al-qaida chief ayman al-zawahiri the coordinator 2015 part 19-71-caliphate-sunni-shia-12

C de Waart; CdW Intelligence to Rent [email protected] In Confidence

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-71-Caliphate-Sunni-Shia-12

In The "War of the Cross, we seek a Strategy, our Enemy has one."How far did (do) we allow the Iranian influence sphere to grow?

There are two main sects of Islam: Sunni and Shi'ite. Sunni Islam is the largest sect, although in some countries it is a minority. Sunnis have their historical roots in the majority group who followed Abu Bakr, an effective leader, as the successor of Muhammad, instead of his cousin and son-in-law Ali. The Sunnis are so named because they believe themselves to follow the sunnah or "custom" of the Prophet. Shi'ites are those Muslims who followed Ali, the closest relative of Muhammad, as Muhammad's successor.

An Iranian-supported Shiite militia that operates under the Iraqi government-sanctioned Popular Mobilization Committee said that Saudi Arabia is “a legitimate and permissible target” and would it “strike and destroy” the country after the kingdom issued a death sentence for a cleric that has called for partition.

“We in the Sayyid al Shuhada Battalion consider Saudi interests a legitimate and permissible target on all levels, and we will strike and destroy them whenever it pleases us,” it continued. “The rulers of petroleum will learn that the followers of Ahl al Bayt [family of Mohammad] will not be content with defeating [the Saudi government] in Baiji, Ramadi, and other Iraqi areas, but will take the battle to the spider’s own nest.”

Despite the Lebanon government’s recent operational success against jihadist plots, the pattern of fighters coalescing into new, emerging groups continues to underline the influential role of personal connections—most of which have roots in al-Qaeda (including the former al-Qaeda in Iraq group)—in fostering inter-jihadist collaboration and resiliency, which is correspondingly difficult to disrupt.

The Pakistanis have already seen the worst imaginable times while dealing with violent extremism. Islamabad can't afford to give one last remaining of its four provinces to the Taliban and sectarian groups. If Sindh falls in the hands of Sunni extremists, the price the whole country will have to pay is going to be much higher than what they have paid so far.

"Iran does not negotiate about Syria with America…The world knows that Iran is now the victorious and the dominant party in the Syrian drama, and if we go to Vienna we should know that we are the victorious ones and America and Saudi Arabia are the defeated ones. The world knows that America and Saudi Arabia are not qualified to discuss the negotiations about Syria because they are the main supporters of the terrorists. [Iranian Foreign Minister] Mr. Zarif "The terrorists wanted to divide Syria and to make Aleppo the terrorists' capital, based on a Turkish, Qatari, Saudi, and American plan

IRGC Deputy Commander Hossein Salami conducted an interview with Iranian Channel 2 on October 26, 2015, in which he discussed Iran's involvement in Syria. Salami said: "Our military role in Syria can be presented on four levels:

The first is strategic – on this level we support the Syrian people, regime and army and convey our experience... via advisory elements.

Another level is the operational level, which includes advising Syrian army commanders.

Yet another level is the tactical level, in which our commanders advise the the Syrian army commanders in charge of operations...

And the fourth level is the technical level, which refers to supplying equipment and training."

The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.–Winston Churchill

CdW Intelligence to Rent of 11 03/05/2023

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the Saudi Arabian foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, after the talks in Vienna“We have maintained that Bashar al-Assad has no role in Syria’s future and that he must leave at some point in this process. “And with regards to at what point the foreign fighters, the foreign forces leave Syria, there was a major disagreement on these issues we were not able to bridge. mAlthough Syria is by far the bigger problem, Yemen also figured in the talks. The forgotten war is no less bloody, and is another area where Iran’s interests differ widely from the Gulf Arabs. “Well we said that we believe that the Yemeni war, there are indications that the war in Yemen is entering a final phase. I can’t tell you if it will take weeks or months but I can tell you that the legitimate government forces are now in control of the vast majority of Yemeni territory. There still remain some areas that need to be liberated including the capital, Sanaa, but the trend is moving in the right direction.

Shia killings going on in Pakistan, who's responsible?

October 27, 2015 – Huffingtonpost The Pakistanis have already seen the worst imaginable times while dealing with violent extremism. Islamabad can't afford to give one last remaining of its four provinces to the Taliban and sectarian groups. If Sindh falls in the hands of Sunni extremists, the price the whole country will have to pay is going to be much higher than what they have paid so far.

