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C de Waart; CdW Intelligence to Rent [email protected] In Confidence

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-138-Caliphate-The State of al-Qaida-45-Seven Phases-14

Just ask al-Suri.“IS is the sexy topic for most people who are watching this stuff. And anyone leaving their home country to go to Syria, people just assume they’re going to join IS. But a lot of people are drawn to Nusra because it’s al Qaeda in Syria, it’s carrying the torch of Osama bin Laden and carrying the torch of the original movement,”

Al-Qaeda 2.0? Meet Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and his grand strategy for the Islamic StateIn November last year, Paris suffered its biggest terrorist attack in modern history when 130 people died in a series of shootings and bombings across the city. The mastermind of the attack, a Belgian national Abdelhamid Abaaoud, was suspected to have travelled to Syria in the past. All of his accomplices were nationals of the European Union. The following month, an American couple of Pakistani origin, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, killed 14 people in a shooting in the Californian city of San Bernardino. No direct ties to any extremist group were found — beyond evidence of self-radicalisation.A nightclub in Orlando, Florida, was attacked by an American of Afghan descent in June this year, the biggest mass-shooting in US history. The attacker, Omar Mateen, was troubled though not having shown in any overt signs of being radicalised. He pledged allegiance to Islamic State head — and self-proclaimed caliph — Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi only during a call to an emergency line during the shooting. Paris, San Bernardino, Orlando, Dhaka, Nice. What connects them, beyond the fact that all of the attackers had — in one way or another — operated under the IS banner? Are they, as the media is fond of saying, “lone wolves,” whose actions are being cleverly coopted by the IS? Or are they proverbial pawns in IS' grand strategy? What is IS' grand strategy? The answers to these questions may lie in the writings of one man, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri — a Syrian national with Spanish citizenship who was once described by a journalist as resembling an “Irish pub patron”. Al-Suri is now in a prison in Syria, having been rendered there by the CIA after he was captured in Quetta, Pakistan, in 2005. His ideas, on the other hand, are very much at play.Indeed, tracing through al-Suri’s writings from around the time he was an Al-Qaeda affiliate, we find a remarkable link between his strategic theory — to which Al-Qaeda never quite warmed up — and the relatively-later phenomenon of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria that morphed into the IS we know today.The intellectual jihadistMustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Nasar — known through a combination of kunya and nom de guerre as “Abu Mus’ab al-Suri” (father of Mus’ab, the Syrian) — was born in Aleppo, Syria in 1958. He began his career as an Islamist militant in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood — deeply influenced by the writings of Egyptian Islamist ideologue Sayyid Qutb. In the 1980s, al-Suri moved to Europe and settled in Spain, eventually obtaining Spanish citizenship through marriage to a Spanish converted to Islam. Like many Islamist militants of that time, al-Suri participated in the Afghan jihad, and established a link with Osama bin Laden.In fact, bin Laden’s first interview to a western television channel — conducted by Peter Bergen of CNN in 1997 — was facilitated by al-Suri. Bergen came out of this experience deeply impressed by al-Suri, admitting that he came to “admire his intellect.” Al-Suri was something of an autodidact intellectual, intimately familiar with western classical music. His affection for his Spanish wife — contrast this with the dour nature of most Islamists — was something that struck his acquaintances. Al-Suri was not your average Islamist.While al-Suri was an Al-Qaeda man, his strategic weltanschauung was to diverge with that of Al-

1The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see. –Winston ChurchillCees de Waart: CdW Intelligence to Rent of 14

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Qaeda’s in significant ways. He was to also become increasingly contemptuous of bin Laden — something he shared with the ‘grandfather’ of the IS, the Jordanian Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi. By all accounts, al-Suri had a tremendous influence on al-Zarqawi. After the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, al-Suri produced his opus — a 1,600-page book called Global Islamic Resistance Call. This remarkable book outlined his vision for ‘Al-Qaeda 2.0’ based on historical lessons learnt, as well as on a close reading of western geopolitics and military strategy. IS was to own up to this Al-Qaeda strategist’s work, as seen by an (unattributed) summa of the same in the first issue of the group’s flagship journal Dabiq.The grand strategy of global jihad The first such lesson was the tenuous nature of traditional centralised ‘secret-hierarchical’ terrorist outfits. Al-Suri had brought up this point in a lecture at an Al-Qaeda training camp. As he put it, in such organisations, if one member is caught, then all others are too, since — by definition of such outfits — each member can be linked to every other member. The need, according to al-Suri, was a “system, not organisation”. A key component of this putative ‘resistance system’ would be individuals who would commit to nothing “other than to believe in the ideas, be absolutely certain in his intention, join the call, and educate himself and those around him”, while at the same time pledging allegiance to the system — the tactic of, in al-Suri’s terminology — “individual-terrorism jihad.”The link between the system and the individual, according to al-Suri, would consist of a common aim, a common name, and a common doctrinal jihadi programme. This is precisely what the relationship of the San Bernardino attackers or the Orlando attacker was to IS. It turns out that social media, in effect, facilitated the practical implementation of al-Suri’s theory.But al-Suri recognised that the focus of the ‘resistance call’ would be the consolidation of physical territory, the second lesson. He considers the greatest loss from the 11 September, 2001 attacks to be not the destruction of the extant Al-Qaeda but the expulsion of the Taliban as rulers of Afghanistan, which meant that the group didn’t have a consolidated physical shelter. This territory — “Al-Qaeda” (the base) — would also, according to al-Suri, be the front for a head-on military confrontation with the adversary. Al-Suri ruled out most of West Asia, Central Asia and Africa, as suitable for the establishment of the base that would be the focal point of a putative Islamic State. He singled out – and it is important to remember that he was writing before the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 — the ‘Levant and Iraq’ as possessing suitable features for an “open-front jihad”. Al-Suri also calculated that, sooner than later, the US and its allies would invade Syria, which would give the vanguards of the physical base there tremendous advantage in an asymmetric conflict. The final lesson that al-Suri drew was the need to structure the ‘resistance call’ in a de-centralised way that would mesh individual-terrorism jihad with the strategic goal of open-front/territorial jihad. He proposes an organisation with three concentric circles. The innermost circle (centred around an emir or a putative caliph) would be the leadership circle. This is necessarily organisationally-centralised and physically located in the same place (in case of IS, Raqqa in Syria). This circle lies inside a circle of “de-centralised units,” comprising jihadis who are directly trained and then spread across the world. Finally, there is the outer circle — the Daw’ah circle, in al-Suri’s jargon – which would be made up of individuals like the San Bernardino couple, or the Nice attacker. While individuals and units in the inner two circles are allowed to communicate with each other and within themselves, such is not the case for communication with the outer circle — where individuals and units operate autonomously and yet, in sync with the larger ‘organisational priorities’.Blinded by apparently nihilistic violence, it can often be tempting to dismiss IS as a group without any overarching strategic vision. Part of this denial is psychological: To accept that the group may indeed have a grand strategy, may feel like giving IS too much credit. And yet, the fact of the matter is that the writings of post-9/11 jihadi theorists reveal a remarkably sophisticated understanding of the means and ends of global jihad — IS (as 'Al-Qaeda 2.0') indeed has a strategy for its present and future.


