al-qaida chief ayman al-zawahiri the coordinator 2016 part 19-135-caliphate- abbottabad documents-4

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Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-135-Caliphate- Abbottabad Documents-4

The US has released a second tranche of documents found during the 2011 raid on a house in Pakistan that killed Osama Bin Laden. C i-ii-iii-iv-v

BBC 2 March, A total of 115 documents have been released, including the al-Qaeda leader's will. Other writings show Bin Laden's fear of being electronically tracked. Here are seven things we learned:

1. 'Obey my will'Bin Laden left a personal fortune of around $29m (£21m) after his death.He urged his family to "obey my will" and to spend his inheritance on "jihad, for the sake of Allah". He referred to the money as being in Sudan, but it is not clear whether it was cash or assets. Bin Laden lived in Sudan for five years in the 1990s as a guest of the Sudanese government. He also ordered sums of money to be given to two men and various relatives. It is not known whether any of the money made its way to his heirs.

2. He thought his wife's tooth was being trackedThe fear of being tracked is a recurring theme in Bin Laden's writing.In a letter to one of his wives, who lived in Iran, the world's most wanted man revealed his fear that a dentist could have inserted an electronic tracking device in her tooth during a cavity operation. "The size of the chip is about the length of a grain of wheat and the width of a fine piece of vermicelli," he wrote under the name Abu Abdullah. The letter ended with an instruction to destroy it. In another letter, Bin Laden fretted about moving money safely. He instructed operatives to discard suitcases carrying cash for fear that they could contain tracking chips and said money should be transported by vehicle, but only on cloudy days, suggesting he feared they could be targeted by drones.Further letters from al-Qaeda commanders detailed the toll being taken on the organisation by drone strikes and one letter admits four men were wrongly executed on suspicion of spying.

3. Feud with future Islamic State groupSeveral documents show a long-running disagreement with al-Qaeda's affiliate in Iraq, which later became the so-called Islamic State (IS). Bin Laden opposed the use of beheadings and other brutality by the then group al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)."We must not get overwhelmed by the war, its atmosphere, conditions, hatreds and revenge that might mislead us," he wrote. Bin Laden also opposed AQI's aim of declaring a caliphate, which he believed did not have enough popular support and posed governance challenges that the group could not meet.

4. Battle for control of his organisationThe documents also show Bin Laden's battle to maintain control over the various al-Qaeda franchises. One document (C-vi) reveals an attempt to get them to adopt a unified management structure, outlining a "chief of staff committee" made up of "officers and personnel qualified to work with a military commander leader" and listing its tasks.A letter to al-Qaeda's branch in Yemen exhorts them to "extend and develop our operations in America" and move on from attempts to blow up US aircraft.Meanwhile a letter from the head of the al-Qaeda franchise in north Africa informs Bin Laden that representatives from north African countries have been admitted on to the organisations's Shura Council as a way of keeping an eye on the local militants, who are described as numerous but young and "lacking jihadi experience".

5. Plan for a 9/11 anniversaryThe year 2011 was to be a big one for Bin Laden.

“Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”― Sun Tzu, The Art of War

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His organisation was planning a media blitz to mark the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks and proposed working with certain media outlets to arrange

coverage. However, there was no discussion of any planned attack. Bin Laden himself was also planning to move out of the compound he was hiding in the Pakistani town of Abbottabad."I say that the latest time we can stay with our present companion brothers is the tenth anniversary of the attack on New York and Washington, after a few months from now; or at the end of this year, 2011," he wrote. However he was killed before the anniversary was reached.

6. University of jihadA study course for new jihadists, entitled "Course of Islamic Study for Soldiers and Members", is included in the declassified documents.Teaching reading and writing is the first module, followed by a long reading list based on the Koran. A third section of lectures includes books by leading contemporary jihadists such as the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who led AQI, as well as a briefing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

7. Wives on the front lineWhether al-Qaeda commanders should be allowed to have their wives with them in their bases appears to have been a vexed issue in the organisation. One document from an al-Qaeda branch in Morocco entitled "The presence of Mujahidin spouses in the field" instructs any commanders who have their wives with them to send them back to their homes and families. Drawing on a range of sources, it concludes that "jihad is not required from women" and says it is allowed to "have an elder woman but not a young one, in a safe area in the frontlines" to prevent fighters becoming distracted."We ask our brothers for their understanding and co-operation," it says.