By: Malik Siraj Akbar Ahlul Bayt News Agency - In a statement issued on October 23, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has urged the Pakistani government to bring to justice the perpetrators of recent terrorist attacks on Shia Muslims that killed over 40 people, including several children. The attacks took place in the provinces of Balochistan and Sindh for which a banned, yet proactive, Sunni extremist group, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), claimed responsibility. The Secretary General has reiterated that nothing justifies terrorism and called upon the Pakistani government "to do its utmost to protect its citizens, including all minorities." There is a problem on the government's side when it comes to dealing with extremist violence. The Sunni groups attack the Shias so frequently that it takes them only a few more days to stage a renewed assault. That said, every new incident helps in covering up the previous one no matter how high a death toll it causes. New attacks enable the police and investigators to close old cases and pretend to be working on new ones. You must be wondering what the police do in the meanwhile when there is no fresh attack. Doesn't it build public pressure on the government? Of course, it does. The government certainly as an effective plan to deal with such situations: blame the Indians.

Consider this. Suhail Anwar Siyal, the Home Minister for the Sindh Province, where a suicide bomber killed around twenty people in Jacobabad district, admitted that the LeJ had accepted responsibility for the carnage but, in spite of that, he still insisted that it was the Indian intelligence agency, the Research and Anlysis Wing (RAW), which had





"spread across Sindh". The Minister was reluctant to blame or criticize the LeJ because he faces a more immediate threat to his safety from the deep-rooted Sunni outfit(s) than a foreign country. So why risk antagonizing the extremist outfit when it is safer and convenient to blame a foreign intelligence agency and quickly get exemption for one's own shortcomings? The minister's role still remains pertinent because if not he then who else will take action against these criminals?

The recent attacks, especially the one in Jacobabad, should not solely be taken as a continuation of the past attacks on the Shias. It is the harbinger of a much larger problem that has been brewing for several years and has now come of age. The rise of militant Islam in Sindh province is deeply disconcerting given Sindh's rich history of tolerance, diversity and acceptance of different religions and sects. Unlike the provinces of the Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, Sindh had remained uncompromising to share space with the Taliban and other militant groups on the land of the Sufi traditions. Sindh is home to 94% of Pakistan's Hindus. Except for Karachi, the province's capital, where Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other terrorist groups have consolidated their grip in recent years, the rest of the province provided no sanctuary to religious extremists. But that now seems history as these armed groups have started attacks outside Karachi in interior Sindh. That is bad news because Sunni militants do not only increase threats for the Shias but they also detest moderate Sunni sects and, worse, the Hindus.In a January 2015 report Conflict Dynamics in Sindh published by the United States Institute for Peace, authors Huma Yusuf and Syed Shoaib Hassan warned that extremist organizations were increasingly active in Sindh's central and northern districts. Sectarian militant groups and the anti-state Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) were consolidating their presence in the province in the rural areas."The escalating activities of extremist groups are having an impact on the province's pluralistic society," they observed and urged Islamabad to "ensure that the province does not become a new base for militants in the same way that FATA and southern Punjab are."A more recent report New Haven of Terrorists published last month by the Washington -D.C.-based Sindhi Foundation and authored by a veteran credible journalist, Hassan Mujtaba, portrays even a more gloomy picture of Sindh. According to the report, several radical groups, including the pro-Taliban Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, sectarian organizations, such as Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) have increased recruitment, donation collection and other activities in Sindh. Better presence in Sindh for these extremist groups means access to safer sanctuaries and new rich sources of wealth. In Sindh, they can redouble their resources by attacking NATO trucks and containers and kidnapping rich Hindu businessmen to extort money.Back in July 2009, BBC correspondent Nisar Kokhar had reported about a fifty percent increase in religious schools in Sindh. These seminaries are generally blamed for churning out Jihadists and offering them safe hideouts. In that report, one progressive Sindhi activist had shared his concerns about the future: "I fear the construction of so many religious schools in Sindh will give birth to a new generation of extremists and conservatives on the land of the tolerant Sufis." As luck would have it, those feared days have arrived for Sindh. The new generation of extremists seems to be absolutely clear about what they should be doing as their first steps. They have started to attack and destroy Shrines of many of the Sufis who preached peace and coexistence. According to Zia Ur Rehman of the Lahore-based the Friday Times, unidentified assailants attacked and burned the shrine of one venerated Sufi, Hazrat Noor Shah Bukhari, in Mirpurkhas. After all, who is radicalizing the young Sindhis? How is the Jihadist culture expanding so rapidly?Yusuf and Hasan, the authors of the USIP report, provide shocking information how these extremist groups take advantage of natural disasters, such as the floods of 2010-11, and





pose as humanitarian groups while going there to recruit fresh fighters. For example, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the charity organ of the terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, they wrote, established 13 relief camps and 6 medical centers soon after the floods in Sindh in order to win the hearts and minds of the people. One sectarian group, Ahle Sunnat Wal Jama'at (ASWJ) "is currently on a recruitment drive in Sindh--by some estimates the groups has signed up twenty-five thousand members in Sindh outside Karachi in recent years."It might sound like a cliché that Pakistan has hard times ahead. The Pakistanis have already seen the worst imaginable times while dealing with violent extremism. Islamabad can't afford to give one last remaining of its four provinces to the Taliban and sectarian groups. If Sindh falls in the hands of Sunni extremists, the price the whole country will have to pay is going to be much higher than what they have paid so far.