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Just ask al-Suri.The author is a fellow at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi.

China, Central Asian states watch as US legitimizes Al Qaeda in SyriaBY CHRISTINA LIN on AUGUST 7, 2016 in ASIA TIMES NEWS & FEATURES, CENTRAL ASIA, CHINA, MIDDLE EASTAlthough a change in name of the terrorist group Jabbat al Nusra to Jabbat Fatah al Sham signifies nothing, Beltway pundits are pushing for arming and legitimizing various al-Qaeda groups under such nicknames to overthrow the Syrian government. Since 2015, Idlib and parts of Aleppo have become the base of anti-Chinese Turkistan Islamic Party and Central Asian jihadists and Nusra, which fights closely with them, is only seeking additional support from the US by the recent re-branding exercise.With Al Qaeda in Syria announcing its name change from Jabbat al Nusra to Jabbat Fatah al Sham and supposedly distancing itself from al-Qaeda, the excited US media, Beltway think tanks and State Department are now pushing full throttle to support this jihadi group to overthrow the Syrian government and establish an Islamic state under Shaira law.CNN immediately gave airtime to the “reformed” al-Qaeda branch, angering many Americans who still remember the 9/11 attacks.[1]Moreover, counter terrorism expert Thomas Joscelyn at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies clarified that Nusra emir Abu Mohammad Jolani did not publicly break his bay’ah, or oath of allegiance to al-Qaeda.[2] Rather, he played with words and merely said Nusra would no longer affiliate to “any external entity”, and given “al-Qaeda has a senior leadership cadre and a roster of members inside Syria, al-Qaeda is not an ‘external entity’” in the country.[3]Nonetheless, it seems Beltway pundits are already pushing for arming and legitimizing al-Qaeda


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groups under various nicknames, describing them as having “local prestige and goodwill” in Aleppo; proposing ways to protect them and finally bomb the Syrian army, and arguing “we need to be somewhat more willing to work with groups that are tainted by past association with the Nusra Front…We should give them anti-tank missiles — though not anti-aircraft missiles — and much more help in terms of ammunition, logistics assistance, and food, to help them build up their forces.”[4]However, these proposals did not clarify why this is actually in the interest of US national security or protecting Americans. As a former CIA operative in charge of instigating the Syrian “civil war” back in 2012 admitted, there were no moderate rebels but US armed them anyway.[5] Now, without a single exception, every armed group in Syria is committed to rule by Shaira law.If anything, the proposals would serve Saudi Arabia’s agenda to import its austere Wahhabism in the Arab Gulf to the Levant and Eastern Mediterranean, and empower radical Islamist groups in the Mideast to harm US national security as well as Eurasian stability.US/Saudi air campaign in Yemen has already devastated the country and empowered Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and Washington is again illegally bombing Libya to fight the jihadists it supported from its bombing five years ago.US/Saudi-backed Wahhabistan It is also mind-boggling why Washington boasts US is a global leader in counter-terrorism while simultaneously stating it has no problem supporting jihadi groups that violate human rights and commit war crimes: chop off children’s heads;[6] use chemical weapons on civilians;[7] oppress women; massacre Christians, Alawites, and other religious and ethnic minorities.Nonetheless, State Department spokesman Mark Toner said ‘one incident here or there” of beheading or chemical attacks will not stop Washington’s funding of jihadi groups.[8]As such, the US seems intent on further allying with the Saudis to fortify the Salafist statelet/Wahhabistan in Syria as described in the 2012 Defense Intelligence Agency report.[9] Indeed, another US/Saudi backed al-Qaeda affiliate Ahrar al Sham’s deputy leader, Ali Al Omar, singled out Afghanistan’s Taliban as a model for Syria, describing them as “the blessed movement” and Taliban’s dead leader Mullah Omar as “the happy emir.”[10]This plan can already be seen in Syria: in government-controlled-areas, women and religious minorities are still free,[11] while rebel jihadists-held areas look like Afghanistan under Taliban rule. If US and Saudi Arabia step up arming the re-branded Syrian al-Qaeda within the Jaish al Fatah (Army of Conquest) to take more territory, backed by a potential Clinton administration to overthrow the Syrian government and replace it with the Conquest army “opposition”, this would also further create a new tidal wave of Syrian refugees to destabilize Europe that is already reeling from the current crisis.