Osama Bin Laden’s Files: Letters to the ‘Commander of the Faithful’BY THOMAS JOSCELYN | March 3, 2016 | [email protected] | @thomasjoscelyn

In a letter addressed to Mullah Omar in late 2010, Osama bin Laden argued that the West had been “undermined and weakened in every respect” by the war in Afghanistan. The al Qaeda master believed the jihadists simply needed to be patient, as the West lacked the will to keep fighting and had suffered “socially, politically, militarily and economically” from the war. Bin Laden offered an economic justification for his assessment, claiming that “America’s wise men are telling the government it must reduce the size of the Pentagon budget to lower payments and interest on their (national) debt, which is now a truly astronomical number.”“You are well aware that some members of NATO — mainly Canada — have announced that they will pull out in 2011, and opposition parties in the Western countries are calling for them to get out of Afghanistan,” bin Laden wrote. “Even Obama believes they need to withdraw in the coming months, as he said publicly, but the Republicans and military generals have been pressuring him and [are] saying that their pulling out would be [seen as] a defeat that would affect their standing and interests throughout the world.”Bin Laden compared President Obama to former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who oversaw the Russians’ withdrawal from Afghanistan after a prolonged war. Bin Laden argued that Obama was making the same kinds of statements that Gorbachev once did in his conversations with Russian generals. “I don’t have money to buy milk for the troops,” bin Laden quoted Gorbachev as saying, according to the US government’s translation of the letter.





Bin Laden also complained about the jihadist operations that caused civilian casualties in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The al Qaeda master’s files are

littered with references to the deleterious effects of such attacks. And bin Laden wanted Omar to address the situation directly.“On another note, you may have heard the many news reports of people praying in mosques and being targeted in attacks that were attributed to mujahidin — especially in Pakistan and Afghanistan recently — as well as attacks on certain markets,” bin Laden wrote. “Dozens of Muslims have been cut down in mosques and public gathering areas just to kill one enemy, and that is not legally permissible [under Islamic law].”“Muslims in general, and the mujahidin in particular, need to hear you [Mullah Omar] cautioning them on the serious matter of shedding Muslim blood unjustly,” bin Laden advised.Two copies of the 2010 letter were included in a cache of 113 declassified files released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) this week. The letters and memos were recovered during the raid on bin Laden’s Abbottabad, Pakistan compound in early May 2011.One version of the letter is dated Nov. 5, 2010. The second, revised copy is dated early Dec. 2010. Both are addressed to the “Commander (Emir) of the Faithful,” a title usually reserved for the Caliph, or Muslim ruler. Al Qaeda used the title for Mullah Omar after bin Laden swore allegiance to him sometime prior to the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Omar, who likely died sometime in 2013, was succeeded by Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour. Ayman al Zawahiri swore fealty to Mansour on behalf of al Qaeda in Aug. 2015. Al Qaeda has referred to Mansour as the “Commander (Emir) of the Faithful” since then. (Al Qaeda’s rivals in the Islamic State use this same honorific when referring to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, who has been renamed “Caliph Ibrahim” by his followers.)Bin Laden’s letter to Omar shows that al Qaeda used the title “Commander of the Faithful” for the Taliban’s chief even in its private correspondence.Indeed, bin Laden emphasized his loyalty to Omar, writing: “We are ready to obey your command.”Another letter addressed to the “Emir of the Believers”A short letter addressed to the “Emir of the Believers,” written in Sept. 2010 by an unidentified author, was also released by the ODNI this week. The missive is brief and its contents are difficult to assess given that its context is unclear. The correspondence is a reply to a letter that was apparently authored by Omar, or by Omar’s subordinates on his behalf.“I have received your kind letter,” the Sept. 2010 letter reads, referring to correspondence attributed to Omar. “I was so happy reading it and I understood what it contained,” the author wrote.The letter reiterates al Qaeda’s fealty to the Taliban’s leader: “We are saying to you, we heard and are in obedience regarding what you had mentioned. We are your soldiers and we are with you heart and soul in supporting the religion of God Almighty.”Al Qaeda skeptical of statements attributed to Mullah OmarThe files from late 2010 reveal that bin Laden was likely corresponding with the Taliban’s senior leadership. And previously released memos found in bin Laden’s possession demonstrate that al Qaeda was closely cooperating with the Haqqani Network, which is part of the Taliban alliance, that same year.However, communications between bin Laden and Mullah Omar were interrupted for some time. In January 2010, “Abu Yahya” wrote to “our honorable Shaykh” (almost certainly bin Laden) that “[o]ne of the important issues” was “to increase the consolidation





