menace in- and for-itself.

Of course, that America had to step foot on ‘Muslim land’ to wage its battle against the jihadis to some extent gratified al-Qaeda. The jihadis considered the United States a weak and decadent society which would surely collapse under the strain of the military campaign it sought to wage against them. They were wrong. Mr. Suri was wrong. The Taliban were thrown out of Kabul. Al-Qaeda was battered in Tora Bora, and almost 80% of its men in Afghanistan were killed. Yet after the Taliban were toppled, Mr. Suri would pen his masterwork, The Global Islamic Resistance Call, in a series of safe houses, and disseminate it in December 2004. Al-Qaeda’s ambition was to revive the Caliphate, and by that stage it was hoped that the War on Terror would incite the umma to overcome the national boundaries drawn up by colonial powers after World War II. The idea behind Bin Laden’s plans vis-à-vis the World Trade Centre had been, in short, to lure the ‘Great Satan’ into ‘Muslim land’ and then expose it as a soft and easy target, which the jihadis could happily chip away at, and, before long, send into the history books alongside the Soviet Union. Given that this was the new mission, however, one could ask what real use had the guerrilla cells for some telegenic leader? Bin Laden wouldn’t be able to direct his cadres in other countries on the specifics of every little mission they hoped to undertake against U.S. Marines and their Iraqi supporters. Mr. Suri went even further in this line of thinking by asking, in effect: why should he? Osama bin Who?

I’ll reiterate here a bit of well-known history for the sake of background. The Afghan mujahedin fractured completely after 1989, after the Red Army had withdrawn, and Afghanistan was torn up by warlords—which was insignificant in-itself, as the Afghans had never enjoyed a centralised state. In the midst of the break-up, the Saudi-funded faction of the

Islamic militants, led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, planned and advocated attacks on ‘the Far Enemy’. In this vision the ideas of Mr. Suri and another gifted Qaeda strategist who went by the alias ‘Abu Bakr Naji’ superseded those laid out in the older works of Sayyid Qutb and Mohammed Abd al-Salam Faraj (chief ideologue of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who had planned President Anwar al-Sadat’s assassination). In Mr. Suri’s formulation, jihad was a personal rather than a collective duty, and as such, it did not require the approval of some Islamic authority, whether some registered Imam somewhere or even the chairman of the board of Al-Qaeda Inc. Although this idea that al-Qaeda’s chieftains were irrelevant did not sit well with others on the Shura council, Mr. Suri was retained as a strategist, if only because his zeal in waging the holy battle against ‘the Zionist-Crusader alliance’ was never in any doubt.

Although at times he appeared to be more interested in guerrilla tactics than the Islamic scriptures, Mr. Suri was too talented a tactician to be dismissed by the more Puritan fanatics of the jihadi house-of-cards (as Mr. Suri himself would have thought of the command-structure of al-Qaeda Central). Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, to take another case of a jihadi leader who may not have been an exactly exemplary member of the cult, was self-evidently a gang-leader if not a clinical-psychopath. And yet, despite his obvious unsuitability as a candidate for a Qaeda figurehead, the man was so brutal and fearsome a leader of his self-titled ‘al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia’ that the nominal heads of the Bin Laden network had little choice but to recognise his lumpen-militias as the real-deal, to wit, the Iraqi manifestation of the greater Qaeda crusade for a global-caliphate. Mr. Suri, for his part, was a more cynical denizen of the Qaeda core, and thus distasteful as a colleague to those of a more theological bent. Still, his value lay in his influence among the more gung-ho milieu behind Bin Laden, which didn’t recoil at the magnitude of the retaliation which al-Qaeda had to expect for carrying out the attacks of September 2001.