Syrian base for Chinese, Central Asian jihadistsMoreover, re-branding Al Nusra to procure additional US support will further empower the entire coalition of the Conquest Army, wherein Nusra (aka Jabbat Fatah al Sham) fights closely with the anti-Chinese Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) and other Central Asian jihadists.It was in April 2015 that the coalition of rebel forces led by al Nusra, TIP, Uzbek-led Imam Bukhari Jamaat (IBJ) and Katibat Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ) defeated the Syrian army at Jisr al-Shughur in northwestern Syria’s Idlib governorate.[12] Seen in videos, then TIP spokesman Abu Ridha al-Turkistani. led fighters to take over a building, and climbed a clock tower to plant a black-and-white al Nusra style flag on which “Turkistan Islamic Party” was written in Arabic.Thus since 2015, Idlib and parts of Aleppo have become the base of Chinese and Central Asian jihadists especially from Uzbekistan. Known as the ‘Aleppo Uzbeks’, several thousand fighters from KTJ and IBJ have also aligned with al Nusra.[13] Now these ‘Aleppo Uzbeks’ and TIP are again


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taking part in the current Aleppo offensive, and are considered by some US scholars as effective military assets given “suicide tactics by JN [Jabbat al Nusra], Jund al-Aqsa, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement [ETIM/TIP], and other extremist groups are a serious threat to Syrian army operations in the northwest…As a result, the regime has had to divert troops from operations to retake and hold Palmyra, Deir al-Zour, and Tabqa [from IS].” [14] This is of great concern to Central Asian states and China, especially since TIP has released videos showing its arsenal of US anti-tank TOW missiles, tanks and other armaments captured from the Syrian army. Given the intermingling of Free Syrian Army with Al Qaeda groups and the sharing of weapons, now Aleppo Uzbeks and TIP likely also have access to anti-aircraft missiles, since their Conquest army claimed responsibility for shooting down the Russian helicopter over Idlib.[15] The last time a group splintered from al-Qaeda, it became Islamic State, thus understandably China is growing increasingly alarmed. Recently, Beijing lauded Britain for listing TIP as a terrorist group, and hopes the US would do the same.[16] Washington has listed ETIM but not TIP, due to initial discrepancy over whether they are the same entity.However, given increasing Sino-US tension over the South China Sea and US intention “ to work with groups that are tainted by past association with the Nusra Front” such as TIP, IBJ and KTJ as assets for Syrian regime change, this remains to be seen.Dr. Christina Lin is a Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at SAIS-Johns Hopkins University where she specializes in China-Middle East/Mediterranean relations, and a research consultant for Jane’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Intelligence Centre at IHS Jane’s.

Yemen’s Houthi rebels used civilians as human shields, Saudi-led coalition bombed civilian sites, Islamic State and Al-Qaeda are strengthening and competing for recruits, says the latest UN report on the conflict in the country, Reuters reports.The 105-page report to the UN Security Council covering the past six months in Yemen was seen by the agency on Thursday. The data was collected remotely, the UN expert panel said in the report, as they couldn’t go to the country. "The panel has documented violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law committed by the Houthi-Saleh forces, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition and forces affiliated to the legitimate Government of Yemen," the document reportedly says. The UN report added that the rebel group could receive even more. When they seized the capital, Sanaa, last year, their forces became listed on the army roster and could get the state funding.It is reported that the Yemeni foreign reserves of the central bank had plunged from $4.6 billion in November 2014 to $1.3 billion in June 2016.RT contributor Catherine Shakdam, political analyst, writer and commentator for the Middle East, believes there are a lot of questions to be answered about the Saudis' role in the Yemeni conflict."I think that the Saudi are playing a very dangerous game. You have to understand what it is they want in the region to really understand why certain things are happening in Yemen. And why is Al-Qaeda or ISIS is making a return in southern Yemen where the Saudi have said to be in control? Aden is under Saudi occupation, de facto, there are Saudi troops in Aden. Why is Al-Qaeda returning? Are they in control?"Al-Qaeda and ISIS taking advantage Yemen isn’t only torn by fighting between the government and the Houthis: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) used the conflict to take control of territories in southern and eastern Yemen, the report added.Also, recently their ammunition and techniques have become better, according to the report. In particular, they allegedly have the new advanced improvised explosive device (IED) designs, and have more reliable electronic detonators than before.Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS) followed Al-Qaeda shortly thereafter, with the two terrorist


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organizations "undermining one another as they compete for recruits."The report added that in March and April this year IS received a large amount of funds in Yemen, “to attract recruits, finance operations, and purchase equipment,” but the experts didn’t specify the source of the cash flow.