of the relation[ship] with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” which “praise be to God” was already “very good.”

The author, who was likely Abu Yahya al Libi (a senior al Qaeda official killed in a US drone strike in June 2012), warned that the Taliban “published statements on some occasions” using “expressions and phrases that were not known or used before by them.” These “statements were issued under the name of Emir al-Mu’minin [“Emir of the Believers,” or Mullah Omar],” but were “far from his style and tone.”The Taliban’s “Shura Council might have the authority to issue statements on his [Omar’s] behalf,” Abu Yahya explained. In fact, the Taliban did falsely issue statements in Mullah Omar’s name long after he passed away.Abu Yahya recommended that the “Shaykh” (bin Laden) correspond directly with Mullah Omar. “Our respected Shaykh, what I see is to activate the relationship between you and Emir al-Mu’minin [“Emir of the Believers”] through correspondence…so that [it] will create a good impression for them and make them feel that you are close and adopting their case,” he wrote.Abu Yahya wanted to thwart any “enticements” from the Americans, which he didn’t think would lure most Taliban commanders but could still cause problems. (The US government has held talks with Taliban representatives, hoping to end the group’s alliance with al Qaeda. These efforts have failed.)Writing to Omar would allow al Qaeda to “show a kind devotion toward” to the Taliban “for their huge sacrifices that they provided and are still offering, especially [because] they are facing enticements from the Americans and their allies, which might reach a high level,” Abu Yahya wrote. “Only the truthful could stay firm; praise be to God, they are the majority in the [Taliban’s] Emirate. Nevertheless, they need to be stabilized, and your speeches have a special influence upon them, yet this is one of the great jihadi methods.”Abu Yahya believed that bin Laden’s writings could “maintain” al Qaeda’s “unity” with the Taliban and “unite our voice.”Bin Laden evidently agreed with Abu Yahya, and began writing to Mullah Omar later that same year. The full scope of their communications cannot be ascertained based solely on the documents released thus far. It is likely that additional evidence of communications with Mullah Omar was recovered in bin Laden’s home. But al Qaeda was clearly skeptical, at least for a time, about who was issuing statements in Mullah Omar’s name.Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.

Osama Bin Laden’s Files: AQAP emir foreshadowed 2011 takeover of southern YemenBY BILL ROGGIO | March 2, 2016 |

Nasir al Wuhayshi, the emir of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula who later became al Qaeda’s general manager, detailed the group’s strengths in Yemen’s provinces prior its





spring 2011 offensive that saw much of the south fall under its control.Wuhayshi, who was killed by the US in a drone strike in June 2015, outlined