KARACHI: The presence of Daesh has been confirmed in Sindh as the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) has prepared a list of 53 terrorists who, it says, are affiliated with the terrorist organisation.According to CTD sources, Abdullah Yousuf alias Abdul Aziz and also Saqib is the Ameer of Daesh, while another suspected terrorist has been identified as Shahid Khokhar, who hails from Hyderabad. The CTD sources further said that the third terrorist is Bilal who is affiliated with Daesh and hails from Mirpurkhas. They said teams had been constituted to bust the network of Daesh in Sindh. Earlier in Islamabad, Inspector General Police (IGP), Sindh, Ghulam Hyder Jamali, while briefing a meeting of the Senate Standing Committee on the Interior on Monday, had revealed that Daesh was involved in an attack on the Ismaili community bus in Safoora Goth. He said that Daesh and the banned terrorist outfit Lashkar-e-Jhangvi were linked to each other. Referring to the Safoora attack suspects, he told the senators that they had been involved with Daesh for at least a year and had been receiving instructions from one Abdul Aziz located in Syria. He informed them that half-a-dozen laptops were also recovered from the suspects, which would help in finding important clues to the attack.

Popular Mobilization Committee militia threatens to ‘strike and destroy’ the Saudi governmentBY BILL ROGGIO | October 30, 2015 | [email protected] | @billroggioAn Iranian-supported Shiite militia that operates under the Iraqi government-sanctioned Popular Mobilization Committee said that Saudi Arabia is “a legitimate and permissible target” and would it “strike and destroy” the country after the kingdom issued a death sentence for a cleric that has called for partition. The militia, Sayyid al Shuhada, is led by a Specially Designated Global Terrorist who is directly tied to Iran’s Qods Force.Sayyid al Shuhada threatened the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Oct. 26, the same day that the Saudi Supreme Court upheld a death sentence for Sheikh Nimr al Nimr, a prominent Shiite cleric. Nimr was sentenced to death “for involvement in anti-government protests that erupted in the Eastern Province in the wake of the Arab uprisings,” in 2011 and 2012, Al Jazeera English reported. Nimr has supported the secession of Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern province, a majority of which is Shiite. The militia threatened the Saudi government in a statement that was released on its official website. A translation of the statement was obtained by The Long War Journal.“Saudi Arabia insists, as all tyrants have throughout history, on committing sins and grave errors, which have transgressed beyond the realm of obedience and fear of Allah,” the statement read. “Indeed, they enter into the realm of great historical mistakes, as exemplified by the decision to uphold the ruling to execute the munificent Sheikh al Nimr