The newly installed U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) chief, General Thomas Waldhauser, earlier this year in a statement to the Senate Arms Services Committee (SASC). It’s just that no one, almost certainly including Waldhauser himself, seemed to notice or recognize it for the criticism it was, including the people tasked with oversight of military operations and those in the media.Over these last years, the number of personnel, missions, dollars spent, and special ops training efforts as well as drone bases and other outposts on the continent have all multiplied. At the same time, incoming AFRICOM commanders have been publicly warning about the escalating perils and challenges from terror groups that menace the command’s area of operations. Almost no one, however -- neither those senators nor the media -- has raised pointed questions, no less demanded frank answers, about why such crises on the continent have so perfectly mirrored American military expansion.Over these last years, the number of personnel, missions, dollars spent, and special ops training efforts as well as drone bases and other outposts on the continent have all multiplied. At the same time, incoming AFRICOM commanders have been publicly warning about the escalating perils and challenges from terror groups that menace the command’s area of operations. Almost no one, however -- neither those senators nor the media -- has raised pointed questions, no less demanded frank answers, about why such crises on the continent have so perfectly mirrored American military expansion.Asked earlier this year about the difficulties he’d face if confirmed, Waldhauser was blunt: “A major challenge is effectively countering violent extremist organizations, especially the growth of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram in Nigeria, al-Shabaab in Somalia, and ISIL in Libya.” That should have been a déjà vu moment for some of those senators. Three years earlier, the man previously nominated to lead AFRICOM, General David Rodriguez, was asked the same question. His reply was suspiciously similar: “A major challenge is effectively countering violent extremist organizations, especially the growth of Mali as an al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb safe haven, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and al-Shabaab in Somalia.” All that had changed between 2013 and 2016, it seemed, was the addition of one more significant threat. That said, Waldhauser isn’t the only AFRICOM chief to point a finger at Rodriguez’s checkered record. Another American general cast an even darker shadow on the outgoing commander’s three-year run overseeing Washington’s shadow war in Africa:“AFRICOM’s priorities on the continent for the next several years will be... in East Africa to improve stability there. Most of that is built around the threat of al-Shabaab. And then, in the North and West Africa is really built around the challenges from Libya down to northern Mali and that region and that instability there creates many challenges... And then after that is the West Africa, really about the Boko Haram and the problem in Nigeria that is, unfortunately, crossing the boundary into Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. So those are the big challenges and then just the normal ones that continue to be a challenge are the Gulf of Guinea... as well as countering the Lord’s Resistance Army...”That critic was, in fact, General David Rodriguez himself in an AFRICOM promotional video released on multiple social media platforms last month. It was posted on the very day that his command also touted its “more than 30 major exercises and more than 1,000 military to military engagements” between 2013 and 2015. It was hardly a surprise, however, that these two posts and the obvious conclusion to be drawn from them -- just how little AFRICOM’S growing set of ambitious continent-wide activities mattered when it came to the spread of terror movements -- went unattended and uncommented upon. “Terrorism and violent extremism are major sources of instability in Africa,”


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Assistant Secretary Linda Thomas-Greenfield of the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May. “Terrorist organizations such as al-Shabaab, Boko Haram (which now calls itself the Islamic State in West Africa), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al-Murabitoun are conducting asymmetric campaigns that cause significant loss of innocent life and create potentially long-term humanitarian crises.”

7 Aug TVC NEWS Somali Islamist group al Shabaab on Saturday shelled residential areas in the town of Baidoa, west of the capital Mogadishu, hitting a hospital and likely causing casualties, the African Union (AU) peace keeping force AMISOM said in a Twitter post.The al Qaeda-allied group, which wants to topple Somalia’s Western-backed government and rule the country according to Islamic Sharia law, has been ramping up attacks on both civilian and military targets in recent months.

Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent asks Kashmiri muslims to follow Burhan Wani’s footstepsIt also gave tips on how to plan attacks. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) has released a message exhorting Kashmiri Muslims to follow Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani’s footsteps and carry out attacks using petrol bombs or “a dagger or knife to slit the throats of forces of Kufr”.Stating that “the jihad of Mujahid Burhan and his companions is the only true path”, it said the response of the “Kashmiri Muslim nation” must not remain confined to agitations of a few days. It also gave tips on how to plan attacks. Titled ‘A message to the Mujahid Nation of Kashmir”, it said, “The response of the Kashmiri Muslim nation to the martyrdom of Mujahid Burhan [May Allah accept him as Shaheed] must not remain confined to agitations of a few days.”Providing operational tips, it said, “Attack the forts of the enemies. Petrol bombs are one of the best ways to soften up the enemies and then attack them with knives and iron rods.”

Every year, Delhi Police review their list of most wanted terrorists. This year, they have included 10 most wanted terrorists in the tally. The names include those of alleged AQIS (Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent) chief Sanaul Haq alias Asim Umar and ISIS recruiter Mohammad Shafi Armar. The list has been released to all officers and posters will soon be put up across the city, said officials.The other suspects are Abu Sufian, Mohammad Umar alias Umar Hyderabadi, Mohammad Rehan, Mohammad Sarjeel, Sayeed Mohammad Arshiyan, Sabeel Ahmed, Mohammad Shahid Fiazal and Farahtullah Gohri. Highly placed sources told The Indian Express that police have shared the list with intelligence agencies,