AQAP’s position in an undated letter that was addressed to an unnamed “brother.” The letter, which was seized from Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, was one of more than 100 released on March 1 by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.The letter appears to have been written sometime in early or mid-2010, while Yemen was experiencing political upheaval and President Abdullah Salih was under pressure to step down. In the letter, Wuhayshi responded to questions from “Abu ‘Uthman,” and notes that “The political conflict is deteriorating and the situation of the country is about to fall apart.” He advocated that AQAP take action lest it fail to capitalize on the political chaos.“Our fear is that, if it falls apart without us having a presence on all levels, we will face competition” from the various factions in Yemen, including “the Muslim Brotherhood and Communists, especially in the South” the Iran-backed Houthis in the north, The Southern Movement (Hirak), and the Revolution Council led by Tariq al Fadhli, Wuhayshi noted.“Our situation, thanks to Allah, is improving for the mujahidin, and as I have mentioned in my previous letters, if you ever wanted Sanaa [the capital of Yemen], today is the day!” Wuhayshi wrote.Wuhayshi then went on to outline the “regions” in Yemen where AQAP is “centralized.” First on his list was Abyan, “which is considered one of the largest area in which we have supporters, presence, and many members, and we have more influence than the Hirak southern secessionist forces.”The next two most important provinces for AQAP are Shabwa and Marib, “which is the largest area and has tribal influence; we are taking advantage of the ruggedness of its land and the influence of its members.”“Then it’s Al Jawf, and Sa’dah in Wadi Abu Jbarah, and Arhab [in] Sanaa, which is considered the largest area in which we hold power,” he continued. “We have supporters and sympathizers in Lahij, Ad Dali’, Aden, Hadramawt, Sanaa, and Al Hudaydah and others.”Wuhayshi then noted the importance of the tribes and their leaders, and said “they have pledged allegiance and they are with us even if they are only a few.” However, “some of them are afraid and prefer to be neutral.”AQAP goes on the offensiveOther documents released from bin Laden’s cache from Abbottabad show there was an ongoing discussion between Wuhayshi and al Qaeda’s central leadership over the merits and pitfalls of taking control of territory in Yemen.Bin Laden responded to Wuhayshi’s letter where he said “if you ever wanted Sanaa [the capital of Yemen], today is the day,” and said it was too soon for AQAP to attempt to overthrow the government. The lengthy letter is undated, but was likely written in the spring of 2010.In another letter, likely written by bin Laden in May 2010 that is addressed to his general manager, Atiyah Abd al Rahman, the al Qaeda emir advocated that AQAP avoid attacking the Yemeni military and police and suggested it only attack US interests in the country. Atiyah responds in July 2010, and told bin Laden that war in Yemen is imminent and that it is time to prepare a military strategy with Wuhayshi. In a letter dated Aug. 7, 2010, bin Laden told Atiyah he is awaiting the details from Wuhayshi in order to discuss the matter on a wider scale to make the most suitable decision.” On Aug. 27, 2010, bin Laden told Atiyah he is awaiting input for Yemeni strategy from Wuhayshi, Anwar al Awlaki, and Said al Shihri.





While the conclusion of this discussion was not disclosed in the recently released filed, AQAP went on the offensive in southern Yemen beginning in

April 2011. And based on Wuhayshi’s prior assessment, AQAP targeted many of the areas he said were vulnerable.By the summer of 2011, AQAP controlled most if not all of Shabwa and Abyan, two of the three provinces he identified as jihadists bastions. AQAP also seized territory in Marib, Lahj, Baydah, and Hadramout. Until the Yemeni government and military regrouped in the spring of 2012, AQAP controlled and administered a large portion of southern Yemen.While AQAP lost the ground it held in southern Yemen after one year, Wuhayshi said the sacrifice was worth it. In two letters, written in May 2012 and August 2012 to Abdelmalek Droukdel, the emir of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Wuhayshi advised AQIM be patient in seizing territory in Mali and to slowly implement sharia, or Islamic law. He also detailed AQAP’s losses, and concluded it was worth the effort.“The control of these areas during one year cost us 500 martyrs, 700 wounded, 10 cases of hand or leg amputation and nearly $20 million,” he said. AQAP’s “position now is far better” despite its losses, as the year of governing large areas gave it “a rare opportunity for guerrilla warfare and liquidations [assassinations].” Additionally, “most of the battle costs, if not all, were paid from through the spoils” of war as well as by taking hostages. [See LWJ report, Wuhayshi imparted lessons of AQAP operations in Yemen to AQIM.]Wuhayshi appears to have been correct. AQAP regrouped after losing ground in southern Yemen in 2012, and capitalized on the next round of Yemeni political turmoil. In 2015, AQAP took advantage of the Houthi takeover of the capital of Sana’a and large areas in western, central, and southern Yemen. Today, AQAP again controls large areas of southern Yemen, primarily in Abyan, Shabwa, Hadramout, and Lahj. [See LWJ report, Al Qaeda seizes more territory in southern Yemen.]Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of The Long War Journal.