by one of the Saudi courts.” Sayyid al Shuhada said it would “strike and destroy” Saudi interested not just in Iraq, but inside the kingdom as well. The militia also directly accused the Saudi government of backing the Islamic State and said it was battling the Saudis in the Iraqi cities of Baiji and Ramadi.“We in the Sayyid al Shuhada Battalion consider Saudi interests a legitimate and permissible target on all levels, and we will strike and destroy them whenever it pleases us,” it continued. “The rulers of petroleum will learn that the followers of Ahl al Bayt [family of Mohammad] will not be content with defeating [the Saudi government] in Baiji, Ramadi, and other Iraqi areas, but will take the battle to the spider’s own nest.”Sayyid al Shuhada’s statement was also issued the same day that the Iranian government issued a veiled threat against the Saudi government if it executed Nimr.“The execution of Sheikh Nimr would have dire consequences for Saudi Arabia,” Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian said on Oct. 26, Al Jazeera English reported.Militia leader a dangerous terroristSayyid al Shuhada is closely linked to Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) – Qods Force, the Iranian government’s special operations branch that foments and supports Islamic revolutions in the Middle East. The militia is led by Abu Mustafa al Sheibani, who was listed by the US government as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in January 2008 for attacking US and British forces, as well as Iraqi political and military leaders. Sheibani was directly linked to the assassination of an Iraqi Interior Ministry colonel, and the attempted killings of Najaf’s police chief and deputy governor.According to the US designation, Sheibani led “a network of Shia extremists that commit and provide logistical and material support for acts of violence that threaten the peace and stability of Iraq and the Government of Iraq.” “The network’s first objective is to fight U.S. forces, attacking convoys and killing soldiers. Its second objective is to eliminate Iraqi politicians opposed to Iran’s influence. Elements of the IRGC were also sending funds and weapons to Al-Sheibani’s network,” the Treasury department designation stated. The designation detailed how the Sheibani Network conducted a variety of attacks against US forces in Baghdad to raise money from Iran.In addition to leading his own network of fighters, Sheibani commanded “several pro-Iranian insurgent groups in southern Iraq that work to destabilize Iraq and sabotage Coalition efforts.” “Ordered by IRGC headquarters to create disorder, the task of these groups is to attack bases of Coalition Forces in southern Iraq, particularly British forces.”Despite Sheibani’s history of targeting Iraqi officials links to Iran, he and his militia have been welcomed to fight in the ranks of the Popular Mobilization Committee, the grouping of armed militias, many backed by Iran, that fight against the Islamic State. The Popular Mobilization Committee is led by Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, a former commander in the Badr Organization who was listed by the US government as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in July 2009 and was described as “an advisor to” Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani. The Committee, which has been praised Brett McGurk, the Obama administration’s Deputy Special Presidential Envoy to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL (the outdated acronym for the Islamic State), has numerous militias like Sayyid al Shuhada that operate under its command.Sayyid al Shuhada’s threat against the Saudi government highlights the power that the Iranian supported militias wield inside Iraq. The militia was never reprimanded by the Iraqi government for threatening a neighboring country. And Sayyid al Shuhada isn’t the first militia to threaten a foreign government without consequence.In June, Akram Abbas al Kabi, the “secretary general” of the Harakat Nujaba, said that “All resistance movements will seek revenge” against the United States “in a timely manner” for an airstrike that purportedly killed 10 members of his militia who were





fighting near Fallujah. Kabi is also a Specially Designated Global Terrorist who has close ties with Iran and who is responsible for killing American soldiers in Iraq.And in early May, radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr threatened to attack US personnel inside Iraq and beyond if the US House of Representatives passed a bill that would have recognized Kurdistan and the Sunnis in western Iraq as their own independent countries. Sadr leads two militias in Iraq, the Saraya al Salam, or Peace Companies (often called the Peace Brigades), and the Liwa al Yaom al Mawood, or Promised Day Brigade. Kabi and Sadr’s militias also operate under the aegis of the Popular Mobilization Committee.Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of The Long War Journal.

The Evolution of Sunni Jihadism in Lebanon Since 2011Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 21October 30, 2015 By: Patrick Hoover

Despite the government’s recent operational success against jihadist plots, the pattern of fighters coalescing into new, emerging groups continues to underline the influential role of personal connections—most of which have roots in al-Qaeda (including the former al-Qaeda in Iraq group)—in fostering inter-jihadist collaboration and resiliency, which is correspondingly difficult to disrupt.Burning cars from a suicide explosion by the Islamic State in Beirut (Source: Daily Star).Since the Syrian civil war began in early 2011, the conflict has reignited sectarian tensions in neighboring Lebanon, transforming parts of the country into flashpoints of violence and operational spaces for militant groups. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Sunni jihadists, as well as a variety of secular militants, recruited, trained and plotted in Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps, using them as a springboard for attacks elsewhere in the region. However, this changed when Sunni jihadist group Fatah al-Islam (FI) attempted to turn north Lebanon—which includes various impoverished, Salafist-influenced Sunni-majority areas where hatred of the Syrian regime has been brewing for decades—into a so-called Islamic emirate in 2007. Despite its defeat at the hands of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in a 111-day battle at the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian camp near Tripoli that summer, FI’s actions marked the point when Lebanon became a battleground for jihadists, rather than simply a launching pad for attacks elsewhere. This set a precedent for subsequent Sunni jihadist groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), the Islamic State, and Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB), to threaten Lebanon’s territorial integrity and delicate sectarian balance.According to the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, an estimated 900 Lebanese citizens have fought or are currently fighting for Sunni militant groups in Syria and Iraq. [1] This reflects that since the summer of 2011, north Lebanon emerged not only as a vast recruiting pool, but also as an effective staging area for Lebanese jihadists crossing into Syria. Supported financially by local Salafist leaders, these jihadists fought for either FI, Jamaat Jund al-Sham (JJS) or smaller groups. FI, in particular, fought battles against the Syrian government in Aleppo, Rif Dimashq, al-Qusair and Homs. [2] However, with most of its leadership decimated by September 2012, FI’s rank-and-file subsequently