Interactions between a Canada-based terrorism expert and jihadis fighting in Iraq and Syria have thrown up a hitherto unknown aspect of Indian fighters – many of them gravitate towards an al Qaeda affiliate and not the Islamic State, perceived as global jihad’s sexy beast. Amarnath Amarasingam, a fellow with George Washington University’s Programme on Extremism, has contacted close to 100 jihadis in the conflict zone since late 2014. Of those, he has interviewed nearly 40, and about half a dozen were from India. Amarasingam found almost all the Indians he interviewed had joined the Jabhat al-Nusra, which is affiliated to al Qaeda and fell out with IS.“IS is the sexy topic for most people who are watching this stuff. And anyone leaving their home country to go to Syria, people just assume they’re going to join IS. But a lot of people are drawn to Nusra because it’s al Qaeda in Syria, it’s carrying the torch of Osama bin Laden and carrying the torch of the original movement,” Amarasingam told Hindustan Times.Read | Jihad 2.0: How Islamic State has changed global terrorismThere is also the sense that Nusra offers the “purest form” of jihad as against IS, which is “a bit more


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theologically corrupted”.According to the latest estimates, nearly 50 Indians have gone to Syria and Iraq to fight with jihadi groups, including 21 cases that recently came to light in Kerala. At least six Indians have reportedly died. Another 25 were arrested while in Syria or on their way to the war-torn country.“There are definitely Indians who have left to go fight with the IS. There are also very likely women and families who have left to go live under the so-called caliphate,” Amarasingam said. “But it’s important to recognise that just as many or around the same number have left to go fight with a variety of different organisations that are active in Syria, such as Jabhat ul-Nusra, Jund al-Aqsa and a lot of these other smaller movements,” he pointed out.There are even those like one Indian who is “independent” and works with whatever group in the region can utilise his services at a particular juncture.

The terrorist attack that killed dozens of lawyers in the western Pakistani city of Quetta is a reminder that terrorists could be forced to evacuate one area but, given time, they will re-emerge from another to carry out a fresh campaign that could threaten the government where it is most vulnerable.Since being driven out of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas last year by 170,000 soldiers, the Pakistan Taliban has proven resilient and resourceful. Since then, its leaders and several thousand fighters relocated into eastern provinces of Afghanistan where neither the government nor the Afghan Taliban dominate. It formed a tactical alliance with splinter factions, including the regional chapter of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS). Together, they have established bases of operation along the eastern and southern Afghan border with Pakistan.

ISIS-Khorasan: All you need to know about the terrorist group behind Quetta's hospital attack ISIS-Khorasan has claimed responsibility for the terror attack in Pakistan's Quetta province, which killed at least 93 people. The ISIS-Khorasan has come forward to claim responsibility for the attack.

The Taliban faction, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, said it was behind both the hospital attack and the killing of Mr Kasi. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar [The Party of Freedom Fighters] split from the Pakistani Taliban two years ago.

fakk al-irtibat, or breaking tiesJabhat Fath Al Sham (“Conquest of the Levant Front”).

It was certainly part of a plan coordinated with al Qaeda's central leadership. Al Qaeda sanctioned the decision to form a new group in a message released. This was no break from al Qaeda, but rather the execution of a deliberate global strategy on behalf of the movement. The al Qaeda statement emphasized that "the brotherhood of Islam that is between us is stronger than all the finite, ever-changing organizational links."

Julani’s group will no longer be known as Jabhat al Nusrah (or Al Nusrah Front), but instead as Jabhat Fath Al Sham (“Conquest of the Levant Front”). The move is being spun in press reports around the globe as Al Nusrah’s official “break” or “split” from al Qaeda.

During an interview in Dec. 2015, Julani steadfastly refused to dissociate with al Qaeda. But he added a noteworthy observation. If “we remain with al Qaeda or not, we will never give up our principles,” Julani said. “We will continue to say that we want to empower sharia and will strive to do so. We will [continue with] our jihad and will not make truces or stop a battle with [our] aggressor” enemies. In other words, Al Nusrah’s ideology would remain unchanged no matter what.

Jabhat Fath Al Sham’s principles are the same as Al Nusrah’s. The first goal for the renamed


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organization is to “work toward establishing the religion of Allah, having His sharia (law) as legislation” and to “establish justice amongst all people,” Julani says. It will “strive toward unity with all groups” and “to unify the ranks of the Mujahideen and liberate the land of Al Sham from the rule of the tyrant [Bashar al Assad] and his allies.”

These have been al Qaeda’s goals since the war in Syria began.

Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) has come out with a new message titled “a message to Mujahid nation of Kashmir,” encouraging Kashmiris in India to emulate knife attacks similar to the ones carried out against the Israelis in the Palestine. “Your brothers in Falasteen” AQIS extols, referring to Palestine, “have written new chapters of jihad with decentralized knife attacks on Israelis, what stops you from using a dagger or knife to slit the throats of forces of Kufr?”

Regards Cees***

This article was originally published by the Combating Terrorism Center on 27 July 2016.The Islamic State will struggle to hold onto the governments it builds and the territory it captures outside of Syria and Iraq because it antagonizes local jihadist competitors and powerful non-Muslim states. The Islamic State could soften its antagonism toward these entities for the sake of expediency, but then it would no longer be able to recruit followers as the uncompromising champion of the global jihadist ideal.Since it announced its caliphate in the summer of 2014, the Islamic State has taken on 17 affiliates or “governorates” that operate in 12 countries outside of Syria and Iraq. Many of the governorates were preexisting jihadist groups or factions that joined the Islamic State because they identified with its antagonism toward local jihadist competitors and its unyielding animosity toward non-Muslim nations. Yet this hostility subsequently limits the group’s ability to build governments or take territory beyond the confines of Syria and Iraq. In most countries where the Islamic State has planted its flag, its aggression prompted powerful local jihadist rivals[a] or international foes to check its advances. The Islamic State could soften its antagonism to one or the other for the sake of convenience, but this would compromise its recruiting ability and tarnish its reputation as the uncompromising champion of the global jihadist ideal.