Osama Bin Laden’s Files: Al Qaeda considered a truce with MauritaniaBY THOMAS JOSCELYN | March 1, 2016 | A newly declassified memo recovered in Osama bin Laden’s compound reveals that al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) considered a truce with the government of Mauritania. It is not clear what, if anything, came of the proposal. But al Qaeda’s senior leadership drafted the terms of a possible deal. The authors of the undated file state that the matter was raised after AQIM’s leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel (also known as Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud), sent a letter to al Qaeda’s management team.“The brothers discussed the matter, and Shaykh Mahmud [Atiyah Abd al Rahman] and Shaykh Abu Yahya [al Libi] were tasked to write a legal research on the truce matter with the apostates and as to whether it was permissible – also to propose it to the leadership, after which we would send it to Abu Musab [Abdel Wadoud]…and to correspond with the Mauritanian brothers to convince them,” the US government’s translation reads.Atiyah Abd al Rahman and Abu Yahya al Libi served as al Qaeda’s general managers before being killed in US drone strikes. Rahman was killed in August 2011 and Libi was struck down in June 2012. The proposed deal would have been very favorable to al Qaeda. In exchange for not carrying out “any military activity in Mauritania,” al Qaeda would have received a number of concessions.The Mauritanian government would have been prohibited from intercepting “the Mujahidin,” including “the seekers of knowledge.” Therefore, al Qaeda could have proselytized inside the country without harassment from security forces. All of the





“prisoner brothers” were to be released and the government “should commit to not carry out any hostile attack against the brothers from its territories.”

If Mauritania agreed to the proposal then it would have been “effective for one year and subject to renewal” with the government paying “10 to 20 million euros annually….to compensate” for AQIM’s loss of income from “the kidnapping of tourists.”For obvious reasons, al Qaeda wanted the deal to “remain a secret agreement between both parties.” If the deal was struck, then AQIM could “benefit from the truce and focus on Algeria,” while also safely putting “cadres” in “rear bases available in Mauritania.”There is no evidence in the files that Mauritania agreed to the proposition.Although the memo does not indicate precisely when this potential agreement was discussed, there are clues in other bin Laden’s files.One of the al Qaeda leaders who deliberated the permissibility of a truce was “Shaykh Haji ‘Uthman,” a nom de guerre used by Shaykh Saeed al Masri (also known as Mustafa Abu al Yazid), who perished in a May 2010 drone strike. Like Rahman and Libi, Masri served as al Qaeda’s general manager prior to his demise. This means the discussions took place sometime before May 2010.Another clue can be found in a letter previously released from bin Laden’s cache. On June 19, 2010, Rahman informed bin Laden that the “brothers in Algeria are definitely waiting for an answer regarding the truce with the apostates and the ransom of their prisoners.” This is almost certainly a reference to the same deal that AQIM wanted to enter into with Mauritania.Rahman noted that “Sheikh Saeed” (al Masri) had previously sent bin Laden the “letters [from] Algeria and others,” but he wanted to double-check that bin Laden received them. “We wrote to them before, and we told Sheikh Abu Yahya to look into this matter further and I hope that you will write to them and us,” Rahman wrote in June 2010.Again, this is consistent with the details in the newly released memo. Abu Yahya al Libi and Rahman are named as the jihadists responsible for researching the issue.Rahman informed bin Laden that their “opinion in that matter” (that is, the proposed truce) was attached to his June 2010 letter.Sought bin Laden’s advice on expanding AQIM’s shura councilThe bin Laden files document other occasions when AQIM sought guidance from al Qaeda’s senior leadership. In another newly released letter, Abdelmalek Droukdel asks bin Laden for his advice concerning the expansion of AQIM’s elite Shura (or advisory) council.“I decided that it was my duty to expand the Shura council of the Organization [AQIM] to include representatives from all the countries of the Islamic Maghreb,” Droukdel informed bin Laden in the undated letter. Droukdel said it was a “legal right for our Mujahidin brothers in these countries,” and was also “the only way for us to become aware of their situation and circumstances and to know about the condition of the people.”Droukdel thought that the inclusion of more jihadists on the Shura would help in establishing AQIM’s “plans” and “policies” in their areas. “Also, without knowing the real situation, we cannot advance and spread jihad in the best fashion to the countries of the Islamic Maghreb, which we are striving to cleanse from the filth of apostates and aspiring to liberate from the Western dominance,” he wrote.Droukdel “decided to include representatives from Tunis, Morocco, Libya, Mauritania, and the Western Sahara.” Still, there was a problem. The “number of brothers who join jihad, such as the Libyans and Tunisians, can be significant,” but “most of them are young (may God extend their lives) and they lack jihadi experience.”AQIM’s emir selected a jihadist known as “Munir al-Tunisi” to represent the Tunisians,





because Tunisi “is known to the brothers in Afghanistan” after participating “in the first Afghan jihad.”