merged with other groups, including JJS.Historically a Palestinian extremist group based in Ain al-Helwah, JJS reemerged in late 2012, as a major recruiter of Lebanese Sunni militants. A key step in this process occurred on December 23, 2012, when former FI fighter Khaled Mahmoud al-Dandashi (a.k.a. Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir) declared himself the “amir” of the newly-formed JJS at the medieval fortress Krak des Chevaliers that overlooks Qalaat al-Hosn, a village near Homs. [3] Al-Dandashi thereafter leveraged familial and personal connections in both Lebanon and Syria to recruit hundreds of followers (al-Hayat, August 21, 2013). He also had agents who had served with him in FI embedded in the Salafist recruiting networks of the Sunni-majority Bab al-Tabbaneh district in Tripoli, which is the scene of frequent clashes against local Alawite Shi’a Muslims. Al-Dandashi remained at Krak des Chevaliers until his death in March 2014, prompting the return of 300 JJS fighters and their families back to north Lebanon (Daily Star [Beirut], March 22, 2014).Throughout the first two years of the conflict, jihadists such as al-Dandashi focused primarily on using Lebanon as a transit point for recruits, cash and weapons. However, in 2013, the strategic direction of the Salafist-Jihadist community shifted away from fighting the forces of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria toward fighting Hezbollah and the Lebanese government, which they regarded as Hezbollah’s “proxy,” in Lebanon. With clearer objectives, Salafist-Jihadists began to behave more in unison, coalescing around the perception that destabilizing Lebanon directly contributes to the weakening of Hezbollah, and thus, al-Assad. Sunni jihadists sought to do this by tainting Hezbollah’s legitimacy and labeling the group as an Iranian tool.Around this time, in 2012, Sunni firebrand Shaykh Ahmad al-Assir emerged as a popular voice for these grievances. Al-Assir first came to widespread attention in 2012 when he demanded an expansion of the state’s writ to curb Hezbollah’s authority (al-Akhbar [Beirut], March 2, 2012). His rhetoric at this time was conciliatory, rational and supportive of greater political rights for Sunnis, many of whom felt themselves economically and politically marginalized. His views grew more radical, however, when the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) grew increasingly hesitant to disarm Hezbollah, especially in Sidon—the site of continuous clashes between pro-Hezbollah and pro-Assir groups. The tension reached a climax in June 2013, when several al-Assir loyalists opened fire on a LAF checkpoint in Sidon, sparking an intense, two-day firefight (Daily Star [Beirut], June 24, 2013). Al-Assir fled into hiding, but was arrested by Lebanese authorities in August 2015 (Daily Star [Beirut], August 15). Even though al-Assir is a fringe character, he came to epitomize the extent to which Sunni grievances can be transformed into armed mobilization in an “open front” and semi-conventional context against the LAF and Hezbollah.Throughout the spring of 2014, Syrian opposition groups suffered defeats in western Syria, particularly in and around al-Qusayr, Qalamoun Nabak and Yabroud. This forced the retreat of hundreds of JN and Islamic State fighters into Lebanon, and particularly into Bekaa’s Baalbek district. Prior to the rebel influx, the Sunni and Syrian-majority camp of Arsal in the Bekaa Valley had served as a gateway for the covert transport and provision of resources and reinforcements for rebels in western Syria. However, after the influx, the camp became a safe haven for militants, allowing them to recruit Syrian refugees and launch attacks on Hezbollah and LAF positions across the northern Bekaa Valley. From December 2013 to March 2014, JN conducted 11 attacks, targeting Hezbollah positions in Hermel, Brital, Nabi Shayth and Nabi Uthman with at least 27 Grad rockets and four martyrdom operations. [4] JN cooperated with the Marwan Hadid Brigades, the Gaza Strip-based wing of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB), in two of these operations. Established in 2009 as an official al-Qaeda affiliate, AAB is a decentralized network of