According to its propaganda, the Islamic State accepts all oaths of allegiance from individuals and groups outside Syria and Iraq. Those groups, however, cannot form governorates until they document their oaths, unify with other jihadist groups in the territory, nominate a governor, select members for a regional consultative council, and devise a strategy for taking territory and implementing sharia. They then present “all this to the Islamic State leadership for approval,” with the caliph determining who will lead the governorate.[1] Groups in lands that are not designated governorates will be contacted by the Islamic State to “receive information and directives” from the caliph. They are asked to join the governorate closest to them.[2][b]As of July 2016, the Islamic State officially claimed 39 govern orates,[c] spanning 14 countries. The 17 governorates outside of Syria and Iraq operate in Libya (Barqah, Fazzan, Tarabulus); Yemen (`Adan Abyan, al-Bayda, Hadramawt, Sanaa, Shabwah, Liwa’ al-Akhdar); Saudi Arabia (al-Bahrayn, al-Hijaz, Najd); Algeria; Egypt (Sayna’); Afghanistan and Pakistan (Khurasan); Russia (Caucasus); and Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon (Gharb Ifriqiyyah). It also claims a presence in Somalia and “covert units” in Turkey, France, Tunisia, Lebanon, Bangladesh, and the Philippines.[d]The Islamic State’s governorates can be divided into three types: statelets, insurgencies, and terrorist organizations. For the purposes of this article, a statelet is a governorate that monopolizes violence in some territory, levies taxes, imposes law, and provides public services. It functions like a government


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even if it is not recognized as such by other nations. An insurgency is a governorate that often occupies territory but cannot always hold it; it is unable or unwilling to perform the functions of a statelet. A terrorist organization is a governorate that holds no territory and can only operate clandestinely.Outside Syria and Iraq, only the governorates in Libya and Afghanistan qualify as statelets, the latter barely. The Khurasan Governorate in Afghanistan controls a few villages in Nangarhar province, whereas the Tarabulus Governorate in Libya controls Sirte on the Mediterranean coast and some minor adjacent towns to the west and east. (As of this writing, the group’s hold on Sirte is rapidly weakening.) The Gharb Ifriqiyyah Governorate, aka Boko Haram, is an insurgency. The other governorates in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, and Russia are terrorist groups.Unsurprisingly, all of the governorates, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, are found in countries with recent or ongoing civil wars and revolutions. Weakened states have security vacuums that jihadist groups exploit for operating and gaining territory; obtaining materiel and moving personnel via illicit networks; and recruiting by way of deep political and social grievances. When expanding, the Islamic State has prioritized moving into territory that is hospitable for rapid growth.Were the Islamic State left unchecked to exploit these factors, it would seize territory quickly. The group is exceptionally good at attracting thousands of foreign fighters to its cause, fundraising locally, and preparing the battlefield through propaganda and subterfuge. It also has a large war chest that it can spend to augment the strength of its affiliates, which it has done in Libya and Afghanistan.

Losing Friends and Alienating Jihadis But many of the Islamic State’s governorates face stiff competition from other jihadist groups, which are often sympathetic to the Islamic State’s rival al-Qaìda. For example, the Islamic State in Libya lost its first base in Darna because it antagonized other jihadist groups that supported al-Qaìda.[3] The governorates in Yemen have struggled to remain relevant against the vastly more powerful al-Qaìda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), whose personnel have operated in Yemen for more than two decades, intermarrying and allying with local tribes.[4] When Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi signaled that jihadis in Yemen should subordinate themselves to him in a November 2014 audiotape, he needlessly alienated AQAP, which up until then had pointedly not picked sides in the dispute between its mother organization and the Islamic State because of sympathy in its ranks for the latter. Senior AQAP cleric Harith bin Ghazi al-Nadhari responded by calling the caliphate religiously illegitimate. “We did not want to talk about the current dispute and the sedition in Syria… however, our brothers in the Islamic State … surprised us with several steps, including their announcement of the caliphate [and] they announced the expansion of the caliphate in a number of countries which they have no governance, and considered them to be provinces that belonged to them,” he stated.[5]In Algeria, al-Qaìda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) blunted the Islamic State’s recruitment drive by denouncing it and carrying out high-profile attacks there.[6] The Taliban, which the Islamic State lambasted as a nationalist enterprise,[7] has confined the Khurasan Governorate to a few villages in Afghanistan.Competition with other jihadist groups is nearly unavoidable for the Islamic State. As Brynjar Lia observed in 2010, the Islamic State cares more about “doctrinal righteousness” than it does about building a popular front in the Muslim world, which has been the primary strategy of al-Qaìda. Whereas al-Qaìda is willing to overlook doctrinal differences for the sake of alliance-building, the Islamic State is less so.[8] And because the group styles itself an empire, it demands an oath of allegiance from all armed groups wherever it declares its writ. Groups that fail to comply risk being branded apostates, traitors not only to the religion but also to the state and meriting death. As might be expected, jihadis who refuse to join the Islamic State dislike being called apostates, which makes it even harder for the Islamic State to build alliances.