It should always be remembered that there was a time, after 9/11, when some in al-Qaeda lost their nerve. Abu al-Walid al-Masri, for instance, another board member of the gang’s Shura council, wrote that his experience in Afghanistan was ‘a tragic example of an Islamic movement managed in an alarmingly meaningless way’, such that ‘[e]veryone knew that their leader was leading them to the abyss and even leading the entire country to utter destruction, but they continued to carry out his orders faithfully and with bitterness’. Mr. Suri, as we have seen, was far more enthusiastic about the prospects of the ‘Great Satan’ coming to his home-turf. He was as dismayed as the next jihadi at the fall of the Taliban, and it was amongst the ruins of that regime that he wrote his magnum opus, as has been alluded to. In 2002, he fled to eastern Iran, where he joined his boss’s son Saad and the Qaeda security chief Saif al-Adl. (The question cannot be asked enough: Why was al-Qaeda, then as now, allowed to operate so freely under the regime of the Shi’ite Mullahs in Tehran?) The Americans, realising his importance (The Global Islamic Resistance Call is studied at West Point), put a five-million-dollar bounty on his head. In exile, Mr. Suri furthered his meditation on the future of the jihadi cause. Mr. Suri was finally captured in Quetta by Pakistani intelligence agents in October 2005 and handed over to the CIA which, under an ill-begotten rendition program, gave him up to the anti-American dictatorship of Syria in 2006. As we know, he has since been set free by Assad himself, and his whereabouts are now unknown though his influence on global jihad has resurged palpably among his militant brethren. In this age of Google and decentralised resistance to the secular world of capital and free speech—think: Occupy Wall Street and the op-ed section of Al Jazeera—Abu Musab al-Suri is an especially effective spokesman and theoretician of ‘leaderless’ jihad: al-Qaeda writ large. In the aftermath of the Tsarnaev brothers’ bombings and the attacks on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Mr. Suri is

perhaps a more authoritative figure in al-Qaeda than Mr. Zawahiri himself, who can organise the old Qaeda vanguard-militias from the tribal regions of Yemen to the impoverished north of Nigeria, but whose attempts to shake-up the West on the scale of 9/11 have taken a backseat to the more amateur assaults on civil society mounted by scattered jihadi cells and lone wolves. The two faces of al-Qaeda today are Mr. Zawahiri and Mr. Suri, but one should not make the mistake of thinking that they represent antagonistic rather than supplementary forces in their clash with civilisation. If Syria becomes the new pre-2001 Afghanistan, a transition materialising before our very eyes, I daresay the Zawahiris of the world will once again have the breathing-space to pull of something a little more formidable in its blood-shedding capacity than a couple of pressure-cookers in Boston. Will they be able to get it? That is the question.

(Shanita Simmons (August 14, 2007). "Manchester Manual: The Code of Conduct for terrorism". Joint Task Force Guantanamo Public Affairs. Retrieved 2008-02-22.) Training is preparing for the events to come, the better trained the more successful you will be. And QA understand it well. Many trained will simply end up on battle fields others will be selected for additional training. History has shown us how that wills ends.

See my previous: Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2014 Part 31-4-AQ- In their own words.

Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2014 Part 19-53-Caliphate-Training Camps.

And, Declaration of War; Osama bin Laden declared war on America in 1996, but before September 11, 2001, few paid more than episodic attention to the one-sided war that al-Qaeda waged against American targets. Over the past five years, others have echoed his call, as these quotes demonstrate. Together they reflect clear and consistent themes. If he (Bin Laden and its AQ affiliates) really wants to wage war, he should openly declare war, and so they did: In August of 1996, Osama bin Laden issued his first fatwa, a 30-page polemic entitled "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," against the United States and Israel, and it was published in a London newspaper called Al Quds al Arabi…. (A must read, Cees, March, 1987) I Dedicate This Book To Those Da'ees Who Are Struggling And Aiting To Lay Down Their Lives For Establishing God's Kingdom On Earth. This book, "METHODOLOGY OF DAWAH ILALLAH – IN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE7" is in your hands. Please read it as a part of the world strategy: how to make the message of Islam acceptable to the West; how to make the Muslim world really free from foreign interference/intervention; how to pave the way for the emergence of a global Islamic order for the deliverance of mankind; and how to administer justice (Al-Qist) and Adl as the order of the day to the suffering humanity. This book is an effort in all these directions. It is the beginning, not the end. Now the question arises as to who will do this job. Prophets are not to come any more. This is also not the job of angels. In fact, it is the responsibility of Muslims who fortunately migrated to Western countries after the Second World War, when there was a dearth of labor in Europe and America and the immigration restrictions were eased. Now it is the responsibility of the immigrant Muslims and the indigenous Muslims to realize their obligations to bring the truth to the West. http://www.dawahinamericas.com/bookspdf/MethodologyofDawah.pdf