But Droukdel “wanted to consult with” bin Laden “on this issue,” given the al Qaeda master’s “rich and invaluable experience and expertise in the area of organization and management.”“We await your guidance and counsel for completing this process, which without a doubt will increase the harmony, unity, and strength of al Mujahidin in the Islamic Maghreb,” Droukdel wrote to bin Laden.It is not surprising that AQIM’s emir would seek guidance from bin Laden. Al Qaeda’s leaders refer to various “districts” in the files recovered in Abbottabad. Each one of these “districts” is a regional branch of al Qaeda’s international organization. The head of each branch swears an oath of loyalty (bay’ah) to al Qaeda’s overall leader. At the time of the aforementioned correspondence, Droukdel was bound by a bay’ah to bin Laden. After the May 2011 raid in Abbottabad, Droukdel reaffirmed his fealty to Ayman al Zawahiri.Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.

Osama Bin Laden’s Files: Boko Haram’s leader wanted to be ‘under one banner’BY THOMAS JOSCELYN | March 4, 2016 |

Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, which became the Islamic State’s “province” in West Africa.Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, requested to speak with Osama bin Laden’s deputy, according to a newly released letter recovered during the May 2011 raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

After citing Islamic texts concerning the benefits of unity and the pitfalls of factionalism, Shekau said he and his men had “listened to…the tapes of al Qaeda and its sheikhs,” including bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, Abu Yahya al Libi and Abu Qatadah al Filistini. Zarqawi, who founded al Qaeda in Iraq and was killed in June 2006, was already dead when Shekau wrote his letter, as he asked Allah to “have mercy on [Zarqawi’s] soul.” Abu Yahya al Libi served as al Qaeda’s general manager until his demise in a US drone strike in June 2012.“But now what we have left is to learn about the system of the organization and how it is organized,” Shekau continued. “The traveler will fail if he does not become familiar with the road that he is taking, and when he fails he may return or choose other options. But, when the traveler knows his way, he never fails, because he knew what he was facing.”Shekau asked Allah to “bear witness” that “we want to be under one banner and there must be a vision to begin with, because our religion is a religion of vision and knowledge.”





“With your permission,” he concluded his letter, “I ask to speak with Osama bin Laden’s deputy, may Allah protect him, because the group is loyal, which