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Refusenik jihadist groups also resent the Islamic State because it woos their soldiers, which fosters factionalism and infighting. Several of the Islamic State’s governorates were formed by splinters of preexisting groups. In 2014, Hafiz Saeed Khan and five other leaders in the Pakistani Taliban left the group and formed the Khurasan Governorate.[9] Many of the Islamic State’s recruits in Yemen have come from AQAP.[10] The Islamic State’s Caucasus Governorate in Russia is a splinter of al-Qaìda’s Caucasus Emirate.[11] The governor of the Caucasus Governorate, Abu Muhammad al-Qadari (aka Rustam Asildarov), previously commanded the Dagestan Governorate, a subset of al-Qaìda’s Caucasus Emirate.[e] The Algeria Governorate was first formed by an AQIM splinter group calling itself Army of the Caliphate, which pledged allegiance in September 2014.[12] Three more AQIM militants[13] and two unknown terrorists[14] followed suit over the next few months.

BandwagoningFactions of refusenik jihadist groups supported the Islamic State for a variety of reasons. Some wanted more power or wealth. The founders of the Khurasan Governorate joined the Islamic State because the Taliban had passed them over for leadership roles or censored them for graft.[15] Others were excited by the reestablishment of the caliphate. A senior religious leader in AQAP praised al-Baghdadi for declaring the caliphate over the objections of his superiors.[16]Jihadist groups that join the Islamic State are not only attracted to its uncompromising policies on ideological grounds. They also find these policies useful for distinguishing themselves from jihadist competitors, which can give them an edge in fundraising and recruitment. When the Islamic State’s leadership broke with al-Qaìda, it castigated its former commanders for not declaring all Shià infidels and not waging jihad on every Muslim government in the Middle East and North Africa.[17] The Islamic State’s governorates in Yemen echoed this hardline message to lure soldiers and leaders away from AQAP because they believed the Islamic State was more aggressive in fighting the war against the Shià Houthis[18] and AQAP was not doing enough to kill Shià civilians.[19] In Afghanistan, the Khurasan Governorate’s hardline stance lured some Taliban soldiers and commanders when the rank and file were unhappy that its leaders were negotiating for peace with the government in Kabul.[20][f]Although the Islamic State and al-Qaìda are equally committed to attacking non-Muslim states, the Islamic State has done more recently to make good on its threats. It was the Islamic State, not al-Qaìda, that brought down a Russian passenger airliner in response to Russia’s escalation in Syria. The Islamic State, not al-Qaìda, has inspired or directed dozens of lethal attacks in the West recently.The Islamic State is not ideologically required to war with all nations at once. Earlier in its history, it focused on state-building in Iraq and sponsored few external plots against non-Muslim states, deferring to al-Qaìda Central for that task. The Islamic State has also acknowledged that it can sign truces with “infidel” states.[g] But as exemplified by its targets since its caliphate was declared two years ago, the Islamic State has determined that global jihad is important for alleviating pressure on its government in Syria and Iraq and for increasing recruiting.The Islamic State’s war on the world from its base in Syria and Iraq has invited reprisals against its affiliates. The United States has bombed the Islamic State’s affiliates in Libya and Afghanistan several times. France increased its troops in the Lake Chad region to support the fight against Boko Haram soon after the group joined the Islamic State.[21] The reprisals limit the governorates’ ability to seize and hold territory, a chief priority of the Islamic State.Obviously, militant Sunni groups that join the Islamic State have determined that the benefits of joining outweigh the costs. And they are not necessarily wrong. If adopting the Islamic State’s hardline stance allows groups to attract enough personnel and resources to defy their many enemies and achieve their objective of state building, then the downsides will have been worth it. The Islamic


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State’s resounding past success in Syria and Iraq and its modest success in Libya demonstrate the rationality of the approach and enhance its attractiveness. But the accelerating collapse of those same statelets at the hands of their many enemies highlights the costs and limits of warring with the world as a political strategy.ConclusionWithout allies, the Islamic State will find it difficult to hold onto the governments it builds and the territory it captures. When the going got tough for al-Qaìda, it could rely on friends like the Taliban to protect it, thanks to its decades of jihadist diplomacy and coalition-building. The Islamic State will have no one to turn to when its caliphate collapses unless it mends its ways.The Islamic State is unlikely to do so. The organization would have to stop demanding that other groups recognize it as the caliphate, which would undermine the Islamic State’s claim to the office and dull its edge in recruitment. Instead, the Islamic State will likely double down on its hardline stance, gambling that it can attract followers faster than its enemies can kill, capture, or dissuade them. Although there probably will not be enough recruits to compensate for alienating potential allies, there will still be enough to wage a global terror campaign to remain relevant as the baddest jihadis in town. At least until someone worse comes along.