local militant groupings active in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine, all of which are responsible for a number of attacks against Israeli and Western targets.The increasing isolation of Arsal due to military pressure from Hezbollah and the LAF encouraged greater cooperation between jihadist groups. This dynamic came into full force in August when JN and AAB came to the Islamic State’s aid in fighting the LAF in response to the arrest of Ahmad Jomaa (al-Jazeera, August 8, 2014). Jomaa was the amir of Fajr al-Islam—a detachment of the Islamic Front-allied Suquor al-Sham Brigade that cooperated closely with JN in al-Qusayr—before pledging allegiance to the Islamic State (Naharnet, August 2, 2014). [5] The five-day battle resulted in nearly 60 militants and 19 Lebanese troops killed, and dozens of security personnel being captured (Daily Star [Beirut], August 12, 2014). Even though the LAF managed to enter Arsal, the camp continues to be a source for Sunni extremism.This inter-jihadist collaboration continued and increased in late October 2014, when the LAF busted an Islamic State-affiliated cell in Asoun and arrested its leader Ahmad Mikati, sparking a series of retaliatory attacks from Islamic State and JN militants. Mikati admitted that he sought to occupy the northern villages of Bakhoun, Asoun, Sir al-Dinnieh and Bekaa Sefrin and turn them into a safe haven for jihadist militants (al-Nahar, October 27, 2014). Mikati planned to coordinate this operation with JN-affiliated militants Khaled Hoblos in Zahrieh, a neighborhood in Tripoli, and Shadi al-Mawlawi, Ousamma Mansour, Ahmad Kasha and Abu Hureira in Bab al-Tabbaneh. Mawlawi and Mansour were the alleged recruiters of suicide bombers who had attacked the mainly Shi’a Jabal Mohsen district in Tripoli (Naharnet, January 20). Over 160 militants were arrested, dozens of weapons caches discovered and several explosives-rigged vehicles dismantled. Had this plan succeeded, the regime-held Homs corridor in Syria would have been sandwiched between two Sunni jihadist-held territories.Meanwhile, in Lebanon, from July 2013 to February 2014, with assistance from JN elements, AAB and Islamic State operatives claimed a total of six attacks in south Beirut. In one of the most significant of these, in November 2013, AAB conducted a double suicide bombing of the Iranian Embassy, killing 23 and injuring at least 160. [6] About three months later, AAB launched another double suicide bombing on the Iranian cultural center, killing at least five and wounding more than 100. [7] The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the bomb attacks on January 4, 2014, in the capital’s Haret Hreik suburb and on June 15 at the Duroy Hotel (Daily Star [Beirut], January 2, 2014). [8]These operations represent another example of tangible teamwork between the Islamic State, AAB, JN, JJS and FI. Illustrative of the personal connections linking various jihadist group, Naim Abbas—one of the masterminds behind the Beirut attacks—befriended Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s bodyguard in AQI, joined forces with AAB former amir Majid al-Majid in Ain al-Helwa, received training on rocket warfare from AAB’s Sirajuddin Zurayqat and spent the majority of 2013 plotting and conducting attacks at the behest of JN and the Islamic State (al-Akhbar, February 26, 2014). His two main contacts were JN’s Yabroud amir Abu Malek al-Talli and the Islamic State’s Abu Abdullah al-Iraqi. Abbas also helped an individual named Mohamad Monther al-Hassan provide explosive material to the Duroy bombers (Daily Star [Beirut], July 3, 2014). Al-Hassan’s uncle was former JJS amir al-Dandashi, who fought with FI alongside two other of al-Hassan’s uncles (NOW Lebanon, July 16, 2014). Well after most of FI’s corps integrated into JJS, on July 7, 2014, JJS pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (YouTube, July 7, 2014). On January 25, 2014, Abu Sayyaf al-Anbari, a former FI commander, released a video announcing the establishment of an Islamic State franchise in Lebanon (al-Arabiya, January 25, 2014).After the clashes in north Lebanon in October 2014, Salafist-Jihadists suffered a number of setbacks in 2015, including the assassination of JN leader Usama Mansur Abu Umar in