Allah will ask me about on the Day of Judgment.”Shekau was likely referring to how al Qaeda “is organized” and the requirements to become part of the organization. Ayman al Zawahiri was bin Laden’s deputy when Shekau’s request was written.Neither the original Arabic, nor the English translation posted online by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) is dated. According to the US government’s translation, Shekau wrote that he and his men “pledge[d] allegiance to our Imam Abu Yusuf Muhammad Bin Yusuf” and this “union” has “continued with us even to this day.” Yusuf, who led Boko Haram, was killed in July 2009.In 2012, both the Washington Post and the Guardian (UK) reported that bin Laden’s files included correspondence with Boko Haram. But it wasn’t until earlier this week that Shekau’s letter was released. The press reporting on bin Laden’s documents suggests that there are more documents related to Boko Haram that have not yet been released. [See LWJ Report, UN adds Boko Haram to al Qaeda sanctions list.]Ties between Boko Haram and al Qaeda’s network prior to joining Islamic StateThe State Department has offered a $7 million reward for information leading to Shekau’s capture. In its wanted notice, State’s Rewards for Justice program recognized the ties between Boko Haram and three al Qaeda branches. There “are reported communications, training, and weapons links between Boko Haram, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al Shabaab, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP], which may strengthen Boko Haram’s capacity to conduct terrorist attacks,” the rewards page for Shekau reads.In Nov. 2013, State designated Boko Haram as a terrorist organization, noting its “links” to AQIM. And when Foggy Bottom designated three Boko Haram leaders (including Shekau) in 2012, it said that two of them “have close links to” AQIM.In July 2013, the UN reported that Boko Haram fighters had been trained in a Shabaab camp in Sudan. According to the UN’s well-placed source, the Boko Haram members were trained by a terrorist “specifically tasked by” al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri to provide instruction to jihadists in Africa.In 2014, the International Crisis Group (ICG) reported independent evidence concerning Zawahiri’s communications with a jihadist who was allied with Boko Haram.Al Qaeda “cells” in West Africa “received communications from Osama bin Laden through intermediaries,” the ICG claimed in a footnote. The “more important a cell, the fewer go-betweens.” Citing a “member” of Ansaru, a jihadist group that has fought alongside Boko Haram at times, the ICG said that Zawahiri “communicated directly with” a leader known as Kambar. Ansaru, which was led by Kambar until his death in 2012, eventually disowned Shekau’s Boko Haram.Shekau swore bay’ah (allegiance) to Baghdadi in 2015Despite Boko Haram’s ties to al Qaeda’s international network, Shekau never swore allegiance, at least publicly, to bin Laden or Zawahiri.Al Qaeda’s leaders may have had reservations about Shekau’s erratic behavior. Al Qaeda also has rules that groups must follow before officially joining the organization, and Shekau’s men have been unwilling to comply. For example, Boko Haram’s deliberate targeting of Muslim civilians violates al Qaeda’s guidelines for waging jihad.Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s Islamic State, which began to rival al Qaeda in 2013 and 2014, has placed no such limits on the violence carried out by its fighters. The Islamic State wooed Shekau in early 2015 by sending a team of operatives to West Africa to secure his





allegiance. Shekau swore his fealty to Baghdadi in Mar. 2015.“[W]e announce our allegiance to the Caliph of the Muslims [Abu Bakr al

Baghdadi]…and will hear and obey in times of difficulty and prosperity, in hardship and ease, and to endure being discriminated against, and not to dispute about rule with those in power, except in case of evident infidelity regarding that which there is a proof from Allah,” Shekau said in an audio message at the time.“We call on Muslims everywhere to pledge allegiance to the Caliph and support him, as obedience to Allah and as their application of the absent duty of the era,” Shekau added. [See LWJ report, Boko Haram leader pledges allegiance to the Islamic State.]Boko Haram was rebranded as the Islamic State’s “province” in West Africa after Shekau’s announcement.Shekau’s letter is somewhat ironic given his eventual decision to join Baghdadi’s cause. In his appeal to al Qaeda’s leaders, Shekau cited hadith (sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad) “calling for unification and rejecting rift.” The rivalry between the Islamic State and al Qaeda is the biggest rift in the history of modern jihadism.Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.




i http://www.dni.gov/index.php/resources/bin-laden-bookshelf?start=1

ii Jihad in Pakistan... Why? And How? http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/Jihad%20in%20Pakistan.pdf

iii To my brothers, the Mujahidin in Iraq, to the heroes in Baghdad in the House of the Caliphate and what surrounds it http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/Second%20letter%20to%20%20Muslim%20brothers%20in%20Iraq.pdf

iv Here, I tell the Muslims in Yemen that the reasons for a revolution and the factors for its success are available to you. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/To%20Muslims%20in%20Yemen.pdf

v Liberating humans before liberating countries http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/Liberating%20humans%20before%20liberating%20countries.pdf

vi Chief of Staff Committee http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/Chief%20of%20Staff%20Committee.pdf

http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/Chief%20of%20Staff%20Committee.pdf

http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/Liberating%20humans%20before%20liberating%20countries.pdf

http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/Liberating%20humans%20before%20liberating%20countries.pdf

http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/To%20Muslims%20in%20Yemen.pdf

http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/Second%20letter%20to%20%20Muslim%20brothers%20in%20Iraq.pdf

http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/Second%20letter%20to%20%20Muslim%20brothers%20in%20Iraq.pdf

http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/Jihad%20in%20Pakistan.pdf

http://www.dni.gov/index.php/resources/bin-laden-bookshelf?start=1