Notesa As Brynjar Lia has argued, doctrinaire jihadist groups have trouble building alliances because they make enemies on all sides. As a consequence, they are unable to build the popular fronts necessary to achieve their political objectives. Brynjar Lia, “Jihadi Strategists and Doctrinarians,” in Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman (eds.) Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions within al-Qa’ida and its Periphery (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2010), p. 130. Although the author does not agree that a popular front is necessary for jihadis to achieve their goals, failing to prioritize enemies is certainly detrimental to any state-building enterprise.b Each governorate has its own governor (wali). If the governorate is the only one in a region, it reports directly to the Islamic State’s leaders in Syria and Iraq. If it is one of several in a region, it may answer to an emir, as they have in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen.c “Officially claimed” means they were mentioned in the Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine or in its official Arabic attack reports. In July, the Islamic State issued a video with an organizational chart of the caliphate that listed 35 governorates. Missing were the governorates of Idlib (“The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men,” Dabiq, issue 10, p. 54), Sahil (Islamic State attack announcement, May 23, 2016, https://justpaste.it/16-8-1437), Junub Baghdad (“Islamic State Operations,” Dabiq, issue 14, p. 24), and al-Bahrayn (“’Da’esh Wilayat al-Bahrain’ yatabanna hujoom al-Husseiniyya al-Haydariyya sharq al-Sa’udiyya,” Mir’a al-Bahrain, October 17, 2015). The chart gives the name Liwa’ al-Akhdar as a governorate in Yemen but does not mention Lahij governorate, which is sometimes mentioned by Islamic State supporters (@ASI_FI, Twitter, March 23, 2015).d On the anniversary of the June 29th announcement of the caliphate, the Islamic State issued an infographic on Twitter, “Two Years Since Announcing the Caliphate,” detailing the organization’s reach.e Al-Qaìda and the Islamic State both use the term governorate to designate subdivisions of their states. For al-Qaìda, governorates are part of emirates or individual states. For the Islamic State, there are no individual states; all are provinces of the caliphate.f The contrast also benefits the “moderate” jihadist groups because it helps them to present themselves to the public as the reasonable alternative to the zealots. Thus, al-Qaìda’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has decried the Islamic State’s tactical and legal excesses to position his group as the moderate jihadist alternative, and al-Qaìda affiliates in Syria and Yemen have repeatedly drawn contrasts between their behavior and that of the Islamic State. At least in Syria, the strategy has paid off; many in the


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mainstream opposition to President Assad view al-Qa`ida’s affiliate al-Nusra as a respectable member.g The Islamic State believes it has more latitude to sign truces with non-Muslim states than Muslim states. “The Rafidah: From Ibn Saba’ to the Dajjal,” Dabiq, issue 13, p. 43.Citations1 “Wilayat Khurasan and the Bay’at from Qawqaz,” Dabiq, issue 7, p. 35.2 The Islamic State, “Remaining and Expanding,” Dabiq, issue 5, p. 24.3 Rami Musa, “Al-Qaida-linked militants attack IS affiliate in Libya,” Associated Press, June 10, 2015.4 Rene Slama, ”Saudis turn a blind eye as Qaeda gains ground in Yemen,” Yahoo News, August 24, 2015; Asa Fitch and Saleh al Batati, “ISIS Fails to Gain Much Traction in Yemen,” Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2016; Katherine Zimmerman, “Exploring ISIS in Yemen,” AEI Critical Threats, July 24, 2015.5 Paul Cruickshank, “Al Qaeda in Yemen rebukes ISIS,” CNN, November 21, 2014.6 Nathaniel Barr, “If at First You Don’t Succeed, Try Deception: The Islamic State’s Expansion Efforts in Algeria,” The Jamestown Foundation, November 13, 2015.7 “A Fatwa for Khurasan,” Dabiq, issue 10.8 Lia.9 Islamuddin Sajid, “Hafiz Saeed Khan: The former Taliban warlord taking Isis to India and Pakistan,” International Business Times, January 19, 2015; Bill Roggio and Thomas Joscelyn, “Discord dissolves Pakistani Taliban coalition,“ Long War Journal, October 18, 2014.10 Shuaib Almosawa, Kareem Fahim, and Eric Schmitt, “Islamic State Gains Strength in Yemen, Challenging Al Qaeda,” New York Times, December 14, 2015.11 Thomas Joscelyn, “New leader of Islamic Caucasus Emirate killed by Russian forces,” Long War Journal, August 11, 2015.12 “Algeria’s al-Qaeda defectors join IS group,” Al Jazeera, September 14, 2014.13 Aaron Y. Zelin, “New statement from al-Qa’idah in the Islamic Maghrib: “About the Rumor of the Allegiance of Katibat al-Ansar to the ‘State Organization’,” Jihadology, September 5, 2015; Aaron Y. Zelin, “New audio message from Katibat al-Ansar: “Statement from the Mujahidin: Bay’ah to the Caliph of the Muslims Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Joining The Islamic State’s Wilayat al-Jaza’ir,” Jihadology, September 5, 2015; “AQIM Division Pledges Allegiance to IS Leader Baghdadi in Video,” SITE Intelligence Group, September 22, 2015.14 “IS Releases Pledge to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi from “Skikda Battalion” in Algeria,” SITE Intelligence Group, May 9, 2015; Aaron Y. Zelin, “New audio message from Sarayyah al-Ghuraba’: “Bay’ah of the Mujahidin in the City of Qusantinah (Constantine) To the Caliph of the Muslims Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Joining The Islamic State’s Wilayat al-Jaza’ir,” Jihadology, July 25, 2015.15 Hekmatullah Azamy and James Weir, “Islamic State and Jihadi Realignments in Khorasan,” Diplomat, May 8, 2015.16 “Gulf of Aden Security Review – June 30, 2014,” AEI Critical Threats, June 30, 2014.17 Thomas Joscelyn, “ISIS spokesman blames Zawahiri for infighting in Syria,” Long War Journal, May 12, 2014; “The Rafidah: From Ibn Saba’ to the Dajjal,” Dabiq, issue 13, pp. 32-45.18 Almosawa, Fahim, and Schmitt.19 Hakim Al Masmari and Asa Fitch, “Yemen Division of Islamic State Claims Suicide Bomb Attacks That Killed Scores,” Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2015.20 Muhammad Akbar Notezai, “What Next for the Afghanistan Peace Talks?” Diplomat, August 5, 2015.21 “France to boost regional forces battling Boko Haram,” Agence France-Presse, March 12, 2015.


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About the AuthorWilliam McCants directs the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at The Brookings Institution and is the author of The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State.


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