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ALARApproach and Landing Accident
Data Overview (1980–1997)
Applicable to: PilotsPrior Knowledge: Have a valid licenseRegion: EveryoneCountry: AnyLanguage: English
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This presentation, which was included in the original FSF ALAR Tool Kit released in 2000, was reviewed in 2009, and its contents remain valid. The statistical data in this presentation are from the original ALAR study. The ALAR study was updated in 2009, and the associated statistical data are available in the presentation titled “Approach and Landing Accident Data Overview (1995–2007).”
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Data Analyses • Study 1: High-level analyses of 287 fatal accidents
(1980–1996)
• Study 2: In-depth study of 76 accidents and serious incidents (1984–1997)
• Study 3: Line observations of 3,300 flights
• High correlation with other studies
All recommendations are supported by data.
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Conclusions
• Standard operating procedures• Missed approaches• Unstabilized approaches• Communication• Environment• Radio altimeter• Safety data monitoring• Information sharing
Approach-and-Landing Fatal Accident Rates by Region
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
0 0.13 0.160.43
0.88
1.64 1.65
2.43
Region
Acci
dent
s per
mill
ion
depa
rtur
es
Western-built Jets,* 1980–1996
* With maximum takeoff weights above 12,500 pounds/5,700 kilograms. JAA = Joint Aviation Authorities
Australasia NorthAmerica
Europe(JAA)
World Europe(non-JAA)
South/CentralAmerica
AfricaAsia
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Case Study Sample of 76 Accidents and Serious Incidents
• Period: 1984–1997
• Major, Regional, Air Taxi, Corporate Ops
• Passenger, Freight and Positioning Flights
• Fixed-wing Jet and Turboprop Aircraft
• Worldwide
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Most Common Types of Approach-and-Landing Accidents
• CFIT
• Loss of control
• Landing overrun
• Runway excursion
• Unstabilized approach
These comprised 76 percent of the sample.
Causal Factors in Approach-and-Landing Accidents and Serious Incidents
Series10
102030405060708090
100
Occ
urre
nces
(per
cent
)
Interactionwith
Automation
Disorientation/Visual
Illusion
Lack of Training/Experience/Qualification
High/Fast onApproach
(continued)ALAR Develop: EAQ RO Feb. 18, 2015 8
Series10
102030405060708090
100
ProceduralViolations
“Press-on-itis”
Occ
urre
nces
(per
cent
)
Low/Slow on Approach
ATC: IncorrectAdvice/Service/
Instruction
ATC = Air traffic control
Causal Factors in Approach-and-Landing Accidents and Serious Incidents (continued, #2)
(continued)ALAR Develop: EAQ RO Feb. 18, 2015 9
Series10
102030405060708090
100
Lack of Position
Awareness
Inadequate CRM
ProceduralErrors
Inadequate Judgment/Airmanship
Occ
urre
nces
(per
cent
)
Flight Handling
CRM = Crew resource management
Causal Factors in Approach-and-Landing Accidents and Serious Incidents (continued, #3)
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Series10
102030405060708090
100
Inadequate RegulatoryOversight
Lack of Safety
Equipment
InadequateRegulation
Occ
urre
nces
(per
cent
)
Runway Condition
InadequateGround
Aids
Circumstantial Factors in Approach-and-Landing Accidents and Serious Incidents
(continued)ALAR Develop: EAQ RO Feb. 18, 2015 11
CRM = Crew resource management
Circumstantial Factors in Approach-and-Landing Accidents and Serious Incidents (continued, #2)
Inadequate training
Management failure
Inadequate procedures
Inadequate CRM
Poor visibility0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Occ
urre
cnce
s (pe
rcen
t)
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Go-around Initiated When WarrantedO
ccur
renc
es (p
erce
nt)
Yes No0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
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Pilot Flying in Approach-and-Landing Accidents and Serious Incidents
CAPT FO Single Pilot Unknown0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Chart Title
Occ
urre
nces
(per
cent
)
CAPT = CaptainFO = First officer
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Summary of FSF ALAR Task Force Findings
• Air Traffic Control– Training/procedures/communication during
abnormal conditions
– Demanding/inappropriate clearances
• Airport– Inadequate ground aids
– Rescue procedure/communication deficiencies
(continued)
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Summary of FSF ALAR Task Force Findings (continued, #2)
• Inadequate situational awareness– Aircraft position, terrain, energy, automation
• Procedural errors and violations
• Inadequate tactical decision making – Judgment/airmanship– “Press-on-itis”/unstabilized approaches/no go-around
• Poor monitoring/cross-check
• Aircraft handling difficulties(continued)
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Summary of FSF ALAR Task Force Findings (continued, #3)
• Flight operations management
– Inadequate safety culture
– Inadequate planning and procedures
– Inadequate standard operating procedures (SOPs)
– Inadequate crew training
– Nonfitment of safety equipment
• Environment– Poor visibility, adverse weather,
runway contamination, visual illusions(continued)
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Summary of FSF ALAR Task Force Findings (continued, #4)
• Regulatory authorities– Inadequate regulation
– Audit/surveillance oversights
• Accident/incident investigation – Noncompliance with Annex 13*
– Poorest safety data in highest ALA rate regions
– Absence of flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR)
* International Civil Aviation Organization Annex 13, Aircraft Accident Investigation
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Interesting Facts• The approach-and-landing accident (ALA) rate for freight,
ferry and positioning flights is eight times higher than the ALA rate for passenger flights.
• The accident risk is five times greater for commercial aircraft flying a nonprecision approach than for those flying a precision approach.
• The approach and landing (from the outer marker to landing) typically comprise 4 percent of the flight time, yet account for 45 percent of the hull losses.