7 METHODOLOGY OF DAWAH ILALLAH http://www.dawahinamericas.com/bookspdf/MethodologyofDawah.pdf

And….IDF Discovers Hamas Terror Training Manuals in GazaAugust 3, 2014 ) As reported by the Washington Free Beacon, Hamas has been sending out to its followers in the Gaza Strip a detailed terrorism training manual that teaches would-be bombers the mechanics of making explosives and how to conceal them in household items such as televisions. The revelation came from documents that were seized by the Israeli military during recent raids in Gaza. IDF soldiers discovered the handbook on the ground in the Gaza Strip as they carried out raids of homes and other facilities utilized by Hamas to plan its terror activities.Hamas’ terrorism training manuals instruct readers on how to construct homemade explosive devices and how to set them so that they will explode in unlikely places. Hamas has even strapped explosives to donkeys and tried to send them after Israeli soldiers. The terrorist organization’s goal is to encourage the citizens of Gaza to plant explosives in unlikely locations in the hopes that Israeli military personnel set them off during routine raids in Gaza. This serves as one more example of how Hamas utilizes unconventional warfare techniques and civilian cover to perpetrate attacks on Israelis. Hamas has already been caught on numerous occasions using women and children as human shields and firing their rockets from such humanitarian sites as hospitals and United Nations-owned schools. The detailed training manual, excerpts of which were published by the IDF this week, explicitly instructs readers to camouflage their explosives, with one diagram demonstrating “how to fill a television-shaped bomb with shrapnel.” Israeli soldiers in Gaza have reported witnessing the techniques described in the handbook actually implemented in various Palestinian homes. In one case, an Israeli soldier entered a civilian home located next door to a school only to find eight mines inter-connected by cable and spread throughout the home. Mines have also been discovered clandestinely placed in the shape of a chicken coop in other homes. Other diagrams in the terrorist handbook appear to detail methods to embed explosives in wall mounts, such as those that are used to hang televisions. As the intense fighting continues and Israel acts to disarm Hamas and destroy its intricate system of underground tunnels, the IDF is reporting that its Givati Brigade located explosives “that are very similar to those detailed in the manual.” The IDF explained, “Such explosives have been found in Palestinian homes in Gaza, endangering not only the residents of the house but also neighbors within range of a potential explosion.” Hamas leaders have been sending out social media tips to its followers and others in the Gaza Strip about how to publicly lie about civilian casualties. The Hamas Interior Ministry — which notoriously ordered its civilians to ignore Israel’s warnings and remain at home during air strikes — is now directing supporters on social media to always describe the dead as “innocent civilians” and be sure not to post pictures that show Hamas fighters launching rockets from populated civilian centers. An instructional video produced by Hamas’ Information Department of the Ministry of the Interior and National Security teaches viewers how to foment sympathy for Hamas in the media, according to a translation of the video published by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). “Anyone killed or martyred is to be called a civilian from Gaza or Palestine, before we talk about his status in jihad or his military rank,” the video declares, according to MEMRI. “Don’t forget to always add ‘innocent civilian’ or ‘innocent citizen’ in your description of those killed in Israeli attacks on Gaza.” The video further directs social media users to “begin [your reports of] news of resistance actions with the phrase, ‘In response to the cruel Israeli attack,’ and conclude with the phrase, ‘This many people have been martyred since Israel launched its aggression against Gaza,’” according to the video. “Be sure to always perpetuate the principle of ‘the role of the occupation is attack, and we in Palestine are fulfilling [the role of] the reaction,’” the video stresses. Hamas urges its supporters to not inform people that rockets are being fired at Israel from densely populated areas, a technique Hamas uses to ensure a maximum number of civilian casualties. “Avoid publishing pictures of rockets fired into Israel

from [Gaza] city centers. This [would] provide a pretext for attacking residential areas in the Gaza Strip,” the video instructs. “Do not publish or share photos or video clips showing rocket launching sites or the movement of resistance [forces] in Gaza.” Palestinian activists who are making statements to Western audiences are encouraged to speak differently than they would to an Arab audience. Regarding “the narrative of life vs. the narrative of blood: [When speaking] to an Arab friend, start with the number of martyrs. [But when speaking] to a Western friend, start with the number of wounded and dead,” the video directs. “Be sure to humanize the Palestinian suffering. Try to paint a picture of the suffering of the civilians in Gaza and the West Bank during the occupation’s operations and its bombings of cities and villages.”…..

And AQ-C lays in waiting. Drag them in, Bleed them Economically, a Thousand Cut’s and half of the War effort lies in propaganda…The Ummah is awaken has arisen, western backed leaders are disposed or getting close to be, democracy failed or is violated and betrayed: by the West and all fits jihadists Ideology…And plan….Phase 5 could rollover in 6..

Regards Cees, see also part 2 and 3