April, and the arrests of al-Assir in August, Islamic State recruiter Omar Ghannoum on August 25, and Ibrahim al-Atrash in September. Al-Atrash, along with JN’s Qalamoun amir Malek Abu al-Talleh, formed and armed JN units in Arsal, and also participated in the kidnapping of LAF and policemen during the August battle (Naharnet, September 16).ConclusionThe future of Salafist-Jihadist movements in Lebanon will largely be determined by the ongoing conflict in Syria and Lebanese domestic politics. The recent Russian military intervention in Syria may diminish the burden on Hezbollah and instead allow it to consolidate and extend its defensive ring from the northeastern Lebanese border to the Homs-Damascus corridor. This prospect could spell trouble for the thousands of Sunni fighters entrenched in Lebanon’s al-Nabek and al-Zabadani districts—key staging zones for operations in eastern Lebanon. Another overlooked but key factor is Lebanon’s domestic political situation. The Lebanese government lacks a president and remains highly-fragmented, dysfunctional and incapable of building fully-functioning, impartial non-sectarian institutions. The lack of credible, moderate Sunni leadership means that some Sunnis will continue to perceive jihadist groups as the most effective defenders of the community.While an increase in Hezbollah’s capabilities and a refocusing of the group on Lebanon may prove disastrous for jihadist groups, it may also harden Sunni militants’ resolve to adapt and survive. Secondly, the Lebanese government shows no signs of becoming significantly more capable to govern, which means that the current conditions in the country, which have allowed jihadists to gain strength and influence, will continue. Despite the government’s recent operational success against jihadist plots, the pattern of fighters coalescing into new, emerging groups continues to underline the influential role of personal connections—most of which have roots in al-Qaeda (including the former al-Qaeda in Iraq group)—in fostering inter-jihadist collaboration and resiliency, which is correspondingly difficult to disrupt. If these groups continue to centralize under fewer banners, as seems the current trend, Lebanon’s Salafist-Jihadist movements will potentially come to pose a greater threat to the country’s fragile political state and delicate sectarian balance in the coming months and years. Patrick Hoover is a Research Associate at the Program on Extremism at the George Washington University Center for Cyber and Homeland Security.Notes1. See http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/.2. Please see http://jihadology.net/2012/07/18/new-statement-from-fata%E1%B8%A5-al-islam-killed-thirty-of-the-soldiers-of-the-rawafi%E1%B8%8D-kufr-in-fondness-in-rural-aleppo/; http://jihadology.net/2012/07/23/new-statement-from-fata%e1%b8%a5-al-islam-about-the-ambush-of-the-army-of-the-alawi-nu%e1%b9%a3ayris-in-the-village-of-al-qas%e1%b9%adal/; http://jihadology.net/2012/07/29/new-statement-from-fata%E1%B8%A5-al-islam-pride-of-the-mujahidin-and-the-dead-of-the-martyrs/.3. Please see http://jihadology.net/2012/12/23/%E1%B9%A3ada-ash-sham-foundation-for-media-production-presents-a-new-video-message-and-statement-from-jund-ash-sham-announcement-on-the-founding-of-jamaat-jund-ash-sham-fi-rif-%E1%B8%A5om/.4. Please see http://jihadology.net/2013/12/19/new-statement-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-in-lebanon-targeting-the-strongholds-of-%E1%B8%A5izb-irani-with-ten-grad-rockets-in-the-hermel-region-of-lebanon/; http://jihadology.net/2014/01/16/new-statement-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-in-lebanon-martyrdom-operation-upon-the-stronghold-of-%E1%B8%A5izb-irani-in-the-hermel/; http://jihadology.net/2014/02/02/new-statement-from-the-abd-allah-azzam-brigades-raid-of-bombing-the-stronghold-of-%e1%b8%a5izb-iran-in-the-hermel/; http://jihadology.net/2014/02/01/new-statement-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-in-lebanon-a-second-martyrdom-operation-upon-the-stronghold-of-%E1%B8%A5izb-iran-in-the-hermel/; http://jihadology.net/2014/02/19/new-statement-from-jabhat-al-nu





%E1%B9%A3rah-in-lebanon-launching-five-grad-rockets-on-the-regions-of-brital-and-al-nabi-shayth/; http://jihadology.net/2014/02/22/new-statement-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-in-lebanon-blessed-martyrdom-operation-in-the-hermel-region/; http://jihadology.net/2014/03/03/new-statement-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-in-lebanon-launching-a-number-of-grad-rockets-upon-the-brital-region/; http://jihadology.net/2014/03/05/new-statement-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-in-lebanon-launching-three-grad-rockets-upon-the-region-of-al-nabi-shayth/; http://jihadology.net/2014/03/08/al-awzai-foundation-for-media-production-presents-a-new-statement-from-the-abd-allah-azzam-brigades-targeting-the-hermel-region-with-six-grad-rockets-in-conjunction-with/; http://jihadology.net/2014/03/13/new-statement-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-in-lebanon-launching-three-grad-rockets-upon-the-region-of-al-nabi-shayth-2/; http://jihadology.net/2014/03/16/new-statement-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-in-lebanon-blessed-martyrdom-operation-on-the-stronghold-of-the-dreaded-%E1%B8%A5izb-iran-in-the-region-of-al-nabi-uthman/.5. The video, which has since been taken down, was available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tQB-pJEBOOg.6. Please see http://jihadology.net/2013/12/26/new-video-message-from-abd-allah-azzam-brigades-siraj-al-din-zurayqat-about-the-raid-of-the-iranian-embassy-in-beirut/.7. Please see http://jihadology.net/2014/03/07/al-awzai-foundation-for-media-production-presents-a-new-statement-from-the-abd-allah-azzam-brigades-on-the-raid-of-the-iranian-cultural-center-in-beirut/.8. Please see http://jihadology.net/2014/06/26/new-statement-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-the-first-raid-in-lebanon/.

Files:TerrorismMonitorVol13Issue21_03.pdf

Oct 21, The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing at a Shia mosque in Saudi Arabia's Najran city in which at least one person was killed and 16 others were injured. The operation targeted "the rejectionist Ismailis", said a statement carried by the

group posted on Twitter, referring to the Ismaili Shia sect who are a minority in Saudi Arabia. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing at a Shia mosque in Saudi Arabia's Najran city in which at least one person was killed and 16 others were injured.

October 23, 2015 Special Dispatch No.6198 South Africa-Based Indian Barelvi Group Issues Anti-Shi'a Fatwa, Declares Them Apostates And Evil, Quotes Prophet Muhammad As Saying: 'Shortly There Will Appear A Group Of People Whose Name Will Be Synonymous With Evil'The following report is a complimentary offering from MEMRI's Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor (JTTM).

A fatwa published by an Indian Barelvi organization based in South Africa noted that the Islamic State (ISIS) considers Shi'ites to be apostates and therefore eligible to be killed, and likewise declares Shi'ites to be apostates.The Barelvi movement in Islam originated from the northern Indian town of Bareilly. It is a movement within Sunni Islam. The Barelvi doctrinal movement, founded in opposition to the Deobandi movement of Islam by Islamic theologian Imam Ahmed Raza Khan (1856-1921), has established branches in many parts of the world. Khan is popularly known as A'la Hazrat. Imam Ahmed Raza Academy, a leading institution of the Barelvi movement, is





based in South Africa. Its website, Raza.org.za, gives its official address as 1st Floor, 92 Victoria Street, Durban 4001, Republic of South Africa.Similar Barelvi organizations exist around the world, notably the Raza Academy in Mumbai, India. However, the Barelvi movement's international headquarters are in Bareilly. Generally speaking, fatwas are published in the form of a question and answer when a person seeks an opinion on an issue. Below is the text of the fatwa published by the Durban-Based Imam Ahmed Raza Academy, in the original English: "Imam Ahmed Raza's... Fatwa on Having Contact With Shia Individuals"A Translation of the Fatwa – Mas'ala No. 87, page 179 of 'Ahkaam-e-Shariat'

"Question: What advice do the Ulema of Deen [scholars of religion] have to offer to the members of the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (Sunnis) regarding their relationship with the Shias (Rawafiz), as to whether they should maintain a friendly association with Shias; or eat and drink with Shias; and whether the maintaining of trade relationship with Shias is permissible? Furthermore, what is the Shar'an [i.e. shari'a-based] ruling against these Sunnis that have such relationships with Shias? Do such Sunnis fall out of the fold of the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat? (Should such Sunnis be excluded from the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat?) And should the rest of the Sunni Muslims severe all religious and social ties with the Sunni Muslim that associates with Shias?"

"Answer: Shias (Rawafiz) have commonly been known throughout the ages as apostates (Murtad) as it has been clearly outlined in 'Raddur Rufaza' (a Fatwa published in the form of a booklet by A'la Hazrat). It is not Halal to have any form of contact or maintain any type of relationship with them in any manner that you would normally have with a fellow Muslim. It is Haram [forbidden] to maintain any form of social contact with them; [to] accord them any form of social etiquette; [to] greet them (make Salaam to them); and even [to] speak to them. Almighty Allah says in the Holy Koran, Surah 6, Verse 68 (Surah An'aam): 'If Satan ever makes thee forget, then after reflection, sit not thou in the company of those who do wrong.'"Rasoolullah [the Prophet Muhammad]... stated in a Hadith: 'Shortly there will appear a group of people (in the Ummah) whose name will be synonymous with evil; they will be known as Raavzi (meaning Heretics or Shias). They will revile the virtuous predecessors (Salf-o-Saleheen); and they will not attend the Jumu'a Salaah [collective prayer], and they will not adhere to the Jamaat (mainstream body of Muslims). Neither sit in their company nor join them for meals, nor drink water with them. Do not intermarry with them or visit them when they are sick. Do not attend the funerals of their dead; and neither join them in the Salaatul Janazah [funeral prayer] nor perform the Salaatul Janazah for their deceased.'"

The above fatwa is also accompanied by the following text written by the Imam Ahmed Raza Academy on the website:"Those Sunni Muslims who freely intermingle socially with the Shias or Raavzis, if they have not already become Shias themselves, are extreme transgressors (of the Shariat). Sunnis are advised to sever social ties with those who freely intermingle with Raavzis or Shias..." "Regarding this sect, the Muslim Revivalist (Mujaddid)... Imam Ahmed Raza... has stated in his Fatawah [fatwas] that this sect, i.e. Shia and Rawafiz, are disassociated from the boundary of Islam (Millat-e-Islamia) and they are regarded as apostates (Fatawah Razveeiah, Vol. 6, Page 25)" Source: Raza.org.za (South Africa), accessed September 9, 2015. The original English of the text has been lightly edited for clarity and standardization.




al-qaida chief ayman al-zawahiri the coordinator 2015 part 19-71-caliphate-sunni-shia-12

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